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
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**OFFICIAL DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS  
RELATING TO THE OUTBREAK OF  
THE EUROPEAN WAR**



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# OFFICIAL DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE EUROPEAN WAR

WITH PHOTOGRAPHIC REPRODUCTIONS OF OFFICIAL  
EDITIONS OF THE DOCUMENTS (BLUE, WHITE,  
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THE GOVERNMENTS OF AUSTRIA-  
HUNGARY, BELGIUM, FRANCE,  
GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN,  
RUSSIA AND SERBIA

*INTRODUCTION, DAILY SUMMARIES, CROSS-REFERENCES,  
AND FOOTNOTES*

BY

EDMUND VON MACH, A.B., A.M., PH.D. (HARVARD)

New York

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1916

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## INTRODUCTION

IN constitutionally governed countries it is customary for the Executive at important times to lay before the Representatives of the people "collected documents" containing the information on which the Government has shaped its foreign policy.

In Great Britain these documents are often printed on large sheets of white paper, loosely bound, called "White Papers." If the documents are very important, they are later reprinted in pamphlet form, and are then called by the color of their cover, "Blue Books."

At the outbreak of the World War in 1914 several Governments besides that of Great Britain issued pamphlets of collected documents, and these have become known, by the color of their respective bindings, as the German "White Book," the French "Yellow Book," the Russian "Orange Book," and so on.

Following the previous customs of their respective countries the several Governments issued more or less exhaustive collections, and in each case were primarily guided by the desire to justify themselves before their own people.

In America the British Blue Book won the greatest favor, not only because it became known first but also because of its inherent worth. Its despatches are well written, and sufficiently numerous to tell a consecutive story. The book is well printed, provided with indexes and cross references, and represents the most scholarly work done by any of the European Governments.

The German White Book, on the other hand, contains few despatches, and these only as illustrations of points made in an exhaustive argument. Such a presentation can be convincing only if one has confidence in the honesty of the author. There can be no doubt that as a source book for study the British Parliamentary Papers are superior to the German Papers, but even the British Papers are not, as many people have wished to believe, complete and do not, therefore, offer the final authority on which scholars can rely. This has been conceded and actually emphasized by so staunch a friend of the Allies as the late Charles Francis Adams. Writing in the Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, January, 1915, Mr. Adams said:—

"We hear a great deal from those interested in original research of public archives and access thereto, and of dates arbitrarily fixed by the various Foreign Offices at which those archives have been, or are to be, laid open to the investigator. It is, however, a bit confounding in this connection to learn, as we now



are learning, that, so far at least as the Foreign Office of Great Britain is concerned, the papers there to be found are at times of somewhat secondary importance. A knowledge of the true inwardness of any given situation of a certain sort must be looked for elsewhere. More even than that, the papers on file in the Foreign Office are not unseldom even illusory. The statement is unquestionably startling; and how, it will be asked, did such a condition of affairs come about? The explanation is curious — English! For at least two centuries now — indeed ever since the British Foreign Office took its present form — a usage as to correspondence has prevailed in connection with it which has now to be reckoned with, a usage in no wise generally understood. As Parliament, far back in the eighteenth century — during in fact the Walpole epoch — gradually assumed the large state functions it has since developed, it became more and more a practice to call on those constituting the Ministry for papers relating to events connected with foreign affairs, especially correspondence. The modern Blue Book was thus gradually evolved. As the practice grew, its inconveniences made themselves felt. Both the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and those with whom he was in correspondence wrote under an ever increasing sense of restraint. As the British diplomatic service was constituted this, not unnaturally, resulted in two forms of correspondence and sets of records — first the usual official exchanges, including instructions and despatches subject to parliamentary call through the Blue Book. Meanwhile, on the other hand, a private interchange of letters, frequently familiar in tone as between old friends, or perhaps relatives, would be going on between the representatives at certain of the foreign courts and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. . . . It was, moreover, in times of exigency that recourse was naturally had to this form of communication. . . . The formal despatches, constituting the great mass of the Foreign Office correspondence — 95 per cent of it, perhaps — were regularly filed in the official archives; and there they now are. The private communications, however, coming from the important embassies and relating generally to more or less critical situations, were considered as belonging to the First Secretary for the time being. . . . Such were the British usage and understanding. Such are they now.”

This quotation establishes the presumption that also in the present British Blue Book only a part of the Correspondence that was exchanged between the British Foreign Office and the British Ambassadors and Ministers abroad has been published. For none of the other books has completeness been claimed.

The question, therefore, arises whether the study of any one of these books or of all of them together can enable the student to arrive at the truth. The editor believes that this question should be answered in the affirmative.

If six or more interested spectators describe one event, no two descriptions may agree. By a judicious comparison of all, however, an impartial observer may come very near to understanding the truth. By noting, moreover, not only what each man says but also what he refrains from saying, it is easy to understand the attitude of each toward the event described, and thus to check his credibility.

A successful study from this point of view necessitates an intimate familiarity with the documents published by all the European Governments, and to attain it the documents must be studied in their relation to one another. This is, however, very difficult unless the system of cross references contained in the British Blue Book is extended to cover all the books. The Macmillan edition is the

first to do this, and to enable the student to turn at once from one book to another and to check the probable accuracy of a Russian presentation, for instance, by comparing it with the British or German version of the same incident.

The several versions are often so different that it becomes necessary to adduce proof for the statement that they have reference to the same event. Such proofs are given in the footnotes.

A great amount of additional information which the editor had gathered in the course of his studies and which he thought might be helpful to other students is also given in the footnotes. It is, of course, not intended to be exhaustive.

There is one other point in which the Macmillan edition differs from the official British publication of *The Collected Diplomatic Documents*. The latter prints one book after another, complete, beginning with the British Blue Book. This edition, on the other hand, prints the despatches according to dates, and within the dates according to the alphabetical order of the countries which sent or received them. This enables the student to see at a glance the state of the diplomatic activities in the various European capitals on any one day. There are several reasons why this is desirable, but the bare mention of one suffices.

The Serbian reply to Austria-Hungary was given on the evening of July 25th. It did not become known in the European Chancelleries until the afternoon of July 26th, as is stated both in the French Yellow Book and in the Russian Orange Book. Whether the delay was due to Serbian negligence or to Austro-Hungarian interference is not known. As a matter of fact, however, practically all the messages of July 26th, in which the reply is discussed, were based on hearsay and not on a knowledge of the wording of the reply. In the British arrangement of the despatches this and similar facts disappear. In the present arrangement they become immediately apparent.

The English translations of the foreign books in the official British version are excellent, and have been followed in this edition throughout. Good translations cannot always be literal translations, and while the editor believes that occasional errors have crept into the Official English version there is no need of a general revision. Serious students, moreover, will prefer to check the accuracy of any given passage of importance themselves by consulting the original. Nor will they be satisfied with reprints in which the possibility of errors cannot be avoided. For this reason photographic reproductions of official copies of the books have been added as an appendix to this edition.<sup>1</sup>

This appendix has relieved the editor of a double responsibility, first of vouching for the accuracy of the translation, and secondly of discussing every inaccuracy he discovered however slight it might have been. He has, therefore, drawn attention to mistranslations

<sup>1</sup> The Editor was unable to obtain an official Serbian Blue Book, and has substituted an excellent French edition.

only when they appeared to him to have a possible bearing on disputed points. One instance will illustrate his meaning. In No. 39 of the Austro-Hungarian Red Book Count Berchtold instructs the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London to explain to Sir Edward Grey in detail the *dossier* "which has been sent to you by mail" ("*das Ihnen auf dem Postwege übermittelte Dossier*"). This is rendered in the official English version "which is being sent to you by mail." Since the question has arisen whether Sir Edward Grey received the *dossier* before Great Britain declared war on Germany, the change of the past tense in this despatch to the present tense may be important.

There are many more points in which this edition differs from others. To students they will be self-explanatory, because they are the result, in every case, of the editor's wish to prepare a serviceable source book, not for partisans but for scholars and intelligent readers. The editor has been content with doing the hard and slow work of collating the despatches and bringing order out of chaos. He has tried to dispel the confusion due to redundancy and at times perhaps to wilful misrepresentation. He has cracked the nut, as it were, that the kernel of truth might lie revealed.

What this truth is, or what it seems to him to be, he may discuss at some future time. All he wished to do in this book was to make the initial studies for others less arduous and thus to stimulate them to search for the truth themselves. His greatest reward, therefore, will be, if scholars agree that he has succeeded in keeping prejudice out of the book, being fair to all, and preparing that most necessary of all helps to a scholar, a reliable source book.

In many doubtful cases the Editor has fortunately had the invaluable advice of Professor C. A. Beard of Columbia University, whose impartial fairness and keen scent for the truth are well known among scholars and to whom he wishes to express his sincere thanks.

EDMUND VON MACH.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.  
June, 1916.

# LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE CORRESPONDENCE, SHOWING THEIR OFFICIAL POSITIONS

## 1. GREAT BRITAIN.

<i>Lord High Chancellor</i> . . . . .	Viscount Haldane.
<i>Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</i> . . . . .	Sir Edward Grey.
<i>Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</i> .	Sir A. Nicolson.
<i>French Ambassador</i> . . . . .	M. Paul Cambon.
	M. de Fleuriau (Chargé d'Affaires).
<i>Russian Ambassador</i> . . . . .	Count Benckendorff.
	M. de Etter (Counsellor of Embassy).
<i>German Ambassador</i> . . . . .	Prince Lichnowsky.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i>	Count Mensdorff.
<i>Belgian Minister</i> . . . . .	Count de Lalaing.
<i>Serbian Minister</i> . . . . .	M. Boschkovitch.

## 2. FRANCE.

<i>President of the Republic</i> . . . .	M. Poincaré.
<i>President of the Council</i> . . . .	M. René Viviani.
<i>Ministers for Foreign Affairs</i> .	1. M. Jonnart.
	2. M. Stéphen Pichon.
	3. M. René Viviani.
	4. M. Bienvenu-Martin (Acting).
	5. M. Doumergue.
	6. M. Delcassé.
<i>Political Director</i> . . . . .	M. Berthelot.
<i>British Ambassador</i> . . . . .	Sir Francis Bertie.
<i>Russian Ambassador</i> . . . . .	M. Isvolsky.
	M. Sevastopoulo (Chargé d'Affaires).
<i>German Ambassador</i> . . . . .	Baron von Schoen.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i> .	Count Szécsen.
<i>Belgian Minister</i> . . . . .	Baron Guillaume.
<i>Serbian Minister</i> . . . . .	M. Vesnitch.

## 3. RUSSIA.

<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i> . .	M. Sazonof.
<i>Minister for War</i> . . . . .	M. Suchomlinof.
<i>British Ambassador</i> . . . . .	Sir George Buchanan.
<i>French Ambassador</i> . . . . .	M. Paléologue.
<i>German Ambassador</i> . . . . .	Count Pourtalès.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i> .	Count Szápáry.
	Count Czernin (Chargé d'Affaires).
<i>Serbian Minister</i> . . . . .	Dr. M. Spalaikovitch.

## 4. GERMANY.

<i>Imperial Chancellor</i>	Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg.
<i>Secretary of State</i>	Herr von Jagow.
<i>Under-Secretary of State</i>	Herr von Zimmermann.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	Sir Edward Goschen. Sir Horace Rumbold (Counsellor of Embassy).
<i>French Ambassador</i>	M. Jules Cambon. M. de Manneville (Chargé d'Affaires).
<i>Russian Ambassador</i>	M. Swerbeiev. M. Broniewsky (Chargé d'Affaires).
<i>American Ambassador</i>	Mr. Gerard.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i>	Count Szogyeny.
<i>Belgian Minister</i>	Baron Beyens.
<i>Serbian Chargé d'Affaires</i>	Dr. M. Yovanovitch.
<i>French Minister at Munich</i>	M. Allizé.
<i>French Consul-General at Frankfurt</i>	M. Ronssin.

## 5. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

<i>Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</i>	Count Berchtold.
<i>Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs</i>	Baron Macchio. Count Forgach.
<i>President of the Ministry of Hungary</i>	Count Tisza.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	Sir Maurice de Bunsen.
<i>French Ambassador</i>	M. Dumaine.
<i>Russian Ambassador</i>	M. Schebeko. Prince Koudacheff (Chargé d'Affaires).
<i>American Ambassador</i>	Mr. Penfield.
<i>German Ambassador</i>	Herr von Tschirsky.
<i>Italian Ambassador</i>	Duke d'Avarna.
<i>Belgian Minister</i>	Count Errembault de Dudzeele.
<i>Serbian Minister</i>	M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch.
<i>French Consul-General at Budapest</i>	M. d'Apchier-le-Maugin.
<i>Russian Consul-General at Fiume</i>	M. Salviati.
<i>Acting Russian Consul at Prague</i>	M. Kazansky.

## 6. TURKEY.

<i>British Chargé d'Affaires</i>	Mr. Beaumont.
<i>French Ambassador</i>	M. Bompard.
<i>Serbian Chargé d'Affaires</i>	M. M. Georgevitch.
<i>Austrian Consul-General</i>	Herr Jehlitschka.

## 7. BELGIUM.

<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i>	M. Davignon. Baron van der Elst (Secretary-General).
<i>Colonial Minister</i>	H. Renkin.
<i>British Minister</i>	Sir Francis Villiers.
<i>French Minister</i>	M. Klobukowski.
<i>American Minister</i>	Mr. Brand Whitlock.
<i>German Minister</i>	Herr von Below Saleske.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Minister</i>	Count Clary.
<i>Dutch Minister</i>	M. de Weede.



**8. SERBIA.**

<i>Prime Minister</i> . . . . .	M. Pashitch.
<i>Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs</i> .	Dr. Laza Patchou.
<i>British Minister</i> . . . . .	Mr. des Graz.
	Mr. Crackanthorpe (First Secretary).
<i>French Minister</i> . . . . .	M. Boppe.
<i>Russian Chargé d' Affaires</i> .	M. Strandtman.
<i>German Secretary of Legation</i> .	Herr von Storck.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Minister</i> .	Baron Giesl von Gieslingen.
<i>Belgian Minister</i> . . . . .	M. de Welle.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Consular Agent at Nish</i> . . . . .	Herr Hoflehner.

**9. ITALY.**

<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i> .	Marquis di San Giuliano.
<i>British Ambassador</i> . . . . .	Sir Rennell Rodd.
<i>French Ambassador</i> . . . . .	M. Barrère.
<i>German Ambassador</i> . . . . .	Herr von Flotow.
<i>Serbian Minister</i> . . . . .	M. Ljub Michailovitch.

**10. SPAIN.**

<i>Belgian Minister</i> . . . . .	Baron Grenier.
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**11. DENMARK.**

<i>French Minister</i> . . . . .	M. Bapst.
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**12. HOLLAND.**

<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i> .	M. Loudon.
<i>French Minister</i> . . . . .	M. Pellet.
<i>Belgian Minister</i> . . . . .	Baron Fallon.

**13. LUXEMBURG.**

<i>Minister of State and President of the Government</i> . . . . .	Dr. Eyschen.
<i>French Minister</i> . . . . .	M. Mollard.
<i>German Minister</i> . . . . .	Herr von Buch.

**14. NORWAY.**

<i>French Minister</i> . . . . .	M. Chevalley.
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**15. SWEDEN.**

<i>French Minister</i> . . . . .	M. Thiébaud.
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**16. SWITZERLAND.**

<i>French Consul-General at Basle</i>	M. Farges.
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## CALENDAR

Beginning with June 28, 1914, the day on which Archduke Francis-Ferdinand and his wife were murdered

Foreign Office at	JUNE 28, 1914		JUNE 29, 1914		JUNE 30, 1914		JULY 1, 1914		JULY 2, 1914	
	Sent to	Received from	Sent to	Received from	Sent to	Received from	Sent to	Received from	Sent to	Received from
	Ambassadors etc. at	Ambassadors etc. at	Ambassadors etc. at	Ambassadors etc. at	Ambassadors etc. at	Ambassadors etc. at	Ambassadors etc. at	Ambassadors etc. at	Ambassadors etc. at	Ambassadors etc. at
Vienna <sup>1</sup>				Belgrade 1		Belgrade 2		Vienna 3		
Brussels										
Paris		Vienna 7								Vienna 8
Berlin										
London										
Petrograd										
Belgrade				Vienna 1		Vienna 2, 5 Berlin 3, 4 Constantinople 6	London and Everywhere 8	London 7 Vienna 9		Paris 10

<sup>1</sup> The despatches have been arranged in this book alphabetically by countries: Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, Serbia. The order of the capitals here given follows this alphabetical arrangement of countries.



FOREIGN OFFICE AT	JULY 3, 1914			JULY 4, 1914			JULY 5, 1914	JULY 6, 1914			JULY 7, 1914			JULY 8, 1914	JULY 9, 1914		
	Sent to	Rec'd from	Ambassadors etc. at	Sent to	Rec'd from	Ambassadors etc. at		Sent to	Rec'd from	Ambassadors etc. at	Sent to	Rec'd from	Ambassadors etc. at		Sent to	Rec'd from	
Vienna						Paris 4	No Despatches			Nish 5				No Despatches			
Brussels																	
Paris						Berlin 9				Petrograd 10							
Berlin																	
London																	
Petrograd																	
Belgrade																	
			Vienna 11, 12			Paris 13 Petrograd 14					Vienna 15, 16					Vienna 17	London and Everywhere 18

FOREIGN OFFICE AT	JULY 10, 1914	JULY 11, 1914		JULY 12, 1914 JULY 13, 1914		JULY 14, 1914		JULY 15, 1914		JULY 16, 1914		JULY 17, 1914	
		Sent to Ambassadors etc. at	Rec'd from	No Despatches		Sent to Ambassadors etc. at	Rec'd from	Sent to Ambassadors etc. at	Rec'd from	Sent to Ambassadors etc. at	Rec'd from	Sent to Ambassadors etc. at	Rec'd from
Vienna	No Despatches			No Despatches									
Brussels													
Paris			Budapest 11						Vienna 12				
Berlin													
London													
Petrograd													
Belgrade							London and Everywhere 20, 21		Vienna 23, 24, 25		Berlin 26		London 27 Rome 28

Foreign Office at	JULY 18, 1914		JULY 19, 1914		JULY 20, 1914		JULY 21, 1914		JULY 22, 1914	
	Sent to	Received from	Sent to	Received from	Sent to	Received from	Sent to	Received from	Sent to	Received from
	Ambassadors etc. at		Ambassadors etc. at		Ambassadors etc. at		Ambassadors etc. at		Ambassadors etc. at	
Vienna							Belgrade 6	Belgrade 7 London etc. 8		
Brussels										
Paris			Vienna 13, 14				London etc. 16	Berlin 15	London etc. 17	Vienna 18 London 19
Berlin										
London					Berlin 1				Berlin 2	
Petrograd										
Belgrade		Petrograd 29	London and Everywhere 30			Vienna 31				

Position Origin at	July 22, 1914		July 24, 1914		July 26, 1914		July 28, 1914		July 27, 1914	
	Sent to	Received from	Sent to	Received from	Sent to	Received from	Sent to	Received from	Sent to	Received from
	Ambassadors etc. at		Ambassadors etc. at		Ambassadors etc. at		Ambassadors etc. at		Ambassadors etc. at	
Vienna	London 6	London 17 Petrograd 18	London 10 Paris 11, 12, 13 Petrograd 14, 15, 16	London etc. 19 Petrograd 21, 26, 27 to Under Secretary 20	Belgrade 22, 23, 24 Serbian Reply 25	London 28 Berlin, Lon- don, etc. 20	Petrograd 28	Petrograd 31 Berlin, London, etc. 24	Petrograd 31 Berlin 33	
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## **PART ONE**

**DESPATCHES SENT AND RECEIVED AT THE VARIOUS  
FOREIGN OFFICES; ARRANGED BY NAMES AND  
PLACES; WITH DIARIES, SUMMARIES OF DE-  
SPATCHES, AND FOOTNOTES**





# DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE WAR

Sunday, June 28, 1914

On this day Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were murdered in Serajevo.

## SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	—	—
Belgium	—	—
France	—	Vienna
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	—	—
Russia	—	—
Serbia	—	—

France :

*From Vienna*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 7<sup>1</sup>

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, June 28, 1914.*

News has just arrived at Vienna that the Hereditary Archduke of Austria and his wife have been to-day assassinated at Serajevo by a student belonging to Grahovo. Some moments before the attack to which they fell a victim, they had escaped the explosion of a bomb which wounded several officers of their suite.

The Emperor, who is now at Ischl, was immediately informed by telegraph.

DUMAINE.

Monday, June 29, 1914

## SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	—	Belgrade
Belgium	—	—
France	—	—
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	—	—
Russia	—	—
Serbia	—	Vienna

<sup>1</sup> For earlier numbers of French Yellow Book, see p. 531.

**Austria-Hungary :***From Belgrade*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 1

*Ritter von Storck, Secretary of Legation, to Count Berchtold.**Belgrade, June 29, 1914.*

UNDER the terrible shock of yesterday's catastrophe it is difficult for me to give any satisfactory judgment on the bloody drama of Serajevo with the necessary composure and judicial calm. I must ask you, therefore, to allow me for the moment to limit myself to putting on record certain facts.

Yesterday, the 15/28, the anniversary of the battle of the Amsel-feld, was celebrated with greater ceremony than usual, and there were celebrations in honour of the Servian patriot, Milos Obilic, who, in 1389 with two companions treacherously stabbed the victorious Murad.

Among all Servians, Obilic is regarded as the national hero. In place of the Turks, however, we are now looked on as the hereditary enemy, thanks to the propaganda which has been nourished under the aegis of the Royal Government and the agitation which has for many years been carried on in the press.

A repetition of the drama on the field of Kossovo seems, therefore, to have hovered before the minds of the three young criminals of Serajevo, Princip, Cabrinovic and the third person still unknown, who also threw a bomb. They also shot down an innocent woman, and may therefore think that they have surpassed their model.

For many years hatred against the Monarchy has been sown in Servia. The crop has sprung up and the harvest is murder.

The news arrived at about 5 o'clock; the Servian Government at about 10 o'clock caused the Obilic festivities to be officially stopped. They continued, however, unofficially for a considerable time after it was dark. The accounts of eye-witnesses say that people fell into one another's arms in delight, and remarks were heard, such as: "It serves them right, we have been expecting this for a long time," or "This is revenge for the annexation."

**Serbia :***From Vienna*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 1

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, June 16/29, 1914.*

THE Vienna Press asserts that the magisterial enquiry has already shown that the Serajevo outrage was prepared at Belgrade; further, that the whole conspiracy in its wider issues was organised at Bel-

grade among youths inspired with the Great Serbian idea, and that the Belgrade Press is exciting public opinion by publishing articles about the intolerable conditions prevailing in Bosnia. Press articles of this kind, according to the Vienna Press, are exercising a strong influence, as Serbian newspapers are being smuggled in large quantities into Bosnia.

**Tuesday, June 30, 1814**

### SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	—	Belgrade
Belgium	—	—
France	—	—
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	—	—
Russia	—	—
Serbia	—	Vienna, Berlin, Constantinople

*Austria-Hungary* enquires what measures the Serbian Government had taken "to follow up the clues to the crime which notoriously are partly to be found in Serbia."

*Serbia* remarks on the attempt of Austria-Hungary to "represent in the eyes of Europe" the Serajevo murder as "the act of a conspiracy engineered in Serbia." The murder "has not yet engaged the attention of the Serbian police."

#### **Austria-Hungary :**

*From Belgrade*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 2

*Ritter Von Storck, Secretary of Legation, to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, June 30, 1914.*

TO-DAY I sent an enquiry to Herre Gruic, General Secretary of the Foreign Office, to ask the obvious question what measures the Royal police had taken, or proposed to take, in order to follow up the clues to the crime which notoriously are partly to be found in Servia.

The answer was that the matter has not yet engaged the attention of the Servian police.

#### **Serbia :**

*From Vienna*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 2

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, June 17/30, 1914.*

THE tendency at Vienna to represent, in the eyes of Europe, the outrage committed upon the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince as

the act of a conspiracy engineered in Serbia is becoming more and more apparent. The idea is to use this as a political weapon against us. The greatest attention ought, therefore, to be paid to the tone adopted by our press in its articles on the Serajevo outrage.

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 5

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Vienna, June 17/30, 1914.*

As Count Berchtold was not able to receive me when I called, I spoke to the Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs concerning the Serajevo outrage. In the course of our conversation I adopted the following line of argument:—

“The Royal Serbian Government condemn most energetically the Serajevo outrage and on their part will certainly most loyally do everything to prove that they will not tolerate within their territory the fostering of any agitation or illegal proceedings calculated to disturb our already delicate relations with Austria-Hungary. I am of opinion that the Government are prepared also to submit to trial any persons implicated in the plot, in the event of its being proved that there are any in Serbia. The Royal Serbian Government, notwithstanding all the obstacles hitherto placed in their way by Austro-Hungarian diplomacy (creation of an independent Albania, opposition to Serbian access to the Adriatic, demand for revision of the Treaty of Bucharest, the September ultimatum, etc.) remained loyal in their desire to establish a sound basis for our good neighbourly relations. You know that in this direction something has been done and achieved. Serbia intends to continue to work for this object, convinced that it is practicable and ought to be continued. The Serajevo outrage ought not to and cannot stultify this work.”

Baron Macchio has taken note of the above and promised to communicate to Count Berchtold all that I said to him.

On the same day I communicated to the French and Russian Ambassadors the substance of this conversation.

I have, etc.

*From Berlin*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 3

*Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d’Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, June 17/30, 1914.*

THE Berlin Press, in publishing articles based on information from Vienna and Budapest, in which the Serajevo outrage is connected with Serbia, is misleading German public opinion.

## SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 4

*Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, June 17/30, 1914.*

THE hostility of public opinion in Germany towards us is growing, and is being fostered by false reports coming from Vienna and Budapest. Such reports are being diligently spread in spite of the contradictions issued by some newspapers and news agencies.

*From Constantinople*

## SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 6

*M. M. Georgevitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Constantinople, June 17/30, 1914.*

I HAD to-day a long conversation with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador here concerning the Serajevo outrage. I expressed the hope that this regrettable event — whatever is said about it in certain diplomatic circles — would not unfavourably influence the relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary which lately had shown considerable improvement.

He replied that such an eventuality was impossible, and ought not to be contemplated. He was also of opinion that Serbo-Austro-Hungarian relations had much improved lately. He added that the work in that direction ought to be persevered in. He informed me that from his latest conversations with Count Berchtold he understood that the latter was satisfied with the attitude adopted by the Serbian Government, and that he, on his part, sincerely desired friendly relations with Serbia.

I have, etc.

Wednesday, July 1, 1914

## SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	—	Uskub, Serbia
Belgium	—	—
France	—	—
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	—	—
Russia	—	—
Serbia	All Legations abroad	London, Vienna

*Austria-Hungary* is informed by her consul in Uskub, Serbia, of "the inhuman joy with which the murder of Serajevo was received in Serbia."

English newspapers discuss the crime as emanating from Serbian revolutionists.

**Austria-Hungary :***From Uskub, Serbia*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 3

*M. Jehlitschka, Consul-General, to Count Berchtold.**Uskub, July 1, 1914.*

ON the 15/28 June the Feast of St. Vitus (Corpus Christi Day), which on this occasion coincided with the 525th anniversary of the battle of the Amselfeld (1389), was for the first time officially celebrated as the "Festival of the Liberation" of the Servian nation.

For four months a special committee had worked at making this celebration an especially solemn and magnificent demonstration of Servian nationality.

The propaganda connected with this at the same time extended to Croatia, Dalmatia and Bosnia, but especially to Hungary; those who took part in it received free passes on the Servian State railways; food and lodging at low prices, maintenance by public bodies, etc., were promised.

The agitation was carried on with energy, and was with a definite end in view.

The visitors to the celebration at Prestina were brought in special trains.

The various speeches ran riot in historical reminiscences, which were connected with the scene of the celebration, and dealt under different aspects with the well-known theme of the union of all Servia and the "liberation of our brethren in bondage" beyond the Danube and the Save, even as far as Bosnia and Dalmatia.

When, during the course of the evening, the news of the horrible crime of which Serajevo had been the scene was circulated, the feeling which animated the fanatical crowd was, to judge by the numerous expressions of applause reported to me by authorities in whom I have absolute confidence, one that I can only characterise as inhuman.

In view of this attitude of the population, which was also displayed at Uskub, all attempts of the Servian press to divest Servia of the moral responsibility for a deed which was received by a representative gathering with such unvarnished satisfaction, collapse miserably.

**Serbia :***To All Serbian Legations Abroad*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 8

*M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs  
to all the Royal Serbian Legations abroad.**Belgrade, June 18/July 1, 1914.*

THE Austrian and Hungarian press are blaming Serbia more and more for the Serajevo outrage. Their aim is transparent, viz., to

destroy that high moral reputation<sup>1</sup> which Serbia now enjoys in Europe, and to take the fullest advantage politically against Serbia of the act of a young and ill-balanced fanatic. But, in Serbia itself, the Serajevo outrage has been most severely condemned in all circles of society, inasmuch as all, official as well as unofficial, immediately recognised that this outrage would be most prejudicial not only to our good neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary but also to our co-nationalists in that country, as recent occurrences have proved. At a moment when Serbia is doing everything in her power to improve her relations with the neighbouring Monarchy, it is absurd to think that Serbia could have directly or indirectly inspired acts of this kind. On the contrary, it was of the greatest interest to Serbia to prevent the perpetration of this outrage. Unfortunately this did not lie within Serbia's power, as both assassins are Austrian subjects. Hitherto Serbia has been careful to suppress anarchic elements, and after recent events she will redouble her vigilance, and in the event of such elements existing within her borders will take the severest measures against them. Moreover, Serbia will do everything in her power and use all the means at her disposal in order to restrain the feelings of ill-balanced people within her frontiers. But Serbia can on no account permit the Vienna and Hungarian press to mislead European public opinion, and lay the heavy responsibility for a crime committed by an Austrian subject at the door of the whole Serbian nation and on Serbia, who can only suffer harm from such acts and can derive no benefit whatever.

Please act in the sense of the above views, and use all available channels in order to put an end as soon as possible to the anti-Serbian campaign in the European press.

*From London*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 7

*M. M. S. Boschkovitch, Minister in London, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*London, June 18/July 1, 1914.*

BASING their information upon reports coming from Austrian sources, nearly all the English newspapers attribute the Serajevo outrage to the work of Serbian revolutionaries.

<sup>1</sup> For the reputation of Serbia see the Report on the Balkan Wars by an International Commission appointed by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and published by the Endowment, Washington, D. C., in the spring of 1914. The murderers of the late king and queen have not yet been brought to justice.



*From Vienna*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 9

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, June 18/July 1, 1914.*

THERE were demonstrations last night in front of the Legation. I may say that the police showed considerable energy. Order and peace were maintained. As soon as I obtain positive information that the Serbian flag has been burned,<sup>1</sup> I will lodge a complaint in the proper quarters. I will report to you the result. Hatred against Serbians and Serbia is being spread among the people, especially by the lower Catholic circles, the Vienna press, and military circles. Please do what is possible to prevent demonstrations taking place in Serbia, and to induce the Belgrade press to be as moderate as possible in tone. The tendency towards us here is still the same. It is expected that the decision as to the attitude to be adopted towards Serbia and the Serbians will be taken after the funeral.

Thursday, July 2, 1914

### SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	—	—
Belgium	—	—
France	—	Vienna
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	—	—
Russia	—	—
Serbia	—	Paris

*France* is informed of great excitement in Vienna, and is quoted as counselling composure in Serbia.

**France :**

*From Vienna*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 8

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 2, 1914.*

THE crime of Serajevo arouses the most acute resentment in Austrian military circles, and among all those who are not content to allow Servia to maintain in the Balkans the position which she has acquired.

<sup>1</sup> See July 3, Serbian Blue Book No. 11.

The investigation into the origin of the crime which it is desired to exact from the Government at Belgrade under conditions intolerable to their dignity would, in case of a refusal, furnish grounds of complaint which would admit of resort to military measures.

DUMAINE.

**Serbia :**

*From Paris*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 10

*Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Minister at Paris, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, June 19/July 2, 1914.*

THE French Government advise<sup>1</sup> us to maintain an attitude of the greatest possible calm and composure in official circles as well as in public opinion.

Friday, July 3, 1914

## SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	—	—
Belgium	—	—
France	—	—
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	—	—
Russia	—	—
Serbia	—	Vienna

*Austria-Hungary* complains officially of the tenor of the Serbian press, while *Serbia* complains of the Austro-Hungarian press and of a "flag" incident in Vienna which is not clearly described in the despatch.

**Serbia :**

*From Vienna*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 11

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Vienna, June 20/July 3, 1914.*

YESTERDAY being the day on which the remains of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife were brought from Serajevo to Vienna, I gave instructions that the national flag at my residence should be hoisted at half-mast as a sign of mourning.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 13, July 24.

Yesterday evening, on this account, protests were made by the concierge, the other tenants, the landlord's agent, and the landlord himself, who demanded the removal of the flag. Explanations proved of no avail, and the assistance of the police authorities was requested. The latter privately asked that the flag should be removed in order to avoid further disorders. The flag was not removed, and accordingly noisy demonstrations took place last night in front of the Legation. The conduct of the police was energetic, and nothing happened to the flag or to the building which might constitute an insult. At 2 A.M. the crowd dispersed. To-day's papers, more particularly the popular clerical papers, publish articles under the heading "Provocation by the Serbian Minister," in which the whole incident is falsely described.

The flag on the Legation building remained flying the whole time up to the conclusion of the service at the Court Chapel. As soon as this ceremony was concluded, the flag was removed. People from all over the quarter in which I live went to the Prefecture, the Municipality, and the State Council to demand the removal of our flag.

The crowd was harangued by Dr. Funder, director in chief of the Catholic *Reichspost*, Hermengild Wagner, and Leopold Mandl, all of whom are known as the chief instigators of the attacks in the Austrian and German press against Serbia and the Serbians.

I have, etc.

#### SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 12

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Vienna, June 20/July 3, 1914.*

IN the course of a conversation which I had with the Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office on the subject of the Serajevo outrage, Baron Macchio severely criticised the Belgrade press and the tone of its articles.<sup>1</sup> He argued that the Belgrade press was under no control and created *die Hetzereien gegen die Monarchie*. I told him that the press in Serbia was absolutely free, and that as a result private people as well as the Government very often suffered; there were, however, no means of proceeding against the press except by going to law. I told him that in the present instance the fault lay with the Austrian and Hungarian press which was controlled by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Was it not true that during the past two years the Austrian and Hungarian press had been attacking Serbia, in such a manner as to offend her most sensitive feelings? The anniversary of the unfortunate war with Bulgaria had taken place a few days ago. I had myself witnessed the great lack of respect with

<sup>1</sup> For quotations from the Serbian Press see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, under date of July 25, 1914. See also French Yellow Book No. 14, under date of July 20, 1914.

which the Vienna press had written about Serbia and the Serbian army during and after the war, as well as in many other matters. The press in Belgrade was much more moderate. For instance, in the present case, a terrible crime had been committed and telegrams were being sent from Vienna to the whole world accusing the entire Serbian nation and Serbia of being accomplices of the detestable Serajevo outrage. All the Austrian newspapers were writing in that strain. Was it possible to remain indifferent? Even if the criminal was a Serbian, the whole Serbian nation and the Kingdom of Serbia could not be held guilty, nor could they be accused in such a manner.

Baron Macchio replied, "Nobody accuses the Kingdom of Serbia nor its Government, nor the whole Serbian nation. We accuse those who encourage the Great Serbian scheme and work for the realisation of its object."

I told him that it appeared to me that from the first the nationality of the criminal had been deliberately put forward in order to involve Belgrade and to create the impression that the outrage had been organised by Serbia. This had struck me immediately, as I knew that up till now the Serbians of Bosnia had been spoken of as *die Bosniaken, bosnische Sprache, die Orthodoxen aus Bosnien*, while now it was being said that the assassin was *ein Serbe*, but not that he was a Bosnian nor that he was an Austrian subject. . . .

"I repeat," said Baron Macchio, "that we do not accuse the Serbian Government and the Serbian nation but the various agitators. . . ."

I begged him to use his influence in order to induce the Vienna press not to make matters more difficult by its accusations in this critical moment, when Serbo-Austrian relations were being put to a severe test.

I have, etc.

Saturday, July 4, 1915

## SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	—	Paris
Belgium	—	—
France	—	Berlin
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	—	—
Russia	—	—
Serbia	—	Paris, Petrograd

M. Poincaré, President of *France*, expresses his sympathy with Austria-Hungary and his belief that Serbia would show great willingness in the "judicial investigation and the prosecution of the accomplices" of the Serajevo criminals. In this view he is seconded by Germany, who for this reason is quoted as expecting no further complications.

**Austria-Hungary :***From Paris*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 4

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 4, 1914.*

TO-DAY I communicated to M. Poincaré the thanks of the Imperial and Royal Government for their sympathy.

In referring to the hostile demonstrations against Serbia among us, he mentioned that after the murder of President Carnot, all Italians throughout France were exposed to the worst persecutions on the part of the people.

I drew his attention to the fact that that crime had no connection with any anti-French agitation in Italy, while in the present case it must be admitted that for years past there has been an agitation in Serbia against the Monarchy fomented by every means, legitimate and illegitimate.

In conclusion, M. Poincaré expressed his conviction that the Serbian Government would meet us with the greatest willingness in the judicial investigation and the prosecution of the accomplices. No State could divest itself of this duty.

**France :***From Berlin*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 9

*M. de Manneville, French Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 4, 1914.*

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday, and has to-day repeated to the Russian Ambassador, that he hoped Serbia would satisfy the demands which Austria might have to make to her with regard to the investigation and the prosecution of the accomplices in the crime of Serajevo. He added that he was confident that this would be the case because Serbia, if she acted in any other way, would have the opinion of the whole civilised world against her.

The German Government do not then appear to share the anxiety which is shown by a part of the German press as to possible tension in the relations between the Governments of Vienna and Belgrade, or at least they do not wish to seem to do so.

DE MANNEVILLE.

**Serbia :**

*From Paris*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 13

*Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Minister at Paris, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Paris, June 21/July 4, 1914.*

I HAD a long conversation on Wednesday last on the subject of the Serajevo outrage with M. Viviani, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was somewhat concerned<sup>1</sup> at what had occurred. I made use of this opportunity to describe to him briefly the causes which had led to the outrage, and which were to be found, in the first place, in the irksome system of Government in force in the annexed provinces, and especially in the attitude of the officials, as well as in the whole policy of the Monarchy towards anything orthodox. He understood the situation, but at the same time expressed the hope that we should preserve an attitude of calm and dignity in order to avoid giving cause for fresh accusations in Vienna.

After the first moment of excitement public opinion here has quieted down to such an extent that the Minister-President himself considered it advisable in the Palais de Bourbon to soften the expressions used in the statement which he had made earlier on the subject in the Senate.

I have, etc.

*From Petrograd*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 14

*Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Petrograd, June 21/July 4, 1914.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that the outrages committed upon Serbs in Bosnia will increase the sympathy of Europe for us. He is of opinion that the accusations made against us in Vienna will not obtain credence. The chief thing is for public opinion in Serbia to remain calm.

**Sunday, July 5, 1914**

There are no published despatches.

<sup>1</sup> The British Premier, Mr. Asquith, in speaking of the murder of Serajevo in the House of Commons, had said that it made him "shudder for the fate of humanity." [*London Times*, July 1, 1914.]

Monday, July 6, 1914

## SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	—	Nish
Belgium	—	—
France	—	Petrograd
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	—	—
Russia	—	—
Serbia	—	Vienna

*Austria-Hungary* is once more informed of the "joy" which the news of the Serajevo murder had created in Serbia.

*Serbian* officials acknowledge the unfortunate tone of the Serbian press, while the Russian foreign minister, M. Sazonof, is troubled by the "attacks of the Austrian press against Serbia."

**Austria-Hungary :***From Nish, Serbia*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 5

*Herr Hoflehner, Consular Agent, to Count Berchtold.**Nish, July 6, 1914.*

THE news of the terrible crime at Serajevo, which had been only too successful, created here a sensation in the fullest sense of the word. There was practically no sign of consternation or indignation; the predominant mood was one of satisfaction and even joy, and this was often quite open without any reserve, and even found expression in a brutal way. This is especially the case with the so-called leading circles — the intellectuals, such as professional politicians, those occupied in education, officials, officers and the students. Commercial circles adopted a rather more reserved attitude.

All explanations made by official Servian circles or individual higher personalities purporting to give expression to indignation at the crime and condemnation of it, must have the effect of the bitterest irony on anyone who has had an opportunity, during the last few days, of gaining an insight at first hand into the feelings of the educated Servian people.

On the day of the crime the undersigned had gone to a coffee garden at about 9 o'clock in the evening without any suspicion of what had happened, and here received from an acquaintance his first information as to the very definite rumour which was being circulated. It was painful in the highest degree to see and hear what a feeling of real delight seized the numerous visitors who were present, with what obvious satisfaction the deed was discussed, and what cries of joy, scorn and contempt burst out — even one who

has long been accustomed to the expression of political fanaticism which obtains here, must feel the greatest depression at what he observed.

France :

*From Petrograd*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 10

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 6, 1914.*

IN the course of an interview which he had asked for with the Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires, M. Sazonof pointed out in a friendly way the disquieting irritation which the attacks of the Austrian press against Serbia are in danger of producing in his country.

Count Czernin having given him to understand that the Austro-Hungarian Government would perhaps be compelled to search for the instigators of the crime of Serajevo on Servian territory, M. Sazonof interrupted him : "No country," he said, "has had to suffer more than Russia from crimes prepared on foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to employ in any country whatsoever the procedure with which your papers threaten Serbia? Do not embark on such a course."

May this warning not be in vain.

PALÉOLOGUE.

Serbia :

*From Vienna*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 15

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June 23/July 6, 1914.*

THE excitement in military and Government circles against Serbia is steadily growing owing to the tone of our press, which is diligently exploited by the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade.

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 16

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Vienna, June 23/July 6, 1914.*

THE principal lines and tendencies to be found in the articles of the Vienna press on the subject of the Serajevo outrage are as follows :—



As long ago as Sunday afternoon, June 25/28 last, when the Vienna newspapers issued extra editions regarding the outrage upon the Crown Prince, the headlines announced that both the perpetrators were Serbians; moreover, this was done in such a manner as to leave the impression that they were Serbs from Serbia proper. In the later reports, which described the outrage, there was a marked tendency to connect it with Serbia. Two circumstances were especially emphasised and were intended to indicate Belgrade as the place of origin of the outrage, viz.: (1) the visit to Belgrade of both of the perpetrators; and (2) the origin of the bombs. As the third and last link in this chain of evidence, the Vienna papers began to publish the evidence given by the assassins at the trial. It was characteristic to find that the Hungarian Korrespondenzbureau, and the Hungarian newspapers, especially the *Az Eszt* were alone in a position to know all about this "evidence." This evidence mainly tends to show: (1) that it has been established that the perpetrators, while in Belgrade, associated with the *comitadji* Mihaylo Ciganovitch; and (2) that the organiser and instigator of the outrage was Major Pribitchevitch.

Another tendency became apparent at the same time, viz.: to hold the "Narodna Odbrana"<sup>1</sup> responsible for this outrage. Further, on Friday last, the latest announcement which the Hungarian Korrespondenzbureau made to the newspapers stated:—

"The enquiries made up to the present prove conclusively that this outrage is the work of a conspiracy. Besides the two perpetrators, a large number of persons have been arrested, mostly young men, who are also, like the perpetrators, proved to have been employed by the Belgrade Narodna Odbrana in order to commit the outrage, and who were supplied in Belgrade with bombs and revolvers."

On the same day, late at night, the Hungarian Korrespondenzbureau sent the following request to the newspapers:—

"We beg the Editor not to publish the report relating to the Serajevo outrage, which appeared in our evening's bulletin."

At the same time the Vienna Korrespondenzbureau published the following official statement:—

"We learn from authoritative quarters that the enquiries relating to the outrage are being kept absolutely secret.<sup>2</sup> All the details, therefore, which have appeared in the public press should be accepted with reserve."

Nevertheless, the Budapest newspapers continued to publish

<sup>1</sup> The "Narodna Odbrana" is a political society of Serbia. For its aims and constitution see below, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 under date of July 25, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> The Austro-Hungarian Government did not know where the threads uncovered by the investigation would lead. Its wish to have them kept secret until it had decided on its course corresponds to its action a few months earlier, which is thus described in the *American Review of Reviews*, May, 1914, p. 545: "Then one day in March a bomb was exploded in the office of the Greek Catholic Magyar bishop that killed the vicar and two others. Evidence discovered later proved that the plot was of Russian origin, the purpose being—as those implicated admitted—to create trouble between Roumania and Austria-Hungary which in its turn would embarrass the Triple Alliance. To prevent more serious complications, the Hungarian Government decided not to probe too deeply in the affair."

alleged reports on the enquiry. In the last "report" of the Budapest newspaper *A Nap*, which was reprinted in yesterday's Vienna papers, the tendency to lay the responsibility for the outrage on the Narodna Odbrana is still further emphasised. According to this report the accused Gabrinovitch had stated that General Yankovitch is the chief instigator of the outrage.

I have, etc.

Tuesday, July 7, 1914

## SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	—	—
Belgium	—	—
France	—	—
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	—	—
Russia	—	—
Serbia	—	Vienna

*Austria-Hungary* is reported by the Serbian Minister in Vienna to be much excited.

**Serbia :**

*From Vienna*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 17

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Vienna, June 24/July 7, 1914.*

IN influential circles the excitement continues undiminished. Though the Emperor has addressed a letter to the Prime Ministers of Austria and Hungary respectively, and to the Minister of Finance, Herr Bilinski, in which an appeal is made for calmness, it is impossible to determine what attitude the Government will adopt towards us. For them one thing is obvious; whether it is proved or not that the outrage has been inspired and prepared at Belgrade, they must sooner or later solve the question of the so-called Great Serbian agitation within the Habsburg Monarchy. In what manner they will do this and what means they will employ to that end has not as yet been decided; this is being discussed especially in high Catholic and military circles. The ultimate decision will be taken only after it has been definitely ascertained what the enquiry at Serajevo has brought to light. The decision will be in accordance with the findings of the enquiry.

In this respect, Austria-Hungary has to choose one of the following courses: either to regard the Serajevo outrage as a national misfortune and a crime which ought to be dealt with in accordance with the evidence obtained, in which case Serbia's coöperation in the work

will be requested in order to prevent the perpetrators escaping the extreme penalty; or, to treat the Serajevo outrage as a Pan-Serbian, South-Slav and Pan-Slav conspiracy with every manifestation of the hatred, hitherto repressed, against Slavdom. There are many indications that influential circles are being urged to adopt the latter course: it is therefore advisable to be ready for defence. Should the former and wiser course be adopted, we should do all we can to meet Austrian wishes in this respect.

I have, etc.

**Wednesday, July 8, 1914**

There are no published despatches.

**Thursday, July 9, 1914**

### SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	—	—
Belgium	—	—
France	—	—
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	—	—
Russia	—	—
Serbia	All Serbian Legations	—

**Serbia :**

*To All Serbian Legations Abroad*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 18

*M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to all the Serbian Legations abroad.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, June 26/July 9, 1914.*

THE Crown Prince Alexander is receiving threatening letters from Austria-Hungary nearly every day. Make use of this in course of conversation with your colleagues and journalists.

**Friday, July 10, 1914**

There are no published despatches.

Saturday, July 11, 1914

# SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	—	—
Belgium	—	—
France	—	Budapest
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	—	—
Russia	—	—
Serbia	—	—

France is informed that the Austro-Hungarian Government and the press are for peace, but that "the general public here (Budapest) believes in war and fears it."

France :

*From Budapest*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 11

M. d'Apchier le Maugin, French Consul-General at Budapest, to  
M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign  
Affairs.

*Budapest, July 11, 1914.*

QUESTIONED in the Chamber on the state of the Austro-Serbian question M. Tisza explained that before everything else it was necessary to wait for the result of the judicial inquiry, as to which he refused at the moment to make any disclosure whatsoever. And the Chamber has given its full approval to this. He also showed himself equally discreet as to the decisions taken at the meeting of Ministers at Vienna, and did not give any indication whether the project of a *démarche* at Belgrade, with which all the papers of both hemispheres are full, would be followed up. The Chamber assented without hesitation.

With regard to this *démarche* it seems that the word has been given to minimise its significance; the anger of the Hungarians has, as it were, evaporated through the virulent articles of the press, which is now unanimous in advising against this step, which might be dangerous. The semi-official press especially would desire that for the word "*démarche*," with its appearance of a threat, there should be substituted the expression "*pourparlers*," which appears to them more friendly and more courteous. Thus, officially, for the moment all is for peace.

All is for peace, in the press. But the general public here believes in war and fears it. Moreover, persons in whom I have every reason to have confidence have assured me that they knew that every day cannon and ammunition were being sent in large quantities

towards the frontier. Whether true or not this rumour has been brought to me from various quarters with details which agree with one another ; at least it indicates what are the thoughts with which people are generally occupied. The Government, whether it is sincerely desirous of peace, or whether it is *preparing a coup*, is now doing all that it can to allay these anxieties. This is why the tone of the Government newspapers has been lowered, first by one note, then by two, so that it is at the present moment almost optimistic. But they had themselves spread the alarm as it suited them (*à plaisir*). Their optimism to order is in fact without an echo ; the nervousness of the Bourse, a barometer which cannot be neglected, is a sure proof of this ; without exception stocks have fallen to an unaccountably low level ; the Hungarian 4 per cents were quoted yesterday at 79.95, a rate which has never been quoted since they were first issued.

D'APCHIER LE MAUGIN.

Sunday, July 12, 1914

There are no published despatches.

Monday, July 13, 1914

There are no published despatches.

Tuesday, July 14, 1914

SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	—	—
Belgium	—	—
France	—	—
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	—	—
Russia	—	—
Serbia	All Serbian Legations	Berlin, Vienna

The tone of the Serbian press and in turn that of the Austro-Hungarian press continue threatening.

Serbia :

*From Berlin*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 19

*Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch  
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 1/14, 1914.*

THE Secretary of State has told me that he could not understand the provocative attitude of the Serbian press and the attacks made

by it against Austria-Hungary, who, as a Great Power, could not tolerate such proceedings.

*From Vienna*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 22

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Vienna, July 1/14, 1914.*

ONCE more public opinion has been excited against us by the Literary Bureau of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. With the exception of the *Zeit* and the *Arbeiter Zeitung*, all the Austro-Hungarian newspapers have obtained from that Bureau the material and tone of their articles on the subject of the Serajevo outrage. You have yourself seen what kind of material and tone this is.

I am reliably informed that official German circles here are especially ill-disposed towards us. These circles have had some influence upon the writings of the Vienna press, especially upon those of the *Neue Freie Presse*.

This latter paper is still anti-Serbian *à l'outrance*. The *Neue Freie Presse*, which is widely read and has many friends in high financial circles, and which — if so desired — writes in accordance with instructions from the Vienna Press Bureau, briefly summarises the matter as follows: "We have to settle matters with Serbia by war; it is evident that peaceable means are of no avail. And if it must come to war sooner or later, then it is better to see the matter through now."

The Bourse is very depressed. There has not been such a fall in prices in Vienna for a long time. Some securities have fallen 45 kronen.

*To All Serbian Legations*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 20

*M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 1/14, 1914.*

(1) The Austrian Korrespondenzbureau is showing a marked tendency to excite public opinion in Europe. This Bureau interprets neither correctly nor sincerely the tone adopted by the Belgrade press. It selects the strongest expressions from such articles as contain replies to insults, threats and false news designed to mislead public opinion, and submits them to the Austro-Hungarian public.

(2) The Korrespondenzbureau quotes especially extracts from articles from those Serbian newspapers which are not the organs of any party or corporation.

(3) As far back as the annexation crisis, Austria-Hungary prohibited the entry into the country of all Serbian political and other newspapers, and thus our Press would not be in a position to excite public opinion in Austria-Hungary and Europe if the Korrespondenzbureau did not lay stress on and spread broadcast the items of news which it gathers from various Serbian papers, in every instance exaggerating them. Six days ago the entry into Austria-Hungary of the *Odyek*, the organ of the Independent Radical Party, was prohibited; thus all our papers are now prevented from entering Austria-Hungary.

(4) With us the press is absolutely free. Newspapers can be confiscated only for *lèse-majesté* or for revolutionary propaganda; in all other cases confiscation is illegal. There is no censorship of newspapers.

In these circumstances, you should point out for their information, where necessary, that we have no other constitutional or legal means at our disposal for the control of our press. Nevertheless, when the articles in our papers are compared with those of Austria-Hungary, it is evident that the Austro-Hungarian papers originate the controversy, while ours merely reply.

Please also emphasize the fact that public opinion in Serbia is relatively calm, and that there is no desire on our part to provoke and insult Austria-Hungary. No one in Europe would know what our newspapers were writing if the Korrespondenzbureau did not publish these items of news with the intention of doing as much harm as possible to Serbia.

#### SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 21

*M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to all the Serbian Legations abroad.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 1/14, 1914.*

DURING the past few days the Austro-Hungarian newspapers have been spreading reports to the effect that there have been demonstrations at Belgrade against the Austro-Hungarian Legation, that some Hungarian journalists were killed; that Austro-Hungarian subjects in Belgrade were maltreated and are now panic-stricken; that at the funeral of the late M. Hartwig Serbian students made a demonstration against the Austro-Hungarian Minister, etc. All these reports are absolutely untrue and imaginary. Complete calm prevails in Belgrade and there were no demonstrations of any kind this year, nor has there been any question of disorder. Not only do the Austro-Hungarian Minister and his staff walk about the town without being molested in any way, but no Austro-Hungarian subject has been in any way insulted, either by word or deed, as is reported by the Viennese papers; still less was any attack made upon the house of any Austro-Hungarian subject or were any of their windows broken. Not a single Austro-Hungarian subject has had

the slightest cause for any complaint. All these false reports are being purposely spread in order to arouse and excite Austro-Hungarian public opinion against Serbia.

The whole of Belgrade and the entire diplomatic body were present to-day at the funeral of the late M. Hartwig; there was not the slightest sign of resentment shown by anybody. During the whole ceremony exemplary order was maintained; so much so that foreigners were impressed with the good behaviour of the crowd, which was such as does not always prevail on similar occasions even in their own countries.

Be good enough to communicate the above to the Government to which you are accredited and to the press.

Wednesday, July 15, 1914

## SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	—	—
Belgium	—	—
France	—	Vienna
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	—	—
Russia	—	—
Serbia	—	Vienna

France is informed of some bellicose articles in German and Austro-Hungarian papers.

The Austro-Hungarian intentions toward Serbia are quoted by the Serbian Minister as shrouded in mystery.

France:

FROM VIENNA

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 12

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 15, 1914.*

CERTAIN organs of the Vienna Press, discussing the military organisation of France and of Russia, represent these two countries as incapable of holding their own in European affairs; this would ensure to the Dual monarchy, supported by Germany, appreciable facilities for subjecting Servia to any treatment which it might be pleased to impose. The *Militärische Rundschau* frankly admits it. "The moment is still favourable to us. If we do not decide for war, that war in which we shall have to engage at the latest in two or three years will be begun in far less propitious circumstances. At this moment the initiative rests with us: Russia is not ready, moral fac-



tors and right are on our side, as well as might. Since we shall have to accept the contest some day,<sup>1</sup> let us provoke it at once. Our prestige, our position as a Great Power, our honour, are in question; and yet more, for it would seem that our very existence is concerned — to be or not to be — which is in truth the great matter to-day."

Surpassing itself, the *Neue Freie Presse* of to-day reproaches Count Tisza for the moderation of his second speech, in which he said, "Our relations with Servia require, however, to be made clear." These words rouse its indignation. For it, tranquillity and security can result only from a *war to the knife* against Pan-Servism, and it is in the name of humanity that it demands the extermination of the cursed Servian race.

DUMAINE.

Serbia :

*From Vienna*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 23

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Vienna, July 2/15, 1914.*

THE most important question for us is, what, if any, are the intentions of the Austro-Hungarian Government as regards the Serajevo outrage. Until now I have been unable to find this out, and my other colleagues are in a similar position. The word has now been passed round here not to tell anybody anything.

The evening before last the Ministers of the Dual Monarchy held a meeting. It has not been possible to learn anything about the object and the result of this meeting. The communiqué issued on the subject was brief and obscure. It appears that the consequences of the Serajevo outrage were discussed at length, but that nothing was decided. It is not clear whether the Chief of Staff and the Naval Commander-in-Chief were present, as was rumoured. After this meeting Count Berchtold travelled to Ischl to report to the Emperor, who, after the funeral of Franz Ferdinand, had returned there to recover his health. In the Hungarian Parliament Count Tisza has replied to the interpellations of the opposition concerning the Serajevo incident; you are acquainted with his statements. His speech was not clear, and I believe it was intentionally obscure. Some people saw in it signs of an intention quietly to await the development of events and of calmness in the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Government, while others saw in it hidden intentions for

<sup>1</sup> The reasons underlying this statement are thus set forth in the *American Review of Reviews*, July, 1914, p. 30: "It is believed that Russia is intending to provoke a Near Eastern Crisis. Reports are also rife that a secret Naval Convention has been concluded between England and Russia with the object of enforcing the demands of the Triple Entente against Germany." And these demands of the Triple Entente, so far as Russia is concerned, are set forth in the same copy of *American Review of Reviews* in an interview with the Russian statesman, Professor Mitronov, as follows: "As far as Russia is concerned extension into the Balkans is a political necessity and nothing short of the possession of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles will end the intolerable situation."

(I should say) an action as yet undecided. It was noted that there was no occasion for haste until the results of the magisterial enquiry were announced. Some time has now elapsed; the matter has been spoken of, discussed, written about and distorted; then came the death of Hartwig and the alarm of Baron Giesl. In connection with this again came the interpellations addressed to Count Tisza in the Hungarian Parliament; you have read his reply. Many hold the opinion here that this second speech is much more restrained than the first, and that this is to be attributed to an order from the Emperor. (The Bourse has now recovered; both the War Minister and the Chief of Staff have gone on leave.) I am loath to express an opinion. In the above-mentioned speech it is to be noted that the possibility of war is not excluded, in the event of the demands of Austria-Hungary in regard to the Serajevo outrage not being complied with.

One thing is certain: Austria-Hungary will take diplomatic steps at Belgrade as soon as the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo is completed and the matter submitted to the Court.

I have, etc.

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 24

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Vienna, July 2/15, 1914.*

It is thought here that the magisterial enquiries and investigations have not produced sufficient evidence to justify bringing an official accusation against Serbia, but it is believed that the latter will be accused of tolerating within her borders certain revolutionary elements. Diplomatic circles here criticise and condemn the mode of procedure of the Austro-Hungarian Government, especially the attitude throughout of the Korrespondenzbureau and the Vienna press. There are many who consider our attitude to be correct and in accordance with the dignity of a nation. They find fault only with the views expressed in some of our newspapers, though they all admit that it is provoked by the Vienna press.

In spite of the fact that it appears that the German Foreign Office does not approve of the anti-Serbian policy of Vienna, the German Embassy here is at this very moment encouraging such a policy.

I have, etc.

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 25

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Vienna, July 2/15, 1914.*

WHAT steps will be taken? In what form? What demands will Austria-Hungary make of Serbia? I do not believe that to-day even

the Ballplatz<sup>1</sup> itself could answer these questions clearly and precisely. I am of opinion that its plans are now being laid, and that again Count Forgach is the moving spirit.

In an earlier report I mentioned that Austria-Hungary has to choose between two courses: either to make the Serajevo outrage a domestic question, inviting us to assist her to discover and punish the culprits; or to make it a case against the Serbians and Serbia, and even against the Jugo-Slavs. After taking into consideration all that is being prepared and done, it appears to me that Austria-Hungary will choose the latter course. Austria-Hungary will do this in the belief that she will have the approval of Europe. Why should she not profit by humiliating us, and, to a certain extent, justify the Friedjung and Agram trials? Besides, Austria-Hungary desires in this manner to justify in the eyes of her own people and of Europe the sharp and reactionary measures which she contemplates undertaking internally in order to suppress the Great Serbian propaganda and the Jugo-Slav idea. Finally, for the sake of her prestige,<sup>2</sup> Austria-Hungary must take some action in the belief that she will thus raise her prestige internally as well as externally. . . .<sup>3</sup>

Austria-Hungary will, I think, draw up in the form of a memorandum an accusation against Serbia. In that accusation will be set forth all the evidence that has been collected against us since April, 1909, until to-day; and I believe that this accusation will be fairly lengthy. Austria-Hungary will communicate this accusation to the Cabinets of the European Powers with the remark that the facts contained therein give her the right to take diplomatic steps at Belgrade, and to demand that Serbia should in the future fulfill all the obligations of a loyal neighbour. At the same time Austria-Hungary will also hand us a note containing her demands, which we shall be requested to accept unconditionally.<sup>4</sup>

I have, etc.

Thursday, July 16, 1914

## SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	—	—
Belgium	—	—
France	—	—
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	—	—
Russia	—	—
Serbia	—	Berlin

<sup>1</sup> The Austrian Foreign Office is situated on the Ballplatz.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 38, despatch from Rome, under date of July 23, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> The omissions indicated by the dots are those of the official British translation.

<sup>4</sup> This was the exact course taken by Austria a few days later.

**Serbia :**

*From Berlin*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 26

*Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 3/16, 1914.*

THE Secretary of State has informed me that the reports of the German Minister at Belgrade point to the existence of a Great Serbian propaganda, which should be energetically suppressed by the Government in the interest of good relations with Austria-Hungary.

Friday, July 17, 1914

# SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	—	—
Belgium	—	—
France	—	—
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	—	—
Russia	—	—
Serbia	—	London, Rome

*Italy* is said to have warned Austria-Hungary, and the English Press is reported in Serbia as being unfavorably influenced by cuttings from the Serbian Press supplied to it by Austria-Hungary.

**Serbia :**

*From London*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 27

*M. M. S. Boschkovitch, Minister at London, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*London, July 4/17, 1914.*

THE Austrian Embassy is making very great efforts to win over the English press against us, and to induce it to favour the idea that Austria must give a good lesson to Serbia. The Embassy is submitting to the news editors cuttings from our newspapers as a proof of the views expressed in our press. The situation may become more acute during the next few weeks. No reliance should be placed in the ostensibly peaceable statements of Austro-Hungarian official circles, as the way is being prepared for diplomatic pressure upon Serbia, which may develop into an armed attack. It is probable that as soon as Austria-Hungary has taken action at Belgrade she will change her attitude and will seek to humiliate Serbia.

*From Rome*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 28

*M. Ljub Michailovitch, Minister at Rome, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs*

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, July 4/17, 1914.*

I HAVE obtained reliable information to the effect that the Marquis di San Giuliano has stated to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador that any step undertaken by Austria against Serbia which failed to take into account international considerations would meet with the disapproval of public opinion in Italy, and that the Italian Government desire to see the complete independence of Serbia maintained.

Saturday, July 18, 1914

## SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	—	—
Belgium	—	—
France	—	—
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	—	—
Russia	—	—
Serbia	—	Petrograd

**Serbia :***From Petrograd*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 29

*Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs*

(Telegraphic.)

*Petrograd, July 5/18, 1914.*

I HAVE spoken to the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the provocative attitude of the Korrespondenzbureau and the Vienna press.

M. Sazonof told me a few days ago that he wondered why the Austrian Government were doing nothing to put a stop to the futile agitation on the part of the press in Vienna which, after all, frightened nobody, and was only doing harm to Austria herself.

Sunday, July 19, 1914

# SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	—	—
Belgium	—	—
France	—	Vienna
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	—	—
Russia	—	—
Serbia	All representatives	—

*France* is placed in possession, through secret sources, of the terms of the forthcoming Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, and learns the reason why it will contain a time limit.

*Serbia* endeavors to justify herself at the various foreign offices of Europe.

**France :**

*From Vienna*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 13

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs*

*Vienna, July 19, 1914.*

THE Chancellor of the Consulate, who has sent me his half-yearly report, in which he sums up the various economic facts which have been the subject of his study since the beginning of the year, has added a section containing political information emanating from a trustworthy source.

I asked him briefly to sum up the information which he has obtained regarding the impending presentation of the Austrian note to Servia, which the papers have for some days been persistently announcing.

You will find the text of this memorandum interesting on account of the accurate information which it contains.

DUMAINE.

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 14

*Memorandum*

*(Extract from a Consular Report on the Economic and Political Situation in Austria)*

*Vienna, July 20, 1914.<sup>1</sup>*

FROM information furnished by a person specially well informed as to official news, it appears that the French Government would be

<sup>1</sup> This memorandum is dated July 20, 1914. Since it is enclosed in a letter of July 19, 1914, it cannot possibly be later than the letter. From the letter itself it would

wrong to have confidence in disseminators of optimism; much will be demanded of Serbia; she will be required to dissolve several propagandist societies, she will be summoned to repress nationalism, to guard the frontier in coöperation with Austrian officials, to keep strict control over anti-Austrian tendencies in the schools; and it is a very difficult matter for a Government to consent to become in this way a policeman for a foreign Government. They foresee the subterfuges by which Serbia will doubtless wish to avoid giving a clear and direct reply; that is why a short interval will perhaps<sup>1</sup> be fixed for her to declare whether she accepts or not. The tenor of the note and its imperious tone almost certainly ensure that Belgrade will refuse. Then military operations will begin.

There is here, and equally at Berlin, a party which accepts the idea of a conflict of widespread dimensions, in other words, a conflagration. The leading idea is probably that it would be necessary to start before Russia has completed the great improvements of her army and railways, and before France has brought her military organisation to perfection. But on this point there is no unanimity in high circles; Count Berchtold and the diplomatists desire at the most localised operations against Serbia. But everything must be regarded as possible. A singular fact is pointed out: generally the official telegraph agency, in its summaries and reviews of the foreign press, pays attention only to semi-official newspapers and to the most important organs; it omits all quotation from and all mention of the others. This is a rule and a tradition. Now, for the last ten days, the official agency has furnished daily to the Austro-Hungarian press a complete review of the whole Servian press, giving a prominent place to the least known, the smallest, and most insignificant papers, which, just on account of their obscurity, employ language freer, bolder, more aggressive, and often insulting. This work of the official agency has obviously for its aim the excitement of public feeling and the creation of opinion favourable to war. The fact is significant.

seem that the report would have to be dated not later than on the date previous to its submission to the ambassador, and that is July 18, 1914.

Whether the student accepts this date, or July 19, 1914, the noteworthy fact is established that France had accurate information — and the ambassador knew it to be so (cf. last line of his letter) — of the intended action of Austria-Hungary, and knew that there would be a time limit attached to Austria's demands.

<sup>1</sup> The word "perhaps" does not occur in the *Times* edition of the French Yellow Book, but has been added to the text in the Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War printed under the authority of His Majesty's Stationery Office. There is no explanation in the Official British Version why the word "perhaps" has been added. The text of the French Yellow Book supplied to the editor by the French Embassy in Washington in October, 1915, contains the word "peut-être."



**Serbia :**

*To All Serbian Missions Abroad*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 30

*M. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Serbian Missions abroad*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 6/19, 1914.*

**IMMEDIATELY** after the Serajevo outrage the Austro-Hungarian press began to accuse Serbia of that detestable crime, which, in the opinion of that press, was the direct result of the Great Serbian idea. The Austrian press further contended that that idea was spread and propagated by various associations, such as the "Narodna Odbrana," "Kolo Srpskich Sestara," etc., which were tolerated by the Serbian Government.

On learning of the murder, the Serbian Royal Family, as well as the Serbian Government, sent messages of condolence,<sup>1</sup> and at the same time expressed severe condemnation of and horror at the crime that had been committed. All festivities which had been fixed to take place on that day in Belgrade were immediately cancelled.

Nevertheless, the press of the neighbouring Monarchy continued to hold Serbia responsible for the Serajevo outrage. Moreover, the Austro-Hungarian press began to spread in connection with it various false reports, designed to mislead public opinion, which provoked the Belgrade press to reply in self-defence, and sometimes to active hostility in a spirit of embitterment aroused by the misrepresentation of what had occurred. Seeing that the Austro-Hungarian press was intentionally luring the Belgrade press into an awkward and delicate controversy, the Serbian Government hastened to warn the press in Belgrade, and to recommend it to remain calm and to confine itself to simple denials and to the suppression of false and misleading reports. The action of the Serbian Government was ineffectual in the case of some of the less important papers, more especially in view of the fact that newly invented stories were daily spread abroad with the object of serving political ends not only against Serbia but also against the Serbs in Austria-Hungary. The Serbian Government were unable to avert these polemics between the Serbian and the Austrian press, seeing that Serbian law, and the provisions of the constitution itself, guarantee the complete independence of the press and prohibit all measures of control and the seizure of newspapers. These polemics were further aggravated by the fact that the Vienna and Budapesth journals selected passages from such of the Serbian newspapers as have practically no influence upon public opinion, strengthened still further their tone, and, having thus manipulated them, passed them on to the foreign press with the obvious intention of exciting public opinion in other European countries and of representing Serbia as being guilty.

Those who have followed the course of these polemics will know

<sup>1</sup> These messages are not given in the published documents. Cf. also British Blue Book No. 121, July 24 and note 1.



that the Belgrade newspapers merely acted in self-defence, confining their activities to denials and to the refutation of falsehoods designed to mislead public opinion, at the same time attempting to convince foreign Governments (which, being occupied with other and more serious affairs, had no time to go into the matter themselves) of the intention of the Austro-Hungarian press to excite public opinion in its own country and abroad.

The Serbian Government at once expressed their readiness to hand over to justice any of their subjects who might be proved to have played a part in the Serajevo outrage. The Serbian Government further stated that they had prepared a more drastic law against the misuse of explosives. The draft of a new law in that sense had already been laid before the State Council, but could not be submitted to the Skupshtina, as the latter was not sitting at the time. Finally, the Serbian Government stated that they were ready, as heretofore, to observe all those good neighbourly obligations to which Serbia was bound by her position as a European State.

During the whole of this period, from the date of the perpetration of the outrage until to-day, not once did the Austro-Hungarian Government apply to the Serbian Government for their assistance in the matter.<sup>1</sup> They did not demand that any of the accomplices should be subjected to an enquiry, or that they should be handed over to trial. In one instance only did the Austrian Government ask for information as to the whereabouts of certain students who had been expelled from the Pakratz Teachers' Seminary, and had crossed over to Serbia to continue their studies. All available information on this point was supplied.

The campaign against Serbia, however, was unremittingly pursued in the Austrian press, and public opinion was excited against her in Austria as well as in the rest of Europe. Matters went so far that the more prominent leaders of political parties in Austria-Hungary began to ask questions in Parliament on the subject of the outrage, to which the Hungarian Prime Minister replied. It is evident from the discussions in this connection that Austria is contemplating some action, but it is not clear in what sense. It is not stated whether the measures which are to be taken — more especially military measures — will depend upon the reply and the conciliatory attitude of the Serbian Government. But an armed conflict is being hinted at in the event of the Serbian Government being unable to give a categorically satisfactory reply.

On the sudden death of the Russian Minister, M. de Hartwig, at the residence of the Austrian Minister, the polemics in the newspapers became still more acute; nevertheless this sad event did not lead to any disorders even during the funeral of M. Hartwig. On the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Legation was so perturbed by certain false reports that Austrian subjects began to conceal themselves, some of them taking refuge in the Semlin and Belgrade hotels,

<sup>1</sup> This statement seems to be at variance with Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 2, under date of June 30, 1914.

and others in the Legation itself. At 5 P.M. on the day of the King's birthday, which passed in the most orderly manner, I was informed by the Austrian Minister, through the Vice-Consul, M. Pomgraz, that preparations were being made for an attack that night on the Austrian Legation and on Austro-Hungarian subjects in Belgrade. He begged me to take the necessary steps for the protection of Austro-Hungarian subjects and of the Legation, stating at the same time that he held Serbia responsible for all that might occur. I replied that the responsible Serbian Government were not aware of any preparations of this kind being made, but that I would in any case at once inform the Minister of the Interior, and beg him at the same time to take such measures as might be necessary. The next day showed that the Austrian Legation had been misled by false rumours, for neither any attack nor any preparations for attack were made. Notwithstanding this, the Austro-Hungarian press took advantage of this incident to prove how excited public opinion was in Serbia and to what lengths she was ready to go. It went even further and tried to allege that something really had been intended to happen, since M. Pashitch himself had stated that he had heard of such rumours. All this indicates clearly the intention to excite public opinion against Serbia whenever occasion arises.

When all that has been said in the Hungarian Parliament is taken into consideration, there is reason for apprehension that some step is being prepared against us which may produce a disagreeable effect upon the relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. There is still further ground for such apprehension, as it is abundantly evident that the enquiry which is being made is not to be limited to the perpetrators and their possible accomplices in the crime, but is most probably to be extended to Serbia and the Great Serbian idea.

By their attitude and the measures they have taken, the Serbian Government have irrefutably proved that they are working to restrain excitable elements, and in the interests of peace and the maintenance of good relations with all their neighbours. The Government have given their particular attention to the improvement and strengthening of their relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which had lately become strained as a result of the Balkan wars and of the questions which arose therefrom. With that object in view, the Serbian Government proceeded to settle the question of the Oriental Railway, the new railway connections, and the transit through Serbia of Austro-Hungarian goods for Constantinople, Sofia, Salonica, and Athens.

The Serbian Government consider that their vital interests require that peace and tranquillity in the Balkans should be firmly and lastingly established. And for this very reason they fear lest the excited state of public opinion in Austria-Hungary may induce the Austro-Hungarian Government to make a *démarche* which may humiliate the dignity of Serbia as a State, and to put forward demands which could not be accepted.

I have the honour therefore to request you to impress upon the

Government to which you are accredited our desire to maintain friendly relations with Austria-Hungary, and to suppress every attempt directed against the peace and public safety of the neighbouring Monarchy. We will likewise meet the wishes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the event of our being requested to subject to trial in our independent Courts any accomplices in the outrage who are in Serbia — should such, of course, exist.

But we can never comply with demands which may be directed against the dignity of Serbia, and which would be unacceptable to any country which respects and maintains its independence.

Actuated by the desire that good neighbourly relations may be firmly established and maintained, we beg the friendly Governments to take note of these declarations and to act in a conciliatory sense should occasion or necessity arise.

Monday, July 20, 1914

### SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	—	—
Belgium	—	—
France	—	—
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	Berlin	—
Russia	—	—
Serbia	—	Vienna

*Great Britain* enters the diplomatic exchange of views on this day, according to the British Blue Book. From the Introductory Narrative to the British Blue Book, Edition of September 28, it appears that Sir Edward Grey had kept in touch from the first with the events arising out of the Serajevo murder. (For the Introductory Narrative see pp. 561 to 570.)

#### Great Britain :

##### *Sent to Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 1

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 20, 1914.*

I ASKED the German Ambassador to-day if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia.

He said that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take some step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable.

I said that I had not heard anything recently,<sup>1</sup> except that Count

<sup>1</sup> This seems to be at variance with Chapter Two of Sir Edward Grey's Introductory Narrative to the British Blue Book Edition, of Sept. 28, 1914. See p. 562. Considering, moreover, the close relations existing between the French and the British Foreign Offices it seems likely that Sir Edward Grey may have had cognisance of the information contained in the Yellow Book, Nos. 13 and 14, under date of July 19, and of the information contained in the despatches published by other Foreign Offices under dates of

Berchtold,<sup>1</sup> in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be cleared up.

The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia.

I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial.

The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that they would act upon some case that would be known.

I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things over. I hated the idea of a war between any of the Great Powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable.

The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment.

I am, etc.

E. GREY.

Serbia:

*From Vienna*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 31

*M. Yon. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs*

Sir,

*Vienna, July 7/20, 1914.*

It is very difficult, indeed almost impossible, to ascertain here anything positive as to the real intentions of Austria-Hungary. The word has been passed round to maintain absolute secrecy about everything that is being done. Judging by the articles in our newspapers, Belgrade is taking an optimistic view of the questions pending with Austria-Hungary. There is, however, no room for optimism. There is no doubt that Austria-Hungary is making preparations of a serious character. What is chiefly to be feared, and is highly probable, is, that Austria is preparing for war against Servia. The general conviction that prevails here is that it would be nothing short of suicide for Austria-Hungary once more to fail to take advantage of the opportunity to act against Servia. It is believed that the two opportunities previously missed — the annexation of Bosnia<sup>2</sup> and the Balkan war<sup>3</sup> — have been extremely injurious to Austria-Hungary. In addition, the conviction is steadily growing that Servia, after her two wars, is completely exhausted, and that a war against

June 28, to July 19, 1914. Whether Serbian Blue Book No. 30, July 19, had been delivered to Sir E. Grey when he wrote the above despatch is not sure.

<sup>1</sup> Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> 1908.

<sup>3</sup> 1913.

Serbia would in fact merely mean a military expedition to be concluded by a speedy occupation. It is also believed that such a war could be brought to an end before Europe could intervene.

The seriousness of Austrian intentions is further emphasised by the military preparations which are being made, especially in the vicinity of the Serbian frontier.

I have, etc.

Tuesday, July 21, 1814

## SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	—	Belgrade
Belgium	—	—
France	London, etc :	Berlin
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	—	—
Russia	—	—
Serbia	—	—

*Serbia* declares her readiness in Berlin to accept the forthcoming Austro-Hungarian demands, provided that Austria-Hungary asks "only for judicial coöperation."

*Germany* declares that she is in complete ignorance of the "contents" of the forthcoming note.

*Austria-Hungary* receives another report of the hostile attitude of the Serbian people, who are represented as rejoicing over the Serajevo murder.

**Austria :**

*From Belgrade*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 6

*Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold*

*Belgrade, July 21, 1914.*

AFTER the lamentable crime of June 28th, I have now been back at my post for some time, and I am able to give some judgment as to the tone which prevails here.

After the annexation crisis<sup>1</sup> the relations between the Monarchy and Servia were poisoned on the Servian side by national chauvinism, animosity and an effective propaganda of Great-Servian aspirations carried on in that part of our territory where there is a Servian population; since the last two Balkan Wars, the success of Servia has increased this chauvinism to a paroxysm, the expression of which in some cases bears the mark of insanity.

I may be excused from bringing proof and evidence of this; they can be had easily everywhere among all parties, in political circles as well as among the lower classes. I put it forward as a well-known axiom that the policy of Servia is built up on the separation of the territories inhabited by Southern Slavs, and as a corollary to this on

<sup>1</sup> The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1908.

the abolition of the Monarchy as a Great Power; this is its only object.

No one who has taken the trouble to move and take part in political circles here for a week can be blind to this truth.

The hatred against the Monarchy has been further intensified as a result of the latest events which influence political opinion here; among them I count the crime of Serajevo, the death of Hartwig and the electoral campaign.

The crime at Serajevo has aroused among the Servians an expectation that in the immediate future the Hapsburg States will fall to pieces; it was this on which they had set their hopes even before; there has been dangled before their eyes the cession of those territories in the Monarchy which are inhabited by the Southern Slavs, a revolution in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the unreliability of the Slav regiments — this is regarded as ascertained fact and had brought system and apparent justification into their nationalist madness.

Austria-Hungary, hated as she is, now appears to the Servians as powerless, and as scarcely worthy of waging war with; contempt is mingled with hatred; she is ripe for destruction, and she is to fall without trouble into the lap of the Great-Servian Empire, which is to be realized in the immediate future.

Newspapers, not among the most extreme, discuss the powerlessness and decrepitude of the neighbouring Monarchy in daily articles, and insult its officials without reserve and without fear of reprimand. They do not even stop short of the exalted person of our ruler. Even the official organ refers to the internal condition of Austria-Hungary as the true cause of this wicked crime. There is no longer any fear of being called to account. For decades the people of Servia has been educated by the press, and the policy at any given time is dependent on the party press; the Great-Servian propaganda and its monstrous offspring, the crime of June 28th, are a fruit of this education.

I pass over the suspicions and accusations with regard to the death of Hartwig, which are on the verge of insanity, and were characterised by "The Times" as "ravings";<sup>1</sup> I do not mention the lying campaign in the press which, however, might strengthen Servians in the conviction that the Government and the representatives of Austria-Hungary are outlaws, and that appellations such as murderer, rogue, cursed Austrian, etc., are suitable stock epithets for us.

The death of Hartwig and the recognition of the gravity of this loss<sup>2</sup> to the Servian political world, have let loose a fanatical cult of the deceased; in this people were influenced not only by gratitude for the past, but also by anxiety for the future, and outbid one another in servile submissiveness to Russia in order to secure her goodwill in time to come.

<sup>1</sup> "The latest suggestion made in one of them (the Servian newspapers) is that M. de Hartwig's sudden death in the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade the other day was due to poison. Ravings of that kind move the contempt as well as the disgust of cultivated people, whatever their political sympathies may be." — *The Times*, July 16, 1913.

<sup>2</sup> Hartwig was the Russian Minister in Belgrade, and was known as an ardent Pan-Slavist, and reckless hater of Austria-Hungary.



As a third factor the electoral campaign has united all parties on a platform of hostility against Austria-Hungary. None of the parties which aspire to office will incur the suspicion of being held capable of weak compliance towards the Monarchy. The campaign, therefore, is conducted under the catchword of hostility towards Austria-Hungary.

For both internal and external reasons the Monarchy is held to be powerless and incapable of any energetic action, and it is believed that the serious words which were spoken by leading men among us are only "bluff."

The leave of absence of the Imperial and Royal Minister of War and Chief of the Staff have strengthened the conviction that the weakness of Austria-Hungary is now obvious.

I have allowed myself to trespass too long on the patience of Your Excellency, not because I thought that in what I have said I could tell you anything new, but because I considered this picture led up to the conclusion which forces itself upon me that a reckoning with Servia, a war for the position of the Monarchy as a Great Power, even for its existence as such, cannot be permanently avoided.

If we delay in clearing up our relations with Servia, we shall share the responsibility for the difficulties and the unfavourable situation in any future war which must, however, sooner or later be carried through.

For any observer on the spot, and for the representative of Austro-Hungarian interests in Servia, the question takes the form that we cannot any longer put up with any further injury to our prestige.

Should we therefore be determined to put forward far-reaching requirements joined to effective control — for this alone could clear the Augean stable of Great-Servian intrigues — then all possible consequences must be considered, and from the beginning there must be a strong and firm determination to carry through the matter to the end.

Half measures, the presentation of demands, followed by long discussions and ending only in an unsound compromise, would be the hardest blow which could be directed against Austria-Hungary's reputation in Servia and her position in Europe.

France :

*From Berlin*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 15

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 21, 1914.*

It has come to my knowledge that the Servian representative at Berlin declared, at the Wilhelmstrasse, yesterday, that his Government was ready to entertain Austria's requirements arising out of the outrage at Serajevo, provided that she asked only <sup>1</sup> for judicial coöperation in the punishment and prevention of political crimes,

<sup>1</sup> *N. Y. Times* translation reads "did not demand."

but that he was charged to warn the German Government that it would be dangerous to attempt, through that investigation, to lower the prestige of Servia.

In confidence I may also inform your Excellency that the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at the diplomatic audience to-day mentioned this subject to Herr von Jagow. He said that he supposed the German Government now had full knowledge of the note prepared by Austria, and were therefore willing to give the assurance that the Austro-Servian difficulties would be localised. The Secretary of State protested that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that note, and expressed himself in the same way to me.<sup>1</sup> I could not help showing my astonishment at a statement which agreed so little with what circumstances lead one to expect.

I have also been assured that, from now on, the preliminary notices for mobilisation,<sup>2</sup> the object of which is to place Germany in a kind of "attention" attitude in times of tension, have been sent out here to those classes which would receive them in similar circumstances. That is a measure to which the Germans, constituted as they are, can have recourse without indiscretion and without exciting the people. It is not a sensational measure, and is not necessarily followed by full mobilisation, as we have already seen, but it is none the less significant.

JULES CAMBON.

*To London, Petrograd, Vienna, Rome*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 16

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 21, 1914.*

I SPECIALLY draw your attention to information of which I am in receipt from Berlin<sup>3</sup>; the French Ambassador notifies the extreme weakness of the Berlin Bourse yesterday, and attributes it to the anxiety which has begun to be aroused by the Servian question.

M. Jules Cambon has very grave reason for believing that when Austria makes the *démarche* at Belgrade which she judges necessary in consequence of the crime of Serajevo, Germany will support her with her authority, without seeking to play the part of mediator.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

<sup>1</sup> The reader must decide for himself whether or not to give credence to this statement by Mr. von Jagow, the German Secretary of State. If true, it proves that Austria-Hungary was preparing her case against Servia without consultation with Germany. In that case it is natural that the Entente Powers should have had more accurate preliminary information of the Austrian note, through their Secret Service, which, for instance, must have supplied the information, French Yellow Book Nos. 13 and 14, July 19, 1914. A friendly power is less apt to maintain a spy service at the capital of an allied Government. See however, also French Yellow Book No. 19, July 22 and footnote.

<sup>2</sup> This information is proved to be wholly false by French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, 1914, where Viviani implies that Germany had not even then proceeded to partial mobilisation.

<sup>3</sup> The only two despatches published as previously received from Berlin are Nos. 9, July 4, and 15, July 15, 1914. Neither of them contains the information here given.



Wednesday, July 22, 1915

## SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	Belgrade, London, etc.	—
Belgium	—	—
France	London, etc.	Vienna, London
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	—	Berlin
Russia	—	—
Serbia	—	—

*Austria-Hungary* sends the text of her Serbian note to her minister in Belgrade for presentation on the next day, and instructs her Representatives at the other capitals in Europe to inform the several foreign offices of her step.

*France* counsels moderation in Vienna.

*Germany* and *Great Britain* are quoted as having done the same.

**Austria-Hungary :**

*To Belgrade.*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 7

*Count Berchtold to Freiherr von Giesl in Belgrade.*

*Vienna, July 22, 1914.*

*Your Honor will please transmit the following note on Thursday, July 23, in the afternoon, to the Royal Government.*

(Translation)

LE Gouvernement Impérial et Royal s'est vu obligé d'adresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois, par l'entremise du Ministre Impérial et Royal à Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie :

"Le 31 mars, 1909, le Ministre de Serbie à Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal la déclaration suivante : —

"La Serbie reconnaît qu'elle n'a pas été atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli créé en Bosnie-Herzégovine et qu'elle se conformera par conséquent à telle décision que les

THE Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on the 23rd July, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade : —

"On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government : —

"Servia recognises that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with

Puissances prendront par rapport à l'article 25 du Traité de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des Grandes Puissances, la Serbie s'engage dès à présent à abandonner l'attitude de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a observée à l'égard de l'annexion depuis l'automne dernier, et elle s'engage, en outre, à changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers l'Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre désormais avec cette dernière sur le pied d'un bon voisinage.'

"Or, l'histoire des dernières années, et notamment les événements douloureux du 28 juin, ont démontré l'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement subversif dont le but est de détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe, est arrivé à se manifester au delà du territoire du royaume par des actes de terrorisme, par une série d'attentats et par des meurtres.

"Le Gouvernement Royal serbe, loin de satisfaire aux engagements formels contenus dans la déclaration du 31 mars, 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement: il a toléré l'activité criminelle des différentes sociétés et affiliations dirigées contre la Monarchie, le langage effréné de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'attentats, la participation d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans les agissements subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans l'instruction publique, toléré enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe à la haine de la

article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Servia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighbourly terms with the latter.'

"The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

"Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction; in

Monarchie et au mépris de ses institutions.

"Cette tolérance coupable du Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'avait pas cessé au moment où les événements du 28 juin dernier en ont démontré au monde entier les conséquences funestes.

"Il résulte des dépositions et aveux des auteurs criminels de l'attentat du 28 juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a été tramé à Belgrade, que les armes et explosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient être munis leur ont été donnés par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes faisant partie de la 'Narodna Odbrana,' et enfin que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a été organisé et effectué par des chefs du service-frontière serbe.

"Les résultats mentionnés de l'instruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de poursuivre plus longtemps l'attitude de longanimité expectative qu'il avait observée pendant des années vis-à-vis des agissements concentrés à Belgrade et propagés de là sur les territoires de la Monarchie; ces résultats lui imposent au contraire le devoir de mettre fin à des menées qui forment une menace perpétuelle pour la tranquillité de la Monarchie.

"C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se voit obligé de demander au Gouvernement serbe l'annexion officielle qu'il condamne la propagande dirigée

short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions.

"This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world.

"It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Sarajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade; that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the 'Narodna Odbrana'; and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

"The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which they have maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on them the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy.

"To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government see themselves compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that they condemn this dangerous propa-

contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage à supprimer, par tous les moyens, cette propagande criminelle et terroriste.

"Afin de donner un caractère solennel à cet engagement, le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie fera publier à la première page du 'Journal officiel' en date du 13/26 juillet l'énonciation suivante: —

"Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels.

"Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé à la propagande susmentionnée et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auquel le Gouvernement Royal s'était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 mars, 1909.

"Le Gouvernement Royal, qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements qu'il

ganda against the Monarchy; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that they undertake to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

"In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of their 'Official Journal' of the 13/26 July the following declaration: —

"The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary — *i.e.*, the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

"The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Government were solemnly pledged by their declaration of the 31st March, 1909.

"The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, consider it their duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward they will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations,

mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer.'

"Cette énonciation sera portée simultanément à la connaissance de l'Armée Royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majesté le Roi et sera publiée dans le 'Bulletin officiel' de l'armée.

"Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage en outre :

"1° à supprimer toute publication qui excite à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie et dont la tendance générale est dirigée contre son intégrité territoriale ;

"2° à dissoudre immédiatement la société dite 'Narodna Odbrana,' à confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, et à procéder de la même manière contre les autres sociétés et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent à la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise ; le Gouvernement Royal prendra les mesures nécessaires pour que les sociétés dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activité sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme ;

"3° à éliminer sans délai de l'instruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie ;

"4° à éloigner du service militaire et de l'administration en général tous les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et dont le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se réserve de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gouvernement Royal ;

which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and suppress.'

"This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the Royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and shall be published in the 'Official Bulletin' of the Army.

"The Royal Servian Government further undertake :

"1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity ;

"2. To dissolve immediately the society styled 'Narodna Odbrana,' to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form ;

"3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary ;

"4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the Royal Government ;

"5° à accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirigé contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie;

"6° à ouvrir une enquête judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe;

"des organes, délégués par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, prendront part aux recherches y relatives;

"7° à procéder d'urgence à l'arrestation du Commandant Voija Tankosić et du nommé Milan Čiganović, employé de l'État serbe, compromis par les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo;

"8° à empêcher, par des mesures efficaces, le concours des autorités serbes dans le trafic illécite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière;

"à licencier et punir sévèrement les fonctionnaires du service-frontière de Schabatz et de Ložnica coupables d'avoir aidé les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontière;

"9° à donner au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal des explications sur les propos injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, qui, malgré leur position

"5. To accept the collaboration<sup>1</sup> in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;

"6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 8th June who are on Servian territory; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation<sup>1</sup> relating thereto;

"7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employé, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo;

"8. To prevent by effective measures the coöperation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Ložnica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;

"9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding

<sup>1</sup> The meaning of Clauses 5 and 6 was, according to Austria-Hungary, "wilfully misinterpreted" by Serbia and her champions. See British Blue Book No. 64, July 28, 1914, where Austria-Hungary is quoted as stating "that coöperation of Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures." Similar coöperation in investigation had, upon request, been granted to Serbia twice at least in the past (see *Austro-Hungary and the War* by Ernest Ludwig), and had also been asked by, and granted to, the United States of America in the investigation of the sinking of the *Maine*. See also the Austrian Explanation, *Austro-Hungarian Red Book* No. 27, July 25, where Austria-Hungary explains that what she has in mind is an arrangement in Serbia similar to the "Bureau de Sûreté" maintained in Paris by Russia. See also *Red Book* No. 34, July 27, 1914.



officielle, n'ont pas hésité après l'attentat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une manière hostile envers la Monarchie austro-hongroise; enfin

"10° d'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents.

"Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal attend la réponse du Gouvernement Royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi, 25 de ce mois, à 6 heures du soir.

"Un mémoire concernant les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo à l'égard des fonctionnaires mentionnés aux points 7 et 8 est annexé à cette note."

J'ai l'honneur d'inviter votre Excellence de vouloir porter le contenu de cette note à la connaissance du Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité, en accompagnant cette communication du commentaire que voici :

Le 31 mars, 1909, le Gouvernement Royal serbe a adressé à l'Autriche-Hongrie la déclaration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus.

Le lendemain même de cette déclaration la Serbie s'est engagée dans une politique tendant à inspirer des idées subversives aux ressortissants serbes de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et à préparer ainsi la séparation des territoires austro-hongrois, limitrophes à la Serbie.

La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle.

Des sociétés et affiliations ne tardèrent pas à se former qui, soit ouvertement, soit clandestinement, étaient destinées à

their official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally,

"10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

"The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July.

"A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note."

I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following observations : —

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and so preparing for the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier.

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of dis-

créer des désordres sur le territoire austro-hongrois. Ces sociétés et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des généraux et des diplomates, des fonctionnaires d'Etat et des juges, bref les sommités du monde officiel et inofficiel du royaume.

Le journalisme serbe est presque entièrement au service de cette propagande, dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent leurs lecteurs à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie voisine ou à des attentats dirigés plus ou moins ouvertement contre sa sûreté et son intégrité.

Un grand nombre d'agents est appelé à soutenir par tous les moyens l'agitation contre l'Autriche-Hongrie et à corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays.

L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens serbes, esprit dont les annales du royaume portent les sanglantes empreintes, a subi une recrudescence depuis la dernière crise balkanique; des individus ayant fait partie des bandes jusque-là occupées en Macédoine sont venus se mettre à la disposition de la propagande terroriste contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

En présence de ces agissements, auxquels l'Autriche-Hongrie est exposée depuis des années, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gouvernement serbe a manqué au devoir que lui imposait la déclaration solennelle du 31 mars, 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contradiction avec la volonté de l'Europe et avec l'engagement

orders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members generals and diplomatists, Government officials and judges — in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom; individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government have not thought it incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Servian Government have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the under-



qu'il avait pris vis-à-vis de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

La longanimité du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal à l'égard de l'attitude provocatrice de la Serbie était inspirée du désintéressement territorial de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de l'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe finirait tout de même par apprécier à sa juste valeur l'amitié de l'Autriche-Hongrie. En observant une attitude bienveillante pour les intérêts politiques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal espérait que le royaume se déciderait finalement à suivre de son côté une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait surtout à une pareille évolution dans les idées politiques en Serbie, lorsque, après les événements de l'année 1912, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal rendit possible, par une attitude désintéressée et sans rancune, l'agrandissement si considérable de la Serbie.

Cette bienveillance manifestée par l'Autriche-Hongrie à l'égard de l'État voisin n'a cependant aucunement modifié les procédés du royaume, qui a continué à tolérer sur son territoire une propagande, dont les funestes conséquences se sont manifestées au monde entier le 28 juin dernier, jour où l'héritier présomptif de la Monarchie et son illustre épouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot tramé à Belgrade.

En présence de cet état de choses le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a dû se décider à entreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes démarches à Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouvernement serbe à arrêter le mouvement incen-

taking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Serbia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of Serbia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Serbia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement of Serbia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is

diaire menaçant la sûreté et l'intégrité de la Monarchie austro-hongroise.

Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal est persuadé qu'en entreprenant cette démarche il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisées, qui ne sauraient admettre que le régicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impunément dans la lutte politique, et que la paix européenne fût continuellement troublée par les agissements partant de Belgrade.

C'est à l'appui de ce qui précède que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal tient à la disposition du Gouvernement Royal de Grande-Bretagne un dossier elucidant les menées serbes et les rapports existant entre ces menées et le meurtre du 28 juin.

Une communication identique est adressée aux représentants Impériaux et Royaux auprès des autres Puissances signataires.

Vous êtes autorisé de laisser une copie de cette dépêche entre les mains de M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

Vienne, le 24 juillet, 1914.

threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold at the disposal of the British Government a *dossier* elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

#### ANNEXE

L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le Tribunal de Sarajevo contre Gavril Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicité y relative — crime commis par eux le 28 juin dernier — a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations suivantes :

1°. Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son séjour à

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#### ANNEX

The criminal enquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against Gavril Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassination committed by them on the 28th June last has up to the present led to the following conclusions : —

1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Arch-

Sarajevo, de l'Archiduc François-Ferdinand fut formé à Belgrade par Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, le nommé Milan Čiganović et Trifko Grabež, avec le concours du commandant Voija Tankosić.

2°. Les six bombes et les quatre pistolets Browning avec munition, moyennant lesquels les malfaiteurs ont commis l'attentat, furent livrés à Belgrade à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež par le nommé Milan Čiganović et le commandant Voija Tankosić.

3°. Les bombes sont des grenades à la main provenant du dépôt d'armes de l'armée serbe à Kragujevač.

4°. Pour assurer la réussite de l'attentat, Čiganović enseigna à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež la manière de se servir des grenades et donna, dans un forêt près du champ de tir à Topšchider, des leçons de tir avec pistolets Browning à Princip et Grabež.

5°. Pour rendre possible à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež de passer la frontière de Bosnie-Herzégovine et d'y introduire clandestinement leur contrebande d'armes, un système de transport secret fut organisé par Čiganović.

D'après cette organisation l'introduction en Bosnie-Herzégovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut opérée par les capitaines-frontières de Chabač (Rade Popović) et de Ložnica ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbić de Ložnica avec le concours de divers particuliers.

duke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, one Milan Čiganović, and Trifko Grabež, with the assistance of Commander Voija Tankosić.

2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež by the man Milan Čiganović and Commander Voija Tankosić at Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand-grenades coming from the arms depot of the Servian army at Kragujevač.

4. In order to ensure the success of the act, Čiganović taught Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež how to use the bombs, and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabež in a forest near the shooting ground at Topšchider.

5. To enable Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was organised by Čiganović.

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the frontiers at Chabeč (Rade Popović) and Ložnica, as well as by the customs officer Rudivoj Grbić, of Ložnica, with the assistance of various individuals.

On the occasion of transmitting the above note, your Honor will verbally add that you are instructed — in case an unconditional affirmative answer of the Royal Government shall not in the meantime have been delivered to you — to leave Belgrade together with the personnel of the Imperial and Royal Embassy at the expiration of the

period of grace of forty-eight hours after your communication contemplated in the note has been made.

*To Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, Petrograd, and Constantinople*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK NO. 8

*Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburg and Constantinople*

*Vienna, July 22,<sup>1</sup> 1914.*

(Translated from the French.)

THE Imperial and Royal Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Royal Servian Government on Thursday, the 23rd instant, through the medium of the Imperial and Royal Minister at Belgrade (see instructions to the Imperial and Royal Envoy in Belgrade of July 22nd, 1914).

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Serbia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing for the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier.

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members generals and diplomatists, Government officials and judges — in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom; individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government have not thought

<sup>1</sup> This note was to be presented on July 24. See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 9, July 23, 1914.

it incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Servian Government have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Servia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement of Servia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold at the disposal of the British Government a *dossier* elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

France :

*To London, Petrograd, Vienna, Rome*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 17

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 22, 1914.*

M. JULES CAMBON having questioned Herr von Jagow on the tenor of the Austrian note at Belgrade, the latter replied that he knew nothing of the text; our Ambassador expressed his great astonishment at this.<sup>1</sup> He emphasizes that the weakness of the Berlin Bourse continues, and that pessimistic rumours are current.

M. Barrère also discussed the same question with the Marquis di San Giuliano, who appears disturbed by it, and gives the assurance that he is working<sup>2</sup> at Vienna in order that Serbia may not be asked for anything beyond what is practicable, for instance, the dissolution of the Bosnian Club, and not a judicial inquiry into the causes of the crime of Serajevo.

In present circumstances, the most favourable presumption one can make is that the Cabinet at Vienna, finding itself carried away by the press and the military party, is trying to obtain the maximum from Serbia by starting to intimidate her, directly and indirectly, and looks to Germany for support in this.

I have asked the French Ambassador at Vienna to use all his influence with Count Berchtold and to represent to him, in a friendly conversation, how much Europe would appreciate moderation on the part of the Austrian Government, and what consequences would be likely to be entailed by violent pressure on Serbia.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

*From Vienna*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 18

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 22,<sup>3</sup> 1914.*

NOTHING is known as to the decision which Count Berchtold, who is prolonging his stay at Ischl, is trying to obtain from the Emperor. The intention of proceeding against Serbia with the greatest severity, of having done with her, of "treating her like another Poland," is attributed to the Government. Eight army corps are said to be ready to start on the campaign, but M. Tisza, who is very dis-

<sup>1</sup> French Yellow Book No. 15, July 21, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> The despatch from Rome containing this information has not been published in the French Yellow Book or elsewhere.

<sup>3</sup> The date of this despatch seems strange, since Count Berchtold had returned to Vienna and despatched the "Serbian Note" to the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade on that date.

turbed about the excitement in Croatia, is said to have intervened actively in order to exercise a moderating influence.

In any case it is believed that the *démarche* will be made at Belgrade this week. The requirements of the Austro-Hungarian Government with regard to the punishment of the outrage, and to guarantees of control and police supervision, seem to be acceptable to the dignity of the Servians; M. Yovanovich believes they will be accepted. M. Pashitch wishes for a peaceful solution, but says that he is ready for a full resistance. He has confidence in the strength of the Servian army; besides, he counts on the union of all the Slavs in the Monarchy to paralyse the effort directed against his country.

Unless people are absolutely blinded, it must be recognised here that a violent blow has every chance of being fatal both to the Austro-Hungarian army and to the cohesion of the nationalities governed by the Emperor, which has already been so much compromised.

Herr von Tschirscky, the German Ambassador, is showing himself a supporter of violent measures, while at the same time he is willing to let it be understood that the Imperial Chancery would not be in entire agreement with him on this point. The Russian Ambassador, who left yesterday for the country in consequence of reassuring explanations made to him at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has confided to me that his Government will not raise any objection to steps directed towards the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the societies which are notoriously revolutionary, but could not accept requirements which would humiliate Servian national feeling.

DUMAINE.

*From London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 19

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 22, 1914.*

YOUR Excellency has been good enough to communicate to me the impressions which have been collected by our Ambassador at Berlin with regard to the *démarche* which the Austro-Hungarian Minister is proposing to make at Belgrade.

These impressions have been confirmed by a conversation which I had yesterday with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Sir Edward Grey told me that he had seen the German Ambassador, who stated to him <sup>1</sup> that at Berlin a *démarche* of the Austro-Hungarian

<sup>1</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 2, July 22, 1914. The interview here spoken of is not given in this British Blue Book unless it is the interview of July 20, British Blue Book No. 1, July 20. Sir E. Grey's remarks quoted here are so much like those made by him on July 20 that it seems unlikely that the interviews given in French Yellow Book No. 19 and British Blue Book No. 1 are not the same. In that case, however, the remarks of the German Ambassador are wrongly given either here or in the Blue Book. In British Blue Book No. 2, July 22, the German Secretary of Foreign Affairs is quoted as considering it "inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Government." It seems incredible that the accuracy of this statement should not have been challenged in the British Blue Book if the German

Government to the Servian Government was expected. Prince Lichnowsky assured him that the German Government were endeavouring to hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna,<sup>1</sup> but that up to the present time they had not been successful in this, and that he was not without anxiety as to the results of a *démarche* of this kind. Sir Edward Grey answered Prince Lichnowsky that he would like to believe that, before intervening at Belgrade, the Austro-Hungarian Government had fully informed themselves as to the circumstances of the conspiracy to which the Hereditary Archduke and the Duchess of Hohenburg had fallen victims, and had assured themselves that the Servian Government had been cognisant of it and had not done all that lay in their power to prevent the consequences. For if it could not be proved that the Servian Government were responsible and implicated to a certain degree, the intervention of Austria-Hungary would not be justified and would arouse against them the opinion of Europe.

The communication of Prince Lichnowsky had left Sir Edward Grey with an impression of anxiety which he did not conceal from me. The same impression was given me by the Italian Ambassador, who also fears the possibility of fresh tension in Austro-Servian relations.

This morning the Servian Minister came to see me, and he shares the apprehensions of Sir Edward Grey. He fears that Austria may make of the Servian Government demands which their dignity, and above all the susceptibility of public opinion, will not allow them to accept without a protest. When I pointed out to him the quiet which appears to reign at Vienna, and to which all the Ambassadors accredited to that Court bear testimony, he answered that this official quiet was only apparent and concealed feelings which were most fundamentally hostile to Servia. But, he added, if these feelings take a public form (*démarche*) which lacks the moderation that is desirable, it will be necessary to take account of Servian public opinion, which has been inflamed by the harsh treatment to which the Austrian Government have constantly subjected that country, and which has been made less patient by the memory of two victorious wars which is still quite fresh. Notwithstanding the sacrifices which Servia has made for her recent victories she can still put 400,000 men in the field, and public opinion, which knows this, is not inclined to put up with any humiliation.

Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador,<sup>2</sup> asked him to recommend his Government not to depart from the prudence and moderation necessary for avoiding new complications, not to demand from Servia any measures to which she could not reasonably submit, and not to allow themselves to be carried away too far.

PAUL CAMBON.

Ambassador had told Sir E. Grey on July 20 (or 21) that the "German Government were endeavouring to hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna etc."

<sup>1</sup> This important statement is not given in the British Blue Book. See previous note.

<sup>2</sup> Such an interview is published in the British Blue Book No. 3, July 23, while this despatch is dated July 22, 1914.



Great Britain :

*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 2

*Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 22)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 22, 1914.*

LAST night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the forthcoming Austrian *démarche* at Belgrade was alluded to by his Excellency in the conversation that ensued. His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that question at issue was one for settlement between Serbia and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference from outside in the discussions between those two countries. He had therefore considered it inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Government on the matter. He had, however, on several occasions, in conversation with the Servian Minister, emphasised the extreme importance that Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing.

Finally, his Excellency observed to me that for a long time past the attitude adopted towards Serbia by Austria had, in his opinion, been one of great forbearance.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the previous despatch, French Yellow Book No. 19.

Thursday, July 23, 1914

The Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum is Presented to Serbia

# SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	London	—
Belgium	—	—
France	London, etc.	Munich
Germany	London, etc.	—
Great Britain	Vienna	Rome, Austr.-Hung. Ambassador
Russia	—	Belgrade
Servia	London, etc.	Aust.-Hung. Minister

*Austria-Hungary* presents her note to Serbia at 6 p.m.; and believing that "Great Britain might be most easily led to form an impartial judgment," sends special instructions to her Ambassador in London.

*Germany* sends instructions to her Ambassadors in London, Paris, and Petrograd, dating these instructions July 23 for presentation on July 24. In the instructions she defines her position.

*Great Britain* is informally informed of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, and discusses the possibility of a European war.

## Austria-Hungary :

*To London*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK NO. 9

*Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 23, 1914.*

As among the Entente Powers, Great Britain might be most easily led to form an impartial judgment on the step which we are to-day taking at Belgrade, I request Your Excellency in the conversation which you will have on the 24th instant on the occasion when you hand in our circular note<sup>1</sup> at the Foreign Office, to point out among other matters that it would have been within the power of Servia to render less acute the serious steps which she must expect from us, by spontaneously doing what is necessary in order to start an inquiry on Servian soil against the Servian accomplices in the crime of 28th June, and by bringing to light the threads, which, as has been proved, lead from Belgrade to Servia.

Up to the present time, although a number of notorious indications point to Belgrade, the Servian Government have not taken any steps in this direction; on the contrary, they have attempted to wipe out the existing traces.

Thus, from a telegraphic despatch from our Legation at Belgrade,<sup>2</sup> it is to be gathered that the Servian civil servant Čiganović, who is compromised by the independent testimony of the affidavits of both

<sup>1</sup> Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 8, July 22.

<sup>2</sup> This Despatch has not been published in the Austro-Hungarian Red Book.

criminals, on the day of the outrage was still in Belgrade, and three days afterwards, when his name was mentioned in the papers, had already left the town. As is well known also, the director of the Servian press declared that Čiganović is completely unknown in Belgrade.

With regard to the short time-limit attached to our demand, this must be attributed to our long experience of the dilatory arts of Servia.<sup>1</sup>

The requirements which we demand that Servia should fulfil, and which indeed contains nothing which is not a matter of course in the intercourse between States which are to live in peace and friendship, cannot be made the subject of negotiations and compromise; and, having regard to our economic interests, we cannot take the risk of a method of political action by which it would be open to Servia at pleasure to prolong the crisis which has arisen.

France :

*To London, Berlin, Petrograd and Rome.*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 20

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Rome.*

*Paris, July 23, 1914.*

ACCORDING to information collected by the French Ambassador at Vienna,<sup>2</sup> the first intention of the Austro-Hungarian Government had been to proceed with the greatest severity against Servia, while keeping eight army corps ready to start operations.

The disposition at this moment was more conciliatory; in answer to a question put to him by M. Dumaine, whom I instructed to call the attention of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the anxiety aroused in Europe, Baron Macchio stated<sup>3</sup> to our Ambassador that the tone of the Austrian note, and the demands which would be formulated in it, allow us to count on a peaceful result. In view of the customary procedure of the Imperial Chancery I do not know what confidence ought to be placed in these assurances.

In any case the Austrian note will be presented in a very short space of time. The Servian Minister holds that as M. Pashitch wishes to come to an understanding, he will accept those demands which relate to the punishment of the outrage and to the guarantees for control and police supervision, but that he will resist everything which might affect the sovereignty and dignity of his country.

In diplomatic circles at Vienna the German Ambassador is in favour of violent measures, while at the same time he confesses that

<sup>1</sup> Exactly the same explanation for the forthcoming time limit was advanced in French Yellow Book, Nos. 13 and 14, as early as July 19, 1914. Austria could, of course, not know that the substance of her note and her reasons for it had been familiar to the Entente Powers since the previous Sunday.

<sup>2</sup> French Yellow Book No. 18, July 22, 1915.

<sup>3</sup> The interview here referred to is not mentioned in the only published Despatch, French Yellow Book No. 18, July 22, 1915, on which the present message can be based.

the Imperial Chancery is perhaps not entirely in agreement with him on this point; the Russian Ambassador, trusting to assurances which have been given him, has left Vienna, and before his departure confided to M. Dumaine that his Government will not raise any objection to the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the revolutionary associations, but that they could not accept requirements which were humiliating to the national sentiment of Servia.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

*From Munich*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 21

*M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paris.*

*Munich, July 23, 1914.*

THE Bavarian press seems to believe that a peaceful solution of the Austro-Servian incident is not only possible but even probable; on the other hand official circles have for some time been assuming with more or less sincerity an air of real pessimism.

In particular the President of the Council said to me to-day that the Austrian note the contents of which were known to him (*dont il avait connaissance*<sup>1</sup>) was in his opinion drawn up in terms which could be accepted by Servia, but that none the less the existing situation appeared to him to be very serious.

Germany:

*To Paris, London, and Petrograd*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 1<sup>2</sup>

*The Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassadors at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg, on July 23rd, 1914.*

THE publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian successor to the throne and his consort took place, disclose clearly the aims which the pan-Serb propaganda has set itself and the

<sup>1</sup> The French phrase does not imply accurate knowledge. It may mean that he had a general idea of the contents, possibly similar to that shared by the Entente Powers since July 19, 1914; cf. French Yellow Book, Nos. 13 and 14.

Bavaria is one of the federated States comprising the German Empire. Owing to its size and importance it enjoys special prerogatives, one of which is its independent representation in some foreign capitals and at the Vatican. Diplomatic negotiations of importance and those concerning the Empire are conducted by the German Foreign Office and the German Ambassadors and Ministers. If the President of the Bavarian Council had more accurate information of the Austrian note than the phrase definitely says he had, he may have received it through the Bavarian Minister who being a Catholic may be assumed to have been in intimate personal relations with the leading Catholics of Austria-Hungary.

<sup>2</sup> The German Foreign Office is not in the habit of issuing collected diplomatic papers on given subjects as the British Foreign Office is. As regards the outbreak of the European War the German Foreign Office contented itself with issuing a narrative to which a number of despatches were added as exhibits. There are therefore comparatively few German despatches published. For the narrative see pp. 551 to 560.

means which it utilises for their realization. Through the published facts the last doubt must disappear that the centre of action of the efforts for the separation of the South Slavic provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their union with the Servian Kingdom must be sought in Belgrade where it displays its activity with the connivance of members of the Government and of the Army.

The Serb intrigues may be traced back through a series of years. In a specially marked manner the pan-Serb chauvinism showed itself during the Bosnian crisis.<sup>1</sup> Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intercession of the Powers is it to be ascribed that the provocations to which at that time Austria-Hungary was exposed on the part of Servia, did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of future well-behaviour which the Servian Government gave at that time, it has not kept. Under the very eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance of official Servia, the pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile increased in scope and intensity; at its door is to be laid the latest crime the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become evident that it is compatible neither with the dignity nor with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to view any longer idly the doings across the border through which the safety and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened. With this state of affairs, the action as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only as justifiable. Nevertheless, the attitude assumed by public opinion as well as by the Government in Servia does not preclude the fear that the Servian Government will decline to meet these demands and that it will allow itself to be carried away into a provocative attitude toward Austria-Hungary. Nothing would remain for the Austro-Hungarian Government, unless it renounced definitely its position as a great Power, but to press its demands with the Servian Government, and, if need be, enforce the same by appeal to military measures, in regard to which the choice of means must be left with it.

I have the honour to request you to express yourself<sup>2</sup> in the sense indicated above to (the present representative of M. Viviani) (Sir Edward Grey) (M. Sasonof) and therewith give special emphasis to the view that in this question there is concerned an affair which should be settled solely between Austria-Hungary and Servia, the limitation to which it must be the earnest endeavour of the powers to insure. We anxiously desire the localisation of the conflict because

<sup>1</sup> Of 1908-1909.

<sup>2</sup> Austria had sent her note to her representative in Belgrade on July 22, and notified her other representatives on the same day, Austro-Hungarian Red Book Nos. 7 and 8. The formal presentation of the note in Servia was to take place in the afternoon of July 23, while the Powers were to be informed of it officially, receiving a copy of the note on July 24, 1914; cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 9. Informally the Powers were informed on July 23; cf. British Blue Book No. 3, July 23, 1914.

On July 21, French Yellow Book No. 15, the German Secretary of Foreign Affairs had said he did not know the contents of the forthcoming note. Between then and July 23, Germany had been informed of the note, and as the above despatch proves, given her approval.

every intercession of another power on account of the various treaty-alliances would precipitate inconceivable consequences.

I shall look forward with interest to a telegraphic report about the course of your interview.

Great Britain :

*From Rome*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 38

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 27.)*<sup>1</sup>

Sir,

*Rome, July 23, 1914.*

I GATHER that the Italian Government have been made cognisant of the terms of the communication which will be addressed to Servia. Secretary-General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusiones which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success.

I have, etc.

RENNELL RODD.

*To Vienna*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 3

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 23, 1914.*

COUNT MENSENDORFF<sup>2</sup> told me to-day that he would be able to-morrow morning to let me have officially the communication that he understood was being made to Servia to-day by Austria. He then explained privately what the nature of the demand would be. As he told me that the facts would all be set out in the paper that he would give me to-morrow, it is unnecessary to record them now. I gathered that they would include proof of the complicity of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Servia.

As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would make any comment until I received an official communication, and it seemed to me probably a matter on which I should not be able to make any comment at first sight.

But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would

<sup>1</sup> This is a letter, delayed in transmission to July 27, and therefore printed by Sir E. Grey among the July 27 despatches. Important diplomatic messages are sent in duplicate by telegram and by letter. This is one of the few instances where Sir E. Grey did not print the telegram, which undoubtedly was properly received. The British Blue Book contains no explanation.

<sup>2</sup> Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

be something in the nature of a time-limit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum, I said that I regretted<sup>1</sup> this very much. To begin with a time-limit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from Servia. I admitted that, if there was no time-limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but I urged that a time-limit could always be introduced afterwards; that, if the demands were made without a time-limit in the first instance, Russian public opinion might be less excited, after a week it might have cooled down, and if the Austrian case was very strong it might be apparent that the Russian Government would be in a position to use their influence in favour of a satisfactory reply from Servia. A time-limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last resort, after other means had been tried and failed.

Count Mensdorff said that if Servia, in the interval that had elapsed since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an enquiry on her own territory, all this might have been avoided. In 1909, Servia had said in a note that she intended to live on terms of good neighbourhood with Austria; but she had never kept her promise, she had stirred up agitation the object of which was to disintegrate Austria, and it was absolutely necessary for Austria to protect herself.

I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count Mensdorff had told me this afternoon, but I could not help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the situation. Great apprehension had been expressed to me, not specially by M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff,<sup>2</sup> but also by others, as to what might happen, and it had been represented to me that it would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburg should use it on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Europe — let us say, Austria, France, Russia, and Germany — were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European<sup>3</sup> credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away.

<sup>1</sup> France, and therefore probably the Entente Powers had known of the time limit since July 19, 1914; cf. French Yellow Book, Nos. 13 and 14.

<sup>2</sup> Accounts of previous interviews to this effect with the Russian and French Ambassadors are not printed in the British Blue Book.

<sup>3</sup> This suggests what Sir E. Grey said in his speech of August 3, that England would suffer almost as much if she stayed out as if she entered the war. Such a view contemplates only England's trade, and disregards the loss of lives.



Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would depend upon Russia.

I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this, it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each other.

Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but he was under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburg had not been very favourable recently.

I am, etc.

E. GREY.

Russia:

*From Belgrade.*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 1

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Belgrade, July 10 (23), 1914.*

THE Austrian Minister, at 6 o'clock this evening, presented an ultimatum from his Government to the Minister of Finance, Patchou, in the absence of Pashitch, requiring the acceptance of the demands contained therein within forty-eight hours. Giesl added verbally that, in the event of failure to accept the note integrally within forty-eight hours, he was under instructions to leave Belgrade with the staff at the legation. Pashitch and the other Ministers, who are away electioneering, have been recalled and are expected at Belgrade to-morrow, Friday, at 10 A.M. Patchou, who communicated to me the contents of the note, solicits the help of Russia and declares that no Servian Government could accept the demands of Austria.

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 2

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Belgrade, July 10 (23), 1914.*

TEXT of the note presented to the Servian Government by the Austro-Hungarian Minister to-day.

[Here follows the text of the note, for which see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7, July 22, 1914.]



**Serbia :**

*From Austro-Hungarian Minister*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 32

*Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, to Dr. Laza Patchou, Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Belgrade, July 10/23, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to Your Excellency herewith the enclosed Note which I have received from my Government, addressed to the Royal Serbian Government.

I have, etc.

Handed personally at 6 P.M.

[For the text of the note see Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 7, July 22, 1914.]

*To All the Serbian Legations Abroad*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 33

*Dr. Laza Patchou, Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 10/23, 1914.*

THE Austro-Hungarian Minister handed me this afternoon at 6 P.M. a note in regard to the Serajevo outrage embodying the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and insisting on a reply from the Serbian Government within two days, *i.e.*, by Saturday, at 6 P.M. He informed me orally that he and his staff would leave Belgrade unless a favourable answer were forthcoming within the stipulated time.

Some of the Ministers being absent from Belgrade the Serbian Government have not as yet come to any decision, but I am in a position to state now that the demands are such that no Serbian Government could accept them in their entirety.

Friday, July 24, 1914

# SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	London, Petrograd	London, Paris, Petrograd
Belgium	London, etc.	Vienna
France	Viviani, London, etc.	Viviani, Berlin, London, Petrograd, Aust.-Hung. Ambassador
Germany		Vienna, Petrograd
Great Britain	Vienna, Paris, Berlin, Belgrade	Petrograd, Vienna, Belgrade, German Ambassador
Russia	Vienna, London etc.	Berlin, Paris, Belgrade Aust.-Hung. Ambassador, Crown Prince of Servia
Serbia	Petrograd, London Crown Prince to Czar	Petrograd

The Governments of the several European Powers are officially notified of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia.

*Austria-Hungary* and *Germany* insist that the dispute remain localized between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

*Great Britain* proposes a Conference of four Powers, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy to mediate between Austria and Russia. At the request of the French Ambassador she apparently alters her plan to mean mediation between Austria and Servia. From the published despatches of this day, which are contradictory, it does not appear which plan Great Britain is urging. She refuses however, to exert pressure on Russia while asking Germany to exert pressure in Vienna.

*Great Britain* refuses Russia's request to promise her unconditional support of Russia and France, but instructs her representative in Belgrade to express no views except in agreement with the representatives of the other two Entente Powers, whose alliance with each other she recognizes to be as binding as that of Austria-Hungary and Germany.

*Serbia* is sure that war on her means a European War.

*Russia* is hostile in her dealings with Austria-Hungary and Germany, and discusses her determination to support Servia even to the extent of going to war, but does so only with the Entente Powers.

*France* promises to support Russia in war, if need be, but gives active diplomatic support to Great Britain's proposal of a Conference of Four Powers. Italy does the same.

*Great Britain* mobilizes her fleet, according to French Yellow Book No. 66, July 27, 1914, but does not mention this fact in any of her published despatches.

*Belgium* foresees a European war.

## Austria-Hungary :

*To London*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 17

*Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 24, 1914.*

IN answer to Your Excellency's telegram of yesterday :

I beg you to explain at once to Sir Edward Grey that our *démarche* of yesterday at Belgrade is not to be considered as a formal ultimatum,

but that it is merely a *démarche* with a time-limit, which, as Your Excellency will be good enough to explain to Sir Edward Grey in strict confidence will — if the time-limit expires without result — for the time be followed only by the breaking off of diplomatic relations, and by the beginning of the necessary military preparations, as we are absolutely resolved to carry through our just demands.

Your Excellency is empowered to add that if Servia, after the expiration of the time-limit, were only to give way under the pressure of our military preparations, we should indeed have to demand that she should make good the expenses which we had incurred; as is well known, we have already had twice (1908 and 1912) to mobilise because of Servia.

**Austria-Hungary:**

*From London*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 10

*Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*London, July 24, 1914.*

HAVE just handed the circular note to Sir Edward Grey, who read it carefully. At the fifth heading, he asked what it meant; to introduce officials of our Government in Servia would be equivalent to the end of Servian political independence. I answered that co-operation of, *e.g.*, police officials, in no way affected the sovereignty of the State.

He regretted the time-limit, as in this way we should be deprived of the possibility of quieting the first outbreak of excitement and bringing pressure to bear upon Belgrade to give us a satisfactory answer. It was always possible to send an ultimatum if answer not satisfactory.

I developed our point of view at length. (Necessity of defence against continued revolutionary undertakings which threaten the territory of the Monarchy, protection of our most vital interests, complete failure of the conciliatory attitude which we had hitherto often shown to Servia, who had had more than three weeks to set on foot of her own accord investigations as to accomplices in outrage, etc.)

The Secretary of State repeated his objections to the short time-limit, but recognized that what was said as to complicity in the crime of Serajevo, as well as many of our other requirements, was justified.

He would be quite ready to look on the affair as one which only concerned Austria-Hungary and Servia. He is, however, very "apprehensive" that several Great Powers might be involved in a war. Speaking of Russia, Germany and France, he observed that the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance might be more or less to the same effect as those of the Triple Alliance.

I fully explained to him our point of view, and repeated with emphasis that in this case we must stand firm so as to gain for our-

selves some sort of guarantees, as hitherto Servian promises have never been kept. I understand that in the first place he considered the question only as it influences the position of Europe. He must, however, in order to be fair to our point of view, put himself in our situation.

He would not go into any more detailed discussion on this subject, said he must have time to study the note more carefully. He was to see the German and the French Ambassadors, as he must first of all exchange ideas with the Powers who are allies of Austria-Hungary and Russia respectively, but have themselves no direct interest in Servia.

*From Paris*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 11

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

I HAVE just read instructions of the 22nd instant to the Minister of Justice,<sup>1</sup> who is entrusted with the representation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in his absence, and left copy.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, who had received information as to the contents of our *démarche* at Belgrade through this morning's papers, seemed to be considerably impressed by my communication. Without entering on any more detailed discussion of the text, he readily agreed that recent events and the attitude of the Servian Government made energetic action on our side quite comprehensible.

Point 5 in the note handed in at Belgrade seemed to make a special impression on the Minister as he asked me to read it to him twice.

The Minister thanked me for my communication which, he said, would be carefully examined. I took the opportunity to impress on him that the question was one which must be brought to an issue directly between Servia and us, but that it was in the general interests of Europe that the trouble which for years past had been kept up by Servian intrigues against us should at last make way for a clear situation.

All friends of peace and order, and I placed France in the first rank of these, should therefore give serious advice to Servia completely to change her attitude, and to satisfy our just demands.

The Minister said that it was the duty of Servia to proceed energetically against any accomplices of the murderers of Serajevo, a duty which she could not escape. While laying special stress on the sympathy of France for Austria-Hungary, and on the good relations which existed between our two countries, he expressed the hope that the controversy would be brought to an end peacefully in a manner corresponding to our wishes.

The Minister avoided every attempt to palliate or to defend in any way the attitude of Servia.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 25, July 24, 1914.

## AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 12

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

BARON SCHOEN will, in accordance with instructions,<sup>1</sup> make a communication here to-day that according to the view of the Berlin Cabinet, our controversy with Servia is a matter which concerns only Austria-Hungary and Servia.

In this connection, he would give them to understand that in case third States should wish to intervene, Germany, true to the obligations of her alliance, would be on our side.

## AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 13

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

BARON SCHOEN has just made the *démarche* as he was instructed.

M. Bienvenu-Martin said to him he could not yet express himself definitely. He could, however, already say this, that the French Government are also of opinion that our controversy with Servia concerns Belgrade and Vienna alone, and that it was hoped here that the question would find a direct and peaceful solution.

The Servian Minister here had already been advised<sup>2</sup> that his Government should give way in every point so far as it was possible, with the limitation, however, "so far as their sovereign rights were not affected."

Baron Schoen laid stress on the European necessity that the focus of constant disturbance at Belgrade must at last be done away with.

*To Petrograd*

## AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 18

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.**Vienna, July 24, 1914.*

I RECEIVED the Russian Chargé d'Affaires on the morning of the 24th, and assured him that I attached special importance to bringing to his knowledge as soon as possible the steps we were taking in Belgrade, and explaining to him our point of view as regards them.

Prince Koudacheff, while thanking me for this courtesy, did not hide his anxiety as to our categorical procedure against Servia, and he observed that there had always been apprehension at St. Petersburg that our *démarche* might take the form of a humiliation of Servia, which must have an echo in Russia.

I took the opportunity of reassuring the Russian Chargé d'Affaires

<sup>1</sup> German White Book, Exhibit 1, July 23, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Serbian Blue Book No. 10, July 2. For different advice given Serbia by France, see French Yellow Book No. 26, July 24, 1914.

as to this. Our aim was to clear up the untenable position of Servia as regards the Monarchy, and with this object to cause the Government of that State on the one hand publicly to disavow the tendencies directed against the present position of the Monarchy, and to suppress them by administrative measures, and on the other hand to make it possible for us to satisfy ourselves that these measures were honestly carried out. I explained at greater length the danger, not only to the integrity of the Monarchy, but also to the balance of power and the peace of Europe, which would be involved in giving further scope to the Great-Servian propaganda, and how all the dynasties, and, not least, the Russian, would apparently be threatened, if the idea took root that a movement which made use of murder as a national weapon could be continued with impunity.

In conclusion, I pointed out that we did not aim at any increase of territory, but only at the maintenance of what we possess, a point of view which could not fail to be understood by the Russian Government.

Prince Koudacheff remarked on this that he did not know the view of his own Government, and also did not know what position Servia would take towards individual demands.

At the conclusion of our interview the Chargé d'Affaires expressly said that he would not fail to bring to the notice of his Government the explanation which I had given him of the step we had taken, especially to the effect that no humiliation of Servia was intended by us.

*From Petrograd*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK NO. 14

*Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs on receiving me, said that he knew what brought me to him, and he would at once explain to me that he could not take up any definite attitude towards my *démarche*. I began by reading out my instructions.<sup>1</sup> The Minister interrupted me for the first time on the mention of the series of outrages, and, on my explanation, asked if then it had been proved that they all had originated at Belgrade. I laid stress on the fact that they all sprang from Servian instigation. In the further course of the reading he said that he knew what it was all about: we wanted to make war on Servia, and this was to serve as a pretext. I replied that our attitude during recent years was a sufficient proof that we neither sought nor required pretexts against Servia. The formal declaration which is required did not elicit any objection from the Minister; he only continued to maintain that Pasić had already expressed himself to this effect. This I corrected. "*Il dira cela 25 fois si vous voulez*," said he. I said to him that no one among us was attacking the integrity of Servia or th

<sup>1</sup> Austro-Hungarian Red Book Nos. 7 and 8, July 22, 1914.

dynasty. M. Sazonof expressed himself most vigorously against the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana, which Serbia would never undertake. The participation of Imperial and Royal officials in the suppression of the revolutionary movements elicited further protest on the part of the Minister. Serbia then will no longer be master in her own house. "You will always be wanting to intervene again, and what a life you will lead Europe." I answered that if Serbia shows goodwill it will be a quieter life than hitherto.

The commentary added to the communication of the note was listened to by the Minister with fair composure; at the passage that our feelings were shared by those of all civilised nations, he observed that this was a mistake. With all the emphasis I could command, I pointed out how regrettable it would be if we could not come to an understanding with Russia on this question, in which everything which is most sacred to us was at stake and, whatever the Minister might say, everything which is sacred in Russia. The Minister attempted to minimise the Monarchical side of the question.

With regard to the dossier which was put at the disposal of the Governments, M. Sazonof wanted to know why we had given ourselves this trouble, as we had already delivered the ultimatum. This was the best proof that we did not really desire an impartial examination of the matter. I said to him that the results which had been attained by our own investigations were quite sufficient for our procedure in this matter, which had to do with Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that we were only ready to give the Powers further information if it interested them, as we had nothing to keep secret.

M. Sazonof said that now that the ultimatum had been issued he was not in the least curious. He represented the matter as if we only wanted to make war with Serbia whatever happened. I answered that we were the most peace-loving Power in the world, but what we wanted was security for our territory from foreign revolutionary intrigues, and the protection of our dynasty from bombs.

In the course of the further discussion, M. Sazonof again made the observation that we certainly had created a serious situation.

In spite of his relative calm, the attitude of the Minister was throughout unaccommodating and hostile.

#### AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 15

*Communiqué of the Russian official Gazette.*

*St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.*

THE St. Petersburg telegraphic agency announces: —

The official journal publishes the following communiqué —

Recent events and the despatch of an ultimatum to Serbia by Austria-Hungary are causing the Russian Government the greatest anxiety. The Government are closely following the course of the dispute between the two countries, to which Russia cannot remain indifferent.

Franc

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK NO. 16

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

AFTER a Council of Ministers<sup>1</sup> which lasted for five hours, M. Sazonof this evening received the German Ambassador, and had a long conversation with him.

The Minister took the point of view, which is probably to be considered as the outcome of the Council of Ministers, that the Austro-Hungarian-Servian conflict was not a matter confined to these States, but a European affair, as the settlement arrived at in the year 1909 by the Servian declaration had been made under the auspices of the whole of Europe.

The Minister pointed out particularly that he had been disagreeably affected by the circumstance that Austria-Hungary had offered a dossier for investigation when an ultimatum had already been presented. Russia would require an international investigation of the dossier, which had been put at her disposal. My German colleague at once brought to M. Sazonof's notice that Austria-Hungary would not accept interference in her difference with Servia, and that Germany also on her side could not accept a suggestion which would be contrary to the dignity of her ally as a Great Power.

In the further course of the conversation, the Minister explained that that which Russia could not accept with indifference was the eventual intention of Austria-Hungary "*de dévorer la Serbie.*" Count Pourtales answered that he did not accept any such intention on the part of Austria-Hungary, as this would be contrary to the most special interest of the Monarchy. The only object of Austria-Hungary was "*d'infliger a la Serbie le châtement justement mérité.*" M. Sazonof on this expressed his doubts whether Austria-Hungary would allow herself to be contented with this, even if explanations on this point had been made.

The interview concluded with an appeal by M. Sazonof that Germany should work with Russia at the maintenance of peace.<sup>2</sup> The German Ambassador assured the Russian Minister that Germany certainly had no wish to bring about a war, but that she naturally fully represented the interests of her ally.

<sup>1</sup> This is undoubtedly the Council of Ministers at which Mr. Sazonof said, British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, 1914, he would have to consult his colleagues concerning the reply which Serbia would make to Austria.

<sup>2</sup> The condition on which Russia would insist is stated in British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914, where Sazonof, as a result of the Council of Ministers held in the afternoon of July 24, states: "Russia could not allow Austria to crush Serbia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war."

Students will note that while the determination of the Entente Powers to go to war unless Austria-Hungary recedes from her position is occasionally expressed even in the published despatches (e.g. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, French Yellow Book No. 38, July 25, and No. 37, which should be compared with British Blue Book No. 25, same day. See also the Editor's "Germany's Point of View," page 230), this is never mentioned to any of the Triple Alliance Powers.



Belgium :

*From Vienna*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 1

*Count Errembault de Dudzele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Vienna, July 24, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith the text of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Servia.

[Here follows the text of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, Red Book No. 7, July 22, 1914.]

*To Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna and Petrograd*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 2

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.*

Sir,

*Brussels, July 24, 1914.*

THE Belgian Government have had under their consideration whether, in present circumstances, it would not be advisable to address to the Powers who guarantee Belgian independence and neutrality a communication assuring them of Belgium's determination to fulfil the international obligations imposed upon her by treaty in the event of a war breaking out on her frontiers.

The Government have come to the conclusion that such a communication would be premature at present, but that events might move rapidly and not leave sufficient time to forward suitable instructions at the desired moment to the Belgian representatives abroad.

In these circumstances I have proposed to the King and to my colleagues in the Cabinet, who have concurred, to give you now exact instructions as to the steps to be taken by you if the prospect of a Franco-German war became more threatening.

I enclose herewith a note, signed, but not dated, which you should read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of which you should give him a copy, if circumstances render such a communication necessary.

I will inform you by telegram when you are to act on these instructions.

This telegram will be despatched when the order is given for the mobilisation of the Belgian army if, contrary to our earnest hope and to the apparent prospect of a peaceful settlement, our information leads us to take this extreme measure of precaution.

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Enclosure in No. 2.

Sir,

THE international situation is serious, and the possibility of a war between several Powers naturally preoccupies the Belgian Government.

Belgium has most scrupulously observed <sup>1</sup> the duties of a neutral State imposed upon her by the treaties of April 19, 1839; and those duties she will strive unflinchingly to fulfil, whatever the circumstances may be.

The friendly feelings of the Powers towards her have been so often reaffirmed that Belgium confidently expects that her territory will remain free from any attack, should hostilities break out upon her frontiers.

All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutrality have nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has been mobilised and is taking up such strategic positions as have been chosen to secure the defence of the country and the respect of its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put in a state of defence.

It is scarcely necessary to dwell upon the nature of these measures. They are intended solely to enable Belgium to fulfil her international obligations; and it is obvious that they neither have been nor can have been undertaken with any intention of taking part in an armed struggle between the Powers or from any feeling of distrust of any of those Powers.

In accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to communicate to your Excellency a copy of the declaration by the Belgian Government, and to request that you will be good enough to take note of it.

A similar communication has been made to the other Powers guaranteeing Belgian neutrality.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The truth of this statement has been challenged by Germany. For the Official Publications on this subject see *European Politics During the Decade before the War as Described by Belgian Diplomats*, German Foreign Office, 1915. See also Fuehr, Alexander, *The Neutrality of Belgium*, Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1915.

<sup>2</sup> These notes were presented to the several Powers on August 1, 1914, in accordance with a telegram (see Belgian Gray Book No. 16) of that day; i.e. a week and a day after the note had been drawn.

One of the reasons why Belgium drew this note thus early, on July 24, may be found in the events touched upon in an account of the experiences of a member of the British Military Intelligence Department, given by himself before the Boston Press Club on Sunday, January 14, 1915. This British officer is Mr. Forbes Sutherland, who said according to an affidavit by two witnesses in the editor's possession:

That for several years he had been a member of the British Military Intelligence Department.

That he landed in New York toward the end of June, 1914, and he there found a cablegram from the home office in London, already three days old, telling him to report immediately.

That he telephoned to his local chief in Montreal, Canada, to inquire what it was all about, and that he was told that it was for the European service.

That he had returned to London and that about one week before the first declaration of war he had gone to Antwerp with one of the heads of the intelligence department to concert measures with the head of the Belgian secret service.

*From M. Viviani, the French Premier, who had been absent together with the President on a visit to Russia.*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 22

*M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

I SHOULD be obliged if you would urgently send on to M. Dumaine the following information and instructions.

*Reval, July 24, 1914, 1 A.M.*

In the course of my conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs we had to take into consideration the dangers which might result from any step taken by Austria-Hungary in relation to Servia in connection with the crime of which the Hereditary Archduke has been a victim. We found ourselves in agreement in thinking that we should not leave anything undone to prevent a request for an explanation or some *mise en demeure* which would be equivalent to intervention in the internal affairs of Servia, of such a kind that Servia might consider it as an attack on her sovereignty and independence.

We have in consequence come to the opinion that we might by means of a friendly conversation with Count Berchtold, give him counsels of moderation, of such a kind as to make him understand how undesirable would be any intervention at Belgrade which would appear to be a threat on the part of the Cabinet at Vienna.

The British Ambassador, who was kept informed by M. Sazonof, expressed the idea that his Government would doubtless associate itself with a *démarche* for removing any danger which might threaten general peace, and he has telegraphed to his Government to this effect.

M. Sazonof has addressed instructions to this effect to M. Schebeko. While there is no question in this of collective or concerted action at Vienna on the part of the representatives of the Triple Entente, I ask you to discuss the matter with the Russian and British Ambassadors, and to come to an agreement with them as to the best means by which each of you can make Count Berchtold understand without delay the moderation that the present situation appears to us to require.

Further, it would be desirable to ask M. Paul Cambon to bring the advantages of this procedure to the notice of Sir Edward Grey, and to support the suggestion that the British Ambassador in Russia will have made to this effect to the Foreign Office. Count Benckendorff is instructed to make a similar recommendation.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 23

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, on board the "France."*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

I HAVE sent on your instructions to Vienna as urgent, but<sup>1</sup> from information contained in this morning's papers it appears that the Austrian note was presented at Belgrade at 6 o'clock yesterday evening.

This note, the official text of which has not yet been handed to us by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, appears to be very sharp; it appears to aim not only at obtaining the prosecution of the Serbs who were directly implicated in the outrage of Serajevo but to require the immediate suppression of the whole of the anti-Austrian propaganda in the Servian press and army. It is said to give Servia till 6 o'clock on Saturday evening to make her submission.

In sending your instructions to M. Dumaine I requested him to come to an agreement with his British and Russian colleagues<sup>2</sup> as to his action.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

France:

*From the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 24

[Here follows the text of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, Austrian Red Book No. 7, July 22, 1914.]

*To Viviani, and London, Berlin, Vienna, Petrograd, Rome and Belgrade.*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 25

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, on board the "France," and to London, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Rome, Belgrade.*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning left me a copy of the Austrian note which was handed in at Belgrade on Thursday evening. Count Szécsen in-

<sup>1</sup> M. Martin's reply, No. 23, indicates that he understood M. Viviani's message, No. 22, to suggest means by which Austria-Hungary might be prevented from presenting her note to Servia. If this was the meaning of the message, it can only have been written with a view to future publication and not in the hope of accomplishing anything. The note is dated July 24, 1 A.M. By that time both Russia and Great Britain had been informed of the contents of the note (British Blue Book No. 3) and the fact that the note had been presented (Russian Orange Book No. 2). In view of the decision of the Entente Powers to have their representatives act in unison — cf. last sentence of Yellow Book No. 23 with British Blue Book No. 12, July 24, 1914 — it is certain that neither Great Britain nor Russia would have kept so important an event as the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian note from the French Premier.

<sup>2</sup> The Entente Powers acted in the Serbian difficulty as a unit from the first. Cf. British Blue Book No. 12, same day, and French Yellow Book No. 23, same day, also Serbian Blue Book No. 5, June 30, 1914.

forms me that the Austro-Hungarian Government gives the Servian Government up to 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday the 25th for their answer.<sup>1</sup>

The note is based on the undertaking made by Servia on the 31st March 1909, to recognise the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reproaches the Servian Government with having tolerated an anti-Austrian propaganda in which officials, the army, and the press have taken part, a propaganda which threatens the security and integrity of Austria, and the danger of which has been shown by the crime of the 28th June which, according to the facts established during the investigation, was planned at Belgrade.

The Austrian Government explain that they are compelled to put an end to a propaganda which forms a permanent danger to their tranquillity, and to require from the Servian Government an official pronouncement of their determination to condemn and suppress it, by publishing in the Official Gazette of the 26th a declaration, the terms of which are given, condemning it, stating their regret, and threatening to crush it. A general order of the King to the Servian army is at the same time to make these declarations known to the army. In addition to this, the Servian Government are to undertake to suppress publications, to dissolve the societies, to dismiss those officers and civil servants whose names would be communicated to them by the Austrian Government, to accept the coöperation of Austrian officials in suppressing the subversive acts to which their attention has been directed, as well as for the investigation into the crime of Serajevo, and finally to proceed to the immediate arrest of a Servian officer and an official who were concerned in it.

Annexed to the Austrian memorandum is a note which sums up the facts established by the investigation into the crime of Serajevo, and declares that it was planned at Belgrade; that the bombs were provided for the murderers, and came from a depot of the Servian army; finally that the murderers were drilled and helped by Servian officers and officials.

On visiting the Acting Political Director immediately after making this communication, Count Szécsen without any observations informed him that the note had been presented. M. Berthelot, on my instructions, confined himself to pointing out to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador the feeling of anxiety which had been aroused by the information available this morning as to the contents of the Austrian note, and the painful feeling which could not fail to be aroused in French public opinion by the time chosen for so categorical

<sup>1</sup> The French Yellow Book prints here the following note: "The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in a private letter on the 24th July sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the following correction:

"In the copy of the dispatch which I had the honour to send to your Excellency this morning, it was said that my Government expected an answer from the Cabinet at Belgrade at latest by 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday the 25th of this month. As our Minister at Belgrade did not deliver his note yesterday until 6 o'clock in the evening, the time allowed for the answer has in consequence been prolonged to 6 o'clock to-morrow, Saturday evening.

"I consider it my duty to inform your Excellency of this slight alteration in the termination of the period fixed for the answer to the Servian Government."

a *démarche* with so short a time limit ; that is to say, a time when the President of the Republic and the President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic had left St. Petersburg and were at sea,<sup>1</sup> and consequently were not able to exert, in agreement with those Powers which were not directly interested, that soothing influence on Serbia and Austria which was so desirable in the interest of general peace.<sup>2</sup>

The Servian Minister has not yet received any information as to the intentions of his Government.

The German Ambassador has asked me to receive him at 5 o'clock this afternoon.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

*To Stockholm — for M. Viviani — Belgrade, Vienna, London, Berlin, Rome, Petrograd*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 26

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Thiébaud, French Minister at Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade, Vienna, London, Berlin, Rome, St. Petersburg.*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

M. VESNITCH was this morning still without any telegram from his Government informing him as to their intentions, and did not know the contents of the Austrian note.<sup>3</sup>

To a request for advice which he made to the Political Director, M. Berthelot said to him, speaking personally and for himself alone, that Serbia must try to gain time,<sup>4</sup> as the limit of forty-eight hours perhaps formed rather a "*mise en demeure*" than an ultimatum in the proper sense of the term ; that there might, for instance, be an opportunity of offering satisfaction on all those points which were not inconsistent with the dignity and sovereignty of Serbia ; he was advised to draw attention to the fact that statements based on the Austrian investigations at Serajevo were one sided, and that Serbia, while she was quite ready to take measures against all the accomplices of a crime which she most strongly condemned, required full information as to the evidence in order to be able to verify it with all speed ; above all to attempt to escape from the direct grip of Austria by declaring herself ready to submit to the arbitration of Europe.

I have asked at London and St. Petersburg for the views and intentions of the British and Russian Governments. It appears on

<sup>1</sup> This thought is stated as coming from the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, in Yellow Book No. 29, July 24, 1914. Cf. also British Blue Book No. 6.

<sup>2</sup> The Austrian Ambassador reporting to his home office (Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 11, July 24), does not mention this interview with the Acting Political Director.

On the other hand M. Bienvenu-Martin does not state here what the Ambassador quotes him there as having said.

<sup>3</sup> The contents of the Austrian note had been published in the French morning papers of July 24, 1914, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 11, July 24 ; and had been disclosed to Sir Edward Grey, British Blue Book No. 3, July 23, 1914.

<sup>4</sup> The advice given Serbia by France is differently stated in Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 13, July 24, 1914.

the other hand from our information that the Austrian note was not communicated to Italy until to-day, and that Italy had neither been consulted nor even informed<sup>1</sup> of it.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 27

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade, London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Rome.*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

THE French Ambassador at Vienna informs me<sup>2</sup> that opinion has been startled by the sudden and exaggerated nature of the Austrian demands, but that the chief fear of the military party appears to be that Serbia may give way.

The Servian Minister in Austria thinks that his Government will show themselves very conciliatory in all that concerns the punishment of the accomplices of the crime, and the guarantees to be given as to the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda, but that they could not accept a general order to the army dictated to the King, nor the dismissal of officers who were suspected by Austria, nor the interference of foreign officials in Serbia. M. Yovanovitch considers that, if it were possible to start a discussion, a settlement of the dispute might still be arranged, with the assistance of the Powers.

Our Ambassador at Berlin<sup>3</sup> gives an account of the excitement aroused by the Austrian note, and of the state of feeling of the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, who thinks that a large part of opinion in Germany would desire war. The tone of the press is threatening and appears to have as its object the intimidation of Russia. Our Ambassador is to see Herr von Jagow this evening.

M. Barrère informs us that Italy<sup>4</sup> is exercising moderating influence at Vienna and is trying to avoid complications.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 28

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade, London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

HERR VON SCHOEN came to inform me of a note from his Government, of which he would not leave me a copy,<sup>5</sup> but at my request he read it twice over to me.

<sup>1</sup> This seems to be at variance with British Blue Book No. 38, July 23, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> The despatch from the French Ambassador in Vienna here referred to has not been published.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. below French Yellow Book No. 29, July 24, 1914.

<sup>4</sup> The despatch from the French Ambassador in Rome here referred to has not been published.

<sup>5</sup> There is no reason why he should not leave a copy with M. Martin. The German Ambassador in London apparently left a copy with Sir E. Grey: British Blue Book



The Note was almost word for word as follows : —

“The statements of the Austro-Hungarian newspapers concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Pan-Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts made known must also do away with all doubt that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is, at any rate, at work there, with the connivance of members of the Government and the army.

“The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Pan-Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the moderation and far-reaching self-restraint of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic intervention of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission, of official Servia, the Pan-Servian propaganda has, since that time, continuously increased in extension and intensity. To its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to remain longer inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as justified. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might even allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude towards Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if they do not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them.”

The German Ambassador particularly called my attention to the last two paragraphs of his note before reading it, pressing the point that this was the important matter. I noted down the text literally ; it is as follows : — “The German Government consider that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively

No. 9, July 24, 1914. M. Martin must have had a copy of it when he wrote this message. However excellent his memory is, he could not have quoted a lengthy note as accurately as he did, from memory.



between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to restrict it to those two immediately concerned.

"The German Government desire urgently the localisation of the dispute, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the natural play of alliances, be followed by incalculable consequences."

I called the German Ambassador's attention to the fact that while it might appear legitimate to demand the punishment of all those who were implicated in the crime of Serajevo, on the other hand it seemed difficult to require measures which could not be accepted, having regard to the dignity and sovereignty of Serbia; the Servian Government, even if it was willing to submit to them, would risk being carried away by a revolution.

I also pointed out to Herr von Schoen that his note only took into account two hypotheses: that of a pure and simple refusal or that of a provocative attitude on the part of Serbia. The third hypothesis (which would leave the door open for an arrangement) should also be taken into consideration; that of Serbia's acceptance and of her agreeing at once to give full satisfaction for the punishment of the accomplices and full guarantees for the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda so far as they were compatible with her sovereignty and dignity.

I added that if within these limits the satisfaction desired by Austria could be admitted, the means of obtaining it could be examined; if Serbia gave obvious proof of goodwill it could not be thought that Austria would refuse to take part in the conversation.

Perhaps they should not make it too difficult for third Powers, who could not either morally or sentimentally cease to take interest in Serbia, to take an attitude which was in accord with the wishes of Germany to localise the dispute.

Herr von Schoen recognised the justice of these considerations and vaguely stated that hope was always possible. When I asked him if we should give to the Austrian note the character of a simple *mise en demeure*, which permitted a discussion, or an ultimatum, he answered that personally he had no views.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

*From Berlin*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 29

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 24, 1914.*

THE delivery of the Austrian note to Serbia has made a deep impression.

The Austrian Ambassador declares that his Government could not abate any of their demands. At the Wilhelmstrasse, as well as in the press, the same view is expressed.

Most of the *Chargés d’Affaires* present in Berlin came to see me this morning. They show little hope of a peaceful issue. The Russian *Chargé d’Affaires* bitterly remarked that Austria has presented her note at the very moment that the President of the Republic and the President of the Council had left St. Petersburg.<sup>1</sup> He is inclined to think that a considerable section of opinion in Germany desires war and would like to seize this opportunity, in which Austria will not doubt be found more united than in the past, and in which the German Emperor, influenced by a desire to give support to the monarchic principle (*par un sentiment de solidarité monarchique*) and by horror at the crime, is less inclined to show a conciliatory attitude.

Herr von Jagow is going to receive me late in the afternoon.

JULES CAMBON.

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 30

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 24, 1914.*

I ASKED the Secretary of State to-day, in the interview which I had with him, if it was correct, as announced in the newspapers, that Austria had presented a note to the Powers on her dispute with Servia; if he had received it; and what view he took of it.

Herr von Jagow answered me in the affirmative, adding that the note was forcible, and that he approved it, the Servian Government having for a long time past wearied the patience of Austria. Moreover, he considers this question to be a domestic one for Austria, and he hopes that it will be localised.

I then said to him that not having as yet received any instructions, the views which I wished to exchange with him were strictly personal. Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely ignorant of Austria’s requirements before they were communicated to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I showed him my surprise at seeing him thus undertake to support claims, of whose limit and scope he was ignorant.

Herr von Jagow interrupted me, and said, “It is only because we are having a personal conversation that I allow you to say that to me.”

“Certainly,” I replied, “but if Peter I. humiliates himself, domestic trouble will probably break out in Servia; that will open the door to fresh possibilities, and do you know where you will be led by Vienna?” I added that the language of the German newspapers was not the language of persons who were indifferent to, and unacquainted with, the question, but betokened an active support. Finally, I remarked that the shortness of the time limit given to Servia for submission would make an unpleasant impression in Europe.

Here von Jagow answered that he quite expected a little excitement

<sup>1</sup> The identical thought was expressed on the same day in Paris by the Acting Political Director, French Yellow Book No. 25. See also same day, British Blue Book No. 6.

(*un peu d'émotion*) on the part of Servia's friends, but that he was counting on their giving her wise advice.

"I have no doubt," I then said to him, "that Russia would endeavour to persuade the Cabinet of Belgrade to make acceptable concessions; but why not ask from one what is being asked from the other, and if reliance is being placed on advice being given at Belgrade, is it not also legitimate to rely on advice being given at Vienna from another quarter?"

The Secretary of State went so far as to say that that depended on circumstances; but immediately checked himself; he repeated that the difficulty must be localised. He asked me if I really thought the situation serious. "Certainly," I answered, "because if what is happening is the result of due reflection, I do not understand why all means of retreat have been cut off."

All the evidence shows that Germany is ready to support Austria's attitude with unusual energy. The weakness which her Austro-Hungarian ally has shown for some years past, has weakened the confidence that was placed in her here. She was found heavy to drag along. Mischievous legal proceedings, such as the Agram and the Friedjung affairs, brought odium on her police and covered them with ridicule. All that was asked of the police was that they should be strong; the conviction is that they were violent.

An article which appeared in the *Lokal Anzeiger* this evening shows also that at the German Chancery there exists a state of mind to which we in Paris are naturally not inclined to pay sufficient attention, I mean the feeling that the monarchies must stand together (*sentiment de la solidarité monarchique*). I am convinced that great weight must be attached to this point of view in order to appreciate the attitude of the Emperor William, whose impressionable nature must have been affected by the assassination of a prince whose guest he had been a few days previously.

It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Herr von Jagow, and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend to every one that they were<sup>1</sup> ignorant of the scope of the note sent by Austria to Servia.

JULES CAMBON.

### *From Petrograd*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 31

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at S. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.*

THE Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has communicated to M. Sazonof a threatening note to Servia.

<sup>1</sup> This sentence reads "know nothing of the note" in *The New York Times Translation*. It contradicts, therefore, the first part of the despatch where the contents of the note are discussed. The official English version gives no explanation of the altered wording. The edition of the French Yellow Book supplied to the editor by the French Ambassador in Washington, October, 1915, contains the past tense.

The intentions of the Emperor of Russia and his Ministers could not be more pacific,<sup>1</sup> a fact of which the President of the Republic and the President of the Council have been able to satisfy themselves directly; but the ultimatum which the Austro-Hungarian Government has just delivered to the Cabinet at Belgrade introduces a new and disquieting element into the situation.

Public opinion in Russia would not allow Austria to offer violence to Servia. The shortness of the time limit fixed by the ultimatum renders still more difficult the moderating influence that the Powers of the Triple Entente might exercise at Vienna.

On the other hand, M. Sazonof assumes that Germany will desire to support her ally and I am afraid that this impression is correct. Nothing but the assurance of the solidarity of the Triple Entente can prevent the German Powers from emphasising their provocative attitude.

PALÉOLOGUE.

*From London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 32

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 24, 1914.*

SIR EDWARD GREY having discussed with me his desire to leave no stone unturned to avert the crisis, we agreed in thinking that the British Cabinet might ask the German Government to take the initiative in approaching Vienna with the object of offering the mediation, between Austria and Servia,<sup>2</sup> of the four Powers which are not directly interested. If Germany agrees, time will be gained, and this is the essential point.

Sir Edward Grey told me that he would discuss with Prince Lichnowsky the proposal I have just explained. I mentioned the matter to my Russian colleague, who is afraid of a surprise from Germany, and who imagines that Austria would not have despatched her ultimatum without previous agreement with Berlin.

Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburg and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter capital by the rumours of a naval entente between Russia and Great Britain, by the Tsar's visit to Bucharest, and by the strengthening of the Russian army. Count Benckendorff had concluded from this

<sup>1</sup> This differs from British Blue Book No. 6, July 24; and No. 17, July 25, 1914. There was a conference between Sazonof and the French and British Ambassadors in Petrograd on July 24, in the morning, as described in British Blue Book No. 6. So far as the French published despatches go, the above is the only report. Cf. also below, German White Book, Exhibit 4, July 24, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> M. Bienvenu-Martin in quoting this suggestion in Yellow Book No. 34, same day, alters it to include mediation at Vienna and St. Petersburg. That this was not the Cambon-Grey intention appears from British Blue Book No. 10, July 24, where Sir E. Grey begins with his idea of action "simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburg," while M. Paul Cambon prefers "mediation between Austria and Servia."

that a war with Russia would be looked upon without disfavour in Germany.

The Under-Secretary of State has been struck, as all of us have been, by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return from Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so she could have stopped the despatch of the ultimatum.

The situation, therefore, is as grave as it can be, and we see no way of arresting the course of events.

However, Count Benckendorff thinks it right to attempt the *démarche* upon which I have agreed with Sir Edward Grey.

PAUL CAMBON.

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 33<sup>1</sup>

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 24, 1914.*

THE Servian Minister received to-night from M. Pashitch a telegram saying that the Austro-Hungarian Government had sent him their ultimatum, the time limit of which expires at 6 o'clock to-morrow, Saturday evening. M. Pashitch does not give the terms of the Austrian communication, but if it is of the nature reported in to-day's "Times," it seems impossible for the Servian Government to accept it.

In consultation with my Russian colleague, who thinks it extremely difficult for his Government not to support Servia, we have been asking ourselves what intervention could avert the conflict.

Sir Edward Grey having summoned me for this afternoon, I propose to suggest that he should ask for the semi-official intervention of the German Government at Vienna to prevent a sudden attack.

PAUL CAMBON.

*To Stockholm for M. Viviani, Belgrade, Petrograd, Berlin, Vienna, Rome*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 34

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), Belgrade, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

THE Austrian Ambassador having communicated his Government's note to Sir Edward Grey, the latter observed that no such

<sup>1</sup> This despatch has been doctored for insertion here. It is an impossible message in its present form. It is dated July 24, and states that the "Servian Minister received to-night," etc., notification of the Austro-Hungarian note. This notification, however, was sent to the Servian Minister on the previous day, July 23. Cf. Serbian Blue Book No. 33. The casual reader would receive the impression from this despatch that the time limit granted to Serbia was 24 hours, from "to-night," July 24, to "to-morrow, Saturday evening."

The last paragraph of this despatch, No. 33, refers to a summons to a conference, which has been described in No. 32.

formidable declaration had ever been addressed by one Government to another; he drew Count Mensdorff's attention to the responsibility assumed by Austria.

With the possibility of a conflict between Austria and Russia before him, Sir Edward Grey proposes to ask for the coöperation of the German Government with a view to the mediation of the four powers who are not directly interested in the Servian question, namely, England, France, Italy and Germany; this mediation to be exercised simultaneously at Vienna and at St. Petersburg.<sup>1</sup>

I advised the Servian Minister to act cautiously, and I am willing to coöperate in any conciliatory action at Vienna, in the hope that Austria will not insist on the acceptance of all her demands as against a small State, if the latter shows herself ready to give every satisfaction which is considered compatible with her independence and her sovereignty.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

## Germany:

### *From Vienna*

#### GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 3<sup>2</sup>

*Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on July 24th, 1914.*

COUNT BERCHTOLD has asked to-day for the Russian Chargé d'affaires<sup>3</sup> in order to explain to him thoroughly and cordially Austria-Hungary's point of view toward Servia. After recapitulation of the historical development of the past few years, he emphasised that the Monarchy entertained no thought of conquest toward Servia. Austria-Hungary would not claim Servian territory. It insisted merely that this step was meant as a definite means of checking the Serb intrigues. Impelled by force of circumstances, Austria-Hungary must have a guaranty for continued amicable relations with Servia. It was far from him to intend to bring about a change in the balance of powers in the Balkan. The Chargé d'affaires, who had received no instructions from St. Petersburg, took the discussion of the Secretary "ad referendum" with the promise to submit it immediately to Sasonof.

<sup>1</sup> Mediation both in Vienna and Petrograd was Sir E. Grey's first idea, see British Blue Book No. 10, July 24, but he was dissuaded from it by the French Ambassador in London, M. Paul Cambon. Cf. British Blue Book No. 10, July 24, 1914. This statement here is, moreover, at variance with M. Cambon's report, Yellow Book No. 32, same day. M. Cambon's desire not to bring any pressure to bear on Russia was eventually shared by Sir E. Grey. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27, and No. 80, July 28, and British Blue Book Nos. 11 and 16.

<sup>2</sup> For Exhibit No. 2 see July 28, 1914. The Exhibits of the German White Book are not numbered chronologically.

<sup>3</sup> See above, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 18, July 24, 1914.



## GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 4

*Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor on July 24th, 1914.*

I HAVE just utilized the contents of Order 592 in a prolonged interview with Sasonof. The Secretary (Sasonof) indulged in unmeasured accusations<sup>1</sup> toward Austria-Hungary and he was very much agitated. He declared most positively that Russia could not permit<sup>2</sup> under any circumstances that the Servo-Austrian difficulty be settled alone between the parties concerned.

**Great Britain :**

*From the Austrian Ambassador.*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 4

*Count Berchtold, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Mensdorff, Austrian Ambassador in London. — (Communicated by Count Mensdorff, July 24, 1914.)*

[Here follows the Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia; cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7, July 22, 1914.]

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 5

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.*

NOTE addressed to Servia, together with an explanation of the reasons leading up to it, has been communicated to me by Count Mensdorff.<sup>3</sup>

In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency, I remarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time limit,<sup>4</sup> and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Servia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean,<sup>5</sup> as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. above French Yellow Book No. 31, same day, "The intentions of the Emperor and his ministers could not be more pacific."

<sup>2</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1915.

<sup>3</sup> Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

<sup>4</sup> That there would be a time limit had been known to France and, therefore, probably to the Entente Powers, since July 19, 1914; cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 13 and 14.

<sup>5</sup> The meaning of this clause is best explained in British Blue Book No. 64, July 28, 1914, where it is said that the Austro-Hungarian Government had stated "that co-operation of Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures. Servia was said to have wilfully misinterpreted this." Cf. also French Yellow Book No. 15, July 21, 1914.

I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made in order to discuss those merits.

I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other Powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.

Count Mensdorff<sup>1</sup> replied that the present situation might never have arisen if Servia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke; Servia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed since the murder; a time limit, said his Excellency, was essential, owing to the procrastination on Servia's part.

I said that if Servia had procrastinated in replying, a time limit could have been introduced later; but, as things now stood, the terms of the Servian reply had been dictated by Austria, who had not been content to limit herself to a demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from its presentation.

*From Petrograd*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK NO. 6

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 24.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.*

I HAD a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof<sup>2</sup> to the effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him.

His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the French<sup>3</sup> Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was imminent.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfil all the obligations<sup>4</sup> entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.

<sup>1</sup> Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

<sup>2</sup> Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> The Entente Powers acted in the Serbian difficulty together from the first. Cf. British Blue Book No. 12, same day, and French Yellow Book No. 23, same day. See also British Blue Book No. 10, note 2.

<sup>4</sup> This must mean "going to war," diplomatic support being spoken of in the next line.



I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion.<sup>1</sup> To this M. Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general European question<sup>2</sup> was involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.

In reply to these remarks, I observed that I gathered from what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs of Servia could not be tolerated. But supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Servia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria?

M. Sazonof<sup>3</sup> said that he himself thought that Russian mobilisation would at any rate have to be carried out;<sup>4</sup> but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be held, probably to-morrow, at which the Emperor would preside, when a decision<sup>5</sup> would be come to.

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view; French Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable that we should know just how far Servia was prepared to go to meet the demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must first consult his colleagues<sup>6</sup> on this point, but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Servia.

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me

<sup>1</sup> This sentence is contrary to the claim that Great Britain is fighting for the rights of the little nations, including Serbia. Cf. British Blue Book Nos. 10 and 11, same day.

<sup>2</sup> This refers to the fetich of all the Powers for the past century, often called "the balance of power." See Russian Orange Book No. 17, July 25: "We count upon it that England will at once side definitely with France and Russia in order to maintain the European balance of power for which she has constantly intervened in the past." Cf. also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 26, July 24, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>4</sup> This raises the question, when it was begun.

<sup>5</sup> For a French account of the decision arrived at in this meeting, see French Yellow Book No. 50, July 26, 1914.

<sup>6</sup> This almost makes it appear as if Russia wrote Serbia's reply for her. Cf. Report of the Balkan Commission, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914, p. 41: "The Balkan alliance in its later phase was but a tool employed by local policy encouraged by Russia, and directed, under the inspiration of Russian diplomacy, against Germanic pretensions."

for a declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack by Austria upon Servia would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France; at any rate, he hoped His Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria.

President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach France, on their return from Russia, for four or five days, and it looks as though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum.<sup>1</sup>

It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.<sup>2</sup>

*From Vienna*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 7

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 24.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 24, 1914.*

BEFORE departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian Ambassador that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia could not leave Russia indifferent.<sup>3</sup>

Russian Chargé d'Affaires was received this morning by Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said <sup>4</sup> to him, as his own personal view, that Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were accepted integrally by 4 P.M. <sup>5</sup> to-morrow. His Excellency added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence

<sup>1</sup> This same idea is expressed by the other two Entente Powers. Cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 25 and 29, same day.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. next day, British Blue Book No. 17, "If she [Russia] feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war."

<sup>3</sup> For a stronger phrasing see July 25, British Blue Book No. 17.

<sup>4</sup> This interview is spoken of in Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 18, July 24, and German White Book, Exhibit 3, same day. According to both despatches the Russian Chargé d'Affaires was without instructions, and consequently refrained from expressing an opinion.

<sup>5</sup> The hour was at first placed at 5 P.M., later at 6 P.M. See French Yellow Book No. 25, July 24.

was at stake; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction throughout the country. He did not think that objections to what had been done could be raised by any Power.

*From Belgrade*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 8

*Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 24.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 24, 1914.*

AUSTRIAN demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Servian Government, who earnestly trust that His Majesty's Government may see their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them.

This request was conveyed to me by Servian Prime Minister, who returned early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clearly very anxious as to developments that may arise.

*From the German Ambassador*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 9

*Note <sup>1</sup> communicated by German Ambassador, July 24, 1914.*

THE publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Great Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts now made known must also do away with the last doubts that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the connivance of members of Government and army.

The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Great Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic interference of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission of official Servia, the Great Servian propaganda has continuously increased in extension and intensity: to its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become

<sup>1</sup> German White Book Exhibit No. 1, July 23, 1914, *cf.* French Yellow Book No. 28, same day.

clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still longer to remain inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them.

The Imperial Government want to emphasise their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently the localisation of the conflict, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences.

*To Paris*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 10

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.*

AFTER telling M. Cambon <sup>1</sup> to-day of the Austrian communication to Servia, which I had received this morning, and of the comment I had made to Count Mensdorff <sup>2</sup> upon it yesterday, I told M. Cambon that this afternoon I was to see the German Ambassador, who some days ago <sup>3</sup> had asked me privately to exercise moderating influence in St. Petersburg. I would say <sup>4</sup> to the Ambassador that, of course, if the presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it,<sup>5</sup> but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which it seemed to me that any Power interested in Servia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to

<sup>1</sup> French Ambassador in London.

<sup>2</sup> Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 1, July 20, 1914.

<sup>4</sup> Sir Edward's remarks to the German Ambassador are the result of his interview with the French Ambassador. For the determination of the Entente Powers to act together in this matter see British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, and note 1.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Nos. 6 and 11, same day.

exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in Serbia, should act together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburg.<sup>1</sup>

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four Powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Serbia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Serbia, and therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Serbia, it would be too late for any mediation.

I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburg<sup>1</sup> until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move into Serbia, and Russia then mobilised, it would be possible for the four Powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate in it.

M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved against Serbia. The important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would be that Germany should propose it to the other Powers.

I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Serbia.

He replied that it was so.

I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon on the subject.

I am, etc.  
E. GREY.

*To Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 11

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.*

GERMAN Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the German Government about the Austrian demand in Serbia. I understand the German Government is making the same communication to the Powers.

I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia I had no concern with it;<sup>2</sup> I had heard nothing yet from St. Petersburg, but I was very apprehensive

<sup>1</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 34, July 24, and note 1.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, and note 3.

of the view Russia would take of the situation. I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavour to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Serbia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any Power could exercise influence alone.

The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being effective, was that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg <sup>1</sup> in favour of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening.

The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Serbia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Serbia; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You should inform Secretary of State.

Prince Lichnowsky <sup>2</sup> said that Austria might be expected to move when the time limit expired unless Serbia could give unconditional acceptance of Austrian demands *in toto*. Speaking privately, his Excellency suggested that a negative reply must in no case be returned by Serbia; a reply favourable on some points must be sent at once, so that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded to Austria.

### To Belgrade

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 12

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.*

SERBIA ought to promise that, if it is proved that Servian officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to express concern and regret.<sup>3</sup> For the rest, Servian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Servian interests.

It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding

<sup>1</sup> Cf. previous note, where Sir E. Grey apparently dropped his idea of bringing simultaneous pressure to bear on Vienna and Petrograd in favor of Paul Cambon's idea of mediation between Vienna and Belgrade.

<sup>2</sup> German Ambassador in London.

<sup>3</sup> This would imply that Austria-Hungary's claim was correct that Serbia had neglected to do this, although four weeks had elapsed since the murder. Cf. also note 1 to Serbian Blue Book No. 30, July 19.



an absolute refusal and replying favourably to as many points as the time limit allows.

Servian Minister here has begged that His Majesty's Government will express their views, but I cannot undertake responsibility of saying more than I have said above, and I do not like to say even that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by French and Russian Governments.<sup>1</sup> You should therefore consult your French and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my views are, as expressed above, to Servian Government.<sup>2</sup>

I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate military action.

**Russia:**

*From Austro-Hungarian Ambassador*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 3

*Note verbale personally presented by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at 10 A.M. on July 11 (24), 1914.*

THE Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on Thursday, the 10th (23rd) instant, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade.

[Here follows the text of the note; see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7, July 22, 1914.]

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 4

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna. Communicated also to London, Rome, Paris, and Belgrade.<sup>3</sup>*

(Telegram.)

*St. Petersburg, July 11 (24), 1914.<sup>4</sup>*

*Please convey the following message to the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs:—*

“La communication du Gouvernement austro-hongrois aux Puissances le lendemain de la présentation de l'ultimatum à Belgrade ne laisse aux Puissances qu'un délai tout à fait insuffisant pour entreprendre quoi qu'il soit

“The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might

<sup>1</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 23, July 24, and British Blue Book No. 6, same day, and note 1.

<sup>2</sup> This advice was never given to Servia; cf. British Blue Book no. 22, July 25, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> According to French Yellow Book No. 39 this note was communicated to Bucharest instead of to Belgrade and also to Berlin.

<sup>4</sup> This note, although dated July 24, was presented in London (British Blue Book No. 13) and Paris (Yellow Book No. 39) on July 25, the very day on which the time limit was to expire. Russia was informed of the presentation of the note on July 23. (Russian Orange Book No. 2.)

d'utile pour l'aplanissement des complications surgies.

"Pour prévenir les conséquences incalculables et également néfastes pour toutes les Puissances qui peuvent suivre le mode d'action du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, il nous paraît indispensable qu'avant tout le délai donné à la Serbie pour répondre soit prolongé. L'Autriche-Hongrie, se déclarant disposée à informer les Puissances des données de l'enquête sur lesquelles le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal base ses accusations, devrait leur donner également le temps de s'en rendre compte.

"En ce cas, si les Puissances se convainquaient du bien-fondé de certaines des exigences autrichiennes, elles se trouveraient en mesure de faire parvenir au Gouvernement serbe des conseils en conséquence.

"Un refus de prolonger le terme de l'ultimatum priverait de toute portée la démarche du Gouvernement austro-hongrois auprès des Puissances et se trouverait en contradiction avec les bases même des relations internationales.

"Le Prince Koudachef est chargé de communiquer ce qui précède au Cabinet de Vienne."

M. Sazonof espère que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté

help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.

"In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness<sup>1</sup> to inform the Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them.

"In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Servian Government.

"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.

"Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet at Vienna."

M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Government<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 8, July 22, paragraph before last, where Austria-Hungary offers to the Powers a "dossier elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June." So far as Austria was concerned, this was an act of courtesy. The Powers had been unwilling or unable to protect her from these intrigues culminating in the murder of the Archduke. It was, therefore, she claimed, her right and her duty to punish them in her own way.

Sazonof interprets the offer of Austria-Hungary not as an act of courtesy but as an accusation lodged before the tribunal of the Powers, who, therefore, should be the judges of how far Austria-Hungary might be permitted to go. According to European traditions, followed for over a century by all the nations, such a course would have affected the dignity of Austria-Hungary as one of the Great Powers. Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, July 25, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> This line varied, of course, according to the Government to which the note was presented.



britannique adhérera au point de vue exposé, et il exprime l'espoir que Sir Edward Grey voudra bien munir l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Vienne d'instructions conformes.

will adhere to the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Gray will see his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at Vienna.

*To London, Berlin, Rome and Paris*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 5

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Representatives at London, Berlin, Rome, and Paris.*

(Telegram.)

*St. Petersburg, July 11 (24), 1914.*

WITH reference to my telegram of to-day to Kudachef<sup>1</sup> we trust that the Government to which you are accredited will share the Russian point of view and will at once instruct their Representative at Vienna to hold similar language.

Communicated to Belgrade.

*From the Serbian Crown Prince and Prince Regent of Serbia*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 6

*Telegram from His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prince Regent of Serbia to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.*

*Belgrade, July 11 (24), 1914.*

THE Austro-Hungarian Government yesterday evening presented to the Servian Government a note respecting the outrage at Serajevo. Servia, aware of her international obligations, has declared, ever since the horrible crime was committed, that she condemned it, and that she was ready to open an enquiry in Servia if the complicity of certain of her subjects were proved at the trial instituted by the Austro-Hungarian authorities. The demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian note are, however, unnecessarily humiliating for Servia, and incompatible with her dignity as an independent State. For instance, we are peremptorily called upon to insert a declaration by the Government in the "Official Journal," and for an order from the Sovereign to the army, in which we are to check the spirit of hostility towards Austria and to blame ourselves for criminal weakness as regards our treacherous intrigues. We are further required to admit Austro-Hungarian officials into Servia to take part with our officials at the trial and to superintend the carrying out of the other conditions laid down in the note. We are required to accept these demands in their entirety within forty-eight hours, failing which the Austro-Hungarian Legation will leave Belgrade. We are prepared to accept those of the Austro-Hun-

<sup>1</sup> Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Vienna.

garian conditions which are compatible with the position of an independent State, as well as those to which your Majesty may advise us to agree, and all those persons whose complicity in the crime may be proved will be severely punished by us. Certain of the demands could not be carried out without changes in our legislation, which would need time. We have been allowed too short a time limit. We may be attacked at the expiration of the time limit by the Austro-Hungarian army which is concentrating upon our frontier. We are unable to defend ourselves and we beg your Majesty to come to our aid as soon as possible. The much appreciated goodwill which your Majesty has so often shown towards us inspires us with the firm belief that once again our appeal to your noble Slav heart will not pass unheeded.

At this critical moment I echo the feelings of the Servian people in praying your Majesty to be pleased to interest yourself in the fate of the Kingdom of Servia.

*From Berlin*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK NO. 7

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, July 11 (24), 1914.*

ALL the morning papers, even those few which recognise the impossibility of Servia's accepting the prescribed conditions, warmly welcome the strong line adopted by Austria. The semi-official "Lokal-Anzeiger" is particularly violent; it describes as fruitless any possible appeals that Servia may make to St. Petersburg, Paris, Athens, or Bucharest, and concludes by saying that the German people will breathe freely when they learn that the situation in the Balkan<sup>1</sup> peninsula is to be cleared up at last.

*From Paris*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK NO. 8

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, July 11 (24), 1914.*

A COPY of the note officially presented at Belgrade has been communicated to the French Government by the Austrian Ambassador.<sup>2</sup> The German Ambassador later visited<sup>3</sup> the Minister and read to

<sup>1</sup> The Balkans had been spoken of for years as the Powder Magazine of Europe, where at any moment a spark might start a European conflagration. Nobody in Berlin or Vienna believed any nation would come to the support of Servia in view of the intrigues which had led to the murder of Serajevo, and which Berlin and Vienna believed were rightly charged against Servia.

<sup>2</sup> French Yellow Book No. 25, July 24, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> French Yellow Book No. 28, July 24, 1914.

him a communication containing the Austrian arguments, and indicating that in the event of a refusal on the part of Serbia, Austria would be obliged to resort to pressure, and, in case of need, to military measures. The communication ended with the observation that, in the opinion of Germany, this question ought to be settled between Austria and Serbia direct, and that it was to the interest of the Powers to localise the affair by leaving it to the interested parties. The Acting Head of the Political Department, who was present at the interview, asked <sup>1</sup> the Ambassador whether the Austrian action should be considered as an ultimatum — in other words, whether, in the event of Serbia not submitting entirely to the Austrian demands, hostilities were inevitable. The Ambassador avoided a direct reply, alleging that he had no instructions.

*From Belgrade*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK NO. 9

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Belgrade, July 11 (24), 1914.*

PASHITCH has returned to Belgrade. He intends to give an answer to Austria within the prescribed time limit — that is to say, tomorrow, Saturday, at 6 P.M. — showing the points which are acceptable or unacceptable. To-day an appeal will be addressed to the Powers<sup>2</sup> to defend the independence of Serbia. Then, added Pashitch, if war is inevitable, we will make war.

**Serbia:**

*To Petrograd*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK NO. 34

*M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 11/24, 1914.*

I INFORMED the Russian Chargé d'Affaires that I would hand in the reply to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum on Saturday at 6 P.M. I told him that the Serbian Government would appeal<sup>3</sup> to the Governments of the friendly Powers to protect the independence of Serbia. If war was inevitable, I added, Serbia would carry it on.

<sup>1</sup> In the French account of this interview, Yellow Book No. 28, July 24, M. Martin and not the Acting Head of the Political Department is said to have asked this question.

<sup>2</sup> The only published appeal is that of the Serbian Crown Prince to the Czar, Russian Orange Book No. 6, July 24, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> No such appeal had been published, except one from the Serbian Crown Prince to the Czar, July 24, Russian Orange Book No. 6.

*To London*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 35

*M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to  
M. M. Boschkovitch, Minister in London.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 11/24, 1914.*

I INFORMED the British Chargé d'Affaires to-day that the Austro-Hungarian demands were such that no Government of an independent country could accept them in their entirety. I expressed the hope that the British Government might possibly see their way to induce the Austro-Hungarian Government to moderate them. I did not conceal my anxiety as to future developments.

*From Petrograd*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 36

*Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime  
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Petrograd, July 11/24, 1914.*

As I was leaving M. Sazonof, to whom I communicated the contents of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, I met the German Ambassador. He seemed to be in very good spirits.<sup>1</sup> During the conversation which followed in regard to the Austro-Hungarian *démarche* I asked Count Pourtales to indicate to me some way out of the situation created by the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. The Ambassador replied that this depended on Serbia alone, since the matter in question must be settled between Austria and Serbia only, and did not concern anyone else. In reply I told Count Pourtales that he was under a misapprehension, and that he would see before long that this was not a question merely between Serbia and Austria, but a European question.

*To the Czar from the Serbian Crown Prince*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 37

*His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander to His Imperial  
Majesty the Emperor of Russia.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 11/24, 1914.*

[See No. 6 of Russian Orange Book, July 24, 1914.]

<sup>1</sup> This sentence may have been retained to give the reader an insight into the character of Count Pourtales. It should, therefore, be compared with similar pictures, e.g. British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, and contrasted with British Blue Book No. 72, July 29, and No. 97, July 30.

Saturday, July 25, 1914

## SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	London, Petrograd Under Secretary of State,	Belgrade
Belgium	Rome etc.	Belgrade
France	London etc., Vienna	Berlin, London, Petrograd, Rome, Vienna, Belgrade
Germany	London	Petrograd
Great Britain	Paris, Petrograd, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Belgrade	Paris, Petrograd, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, Belgrade, Russian Ambassador
Russia	London All Representatives	Vienna, Belgrade, Berlin, Paris, London, German Ambassador

*Russia* and *Great Britain* endeavor to secure from Austria-Hungary an extension of the time limit set in the Serbian note to expire on this day at 6 P.M. The *French* support of this request, while promised, does not materialize. *Germany* gives her support, but doubts Austria's willingness to grant the request.

*Austria-Hungary* denies the request, but announces that she will not immediately proceed to war, and that a period of military preparation will intervene. This appears to satisfy Great Britain as a concession of practical value.

*Serbia* delivers her reply which does not satisfy Austria-Hungary, whose legation leaves Belgrade at 6.30 P.M.

*Great Britain* continues her efforts to bring about a Conference of four powers, but apparently has yielded to the view of the French Ambassador that no pressure should be exerted on Russia, for in one note Sir E. Grey even substitutes Russia for Italy in the proposed group of the mediating powers.

*Germany* repeats that she had not been consulted by Austria-Hungary in the preparation of her note to Servia, but finding her demands just would support her. She declines to mediate between Austria and Serbia, but announces her willingness to take part in mediation between Austria and Russia.

*Russia* and *France* are endeavoring to secure the unconditional support of Great Britain, not in the interest of Serbia, but to maintain the European balance of power.

*Austria-Hungary* disclaims any intention of disturbing this balance of power, and explains anew her reasons for proceeding against Serbia. She also explains the meaning of those clauses of her note which she says had been misunderstood; and states that Russia was acting under a misapprehension. She also issues a *dossier* containing the proofs of her indictment of Serbia.

*France* refuses to issue an official correction of erroneous accounts in the French press concerning the attitude of Germany.

*Belgium* continues to contemplate the probability of a European War.

**Austria-Hungary:**

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 19

*Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburg and Constantinople.*

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

YOUR EXCELLENCY will find herewith the dossier mentioned in the circular note <sup>1</sup> to the Powers with reference to the Great-Servian propaganda, and its connection with the Serajevo murder.

Your Excellency is instructed to bring this dossier to the notice of the Government to which you are accredited.

(See Note 2 to British Blue Book No. 48, July 27.)

*Enclosure*

**"The Dossier" <sup>2</sup>**

The Servian agitation, which has as its object the separation from the Austrian Monarchy of the Southern Slav districts in order to unite them with the Servian States, dates from far back.

This propaganda on Servian soil, always the same in its ultimate object, although varying in its means and intensity, reached one of its culminating points at the time of the annexation crisis. Throwing off the protecting cloak of secrecy, it then revealed its purpose openly and undisguisedly, and attempted, under the patronage of the Servian Government, to attain its ends by every means in its power.

While the whole of the Servian press was calling for war against the Monarchy by malicious invectives in which facts were perverted, apart from other means of propaganda, associations were being formed to prepare for this war.

The Narodna Odbrana stood out as the most important of these associations. Having its origin in an already existing revolutionary committee, it was constituted as a private society, although in fact it took the form of an organisation of Servian military and civil officials wholly dependent on the Foreign Office at Belgrade. Amongst its founders one may mention: General Božo Janković, ex-ministers Ljuba Jovanović, Ljuba Davidović, and Velislav Vulović, Živojin

<sup>1</sup> Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 8, July 22, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> This "dossier," being too long to be telegraphed, was sent by mail (see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 39, July 28). It was presented (the Powers were advised of it on July 25, see French Yellow Book No. 38 and note 1) in Paris on July 27, and was published, in part, under No. 75 of the French Yellow Book of that date. It was probably presented in London to Sir Edward Grey on the same day. Sir E. Grey, however, published only a scant summary of it in British Blue Book No. 48, omitting the rest and not stating that he had received it. In the introductory narrative to the edition of the Blue Book of Sept. 28, 1914, Sir E. Grey says: "That his Majesty's Government did not receive any statement of the evidence on which Austria had founded her ultimatum till the 7th August." Neither the British Blue Book nor the Austro-Hungarian Red Book contains a despatch of this day, which renders it impossible to ascertain to which "evidence" Sir E. Grey referred in this sentence. It may have been a complete transcript of the evidence presented at the trial of the Serajevo murderers.

The "dossier," however, contained the "evidence on which Austria had founded her ultimatum," and this Sir E. Grey kept from Parliament, from the country and possibly from his colleagues. The first partial knowledge of the "dossier" that the world had came from the French Yellow Book which was published several months after the outbreak of the war.



Dacic (Director of the Government printing establishment), and Majors (then Captains) Voja Tankosić and Milan Pribicević. This association aimed at the creation and equipment of free companies for use in the impending war against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. (See Appendix 2.)

A convincing description of the activity at that time of the Narodna Odbrana will be found amongst others in the deposition of Trifko Krstanović, a Bosnia-Herzegovinian subject, in the course of his evidence before the district court at Serajevo; he was then at Belgrade, and had been accepted by the Narodna Odbrana, with other subjects of the Monarchy as a komitadji. At the beginning of 1909, Krstanović had arrived with about 140 fellow-members at a school established for the formation of new bands at Čuprija (in the district of Jagodina), managed by Captains Voja Tankosić and Dusan Putnik. The only instructors at this school were Servian officers. General Božo Janković and Captain Milan Pribičević inspected the three-monthly courses of these bands at regular intervals.

The new komitadjis received their training in musketry, bomb throwing, mine laying, blowing up of railways, tunnels and bridges, and the destruction of telegraph wires. According to the instructions of their leaders, it was their duty to put into practice in Bosnia and Herzegovina the knowledge they had recently acquired.

By this action, carried on in the most open manner and encouraged by the Servian Government, the Narodna Odbrana was thus prepared for guerilla warfare against Austria-Hungary. In this way subjects of the Monarchy were led into treason against their country, and induced, as Servian emissaries, systematically to practice underhand attacks against the means of defence of their country.

This period of aggressive aspirations ended with the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 31st March, 1909, in which the Government of Belgrade announced that they were prepared to accept the new situation created in municipal and international law by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and solemnly promised to maintain in future friendly relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

With this declaration, the agitation, which constituted a source of constant trouble to Austria-Hungary, seemed to have come to an end, and the road to an amicable *rapprochement* between Servia and the Monarchy to have been entered on. Deprived of the encouragement of the Servian Government, and combated by that Government in accordance with their engagements, the propaganda hostile to the Monarchy could only have continued a shadowy existence and would have been condemned to early destruction. On the other hand, the ties of language, race and culture existing between the Southern Slav districts of the Monarchy and Servia ought to have resulted in the realisation of a task of common development inspired by mutual friendship and parallel interests.

These hopes, however, have not been realised.

Aspirations hostile to the Monarchy have continued, and under

the eyes of the Servian Government, who have done nothing to suppress this movement, the anti-Austro-Hungarian propaganda has only increased in extent and volume. Hatred against the Monarchy has been fanned and kindled into an irreconcilable feeling. The Servian people alike by adapting their former course of action to the new situation and by supplementing it by fresh methods were summoned to the "inevitable death struggle" against Austria-Hungary. Secret ramifications have been systematically spread towards the Slav districts in the south of the Monarchy whose subjects have been incited to treason against their country.

Above all, the Servian press has since then worked incessantly in this spirit.

Up to the present time no fewer than eighty-one newspapers appearing in Servia have had to forfeit their right to delivery through the post on account of their contents falling within the scope of the penal law.

There is hardly a clause in the penal code protecting the sacred person of the Monarch and the members of the Imperial Family, or the integrity of the State, that has not been violated by Servian papers.

A few examples of these press views, selected from the great mass of material published by the press at various dates, are contained in Appendix I.

Without entering into a detailed account of these expressions of Servian public opinion, it is necessary to note that in spite of the formal recognition accorded by Servia, it has never ceased to consider the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, both before and after the event, as a robbery committed against Servia for which reparation is due. This idea not only constantly recurs with every modulation of its coarse language in the papers professing most advanced views, but also finds expression in hardly veiled terms in the *Samouprava*, which is in such close touch with the Foreign Office of Belgrade. (See Appendix I (b).)

Nor can one omit to draw attention to the manner in which the attempt made on the 15th June, 1910, at Serajevo, by Bogdan Zerajić against the Feldzeugmeister von Varešanin, Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was turned to account by the press.

As is known, Zerajić had killed himself immediately after his deed, and before committing it had burnt all his papers. Under these circumstances, it was impossible to throw full light upon the motives of his crime. It could, however, be inferred from a document found on his person that he was a follower of the views of Krapotkin. Evidence collected leads likewise to the conclusion that the crime was of an anarchist type.

This, however, did not prevent the Servian press from celebrating the criminal as a national Servian hero and from glorifying his deed. Indeed, the "Politika" protested strongly against the idea that Zerajić was an anarchist, and declared him to be "a Servian hero whose name all Servians will repeat with respect and grief."



The *Politika* considers the 18th August<sup>1</sup> of the same year as a suitable opportunity on which to return to the crime of Zerajić, "whose name will be sacred to the people," and to celebrate the outrage in verse. (See Appendix I (a).)

In this way this crime, which had nothing to do with the territorial aspirations against the Monarchy, was exploited for the furtherance of these ideas and by the glorifying of Zerajić, murder was hailed in the most explicit way as a glorious means towards the realisation of this aim and one worthy to be imitated in the struggle. This approbation of murder as a weapon fully admissible in the struggle against the Monarchy re-appears later in the press in discussing the attempt made by Jukić against the Royal Commissioner von Cuvaj. (See Appendix I (c).)

These newspapers, which were circulated not only in Serbia but also, as we shall show later, illicitly smuggled into the Monarchy by well-organised secret methods, have awakened and kept alive this mood in the masses, a mood which has provided a fruitful field for the activities of the associations hostile to the Monarchy.

The Narodna Odbrana became the centre of the agitation carried on by the associations. The same persons who were at its head at the time of the annexation still control it. Now as then, they still control it in the capacity of the most active and energetic organisers, the most violent opponents of the Monarchy; General Božo Janković, Živojin Dačić (Director of the Government printing establishment), and Majors Milan Pribicević and Voja Tankosić. Organised on a broad and far-reaching scale and constituted on a strict hierarchical basis (see Appendix 2, "Organisation"), the Narodna Odbrana counted soon some 400 committees which developed a very active agitation.

Moreover, the Narodna Odbrana became closely allied with the "shooting federation" (*Schützenbund*), (762 societies), the great Sokol<sup>2</sup> Association "Dusan" (2,500 members), the Olympian Club, the association of horsemen (*Reiterverein*), "Prince Michael," the society of sportsmen (*Jägerbund*), and the league of development (*Kulturliga*), as well as numerous other associations all of which, subordinate to it, were under the guidance and protection of the Narodna Odbrana, and worked on the same lines. Becoming more and more closely intermingled, these associations arrived at a complete amalgamation in such a way that to-day they are nothing but members of the single body of the Narodna Odbrana.

Thus the Narodna Odbrana has set up all over Serbia a close network of agitation, and has attracted to its principles all those who were receptive of its ideas.

The official publications of the Narodna Odbrana demonstrate sufficiently clearly the spirit which animates it.

While in its statutes, it represents itself as an "educational society"

<sup>1</sup> Birthday of His Imperial and Apostolic Majesty.

<sup>2</sup> [Sokol = falcon. The name given to gymnastic associations throughout Slav countries which have adopted the falcon as their emblem.]

(*Kulturverein*) concerning itself only with the spiritual and physical improvement of the Servian population and its material progress, the Narodna Odbrana discloses in its official publication (see Appendix 2) the true and single motive of its existence in that which it calls its "re-organised programme": to preach to the Servian people the sacred truth by "fanatical and indefatigable work" under the pretence that the Monarchy wishes to "take away Servian liberty and language and even to destroy her"; that it is an essential necessity to wage against Austria-Hungary, her "first and greatest enemy," "a war of extermination with rifle and cannon," and "by every means" to prepare the people for this war, which is "to liberate the conquered territories," in which "seven million brothers are suffering in bondage."

All the efforts "at an educational programme" (*Kulturbestrebungen*) of the Narodna Odbrana are exclusively concerned with this idea simply as a means for the organisation and education of the people for the longed-for death struggle against the Monarchy.

All the associations affiliated to the Narodna Odbrana work in the same spirit; the Sokol Association at Kragujevac will serve as an example (see Appendix 3).

As in the case of the Narodna Odbrana, officers, professors and civil servants are at its head.

The speech in which its President, Major Kovačević, opened the annual meeting of 1914, made absolutely no mention of physical training, which is supposed to be the real object of a Sokol association, and confined itself solely to "the preparations for war" against the "dangerous, heartless, grasping, odious and greedy enemy in the north" who "robs millions of Servian brothers of their liberty and rights, and holds them in bondage and chains."

In the administrative reports of this association the technical work is placed entirely in the background, and only serves as headlines for the avowal of the real "objects of the activities of the administration," namely, the preparation of national development and the strengthening of the "oppressed nation" with the object of enabling it to carry out its "incomplete programme and its unfinished task," and to accomplish that "great action" "which is to be carried out in the near future," "the liberation of those brothers who live across the Drina, who are suffering the martyrdom of the crucified."

Even the treasurer makes use of his financial reports to send forth the appeal that "falcons must be reared" capable "of bringing freedom to the brothers still in bondage."

As in the case of the "educational programme" of the Narodna Odbrana, the gymnastic activity of the Sokols is not the real object but merely a means at the service of the same propaganda carried on in the same spirit, and even with the very same words.

When the Narodna Odbrana appeals to the "people" for a death struggle against the Monarchy, it does not address itself only to the Servian people, but to all Southern Slav nationalities. In the eyes of the Narodna Odbrana, the Slav regions in the south of the

Monarchy are regarded as "our subjected Servian territories." (See Appendix 4.) The Southern Slav subjects of the Monarchy are further also expected to take part in this "national work." This "healthy and necessary work" is, therefore, to be carried on beyond the Servian frontier. The Narodna Odbrana recruits its "heroes for this holy war" even on the soil of the Monarchy, and among them Obilic, the murderer of Murad, is to light them on their way as an example of sacrifice for one's country worthy of imitation.

But in order to incite "brothers outside Servia" to share in "the work of private effort," the Narodna Odbrana keeps in close touch with the "brothers beyond the frontier." It is not said in the publications of the society, how this intimate association is carried out, no doubt because it appertains to that part of the "common work" which "for many reasons cannot, or ought not to be divulged."

How comprehensive this branch of its activity is, can be seen by the fact that not only the central committee of the Narodna Odbrana, but also certain of its local committees contain special sections for "foreign affairs."

This "foreign" activity of the Narodna Odbrana and its affiliated branches is extremely varied.

What is relatively less dangerous inasmuch as it can be officially controlled, consists of lecture tours undertaken by distinguished members of the Narodna Odbrana in the southeastern parts of the Monarchy where they speak before various societies on national or educational subjects. These tours give the speakers the desired opportunity, which is indeed the chief object of these journeys, of explaining the true aims of the associations in language more or less veiled, which is intelligible to those who are already initiated.

Amongst these emissaries, one of the best known is Živojin Dačić (Director of the Government printing establishment), already several times alluded to; it was he who, on the 8th August, 1909, issued an "appeal" to the Servian people in which he called Austria-Hungary the enemy of Servia, and exhorted them to prepare for the war against the Monarchy. On numerous occasions, Dačić undertook tours of this nature in the southeastern districts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. During one of these lectures at Karlovci in 1912, he flung his accustomed prudence to the winds and spoke openly of the "union of all Serbs against the common foe," by which he designated Austria-Hungary in unmistakable language.

More dangerous are the relations with associations in the Monarchy formed by Servian associations imbued with the spirit of the Narodna Odbrana under the cloak of community of interests and of culture; for the mutual visits of these associations, whether by delegates or in bodies, which escape all official control, are utilised by the Servians for all sorts of plots against the Monarchy.

Thus, for instance, at the well-known feast of the Prosvjeta Association at Serajevo, in September, 1912, an envoy of the Narodna Odbrana had the effrontery secretly to recruit Bosnian adherents to his society. (See Appendix 6.) The message which the representa-

tive of the Sokol Association at Kragujevac brought to the "brothers in Bosnia" at this feast was: "We have not forgotten you; the wings of the falcon of Sumadija are still powerful" — a thought which in confidential intercourse would no doubt have found quite a different expression and one better corresponding to the tendencies of this society which we have already explained. (See Appendix 3.) As to the events that take place at meetings of the same kind in Servia, the Imperial and Royal authorities cannot have any information founded on unimpeachable authority, as they only possess on this matter confidential information which it is difficult to check. In this connection, one may mention the visit of Agram students to Servia in April, 1912, who received from the Servians an official military reception accompanied even by a review of troops in their honour, and that in a manner so suggestive that the administrative report of the Sokol Association at Kragujevac could say: "This event marks the beginning and germ of a great deed which will be accomplished in the near future, it is a germ which will ripen when the soul of the people bursts its bonds and until there is no barrier that has not been destroyed."

It is only recently that it has come to the knowledge of the Austro-Hungarian authorities that the Servian Sokol associations have succeeded in inducing similar societies into the Monarchy to establish a connection with them which is up to the present secret, and the character of which is not yet quite clear, for the inquiries on this point are still in progress. Up to the present, however, the information obtained permits the conclusion that traces have been discovered of one of the ways by which the subversive aims of the Servian Sokols and their friends have poisoned the minds of certain groups of mistaken and misled persons in the Monarchy.

This propaganda which is aimed at wider circles, and is rather of a preparatory nature, assumes minor importance compared with that of the "foreign work" which is conducted by the Narodna Odbrana and its friends in the form of personal agitation among individuals. It is in this field that the most melancholy results are shown.

By means of confidential and secret emissaries, it carries the poison of rebellion to the circles of men of mature age as well as those of irresponsible youth.

It is thus, for example, that the late officers of the Honved B.B., D.K., V.M., and the lieutenant of Croatian-Slavonian Gendarmerie V.K., led astray by Milan Pribičević, left the service of the army of the Monarchy under most suspicious circumstances and turned to Servia; they have seen in the meanwhile most of their dreams unrealised and some of them, at any rate, are thinking of returning to the Fatherland they have betrayed.

The agitation introduced from Servia into the middle schools of Croatia and Bosnia is unhappily too well known to need illustration; what is less known is that people who have been expelled from Croatian and Bosnian schools owing to grave breaches of discipline, are received in Servia with open arms, and often even protected by the

State and educated as enemies of the Monarchy. The Servian schools with their anti-Austrian staffs, and their large number of professors and teachers who are members of the Narodna Odbrana, are clearly establishments thoroughly adapted for training experts of this kind. A very notable case of this sort may be quoted here. In March, 1914, several pupils of the Training College of Pakrac (Croatia) were dismissed on account of a strike. They went to Servia, where some of them immediately obtained situations as schoolmasters, while others were admitted to a college for teachers. One of those who had been thus dismissed, and who was connected with anti-Austrian circles, declared publicly that he and his people would give a proof, during the sojourn of the hereditary Archduke in Bosnia, that this province was Servian territory. It is, as we may add, highly significant that during the stay of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Bosnia, the Royal Servian Prefect of the district of Krajna gave to the three training college students, who were thus gravely implicated, Servian passports in which he falsely described them as Servian subjects, although he must have known that they were Croatians. With these passports, the three agitators were able to enter the Monarchy without being noticed, where, however, they were eventually recognised and arrested.

All this is not, by a long way, enough to give a complete representation of the "foreign" activity of the Narodna Odbrana.

The Imperial and Royal Government had been informed for a long time past by confidential reports that the Narodna Odbrana had made military preparations for the war which it desired to make against the Monarchy, inasmuch as it kept emissaries in Austria-Hungary, who, as soon as hostilities broke out, would attempt in the usual guerilla manner to destroy means of transport and equipment and stir up revolt or panic. (See Appendix 7.)

The criminal proceedings taken in 1913 by the District Court at Serajevo against Jovo Jagličić and his associates for espionage (Appendix 6), confirm this confidential information. As at the time of its foundation, the preparation for guerilla warfare still figures in the programme of the Narodna Odbrana, to which must now be further added a complete system of espionage.

It is for this reason that the programme of the Narodna Odbrana, described as "re-organised," is in reality an extended programme which includes the preparation for a "war of extermination" against the Monarchy, and even its realisation, and finally the unfurling of the "ancient red flag of the Narodna Odbrana."

Acts of terrorism must finally result from this atmosphere of hatred against the Monarchy, which is publicly and secretly provoked, and from an agitation which considers itself free from all responsibility; in order to bring them about, all means are regarded as permissible in the struggle against Austria-Hungary, including even without any sense of shame common acts of murder.

On the 8th June, 1912, a man named Lukas Jukić shot von Cuvaj, the Royal Commissioner at Agram, with the result that the Councillor



(*Banalrat*) von Hervoić, who was seated in the same carriage, was mortally wounded. Jukić, in his flight, shot a policeman who was pursuing him, and wounded two others.

From the subsequent public investigation it appeared that Jukić was saturated with the ideas and plans propagated by the Narodna Odbrana, and that although Jukić had for some time past been devoting himself to criminal schemes, these schemes were only matured after he had made an excursion to Belgrade together with the Agram students on the 18th of April, 1912. At the noisy celebrations in honour of the visitors, Jukić had entered into relations with several people belonging to the circle of the Narodna Odbrana, with whom he had had political discussions. A few days afterwards he returned to Belgrade, and there received from a Servian major a bomb, and from a comrade the Browning pistol with which he carried out his crime.

In the opinion of experts, the bomb found at Agram was made in an arsenal for military purposes.

Jukić's attempt had not been forgotten, when on the 18th of August, 1913, Stephen Dojčić, who had returned from America, made an attempt on the life of the Royal Commissioner, Baron Skerlecz, at Agram — an attempt which was the outcome of action organised by the Servians among the Southern Slavs living in America, and which was also the work of the "foreign" propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and its confederates.

A pamphlet by the Servian, T. Dimitrijević, printed in Chicago, and entitled "Natrag u staro ognjiste vaše," with its unbridled attacks against His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, and its appeal to the Servians of the Monarchy with reference to their impending "deliverance," and urging them to migrate home to Servia, demonstrates the fact that the propaganda carried out unchecked in America from Servia, and that carried on from Servia in the territory of the Monarchy, worked on parallel lines.

And again, scarcely a year later, Agram was the scene of a new outrage, this time unsuccessful.

On the 20th of May, 1914, Jakob Schäfer made an attempt at the Agram Theatre on the life of the Ban, Freiherr von Skerlecz, an attempt which was frustrated at the last moment by a police official. The subsequent investigation revealed the existence of a plot inspired by Rudolf Hercigonja. From the depositions of Hercigonja and his five accomplices, it is manifest that this crime also originated in Servia.

Having taken part in an unsuccessful attempt to liberate Jukić, Hercigonja fled to Servia (October, 1912), where, together with his accomplice Marojan Jakšić, he consorted with the komitadjis and members of the Narodna Odbrana. As frequently happens when immature minds are excited by occupying themselves too early with political questions, the result of this corrupting company was here also disastrous. Hercigonja returned home impressed by the dogma learnt in Belgrade that the Southern Slav territories of Austria-Hungary must be separated from it and re-united to the Servian kingdom.

He had further been persuaded by the teachings of the friends with whom he associated there, that this object should be pursued by means of attempts on the lives of persons holding high office and leading politicians of the Monarchy as the only means of obtaining this end.

This is the spirit in which Hercigonja influenced his friends at Agram and converted some of them to his ideas. Foremost among his plans was the carrying out of an attempt on the life of the heir to the throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

A few months before proceedings had been taken against Luka Aljinović for treasonable agitation. In the course of these proceedings three witnesses declared that Aljinović had told them that in the year 1913 he had received at Belgrade 100 dinar from the Narodna Odbrana, and a similar sum from a secret association of students, for purposes of agitation, but especially to carry out an attempt on the life of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

It is clear how far the criminal agitation of the Narodna Odbrana and those who shared in its views, has of late been primarily directed against the person of the hereditary Archduke. From these facts the conclusion may be drawn that the Narodna Odbrana, as well as the associations hostile to the Monarchy in Servia, which were grouped round it, recently decided that the hour had struck to translate theory into practice.

It is noteworthy, however, that the Narodna limits itself in this way to inciting, and where the incitement has fallen on fertile soil to providing means of material assistance for the realisation of its plans, but that it has confided the only dangerous part of this propaganda of action to the youth of the Monarchy, which it has excited and corrupted, and which alone has to bear the burden of this miserable "heroism."

All the characteristics of this procedure are found in the history and origin of the profoundly regrettable outrage of the 28th of June (see Appendix 8).

Princip and Grabež are characteristic examples of young men who have been poisoned from their school days by the doctrines of the Narodna Odbrana.

At Belgrade, where he frequented the society of students imbued with these ideas, Princip busied himself with criminal plans against the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, against whom the hatred of the Servian element hostile to the Monarchy was particularly acute on the occasion of his tour in the annexed territories.

He was joined by Čabrinović, who moved in the same circles, and whose shifting and radically revolutionary views, as he himself admits, as well as the influence of his surroundings in Belgrade and the reading of the Servian papers, inspired him with the same sense of hostility to the Monarchy, and brought him into the propaganda of action.

Thanks to the state of mind in which he already was, Grabež succumbed very quickly to this milieu, which he now entered.

But however far this plot may have prospered, and however

determined the conspirators may have been to carry out the attempt, it would never have been effected, if people had not been found, as in the case of Jukić, to provide the accomplices with means of committing their crime. For, as Princip and Čabrinović have expressly admitted, they lacked the necessary arms, as well as the money to purchase them.

It is interesting to see where the accomplices tried to procure their arms. Milan Pribičević and Živojin Dačić, the two principal men in the Narodna Odbrana, were the first accomplices thought of as a sure source of help in their need, doubtless because it had already become a tradition amongst those ready to commit crimes, that they could obtain instruments for murder from these representatives of the Narodna Odbrana. The accidental circumstance that these two men were not at Belgrade at the critical moment doubtless balked this plan. However, Princip and Čabrinović were not at a loss in finding other help, that of Milan Čiganović, an ex-komitadji, and now a railway official at Belgrade, and at the same time an active member of the Narodna Odbrana, who, in 1909, first appeared as a pupil at the school (*Bandenschule*) at Čuprija (see Appendix 5). Princip and Čabrinović were not deceived in their expectations, as they at once received the necessary help from Čiganović.

The latter, and at his instigation, his friend Major Voja Tankosić, of the Royal Servian Army, also one of the leaders of the Narodna Odbrana, who has already been mentioned several times, and who, in 1908, was at the head of the school of armed bands at Čuprija (see Appendix 5), now appear as moving spirits and active furtherers in the plot; the repulsive manner in which they approved as a matter of course, is significant of the moral qualities of the whole anti-Austrian movement. They had at first only one doubt, and that but a fleeting one, as to whether the three conspirators were really resolved to commit this act. This doubt, however, soon disappeared, thanks to their insidious counsels. Thenceforth they were prepared to give every assistance. Tankosić produced four Browning pistols, ammunition and money for the journey; six hand-grenades from the Servian army supplies completed the equipment, of which the composition and origin recalls the case of Jukić. Anxious about the success of the attempt, Tankosić had the conspirators instructed in shooting, a task which Čiganović carried out with a success which has since been fully proved. Tankosić and Čiganović were further anxious to ensure secrecy for the plot by special means which had not been bargained for by the assassins. They therefore supplied cyanide of potassium, telling the two culprits to commit suicide after the crime, a precaution which was to be specially advantageous to themselves, as secrecy would thus relieve them of the slight danger which they were incurring in the enterprise. Sure death for the victims of their corruption, perfect security for themselves, this is the motto of the Narodna Odbrana, as was already known.

In order to render the execution of the crime possible, it was necessary that the bombs and arms should be secretly smuggled into



Bosnia. There again Čiganović gave all the assistance in his power; he wrote out for the conspirators the exact route to be followed, and assured them of the collusion of the Serbian Customs officials for getting them into Bosnia. The way in which this journey, described by Princip as "mysterious," was organised and carried out can leave no doubt but that this route was a secret one, prepared in advance, and already often used for the mysterious designs of the Narodna Odbrana. With an assurance and a certainty which could only result from long habit, the frontier guards at Šabac and Ložnica lent their administrative organisation for the purpose. The secret transport with its complicated system of ever-changing guides, who were summoned as if by magic, and who were always on the spot when wanted, was effected without a hitch. Without inquiring into the object of this strange journey of some immature students, the Serbian authorities set this smooth machinery into motion at a word from the ex-komitadji and minor railway official, Čiganović. However, they had no need to ask any questions, as from the instructions they had received, it was perfectly clear that a new "mission" of the Narodna Odbrana was being carried out. The sight of the arsenal of bombs and revolvers caused the exciseman Grbić merely to smile good-naturedly and approvingly — sufficient proof of how accustomed they were on this "route" to find contraband of this nature.

The Royal Serbian Government have taken a grave responsibility on their shoulders, in allowing all this to take place.

Though bound to cultivate neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary, they have allowed their press to disseminate hatred against the Monarchy; they have allowed associations established on their own territory under the leadership of high officers, of public officials, of professors and of judges, to carry on openly a campaign against the Monarchy, with the ultimate object of inciting its citizens to revolution; they have not prevented men devoid of all moral scruples, who share in the direction of its military and civil administration, from poisoning the public conscience, so that in this struggle low murder appears as the best weapon.

## APPENDIX 1

### OPINIONS OF THE SERBIAN PRESS

(a) The *Politika*, on the 18th August, 1910, on the occasion of the eightieth birthday of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, published a large portrait of Bogdan Zerajić, who, two months earlier, had made a murderous attack on the Governor of Bosnia, Freiherr von Varešanin. In the article dealing with this, the following observations were made: — "Two months ago, on the 2nd of June (old style), on the opening day of the Diet of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a young Serbian, the student Bogdan Zerajić, made an attempt in Serajevo to kill the Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, General Marian Varešanin. Zerajić fired five shots at

this renegade, who had assured his career by pouring out the blood of his brothers in the famous insurrection in Rakovica, but, owing to a remarkable accident, did not succeed in killing him. Whereon the brave and composed Zerajić fired the sixth and last bullet through his own head, and immediately fell dead. In Vienna, they knew very well that it was not the reading of Russian and revolutionary writings which had induced Zerajić to make his attempt, but that he acted thus as the noble scion of a race which wished to protest against foreign rule in this bloody way. Therefore, they sought to hush up the whole matter as quickly as possible, and — contrary to their custom — to avoid an affair which would have still more compromised the Austrian Government in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Vienna, it was desired that every memory of Zerajić should be extinguished, that no importance should be attached to his attempt; but just this fear of the dead Zerajić, and the prohibition against mentioning his name throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, brought it about that his name is spoken among the people as something sacred to-day, on the 18th of August, perhaps more than ever.

“To-day, we too light a candle at his grave and cry ‘Honour to Zerajić.’”

To this is added a poem, the translation of which is as follows: —

“Bosnia lives and is not dead yet,  
In vain have you buried her corpse;  
Still the chained victim spits fire,  
Nor is it yet time to sing the dirge.  
With devil’s hand you have scratched a grave for her  
But the living dead will not descend into the vault;  
Emperor, dost thou hear?  
In the flash of the revolver the leaden bullets hiss about thy throne.  
These are not slaves; this is glorious freedom  
Which flashes from the bold hand of the oppressed.  
Why does this horrible Golgotha shudder?  
Peter drew the sword in Christ’s defence,  
His hand fell, but out of the blood  
A thousand brave hands will rise;  
That shot was only the first herald  
Of the glorious Easter after Golgotha’s torments.”

(b) On the 8th October, 1910, on the occasion of the anniversary of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the *Politika* and the *Mali Journal*, the last of which appeared with a black border, published articles in which they indulged in violent attacks against Austria-Hungary. Europe must convince herself that the Servian people still think always of the “*revanche*.” The day of the “*revanche*” must come; for this the feverish exertions of Servia to organise her military power as well as the feeling of the Servian people and their hatred of the neighbouring kingdom were a guarantee.

On the same occasion the *Samouprava* wrote on the 9th October, 1910, “Abuse and excesses are no fit means to express true patriotism; quiet, steady and honest work alone leads to the goal.”

(c) On the 18th April, 1911, the *Politika* said: “Except for a few cynics, no one in Servia would be glad to see King Peter pro-

ceeding to Vienna or Budapest. By the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the possibility of friendship between Serbia and Austria-Hungary was once for all destroyed. Every Serbian feels that."

(d) The *Beogradske Novine* wrote on the 18th April, 1911:—"Even in Government circles the projected journey of King Peter to the Emperor Francis Joseph is disapproved. The storm of indignation which has seized the whole of the Serbian race on account of the King's proposed journey is entirely comprehensible."

(e) The *Mali Journal* of the 19th April, 1911, says: "A visit of King Peter to the ruler of Austria-Hungary would be an insult to all Serbs. By this visit, Serbia would forfeit the right to play the part of Piedmont. The interests of Serbia can never coincide with the interests of Austria."

(f) On the 23rd April, 1911, the *Politika*, the *Mali Journal*, the *Tribuna*, the *Beogradske Novine*, and the *Vezernje Novosti*, commented on the projected visit of King Peter to the Court of Vienna: "Between Serbia and Austria, friendship can never exist. The projected visit of King Peter would, therefore, be for Serbia a 'shameful capitulation,' 'a humiliation of Serbia,' 'a solemn sanctioning of all the crimes and misdeeds that Austria-Hungary has committed against Serbia and the Serbian people.'"

(g) On the 18th April, 1912, the *Trgovinski Glasnik* wrote in an article headed, "The decay of Austria":—

"In Austria-Hungary decay prevails on all sides. What is now happening beyond the Danube and the Save is no longer a German, Magyar, Bohemian or Croatian crisis, it is a universal Austrian crisis, a crisis of the dynasty itself. We Servians can observe such a development of affairs in Austria with satisfaction."

(h) The *Balkan*, in an article entitled "The Borders of Albania," in attacking Austria-Hungary, expressed itself to this effect: "If Europe is too weak to call a halt to Austria-Hungary, Montenegro and Serbia will do it, saying to Austria, 'Halt! no further!' A war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia is inevitable. We have dismembered the Turkish Empire, we will dismember Austria too. We have finished one war, we are now facing a second."

(i) The *Vecernje Novosti*, of the 22nd April, 1913, appeals to the Serbian travelling public and to Serbian traders to boycott the *Donau Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft* (The Danube Steam Navigation Company). "No one should travel or consign goods by ships of this Austrian Company. All who do this should be punished with fines by a committee. The moneys would flow to the funds of the *Komitadjis* which are to be applied for the purpose of the coming war with Austria."

(k) The *Tribuna* of the 26th May, 1913, on the occasion of the seizure of Ada Kaleh by Austria, writes: "The criminal black and yellow Austria has again carried out a piratical trick. It is a thief who, when he cannot steal a whole sack of gold, contents himself with one dinar."

(l) On the 10th June, 1913, on the occasion of the recurrence of

the anniversary of the murderous attack on the Royal Commissary in Agram by the student Luka Jukić, the Servian newspapers published memorial articles. An article in the *Pragda* stated that: "It must grieve us to the bottom of our hearts that everyone has not acted like our Jukić. We have no longer a Jukić, but we have the hatred, we have the anger, we have to-day ten million Jukićs. We are convinced that soon Jukić, through his prison window, will hear the last cannon shot of freedom."

(m) The *Mali Journal* of the 7th October, 1913, gives a leading place to an article in which Austria-Hungary is denied the right of existence, and the Slavonic peoples are invited to support the offensive campaign contemplated by Servia.

(n) The *Piémont* writes on the commemoration day of the annexation: "Five years ago to-day an imperial decree extended the sovereignty of the Hapsburg sceptre over Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Servian people will feel for decades yet the grief which was that day inflicted on them. Shamed and shattered, the Servian people groaned in despair. The people vow to take vengeance in attaining freedom by an heroic step. This day has aroused the energy which had already sunk to sleep, and soon the refreshed hero will strive for freedom. To-day when Servian graves adorn the ancient Servian territories, when the Servian cavalry has trod the battlefields of Macedonia and old Servia, the Servian people having ended their task in the South turn to the other side, whence the groans and tears of the Servian brother are heard, and where the gallows has its home. The Servian soldiers who to-day in Dušan's kingdom fight those Albanians who were provoked against us by the state which took Bosnia and Herzegovina from us, vowed to march against the 'second Turkey' even as with God's help they had marched against the Balkan Turkey. They make this vow and hope that the day of revenge is drawing near. One Turkey vanished. The good Servian God will grant that the 'second Turkey' will vanish too."

(o) The *Mali Journal* of the 4th November, 1913, writes: "Every effort towards a *rapprochement* with Austria-Hungary is equivalent to a betrayal of the Servian people. Servia must understand the facts and always hold before her eyes that she has in Austria-Hungary her most dangerous enemy, and that it must be the sacred obligation of every Servian Government to fight this enemy."

(p) On the 14th January, 1914, the *Pragda* said: "Our new year's wishes are first of all for our still unfreed brothers sighing under a foreign yoke. Let the Servians endure; after Kossovo came Kumanovo, and our victorious career is not yet ended."

(q) The *Novosti* of the 18th January, 1914, published a picture of "The Blessing of the Water in Bosnia" with the following text: "Even in places which lie under the foreign yoke, the Servians preserve their customs against the day when in glorious joy the day of freedom dawns."

(r) The *Zastava* confesses in January, 1914: "Servia incites the Austro-Hungarian Servians to revolution."

(s) The *Mali Journal* of the 9th March, 1914, writes: "Servia can never forget Franz Ferdinand's sabre-rattling in the Skutari affair."

(t) On the 4th April, 1914, the *Zastava* writes: "The Austrian statesmen who only conduct a policy of hatred, a bureaucratic policy, not a policy inspired by broad vision, are themselves preparing the ruin of their State."

(u) The *Pragda* of the 8th April, 1914, says: "Austria has now lost her right to exist."

(v) In their Easter numbers (April, 1914) all the Servian newspapers expressed the hope that soon their unfreed, oppressed brothers under the yoke would celebrate a joyous resurrection.

(w) In the *Tribuna* of the 23rd April, 1914, it is stated that: "The pacifists have invented a new catchword, that of the 'patriotism of Europe.' This programme can only be realised, however, when Austria is partitioned."

(x) The *Mali Journal* of the 12th May, 1914, writes: "What are called crimes in private life are called, in Austria, politics. History knows a monster, and that monster is called Austria."

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## APPENDIX 2

EXTRACT FROM THE "NARODNA ODBRANA," AN ORGAN PUBLISHED BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE NARODNA ODBRANA SOCIETY. (NARODNA ODBRANA IZDANJE STREDISNOG ODBORA NARODNE-ODBRANE. BEOGRAD, 1911. "NOVA STAMPARLJA" DAVIDOVIĆ, DEČANSKA ULICA BR. 14, LJUB. DAVIDOVIČA.)

In a short introduction it is first of all remarked that this pamphlet "does not completely or exhaustively reproduce the whole work of the Narodna Odbrana because, for many reasons, it is neither permissible nor possible to do this."

The document is divided into three parts of which the first consists of fourteen chapters and is in the nature of a programme, while the second contains a report of the activities of the Society, and in the third examples are given for the organisation of similar societies abroad.

In the first chapter, "Origin and activity of the first Narodna Odbrana," it is remarked that the Society was founded as a consequence of the popular movement arising in Servia on the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that it had the following objects:—

(1) Raising, inspiring and strengthening the sentiment of nationality.

(2) Registration and enlistment of volunteers.

(3) Formation of volunteer units and their preparation for armed action.

(4) Collection of voluntary contributions, including money and other things necessary for the realisation of its task.

(5) Organisation, equipment and training of a special revolutionary band (Komitee), destined for special and independent military action.



(6) Development of activity for the defence of the Servian people in all other directions. In this connection, it is remarked that owing to the recognition of the annexation by the Great Powers an end had been made to all this work of the Society on which, while retaining its existing constitution, the Society had taken measures to reorganise its programme and to undertake new work, so that, on the recurrence of a similar occasion, "the old red War Flag of the Narodna Odbrana would again be unfurled."

At the beginning of the second chapter, "The new Narodna Odbrana of to-day," it is stated that "at the time of the annexation, experience had shown that Servia was not ready for the struggle which circumstances imposed upon her, and that this struggle, which Servia must take up, is much more serious and more difficult than it was thought to be; the annexation was only one of the blows which the enemies of Servia have aimed at this land, many blows have preceded it, and many will follow it. Work and preparation are necessary so that a new attack may not find Servia equally unprepared." The object assigned to the work to be done by people of every class is stated to be "the preparation of the people for war in all forms of national work, corresponding to the requirements of the present day," and the means suggested to effect this object are "strengthening of the national consciousness, bodily exercises, increase of material and bodily well-being, cultural improvement, etc. . . . so far as individuals and societies can and should assist the State in these spheres."

The third chapter, "The three principal tasks," begins with a hint that the annexation has taught that national consciousness in Servia is not so strong as it should be in a country which, as a small fraction of three millions, forms a hope of support for seven millions of the oppressed Servian people. The first task of the Society, therefore, consists in strengthening the national consciousness. The second task is the cultivation of bodily exercises, the third the proper utilisation of these activities learned in the field of sport.

In the fourth chapter. (Musketry) prominence is given to the value of good training in musketry, especially having regard to the circumstances of Servia, where the military training only lasts six months. These observations conclude with the sentence:

"A new blow, like that of the annexation, must be met by a new Servia, in which every Servian, from child to greybeard, is a rifleman."

The fifth chapter, which treats of "The relations of the Narodna Odbrana to the Sokol societies," begins with a social and political excursus as to the conditions on which the powers of States depend. In this connection the fall of Turkey is referred to, and it is said:

"The old Turks of the South gradually disappear and only a part of our people suffer under their rule. But new Turks come from the North, more fearful and dangerous than the old; stronger in civilisation and more advanced economically, our northern enemies come

against us. They want to take our freedom and our language from us and to crush us. We can already feel the presages of the struggle which approaches in that quarter. The Servian people are faced by the question 'to be or not to be?'"

"What is the object of the Lectures?" is the title of the seventh chapter, the principal contents of which are covered by the following sentences:

"The Narodna Odbrana instituted lectures which were largely propaganda lectures. The programme of our new work was developed. Every lecture referred to the annexation, the work of the old Narodna Odbrana and the task of the new. The lectures will never cease to be propaganda lectures, but they will develop special branches more and more and concern themselves with all questions of our social and national life."

In the eighth chapter, "Women's Activities in the Narodna Odbrana," the ninth "Detail and Lesser Work," and the tenth, "Renaissance of the Society," the preparation and deepening of the Society's work and the necessity of a regeneration of the individual, the nation and the State are treated in reference to the tasks of the Narodna Odbrana.

The Introduction to the eleventh chapter ("New Obilić and Singjelić"<sup>1</sup>) runs as follows:—

"It is an error to assert that Kossovo is past and gone. We find ourselves in the midst of Kossovo. Our Kossovo of to-day is the gloom and ignorance in which our people live. The other causes of the new Kossovo live on the frontiers to the North and West: the Germans, Austrians and 'Schwabas,' with their onward pressure against our Servian and Slavonic South." In conjunction with the reference to the heroic deeds of Obilić and Singjelić, the necessity of sacrifice in the service of the nation is alluded to, and it is declared that "national work is interwoven with sacrifice, particularly in Turkey and in Austria, where such workers are persecuted by the authorities and dragged to prison and the gallows. For this struggle, also, against gloom and ignorance there is no need of such heroes. The Narodna Odbrana does not doubt that in the fight with gun and cannon against the 'Schwabas' and the other enemies with whom we stand face to face, our people will provide a succession of heroes. However, the Narodna Odbrana is not content with this, for it regards the so-called peaceful present day conditions as war, and demands heroes too for this struggle of to-day which we are carrying on in Servia and beyond the frontier."

The twelfth chapter treats of "Union with our brothers and friends," and its principal contents are concentrated in the following sentences:—

<sup>1</sup> Miloš Obilić (or Kobilić) crept — according to Serbian tradition — into the Turkish Camp, after the battle on the Amselveld, and there murdered the Sultan Murad (von Kállay, *Geschichte der Serben*, Vol. I). Stephan Singjelić, Prince of Resara, played a part during the Serbian Revolution, 1807–1810. In 1809, Singjelić defended the redoubt of Tschagar against the Turks, and is said to have blown himself into the air, with some of his followers and many Turks, when outnumbered. (Von Kállay, *Die Geschichte des serbischen Aufstandes*.)

"The maintenance of union with our brothers near and far across the frontier, and our other friends in the world, is one of the chief tasks of the Narodna Odbrana. In using the word 'people' the Narodna Odbrana means our whole people, not only those in Servia. It hopes that the work done by it in Servia will spur the brothers outside Servia to take a more energetic share in the work of private initiative, so that the new present day movement for the creation of a powerful Servian Narodna Odbrana will go forward in unison in all Servian territories."

The thirteenth chapter, which is headed "Two Important Tasks," proceeds as follows:—

"As we take up the standpoint that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has completely brought into the light of day the pressure against our countries from the North, the Narodna Odbrana proclaims to the people that Austria is our first and greatest enemy." This work (that is to say, to depict Austria to the Servian people as their greatest enemy) is regarded by the Society, according to the following expressions of opinion, as a healthy and necessary task, in fact, as its principal obligation. For the pamphlet goes on as follows:—

"Just as once the Turks attacked us from the south, so Austria attacks us to-day from the north. If the Narodna Odbrana preaches the necessity of fighting Austria, she preaches a sacred truth of our national position."

The hatred against Austria brought about by this propaganda is, of course, not the aim but the natural consequence of this work, the object of which is independence and freedom. If on this account hatred of Austria germinates, it is Austria who sows it by her advance, which conduct "makes obligatory a war of extermination against Austria."

After some praise of the modern conception of nationalism the remark is made that in speaking of "freedom and unity," too much is mere talk. The people must be told that:—

"For the sake of bread and room, for the sake of the fundamental essentials of culture and trade, the freeing of the conquered Servian territories and their union with Servia is necessary to gentlemen, tradesmen, and peasants alike." Perceiving this the people will tackle the national work with greater self-sacrifice. Our people must be told that the freedom of Bosnia is necessary for her, not only out of pity for the brothers suffering there, but also for the sake of trade and the connection with the sea.

The "two tasks" of the Narodna Odbrana are then again brought together in the following concluding sentence:—

"In addition to the task of explaining to the people the danger threatening it from Austria, the Narodna Odbrana has the important duty, while preserving intact the sacred national memories, of giving to the people this new, wholesome and, in its consequences, mighty conception of nationalism and of work in the cause of freedom and union."

The fourteenth and final chapter begins with an appeal to the



Government and people of Servia to prepare themselves in all ways for the struggle "which the annexation has foreshadowed."

Hereon the activities of the Narodna Odbrana are again recapitulated in the following sentences: —

"While the Narodna Odbrana works in conformity with the times according to the altered conditions, it also maintains all the connections made at the time of the annexation; to-day therefore it is the same as it was at the time of the annexation. To-day, too, it is Odbrana (defence); to-day, too, Narodna (of the people); to-day, too, it gathers under its standard the citizens of Servia as it gathered them at the time of the annexation. Then the cry was for war, now the cry is for work. Then meetings, demonstrations, voluntary clubs, (*Komitees*), weapons and bombs were asked for; to-day steady, fanatical, tireless work and again work is required to fulfil the tasks and duties to which we have drawn attention by way of present preparation for the fight with gun and cannon which will come."

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The pamphlet and the annual report contain the following information as to the organisation of the Narodna Odbrana: —

A Central Committee at Belgrade directs all proceedings of the Narodna Odbrana. All other committees of the Narodna Odbrana are subject to this. The Central Committee is divided into four sections: — for cultural work, for bodily training, for financial policy, and for foreign affairs.

District Committees, with their centre at the seat of the offices of the District Government, conduct the affairs of the Society in the corresponding districts. Every District Committee divides itself into sections for culture (the President being the Chairman of the local branch of the "Culture League"), for bodily training (the President being a local member of the Riflemen's, Sokol, Sportsmen's and Horsemen's clubs) and for financial affairs; some District Committees have also a section for Foreign Affairs.

Divisional Committees located at the seat of the local authorities conduct the affairs of the Society in the various divisions.

Local Committees conduct the Society's affairs in the various towns and villages.

Confidential men are located in those places in the interior of the country where the constitution of a Committee is not necessary.

Societies "which work in close connection with the organisation of the Narodna Odbrana" and are supported by the latter in every respect are the following: —

The Riflemen's Association with 762 societies, the Sokol Association "Dusan the Strong" with 2500 members, the Olympic Club, the Horsemen's Society, "Prince Michael," the Sportsmen's Association and the Culture League.

All these societies are organised on similar lines to those of the Narodna Odbrana and use their premises, including club houses, libraries, etc. Distinguished members of these societies are chairmen of sections in the Committees of the Narodna Odbrana.

APPENDIX 3

EXTRACT FROM THE "REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SOKOL SOCIETY DUSAN THE STRONG IN KRAGUJEVAC IN THE YEARS 1912-13." (KRAGUJEVAC PRINTING OFFICE "BUDUĆNOST" TIH. LEKIĆ 1914.)

At the head of this report is printed the speech with which the President, Major Kovačević of the Servian Army, greeted the annual meeting in January, 1914.

"It is known to you," the President began, "that Sokolism, which arose in the struggle against Germanism, is a purely Slavonic institution, which has for its aim to unite and to inspire all the Slavonic brothers, and to give physical and intellectual training for the struggle against the enemy of Slavism.

"We Servians, as a part of the great Slavonic community, have taken up the Sokol idea and have agreed to the common work for our own and our brothers' welfare and happiness.

"We Serbians, too, will live and work in the spirit of the Sokols, for we wish to revive the weary and the feeble, to strengthen the weak and the troubled, to free the imprisoned and the enchained. We have done this now and in earlier wars. We have rescued part of our brothers from the insolence of the enemy in the South. We have struck off their fetters, we have rid them of their sufferings and given them freedom, so that they enjoy happiness, equality and brotherhood."

After giving a few words of praise to this "noble work" which "realised a part of the great Sokol idea," Major Kovačević proceeded:

"Oh, my brothers and sisters, our enemy in the North is more dangerous and pitiless, because he is stronger in respect of his civilisation and his economic position.

"This enemy is insatiable in his lusts; he holds millions of our brothers in slavery and chains. He took law and freedom from them and subjected them all to his service. The brothers murmur, call and beg for still quicker help.

"We must not leave them to the mercy of this fearful and greedy enemy. We must hurry to their help the sooner because it is our duty to do so. Could we in any event be happy when so many brothers live in slavery, suffer and murmur?

"Brothers and sisters!

"The enemy is dangerous, greedy and troublesome. Let us ever be on our guard.

"Let us go to work with still greater willingness and self-sacrifice. Let us be scrupulous according to the sacred Sokol obligation, true and enduring.

"Let us prepare ourselves for the struggle and for the just Sokol idea.

"Let us unite and ally ourselves with innumerable Sokol hosts, and let us always remember that truth which the Servian Sokols

wrote upon their flag: That only a healthy, powerful, well-organised people, conscious of its nationality, is fit to defend itself, to struggle, and to conquer."

The report of the Committee of Management follows the speech of the President. After a description of the successes in the last wars, which interfered with the activities of the Society for two years, it is stated that "the day arrived when we returned to our work, because our programme was not yet fulfilled, because our task was not yet ended. A great part of our people still endure the pains of the crucified Christ; we have still to visit our brothers beyond the Drina; we have still to seek out the town of Serajevo and the inheritance of St. Sava;<sup>1</sup> we must behold the home of Marina Novak, of Deli Radivoj and of the old Vujadin; we must cross the mountains of Romanaija and see why Travnik is veiled in mist. That song must end at last: 'Ah! Bosnia, thou orphan child before God, hast thou nowhere people of thy race. . . .'"

After a discussion of various undertakings of the Society, emphasis is laid on the fact that the Society maintains relations with the brother societies beyond the Save and the Drina, and special emphasis is laid on the dispatch of delegates to the Jubilee of the Prosvjeta held in Serajevo. On this the report remarks: "By sending representatives to the brothers in Bosnia the Committee intended to say to them — we have not forgotten you, the wings of the falcon of Sumadija are still mighty." After a detailed description of a visit of the Agram students to Serbia<sup>2</sup> and of the dedication of the flag of "the Young People's Temperance Association," the report of the executive concludes with the following sentences: —

"These manifestations — the coming of the brother Croats to Sumadija and the meeting of the 'temperate youth' from all Servian regions are correctly appreciated by our leaders, and one would not exaggerate if one said that these events indicate the beginning and the germ of a great deed to be done in the near future.

"They are the expression of a great and, till now, silent awakening of the national consciousness and of the strength of an oppressed nation which is not allowed to arise and unite. In a little time this germ will ripen, and when the soul of the people arises still more, there will be no barrier which it cannot break, and no obstacle which it cannot tear down upon its way. The work of strengthening this power, the assistance and acceleration of the progress of this national development, the preparation and the support of this idea, was always the aim of the actions of our leaders."

The treasurer's report enumerates first of all those who have supported the society. In addition to a number of members of the

<sup>1</sup> St. Sava (ob. 1236) is the patron saint of the Serbians. Herzegovina is the name of *Ducatus Santi Save*. The "inheritance of St. Sava" is, therefore, equivalent in meaning to "Herzegovina."

<sup>2</sup> This visit of the Agram students (April, 1912) to Belgrade, Nish, Semendria, etc., was used in Serbia as the pretext for a great demonstration of hostility to the Monarchy. The excursionists were accorded military honours, and lunches and balls took place in the Military Academy and the Officers' Club. In Nish, indeed, a military parade was held in honour of the visitors.

Kragujevac District Committee, the following are mentioned and thanked : —

The District Committee of the "Narodna Odbrana" at Kragujevac, particularly its "Ritter" section, which often assisted the Sokol Society with substantial support; the Headmaster of the Gymnasium at Kragujevac, who "always showed his fatherly care" to the Sokols; the Divisional Commandant of Sumadija, who had substantially supported the society; the President of the District Court at Kragujevac; the District Chairman and the Parish Chairman at Kragujevac.

After referring to the members of the society who have fallen in war, the treasurer closes his report with the following words : —

"After so brilliant a victory over a portion of our enemies, those who control our society hope that you all, from now onwards, will devote yourselves still more, more unitedly and more entirely, to the activities of Sokolism so that you may rear falcons in our falcon's eyrie, who at the given moment, will one day be ready to fly aloft, and in their mighty flight bring freedom, love and brotherhood to all our brothers who are not yet free."

The annual report is signed by Major M. J. Kovačević, President, by the secretary of the Law Courts, D. V. Brzaković, as secretary, and by ten members of the executive, among whom are included two professors (Emil Lukić and Milan Janković), as well as a further officer (Major of Infantry, Michael Vasić).

It is clear from this annual report, and from a schedule also signed by Major M. J. Kovačević and Brzaković, Secretary of the Law Courts, and sent to the Kragujevac Sokol Society by the "Srpski Soko" in Tuzla for completion, that the Sokol Societies in Servia stand in close relation with various similar societies in the Monarchy to an extent not hitherto known.

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#### APPENDIX 4

#### THE SERVIAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE IN THE SERVICE OF THE NARODNA ODBRANA

An appeal by the Narodna Odbrana appears as a supplement to the Servian Official Gazette, *Srpski Novine*, of 28th June, 1914 (new style), and was supplied to all subscribers to the paper.

The following passages occur in this appeal : —

"Brothers and sisters ! Kossovo was only partly avenged, the day of St. Vitus (Vidovdan) was only partly expiated. Just as far as the territories reach where our people's speech is heard — the Servian, Croatian, and Slovenian — from Kikinda to Monastir, from Trieste to Carevo-Solo, just as far and wide does the meaning of St. Vitus' Day and of Kossovo extend. So many souls of our race weep on this territory; so many fetters of our brothers clank; so much work is yet to be done; so much have we still to sacrifice. St. Vitus' Day could

formerly mean a day of mourning for us, but to-day, when we have already gone so far in the new history of the people; when behind us stand great and glorious national events, and before us still greater and more glorious events await us; to-day when we stand in the midst of the creation of a great national State; to-day St. Vitus' Day must be for us a day of great joy and pride, because of that which has happened, and sprung from it, and still more because of that which will come. Men and women of Servia! Millions of our brothers, Slovenes, Croats, and Servians beyond our frontiers, look to-day to us, the Children of the Kingdom, and joy and hope fill their breast as they now behold to-day's majestic manifestations for the national cause. God helps the brave! Forward all! That part of our sacred task which is as yet unrealised calls us. Belgrade, St. Vitus' Day, 1914."

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#### APPENDIX 5

##### DEPOSITION OF TRIFKO KRSTANOVIĆ, CONCERNING THE NARODNA ODBRANA

The baker's assistant, Trifko Krstanović, of Zavadonici, was arrested by a gendarmerie patrol on the night of the 6th-7th July, 1914, because he had been heard to remark shortly after the murderous attack on the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, that this attack was to be expected and because this remark brought him under suspicion of having had knowledge of the plot.

He was, on this account, brought up before the District Court at Serajevo. The examination of the prisoner revealed that his remark did not justify the suspicion which had arisen against him, since it, founded entirely on his earlier knowledge of the activities of the Narodna, was merely the expression of his conviction that, on account of the agitation developing in Servia against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and especially against the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, a deed of that kind was to be expected. In the absence of any material facts in support of the charge, the proceedings against Krstanović were accordingly withdrawn, and, having regard to his knowledge of the activities of the Narodna Odbrana, which had an important bearing on the inquiry, he was subpoenaed as a witness.

An extract from his depositions taken on the 19th July, 1914, which is relevant to the matters here in question, is as follows:—

"In the autumn of the year 1908, I crossed the frontier to Servia on the Mokra Gora, near Visegrad, to seek work. I first came to Bagina Bašta in the district of Užice, and as I found no work there, I went to Belgrade, where I arrived just at the time when the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was announced. As I saw that the annexation had caused great popular commotion and excitement, and that I should not be able to find any work, I went to the Imperial and Royal Consulate and tried to get myself sent home. There I was



told to come back in the afternoon, and that I should then be sent home. However, as I came out of the Consulate, a gendarme seized me on the street, and asked me where I came from; under the impression that I was a spy, he conducted me to a tower (*Karaula*). Here I was questioned, and when I said to them that I wanted to go home, a non-commissioned officer began to abuse me: Why should I now want to go out of Serbia which now needed more people because a war with Austria would come? When I said to him that I had nothing to live on, he answered me that I would find full maintenance if I would register myself in the Komitee. In my need I agreed, and a gendarme took me to the inn 'Zelenom Vijencu' ('The Green Wreath'), and introduced me there to Voja Tankosić, the leader of the Komitee and a captain in the regular army. Here, at the 'Green Wreath' I was provided with food and lodging, and, as I saw, other members of the Komitee lived here. Voja Tankosić told me that the business of the Komitee was to learn bomb-throwing, the destruction of bridges, tunnels, telegraphs and railways, because a war between Serbia and Austria could easily arise. On this a man took me to a small building belonging to the Royal Demesne next to the Treasury, where the offices of the Komitee were situated, and in the office I met Milan Pribičević, who enrolled me in the Komitee. At this enrolment, Milan Pribicević asked me whether Voja Tankosić had told me the obligations which I had as a member of the Komitee. To this I answered 'Yes.' He said that those enrolled must be efficient, strong, and self-sacrificing. "There were then about 70 of us enrolled. In Belgrade we did nothing. After about six weeks our leader Tankosić informed us that the Great Powers had prohibited our Komitee, and that we must leave Belgrade and hide ourselves somewhere in an out-of-the-way place not visited by foreigners. In this way they sent us to the town of Čuprija. Here we were drilled by the officers, Voja Tankosić, Dušan Putnik, Zivko Gvosdić and Mitar Djinović, who was involved in the Montenegrin bomb outrage, and was shot in Montenegro. In order that no one should become aware of our objects, or know anything of our numbers, we were forbidden to have intercourse with outsiders. We practised the throwing of bombs, the construction of mines, and the destruction of telegraphs, railways, tunnels and bridges. Every fortnight we were visited by Milan Pribičević, General Božo Janković, the pharmacist Škarić, the deputy Zivko Rafajlović, and a certain Glišić Milutin, a Treasury official, who watched our drill and paid for our board on each occasion. Our instructors told us that, when war was declared, we Komitees would go in advance, then the volunteers, and then the regular army. There were about 140 men at Čuprija. Besides board, we had lodging and clothes and 25 para a day for tobacco. The school lasted about three months, that is until March, 1909. Then the members of the committee told us that we were dismissed, that we could all go wherever we wished, for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been recognised by the Great Powers, and that our Komitee had become useless. On the

dissolution of the Komitee General Božo Janković told me to enter the service of Božo Milanović at Šabać, where I should receive wages of 50 dinar a month. He did not tell me what the nature of the service would be. I accepted because, as a member of the Komitee, I regarded myself as bound to obey General Janković, and also because I had nothing to live on, and had to earn my livelihood. In this way I came to Šabać in March, 1909, and reported myself to Božo Milanović, a tradesman of Šabać. General Janković had told me that Božo Milanović was chairman of the Narodna Odbrana in Šabać, and that I should assist him in connection with this Narodna Odbrana. When I had given Božo Milanović the General's letter and he had read it, he told me that I must serve him faithfully and carry out his orders. My chief duty would be to carry his letters wheresoever they were addressed. It would cost me my life if I failed to carry a letter to its destination, and if any one else got hold of it. On the next day, Božo Milanović gave me a closed letter which I was to take to Čedo Lukić, Superintendent of Excise at Serbisches-Rača. On the road to Rača, at the village of Bogatić, the District Captain stopped me, took the letter from me opened it and read it. In the letter it said that Lukić should immediately buy three boats so that they should be ready if they were required. 100 dinar were enclosed in the letter. On this occasion the Captain told me that the Ministry had given strict orders that the Komitadji were to do nothing without orders, so that international diplomatic intervention should not be provoked. I returned to Šabać and told Božo Milanović what had happened to me. Božo Milanović applied to the District Prefect, who gave orders that the revolver, which the Captain at Bogatić had taken from me, should be returned. He also gave orders that the Captain should send the letter to Čedo Lukić to whom it was addressed. I carried letters of this sort from March, 1909, until October, 1910, and in that time I took 43 letters to Serbisches-Rača, 55 to Ložnica, 5 to Zvornik, 2 to Ljubivija, and I don't know how many to Koviljača. I noticed how often I was in each place because these places are a very long way from Šabać. I took the letters to the chiefs of the Customs houses in the various places, and from them I received letters in reply and took them to Božo Milanović. I recollect that on a few occasions I took letters to Šepačka Ada. My assistant in letter carrying was one Vaso Erić, a native of Srebrenica. Every week I took letters from Božo Milanović to Belgrade, and delivered them to Milan Pribičević and Božo Janković. I knew nothing of the contents of these letters, and no one told me anything about them. So far as I could see, the letters despatched by Božo Milanović were not in cipher, but the letters sent by the chiefs of the Customs houses were written in special characters, a fact which I observed when Božo Milanović opened them. Once I brought one of these cipher letters to Božo Milanović, I think it was from Zvornik, and he sent me with the letter to Mika Atanasijević, Professor at Šabać, to decipher. He did this, as he usually did; but perhaps he forgot to close the letter, so that I could read it. The letter stated, that it



was reported from a reliable source, that money was to be stamped with the likeness of the heir to the throne, and this was an indication that the Emperor Francis Joseph was about to abdicate. After about eight months of my service with Božo Milanović, Božo gave me his visiting card with a death's head drawn upon it; on it was written that I was designated an initiate (*porjerenik*) of the Narodna Odbrana. On this occasion he told me, that the business was spying. . . .

"On one occasion, I learnt from the officer Dušan Opterkić, member of the Narodna Odbrana, that the Narodna Odbrana had 23 branches in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Beyond this, I do not know what organisation, if any, the Narodna Odbrana has in Bosnia. From time to time, Milan Pribičević gave me a revolver, or money for the purchase of a revolver, for me to give to the Customs officers on the frontier who served as Komitadjis who had no revolver nor any money to buy a revolver themselves. It appeared to me that Milan Pribičević gave them these things as an honour, just because they were Komitadjis. I had nothing else to do with arms.

"On one occasion, during my service with Božo Milanović, I was ordered to accompany a man to a peasant in Lijasnica on the Drina, who would give us all necessary information and show us everything, so that we two could kill Ljubo Stanaričić, a Servian officer of Reserve, who had fled to Bijeljina. For the Committee of the Narodna Odbrana had learnt that Ljubo Stanaričić was dangerous to the Servian State, and had resolved that he should be put to death.

"That man and I received instructions from Božo Milanović to go to a certain place across the Drina, and to kill Ljubo Stanaričić, who lives just on the bank of the Drina on the Bosnian side in the district of Bijeljin. I and that man had descended into the Drina, but because the water was deep, and we saw that Ljubo was walking round his house with a gun on his shoulder, we returned to that peasant's house. As I saw that we could not kill him with the knife, I sent that man to Šabać to tell Božo Milanović that it was not possible to kill Stanaričić in the manner he desired, namely, with the knife. On this, I received orders from Božo Milanović that we should kill him in any case. We then determined to shoot him with a gun. According to Božo's instructions, the man who was with me was to shoot and kill him, and I was to confirm whether these instructions were carried out. In the meantime, however, a mounted gendarme brought us instructions from the District Prefect of Šabać that we were to return, and to abandon the original project. And so we returned to Šabać.

"In October, 1910, I demanded an increase of pay from Božo Milanović, and, on his refusal, I left his service. From Šabać I went to Belgrade, where I met General Janković, and he had me arrested for refusing obedience. They took me through various prisons for about two months, and all because I had refused to obey them, and they feared I would betray their secrets. Finally, the authorities decided to send me to Bosnia. In Šabać a prisoner told me that my life was at stake. The gendarmes accompanied me to Zvornik, where

they handed me over to the Bosnian gendarmes. In this way I came to Bosnia in December, 1910.

"I know nothing of any 'Black Hand,' with the exception of what I have read of it in Servian newspapers. I can't remember now what was written in the newspapers about the 'Black Hand.' Nor do I know anything of the 'Black List.' After the annexation there prevailed in Servia universal anger and hatred against the person of the Heir to the Austrian Throne, who was regarded as the sworn enemy of the Servians."

Beyond this, Krstanović referred to his earlier statements, of which only the following are of interest as supplementing the foregoing testimony.

The Komitee into which Milan Pribičević introduced Krstanović was set up by the Narodna Odbrana. In the school at Čuprija there were 20 to 22 Austrian subjects. Milan Čiganović was also one of the pupils.

In the school at Čuprija it was inculcated that the Komitee must be ready to proceed to Bosnia, on the command of the Narodna Odbrana, and there act according to the orders of their commanders.

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## APPENDIX 6

### EXTRACT FROM THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF SERAJEVO IN THE PROSECUTION OF JOVO JAGLIČIĆ AND OTHERS FOR ESPIONAGE.

In the year 1913, it was discovered that Jovo Jagličić and several accomplices were carrying on espionage in Bosnia in the interests of Servia. The criminal proceedings instituted in the matter afforded *inter alia* opportunities for obtaining an insight into the methods of the Great-Servian propaganda, and more especially of the Narodna Odbrana.

Jovo Jagličić made a statement that in the month of August or September, 1912, he for the first time met Petar Klarić, known as Pešut, formerly a cattle inspector in Foča, who had fled to Montenegro in 1912 and then became a Komitadji.

At their first meeting Klarić asked Jagličić whether he knew Rade Milošević of Kalinovik, and, on his answering, said that Milošević was lying very ill in hospital: "It would be a pity if he were to die; we have spoken of great matters; has he never said anything to you about them?" On receiving a negative answer Klarić went on: "I had something important to tell you; we are Servians, and must do something important for Servia. Come to my office." There the following conversation ensued between them:—

"Jovan, I will tell you something; I don't know you yet and whether you will betray me. I tell you, nevertheless, and if you have the heart, betray me!"

On Jagličić asking him what it was all about, Klarić answered, "Brother, in Serbia there is a society called the 'Narodna Odbrana.' Many people must join this society; many have been enrolled already in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in the whole Monarchy; among them are people of intelligence and means, long-headed people, and if they can do it why should we not do it too, so that we too may help a bit."

To the question, what was the object of this society, Klarić answered: —

"The Society has this object: for instance, you are in Kalinovik; you let me know what the news is there, how many soldiers, how many guns, how much ammunition, different arms, who comes, who leaves, and so on. We have a secret writing, 'cipher,' and use it for correspondence. If you are loyal, you will get it too."

Jagličić was frightened that Klarić was merely sounding him for the purpose of denouncing him, and therefore asked him to tell him the names of some of the members, on which Klarić reflected for some time and then told him a name, which gave him confidence.

Hereon Klarić said to him: "Shall I give you the 'cipher'?" Jagličić agreed. Klarić, who knew the cipher by heart, wrote it out on a slip and gave it to Jagličić.

On another occasion Klarić gave an account of his stay at Banja-Koviljača (near Ložnica) where he was instructed by the Servian captain Todorović<sup>1</sup> in bomb-throwing, and when asked by the accused why he learnt this he answered: "If anything such as I have spoken of to you comes to pass, it is necessary that I should know how to handle bombs, and that I should teach you and you should teach others, so that powder magazines and other important objects should be blown up, for in that case we should receive bombs from Serbia."

Klarić then described the appearance of the bombs, and said that he had already enrolled people who, in case of war, would cut telegraph and telephone wires.

At these meetings Jagličić learnt from Klarić that it also appertained to the duties of members of the Narodna Odbrana to induce Austro-Hungarian soldiers to desert, to enlist volunteers (Komitadjis), to organise bands, to blow up objects and depots, and so on. Klarić also informed him that even cipher correspondence between Bosnian and Servian members would not be entrusted to the post, but despatched across the frontier by reliable messengers.

Klarić further told Jagličić that on the occasion of the Prosvjeta celebration (in September, 1912) a Servian major had stayed in the Hotel "Europe" with the Servian deputation which was sent to it,<sup>2</sup> that Klarić had taken members of the Narodna Odbrana to him, and that he had sworn them in.

From a spy Jagličić learnt that bombs would arrive in Serajevo, or had already arrived, that these had the appearance of pieces of

<sup>1</sup> Captain Kosta Todorović was then in fact Boundary Commissioner and Director of the Serbian Intelligence Service for the frontier line from Rača to Ljuboiija.

<sup>2</sup> The Serbian major, Mika Janković, appeared as a delegate at the Prosvjeta celebration.

soap,<sup>1</sup> and that two or three would either be sent to this spy or that he would fetch them.

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## APPENDIX 7

### FROM CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS ON THE NARODNA ODBRANA

The control of the Narodna Odbrana is in the hands of representatives of all parties so as to win over both the progressives and those who are hostile to the conspirators. Its actual guiding spirit is Pribičević, now Major. The position of secretary is always filled by an officer on leave.

The object of the Narodna Odbrana is to develop effective propaganda in military and civilian circles in the Southern-Slav portions of Austria-Hungary, with the object of preparing for a revolution, interference with any mobilisation that may take place, and the initiation of panics, revolts, etc.

The organisation has many trusted representatives and emissaries in the Monarchy, who carry on an unostentatious personal propaganda. Some are sent specially — to enlist a few men — preferably railway officials — in the neighbourhood of important bridges, junctions, etc., whose duty it is at the appropriate moment to carry out the directions they have received, or to get them carried out.

Intercourse between the members of the Narodna Odbrana is, so far as possible, effected by keeping in personal touch with each other.

Young people, workmen and railwaymen chiefly are enrolled as members.

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## APPENDIX 8

EXTRACT FROM THE RECORDS OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AT SERAJEVO, TOUCHING THE PROCEEDINGS THERE INSTITUTED AGAINST GAVRILO PRINCIP AND CONFEDERATES ON ACCOUNT OF THE CRIME OF ASSASSINATION PERPETRATED ON THE 28TH JUNE, 1914, ON HIS IMPERIAL AND ROYAL HIGHNESS THE ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND OF AUSTRIA-ESTE AND HER HIGHNESS THE DUCHESS SOPHIE OF HOHENBERG.

### *I. The deed and the perpetrators*

Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, Trifko Grabež, Vaso Čubriović and Četres Popović confess that in common with the fugitive Mehemed Mehmedbašić they contrived a plot for the murder of the

<sup>1</sup> The bombs used in the Serajevo attack on the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, as well as those found in the Save, near Brcko, in the year 1913, which came from the Royal Serbian Arsenal at Kragujevac, can in fact be compared with pieces of soap.

Archduke Franz Ferdinand and, armed with bombs and in the case of some of them with Browning pistols, laid wait for him on the 28th June, 1914, on his progress through Serajevo for the purpose of carrying out the planned attack.

Nedeljko Čabrinović confesses that he was the first of the conspirators to hurl a bomb against the Archduke's carriage, which missed its mark and which on exploding injured only the occupants of the carriage following the Archducal motor car.

Gavrilo Princip confesses that he fired two shots from a Browning pistol against the Archducal motor car, by which the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg received fatal wounds.

Both perpetrators confess that the act was done with intent to murder.

These confessions have been fully verified by means of the investigations which have taken place, and it is established that the deceased Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the deceased Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg died as a result of the revolver shots fired at them by Gavrilo Princip.

## *II. Origin of the plot*

The accused have made the following declarations, which are essentially consistent, before the examining magistrate: —

In April, 1914, Princip, during his stay at Belgrade, where he associated with a number of Servian students in the cafés of the town, conceived the plan for the execution of an attempt on the life of the late Archduke Franz Ferdinand. He communicated this intention to his acquaintance Čabrinović, who also was in Belgrade at the time. The latter had already conceived a similar idea and was ready at once to participate in the attempt. The execution of an attempt on the Archduke's life was a frequent topic of conversation in the circle in which Princip and Čabrinović moved, because the Archduke was considered to be a dangerous enemy of the Servian people.

Princip and Čabrinović desired at first to procure the bombs and weapons necessary for the execution of the deed from the Servian Major Milan Pribičević or from the Narodna Odbrana, as they themselves did not possess the means for their purchase. As, however, Major Pribičević and the authoritative member of the said association, Zivojin Dačić, were absent from Belgrade at that time, they decided to try to obtain the weapons from their acquaintance Milan Čiganović, who had formerly been a Komitadji and was at that time in the employment of the State railways.

Princip, through the instrumentality of an intimate friend of Čiganović, now got into communication with the latter. Thereupon Čiganović called on Princip and discussed the planned attempt with him. He entirely approved it, and thereupon declared that he would like to consider further whether he should provide the weapons for

the attempt. Čabrinović also talked with Čiganović on the subject of the weapons.

At Easter Princip took Trifko Grabež, who also was in Belgrade, into his confidence. The latter is also shown by his own confession to have declared himself ready to take part in the attempt.

In the following weeks Princip had repeated conversations with Čiganović about the execution of the attempt.

Meanwhile Čiganović had reached an understanding on the subject of the planned attack with the Servian Major Voja Tankosić, who was a close friend of his and who then placed at his disposal for this object the Browning pistols.

Grabež confesses in conformity with the depositions of Princip and Čabrinović that on the 24th May he, accompanied by Čiganović, visited Major Tankosić at the latter's request at his rooms. He says that after he had been introduced Tankosić said to him: "Are you the man? Are you determined?" Whereupon Grabež answered: "I am." Tankosić next asked: "Do you know how to shoot with a revolver?" and when Grabež answered in the negative Tankosić said to Čiganović: "I will give you a revolver; go and teach them how to shoot."

Hereupon Čiganović conducted Princip and Grabež to the military rifle range at Toprider and instructed them in a wood adjoining the range in shooting with a Browning pistol at a target. Princip proved himself the better shot of the two. Čiganović also familiarized Princip, Grabež and Čabrinović with the use of the bombs which were later given to them.

On the 27th May, 1914, Čiganović handed over to Princip, Čabrinović and Grabež, as their confessions agree in stating, six bombs, four Browning revolvers and a sufficient quantity of ammunition, as well as a glass tube of cyanide of potassium with which to poison themselves after the accomplishment of the deed in order that the secret might be kept. Moreover Čiganović gave them some money.

Princip had previously informed Danilo Ilić, at Easter, of his plan of assassination. He now begged the latter on his return to Serajevo to enlist certain additional persons, in order to ensure the success of the attempt. Hereupon Ilić according to his confession enlisted Jaso Čubrilović, Četro Popović and Mehemed Mehmedbašić in the plot.

### *III. Origin of the bombs*

Only one of the bombs was made use of in the execution of the attempt. The remaining five bombs came later into the possession of the police at Serajevo.

In the opinion of the judicial experts these bombs are Servian hand-grenades which were factory-made and intended for military purposes. They are identical with the 21 bombs which were found in the Save at Brčko in the year 1913 and which were partly in their original packing, which proved without a doubt that they came from the Servian arsenal of Kragujevac.



It is thus proved that the grenades which were used in the attempt against the Archduke Franz Ferdinand also came from the stores of the Army Depot at Kragujevac.

Grabež quite spontaneously calls the grenades which were handed over to him and his accomplices "Kragujevac bombs."

*IV. Transport of the three assailants, and of the weapons from Serbia to Bosnia*

With regard to this Princip makes the following statement : —

Čiganović told Čabrinović, Grabež and Princip that they were to make their way viâ Šabać and Ložnica to Tuzla and there to betake themselves to Miško Jovanović who would take over the weapons. Next they were to go to Šabać and report themselves to the frontier captain Major Rade Popović, to whom he gave them a note, of which Princip took charge. On the 28th May the three accomplices left Belgrade with the weapons. At Šabać Princip handed over the note which he had received from Čiganović to Major Popović, who thereupon conducted all three to the orderly room and drew them up a pass in which it was stated that one of them was an exciseman and the other two his colleagues. The pass contained also the name of this alleged exciseman, but he had forgotten the name. At the same time Major Popović handed over a closed letter for the frontier captain at Ložnica, whose name was Pravanović, Prdanović or Predojević.

Princip, Čabrinović and Grabež passed the night at Šabać and went by train the next morning to Ložnica, with a half-price ticket, it may be remarked, on the strength of the pass which Major Popović had drawn up for them. They reached Ložnica at noon and delivered to the frontier captain at that place Major Popović's letter, in which were the words: "See that you receive these people and bring them on their way, you know where." The frontier captain said he would summon his excisemen from the frontier and give the three into the charge of the most reliable man. Thereupon he telephoned, and made an appointment with the three accomplices for 7 o'clock the next morning in his office.

Next morning the three conspirators agreed that Čabrinović should take Grabež's pass and make his way openly to Zvornik, but that Princip and Grabež should cross the frontier secretly. This plan was discussed with the frontier captain and it was decided that an excise man from Lješnica called Grbić was to take Princip and Grabež with him to his tower (*karaula*) and bring them over the frontier. Čabrinović accordingly walked to Banja Koviljača in the direction of Zvornik. Princip and Grabež drove with the exciseman Grbić to Lješnica, where they deposited the bombs and the revolver in a room in a hotel. While they were doing so the exciseman Grbić caught sight of these objects. Princip himself described this journey as mysterious.

Grabež's statement conformed in essentials with Princip's and was supplemented by an addition to the effect that Grbić laughed when he saw the bombs and the revolver and merely asked to what part of



Bosnia they were going with those bombs. The excisemen certainly thought that Grabež and Princip were travelling on a mission.

Grbić and a second exciseman brought Princip and Grabež in a boat to an island in the Drina. There Grbić instructed them to wait for a peasant who would come to fetch them. They passed the night on the island in a peasant's hut to which Grbić had directed them; next day came a peasant who conducted them during the night first through a bog and then over the mountains to the neighbourhood of Priboj, where he handed them over to the local teacher Čubrilović, who seemed to have been already waiting for them, to see them further on their way.

He took them on to Miško Jovanović at Tuzla.

Čabrinović's statement about the events of the journey up to the point at which he parted with Princip and Grabež conformed in essentials with those of the latter, and only added by way of supplement that Major Popović told them that he did not reach Šabač from Belgrade till the day before their arrival.

In Ložnica, Čabrinović, Princip and Grabež decided to separate, as it was too dangerous to go about all three together. The frontier captain at Ložnica, whom they informed of this, applauded their plan and gave Čabrinović a letter for M. Jaklojević, the teacher at Mali-Zvornik. Hereupon Čabrinović handed over the bombs, Brown-ing pistol and ammunition which he had been carrying, to Princip and Grabež, and went to Mali-Zvornik with an exciseman who had been told off to accompany him.

There he found the teacher Jaklojević, to whom he handed the letter from the frontier captain of Ložnica. Hereupon the former notified the Servian frontier guard. When Čabrinović, with the teacher, reached this frontier post, a man was already waiting there for them, who brought them in a boat over the Drina to Gross-Zvornik in Bosnia.

Čabrinović then proceeded to Miško Jovanović at Tuzla.

### *Supplement*

Just before this memoir was closed, minutes of evidence were published by the District Court at Serajevo from which it appears that a subject of the Monarchy some days before the 28th June last desired to make a report to the Imperial and Royal Consulate at Belgrade to the effect that he suspected that a plan existed for the execution of an attempt on the life of Archduke Franz Ferdinand during his presence in Bosnia. It seems that the man was prevented from making this report by members of the Belgrade police force, who arrested him on trivial grounds just as he was about to enter the Imperial and Royal Consulate. The conclusion to be drawn from the statements contained in the evidence in question would seem to be that the police officials concerned had knowledge of the planned attempt, and only arrested this man in order to prevent him from laying the information.

As these statements have not yet been verified, no opinion can be expressed at the present stage on their reliability. In view of the investigations into the matter now pending, the more minute details of the evidence cannot be published more exactly at present.

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## APPENDIX 9

### THE SERBIAN PRESS ON THE ASSASSINATION

(a) The Belgrade newspaper *Balkan* writes on the 29th June, with regard to the two perpetrators:—

“Nedeljko Čabrinović, a compositor by profession, was full of anarchical ideas, and well known as a restless spirit. Until twenty days ago, he lived in Belgrade, whither he came after the war and was employed in the State printing works. Before his departure he announced that he was going to Trieste, where he would get work in a new printing works. Gavrilo Princip also was living at Belgrade until a short time ago. During the war he offered his services as a volunteer, but was not accepted, and therefore he left Belgrade. He returned, however, at Christmas last year to Belgrade, attended the gymnasium for a time, and left Belgrade almost at the same time as Čabrinović, though in a different direction. Princip was a silent, nervous, hard-working student, and associated with some fellow students who came, like himself, from Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as latterly with Čabrinović. He inclined towards socialistic ideas, although he had originally belonged to the Young Men Progressive Party. Princip, like Čabrinović, was brought up at Serajevo; the two have been bound by ties of the closest friendship since their childhood.”

(b) The *Piémont* of the 1st July, points out that Princip's protest was a sequel to the public protest of the assassin Zerajić. The explanation of the former's, as of the latter's activities, is to be found in the system of government in Bosnia. The circumstance that Princip executed the deed of vengeance on the national festival of St. Vitus, the day which had been chosen for the manœuvres, made the desperate act of the young martyr more intelligible and more natural. (The newspaper was confiscated by the police on account of this article; the confiscation was, however, annulled the day after by the Court of First Instance at Belgrade.)

(c) The Young Radical *Odjek*, of the 3rd July, says:—“The Archduke Franz Ferdinand was sent to Serajevo on the day of enthusiasm in order to celebrate a brutal manifestation of violence and domination. This brutal act was bound to evoke brutal feelings of resistance, hatred and revenge.”

(d) The organ of the Nationalist Party, *Srpska Zastava*, of the 3rd July, says in an article entitled “Suspicious and Threats”:—“The assassination comes to be regarded more and more as the out-

come of the unsound state of affairs in the Monarchy. On the other hand, the savage persecution of the Servian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina evokes the horror of the whole civilised world."

(e) The Progressive newspaper, *Pravda*, of the 3rd July, writes: — "The policy of Vienna is a cynical one. It exploits the death of the unfortunate couple for its abominable aims against the Servian people."

(f) The *Agence des Balkans*, of the 3rd July, says: — "The crimes which have been perpetrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Servians have been carried out under the auspices and at the direct instigation of the Austro-Hungarian civil and military authorities."

(g) The *Pravda*, of the 4th July, says: — "All the murders and assassinations which have been carried out up to the present time in Austria have arisen from one and the same source. The oppressed peoples of the Monarchy were obliged to have recourse to this method of protest, because no other way was open to them. In the chaos of a reign of terror, it is natural and quite intelligible that the era of assassinations should have firmly established itself."

(h) The *Balkan*, of the 5th July, remarks that Austria-Hungary "must be placed under international control, because of its persecution of the innocent"; for Austria-Hungary has less cohesion than Turkey.

(i) The *Mali Journal*, of the 7th July, writes: — "A sprig of the Middle Ages has been murdered at Serajevo within the last few days. He has been murdered by a lad whose grief for the enslavement of his immediate Fatherland (*engeres Vaterland*) amounted to a paroxysm, that grief which the robbers of the land of his fathers had brought upon him. What has been the contribution of official Austria-Hungary to this? It has answered with general massacres, plunderings and destruction of Servian life and property. Only the worthless distinguish themselves by such heroism. Cowards are always mighty heroes when they are sure that nothing will happen to them. Only compare Princip and Čabrinović with these heroes, and you will at once see the great difference between them. Civilisation and justice are a huge lie in Austria-Hungary."

(j) The *Tribuna*, of the 7th July, says: — "We are of the opinion that the Serajevo murder was arranged to facilitate the extermination of the Servians at one blow."

(k) The *Piémont*, of the 8th July, reports from Bajina Baschka that the Austrian officials in Bosnia are preparing a massacre of the Christians.

(l) The *Balkan*, of the 8th, publishes a report from Bosnia, under the title "St. Bartholomew's Day at Serajevo," and pleads for a general boycott against all the Austrians living in Servia.

(m) The *Mali Journal*, of the 8th, appeals to its readers to boycott the Danube Steamship Company.

(n) Under the title "Nothing from Austria-Hungary!" the *Tribuna*, of the 8th, writes that it would be best to order nothing from Austria-Hungary, to abstain from visiting the Austrian and

Hungarian Spas, and from calling in doctors from Austria-Hungary. It says that private initiative can accomplish a great deal in the direction suggested. The State and the Government offices must not mix themselves up in this movement. It is enough to appeal to the citizens.

(o) The *Stampa*, of the 8th, asserts that the Serajevo police are exposing the arrested assassins to the most inhuman and brutal torture in order to extort from them untrue confessions on which it is intended to base complaints against the Servian people.

(p) The *Agence des Balkans*, of the 9th, reports from Belgrade: — "Absolutely trustworthy private reports announce that a general massacre of Servians is on the point of breaking out in Bosnia and Herzegovina."

(q) The *Balkan*, of the 9th July, taking as its text Mr. Asquith's statement on the announcement of the news of the death of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, that he was full of anxiety for the fate of humanity,<sup>1</sup> publishes a historical survey of the events of the last 40 years, from which it deduces that the Servian people during this period have been exposed to the cruel persecutions of Austria-Hungary's Jesuitical policy. Archduke Franz Ferdinand, like all the sons of Loyola, who only work in human blood, and who do homage to the principle, "The end justifies the means," was bound to be overtaken by fate and to fall a victim to Jesuitism, as the whole of Austria-Hungary will also fall. But by the downfall of Austria-Hungary, peace and tranquillity would ensue to mankind. The sum of all these truths emerges in the conclusion that Asquith might with a calm mind have accompanied the news of the murder with the word, "I am no longer anxious for the fate of humanity."

(r) The *Politika*, of the 9th July, expresses itself in a leading article under the heading, "Shameless Lies," as follows: — "The manner in which the inquiries into the Serajevo murder are being carried on shows quite clearly what objects Austria is aiming at in those inquiries. When the assassins, regardless of all the tortures to which they were exposed, refused to say what was demanded of them, other individuals were unearthed who expressed themselves ready on certain conditions to confess a certain degree of complicity in the murder, but at the same time to implicate all those persons who were objectionable to Austria. This method has succeeded for the moment because the hired individuals state whatever they are asked to state, and the Austrian police take care that these lies are at once spread to all the points of the compass. Austria has no sense of shame, and thinks that somebody will be found to believe lies of this sort."

(s) The *Stampa*, of the 9th, says that not everything which has happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina has yet been revealed and attained publicity. Strict secrecy is being maintained. But the truth will sooner or later come to the surface; blood-thirsty Austria

<sup>1</sup> ["We are once more confronted with one of those incredible crimes which almost make us despair of the progress of mankind."]

Mr. Asquith's Speech, *Times*, July 1, 1914.]

will drink, nay, is drinking, Servian blood, till she can drink no more. It is reported that there are to-day about ten thousand wounded and dead in Bosnia.

(t) The *Politika*, of the 10th July, hurls extravagant abuse against the members of the Imperial House.

(u) The Commercial Journal, *Trgovinski Glasnik*, of the 10th July, talks about the corruption and unscrupulousness of the Austro-Hungarian policy, which it calls Jesuitical, reckless and dishonourable. It is a warning to the Servian people in Austria-Hungary that they are not living in a civilised State which guarantees life and property, but that they must hold themselves armed and ever ready to defend themselves against the robbery of the officials and the Government. After the latest occurrences, the Servian people ought no longer to wait like a lamb, which any day might be led to the slaughter, but like a lion ready for a bloody resistance.

(v) In the *Stampa*, of the 10th July, we find: — "Nothing lasts for ever, nor will Austria-Hungary remain for ever in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The time is not far off when the Servians who broke the power of the Turks and punished the Bulgarians, will circle round the Ivan Planina on the Trebević."

(w) The *Pravda*, of the 10th July, under the title "Boycott against Good-for-nothings," appeals for a boycott of Austrian firms in Belgrade, as well as of Austrian wares, and says that it is the duty of the Narodna Odbrana to see that the boycott is strictly carried out.

(x) The *Zvono*, of the 16th July, declares Princip to be the son of Countess Lonyay, to whom the charge was given that he should avenge the death of Crown Prince Rudolf on his murderer, Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

(y) The *Mali Journal*, of the 19th July, publishes a report which says: — "Princip was instigated to make the attempt by an Austro-Hungarian agent. It is said in Vienna that it is only in the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade that the real culprit is to be found."

(z) The leading Young Radical organ, *Odjek*, of the 20th July, writes: — "Austria-Hungary offers a hundred proofs that it will inherit the title of the 'sick man' of Europe. While in Servia not a single Austrian citizen has been molested, villages and towns have been plundered in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This fact is one more proof on how much higher a cultural and moral level Servia stands than Austria-Hungary."

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## APPENDIX 10

### THE LOCAL COMMITTEE OF THE NARODNA ODBRANA AT NISH, ON THE SUBJECT OF THE CRIME AGAINST THE ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND.

A confidential communication has come to the ears of the Imperial and Royal Foreign Office from a reliable correspondent, whose name



will be published at the proper time, according to which the Local Committee of the Narodna Odbrana at Nish, recently held a meeting at which the president of this Committee, Jaša Nenadović, director of the Nish prison, touched on the subject of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, using the following words: "Serbia was absolutely bound this time to have recourse to a measure like the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, because the Archduke, on account of his aggressive and eccentric character, was a prominent and deadly danger for Serbia, and possibly for wider Slavonic circles also. Had he remained alive, he would have soon challenged Serbia to war or attacked it, in which case Serbia, which was now so much weakened materially, and had not yet completed her army re-organisation, would certainly have been lost. But now Serbia had been rescued by the Serajevo murder, and one of the dangers which threatened Serbia in the person of the victim had been swept out of the way. Serbia would now have rest for several years, as the new heir to the throne would consider well before walking in the steps of his predecessor."

"Though he was aware, continued the speaker, that the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand would be a heavy blow and a great grief to Austria-Hungary, and that it would be followed by the torture of those of our nation who were living in that country, yet he would not have thought that his suppositions would have been so completely fulfilled, and that the Croats would have behaved as they had. Yet his friends in Bosnia and Herzegovina had assured him that the Austro-Hungarian officials were cowards and would not dare to overstep the mark in the measures they took; unfortunately, however, these friends, and through them we too, had been disappointed. If things went on much longer as they were going at present, revolvers and bombs would at last have to play their real rôle. Whatever the God of Serbia has in store, things cannot go on as at present."

The remarks of the speaker were received with complete approval by his hearers.

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## APPENDIX 11

### SUPPLEMENTS AFTER GOING TO PRESS

#### 1. — *To Appendix 8*

The teacher, Čubrilović, who undertook the guidance of Princip and Grabež at Priboj, has made a complete confession, from which the following important facts emerge:—

In the year 1911, Čubrilović, on the occasion of a Sokol expedition to Šabać, was initiated by Božo Foviž, a member of the managing committee of the Narodna Odbrana, into the objects of that association, and was then appointed representative of the Narodna Odbrana in Zvornik (Bosnia). At his invitation, Miško Jovanović

was later nominated representative of the Narodna Odbrana for Tuzla.

A peasant acted as go-between in the communications with the Narodna Odbrana, in fact, the same peasant who brought Princip and Grabež to Čubrilović, with the information that he was bringing two Servian students with weapons to him. When he learned this, he knew that it was a "mission" from the Narodna Odbrana. Princip and Grabež told him that they had bombs and revolvers with them, with a view to making an attempt on the life of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

2. — *Pictures in the Belgrade War Office of a nature hostile to the Monarchy*

There are four allegorical pictures on the wall outside the reception hall of the Royal Servian War Office, of which three are representations of Servian victories, while the fourth symbolises the realisation of the anti-Monarchical tendencies of Servia.

Over a landscape, partly mountains (Bosnia), partly plains (South Hungary), rises the "Zora," the rosy dawn of Servian hopes. In the foreground stands a woman in armour, whose shield bears the names of all the "provinces still awaiting liberation": Bosnia, Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Syrmia, Dalmatia, etc.

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*To the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 20

*Count Berchtold to the Under Secretary, Freiherr von Macchio at Vienna.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Lambach, July 25, 1914.*

RUSSIAN Chargé d'Affaires telegraphs to me that he has received urgent instructions from his Government to press for a prolongation of time-limit fixed for the ultimatum to Servia. I request Your Excellency to reply to him in my name that we cannot consent to a prolongation of time-limit. Your Excellency will add, that Servia, even after breaking off of diplomatic relations, can bring about friendly solution by unconditional acceptance of our demands, although we should be obliged in such an event to demand reimbursement by Servia of all costs and damage incurred by us through our military measures.



*To Petrograd*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 21

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Bad Ischl, July 25, 1914.*

FOR Your Excellency's information and guidance: —

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires called this morning<sup>1</sup> on the Under Secretary, in order to express in the name of his Government the wish that the time-limit fixed in our note to Servia might be prolonged.

This request was based on the grounds that the Powers had been taken by surprise by our move, and that the Russian Government would regard it merely as natural consideration for the other Cabinets, on the part of the Vienna Cabinet, if an opportunity were given to the former to examine the data on which our communication to the Powers was based and to study our prospective dossier.

The Under Secretary replied to the Chargé d'Affaires that he would immediately bring his explanation to my knowledge; but that he could tell him at once that there was no prospect of a prolongation of the time-limit fixed being granted by us. As to the grounds which the Russian Government had advanced in support of the wish they had expressed, they appeared to rest upon a mistaken hypothesis.<sup>2</sup> Our note to the Powers was in no way intended to invite them to make known their own views on the subject, but merely bore the character of a statement for information, the communication of which we regarded as a duty laid on us by international courtesy. For the rest, we regarded our action as a matter concerning us and Servia alone, which action, notwithstanding the patience and longsuffering we had exhibited for years past, we had been forced by the development of circumstances to take, much against our own wish, for the defence of our most vital interests.

*From Belgrade*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 22

*Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

CABINET Council met yesterday evening and early this morning; form of answer to our note was settled after several drafts, and is to be delivered to me before the time-limit expires. I hear that Royal train is being made up; gold belonging to the National Bank

<sup>1</sup> This time of day is important, because the French Ambassador says, French Yellow Book No. 48, that it "seems useless to support" the Russian request, "when there is no longer any time for it," since his instructions reached him "exactly at the moment when the time limit given to Servia expires." The time limit expired at 6 P.M. No reason is advanced in the French Yellow Book why the instructions should have reached the French Ambassador so late. There is telegraphic and telephonic communication between Paris and Vienna. See French Yellow Book No. 39, No. 41 ("this morning"), No. 44, No. 45, No. 47 and No. 48; British Blue Book No. 26, and Russian Orange Book No. 15, all of the same day.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 4, July 24, 1914, and note 3.

and to the railway, as well as the Foreign Office records, are being taken into the interior of the country. Some of my colleagues are of the opinion that they must follow the Government; packing-up is proceeding at the Russian Legation in particular.

Garrison has left town in field order. Ammunition depots in the fortress were evacuated. Railway station thronged with soldiers. The ambulance trains have left Belgrade, proceeding towards the south. In pursuance of the instructions which have reached me while I write, we intend, in the event of a rupture, to leave Belgrade by the 6.30 train.

*From Semlin, Serbia*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 23

*Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraph c.)

*Semlin, July 25, 1914.*

ORDERS for general mobilisation were issued in Servia at 3 P.M.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 24

*Freiherr Von Giesl to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Semlin, July 25, 1914.*

As a result of the Royal Servian Government's unsatisfactory answer to our demands of the 23rd inst., I have announced that diplomatic relations are broken off with Servia, and have left Belgrade with the staff of the Legation. The reply was delivered to me at two minutes to six P.M.

*From Serbia*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 25

*Note <sup>1</sup> of the Royal Serbian Government of 12/25 July, 1914.*

(Translation).

THE Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant,<sup>2</sup> and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State — protests

<sup>1</sup> See Austrian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914 where the Serbian Note is printed in full together with the reasons why Austria-Hungary deemed it unsatisfactory.

<sup>2</sup> Old style.

which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18th<sup>1</sup> March, 1909 — have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their agents, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies — manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Servia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Servia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the *Journal officiel*, on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration: —

“The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary — *i.e.*, the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly pledged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> New style.

"The Government, etc. . . ." (identical with the text as demanded).

The Royal Government further undertake : —

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchina a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the Narodna Obdrana and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia everything that serves or might serve to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from the military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and functionaries for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th <sup>1</sup> June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal

<sup>1</sup> Old Style.

procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voja Tankosić. As regards Milan Čiganović, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th<sup>1</sup> June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Ločnitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials whether in Serbia or abroad, in interviews after the crime which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will themselves take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of the Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909.

*To Petrograd*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 26

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.*

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

WE were, of course, aware, when we decided to take serious measures against Serbia, of the possibility that the Servian dispute



might develop into a collision with Russia. We could not, however, allow ourselves to be diverted by this eventuality from the position we took up towards Servia, because fundamental considerations of national policy brought us face to face with the necessity of putting an end to the state of affairs in which a Russian charter made it possible for Servia to threaten the Monarchy continuously without punishment and without the possibility of punishment.

Should events prove that Russia considered the moment for the great settlement with the central European Powers to have already arrived,<sup>1</sup> and was therefore determined on war from the beginning, the following instructions to your Excellency appear indeed superfluous.

It might, however, be conceivable that Russia, in the event of the refusal of our demands by Servia, and in face of the resulting necessity for us of military measures, might think better of it, and might even be willing not to allow herself to be swept away by the bellicose elements. It is to meet this situation that the following explanations have been drawn up, which your Excellency will use with M. Sazonof and the President of the Council, at the right moment, in the manner which you think best, and when the opportunity, in your opinion, presents itself.

I assume, generally, that your Excellency in the existing circumstances, has established a close understanding with your German colleague,<sup>2</sup> who will certainly have been enjoined by his Government to leave the Russian Government no room for doubt that Austria-Hungary, in the event of a conflict with Russia, would not stand alone.

I am under no illusion that it will be easy to make M. Sazonof understand the step taken by us at Belgrade, which had become inevitable.

There is, however, one factor which cannot fail to impress the Russian Foreign Minister, and that is the emphasising of the circumstance that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, in conformity with the principle to which it has adhered for decades past, is actuated in the present crisis by no selfish motives in appealing to arms in order to reach a settlement of her differences with Servia.

The Monarchy possesses territory to repletion and has no desire for Servian possessions. If a conflict with Servia is forced upon us, it will be for us not a conflict for territorial gain, but merely a means of self-defence and self-preservation.

The contents of the circular note, which in itself is sufficiently eloquent, are placed in their proper light by the dossier relating to the Servian propaganda against the Monarchy, and the various points of connection between this propaganda and the crime of June 28th.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> Germany and Austria, it seems, were determined to stand together diplomatically as closely as France, England and Russia; cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, note 1. Italy appears to have been as close to the Entente Powers as to her own allies if one may judge by the despatches from Rome contained in the British Blue Book and the French Yellow Book. See also French Yellow Book No. 35, July 25, and No. 51, July 26.

Your Excellency will draw the Russian Minister's very particular attention to this dossier<sup>1</sup> and impress upon him that it is an unique event in history that a Great Power should have borne with the seditious intrigues of an adjoining small State for so long a time and with such unparalleled patience as Austria-Hungary has borne with those of Servia.

We had no wish to pursue a policy adverse to the ambitions of the Christian Balkan States, and we have therefore — notwithstanding that we well knew how little value was to be attached to Servian promises — suffered Servia to increase her territory after the annexation crisis of 1908 to nearly double its former extent.

Since that time the subversive movement which has been fostered in Servia against the Monarchy has assumed such excessive proportions that the vital interests of Austria-Hungary, and even of our Dynasty itself, appear to be threatened by the revolutionary activities of Servia.

We must assume that to conservative loyal Russia energetic measures on our part against this menace to all public order will appear intelligible and indeed necessary.

When Your Excellency reaches this point in your conversation with M. Sazonof, the moment will have arrived to add to your explanation of our motives and intentions the hint that we — as your Excellency will have already been in a position to explain — aim at no territorial gains, and also did not wish to infringe the sovereignty of the Kingdom, but that, on the other hand, we will proceed to extreme measures for the enforcement of our demands.

That we had striven up till now, so far as in us lay, to preserve the peace which we considered to be the most precious possession of nations, was shown by the course of events during the last 40 years, and by the historical fact that our gracious Emperor has won for himself the glorious title of "Protector of the Peace."

We should, therefore, most sincerely deplore the disturbance of the European peace, because we also were of the opinion that the strengthening of the Balkan States in a position of political and national independence would prove to the advantage of our relations with Russia, and would also remove all possibility of antagonism between us and Russia; also because we have always been ready, in the shaping of our own policy, to take into consideration the dominant political interests of Russia.

Any further toleration of Servian intrigues would undermine our existence as a State and our position as a Great Power, thus also threatening the balance of power in Europe. We are, however, convinced that it is to Russia's own interests, as her peaceful leaders will clearly see, that the existing European balance of power which is of such importance for the peace of the world, should be maintained. Our action against Servia, whatever form it takes, is conservative

<sup>1</sup> See note 1 to Enclosure of Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25, 1914, where it is stated that Sir E. Grey did not publish this "dossier." Russia also omitted it in her published documents in the Russian Orange Book.



from first to last, and its object is the necessary preservation of our position in Europe.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 27

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

As point 5 of our demands, namely, the participation of representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government in the suppression of the subversive movement in Servia has given rise to special objection on the part of M. Sazonof, your Excellency will explain in strict confidence with regard to this point that this clause was interpolated merely out of practical considerations, and was in no way intended to infringe on the sovereignty of Servia.

By "collaboration" in point 5, we are thinking of the establishment of a private "Bureau de Sûreté" at Belgrade, which would operate in the same way as the analogous Russian establishments in Paris and in co-operation with the Servian police and administration.

**Belgium :**

*To Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 3

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.*

Sir,

*Brussels, July 25, 1914.*

I HAVE addressed an undated circular note, a copy of which is enclosed, to the Belgian representatives accredited to the Powers guaranteeing the independence and neutrality of Belgium.

Should the danger of a war between France and Germany become imminent, this circular note will be communicated to the Governments of the guaranteeing Powers, in order to inform them of our fixed determination to fulfil those international obligations that are imposed upon us by the treaties of 1839.

The communications in question would only be made upon telegraphic instructions from me.

If circumstances lead me to issue such instructions, I shall request you also, by telegram, to notify the Government to which you are accredited of the step we have taken, and to communicate to them a copy of the enclosed circular note for their information, and without any request that they should take note thereof.

My telegram will <sup>1</sup> inform you of the date to be given to the circular note, which you should be careful to fill in on the copy which you hand to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

It is unnecessary to point out that this despatch and its enclosure should be treated as strictly confidential until the receipt of fresh instructions from me.

<sup>1</sup> Notice the absence of any uncertainty whether or not such a telegram will be sent.

Enclosure in No. 3  
(See Enclosure in No. 2.)

*From Belgrade*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 4

*M. Michotte de Welle, Belgian Minister at Belgrade, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Belgrade, July 25, 1914.<sup>1</sup>*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the reply returned by the Servian Government to the Austro-Hungarian note of the 10 (23) July.

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Enclosure in No. 4

[Text of the Serbian reply, for which see Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 25, July 25 and No. 34, July 27, 1914.]

France:

*From Berlin*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 35

*M. Jules Cambon, French Minister at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

THE Belgian Minister appears very anxious about the course of events.

He is of opinion that Austria and Germany have desired to take advantage of the fact that, owing to a combination of circumstances at the present moment, Russia and England appear to them to be threatened by domestic troubles, while in France the state of the army is under discussion. Moreover, he does not believe in the pretended ignorance of the Government of Berlin on the subject of Austria's *démarche*.

He thinks that if the form of it has not been submitted to the Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its despatch has been cleverly chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise the Triple Entente at a moment of disorganisation.

He has seen the Italian Ambassador, who has just interrupted his holiday in order to return. It looks as if Italy would be surprised, to put it no higher, at having been kept out of the whole affair by her two allies.<sup>2</sup>

JULES CAMBON.

<sup>1</sup> This despatch could not have reached Brussels on July 25. It was probably sent by mail. In Belgian Gray Book No. 6, July 27, the actual Serbian reply does not seem to be known. Cf. also French Yellow Book No. 56, July 26, where it is stated that the reply became known after a delay of 20 hours. Cf. also Russian Orange Book No. 36, July 27.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 36, same day, where according to the German Ambassador Austria-Hungary had acted without consulting either Germany or Italy.

*To Viviani and London, Berlin, Petrograd, and Vienna*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 36

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna.*

*Paris, July 25, 1914.*

THE German Ambassador came at 12 o'clock to protest against an article<sup>1</sup> in the *Echo de Paris* which applied the term "German threat" (*menace allemande*) to his *démarche* of yesterday. Herr von Schoen told a certain number of journalists, and came to state at the *Direction Politique*, that there has been no "concert" between Austria and Germany in connection with the Austrian note, and that the German Government had no knowledge of this note when it was communicated to them at the same time as to the other Powers, though they had approved it subsequently.

Baron von Schoen added, moreover, that there was no "threat"; the German Government had merely indicated that they thought it desirable to localise the dispute, and that the intervention of other Powers ran the risk of aggravating it.

The Acting Political Director took note of Baron von Schoen's *démarche*. Having asked<sup>2</sup> him to repeat the actual terms of the last two paragraphs of his note, he remarked to him that the terms showed the willingness of Germany to act as intermediary between the Powers and Austria. M. Berthelot added that, as no private information had been given to any journalist, the information in the *Echo de Paris* involved this newspaper alone, and merely showed that the German *démarche* appeared to have been known elsewhere than at the Quai d'Orsay, and apart from any action on his part. The German Ambassador did not take up the allusion.

On the other hand, the Austrian Ambassador at London also came to reassure Sir Edward Grey, telling him that the Austrian note did not constitute an "ultimatum" but "a demand for a reply with a time limit"; which meant that if the Austrian demands are not accepted by 6 o'clock this evening, the Austrian minister will leave Belgrade and the Austro-Hungarian Government will begin military "preparations" but not military "operations."

The Cabinet of London, like those of Paris and St. Petersburg, has advised Belgrade to express regret<sup>3</sup> for any complicity which might be established in the crime of Serajevo, and to promise the most complete satisfaction in this respect. The Cabinet added that in any case it was Servia's business to reply in terms which the interests of the country appeared to call for. The British Minister at

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 19, of same day commenting on the inaccuracies and additions of this article.

<sup>2</sup> This refers to the interview of the previous day, July 24, French Yellow Book No. 28. There, however, Mr. Martin himself does the asking.

<sup>3</sup> Belgrade had obviously not done so before, for if it had this advice would have been superfluous. One of the chief grounds of complaint that Austria-Hungary had against Serbia was that the latter had neither officially expressed her regret, nor controlled the exultation permeating the Serbian press.

Belgrade is to consult his French and Russian colleagues, and, if these have had corresponding instructions in the matter, advise <sup>1</sup> the Servian Government to give satisfaction on all the points on which they shall decide that they are able to do so.

Sir Edward Grey told Prince Lichnowsky (who, up to the present,<sup>2</sup> has made no communication to him similar to that of Herr von Schoen at Paris) that if the Austrian note caused no difficulty between Austria and Russia, the British Government would not have to concern themselves with it, but that it was to be feared that the stiffness of the note and the shortness of the time limit would bring about a state of tension. Under these conditions the only chance that could be seen of avoiding a conflict would consist in the mediation of France, Germany, Italy<sup>3</sup> and England, Germany alone being able to influence the Government at Vienna in this direction.

The German Ambassador replied that he would transmit this suggestion to Berlin, but he gave the Russian Ambassador, who is a relative of his, to understand that Germany would not lend herself to any *démarche* at Vienna.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

*From London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 37

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 25, 1914.*

THE German Ambassador came to the Foreign Office to state that his Government would refuse<sup>4</sup> to interfere in the dispute between Austria and Servia.

Sir Edward Grey replied that without the co-operation of Germany at Vienna, England would not be able to take action at St. Petersburg. If, however, both Austria and Russia mobilised, that would certainly be the occasion for the four other Powers to intervene. Would the German Government then maintain its passive attitude, and would it refuse to join with England, France and Italy?

Prince Lichnowsky does not think so, since the question would

<sup>1</sup> As a matter of fact, while such instructions were sent by Sir E. Grey the British representative failed to offer this advice to Serbia. See British Blue Book No. 22, July 25, 1914. He gave as his reason that his French and Russian colleagues "have not yet received instructions from their Governments." So far as the French Minister is concerned, this explanation is at variance with the above despatch.

<sup>2</sup> This is wrong; see British Blue Book No. 9, July 24, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> This was the British formula of July 24, 1915. On the day of this despatch, however, July 25, Sir E. Grey had changed this formula to read Germany, France, Russia and Great Britain; see British Blue Book No. 25.

<sup>4</sup> This is not so stated in any despatch of this date in the British Blue Book. Cf. British Blue Book No. 25, where the German Ambassador is quoted by Sir E. Grey: "if what I contemplated was mediation between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it." This means that Sir E. Grey's original idea of mediation between Austria and Russia might be acceptable, while its modification, under the pressure of the French Ambassador, of mediation between Austria and Serbia was not acceptable.

no longer be one of difficulties between Vienna and Belgrade, but of a conflict between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Sir Edward Grey added this observation, that if war eventually broke out, no Power in Europe would be able to take up a detached attitude <sup>1</sup> (*pourrait s'en désintéresser*).

DE FLEURIAU.

*From Petrograd*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 38

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.*

THE Russian Government is about to endeavour to obtain from the Austro-Hungarian Government an extension of the time limit fixed by the ultimatum, in order that the Powers may be able to form an opinion on the judicial *dossier*, the communication of which is offered to them.<sup>2</sup>

M. Sazonof has asked the German Ambassador to point out to his Government the danger of the situation, but he refrained from making any allusion to the measures <sup>3</sup> which Russia would no doubt be led to take, if either the national independence or the territorial integrity of Servia were threatened. The evasive replies and the recriminations of Count de Pourtalès left an unfavourable impression on M. Sazonof.

The Ministers will hold a Council to-morrow with the Emperor presiding. M. Sazonof preserves complete moderation.<sup>4</sup> "We must avoid," he said to me, "everything which might precipitate the crisis. I am of opinion that, even if the Austro-Hungarian Government come to blows with Servia, we ought not to break off negotiations."

PALÉOLOGUE.

*To Vienna*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 39

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna.*

*Paris, July 25, 1914.*

THE Russian Government has instructed its representative at Vienna to ask the Austrian Government for an extension of the time

<sup>1</sup> The *New York Times* translation reads "would be able to remain aloof from it." A comparison of Fleuriau's report of Sir E. Grey's words with the latter's own report of what he told the German Ambassador, British Blue Book No. 25, reveals that Fleuriau gave his Government the impression that Sir E. Grey had far more definitely hinted to the German Ambassador that England would fight by the side of France and Russia than Sir E. Grey himself stated he had done.

<sup>2</sup> This suggests that Sir E. Grey knew of the preparation of the *dossier*. Cf. notes to British Blue Book No. 48, July 27, and Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25 (enclosure).

<sup>3</sup> This means Russia's intention to go to war; cf. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914.

<sup>4</sup> For his determination, however, see British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914.

limit fixed for Servia, so as to enable the Powers to form an opinion on the *dossier* which Austria has offered to communicate to them, and with a view to avoiding regrettable consequences for everyone.

A refusal of this demand by Austria-Hungary would deprive of all meaning the *démarche* which she made to the Powers by communicating her note to them, and would place her in a position of conflict with international ethics.

The Russian Government has asked that you should make a corresponding and urgent *démarche* to Count Berchtold. I beg you to support the request of your colleague.<sup>1</sup> The Russian Government have sent the same request to London, Rome, Berlin and Bucharest.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

*From London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 40

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 25, 1914.*

SIR EDWARD GREY has had communicated to him this morning the instructions which require the Russian Ambassador at Vienna to ask for an extension of the time limit given to Servia by Austria's note of the day before yesterday. M. Sazonof asked that the Russian *démarche* should be supported by the British Embassy.

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir M. de Bunsen to take the same action<sup>2</sup> as his Russian colleague, and to refer to Austria's communication which was made to him late last night by Count Mensdorff, according to the terms of which the failure of Servia to comply with the conditions of the ultimatum would only result, as from to-day, in a diplomatic rupture and not in immediate military operations.

Sir Edward Grey inferred from this action that time would be left for the Powers to intervene and find means for averting the crisis.

DE FLEURIAU.

*From Berlin*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 41

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

THIS morning the British Chargé d'Affaires, acting under instructions from his Government, asked Herr von Jagow if Germany were willing to join with Great Britain, France and Italy with the object of

<sup>1</sup> The French Minister did not do so; cf. French Yellow Book No. 48, same day. For a discussion of his reasons see above, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, July 25, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 26, July 25, 1914 where Sir E. Grey writes: "You may support in *general terms*, etc."



intervening between Austria and Russia, to prevent a conflict and, in the first instance, to ask Vienna to grant an extension of the time limit imposed on Serbia by the ultimatum.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that directly after the receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's despatch informing him of the intentions of Sir Edward Grey, he had already telegraphed this very morning to the German<sup>1</sup> Ambassador at Vienna to the effect that he should ask Count Berchtold for this extension. Unfortunately Count Berchtold is at Ischl.<sup>2</sup> In any case Herr von Jagow does not think that this request would be granted.

The British Chargé d'Affaires also enquired of Herr von Jagow, as I had done yesterday, if Germany had had no knowledge of the Austrian note before it was despatched, and he received so clear a reply in the negative that he was not able to carry the matter further; but he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at the blank cheque given by Germany to Austria.

Herr von Jagow having replied to him that the matter was a domestic one for Austria, he remarked that it had become essentially an international one.

JULES CAMBON.

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 42

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed to ask the German Government to make strong representations to the Cabinet at Vienna, with a view to obtaining an extension of the time limit of the ultimatum.

Herr von Jagow not having made an appointment with him until late in the afternoon,<sup>3</sup> that is to say, till the very moment when the ultimatum will expire, M. Broniewski sent an urgent note addressed to the Secretary of State in which he points out that the lateness of Austria's communication to the Powers makes the effect of this communication illusory, inasmuch as it does not give the Powers time to consider the facts brought to their notice before the expiration of the time limit. He insists very strongly on the necessity for extending the time limit, unless the intention be to create a serious crisis.

JULES CAMBON.

<sup>1</sup> In French text by an obvious error "de la Grande-Bretagne" is printed.

<sup>2</sup> Count Berchtold left for Ischl on the 25th in the morning; cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, same day. The Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia had been made known to Russia in the evening of July 23; and had been known to France and, therefore, probably to the Entente Powers, in general terms, inclusive of the fact that there would be a time limit, on July 19, 1914; cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 13 and 14.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. the previous despatch No. 41, where Mr. von Jagow is spoken of as having received the British Chargé d'Affaires in the same matter, and having already requested an extension of the time limit.



FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 43

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires has, in accordance with his instructions, approached the Secretary of State with a view to securing an extension of the time limit of the ultimatum. Herr von Jagow replied that he had already transmitted to Vienna a suggestion of this nature, but that in his opinion all these *démarches* were too late.

M. Broniewski insisted that if the time limit could not be extended, action <sup>1</sup> at least might be delayed so as to allow the Powers to exert themselves to avoid a conflict. He added that the Austrian note was couched in terms calculated to wound Serbia and to force her into war.

Herr von Jagow replied that there was no question of a war, but of an "*exécution*" <sup>2</sup> in a local matter.

The Chargé d'Affaires in reply expressed regret that the German Government did not weigh their responsibilities in the event of hostilities breaking out, which might extend to the rest of Europe; to this Herr von Jagow replied that he refused to believe in such consequences.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires, like myself, has heard the rumour that Austria, while declaring that she did not desire an annexation of territory, would occupy parts of Serbia until she had received complete satisfaction. "One knows," he said to me, "what this word 'satisfaction' means." M. Broniewski's impressions of Germany's ultimate intentions are very pessimistic.

JULES CAMBON.

*From Rome*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 44

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 25, 1914.*

THE Russian Ambassador has carried out at the Consulta the *démarche* which M. Sazonof requested the representatives of Russia at Paris, Berlin, Rome and Bucharest <sup>3</sup> to undertake, the object of which was to induce these various Cabinets to take action similar to that of Russia at Vienna, with a view of obtaining an extension of the time limit imposed on Serbia.

<sup>1</sup> Austria-Hungary had already promised that actual military operations would be delayed; cf. British Blue Book No. 26, July 25, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> There is no reason why the official English translation should have retained this French word, instead of translating the whole phrase which means "no question of war, but of action in a local matter."

<sup>3</sup> The occasional appearance of Bucharest in these despatches is noteworthy.

In the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, M. Salandra and M. di Martino replied that they would put themselves into communication with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but that his reply could not reach them until towards 6 o'clock, that is to say, too late to take any step at Vienna.

BARRÈRE.

*From Vienna*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 45

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires received instructions from his Government to ask for an extended time limit for the ultimatum to Servia at the very moment<sup>1</sup> that Count Berchtold was leaving for Ischl, with the intention, according to the newspapers, of remaining there near the Emperor until the end of the crisis.

Prince Koudacheff informed him nevertheless of the *démarche* which he had to carry out, by means of two telegrams *en clair*, one addressed to him on his journey and the other at his destination. He does not expect any result.

Baron Macchio, General Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to whom the Prince communicated the tenour of his instructions and of his telegrams, behaved with icy coldness when it was represented to him that to submit for consideration grievances with documentary proofs without leaving time for the *dossier* to be studied, was not consonant with international courtesy.<sup>2</sup> Baron Macchio replied that one's interests sometimes exempted one from being courteous.

The Austrian Government is determined to inflict humiliation on Servia: it will accept no intervention from any Power until the blow had been delivered and received full in the face by Servia.

DUMAINE.

*From Belgrade*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 46

*M. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

M. PASHITCH has just acquainted me with the reply which will be sent this evening to the Austrian Minister.

The Servian Government agrees to publish to-morrow in the *Journal Officiel* the declaration which has been required of them; they will

<sup>1</sup> This was in the morning; cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, same day.

<sup>2</sup> Austria-Hungary was of a different opinion; cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, July 25, and note 2.

communicate it also to the army by means of an Order of the Day; they will dissolve the societies of national defence and all other associations which might agitate against Austria-Hungary; they undertake to modify the press law, to dismiss from service in the army, in the ministry of public instruction and in the other Government offices, all officials who shall be proved to have taken part in the propaganda; they only request that the names of these officials may be communicated to them.

As to the participation of Austrian officials in the enquiry, the Government ask that an explanation<sup>1</sup> of the manner in which this will be exercised may be given to them. They could accept no participation which conflicted with international law or with good and neighbourly relations.

They accept all the other demands of the ultimatum and declare that if the Austro-Hungarian Government is not content with this, they are ready to refer the matter to the Hague Tribunal, or to the decision of the Great Powers who took part in the preparation of the declaration of March 31, 1909.

BOPPE.

*From Berlin*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 47

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

THROUGHOUT the afternoon there has been a persistent rumour that Serbia had submitted to the Austrian demands. This evening the newspapers published extra editions which announce a rupture at Belgrade and the departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister.

The correspondent of the *Agence Havas* at the Wilhelmstrasse has just received confirmation of this rumour. Large crowds consisting of several hundred persons are collecting here before the newspaper offices and a demonstration of numbers of young people has just passed through the Pariser-platz shouting cries of "Hurrah" for Germany, and singing patriotic songs. The demonstrators are visiting the *Siegessäule*, the Austrian and then the Italian<sup>2</sup> Embassy. It is a significant outburst of chauvinism.

A German<sup>3</sup> whom I saw this evening confessed to me that it had been feared here that Serbia would accept the whole Austrian note,

<sup>1</sup> For an explanation of the Austro-Hungarian meaning see the Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 27, of the same day.

<sup>2</sup> As early as in 1912 Paul Rohrbach had pointed out in *Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt* (translated, *German World Policies*, The Macmillan Co.) that in a European conflagration Germany could not count on the support of Italy.

<sup>3</sup> For a clear understanding of the ante-war days it is unfortunate that the French Ambassador in Berlin not infrequently quotes anonymous Germans whose standing and importance remain obscure.

reserving to herself the right to discuss the manner in which effect should be given to it, in order to gain time and to allow the efforts of the Powers to develop effectively before the rupture.

In financial circles measures are already being taken to meet every eventuality, for no means of averting the crisis is seen, in view of the determined support which Germany is giving to Austria.

I, for my part, see in Great Britain the only Power which might be listened to at Berlin.

Whatever happens, Paris, St. Petersburg and London will not succeed in maintaining peace with dignity unless they show a firm and absolutely united front.<sup>1</sup>

JULES CAMBON.

*From Vienna*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 48

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

YOUR telegram<sup>2</sup> reaches me exactly at the moment when the time limit given to Serbia expires. On the other hand I have just informed you under what conditions the Russian Chargé d'Affaires has had to carry out his *démarche*. It seems useless to support him when there is no longer any time for it.<sup>3</sup>

During the afternoon a rumour spread that Serbia had yielded to the ultimatum, while adding that she was appealing to the Powers against it. But the latest news is that at the last moment we are assured that the Austrian Minister has just left Belgrade hurriedly; he must have thought the Servian Government's acceptance of the conditions imposed by his Government inadequate.

DUMAINE.

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 49

*Reply of Serbian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note.*

(Communicated by M. Vesnitch, Serbian Minister, July 27.)<sup>4</sup>

[For the text see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914, or *ib.* No. 25, July 25, 1914.]

<sup>1</sup> This was Russia's great aim, to secure England's unconditional support; cf. British Blue Book No. 6, June 24, 1914, and no. 17, June 25.

<sup>2</sup> French Yellow Book No. 39, same day.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, same day: "This morning." The time limit was to expire at 6 P.M. See also Russian Orange Book No. 15, same day. There would not seem to be any reason why the French Ambassador should have received his instructions too late to act. See also British Blue Book No. 13, July 25, 1914.

<sup>4</sup> Notice the day, July 27, when the Serbian reply was officially presented. A summary reached France on July 26, but with a delay of 20 hours. See French Yellow Book No. 56, July 26.

Germany:

*To London*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 13

*Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on July 25th, 1914.*

The distinction<sup>1</sup> made by Sir Edward Grey between an Austro-Servian and an Austro-Russian conflict is perfectly correct. We do not wish to interpose in the former any more than England, and as heretofore we take the position that this question must be localised by virtue of all powers refraining from intervention. It is therefore our hope that Russia will refrain from any action in view of her responsibility and the seriousness of the situation. We are prepared, in the event of an Austro-Russian controversy, quite apart from our known duties as allies, to intercede between Russia and Austria jointly with the other powers.

*From Petrograd*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 6

*Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to the Chancellor on July 25th, 1914.*

Message to H.M. from General von Chelius (German honorary aide de camp to the Czar).

The manœuvres of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were suddenly interrupted and the regiments returned to their garrisons at once. The manœuvres have been cancelled. The military pupils were raised to-day to the rank of officers instead of next fall. At headquarters there obtains great excitement over the procedure of Austria. I have the impression<sup>2</sup> that complete preparations for mobilisation against Austria are being made.

<sup>1</sup> Sir Edward Grey knew from British Blue Book Nos. 6 and 17 of Russia's determination to intervene in favor of Serbia. Germany believed that Russia would not intervene because, without England, she might be forced by France to refrain from aggressive action, and in view of Asquith's invectives against Serbia in Parliament after the Serajevo murder [The Times, July 1, 1914 quotes him as saying, "We are once more confronted with one of those incredible crimes which almost make us despair of the progress of mankind"] did not believe that England would go to war for Serbia.

Sir Edward Grey's first proposal was that four powers should intervene simultaneously in Petrograd and in Vienna. This plan was modified under French pressure (see despatches of July 24 and 25, 1914) to amount to a request that Germany induce Austria-Hungary to submit her case against Serbia to a conference of four powers, one of whom should be Russia herself (British Blue Book No. 25, July 25, 1914).

The German position is made perfectly clear in the above despatch.

<sup>2</sup> The correctness of this impression is proved by the telegram from the Czar to the German Emperor of July 30 (German White Book, Exhibit 23a), in which the Czar says: "The military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago." Cf. also British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, and note 5. And for the general subject of Russian mobilization see the American Review of Reviews, May, 1914, p. 544: "The French papers are now admitting that Russia's recent mobilization of a million men on her German and Austrian frontiers was chiefly intended as a demonstration to France that her ally could help her in time of need." See also Musical Courier, Sept. 30, 1915, p. 8, where an American traveller relates his experiences with mobilized Russian troops in Batum and in Sebastopol on May 24, 1914.

**Great Britain:***From the Russian Ambassador*BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 13<sup>1</sup>*Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25.*

(Translation.)

M. SAZONOF télégraphie au Chargé d'Affaires de Russie à Vienne en date du 11 (24) juillet, 1914:	M. SAZONOF telegraphs to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna on the 11th (24th) July, 1914:
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[For the text see Russian Orange Book No. 4, July 24, 1914.]

*To Paris and Petrograd*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 14

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and to  
Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

AUSTRIAN Ambassador has been authorised to explain to me that the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a *démarche* with a time limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the time limit the Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic relations and begin military preparations, not operations.<sup>2</sup>

In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same information at Paris (St. Petersburg), you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible; it makes the immediate situation rather less acute.

*From Paris*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 15

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —  
(Received July 25.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 25, 1914.*

I LEARN from the Acting Political Director that the French Government have not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Gov-

<sup>1</sup> This is the first despatch listed in the British Blue Book under date of July 25. It was sent on the 24th from Petrograd and delivered in London early the next day. It was undoubtedly received at the same time in Paris, if not late on July 24. Since it is not listed in the French Yellow Book the exact time when it was received cannot be given. It may, however, be surmised that in the absence of published information to the contrary, it reached Paris in ample time to instruct the French Ambassador to support his Russian colleague in Vienna. The French Ambassador, however, claimed that his instructions reached him too late; cf. French Yellow Book No. 48, same day.

<sup>2</sup> This concession of Austria-Hungary was a half-way acceptance of Russia's request (British Blue Book No. 13, Russian Orange Book No. 4) for an extension of the time limit.



ernment contained in your telegram of to-day.<sup>1</sup> They have, however, through the Servian Minister here, given similar advice to Servia as was contained in your telegram to Belgrade of yesterday.<sup>2</sup>

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 16

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 25.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 25, 1914.*

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs has no suggestions to make except that moderating advice might be given at Vienna as well as Belgrade.<sup>3</sup> He hopes that the Servian Government's answer to the Austrian ultimatum will be sufficiently favourable to obviate extreme measures being taken by the Austrian Government. He says, however, that there would be a revolution in Servia if she were to accept the Austrian demands in their entirety.

*From Petrograd*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 17

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 25.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.*

I SAW the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and communicated to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of to-day to Paris,<sup>4</sup> and this afternoon I discussed with him the communication which the French Ambassador suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade.<sup>5</sup>

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that the explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond with the information which had reached him from German quarters.<sup>6</sup> As regards the latter, both his Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is too late to make such a communication, as the time limit expires this evening.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 14.

<sup>2</sup> The advice spoken of is contained in British Blue Book No. 12, July 24, 1914, a despatch to the British Minister in Belgrade, who in No. 22, July 25, informs Sir E. Grey that he had not offered the advice because his French and Russian colleagues had received no instructions. Cf. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 13, July 25th, and note; also British Blue Book No. 10, July 24, and note, and French Yellow Book No. 34, July 24. France wishes mediation between Vienna and Belgrade.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 14.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 12. There is no hint in Sir E. Grey's despatch to Belgrade that it was suggested by the French Ambassador. Cf. British Blue Book No. 15, and note.

<sup>6</sup> The published despatches contain no hint as to this information, and as a matter of fact Austria did as she had told England she would do. Sazonof, moreover, had received the correct Austro-Hungarian offer through the Russian Ambassador in London, Russian Orange Book No. 16, same day.



The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Serbia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Serbia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was in favour of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Serbia in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers.

If Serbia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Serbia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions,<sup>1</sup> and she would take no action until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present *status quo* in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war.

I said that England could play the rôle of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality.

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Serbia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, 1914, and last paragraph of this note.

*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 18

*Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 25.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of the 24th July<sup>1</sup> acted on.

Secretary of State says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he immediately instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it appeared from press that Count Berchtold<sup>2</sup> is at Ischl, and Secretary of State thought that in these circumstances there would be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands.

Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and had told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburg. I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I said that telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. He said that he had given the Russian Government to understand that last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that note, he had in fact had no such knowledge.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 11, July 24, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

*From Rome*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 19

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. —*  
*(Received July 25.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, July 25, 1914.*

I SAW the Secretary-General this morning and found that he knew of the suggestion that France, Italy, Germany and ourselves should work at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of moderation, if the relations between Austria and Servia become menacing.

In his opinion Austria will only be restrained by the unconditional acceptance by the Servian Government of her note. There is reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica Railway.

*From Vienna*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 20

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. —*  
*(Received July 25.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

LANGUAGE of press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender of Servia is neither expected nor really desired. It is officially announced that the Austrian Minister is instructed to leave Belgrade with staff of legation failing unconditional acceptance of note at 6 P.M. to-day.

Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl to-day<sup>1</sup> to communicate personally to the Emperor Servian reply when it comes.

*From Belgrade*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 21

*Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 25.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

THE Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible.

The following is a brief summary of the projected reply : —

The Servian Government consent to the publication of a declaration in the *Official Gazette*. The ten points are accepted with reservations. Servian Government declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of enquiry so long as the appointment of the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, and French Yellow Book No. 45 and note, July 25, 1915.

commission can be shown to be in accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested the officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to suppress the Narodna Odbrana.

The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content<sup>1</sup> with the full satisfaction offered in the Servian reply.

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 22

*Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires, at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 25.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

I HAVE seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from Constantinople, and my Russian colleague, and informed them of your views.

They have not yet received instructions from their Governments, and in view of this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Servian reply, I have up to now abstained<sup>2</sup> from offering advice to the Servian Government.

I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have already urged the utmost moderation on the Servian Government.

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 23

*Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 25.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

THE Austrian Minister left at 6.30.

The Government have left for Nish, where the Skuptchina<sup>3</sup> will meet on Monday. I am leaving with my other colleagues, but the vice-consul is remaining in charge of the archives.

*To Petrograd*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 24

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you

<sup>1</sup> For reasons why Austria-Hungary was not content, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 12. July 24.

<sup>3</sup> The Serbian Parliament.

said as reported in your telegram of yesterday,<sup>1</sup> and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government.

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel.<sup>2</sup> If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.

The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian *démarche* makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilised against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate.

No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included the allies or friends of both. The co-operation of Germany would therefore, be essential.<sup>3</sup>

### *To Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 25

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d' Affaires at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

THE Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that the Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military operations. In informing the German Ambassador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had urged yesterday should be delayed.

Apparently we should now soon be face to face with the mobilisation of Austria and Russia. The only chance of peace, if this did happen, would be for Germany, France, Russia,<sup>4</sup> and ourselves to keep

<sup>1</sup> See No. 6, July 24, 1916.

<sup>2</sup> This disposes of the claim popularly made that one of the reasons why Great Britain went to war was in part to protect the independence of a little state — Serbia.

<sup>3</sup> Germany accepted Sir Edward Grey's view and promised her coöperation in mediation between Russia and Austria on this same day, July 25, cf. German White Book, Exhibit 13. Cf., however, French Yellow Book No. 37, same day, where Germany is quoted as refusing to interfere between Austria and Serbia.

The Petrograd-Vienna mediation may be called the Sir E. Grey plan, and this Germany accepted on July 25. The Vienna-Belgrade mediation may be called the Paul Cambon modification, and this Germany rejected.

<sup>4</sup> All the editions of the British Blue Book including the important one of Sept. 28, 1914, print here "Russia." In the Collected Diplomatic Documents Sir Edward Grey inserts a footnote to Russia "Should be Italy." A similar footnote had appeared in the *New York Times* edition of August, 1914. The fact that "Russia" continued to be printed without a footnote, even in the official edition of Sept. 28, which contained a number of corrections, raises the presumption that "Russia" had not only been written, but also meant. It is true that in British Blue Book No. 17 of the same date, Russia said that she "would be quite ready to stand aside," but this may also imply that mention had been made of her as a member of the "Conference." Certainty on this point is, however, impossible.

together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier till we had had time to try and arrange matters between them.

The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German Foreign Office saying that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Servia, but once she had launched that note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky<sup>1</sup> said, however, that if what I contemplated was mediation between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it.<sup>2</sup> He expressed himself as personally favourable to this suggestion.

I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title to intervene between Austria and Servia, but as soon as the question became one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we must all take a hand.<sup>3</sup>

I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of Russian and Austrian mobilisation, the participation of Germany would be essential to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were travelling at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them,<sup>4</sup> and could not therefore be sure of their views, but I was prepared, if the German Government agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Government that I thought it the right thing to act upon it.

### *To Vienna*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 26

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

THE Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following telegram which his Government have sent to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, with instructions to communicate it to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs : —

“The delay given to Servia for a reply is so limited that the Powers are prevented from taking any steps to avert the complications which are threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austrian Government will prolong the time limit, and as the latter have declared their willingness to inform the Powers of the data on which they have based their demands on Servia, the Russian Government hope that these particulars will be furnished in order that the Powers may examine the matter. If they found that some of the Austrian requests were well founded, they would be in a position to advise the Servian Government accordingly. If the Austrian Government were indisposed to prolong the time limit, not only would they be

<sup>1</sup> German Ambassador in London.

<sup>2</sup> German White Book, Exhibit 13, same day.

<sup>3</sup> This phrase is very much stronger in French Yellow Book No. 37, same day, where Paul Cambon reports what he claims Sir E. Grey told him he had said to the German Ambassador.

<sup>4</sup> See, however, the British-French and French-British despatches of July 24, and July 25, 1914.



acting against international ethics, but they would deprive their communication to the Powers of any practical meaning."

You may support in general terms <sup>1</sup> the step taken by your Russian colleague.

Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, it has been a relief to hear that the steps which the Austrian Government were taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to military preparations, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any irretrievable steps.

*To Paris, Berlin, and Petrograd*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 27

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, and Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

I HAVE communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of the Servian reply contained in Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegram of to-day.<sup>2</sup> I have said that, if Servian reply, when received at Vienna, corresponds to this forecast, I hope the German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favourable view of it.

*To? or From?*

No. 28

[Nil.]

Sir Edward Grey has never explained this deleted No. 28. The British Blue Book was not prepared and distributed, as was the German White Book, in a hurry to supply the necessary background to the speeches delivered in Parliament on the strength of which the nation went to war. The British Blue Book was distributed in Parliament several days after England had declared war on Germany. A careless numbering of the despatches seems out of the question. No. 28 very likely was a despatch which Sir E. Grey at the last moment decided not to publish.

*To Rome*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 29

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

THE Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day. I told him in general terms what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On this day Sir E. Grey was not yet willing to be known either in Vienna or in Berlin as making common cause with the other Entente Powers.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 21, same day.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 27, same day.



The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He made no secret of the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided.

I am, etc.

E. GREY.

*To Belgrade*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 30

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

THE Servian Minister called on the 23rd<sup>1</sup> instant and spoke to Sir A. Nicolson<sup>2</sup> on the present strained relations between Servia and Austria-Hungary.

He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted. They were perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria-Hungary so long as such demands were kept on the "terrain juridique." If the results of the enquiry at Serajevo — an enquiry conducted with so much mystery and secrecy — disclosed the fact that there were any individuals conspiring or organising plots on Servian territory, the Servian Government would be quite ready to take the necessary steps to give satisfaction; but if Austria transported the question on to the political ground, and said that Servian policy, being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that Servia must abandon certain political ideals,<sup>3</sup> no independent State would, or could, submit to such dictation.

He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke were Austrian subjects — Bosniaks;<sup>4</sup> that one of them had been in Servia, and that the Servian authorities, considering him suspect and dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian authorities found that the latter protected him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual.

Sir A. Nicolson, on being asked by M. Boschkovitch<sup>5</sup> his opinion on the whole question, observed that there were no data on which to base one, though it was to be hoped that the Servian Government would endeavour to meet the Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit.

I am, etc.

E. GREY.

<sup>1</sup> It seems strange that this interview of the 23d should not have been mentioned to the British representative in Belgrade until two days later, the twenty-fifth, especially since the instructions given to the representative in Belgrade in No. 12, July 24, seem to be based on the information given in the interview of the 23d. The interview, moreover, appears to have taken place before the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian note. While in a continuous story of events this note does not belong here, the reader will have no difficulty in seeing why it has nevertheless been introduced in this place.

<sup>2</sup> British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> These certain political ideals were those of a Greater Serbia which could not be realized except at the cost of a dismembered Austria-Hungary.

<sup>4</sup> *Bosniaks* is the term by which Austria-Hungary called the Serbians in Bosnia before the murder of Serajevo, while Serbia called them *Serbians*. After the murder, the Serbians used the term *Bosniaks* to indicate that Serbia was innocent, and Austria-Hungary used the term *Serbians* to show that Serbia was guilty.

<sup>5</sup> Serbian Minister in London.

**Russia :***Announcement by the Russian Government*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 10

*St. Petersburg, July 12 (25), 1914.*

RECENT events and the despatch of an ultimatum to Servia by Austria-Hungary are causing the Russian Government the greatest anxiety. The Government are closely following the course of the dispute between the two countries, to which Russia cannot remain indifferent.

*From Vienna*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 11

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 12 (25) 1914.*

COUNT BERCHTOLD is at Ischl.<sup>1</sup> In view of the impossibility of arriving there in time, I have telegraphed to him our proposal to extend the time limit of the ultimatum, and I have repeated this proposal verbally to Baron Macchio. The latter promised to communicate it in time to the Minister for Foreign Affairs but added that he had no hesitation in predicting a categorical refusal.

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 12

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 12 (25), 1914.*

IN continuation of my telegram of to-day I have just heard <sup>2</sup> from Macchio that the Austro-Hungarian Government refuse our proposal to extend the time limit of the note.

*From Belgrade*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 13

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade to Russia Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.*

(Delayed in transmission, received July 14 (27), 1914).

(Telegram.)

FOLLOWING is the reply which the President of the Servian Cabinet to-day handed to the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade before the expiration of the time limit of the ultimatum.

[Here follows the text of the Serbian reply, for which see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 25, July 25, and No. 34, July 27, 1914.]

<sup>1</sup> He went there during the forenoon of July 25. Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, and British Blue Book No. 20, July 25, 1914, and French Yellow Book No. 45, same day.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 20, and for reasons for the refusal No. 21, July 25, 1914.

*From Berlin*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 14

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, July 12 (25), 1914.*

I HAVE received your telegrams of the 11th (24th) <sup>1</sup> July and have communicated its contents to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He tells me that the British Government have likewise urged him to advise <sup>2</sup> Vienna to extend the time limit of the ultimatum. He has informed Vienna telegraphically of this step, and he will do the same as regards Russia's action, but he fears that in the absence of Berchtold, who has left for Ischl, and in view of the lack of time, his telegrams may have no result. Moreover, he has doubts as to the wisdom of Austria yielding at the last moment, and he is inclined to think that such a step on her part might increase the assurance of Servia. I replied that a great Power such as Austria could give way without impairing her prestige, and I adduced every other similar argument, but failed, nevertheless, to obtain any more definite promise. Even when I gave him to understand that action must be taken at Vienna if the possibility of terrible consequences was to be avoided, the Minister for Foreign Affairs answered each time in the negative.

*From Paris*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 15

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, July 12 (25), 1914.*

I HAVE received your telegram of the 11th (24th) <sup>3</sup> July respecting the extension of the time limit of the Austrian ultimatum, and I have made the communication in accordance with your instructions. The French Representative <sup>4</sup> at Vienna has been furnished with similar instructions.

*From London*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 16

*Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, July 12 (25), 1914.*

I HAVE received your telegram of the 11th July.<sup>5</sup> Grey has instructed <sup>6</sup> the British Ambassador at Vienna to support our action

<sup>1</sup> Russian Orange Book Nos. 4 and 5, July 24, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> British Blue Book No. 26, July 25, 1914; cf. also French Yellow Book Nos. 41, 42, 43, July 25, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> Russian Orange Book Nos. 4 and 5, July 24, 1914.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 39 and 48, July 25, 1914.

<sup>5</sup> Russian Calendar, which is July 24 of our calendar; Russian Orange Book Nos. 4 and 5.

<sup>6</sup> British Blue Book No. 26, July 25, 1914.

for the extension of the time limit of the ultimatum. At the same time he explained to me that the Austrian Ambassador had come to see him,<sup>1</sup> and had explained that the Austrian note should not be regarded as an ultimatum. It should be regarded as a step, which, in the event of no reply, or in the event of an unsatisfactory reply within the time fixed, would be followed by a rupture of diplomatic relations and the immediate departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister from Belgrade; without, however, entailing the immediate opening of hostilities. Grey added that as a result of this explanation he had told the British Ambassador at Vienna that, should it be too late to raise the question of extending the time limit of the ultimatum, the question of preventing hostilities might perhaps serve as a basis for discussion.<sup>2</sup>

*To London*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 17

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London.*

(Telegram.)

*St. Petersburg, July 12 (25), 1914.*

IN the event of any change for the worse in the situation which might lead to joint action by the Great Powers, we count upon it that England will at once side definitely with Russia and France, in order to maintain the European balance of power,<sup>3</sup> for which she has constantly intervened in the past, and which would certainly be compromised in the event of the triumph of Austria.

*From the German Ambassador*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 18<sup>4</sup>

*Note verbale handed to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, July 12 (25), 1914.*

(Translation.)

IL nous revient de source autoritative que la nouvelle répandue par quelques journaux d'après laquelle la démarche du Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade aurait été faite à l'instigation de l'Allemagne est

WE learn from an authoritative source that the news spread by certain newspapers, to the effect that the action of the Austro-Hungarian Government at Belgrade was instigated by Germany, is absolutely false.

<sup>1</sup> British Blue Book No. 14, July 25, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> Contrast the information here directly transmitted to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs with the latter's reply to the British Ambassador in Petrograd, British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, 1914, and note 4.

<sup>4</sup> This is only a supplementary declaration to German White Book, Exhibit No. 1, which is the important German declaration, presented in Paris, London and Petrograd. It is printed in British Blue Book No. 9, French Yellow Book No. 28, July 24, but is omitted in the Russian Orange Book.

absolument fausse. Le Gouvernement allemand n'a pas eu connaissance du texte de la note autrichienne avant qu'elle ait été remise, et n'a exercé aucune influence sur son contenu. C'est à tort qu'on attribue à l'Allemagne une attitude comminatoire.

L'Allemagne appuie naturellement comme allié de l'Autriche les revendications à son avis légitimes du Cabinet de Vienne contre la Serbie.

Avant tout elle désire, comme elle l'a déjà déclaré dès le commencement du différend austro-serbe, que ce conflit reste localisé.

The German Government had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before it was presented, and exercised no influence upon its contents. A threatening attitude is wrongly attributed to Germany.

Germany, as the ally of Austria, naturally supports the claims made by the Vienna Cabinet against Serbia, which she considers justified.

Above all Germany wishes, as she has already declared from the very beginning of the Austro-Servian dispute, that this conflict should be localised.

*From Paris*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK NO. 19

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, July 12 (25), 1914.*

PLEASE refer to my telegram<sup>1</sup> of the 11th (24th) July.

A morning paper has to-day published, in a not altogether correct form,<sup>2</sup> the declarations made yesterday by the German Ambassador, and has added comments in which it characterises these utterances as being in the nature of threats. The German Ambassador, who is much upset by these disclosures, to-day visited the Acting Head of the Political Department, and explained to him that his words in no wise bore the threatening character attributed to them. He stated that Austria had presented her note to Serbia without any definite understanding with Berlin, but that Germany nevertheless approved of the Austrian point of view, and that undoubtedly "the bolt once fired" (these were his own words), Germany could only be guided by her duties as an ally.

<sup>1</sup> Russian Orange Book No. 8, July 24, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 36, July 25, 1914.

*From London*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 20

*Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, July 12 (25), 1914.*

GREY has told me that the German Ambassador has declared to him that the German Government were not informed of the text of the Austrian note, but that they entirely supported Austria's action.<sup>1</sup> The Ambassador at the same time asked if Great Britain could see her way to bring conciliatory pressure to bear at St. Petersburg. Grey replied that this was quite impossible. He added that, as long as complications existed between Austria and Servia alone, British interests were only indirectly affected; but he had to look ahead to the fact that Austrian mobilisation would lead to Russian mobilisation, and that from that moment a situation would exist in which the interests of all the Powers would be involved. In that event Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action.<sup>2</sup>

*From Belgrade*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 21

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.*

IN spite of the extremely conciliatory nature of the Servian reply to the ultimatum, the Austrian Minister has just informed the Servian Government, in a note handed in at 6.30 P.M. this evening, that, not having received a satisfactory<sup>3</sup> answer within the time limit fixed, he was leaving Belgrade with the entire staff of the legation. The Skupshtina is convoked for the 14th (27th) July at Nish. The Servian Government and the Diplomatic Body are leaving this evening for that town.

*From London*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 22

*Russian Ambassador at London to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, July 12 (25), 1914.*

GREY has told the German Ambassador that in his opinion Austrian mobilisation must lead to Russian mobilisation, that grave danger of a

<sup>1</sup> See German White Book, Exhibit No. 1, July 23, British Blue Book No. 9, July 24, omitted in the Orange Book. See note to Russian Orange Book No. 18, July 25, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 25, French Yellow Book No. 37, July 25, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> For the reasons of Austria-Hungary why the Serbian note did not satisfy her, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914.

general war will thereupon arise, and that he sees only one means of reaching a peaceful settlement, namely, that, in view of the Austrian and Russian mobilisations, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain should abstain from immediate mobilisation, and should at once offer their good offices. Grey told me that the first essential of this plan was the consent of Germany and her promise not to mobilise. He has therefore, as a first step, made an enquiry on this point at Berlin.<sup>1</sup>

**Serbia :**

*To All Serbian Legations Abroad*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 38

*M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914.*

A BRIEF summary of the reply of the Royal Government was communicated to the representatives of the allied Governments<sup>2</sup> at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-day.<sup>3</sup> They were informed that the reply would be quite conciliatory on all points, and that the Serbian Government would accept the Austro-Hungarian demands as far as possible. The Serbian Government trust that the Austro-Hungarian Government, unless they are determined to make war at all costs, will see their way to accept the full satisfaction offered in the Serbian reply.

*The Serbian Reply to Austria-Hungary*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 39

*Reply of Serbian Government to the Austro-Hungarian Note.—Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914.*

[For the text see Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 25, July 25, and No. 34, July 27, 1914.]

<sup>1</sup> No detailed references to the mobilization of Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain are contained in any despatches published in the British Blue Book.

<sup>2</sup> This expression is noteworthy, referring no doubt to France, Russia and England, who are here spoken of either as allied to each other or even allied to Serbia. See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 58, August 4, where Count Mensdorf quotes Sir E. Grey as referring to Great Britain as the ally of France. Cf. also French Yellow Book No. 158, August 4. Since no mention is made of a summary being given to the representatives of the other Powers, "the representatives of the allied Governments" were possibly invited as representing a unit to the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is, however, not mentioned in French Yellow Book No. 46, July 25, 1914, where the French Minister simply reports "M. Pashitch has just acquainted me, etc."

<sup>3</sup> For the delay with which even this summary reached the Powers see French Yellow Book No. 56, July 26, and Russian Orange Book No. 36, July 27.



*From the Austro-Hungarian Minister*SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 40<sup>1</sup>

*Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914.*

As the time limit stipulated in the note, which, by order of my Government, I handed to His Excellency M. Patchou, on Thursday, the day before yesterday, at 6 P.M., has now expired, and as I have received no satisfactory reply, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I am leaving Belgrade to-night together with the staff of the Imperial and Royal Legation.

The protection of the Imperial and Royal Legation, together with all its appurtenances, annexes, and archives, as well as the care of the subjects and interests of Austria-Hungary in Serbia, is entrusted to the Imperial German Legation.

Finally, I desire to state formally that from the moment this letter reaches Your Excellency the rupture in the diplomatic relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary will have the character of a *fait accompli*.

I have, etc.

*To All Serbian Legations Abroad*SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 41<sup>2</sup>

*M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.*

*Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914.*

I COMMUNICATED the reply to the Austro-Hungarian note to-day at 5.45 P.M. You will receive the full text of the reply to-night. From it you will see that we have gone as far as was possible. When I handed the note to the Austro-Hungarian Minister he stated that he would have to compare it with his instructions, and that he would then give an immediate answer. As soon as I returned to the Ministry, I was informed in a note from the Austro-Hungarian Minister that he was not satisfied with our reply, and that he was leaving Belgrade the same evening, with the entire staff of the Legation. The protection of the Legation and its archives, and the care of Austrian and Hungarian interests had been entrusted by him to the German Legation. He stated finally that on receipt of the note diplomatic relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary must be considered as definitely broken off.

<sup>1</sup> This note should more properly follow No. 41.

<sup>2</sup> Parts of this note, from a chronological point of view, should have been printed before No. 40.

The Royal Serbian Government have summoned the Skupshtina to meet on July 14/27 at Nish, whither all the Ministries with their staffs are proceeding this evening. The Crown Prince has issued, in the name of the King, an order for the mobilisation of the army, while to-morrow or the day after a proclamation will be made in which it will be announced that civilians who are not liable to military service should remain peaceably at home, while soldiers should proceed to their appointed posts and defend the country to the best of their ability, in the event of Serbia being attacked.

*From the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 42

*Count Leopold Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna.*

Sir,

*Vienna, July 12/25, 1914.*

As no satisfactory reply<sup>1</sup> has been given to the note which the Imperial and Royal Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary handed to the Royal Government on the 10/23 instant, I have been compelled to instruct Baron Giesl to leave the Serbian capital and to entrust the protection of the subjects of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty to the German Legation.

I regret that the relations which I have had the honour to maintain with you, M. le Ministre, are thus terminated, and I avail myself of this opportunity to place at your disposal the enclosed passports for your return to Serbia, as well as for the return of the staff of the Royal Legation.

I have, etc.

<sup>1</sup> For Austria-Hungary's reasons why the reply was not satisfactory see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914.

Sunday, July 26, 1914

## SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	London, Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, Petrograd	Petrograd
Belgium	—	Austro-Hungarian Minister
France	London, London, etc. Note for Minister	Rome, Petrograd, Vienna, Christiania, Luxemburg
Germany	London, Paris, Petrograd	Petrograd
Great Britain	Paris, Berlin, Rome, Paris	Vienna, Berlin, Rome
Russia	Rome, Vienna, Berlin	Prague, Paris, Berlin
Serbia	—	—

The full Serbian reply and the reasons why it had not satisfied Austria-Hungary remained unknown to the Powers throughout the whole of Sunday, July 26. A summary of the Serbian reply reached Paris and also Petrograd with a delay of twenty hours, and there is no indication in the published despatches that it reached the other Foreign Offices sooner.

In the absence of accurate information two versions gained currency. First that Serbia's seeming concessions were a sham, and that she knew them to be so or she would not have ordered the mobilization of her troops three hours before she sent her reply to Austria-Hungary. Secondly, that she had yielded in everything except a few minor points.

*Austria-Hungary* continues her endeavors to prove to the Powers that she had been forced to act harshly with Serbia, but that she did not contemplate any territorial aggrandisement at the expense of Serbia. She orders the mobilization of some of her troops.

*Germany* is greatly concerned about the military preparations going on especially in Russia and warns the Powers of the danger that lies in mobilisation. She endeavors to gain the confidence of France, and France's willingness to intercede in Russia.

*Great Britain* continues her efforts to bring about a Conference of four Powers; at first, as on the previous days, with a view to mediation between Petrograd and Vienna; afterwards — and probably owing to French opposition to her original plan — with the view of discovering "an issue which would prevent complications."

*Russia* holds a "long and friendly conversation," as Sazonof describes it, with Austria-Hungary, and suggests the settlement of the Serbian difficulty by means of direct conversations between Petrograd and Vienna. Another suggestion that Serbia should appeal for British intervention is not pressed.

Russian mobilization continues.

*France* reverts to her plan that Germany should exert pressure on Austria-Hungary amounting to mediation between her and Serbia. She claims to be convinced of Russia's moderation and pacific intentions, but does not publish the accounts of Russian mobilisation which must have reached her as well as Germany. Germany's request that she let it be known that France and Germany are jointly working for peace, she rejects as emphatically as Germany's other request that she should urge moderation in Petrograd.

*Italy* is urged by the Entente Powers to dissociate her interests from those of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and is informed by Russia of the latter's definite determination to come to the assistance of Serbia.

*Serbia* is silent on this day, and Belgium practically so.

**Austria-Hungary:**

*From Petrograd*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 28

*Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 26, 1914.*

As the result of reports about measures taken for mobilisation of Russian troops, Count Pourtalès has called the Russian Minister's attention in the most serious manner to the fact that nowadays measures of mobilisation<sup>1</sup> would be a highly dangerous form of diplomatic pressure. For, in that event, the purely military consideration of the question by the general staffs would find expression, and if that button were once touched in Germany, the situation would get out of control.

M. Sazonof assured the German Ambassador on his word of honour that the reports on the subject were incorrect; that up to that time not a single horse and not a single reservist had been called up, and that all the measures that were being taken were merely measures of preparation in the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, and perhaps Kasan and Moscow.

Immediately afterwards the Imperial German Military Attaché received by courier late in the evening an invitation from Suchomlinof, the Minister for War, who explained that Count Pourtalès had spoken with the Foreign Minister about the Russian military preparations, and as the Ambassador might have misunderstood certain military details, he was taking the opportunity of giving him more detailed information. In the following telegram<sup>2</sup> from Count Pourtalès to Berlin which has been placed at my disposal, the pertinent communications from Major von Eggeling are collected:

"The Military Attaché reports with regard to a conversation with the Russian Minister of War: M. Sazonof had asked him to make the military position clear to me. The Minister for War gave me his word of honour that as yet no orders for mobilisation of any kind had been issued. For the present merely preparatory measures would be taken, not a horse would be taken, not a reservist called up. If Austria crossed the Servian frontier, the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan, which face Austria, would be mobilised. In no circumstances will mobilisation take place on the German front, Warsaw, Vilna and St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany is earnestly desired. My question what was the object of the mobilisation against Austria, was met with a shrug of the shoulders and a

<sup>1</sup> For the aggressive meaning of mobilisation according to International Law see Elihu Root, President of the American Society of International Law, in the *American Journal of International Law*, July, 1914: "It is well understood that the exercise of the right of self-protection may and frequently does extend in its effect beyond the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the state exercising it. The strongest example probably would be the mobilisation of an army by another Power immediately across the frontier. Every act done by the other Power may be within its own territory, yet the country threatened by the state of facts is justified in protecting itself by immediate war."

<sup>2</sup> Not published in German White Book.

reference to the diplomatists. I gave the Minister for War to understand that his friendly intentions would be appreciated by us, but that we should also consider mobilisation against Austria to be in itself extremely threatening. The Minister emphasised repeatedly and with great stress Russia's urgent need of and earnest wish for peace."

*To London*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 29

*Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

HERR VON TSCHIRSCHKY informed me to-day in pursuance of his instructions that, according to a telegram <sup>1</sup> from Prince Lichnowsky which had been despatched in London on the 25th of July at 3 P.M., Sir E. Grey had transmitted to the latter the sketch of an answer from Servia, and had remarked in the private letter accompanying it, that he hoped that the Berlin Cabinet in view of the conciliatory tenor of this answer would support its acceptance in Vienna.

I consider it desirable that your Excellency should again approach the matter with the Secretary of State, and call his attention to the fact that almost simultaneously with the transmission by him of this letter to Prince Lichnowsky, namely at 3 P.M. yesterday, Servia had already ordered the general mobilisation <sup>2</sup> of her army, which proves that no inclination for a peaceful solution existed in Belgrade. It was not till six o'clock, after mobilisation had been proclaimed, that the answer, which had apparently been previously telegraphed to London and the contents of which were not reconcilable with our demands, was delivered to the Imperial and Royal Minister at Belgrade.

*To Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, and Petrograd*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 30

*Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, and St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

WE have broken off diplomatic relations with Servia after she had refused <sup>3</sup> the demands we had addressed to her. I beg your Excellency now to proceed at once to the Foreign Minister or his deputy, and to express yourself to him approximately to the following effect:—

The Royal Servian Government have refused to accept the demands which we were forced to address to them in order to secure

<sup>1</sup> Not published in German White Book.

<sup>2</sup> See Belgian Gray Book No. 5, July 26, 1914, and British Blue Book No. 32, same day.

<sup>3</sup> For the reasons why Austria-Hungary deemed the Serbian note unsatisfactory see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914.

permanently our most vital interests which were menaced by them, and have thereby made it clear that they do not intend to abandon their subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder in some of our frontier provinces and their final disruption from the Monarchy.

Reluctantly, therefore, and very much against our wish, we find ourselves obliged to compel Servia by the sharpest measures to make a fundamental change in the attitude of enmity she has up to now pursued.

See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 31, July 27, 1914, which describes an interview between Sazonof and the Austrian Ambassador on July 26, 1914.

**Belgium :**

*From Austro-Hungarian Legation*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 5

*Communications made on July 26, 1914, by the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Brussels to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

M. PASHITCH gave the reply of the Servian Government to the Austro-Hungarian note before 6 o'clock yesterday. This reply not having been considered satisfactory, diplomatic relations have been broken off and the Minister and staff of the Austrian Legation have left Belgrade. Servian mobilisation had already been ordered before 3 o'clock.<sup>1</sup>

**France :**

*To Viviani, London, etc.*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK NO. 50

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the President of the Council (on board the "La France," ) and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 26, 1914.*

THE events of Saturday can be summed up as follows : — refusal of Austria to grant the extension of the time limit asked for by Russia, — departure of the Austrian Minister from Belgrade after receiving a reply from Servia which was considered insufficient although it reached the limit of any possible concession<sup>2</sup> — order for mobilisation given in Servia whose Government retired to Kragoujewatz,<sup>3</sup> where it was followed by the French and Russian Ministers.

The Italian Government, to whom the Austrian note had been communicated on Friday, without any request for support or even

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 29, also British Blue Book No. 32, same day.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 49, printed under July 25, 1914, stating that Servia did not present her reply to France till the next day, July 27. Cf. also French Yellow Book No. 56, July 26, which states that even the summary was 20 hours late in reaching the Foreign Office. Cf. also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 29, July 26, 1914, and Russian Orange Book No. 36, July 27. See also, Serbian Blue Book No. 38, July 25, Note 2.

<sup>3</sup> Nish, according to Russian Orange Book No. 21, July 25, 1914.



advice, could not, in the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, who does not return till Tuesday, make any reply to the suggestion of the Russian Government proposing to press at Vienna for an extension of time. It appears from a confidential communication by the Italian Ambassador to M. Paléologue that at Vienna people still soothe themselves with the illusion that Russia "will not hold firm." It must not be forgotten that Italy is only bound by the engagements of the Triple Alliance if she has been consulted beforehand.

From St. Petersburg we learn that M. Sazonof has advised Serbia to ask for British mediation.<sup>1</sup> At the Council of Ministers<sup>2</sup> on the 25th, which was held in presence of the Emperor, the mobilisation of thirteen army corps intended eventually to operate against Austria was considered; this mobilisation, however, would only be made effective if Austria were to bring armed pressure to bear upon Serbia, and not till after notice had been given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, upon whom falls the duty of fixing the day, liberty being left to him to go on with negotiations even if Belgrade should be occupied. Russian opinion makes clear that it is both politically and morally impossible for Russia to allow Serbia to be crushed.

In London the German *démarche*<sup>3</sup> was made on the 25th in the same terms as those used by Baron von Schoen at Paris. Sir Edward Grey has replied to Prince Lichnowsky that if the war were to break out no Power in Europe could take up a detached attitude. He did not express himself more definitely and used very reserved language to the Servian Minister. The communication made on the evening<sup>4</sup> of the 25th by the Austrian Ambassador makes Sir Edward Grey more optimistic; since the diplomatic rupture does not necessarily involve immediate military operations, the Secretary of State is still willing to hope that the Powers will have time to intervene.

At Berlin<sup>5</sup> the language used by the Secretary of State to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires is unsatisfactory and dilatory; when the latter asked him to associate himself with a *démarche* at Vienna for an extension of the time limit, he replied that he had already taken action in this sense but that it was too late; to the request for an extension of the time limit before active measures were taken, he replied that this had to do with a domestic matter, and not with a war but with local operations. Herr von Jagow pretends not to believe that the Austrian action could lead to general consequences.

A real explosion of chauvinism<sup>6</sup> has taken place at Berlin. The

<sup>1</sup> This is a new suggestion. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 46, July 25, where an appeal to the European Powers is contemplated. It reached Paris, moreover, not on the 25th, as this despatch implies, but on the 26th; see below No. 53, French Yellow Book.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 36, July 25, 1914, and note.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 14, July 25, and its place among the despatches of that date, which makes it more likely that the communication was made early in the morning. It was, moreover, the subject of much diplomatic correspondence throughout the day.

<sup>5</sup> For the events described in this paragraph see British Blue Book No. 18, and French Yellow Book No. 37, of July 25, 1914.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 47, July 25, 1914. The rest of the information contained in this paragraph is not written in M. Jules Cambon's published despatch.



German Emperor returns direct to Kiel. M. Jules Cambon thinks that, at the first military steps taken by Russia, Germany would immediately reply, and probably would not wait for a pretext before attacking us.

At Vienna, the French Ambassador has not had time<sup>1</sup> to join in the *démarche* of his Russian colleague for obtaining an extension of the time limit fixed for Serbia; he does not regret it, this *démarche* having been categorically rejected, and England not having had time to give instructions to her representative about it.

A note from the British Embassy<sup>2</sup> has been delivered to me: it gives an account of the conversation between the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg and M. Sazonof and M. Paléologue. Sir Edward Grey thinks that the four Powers who are not directly interested ought to press both on Russia and Austria that their armies should not cross the frontier, and that they should give time to England, France, Germany and Italy to bring their mediation into play. If Germany accepts, the British Government has reason to think that Italy also would be glad to be associated in the joint action of England and France; the adherence of Germany is essential, for neither Austria nor Russia would tolerate any intervention except that of impartial friends or allies.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

*From Rome*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 51

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 26, 1914.*

A TELEGRAM from Vienna which has just been received at the Consulta informs them that the diplomatic rupture between Austria and Serbia has taken place, and that Austria is proceeding to military measures.

The Marquis di San Giuliano, who is at Fiuggi, will not return to Rome till the day after to-morrow.

To-day I had an interesting conversation with the President of the Council on the situation, the full gravity of which he recognises. From the general drift of his remarks, I have carried away the impression that the Italian Government would be willing, in case of war, to keep out of it and to maintain an attitude of observation.<sup>3</sup>

M. Salandra said to me on this subject: "We shall make the greatest efforts to prevent peace being broken; our situation is somewhat analogous to that of England. Perhaps we could do something in a pacific sense together with the English." M. Salandra

<sup>1</sup> For the error of this statement see the despatches dealing with this subject on July 25, 1914, and the notes.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 24, July 25, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> It was obviously in the interest of the Entente Powers, in case of a European war, to secure the separation of Italy from Austria-Hungary and Germany.

stated definitely to me that the Austrian note had been communicated to Rome at the last moment.

BARRÈRE.

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 52<sup>1</sup>

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 26, 1914.*

M. SAZONOF yesterday told the Italian Ambassador at St. Petersburg that Russia would employ all diplomatic means to avoid a conflict, and that she did not give up hope that mediation might lead Austria to a less uncompromising attitude; but that Russia could not be asked to allow Serbia to be crushed.

I observe that the greater part of Italian public opinion is hostile to Austria in this serious business.

BARRÈRE.

*To London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 53

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. de Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires at London.*

*Paris, July 26, 1914.*

M. PALÉOLOGUE sends me the following telegram:—

“M. Sazonof advises the Servian Government to ask for the mediation of the British Government.”<sup>2</sup>

In concurrence with M. Paul Cambon,<sup>3</sup> I think that the French Government can only say that they hope to see the British Government accept, if an offer of this kind is made to them.

Be good enough to express yourself in this sense at the Foreign Office.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

*From Petrograd*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 54

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 26, 1914.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs continues with praiseworthy perseverance to seek means to bring about a peaceful solution. “Up

<sup>1</sup> This despatch refers to the interview, described in British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914, between the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the British and French Ambassadors. The direct report of this interview by the French Ambassador has not been printed in the French Yellow Book. No valid reason appears why such a roundabout mention of this interview in Petrograd should receive preference in the official publication of the despatches.

<sup>2</sup> See French Yellow Book No. 50, July 26, and note 3; contrast British Blue Book No. 44, July 27.

<sup>3</sup> No despatch from Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, to this effect has been published in the French Yellow Book.

to the last moment," he declared to me, "I shall show myself ready to negotiate."<sup>1</sup>

It is in this spirit that he has just sent for Count Szápáry to come to a "frank and loyal explanation." M. Sazonof commented in his presence on the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, article by article, making clear the insulting character<sup>2</sup> of the principal clauses. "The intention which inspired this document," he said, "is legitimate if you pursued no aim other than the protection of your territory against the intrigues of Servian anarchists; but the procedure to which you have had recourse is not defensible." He concluded: "Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, and I will guarantee you the result."

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador showed himself moved by this language; however, while awaiting instructions, he reserves the opinion of his Government. Without being discouraged M. Sazonof has decided to propose<sup>3</sup> this evening to Count Berchtold the opening of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg on the changes to be introduced into the ultimatum.

This friendly and semi-official interposition of Russia between Austria and Servia has the advantage of being expeditious. I therefore believe it to be preferable to any other procedure and likely to succeed.

PALÉOLOGUE.

*From Vienna*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 55

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

M. SCHEBEKO has returned hastily from a journey to Russia; he had only undertaken it after he had received an assurance from Count Berchtold that the demands on Servia would be thoroughly acceptable.<sup>4</sup>

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg spoke in the same sense to M. Sazonof the evening before the delivery of the note. This procedure, which is quite usual<sup>5</sup> in the diplomacy of the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 38, July 25, and contrast with British Blue Book No. 17, same day.

<sup>2</sup> In the Russian Orange Book No. 25, same day this interview is called "long and friendly." Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 5, same day, and note; also British Blue Book No. 44, July 27.

<sup>3</sup> There is no published despatch showing that he did this. On the contrary in French Yellow Book No. 53, July 26, Sazonof makes an entirely different suggestion. He did, however, revert to the plan proposed here later (see British Blue Book No. 78, July 29) and thereby blocked the plan of a Conference of Ministers in Belgrade.

<sup>4</sup> The reader must decide for himself whether Count Berchtold was honest in his belief or not. From French Yellow Book No. 15, July 21, *New York Times* translation, it seems that Serbia was willing to accept the demands of Austria-Hungary, if they did not include judicial participation. This demand was dropped in favor of participation in the investigation. See also British Blue Book No. 57, July 27, printed under date of July 28.

<sup>5</sup> A subjective judgment of this kind while indicative of the existing suspicion on the part of the French Government cannot, of course, claim to be in the nature of proving the case.

Monarchy, and which Baron Macchio has also employed towards me, seems to have greatly added to the irritation of the Russian Government.

M. Schebeko will make an effort, however, to profit by the delay which is indispensable for mobilisation, in order to make a proposal for an arrangement, which will at least have the advantage of allowing us to measure the value of the pacific declarations of Germany.

While we were talking over the situation this evening, in company with Sir M. de Bunsen,<sup>1</sup> the latter received instructions<sup>2</sup> from the Foreign Office with reference to the *démarche* to be attempted by the representatives of the four Powers less directly interested. I am expecting, therefore, that we may have to consult to-morrow with the Duke d'Avarna and with M. Tschirscky, who, in order to refuse his concurrence, will almost certainly entrench himself behind the principle of localising the conflict.<sup>3</sup>

My impression is that the Austro-Hungarian Government, although surprised and perhaps regretting the vigour with which they have been inspired, will believe themselves obliged to commence military action.

DUMAINE.

*To Viviani, London, Petrograd, Berlin, Vienna, Rome*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 56

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the President of the Council (on board the "La France," ) and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 26, 1914.*

THE summary of the Servian reply to the Austrian note only reached us after twenty hours delay.<sup>4</sup> Although the Servian Government had given way on all points, with the exception of two small reservations,<sup>5</sup> the Austro-Hungarian Minister has broken off relations, thus proving the determined wish of his Government to proceed to execution on Servia.

According to a telegram from M. Jules Cambon, the British Ambassador thinks that there is a slight yielding; when he observed to Herr von Jagow that Sir Edward Grey did not ask him to intervene between Austria and Servia, but, as this question ceased to be localised, to intervene with England, France and Italy at Vienna and St. Petersburg, the Secretary of State declared that he would do his best to maintain peace.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The close union of the three Entente Powers is apparent throughout. Cf. British Blue Book No. 40, July 26, 1914, and British Blue Book No. 6, note 1, July 24.

<sup>2</sup> See British Blue Book Nos. 55 and 36, July 26, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> Contrast this paragraph with British Blue Book No. 40, same day, where the same interview is described.

<sup>4</sup> I.e. on Sunday, July 26, at 2 P.M.

<sup>5</sup> For the entirely different view of the Austro-Hungarian Government see their Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914.

<sup>6</sup> Germany did more and accepted Sir E. Grey's plan; German White Book, Exhibit 13, July 25, 1914.

In the course of an interview between M. Barrère and the General Secretary of the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the latter indicated that probably the Italian Government would not have approved the Austrian note; but as it was not communicated to them beforehand, the Government consider themselves by this fact relieved of all responsibility in the grave step taken by Austria.<sup>1</sup>

The German Ambassador came this afternoon to make a communication to me relating to an intervention by France with Russia in a pacific sense. "Austria," he said to me, "has declared to Russia that she was not pursuing any territorial aggrandisement nor any attack on the integrity of the Kingdom of Servia; her only intention is to ensure her own tranquillity and to take police measures. The prevention of war depends on the decision of Russia; Germany feels herself identified with France in the ardent desire that peace may be maintained, and has the firm hope that France will use her influence in this sense at St. Petersburg."

I replied to this suggestion that Russia was moderate, that she had not committed any act which allowed any doubt as to her moderation, and that we were in agreement with her in seeking a peaceful solution of the dispute. It therefore appeared to us that Germany on her side ought to act at Vienna, where her action would certainly be effective, with a view to avoiding military operations leading to the occupation of Servia.<sup>2</sup>

The Ambassador having observed to me that this could not be reconciled with the position taken up by Germany "that the question concerned only Austria and Servia," I told him that the mediation at Vienna and St. Petersburg could be the act of the four other Powers less interested in the question.

Herr von Schoen then entrenched himself behind his lack of instructions in this respect, and I told him that in these conditions I did not feel myself in a position to take any action at St. Petersburg alone.

The conversation ended by the renewed assurances of the Ambassador of the peaceful intention of Germany, whom he declared to be on this point identified with France.<sup>3</sup>

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

#### FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 57

#### *Note for the Minister*

*Paris, Sunday evening, July 26, 1914.*

AFTER the visit which he paid to the Minister at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, Baron von Schoen went this evening at 7 o'clock to the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 51 and 52, same day.

<sup>2</sup> The attitude of France, consistently carried out through the next days, is here foreshadowed. Her view is that Austria-Hungary's position was unreasonable, while Russia's was reasonable and moderate. Germany, therefore, should exert pressure on Austria, while she herself refused to exert like pressure on Russia.

<sup>3</sup> Germany was trying to work together with France for the maintenance of peace. France refused to appear to act in accord with Germany for fear of offending Russia, see French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27.

*Direction Politique*, to ask that in order to avoid the appearance in the newspapers of comments intended to influence public opinion, such as that in the *Echo de Paris* of the evening before,<sup>1</sup> and in order to define exactly the sense of the *démarches* of the German Government, a brief statement should be communicated to the press on the interview between the German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Herr von Schoen, in order to define what he had in his mind, suggested the following terms, which the Acting Political Director took down at his dictation: "During the afternoon the German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had a fresh interview, in the course of which, in the most amicable spirit, and acting in an identical spirit of peaceful co-operation (*sentiment de solidarité pacifique*), they examined the means which might be employed to maintain general peace."<sup>2</sup>

The Acting Political Director replied at once, "Then, in your opinion, every thing is settled, and you bring us the assurance that Austria accepts the Servian note or will enter into conversations with the Powers on this matter?" The Ambassador having appeared surprised and having vigorously denied the suggestion, it was explained to him that if there was no modification in Germany's negative attitude, the terms of the suggested "note to the press" were exaggerated, and of a nature to give a false security to French opinion by creating illusion on the real situation, the dangers of which were only too evident.

To the assurances lavished by the German Ambassador as to the optimistic impressions which he had formed, the Acting Political Director replied by asking if he might speak to him in a manner quite personal and private, as man to man, quite freely and without regard to their respective functions. Baron von Schoen asked him to do so.

M. Berthelot then said that to any simple mind Germany's attitude was inexplicable if it did not aim at war; a purely objective analysis of the facts and the psychology of the Austro-German relations led logically to this conclusion. In the face of the repeated statement that Germany was ignorant of the contents of the Austrian note, it was no longer permissible to raise any doubt on that point; but was it probable that Germany would have arrayed herself on the side of Austria in such an adventure with her eyes closed? Did the psychology of all the past relations of Vienna and Berlin allow one to admit that Austria could have taken up a position without any possible retreat, before having weighed with her ally all the consequences of her uncompromising attitude? How surprising appeared the refusal by Germany to exercise mediating<sup>3</sup> influence at Vienna now that she knew the extraordinary text of the Austrian note! What responsibility was the German Government assuming

<sup>1</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 36, and Russian Orange Book No. 19, July 25, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. preceding despatch and note 6.

<sup>3</sup> France was still clinging to the Paul Cambon modification — mediation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia — of the Sir E. Grey plan — mediation between Russia and Austria-Hungary.



and what suspicions would rest upon them if they persisted in interposing between Austria and the Powers, after what might be called the absolute submission of Servia, and when the slightest advice given by them to Vienna would put an end to the nightmare which weighed on Europe!

The breaking off of diplomatic relations by Austria, her threats of war, and the mobilisation which she was undertaking<sup>1</sup> make peculiarly urgent pacific action on the part of Germany, for from the day when Austrian troops crossed the Servian frontier, one would be faced by an act which without doubt would oblige<sup>2</sup> the St. Petersburg Cabinet to intervene, and would risk the unloosing of a war which Germany declares that she wishes to avoid.

Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian note,<sup>3</sup> and had only approved it after its delivery; she thought, however, that Servia had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be able to forget it, and that Austria owed it to herself to put an end to a situation which was dangerous and intolerable for a great Power. He declared besides that he did not know the text of the Servian reply, and showed his personal surprise that it had not satisfied Austria, if indeed it was such as the papers, which are often ill informed, represented it to be.

He insisted again on Germany's peaceful intentions and gave his impressions as to the effect that might arise from good advice given, for instance, at Vienna, by England in a friendly tone. According to him Austria was not uncompromising; what she rejects is the idea of a formal mediation, the "spectre" of a conference: a peaceful word coming from St. Petersburg, good words said in a conciliatory tone by the Powers of the Triple Entente, would have a chance of being well received. He added, finally, that he did not say that Germany on her side would not give some advice at Vienna.

In these conditions the Political Director announced that he would ask the Minister if it appeared to him opportune to communicate to the press a short note in a moderate tone.

<sup>1</sup> There is here no reference to Serbia's mobilisation ordered three hours before she sent her reply to Austria-Hungary; cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 5, July 26, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> France throughout deemed Russia's interest in protecting Serbia more vital than Austria-Hungary's interests in protecting herself from Serbian intrigues.

<sup>3</sup> Here the official British publication "Collected Diplomatic Documents" prints the following note, not contained in the French Yellow Book, and does so without any explanation:

"Cf. No. 21. Letter from the French Minister in Munich stating that the Bavarian President of the Council said, on July 23, that he had read the Austrian note to Servia.

"Cf. also the British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 95, page 74, in which Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, states:—

"Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it."

The first paragraph in its English translation, is a perversion of the truth. The French text merely says that he "had cognisance," and for this see note to French Yellow Book No. 21, July 23. As to the rest the reader must decide for himself whether the anonymous informant of the British Ambassador deserves more credence than the German Chancellor and Secretary of Foreign Affairs who repeatedly said that they had not known the contents of the Austro-Hungarian note until it was officially presented to the Powers. Cf. especially French Yellow Book No. 15, July 21, No. 17, July 22, and No. 30, July 24.



*From Christiania*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 58

*M. Chevalley, French Minister at Christiania, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Christiania, July 26, 1914.*

THE whole German fleet <sup>1</sup> in Norway has received orders to put to sea. The German authorities at Bergen declare that it is to make straight for Germany.

German ships scattered in the Fjords to the north of Bergen were to join those which are in the neighbourhood of Stavanger.

CHEVALLEY.

*From Luxemburg*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 59

*M. d'Annoville, French Chargé d'Affaires at Luxemburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Luxemburg, July 26, 1914.*

ACCORDING to information which I have just received from Thionville, the four last classes set at liberty have been ordered to hold themselves at the disposition of the *Commandatur* at any moment.

Without being completely mobilised the reservists are forbidden to go away from their place of residence.

Germany:

*From Petrograd*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 5

*The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor. Telegram of July 26th, 1914.*

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had an extended interview <sup>2</sup> with Sazonof this afternoon. Both parties had a satisfactory impression as they told me afterwards. The assurance of the Ambassador that Austria-Hungary had no idea of conquest but wished to obtain peace at last at her frontiers, greatly pacified the Secretary.

<sup>1</sup> Orders to stop the demobilization of the British fleet had been issued, two days earlier, on July 24, 1914, according to French Yellow Book No. 66, July 27, 1914. See also note 2, British Blue Book No. 47, July 27.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 25, same day, "long and friendly" interview; but contrast impression of this interview on French Ambassador, French Yellow Book No. 54, same day, where Sazonof is reported as having "made clear the insulting character of the principal clauses." No mention of this interview is made in the Austro-Hungarian Red Book. The Russian despatch, No. 25, is sent to Vienna. There can be no doubt that Sazonof gave the impression to both Austria-Hungary and Germany that a *rapprochement* between Russia and Austria-Hungary was possible.

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 7

*Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to the Chancellor on July 26th, 1914.*

The military attaché requests the following message to be sent to the general staff:

I deem it certain that mobilisation has been ordered for Kiev and Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow and improbable elsewhere.

*To London*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 10

*Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London. Urgent. July 26th, 1914.*

Austria-Hungary has declared in St. Petersburg officially and solemnly that it has no desire for territorial gain in Servia; that it will not touch the existence of the Kingdom, but that it desires to establish peaceful conditions. According to news received here, *Russia is about to summon several bodies of reservists also against us.*<sup>1</sup> If this news proves correct, we shall be forced to countermeasures very much against our own wishes. Our desire to localise the conflict and to preserve the peace of Europe remains unchanged. We ask to act in this sense at St. Petersburg with all possible emphasis.<sup>2</sup>

*To Paris*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 10a<sup>3</sup>

*Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris. July 26th, 1914.*

After officially declaring to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire territorial gain and to touch the existence of the Kingdom, the decision whether there is to be a European war rests solely with Russia which has to bear the entire responsibility. We depend upon France with which we are at one in the desire for the preservation of the peace of Europe that it will exercise its influence at St. Petersburg in favour of peace.

<sup>1</sup> The words in italics are substituted here from the *New York Times* translation for those of the Collected Diplomatic Documents, which is the official British version and follows the official German translation, and reads "the call for several classes of the reserves is expected immediately which is equivalent to mobilisation." It will be noticed that two thoughts are inadvertently omitted here: first that it is Russia who is mobilising; secondly that she is mobilising "also against us." The editor of the Collected Diplomatic Documents who states, on p. 403, that "a few footnotes have been inserted to point out certain discrepancies between the translation and the German original," disregards the omission of Russia in his footnote to these words, stating merely "The German text adds here *auch gegen uns* (also against us)."

<sup>2</sup> This entire message delivered to Sir E. Grey by the German Ambassador has been omitted in the British Blue Book.

<sup>3</sup> From Russian Orange Book No. 28, July 26, 1914, it appears that this message was delivered in Paris. It is, however, not printed in the French Yellow Book.

In the English Translations published by The Imperial German Foreign Office these "Exhibits" are renumbered and printed as numbers: 10a becomes 11; 10b 12, etc.

*To Petrograd*GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 106<sup>1</sup>

*Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 26th, 1914.*

After Austria's solemn declaration of its territorial disinterestedness, the responsibility for a possible disturbance of the peace of Europe through a Russian intervention rests solely upon Russia. We trust still that Russia will undertake no steps which will threaten seriously the peace of Europe.

For an additional message to Russia see below after No. 29 of the Russian Orange Book, July 26, 1914.

Great Britain :

*From Vienna*BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 31<sup>2</sup>

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

SERVIAN reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered satisfactory, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade. War is thought to be imminent.

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 32

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

ACCORDING to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will keep quiet during chastisement of Servia, which Austria-Hungary is resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Servian territory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose, the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to take a step which would probably result in many frontier questions in which Russia is interested, such

<sup>1</sup> Like the preceding two messages which have been omitted from the British Blue Book and the French Yellow Book respectively, this message has been omitted from the Russian Orange Book.

<sup>2</sup> The information contained in this despatch had reached England from Belgrade on the previous day; British Blue Book No. 23.

as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian, and Persian questions being brought into the melting-pot. France, too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war.

I replied that matters had, I thought, been made a little difficult for other Powers by the tone of Austro-Hungarian Government's ultimatum to Servia. One naturally sympathised with many of the requirements of the ultimatum, if only the manner of expressing them had been more temperate. It was, however, impossible, according to the German Ambassador, to speak effectively in any other way to Servia. Servia was about to receive a lesson which she required; the quarrel, however, ought not to be extended in any way to foreign countries. He doubted Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Servia, acting as if she made any such claim. As for Germany she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter.

The German Ambassador had heard of a letter<sup>1</sup> addressed by you yesterday to the German Ambassador in London in which you expressed the hope that the Servian concessions would be regarded as satisfactory. He asked whether I had been informed that a pretence of giving way at the last moment had been made by the Servian Government. I had, I said, heard that on practically every point Servia had been willing to give in. His Excellency replied that Servian concessions were all a sham.<sup>2</sup> Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilisation<sup>3</sup> and retirement of Government from Belgrade.

*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 33

*Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 26, 1914.*

EMPEROR returns suddenly to-night, and Under-Secretary of State says that Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on His Majesty's own initiative. They fear that His Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excitement. Under-Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador at St. Petersburg had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Servian territory Russia would not remain indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia would not act if Austria did not annex territory.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 29, same day.

<sup>2</sup> For the reasons see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 29, Belgian Gray Book No. 5, same day.

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 34

*Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 26, 1914.

UNDER-SECRETARY of State has just telephoned to me to say that German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a favourable view of Servian reply if it corresponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July.<sup>1</sup>

Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German Government do not see their way to going beyond this.

*From Rome*BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 35<sup>2</sup>

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 26, 1914.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a conference, and will instruct Italian Ambassador to-night accordingly.

Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this evening that Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did not imply declaration of war.

*To Paris, Berlin, Rome*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 36

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, and Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.

WOULD Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications?<sup>3</sup> You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg should be authorised to request

<sup>1</sup> See No. 21, July 25, 1914.<sup>2</sup> This seems to be a reply to No. 36.<sup>3</sup> This is no longer the Conference of Sir E. Grey's original plan — mediation between Russia and Austria-Hungary — nor of the Paul Cambon modification of this plan — mediation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. See note to No. 37.

that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference.

*To Paris*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 37

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.*

BERLIN telegram of 25th July.<sup>1</sup>

It is important to know if France will agree to suggested action by the four Powers if necessary.

*From Rome*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 38

[Here Sir E. Grey prints a despatch from Rome dated July 23, but delayed in transmission. For the text see above under date of July 23, and explanatory note.]

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 39

*Reply of Serbian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note. — (Communicated by the Serbian Minister, July 27.)*

[For the text see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 25, July 25, and No. 34, July 27, 1914. The British Blue Book fails to print the Austro-Hungarian comment.]

According to the published despatches none of the Entente Powers had received copies of the Serbian reply on July 26, and even a summary of the reply had reached Paris with a delay of twenty hours, *i.e.* at 2 P.M. Sunday, July 26, 1914 (French Yellow Book No. 56, same day also Russian Orange Book No. 36, July 27). As to the reply, however, two versions were current on July 26: first, that disseminated by Russia, Serbia and France, to the effect that Serbia had yielded completely except on one or two minor points; secondly, that given out by Austria-Hungary and Germany, to the effect that Serbia's concessions were a sham and that the entire reply was unsatisfactory.

The only foreign offices cognisant of the reply were, of course, those of Serbia and Austria-Hungary, unless one wishes to understand a passage of British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, (see note 7) to mean that the Russian Cabinet wrote the note for Serbia.

Eventually Austria-Hungary sent her commentary on this note to the Powers by mail July 27 (see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 39, July 28). These comments, however, were not printed either in the British Blue Book or the French Yellow Book in any of the editions receiving currency in America or in the Collected Diplomatic Documents officially issued by England. Neither does it appear in any of the other books except the Austro-Hungarian Red Book.

<sup>1</sup> The official British version contains here a footnote "See No. 18." The Conference there spoken of has in view "working in favour of mediation in Vienna and at St. Petersburg." It is in short Sir E. Grey's original plan. Despatches Nos. 36 and 37, therefore, contain different proposals. France's objections to working in favour of moderation in Petrograd were discussed above in note 5 to French Yellow Book No. 56, July 26. Very probably, therefore, British Blue Book No. 37 should precede No. 36. When Sir E. Grey met determined opposition in Paris to his plan (No. 37) he may have modified it, as expressed in No. 36. No. 36 reached the British Ambassador while he was at a conference with the Russian and French Ambassadors in Vienna in the evening (French Yellow Book No. 55) and his reply, British Blue Book No. 40, while dated July 26, was received in London the next day. All this makes it unlikely that after sending No. 36, Sir E. Grey should have reverted to his original plan in No. 37. From No. 35 it does not appear which plan of a conference was accepted by Italy.



*From Vienna*BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 40<sup>1</sup>

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.*  
— (Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war, and that it is impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th instant<sup>2</sup> (last paragraph).

When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Paris<sup>3</sup> arrived, I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both with me.<sup>4</sup> They expressed great satisfaction with its contents, which I communicated to them. They doubted, however, whether the principle of Russia being an interested party entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro-Servian dispute would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government.

Instructions were also given to the Italian Ambassador to support the request of the Russian Government that the time limit should be postponed. They arrived, however, too late for any useful action to be taken.

**Russia :***To Rome*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 23

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Rome.*

(Telegram.)

*St. Petersburg, July 13 (26), 1914.*

ITALY might play a part of the first importance in favour of preserving peace, by bringing the necessary influence to bear upon Austria, and by adopting a definitely unfavourable attitude towards the dispute on the ground that it could not be localised. You should express your conviction that Russia cannot possibly avoid coming to the help of Servia.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No. 40 should precede No. 39, for while both despatches are said to have been received on July 27, No. 40 was sent on July 26.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 26, July 25.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 36, July 26, 1914.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. the French account of this interview, French Yellow Book No. 55, same day.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 51 and 52, July 26, and for Russia's determination to force a war unless Austria-Hungary yielded. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914, "if she (i.e. Russia) feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war."



*From Prague*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK NO. 24

*Acting Russian Consul at Prague to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Prague, July 13 (26), 1914.*

MOBILISATION<sup>1</sup> has been ordered.

*To Vienna; also Berlin, Paris, London, and Rome*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK NO. 25

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Vienna.*

(Telegram.)

*St. Petersburg, July 13 (26), 1914.*

I HAD a long and friendly<sup>2</sup> conversation to-day with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador. After discussing the ten demands addressed to Servia, I drew his attention to the fact that, quite apart from the clumsy form in which they were presented, some of them were quite impracticable, even if the Servian Government agreed to accept them. Thus, for example, points 1 and 2 could not be carried out without recasting the Servian press law and associations law, and to that it might be difficult to obtain the consent of the Skupshtina. As for enforcing points 4 and 5, this might lead to most dangerous consequences, and even to the risk of acts of terrorism directed against the Royal Family and against Pashitch, which clearly could not be the intention of Austria. With regard to the other points it seemed to me that, with certain changes of detail, it would not be difficult to find a basis of mutual agreement, if the accusations contained in them were confirmed by sufficient proof.

In the interest of the maintenance of peace, which, according to the statements of Szapary, is as much desired by Austria as by all the Powers, it was necessary to end the tension of the present moment as soon as possible. With this object in view it seemed to me most desirable that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador should be authorised to enter into a private exchange of views<sup>3</sup> in order to redraft certain articles of the Austrian note of the 10th (23rd) July in consultation with me. This method of procedure would perhaps enable us to find a formula which would prove acceptable to Servia, while giving satisfaction to Austria in respect of the chief of her demands. Please convey the substance of this telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a judicious and friendly manner.

Communicated to Russian Ambassadors in Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy.

<sup>1</sup> The despatches probably received in Petrograd announcing the Serbian mobilisation on July 25, three hours before Servia sent her reply to Austria-Hungary, are not published in the Russian Orange Book. See Belgian Gray Book No. 5, July 26, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 5, and contrast French Yellow Book No. 54, both of July 26, 1914. For the Austrian Version see Red Book No. 31, July 27, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> This is Sazonof's counter proposition to Sir E. Grey's plan of a conference of four Powers.

*To Berlin*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 26

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegram.)

*St. Petersburg, July 13 (26), 1914.*

PLEASE communicate the contents of my telegram<sup>1</sup> to Vienna of to-day to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, and express to him the hope that he, on his part, will be able to advise Vienna to meet Russia's proposal in a friendly spirit.

*From Paris*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 27

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, July 13 (26), 1914.*

THE Director of the Political Department informs me that, upon his informing the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador<sup>2</sup> of the contents of the Servian reply to the ultimatum, the Ambassador did not conceal his surprise that it had failed to satisfy Giesl. In the opinion of the Director of the Political Department, Servia's conciliatory<sup>3</sup> attitude should produce the best impression in Europe.

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 28

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, July 13 (26), 1914.*

THE German Ambassador again visited the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day, and made to him the following declarations:<sup>4</sup>—

(Translation.)

“L'Autriche a déclaré à la Russie qu'elle ne recherche pas des acquisitions territoriales et qu'elle ne menace pas l'intégrité de la Serbie. Son but unique est d'assurer sa propre tranquil-

“Austria has declared to Russia that she does not desire territorial acquisitions, and that she harbours no designs against the integrity of Servia. Her sole object is to secure her own peace

<sup>1</sup> Russian Orange Book No. 25, and see note 3 to that despatch.

<sup>2</sup> The summary of the Serbian reply reached Paris in the afternoon of July 26, 1914; see French Yellow Book No. 56, July 26, where an interview with the German Ambassador is described. The interview here referred to with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador is not mentioned in the French Yellow Book.

<sup>3</sup> For a contrary interpretation of the Serbian attitude see British Blue Book No. 32, same day, and note 2.

<sup>4</sup> This is the official message, German White Book, Exhibit 10a, sent by the Chancellor to the German Ambassador in Paris. It is not printed in the French Yellow Book and is here printed as if it were a personal opinion of the German Ambassador.

lité. Par conséquent il dépend de la Russie d'éviter la guerre. L'Allemagne se sent solidaire avec la France dans le désir ardent de conserver la paix et espère fermement que la France usera de son influence à Pétersbourg dans un sens modérateur." and quiet, and consequently it rests with Russia to prevent war. Germany is at one with France in her ardent desire to preserve peace, and she sincerely hopes that France will exercise a moderating influence at St. Petersburg."

The Minister pointed out that Germany on her part might well act on similar lines at Vienna, especially in view of the conciliatory spirit displayed by Servia. The Ambassador replied that such a course was not possible, owing to the decision not to intervene in the Austro-Servian dispute. The Minister then asked whether the four Powers — Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France — could not make representations at St. Petersburg and Vienna, for that the matter amounted, in effect, to a dispute between Austria and Russia. The Ambassador alleged that he had no instructions. Finally, the Minister refused to agree to the German proposal.

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK NO. 29

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

Paris, July 13 (26), 1914.

THE Director of the Political Department has expressed the personal opinion that the series of representations made by Germany at Paris aim at intimidating<sup>1</sup> France and at securing her intervention at St. Petersburg.

*From Berlin*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK NO. 30

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

Berlin, July 13 (26), 1914.

ON the news reaching Berlin that the Austrian army had mobilised against Servia, a large crowd, in which the papers

<sup>1</sup> Russia also received, on this day, July 26, 1914, the following message from Berlin, which is not printed in the Russian Orange Book. It is here quoted from the German White Book (authorized translation), p. 7:

"Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilising the army.

"But mobilisation means war.

"As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilisation would be directed against both Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of the Servian kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume an attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Servia, as Austria-Hungary does not intend to question the latter. It will be easy in the further development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding."

report the presence of an Austrian element, gave vent to a series of noisy demonstrations in favour of Austria. Late in the evening the crowd several times collected before the Imperial Russian Embassy and some anti-Russian shouting occurred. Hardly any police were present and no precautions were taken.

**Serbia :**

Serbia has not published any despatches of July 26, 1914.

Monday, July 27, 1914

# SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	Petrograd, Berlin, Rome London, Paris, Petrograd	Petrograd, Berlin
Belgium	—	Berlin
France	London, London etc.	Basle, London, Petrograd, Constantinople, Berlin, Rome Serbian reply and Austro-Hungarian Memorandum.
Germany	London	Kovno, Berne, Petrograd
Great Britain	Berlin, Petrograd, Vienna, Rome	Vienna, Paris, Berlin, Petrograd, Rome Serbian reply and Austro-Hungarian Memorandum
Russia	Paris and London, Berlin, London etc. Czar to Serbian Crown Prince	London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna
Serbia	—	Czar to Serbian Crown Prince.

*Austria-Hungary* sends out for presentation to the Powers the *dossier* with her proofs of Serbian guilt and issues her comments to the Serbian reply, explaining in detail why she could not accept it as satisfactory, and repeats her declaration that she "does not aim in any way at territorial acquisitions of any sort."

*France* continues to hold Germany responsible for Austria-Hungary's firmness in dealing with Serbia, and refuses Germany's request to intercede in Petrograd. She is troubled by the confidence expressed by the German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors in London that "England would preserve neutrality" and, like Russia, is endeavoring to secure the promise of English support in case of war. Sazonof is represented by the French officials as very moderate and desirous of peace. Sir E. Grey's proposal of a conference to "examine means of finding a solution" is supported but altered to include Belgrade instead of only Vienna and Petrograd, while Jules Cambon in Berlin renews his request that Berlin alone intervene in Vienna.

*Germany* accepts in principle Sir E. Grey's proposal of a conference and "at once starts the mediation proposal in Vienna in the sense desired by Sir Edward Grey." She expects, however, most good from direct conversations between Vienna and Petrograd as suggested by Sazonof. She continues to point out the danger of Russian mobilisation.

*Great Britain* announces the action of keeping her fleet mobilised as of this day while it actually occurred on July 24. It was meant to dissipate the impression that in any event England "would stand aside," which impression Sazonof "deplored." Serbia's reply continues to be represented as satisfactory by Sir E. Grey, who omits from the Blue Book both the *dossier* and the Austro-Hungarian comments on the Serbian reply. Great Britain repeats her conference proposals to mediate between Petrograd and Vienna or, according to the French Yellow Book, also Belgrade. Sir E. Grey is, however, not unfavourable to Sazonof's plan of direct conversations.

*Russia*, while not refusing categorically Sir E. Grey's plan, urges her own of direct conversations. She continues her mobilisation, although some of her high officials deny this.

*Serbia* officially appeals to Russia for help.

*Belgium* discusses the Serbian reply on information supplied by the British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.

### **Austria-Hungary :**

#### *From Petrograd*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 31

*Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

JUST had a long conversation with M. Sazonof.<sup>1</sup> Told the Minister I was under the impression that mistaken ideas were prevalent in Russia with regard to the character of our action. We were credited with wishing to push forward into Balkan territory, and to begin a march to Salonica or even to Constantinople. Others, again, went so far as to describe our action merely as the starting point of a preventive war against Russia. I said that all this was erroneous, and that parts of it were absolutely unreasonable. The goal of our action was self-preservation and self-defence against hostile propaganda by word, in writing, and in action, which threatened our integrity. It would occur to no one in Austria-Hungary to threaten Russian interests, or indeed to pick a quarrel with Russia. And yet we were absolutely determined to reach the goal which we had set before us, and the path which we had chosen seemed to us the most suitable. As, however, the action under discussion was action in self-defence, I could not conceal from him that we could not allow ourselves to be diverted from it by any consequences, of whatever kind they might be.

M. Sazonof agreed with me. Our goal, as I had described it to him, was an entirely legitimate one, but he considered that the path which we were pursuing with a view to attaining it was not the surest. He said that the note which we had delivered was not happy<sup>2</sup> in its form. He had since been studying it, and if I had time, he would like to look it through once more with me. I remarked that I was at his service, but was not authorised either to discuss the text of the note with him or to interpret it. Of course, however, his remarks were of interest. The Minister then took all the points of the note in order, and on this occasion found seven of the ten points admissible without very great difficulty; only the two points<sup>3</sup> dealing with the collaboration of the Imperial and Royal officials in Servia and the point dealing with the removal of officers and civil servants to be designated by us,<sup>4</sup> seemed to him to be unacceptable in their present

<sup>1</sup> While dated July 27, this interview took place on July 26; cf. Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26, and note 1. The last paragraph of this note, moreover, refers to the Serbian mobilisation, which took place on the 25th, as of "the previous day."

<sup>2</sup> French Yellow Book No. 54, July 26, quotes Sazonof as having said "insulting."

<sup>3</sup> They are points 5 and 6, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7, July 22, 1914, and the explanation, Red Book No. 27, July 25, 1914.

<sup>4</sup> This is point 4 of the note to Servia, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7, July 22, 1914.

form. With regard to the two first points, I was in a position to give an authentic interpretation in the sense of your Excellency's telegram of the 25th instant;<sup>1</sup> with regard to the third, I expressed the opinion that it was a necessary demand. Moreover, matters had already been set in motion. The Servians had mobilised on the previous day<sup>2</sup> and I did not know what had happened since then.

*To Petrograd*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 32

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 27, 1914.*

I EMPOWER your Excellency to declare to M. Sazonof that, so long as the war between Austria-Hungary and Servia remains localised, the Monarchy does not aim in any way at territorial acquisitions of any sort.

*From Berlin*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 33

*Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, June 27, 1914.*

M. SAZONOF explained to the German Ambassador that he could "guarantee" to him "that on the Russian side no mobilisation had been begun; though it was true that certain necessary military precautions were being taken."

The German military attaché at St. Petersburg reports<sup>3</sup> that "the Russian Minister of War has given him his word of honour that not a man or a horse has been mobilised; however, naturally, certain military precautions have been taken"; precautions which, as the German military attaché adds, apparently spontaneously, to his report, "are to be sure pretty far-reaching."

*To Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, and Petrograd*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 34

*Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, and St. Petersburg.*

*Vienna, July 27, 1914.*

ANNEXED you will find the text, annotated with our remarks, of the note which the Royal Servian Government on the 25th of June transmitted to the Imperial and Royal Minister at Belgrade.

<sup>1</sup> Austro-Hungarian Red Book Nos. 21, 26, and 27, July 25, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 5, July 25, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 11, also 8 and 9, July 27, 1914.



Enclosure <sup>1</sup>*Reply of the Royal Servian Government to the Imperial and Royal Government of the 12/25 July, 1914.*

(Translation.)

The Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant,<sup>2</sup> and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skupschtina<sup>3</sup> and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State — protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18th<sup>1</sup> March, 1909 — have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their agents, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy dur-

(Remarks.)

The Royal Servian Government confine themselves to asserting that, since the declarations on the 18th March, 1909, no attempt has been made by the Servian Government and their agents to change the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Thereby they deliberately and arbitrarily shift the ground on which our *démarche* was based, as we did not maintain that they and their agents have taken any official action in this direction.

Our charge, on the contrary, is to the effect that the Servian Government, notwithstanding the obligations undertaken in the above-quoted note, have neglected to suppress the movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy.

Their obligation, that is to say, was that they should change the whole direction of their policy and adopt a friendly and neighbourly attitude towards the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and not merely that they should refrain from officially attacking the incorporation of Bosnia in the Monarchy.

<sup>1</sup> For a brief summary see French Yellow Book No. 75 (2), July 28, and footnote.

<sup>2</sup> Old style.

<sup>3</sup> The Serbian Parliament.

ing the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Serbia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies — manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject,

The proposition of the Royal Servian Government that utterances in the press and the activities of societies are of a private character and are not subject to official control is absolutely antagonistic to the institutions of modern States, even those which have the most liberal law with regard to press and associations; this law has a public character and subjects the press, as well as associations, to State control. Moreover, Servian institutions themselves contemplate some such control. The complaint against the Servian Government is in fact that they have entirely omitted to control their press and their associations, of whose activities in a sense hostile to the Monarchy they were well aware.

This proposition is incorrect; the Servian Government were accurately informed of the suspicions which were entertained against quite definite persons and were not only in a position but also bound by their internal laws to initiate spontaneous enquiries. They have done nothing in this direction.

without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the *Journal officiel*, on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration: —

“The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary — *i.e.*, the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly pledged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909.<sup>1</sup>

“The Government, etc. . . .” (identical with the text as demanded).

The Royal Government further undertake: —

Our demand ran: —

“The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary. . . .”

The alteration made by the Royal Servian Government in the declaration demanded by us implies that no such propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary exists, or that they are cognisant of no such propaganda. This formula is insincere and disingenuous, as by it the Servian Government reserve for themselves for later use the evasion that they had not by this declaration disavowed the then existing propaganda, and had not admitted that it was hostile to the Monarchy, from which they could further deduce that they had not bound themselves to suppress propaganda similar to that now being carried on.

The wording demanded by us ran: —

“The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and functionaries . . . participated. . . .”

By the adoption of this wording with the addition “according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government” the Servian Government are pursuing the object that has already been referred to above, namely, that of preserving a free hand for the future.

We had demanded of them: —

1. “To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hun-

<sup>1</sup> New style.

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skupschтина<sup>1</sup> a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the Constitution.

garian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy."

We wished therefore to ensure that Serbia should be obliged to see to it that press attacks of that nature should be discontinued in future; we wished therefore to know that a definite result in this connection was assured.

Instead of this Serbia offers us the enactment of certain laws which would be calculated to serve as means towards this result, viz.: —

(a) A law under which the press publications in question which are hostile to the Monarchy are to be punished on their merits (*subjectiv*) a matter which is of complete indifference to us, all the more as it is well known that the prosecution of press offences on their merits (*subjectiv*) is only very rarely possible, and, if any law of the sort is laxly administered, even in the few cases of this nature a conviction would not be obtained; this, therefore, is a proposal which in no way meets our demand as it does not offer us the slightest guarantee for the result which we wish to obtain.

(b) A law supplementary to Article 22 of the constitution which would permit confiscation — a proposal which is equally unsatisfactory to us, as the existence of such a law in Serbia is of no use to us, but only the obligation of the Government to apply it; this, however, is not promised us.

These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory — all the

<sup>1</sup> The Serbian Parliament.

more so as they are evasive in that we are not told within what period of time these laws would be enacted, and that in the event of the rejection of the Bills by the Skupschtina — apart from the possible resignation of the Government — everything would be as it was before.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the Narodna Odbrana and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia everything that serves or might serve to foment the propaganda against Austria-

The whole of the public life of Servia teems with the propaganda against the Monarchy, of the Narodna Odbrana and of societies affiliated to it; it is therefore quite impossible to admit the reservation made by the Servian Government when they say that they know nothing about them.

Quite apart from this the demand we have made is not entirely complied with, as we further required: —

That the means of propaganda possessed by these associations should be confiscated.

That the re-establishment of the dissolved associations under another name and in another form should be prevented.

The Belgrade Cabinet maintains complete silence in both these directions, so that the half consent which has been given us offers no guarantee that it is contemplated to put a definite end to the activities of the associations hostile to the Monarchy, especially of the Narodna Odbrana, by their dissolution.

In this case also the Servian Government first ask for proofs that propaganda against the Monarchy is fomented in public educational establishments in Servia, when they must know

Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from the military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and functionaries for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the

that the school books which have been introduced into the Servian schools contain matter of an objectionable nature in this respect, and that a large proportion of the Servian teachers are enrolled in the ranks of the Narodna Odbrana and the societies affiliated with it.

Moreover, here too the Servian Government have not complied with a portion of our demand as fully as we required, inasmuch as in their text they have omitted the addition which we desired "both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction" — an addition which quite clearly shows in what directions the propaganda against the Monarchy in the Servian schools is to be looked for.

Inasmuch as the Royal Servian Government attach to their consent to the removal of the officers and functionaries in question from military and civil service the condition that these persons should have been convicted by judicial enquiry, their consent is confined to those cases in which these persons are charged with a crime punishable by law. As we, however, demand the removal of those officers and functionaries who foment propaganda against the Monarchy, a proceeding which is not generally punishable by law in Servia, it appears that our demand under this head also is not complied with.

International Law has just as little to do with this question as has criminal procedure. This is purely a matter of State police, which must be settled by way of a separate agreement. Servia's reservation is therefore unintel-

representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th<sup>1</sup> June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

ligible, and would be calculated, owing to the vague general form in which it is couched, to lead to unsurmountable difficulties when the time comes for concluding the prospective agreement.

Our demand was quite clear and did not admit of misinterpretation. We desired:—

(1) The opening of a judicial enquiry (*enquête judiciaire*) against accessories to the plot.

(2) The collaboration of representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government in the investigations relating thereto (“*recherches*” as opposed to “*enquête judiciaire*”).

It never occurred to us that representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government should take part in the Servian judicial proceedings; it was intended that they should collaborate only in the preliminary police investigations, directed to the collection and verification of the material for the enquiry.

If the Servian Government misunderstand us on this point they must do so deliberately, for the distinction between “*enquête judiciaire*” and simple “*recherches*” must be familiar to them.

In desiring to be exempted from all control in the proceedings which are to be initiated, which if properly carried through would have results of a very undesirable kind for themselves, and in view of the fact that they have no handle for a plausible refusal of the collaboration of our representatives in the preliminary police investigations (numberless precedents exist for

<sup>1</sup> Old Style.



7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voja Tankosić. As regards Milan Ziganović, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th<sup>1</sup> June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, is well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Govern-

such police intervention) they have adopted a standpoint which is intended to invest their refusal with an appearance of justification and to impress on our demand the stamp of impracticability.

This answer is disingenuous.

The enquiries set on foot by us show that three days after the crime, when it became known that Ciganović was implicated in the plot, he went on leave and travelled to Ribari on a commission from the Prefecture of Police at Belgrade. It is, therefore, in the first place incorrect to say that Ciganović had left the Servian State Service on the 25th/28th June. To this must be added the fact that the Prefect of Police at Belgrade, who had himself contrived the departure of Ciganović and who knew where he was stopping, declared in an interview that no man of the name of Milan Ciganović existed in Belgrade.

The interviews in question must be quite well known to the Royal Servian Government. By requesting the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them all kinds of details about these interviews, and keep-

<sup>1</sup> Old Style.

ment, were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will themselves take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909.

ing in reserve the holding of a formal enquiry into them, they show that they are not willing to comply seriously with this demand either.

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**Belgium :**

*From Berlin*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 6

*Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, July 27, 1914.*

ACCORDING to a telegram from the British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade,<sup>1</sup> the Servian Government have given way on all the points

<sup>1</sup> Belgium had her own representative in Belgrade. No valid reason appears why the information here published should have come in the roundabout way through the

of the Austrian note. They even allow the intervention of Austrian officials if such a proceeding is in conformity with the usages of international law. The British Chargé d'Affaires considers that this reply should satisfy Austria if she is not desirous of war. Nevertheless, a more hopeful atmosphere prevails here to-day, more particularly because hostilities against Servia have not begun. The British Government suggest mediation by Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy at St. Petersburg and Vienna in order to find some basis for compromise. Germany alone has not yet replied. The decision rests with the Emperor.

France :

*From Basle*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 60

*M. Farges, French Consul-General at Basle, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Basle, July 27, 1914.*

FOUR days ago the German officers on leave in this district received orders to break off their leave and return to Germany.

Moreover, I learn from two reliable sources that warning has been given to persons owning motor cars in the Grand Duchy of Baden to prepare to place them at the disposal of the military authorities, two days after a fresh order. Secrecy on the subject of this warning has been directed under penalty of a fine.<sup>1</sup>

The population of Basle is very uneasy, and banking facilities are restricted.

FARGES.

*To London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 61

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, on board the "La France" (for the President of the Council) and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

THE three steps taken by the German Ambassador at Paris seem characteristic : — On Friday he reads a note <sup>2</sup> in which the German

British official in Belgrade and the Belgian Minister in Berlin. Since the exhaustive Austro-Hungarian comment on the Serbian reply, Red Book No. 34, same day, was presented to all the great Powers it is significant that no reference to it is here made, and that the British official presents exclusively the Serbian, and one may say, Russian view of the Serbian reply.

<sup>1</sup> The accuracy of this statement can neither be proved nor disproved at this writing. German writers have denied it. If the information was true, one should expect to have it reported directly by the French consuls in the Grand Duchy of Baden. On the other hand, precautionary measures would, of course, have been taken near the French frontier earlier than elsewhere.

<sup>2</sup> French Yellow Book No. 28, July 24.

Government categorically place themselves between Austria and the Powers, approving the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and adding that "Germany warmly desires that the dispute should remain localised, since any intervention of another party must through the play of its alliances provoke incalculable consequences;" — the second day, Saturday, the effect having been produced, and the Powers having, on account of the surprise, the shortness of the time-limit, and the risks of general war, advised Serbia to yield,<sup>1</sup> Herr von Schoen returns to minimise this step,<sup>2</sup> pretending to be astonished at the impression produced, and protests that intentions are attributed to Germany which she does not harbour, "since," he says, "there was neither concert before nor threat afterwards;" — the third day, Sunday, the result having been obtained, since Serbia has yielded, as one might almost say, to all the Austrian demands, the German Ambassador appears on two occasions<sup>3</sup> to insist on Germany's peaceful intentions, and on her warm desire to co-operate in the maintenance of peace, after having registered the Austrian success which closes the first phase of the crisis.

The situation at the moment of writing remains disturbing, on account of the incomprehensible<sup>4</sup> refusal of Austria to accept Serbia's submission, of her operations of mobilisation, and of her threats to invade Serbia. The attitude taken up from the beginning by the Austrian Government, with German support, her refusal to accept any conversation with the Powers, practically do not allow the latter to intervene effectively with Austria without the mediation of Germany. However, time presses, for if the Austrian army crosses the frontier it will be very difficult to circumscribe the crisis, Russia not appearing to be able to tolerate<sup>5</sup> the occupation of Serbia after the latter has in reality submitted to the Austrian note, giving every satisfaction and guarantee. Germany, from the very fact of the position taken up by her, is qualified to intervene effectively and be listened to at Vienna; if she does not do this she justifies all suspicions and assumes the responsibility for the war.

The Powers, particularly Russia, France, and England, have by their urgent advice induced Belgrade to yield,<sup>1</sup> they have thus fulfilled their part; now it is for Germany, who is alone able to gain a rapid hearing at Vienna, to give advice to Austria, who has obtained satisfaction and cannot, for a detail easy to adjust, bring about a general war.

It is in these circumstances that the proposal made by the Cabinet of London is put forward; M. Sazonof having said to the British Ambassador that as a consequence of the appeal of Serbia to the Powers,<sup>6</sup> Russia would agree to stand aside, Sir Edward Grey has formulated the following suggestion to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin

<sup>1</sup> See note to British Blue Book No. 39, July 26, and British Blue Book No. 22, where it appears that the advice was never given.

<sup>2</sup> French Yellow Book No. 36, July 25.

<sup>3</sup> French Yellow Book Nos. 56 and 57, July 26.

<sup>4</sup> For Austria's reasons see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Note 2, French Yellow Book No. 57, July 26.

<sup>6</sup> This appeal was never made; cf. also French Yellow Book No. 68, July 27, 1914.

and Rome: the French, German and Italian Ambassadors at London would be instructed to seek with Sir Edward Grey a means of resolving the present difficulties, it being understood that during this conversation Russia, Austria and Servia would abstain from all active military operations.<sup>1</sup> Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, who showed himself favourable to it; it will be equally well received in Paris, and also at Rome, according to all probability. Here again it is Germany's turn to speak, and she has an opportunity to show her goodwill by other means than words.

I would ask you to come to an understanding with your British colleague, and to support his proposal with the German Government in whatever form appears to you opportune.<sup>2</sup>

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

*To London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK NO. 62

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the President of the Council (on board the "La France") and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna.*

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

AFTER his *démarche* of yesterday<sup>3</sup> tending to an intervention by France at St. Petersburg in favour of peace, the German Ambassador returned, as I have informed you, to the *Direction Politique* on the pretext that it might be desirable to communicate to the press a short note indicating the peaceful and friendly sense of the conversation; he even suggested the following terms:—"During the afternoon the German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had a fresh interview, in the course of which, in the most amicable spirit and acting in an identical spirit of peaceful co-operation, they examined the means which might be employed to maintain general peace." He was told in answer, that the terms appeared exaggerated and of a nature to create in public opinion illusions on the real situation; that, however, a brief note in the sense indicated, that is to say, giving an account of a conversation at which the means employed to safeguard peace had been examined, might be issued if I approved it.

The note communicated was as follows:—"The German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have had a fresh interview, in the course of which they sought means of action by the Powers for the maintenance of peace." This phrasing, deliberately colourless, avoided an appearance of solidarity with Germany which might have been misinterpreted.

<sup>1</sup> Note that no engagement is taken to refrain from mobilisation.

<sup>2</sup> This last paragraph can refer only to the French Ambassador in Berlin, although the despatch is not listed as having been sent also to Berlin.

<sup>3</sup> French Yellow Book No. 56 and 57, July 26.

This morning <sup>1</sup> Herr von Schoen addressed a private letter to the Political Director under pretext of resuming his interview with the Minister, and has added: "Note well the phrase in an identical spirit of peaceful co-operation. This is not an idle phrase, but the sincere expression of the truth." The summary annexed to the letter was drawn up as follows:—"The Cabinet of Vienna has, formally and officially, caused it to be declared to that of St. Petersburg, that it does not seek any territorial acquisition in Servia, and that it has no intention of making any attempt against the integrity of the kingdom; its sole intention is that of assuring its own tranquillity. At this moment the decision whether a European war must break out depends solely on Russia. The German Government have firm confidence that the French Government, with which they know that they are at one in the warm desire that European peace should be able to be maintained, will use their whole influence with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg in a pacific spirit."

I have let you know the reply <sup>2</sup> which has been given (a French *démarche* at St. Petersburg would be misunderstood,<sup>3</sup> and must have as corollary a German *démarche* at Vienna, or, failing that, mediation by the four less interested Powers in both capitals).

Herr von Schoen's letter is capable of different interpretations; the most probable is that it has for its object, like his *démarche* itself, an attempt to compromise France with Russia and, in case of failure, to throw the responsibility for an eventual war on Russia and on France<sup>4</sup>; finally, by pacific assurances which have not been listened to, to mask military action by Austria in Servia intended to complete the success of Austria.

I communicate this news to you by way of information and for any useful purpose you can put it to.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

*From London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 63

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 27, 1914.*

THE German Ambassador and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador allow it to be understood that they are sure that England would preserve neutrality if a conflict were to break out. Sir Arthur Nicol-

<sup>1</sup> From Russian Orange Book No. 28, July 26, it appears that this declaration was made on July 26. See German White Book 10a, July 26, giving an official German message to France, which is not printed in its entirety in the Yellow Book.

<sup>2</sup> For a similar refusal of Great Britain to exert her conciliatory influence in Petrograd, see French Yellow Book No. 80, July 28.

<sup>3</sup> *The Times* translation says "would have been difficult to explain." This is the more accurate translation.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 29, July 26. It seems that the entire French despatch refers to events that took place on the previous day. This then is a "rewritten" despatch for the purpose of making the Yellow Book appear to be more complete than it is.



son has told me,<sup>1</sup> however, that Prince Lichnowsky cannot, after the conversation which he has had with him to-day, entertain any doubt as to the freedom which the British Government intended to preserve of intervening in case they should judge it expedient.

The German Ambassador will not have failed to be struck with this declaration, but to make its weight felt in Germany and to avoid a conflict, it seems indispensable that the latter should be brought to know for certain that they will find England and Russia by the side of France.<sup>2</sup>

DE FLEURIAU.

*From St. Petersburg*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 64

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

M. SAZONOF has used conciliatory language to all my colleagues.

In spite of the public excitement, the Russian Government is applying itself successfully to restraining the press; in particular great moderation towards Germany has been recommended.<sup>3</sup>

M. Sazonof has not received any information from Vienna or from Berlin since yesterday.

PALÉOLOGUE.

*From Constantinople*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 65

*M. Bompard, French Ambassador at Constantinople, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Therapia, July 27, 1914.*

THE Austro-Servian conflict holds the attention of the Ottoman Government, and the Turks are delighted at the misfortunes of Serbia, but people here generally are led to believe that the conflict will remain localised. It is generally thought that once again Russia will not intervene in favour of Serbia in circumstances which would extend the armed conflict.

The unanimous feeling in Ottoman political circles is that Austria, with the support of Germany, will attain her objects and that she will make Serbia follow Bulgaria and enter into the orbit of the Triple Alliance.<sup>4</sup>

BOMPARD.

<sup>1</sup> This is not given in the British Blue Book.

<sup>2</sup> For the culmination of this wish, see French Yellow Book No. 138, August 2, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> But even M. Paléologue does not claim that it was observed. See the Russian press of these days.

<sup>4</sup> This is a very important statement; especially since no one had ever claimed that Bulgaria had been forced into "the orbit of the Triple Alliance" by unfair or militaristic means.



*From London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 66

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 27, 1914.*

SIR EDWARD GREY<sup>1</sup> told the German Ambassador this morning that if Austria were to invade Servia after the Servian reply, she would make it clear that she was not merely aiming at the settlement of the questions mentioned in her note of July 23, but that she wished to crush a small state. "Then," he added, "a European question would arise, and war would follow in which other Powers would be led to take a part."

The attitude of Great Britain is confirmed by the postponement of the demobilisation of the fleet. The First Lord of the Admiralty took this measure quietly on Friday<sup>2</sup> on his own initiative; to-night, Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues decided to make it public. This result is due to the conciliatory attitude of Servia and Russia.

DE FLEURIAU.

*From Berlin*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 67

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 27, 1914.*

TO-DAY I have had a conversation with the Secretary of State on the proposal by England that Germany should join the Cabinets of London, Paris and Rome to prevent hostilities between St. Petersburg and Vienna.

I remarked to him that Sir Edward Grey's proposal opened the way to a peaceful issue. Herr von Jagow replied that he was disposed to join in, but he remarked to me that, if Russia mobilised, Germany would be obliged to mobilise at once, that we should be forced to the same course also, and that then a conflict would be almost inevitable. I asked him if Germany would regard herself as bound to mobilise in the event of Russia mobilising only on the Austrian frontier; he told me "No," and authorised me formally to communicate this limitation to you. He also attached the greatest importance to an intervention with Russia by the Powers which were friendly with and allied to her.

Finally, he remarked that if Russia attacked Austria, Germany would be obliged to attack at once on her side. The intervention

<sup>1</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 46, July 27, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> Friday was July 24; cf. Sir E. Grey's "to-day," British Blue Book No. 48, July 27, 1914; see also Blue Book No. 47, July 27, 1914.

For the effect of this admiralty order on Russia and on bringing on the war, see Editorial, *Daily News* (London), August 1, 1914.

proposed by England at St. Petersburg and Vienna<sup>1</sup> could, in his opinion, only come into operation if events were not precipitated. In that case, he does not despair that it might succeed. I expressed my regret that Austria, by her uncompromising attitude had led Europe to the difficult pass through which we were going, but I expressed the hope that intervention would have its effect.

JULES CAMBON.

*From London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 68

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 27, 1914.*

YESTERDAY in the course of a conversation between M. Sazonof, M. Paléologue and Sir G. Buchanan, the Russian Minister said that Servia was disposed to appeal<sup>2</sup> to the Powers, and that in that case his Government would be prepared to stand aside.

Sir E. Grey has taken these words as a text on which to formulate to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin, and Rome a proposal with which Sir Francis Bertie will acquaint your Excellency. The four Powers would intervene in the dispute, and the French, German, and Italian Ambassadors at London would be instructed to seek, with Sir E. Grey, a means of solving the present difficulties.

It would be understood that, during the sittings of this little conference, Russia, Austria and Servia would abstain from all active military operations. Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, who has shown himself favourable to it.

DE FLEURIAU.

*From London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 69

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 27, 1914.*

THE Servian Minister has not received instructions from his Government to ask for the mediation<sup>3</sup> of England; it is, however, possible that the telegrams from his Government have been stopped on the way.

<sup>1</sup> This is Sir E. Grey's first plan. The French wish was to have mediation between Vienna and Belgrade.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 61, July 27, and British Blue Book No. 22, July 25, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> The proposal of English mediation was one of the many made but never pressed, probably for the reason suggested in French Yellow Book No. 70, same day. The nearest account of something in the nature of such a demand is given in Serbian Blue Book No. 35, July 24 [note the date].

However, the British proposal for intervention by the four Powers intimated in my preceding telegram has been put forward, and ought I think to be supported in the first place.

DE FLEURIAU.

*To London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 70

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London.*

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

THE British Ambassador has communicated to me Sir E. Grey's proposal<sup>1</sup> for common action by England, Germany, France and Italy at Vienna, Belgrade<sup>2</sup> and St. Petersburg, to stop active military operations while the German, Italian and French Ambassadors at London examine, with Sir Edward Grey, the means of finding a solution for the present complications.

I have this morning directed M. Jules Cambon to talk this over with the British Ambassador at Berlin, and to support his *démarche* in whatever form he should judge suitable.

I authorise you to take part in the meeting proposed by Sir E. Grey. I am also ready to give to our representatives at Vienna, St. Petersburg and Belgrade, instructions in the sense asked for by the British Government.

At the same time I think that the chances of success of Sir E. Grey's proposal depend essentially on the action that Berlin would be disposed to take at Vienna; a *démarche* from this side, promoted with a view to obtain a suspension of military operations, would appear to me doomed to failure if Germany's influence were not first exercised.

I have also noted, during Baron Von Schoen's observations, that the Austro-Hungarian Government was particularly susceptible when the words "mediation," "intervention," "conference" were used, and was more willing to admit "friendly advice" and "conversations."

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

*From London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 71

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 27, 1914.*

I HAVE communicated to Sir Edward Grey your adherence to his proposal for mediation by the four Powers and for a conference at

<sup>1</sup> British Blue Book No. 11, July 24 and No. 24, July 25.

<sup>2</sup> Belgrade is not contained in the British proposal, British Blue Book No. 11, July 24. It was, however, France's persistent wish to have mediation between Vienna and Belgrade.

London. The British Ambassador at Vienna has received the necessary instructions to inform the Austro-Hungarian Government as soon as his French, German, and Italian colleagues are authorised to make the same *démarche*.

The Italian Government have accepted intervention by the four Powers with a view to prevent military operations; they are consulting the German Government on the proposal for a conference and the procedure to be followed with regard to the Austro-Hungarian Government. The German Government have not yet replied.

DE FLEURIAU.

*From Rome*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 72

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 27, 1914.*

THE Marquis di San Giuliano has returned to Rome this evening, and I saw him immediately after his arrival. He spoke to me of the contents of the Austrian note, and formally assured me that he had not had any previous knowledge of it.<sup>1</sup>

He knew, indeed, that this note was to have a rigorous and forcible character; but he had not suspected that it could take such a form. I asked him if it was true that he had given at Vienna, as certain papers allege, an approval of the Austrian action and an assurance that Italy would fulfil her duties as an ally towards Austria. "In no way:" the Minister replied: "we were not consulted; we were told nothing; it was not for us then to make any such communication to Vienna."

The Marquis di San Giuliano thinks that Servia would have acted more wisely if she had accepted the note in its entirety; to-day he still thinks that this would be the only thing to do, being convinced that Austria will not withdraw any of her claims, and will maintain them, even at the risk of bringing about a general conflagration; he doubts whether Germany is disposed to lend herself to any pressure on her ally. He asserts, however, that Germany at this moment attaches great importance to her relations with London,<sup>2</sup> and he believes that if any Power can determine Berlin in favour of peaceful action, it is England.

As for Italy, she will continue to make every effort in favour of peace. It is with this end in view, that he has adhered without hesitation to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a meeting in London of the Ambassadors of those Powers which are not directly interested in the Austro-Servian dispute.

BARRÈRE.

<sup>1</sup> It is noteworthy that the Entente diplomats in none of the published despatches doubted the honesty of Italy's denial of having had previous accurate knowledge of the Austrian note. Cf. also French Yellow Book No. 51, July 26.

<sup>2</sup> The opponents of Germany have desired to minimize Germany's wish to be on good terms with England.

*From Berlin*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 73

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 27, 1914.*

THE British Ambassador, who returned to-day, saw the Secretary of State and discussed with him Sir Edward Grey's proposal. In his reply Herr von Jagow continued to manifest his desire for peace, but added that he could not consent to anything which would resemble a conference of the Powers; that would be to set up a kind of court of arbitration, the idea of which would only be acceptable if it were asked for by Vienna and St. Petersburg.<sup>1</sup> Herr von Jagow's language confirms that used by Baron von Schoen to your Excellency.

In fact, a *démarche* by the four Powers at Vienna and St. Petersburg could be brought about by diplomatic means without assuming the form of a conference and it is susceptible of many modifications; the important thing is to make clear at Vienna and at St. Petersburg the common desire of the four Powers that a conflict should be avoided. A peaceful issue from the present difficulties can only be found by gaining time.

JULES CAMBON.

*From Berlin*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 74

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 27, 1914.*

I HAD a conversation to-day with the Secretary of State and gave support to the *démarche* which Sir E. Goschen had just made.

Herr von Jagow replied to me, as he had to the British Ambassador, that he could not accept<sup>2</sup> the proposal that the Italian, French and German Ambassadors should be instructed to endeavour to find with Sir Edward Grey a method of resolving the present difficulties, because that would be to set up a real conference to deal with the affairs of Austria and Russia.<sup>3</sup>

I replied to Herr von Jagow that I regretted his answer, but that the great object which Sir Edward Grey had in view went beyond any question of form; that what was important was the co-operation of Great Britain and France with Germany and Italy in a work of peace; that this co-operation could take effect through common *démarches* at St. Petersburg and at Vienna,<sup>4</sup> that he had often ex-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 70, same day.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 70 and 73, same day.

<sup>3</sup> See, however, British Blue Book No. 46, same day, where Germany accepts "in principle."

<sup>4</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 73, same day.

pressed to me his regret at seeing the two allied groups always opposed to one another in Europe; that there was here an opportunity of proving that there was a European spirit, by shewing four Powers belonging to the two groups acting in common agreement to prevent a conflict.

Herr von Jagow evaded the point by saying that Germany had engagements with Austria. I observed to him that the relations of Germany with Vienna were no closer than those of France with Russia,<sup>1</sup> and that it was he himself who actually was putting the two groups of allies in opposition.

The Secretary of State then said to me that he was not refusing to act so as to keep off an Austro-Russian dispute, but that he could not intervene in the Austro-Servian dispute. "The one is the consequence of the other," I said, "and it is a question of preventing the appearance of a new factor of such a nature as to lead to intervention by Russia."

As the Secretary of State persisted in saying that he was obliged to keep his engagements towards Austria, I asked him if he was bound to follow her everywhere with his eyes blindfolded, and if he had taken note of the reply of Servia to Austria which the Servian Chargé d'Affaires had delivered to him this morning. "I have not yet had time," he said. "I regret it. You would see that except on some points of detail Servia has yielded entirely. It appears then that, since Austria has obtained the satisfaction which your support has procured for her, you might to-day advise her to be content or to examine with Servia the terms of her reply."

As Herr von Jagow gave me no clear reply, I asked him whether Germany wished for war. He protested energetically, saying that he knew what was in my mind, but that it was wholly incorrect. "You must then," I replied, "act consistently. When you read the Servian reply, I entreat you in the name of humanity to weigh the terms in your conscience, and do not personally assume a part of the responsibility for the catastrophe which you are allowing to be prepared." Herr von Jagow protested anew, adding that he was ready to join England and France in a common effort, but that it was necessary to find a form for this intervention which he could accept, and that the Cabinets must come to an understanding on this point.

"For the rest," he added, "direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg have been entered upon and are in progress.<sup>2</sup> I expect very good results from them and I am hopeful."

As I was leaving I told him that this morning I had had the impression that the hour of *détente* had struck, but I now saw clearly that there was nothing in it. He replied that I was mistaken; that

<sup>1</sup> This has been denied by those who have claimed that the Teutonic alliance was practically for aggressive purposes, while the French-Russian alliance was entirely defensive.

<sup>2</sup> Sazonof had proposed this conversation; cf. Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26, and No. 38, July 27, also French Yellow Book No. 54, July 26; also British Blue Book Nos. 55 and 69, July 28. From French Yellow Book No. 54, it appears that Russia had for the time being abandoned the Grey Conference idea, and that the French Ambassador to Russia believed Russia's new plan "to be preferable to any other procedure."



he hoped that matters were on the right road and would perhaps rapidly reach a favourable conclusion. I asked him to take such action in Vienna as would hasten the progress of events, because it was a matter of importance not to allow time for the development in Russia of one of those currents of opinion which carry all before them.

In my opinion it would be well to ask Sir Edward Grey, who must have been warned by Sir Edward Goschen of the refusal to his proposal in the form in which it was made, to renew it under another form, so that Germany would have no pretext for refusing to associate herself with it, and would have to assume the responsibilities that belong to her in the eyes of England.

JULES CAMBON.

*To London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 75

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

THE Austro-Hungarian Ambassador came to see me to hand me a memorandum<sup>1</sup> which amounted to an indictment of Serbia; he was instructed by his Government to state that since Serbia had not given a satisfactory reply to the requirements of the Imperial Government, the latter found themselves obliged to take strong measures to induce Serbia to give the satisfaction and guarantees that are required of her. To-morrow the Austrian Government will take steps to that effect.

I asked the Ambassador to acquaint me with the measures contemplated by Austria, and Count Scézszen replied that they might be either an ultimatum, or a declaration of war, or the crossing of the frontier, but he had no precise information on this point.

I then called the Ambassador's attention to the fact that Serbia had accepted Austria's requirements on practically every point, and that the differences that remained on certain points might vanish with a little mutual goodwill, and with the help of the Powers who wished for peace; by fixing to-morrow as the date for putting her resolution into effect, Austria for the second time was making their co-operation practically impossible, and was assuming a grave responsibility in running the risk of precipitating a war the limits of which it was impossible to foresee.

I enclose for your information the memorandum that Count Scézszen handed to me.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

<sup>1</sup> The so-called *dossier*, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25. It was published only in part in the *New York Times* translation of the French Yellow Book. Sir E. Grey apparently received the *dossier* on the same day but gave only a very brief summary of it in British Blue Book No. 48, July 27. The *dossier* itself is not printed in the British Blue Book.



ENCLOSURE

*Memorandum of the Austro-Hungarian Government, handed by Count Scézszen to M. Bienvenu-Martin on July 27, 1914.*

(See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25.)

*From Serbia*

The reply of the Serbian Government to the Austro-Hungarian note was communicated to France on this day, July 27, 1914. See French Yellow Book No. 49, July 25, and for text Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914, except that France did not publish the Austro-Hungarian comment.

**Germany :**

*From Kowno*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 8

*Telegram of the Imperial Consulate at Kowno to the Chancellor on July 27th, 1914.*

Kovno has been declared to be in a state of war.

*From Berne*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 9

*Telegram of the Imperial Minister at Berne to the Chancellor on July 27th, 1914.*

Have learned reliably that French XIVth corps has discontinued manœuvres.

*From St. Petersburg*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 11

*Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor on July 27th, 1914.*

Military Attaché reports a conversation with the Secretary of War. Sasonof has requested the latter to enlighten me on the situation. The Secretary of War has given me his word of honour that no order to mobilise has as yet been issued.<sup>1</sup> Though general preparations are being made, no reserves were called and no horses mustered. If Austria crossed the Servian frontier, such military districts as are directed toward Austria, viz., Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilised. Under no circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilni, St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany was desired very much. Upon my inquiry into the object of mobilisation against

<sup>1</sup> The Czar telegraphed to the Emperor on July 30 that mobilisation had been decided upon five days ago, i.e. July 25. Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 23a, July 30. Cf. also British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, note 5.

Austria he shrugged his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. I told the Secretary that we appreciated the friendly intentions, but considered mobilisation even against Austria as very menacing.

*To London*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 12

*Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on July 27th, 1914.*

We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey's to hold a quadruple conference in London.<sup>1</sup> It is impossible for us to place our ally in his dispute with Servia before a European tribunal. Our mediation must be limited to the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict.

*To London*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 15

*Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in London on July 27th, 1914.*

We have at once started the mediation proposal in Vienna in the sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey. We have communicated besides to Count Berchtold the desire of M. Sasonof for a direct parley with Vienna.<sup>2</sup>

**Great Britain :**

*From Vienna*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 41

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.*  
— (Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 27, 1914.*

I HAVE had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Servia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment.

<sup>1</sup> Apparently antedates British Blue Book No. 43, and French Yellow Book No. 67, July 27.

<sup>2</sup> Apparently sent in reply to conversation between Mr. von Jagow and the British Ambassador. British Blue Book No. 43, same day. Cf. also British Blue Book No. 46, same day.

I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me; to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of His Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency whether he can not suggest a way out even now.

*From Paris*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 42

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —*  
(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

YOUR proposal,<sup>1</sup> as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday, is accepted by the French Government. French Ambassador in London, who returns there this evening, has been instructed accordingly. Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. Necessary instructions have also been sent to the French representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, but until it is known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Russian, and British Ambassadors to do so.

*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 43

*Sir B. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —*  
(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 27, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of 26th July.<sup>2</sup>

Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonof<sup>3</sup> to exchange views with Count Berchtold.<sup>4</sup> He thought

<sup>1</sup> The official version prints here as a footnote "Nos. 36 and 37." These two despatches contained different proposals as explained above in note 1 to British Blue Book No. 37, July 26.

<sup>2</sup> British Blue Book No. 36, July 26 according to footnote in Official Blue Book. Cf., however, British Blue Book No. 46, where Germany accepts the offer of No. 37. See notes on Nos. 36 and 37, July 26, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>4</sup> Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26, 1914.

that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments.

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by "mobilising against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.

Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburg had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation.<sup>1</sup>

*From St. Petersburg*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 44

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 27.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

AUSTRIAN Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had yesterday<sup>2</sup> with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objectionable features of the recent action taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that, although he perfectly understood Austria's motives, the ultimatum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be accepted as a whole by the Servian Government. Although the demands were reasonable enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly be put into immediate execution seeing that they entailed revision of existing Servian laws, but were, moreover, incompatible with Servia's dignity as an independent State. It would be useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In order, however, to put an end to the present tension, he thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria.<sup>3</sup> The Austrian

<sup>1</sup> Cf. German White Book, Exhibit No. 5, July 26.

<sup>2</sup> July 26, Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26. French Yellow Book No. 54, July 26.

<sup>3</sup> This is a new proposal added to the others that had been offered: (a) Sir Edward Grey's various conference plans, (b) Sazonof's plan to substitute for the Conference direct conversation with Vienna. This last proposal, according to Sir G. Buchanan, was made by Sazonof to the Austrian Ambassador. This was, however, not the case. See Sazonof's report of the interview, Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26, and the French Ambassador's report, French Yellow Book No. 54, same day, and the Austrian Ambassador's report, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 31, July 27. From French Yellow Book No. 52, July 26, it appears that this proposal may have been made to the Italian Ambassador. It was directly made to Rome by Sazonof in Russian Orange Book No. 23, July 26. From this despatch, where Italy is urged to adopt a definitely unfavourable attitude, it is clear that the proposal was not *bona fide*, which may be the reason why Sir E. Grey did not accept it. The prominent fact of the entire investigation is that Sir G. Buchanan's despatch is inaccurate.

Ambassador undertook to communicate his Excellency's remarks to his Government.

On the Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told him that I had correctly defined the attitude of His Majesty's Government in my conversation with him, which I reported in my telegram of the 24th instant.<sup>1</sup> I added that you could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if they supported Austria by force of arms.<sup>2</sup> Their attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace. His Excellency must not, if our efforts<sup>3</sup> were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict. In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer mobilisation ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.

In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that until the issue of the Imperial ukase no effective steps towards mobilisation could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete her military preparations if it was deferred too long.

*From St. Petersburg*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 45

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 27.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

SINCE my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my telegram of to-day,<sup>4</sup> I understand that his Excellency has proposed that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

*To Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 46

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.*

GERMAN Ambassador has informed me that German Government accept in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the

<sup>1</sup> See No. 6, July 24, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> What these efforts were, to preserve peace with dignity for all, or to force Austria-Hungary to submit, is not stated.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 44.

four Powers,<sup>1</sup> reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. He has also been instructed<sup>2</sup> to request me to use influence in St. Petersburg to localise the war and to keep up the peace of Europe.

I have replied that the Servian reply went farther than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia could hardly be expected to accept.<sup>3</sup> I assumed that Servian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now required. If Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into Servia, it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be involved. Servian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German Government should urge this at Vienna.<sup>4</sup>

I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if the war could not be localised, and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed.<sup>5</sup> Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Servia, and would bring other Powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Servian reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged.

*To St. Petersburg*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 47

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.*

SEE my telegram of to-day to Sir E. Goschen.<sup>6</sup>

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. German White Book Exhibit 15, July 27, in reply to British Blue Book No. 43, July 27, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> This further instruction is not printed in the German White Book.

<sup>3</sup> Confirmation of such a remark by Mr. von Jagow would be valuable.

<sup>4</sup> Germany complied with this request; cf. British Blue Book No. 67, July 28.

<sup>5</sup> This is a clear reference to one danger threatening Austria-Hungary. The other danger of losing her prestige as a big Power if she failed to punish Serbian intrigues is often mentioned in the despatches.

<sup>6</sup> The official British version prints this footnote: "See No. 46." In first edition the reference was given as No. 37.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, where Sazonof hopes that England "would not fail to proclaim her solidarity with Russia and France." Germany and Austria continued to believe until July 29 that England would not do so; cf. British Blue Book No. 106, July 30, where the British Ambassador in Rome states that "Germany was now



This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manœuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.<sup>1</sup>

We hear from German and Austrian sources that they believe Russia will take no action so long as Austria agrees not to take Servian territory.<sup>2</sup> I pointed this out, and added that it would be absurd if we were to appear more Servian than the Russians<sup>3</sup> in our dealings with the German and Austrian Governments.

### *To Vienna*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 48

*Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.*

COUNT MENSENDORFF<sup>4</sup> told me by instruction<sup>5</sup> to-day that the Servian Government had not accepted the demands which the Austrian Government were obliged to address to them in order to secure permanently the most vital Austrian interests. Serbia showed that she did not intend to abandon her subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier territories and their final disruption from the Austrian Monarchy. Very reluctantly, and against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change of the attitude of enmity pursued up to now by Serbia. As the British Government knew, the Austrian Government had for many years endeavoured to find a way to get on with their turbulent neighbour, though this had been made very difficult for them by the continuous provocations of Serbia. The Serajevo murder had made clear to everyone what

disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us." Cf. also British Blue Book No. 80, July 29, and French Yellow Book No. 96, July 29.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 66, July 27, where it is stated that the fleet was kept mobilised on July 24. See also letter by Admiral Lord Fisher, *New York Evening Sun* and *Milwaukee Free Press*, April 19, 1915, "Mobilisation of the fleet before the war on the innocent pretext of an expected visit from the king."

<sup>2</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 33, July 26.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, where Sazonof says he could not be "more Servian than Serbia."

<sup>4</sup> Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

<sup>5</sup> What follows is a very brief summary in general terms of the *dossier*, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25. This was received in Paris on July 27; see French Yellow Book No. 75, of that date.

In Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 39, July 28, it is stated that the *dossier* had been sent by post, "das Ihnen auf dem Postwege übermittelte Dossier." And from French Yellow Book No. 75, July 27, it appears that it had been sent early enough to be presented in Paris on July 27. Such documents are generally sent to be presented simultaneously at the various Foreign offices. It is, therefore, practically certain that the *dossier* was presented also in London on July 27. The official English translation "which is being sent to you by post" conveys the wrong impression that the document could not have been in London on July 27. It is noteworthy that Sir E. Grey did not print the whole *dossier* anywhere in the British Blue Book, while he even stated in the Preface to the Blue Book edition of Sept. 28, 1914, that he "did not receive any statement of the evidence on which Austria had founded her ultimatum till the 7th August." See also note 1 to the *dossier*, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25, and the Instructions to the several Ambassadors.



appalling consequences the Servian propaganda had already produced and what a permanent threat to Austria it involved. We would understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guarantees for the definite suppression of the Servian aspirations and for the security of peace and order on the southeastern frontier of Austria. As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted, the Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. They had not taken this decision without reluctance. Their action, which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could not be represented otherwise than as an act of self-defence. Also they thought that they would serve a European interest if they prevented Servia from being henceforth an element of general unrest such as she had been for the last ten years. The high sense of justice of the British nation and of British statesmen could not blame the Austrian Government if the latter defended by the sword what was theirs, and cleared up their position with a country whose hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity. Finally, the Austrian Government, confiding in their amicable relations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localising the fight, if necessary.

Count Mensdorff added on his own account that, as long as Servia was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures because of her adherence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now that Servia had doubled her territory and population without any Austrian interference, the repression of Servian subversive aims was a matter of self-defence and self-preservation on Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Servian territory or aggressive designs against Servian territory.<sup>1</sup>

I said that I could not understand the construction<sup>2</sup> put by the Austrian Government upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mensdorff the substance of the conversation that I had had with the German Ambassador this morning about that reply.

Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory; but the Servians had refused the one thing — the co-operation of Austrian officials and police — which would be real guarantee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.

I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that, even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Servia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Servia and at the same time satisfy Russia, well and good<sup>3</sup>; but, if not, the consequences would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an expression of the views of the German Government. I feared that it would be

<sup>1</sup> Cf. note No. 3 to the previous despatch.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. note to British Blue Book No. 39 under date of July 26.

<sup>3</sup> Sir E. Grey here expresses an idea contrary to that often mentioned, viz. that England was the protector of the little nations.

expected in St. Petersburg that the Servian reply would diminish the tension, and now, when Russia found that there was increased tension, the situation would become increasingly serious. Already the effect on Europe was one of anxiety. I pointed out that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day,<sup>1</sup> but we had felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to me that the Servian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Servia that I had ever seen a country undergo,<sup>2</sup> and it was very disappointing to me that the reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative.

I am, etc.

E. GREY.

*To Rome*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 49

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.*

THE Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson<sup>3</sup> to-day that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal for a conference of four to be held in London.

As regards the question of asking Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Servia to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, the Marquis di San Giuliano<sup>4</sup> would recommend the suggestion warmly to the German Government, and would enquire what procedure they would propose should be followed at Vienna.

I am, etc.

E. GREY.

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 39

Reply of Serbian Government to Austro-Hungarian note (communicated by the Serbian Minister, July 27). See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27.

Russia :

*From London*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 31

*Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, July 14 (27), 1914.*

I HAVE received your telegram of the 13th (26th) July.<sup>5</sup> Please inform me by telegraph whether you consider that your direct dis-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. note 2 to British Blue Book No. 47, July 27.

<sup>2</sup> With this "humiliation" of Serbia compare the fate in recent years of Persia, Morocco, Corea, and other small nations.

<sup>3</sup> British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>4</sup> Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed in Russian Orange Book.

cussions<sup>1</sup> with the Vienna Cabinet harmonise with Grey's scheme for mediation by the four Governments. Having heard from the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that you would be prepared to accept such a combination, Grey decided to turn it into an official proposal, which he communicated yesterday to Berlin, Paris, and Rome.<sup>2</sup>

*To Paris and London*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 32

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Paris and London.*

(Translation.)

*Saint-Petersbourg,*  
(Télégraphique.)  
*le 14 (27) juillet, 1914.*

L'AMBASSADEUR d'Angleterre est venu s'informer si nous jugeons utile que l'Angleterre prenne l'initiative de convoquer à Londres une conférence des représentants de l'Angleterre, la France, l'Allemagne et l'Italie, pour étudier une issue à la situation actuelle.

J'ai répondu à l'Ambassadeur que j'ai entamé des pourparlers avec l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie, en conditions que j'espère favorables. Pourtant je n'ai pas encore reçu de réponse à la proposition que j'ai faite d'une revision de la note entre les deux Cabinets.

Si des explications directs avec le Cabinet de Vienne se trouvaient irréalisables, je suis prêt à accepter la proposition anglaise, ou toute autre de nature à résoudre favorablement le conflit.

Je voudrais pourtant écarter dès aujourd'hui un malentendu qui pourrait surgir de la réponse

*St. Petersburg,*  
(Telegraphic.)  
*July 27, 1914.*

THE British Ambassador came to ascertain whether we think it desirable that Great Britain should take the initiative in convoking a conference in London of the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy to examine the possibility of a way out of the present situation.

I replied to the Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which, I hope, may be favourable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets.

If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove impossible, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favourable solution of the conflict.

I wish, however, to put an end from this day forth to a misunderstanding which might arise

<sup>1</sup> See Orange Book No. 25, July 26; No. 38, July 27, and French Yellow Book No. 64, July 27. Sazonof had made the proposals of direct discussions of the Austrian note to Serbia on July 27, and on July 28 had not yet heard from Vienna. For a review of this whole subject see the note to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28.

<sup>2</sup> British Blue Book Nos. 36, 37, July 26, also Nos. 43 and 57, July 27.

Donnée par le Ministre de la Justice français à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, concernant des conseils de modération à donner au Cabinet Impérial.

from the answer given by the French Minister of Justice to the German Ambassador, regarding counsels of moderation to be given to the Imperial Cabinet.

*To Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 33

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.*

(Telegram.)

*St. Petersburg, July 14 (27), 1914.*

I HAVE taken note of the reply<sup>1</sup> returned by the Servian Government to Baron Giesl. It exceeds all our expectations in its moderation, and in its desire to afford the fullest satisfaction to Austria. We do not see what further demands could be made by Austria, unless the Vienna Cabinet is seeking for a pretext for war with Servia.

*From Paris*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 34

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, July 14 (27), 1914.*

THE German Ambassador discussed the situation again to-day at great length with the Director of the Political Department. The Ambassador laid great stress on the utter impossibility of any mediation or conference.<sup>2</sup>

*From Paris*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 35

*Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, July 14 (27), 1914.*

I DISCUSSED the situation with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the presence of Berthelot, directly after my return to Paris. They both confirmed the information respecting the action taken by the German Ambassador,<sup>3</sup> which Sevastopoulo has already telegraphed to you. This morning Baron von Schoen confirmed his declaration of yesterday in writing, *i.e.* :

1. That Austria has declared to Russia that she seeks no territorial acquisitions and that she harbours no designs against the integrity of Servia. Her sole object is to secure her own peace and quiet.

<sup>1</sup> See note to British Blue Book No. 39, under date of July 26.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 61, July 27.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 61, July 27.

2. That consequently it rests with Russia to avoid war.

3. That Germany and France, entirely at one in their ardent desire to preserve peace, should exercise their moderating influence upon Russia.

Baron von Schoen laid special emphasis on the expression of solidarity of Germany and France. The Minister of Justice is convinced that these steps on the part of Germany are taken with the evident object of alienating Russia and France, of inducing the French Government to make representations at St. Petersburg, and of thus compromising our ally in our eyes; and finally, in the event of war, of throwing the responsibility not on Germany, who is ostensibly making every effort to maintain peace, but on Russia and France.

*From Paris*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 36

*Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, July 14 (27), 1914.*

It is clear from your telegrams <sup>1</sup> of the 13th (26) July that you were not then aware of the reply of the Servian Government. The telegram from Belgrade informing me of it also took twenty hours <sup>2</sup> to reach us. The telegram from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent the day before yesterday at 11 o'clock in the morning, at the special urgent rate, which contained instructions to support our representations, only reached its destination at 6 o'clock. There is no doubt that this telegram was intentionally delayed by the Austrian telegraph office.

*From Paris*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 37

*Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, July 14 (27), 1914.*

On the instructions of his Government, the Austrian Ambassador has informed the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that Servia's answer has not been considered satisfactory in Vienna, and that to-morrow, Tuesday, Austria will proceed to take "energetic action" with the object of forcing Servia to give the necessary guarantees. The Minister having asked what form such action would take, the Ambassador replied that he had no exact information on the subject, but it might mean either the crossing of the Servian frontier, or an ultimatum, or even a declaration of war.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed in either the French Yellow Book or the Russian Orange Book.

<sup>2</sup> It also reached the French Government with a delay of twenty hours. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 56, July 26.

*From Berlin*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 38

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, July 14 (27), 1914.*

I BEGGED the Minister for Foreign Affairs to support your proposal in Vienna that Szápáry should be authorised to draw up, by means of a private exchange of views with you, a wording of the Austro-Hungarian demands which would be acceptable to both parties. Jagow answered that he was aware of this proposal and that he agreed with Pourtalès that, as Szápáry had begun this conversation, he might as well go on with it. He will telegraph in this sense to the German Ambassador at Vienna. I begged him to press Vienna with greater insistence to adopt this conciliatory line; Jagow answered that he could not advise Austria to give way.

*From Berlin*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 39

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, July 14 (27), 1914.*

BEFORE my visit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day his Excellency had received the French Ambassador, who endeavoured to induce him to accept the British proposal for action in favour of peace, such action to be taken simultaneously at St. Petersburg and at Vienna by Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France. Cambon suggested that these Powers should give their advice to Vienna in the following terms: "To abstain from all action which might aggravate the existing situation." (*S'abstenir de tout acte qui pourrait aggraver la situation de l'heure actuelle.*) By adopting this vague formula, all mention of the necessity of refraining from invading Servia might be avoided. Jagow refused point-blank to accept this suggestion<sup>1</sup> in spite of the entreaties of the Ambassador, who emphasised, as a good feature of the suggestion, the mixed grouping of the Powers, thanks to which the opposition between the Alliance and the Entente — a matter of which Jagow himself had often complained — was avoided.

*To Serbia*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 40

*Telegram from His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Serbia, July 14 (27), 1914.*

WHEN your Royal Highness applied to me at a time of especial stress, you were not mistaken in the sentiments which I entertain for you, or in my cordial sympathy with the Servian people.

<sup>1</sup> For von Jagow's reasons see French Yellow Book No. 74, July 27, also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 35, July 28.



The existing situation is engaging my most serious attention, and my Government are using their utmost endeavour to smooth away the present difficulties. I have no doubt that your Highness and the Royal Servian Government wish to render that task easy by neglecting no step which might lead to a settlement, and thus both prevent the horrors of a new war and safeguard the dignity of Servia.

*From Vienna*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 41

*Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 14 (27), 1914.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs is away. During a long conversation which I had with Macchio to-day I drew his attention, in a perfectly friendly way, to the unfavourable impression produced in Russia by the presentation of demands by Austria to Servia, which it was quite impossible for any independent State, however small, to accept. I added that this method of procedure might lead to the most undesirable complications, and that it had aroused profound surprise and general condemnation in Russia. We can only suppose that Austria, influenced by the assurances given by the German Representative at Vienna, who has egged her on throughout this crisis, has counted on the probable localisation of the dispute with Servia, and on the possibility of inflicting with impunity a serious blow upon that country. The declaration by the Russian Government that Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the face of such conduct has caused a great sensation here.

*From London*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 42

*Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, July 14 (27), 1914.*

GREY has just informed the German Ambassador, who came to question him as to the possibility of taking action at St. Petersburg, that such action ought rather to be taken at Vienna, and that the Berlin Cabinet were the best qualified to do so. Grey also pointed out that the Servian reply to the Austrian note had exceeded anything that could have been expected in moderation and in its spirit of conciliation. Grey added that he had therefore come to the conclusion that Russia must have advised Belgrade to return a moderate reply, and that he thought the Servian reply could form the basis of a peaceful and acceptable solution of the question.



In these circumstances, continued Grey, if Austria were to begin hostilities in spite of that reply, she would prove her intention of crushing Servia. Looked at in this light, the question might give rise to a situation which might lead to a war in which all the Powers would be involved

Grey finally declared that the British Government were sincerely anxious to act with the German Government as long as the preservation of peace was in question; but, in the contrary event, Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action.

**Serbia :**

*From St. Petersburg*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 43

*His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Serbia.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Petrograd, July 14/27, 1914.*

[See Russian Orange Book No. 40, July 27.]

**Tuesday, July 28, 1914**

**SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES**

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	Belgrade, Berlin, London, St. Petersburg	Berlin, Tokio
Belgium	—	Vienna
France	London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome, Viviani	Vienna, London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Viviani
Germany	German Governments, St. Petersburg	Vienna
Great Britain	Emperor to Czar Berlin, St. Petersburg	Paris, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome, Berlin, Nish, French and Russian Embassies
Russia	London	Fiume, Vienna, Berlin
Serbia	All Serbian legations St. Petersburg	Vienna

*Austria-Hungary* declares war on Serbia and endeavours to explain her point of view to England most especially, but also to Russia. Russia's extensive mobilisation results in Austria-Hungary calling on Germany for assistance and urging her to use toward Russia "unambiguous language." Sir E. Grey's proposal transmitted by Germany is declared to have come too late.

*France* is resolved to support English and Russian proposals but persists in claiming that mediation should not be between Vienna and Petrograd alone, but include Belgrade. She views with suspicion every act and statement of Germany, and refuses to announce that she and Germany had agreed to work for peace. She also refuses to use a moderating influence on Russia.

*Germany*: The Chancellor informs the Federal Governments of the serious state of affairs, expressing the hope to be able to maintain peace but announcing it as the duty of Germany to support Austria-Hungary, if "through the interference of Russia the fire" should be spread. At the same time she urges Austria-Hungary to come to an understanding with Russia.

The Emperor personally appeals to the Czar in the interest of peace.

*Great Britain* declares that she would find it embarrassing to give Russia "pacific advice." She also does not follow up the advice sent by the British Ambassador in Rome to the effect that "Serbia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers." Her own conference proposal she "would suspend" in favor of Russia's proposal of direct conversations with Vienna. Sir E. Grey even made an alternate proposal, which Germany transmitted to Vienna, but which is not mentioned either in the British Blue Book or the French Yellow Book. (See German White Book, Exhibit 16.)

*Russia* announces the failure of direct conversations with Vienna at the very moment when Sir E. Grey suspends his proposal, and disregarding Sir E. Grey's conference plan calls for English mediation, apparently between Vienna and Belgrade, which was France's suggestion.

*Serbia*, according to the uncontradicted statement of Vienna (British Blue Book No. 56, under date of July 28) opens hostilities, and asks Russia for help, assuring the latter of her loyalty.

**Austria-Hungary :**

*From Berlin*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 35

*Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 28, 1914.*

THE proposal for mediation made by Great Britain, that Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France should meet at a conference at London, is declined <sup>1</sup> so far as Germany is concerned on the ground that it is impossible for Germany to bring her Ally before a European Court in her settlement with Servia.

*From Tokio*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 36

*Freiherr Von Müller to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tokio, July 28, 1914.*

TO-DAY'S semi-official *Japan Times* contains a leading article which concludes by saying that Japan is on the best possible terms with the three Great Powers concerned — Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia — while it is in no way interested in Servia. In the case of war, the Imperial Government would, as a matter of course, maintain the strictest neutrality.

*To Belgrade*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 37

*Count Berchtold to the Royal Servian Foreign Office at Belgrade. (Translated from the French.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

THE Royal Servian Government not having answered in a satisfactory manner the note of 23rd July presented by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms.

Austria-Hungary consequently considers herself henceforward in a state of war <sup>2</sup> with Servia.

*To Berlin*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 38

*Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény in Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

FOR Your Excellency's information and for communication to the Secretary of State : —

<sup>1</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 43, July 27. For a later agreement see British Blue Book No. 46, July 27, and German White Book, Exhibits 12 and 15, July 27.

<sup>2</sup> For the Austro-Hungarian note announcing to the Powers that war had been declared, see British Blue Book No. 50, July 28.

I have received the following telegram from Count Mensdorff, dated the 27th inst. : —

“I have to-day had the opportunity of explaining at length to Sir Edward Grey, that our action is not one of aggression but of self-defence and of self-preservation, and that we have no intention of making any territorial acquisition, or of destroying Servian independence.<sup>1</sup> What we desire is to obtain a certain measure of satisfaction for what has passed, and guarantees for the future.

For this purpose I availed myself of some of the points out of Your Excellency's communications to Count Szápáry.

Sir E. Grey said to me that he was very much disappointed that we were treating the Servian answer as if it were a complete refusal.

He had believed that this answer would furnish a basis on which the four other Governments could arrive at a peaceful solution.

This was his idea when he proposed a conference.

The conference would meet on the assumption that Austria-Hungary as well as Russia would refrain from every military operation during the attempt of the other Powers to find a peaceful issue.

(The declaration of Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons to-day amplifies the project of a conference.) When he spoke of our refraining from military operations against Servia, I observed that I feared that it was perhaps already too late. The Secretary of State expressed the view that if we were resolved under any circumstances to go to war with Servia, and if we assumed that Russia would remain quiet, we were taking a great risk. If we could induce Russia to remain quiet, he had nothing more to say on the question.<sup>2</sup> If we could not, the possibilities and the dangers were incalculable.

As a symptom of the feeling of unrest he told me that the British Grand Fleet, which was concentrated in Portsmouth after the manœuvres, and which should have dispersed to-day,<sup>3</sup> would for the present remain there. “We had not called up any Reserves, but as they are assembled, we cannot at this moment send them home again.”

His idea of a conference had the aim of preventing, if possible, a collision between the Great Powers, and he also aimed at the isolation of the conflict. If, therefore, Russia mobilises and Germany takes action, the conference necessarily breaks down.

I believe that I need not specially point out to Your Excellency that Grey's proposal for a conference, in so far as it relates to our conflict with Servia, appears, in view of the state of war which has arisen, to have been outstripped by events.

<sup>1</sup> British Blue Book No. 48, July 27.

<sup>2</sup> This is a refutation of the popular claim that Great Britain went to war in part on Serbia's account, to vindicate the rights of the little nations.

<sup>3</sup> This refers to the interview of July 27. See British Blue Book No. 48.

*To London*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 39

*Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

We attach the greatest importance to the point that Sir E. Grey should appreciate in an impartial manner our action against Serbia in general, and in particular our refusal to accept the Servian answer, and I therefore ask Your Excellency to take the opportunity of explaining to the Secretary of State in detail the dossier which is being<sup>1</sup> sent to you by post, and that you will emphasise the specially salient passages; in the same sense Your Excellency should discuss with Sir E. Grey the critical observations on the Servian note (the text of the note without observations has been sent to Your Excellency by post yesterday),<sup>2</sup> and you should make clear to him that the offer of Serbia to meet points in our note was only an apparent one, intended to deceive Europe without giving any guarantee for the future.

As the Servian Government knew that only an unconditional acceptance of our demands could satisfy us, the Servian tactics can easily be seen through: Serbia accepted a number of our demands, with all sorts of reservations, in order to impress public opinion in Europe, trusting that she would not be required to fulfil her promises. In conversing with Sir E. Grey your Excellency should lay special emphasis on the circumstance that the general mobilisation of the Servian army was ordered for the afternoon of the 25th July at 3 o'clock, while the answer to our note was delivered just before the expiration of the time fixed, that is to say, a few minutes before 6 o'clock. Up to then we had no military preparations, but by the Servian mobilisation we were compelled to do so.

*To St. Petersburg*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 40

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

FOR your Excellency's information and guidance:

The Imperial Russian Ambassador spoke to me to-day in order to inform me of his return from short leave in Russia, and at the same time to execute a telegraphic instruction of M. Sazonof. The latter had informed him that he had had a lengthy and friendly discussion with your Excellency (your Excellency's telegram of the 27th instant),<sup>3</sup> in the course of which he had discussed with great readiness

<sup>1</sup> This is a wrong translation; it should read, "which has been despatched to you," and is so translated in the English translation issued by the Austro-Hungarian Government.

<sup>2</sup> Neither the *dossier* nor the Austro-Hungarian comments on the Serbian note were printed in the British Blue Book, although the Serbian reply was printed in No. 39 before No. 40 which is a telegram of July 26. For the reason why this Serbian reply is printed in this edition among the July 27 despatches, see note to British Blue Book No. 39, under date of July 26.

<sup>3</sup> Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 31, July 27.

the various points of the Servian answer. M. Sazonof was of the opinion that Serbia had gone far in meeting our wishes, but that some of the demands appeared to him entirely unacceptable, a fact which he had not concealed from your Excellency. It appeared to him under these circumstances that the Servian reply might properly be regarded as furnishing a starting point for an understanding to attain which the Russian Government would gladly lend a hand. M. Sazonof therefore desired to propose to me that the exchange of ideas with your Excellency should be continued, and that your Excellency should receive instructions with this end in view.

In reply, I emphasised my inability to concur in such a proposal. No one in our country could understand, nor could anyone approve negotiations with reference to the wording used in the answer which we had designated as unsatisfactory. This was all the more impossible because, as the Ambassador knew, there was a deep feeling of general excitement which had already mastered public opinion. Moreover, on our side war had to-day been declared against Serbia.

In reply to the explanations of the Ambassador, which culminated in asserting that we should not in any way suppress the admitted hostile opinion in Serbia by a warlike action, but that, on the contrary we should only increase it, I gave him some insight into our present relations towards Serbia which made it necessary, quite against our will, and without any selfish secondary object, for us to show our restless neighbour, with the necessary emphasis, our firm intention not to permit any longer a movement which was allowed to exist by the Government, and which was directed against the existence of the Monarchy. The attitude of Serbia after the receipt of our note had further not been calculated to make a peaceful solution possible, because Serbia, even before she transmitted to us her unsatisfactory reply, had ordered a general mobilisation, and in so doing had already committed a hostile act against us. In spite of this, however, we had waited for three days. Yesterday hostilities were opened against us on the Hungarian frontier on the part of Serbia. By this act we were deprived of the possibility of maintaining any longer the patience which we had shown towards Serbia. The establishment of a fundamental but peaceful amelioration of our relations towards Serbia had now been made impossible, and we were compelled to meet the Servian provocation in the only form which in the given circumstances was consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy.

*To London*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 41

*Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

THE British Ambassador, who discussed matters with me to-day has, in accordance with his instructions, explained the attitude of Sir E. Grey with regard to our conflict with Serbia as follows: —



The British Government have followed the previous course of events during the crisis with lively interest, and they attach importance to giving us an assurance that they entertain sympathy for us in the point of view we have adopted, and that they completely understand the grievances which we have against Servia.

If England has no ground for making our dispute with Servia in itself an object of special consideration, nevertheless this question cannot escape the attention of the Cabinet at London, because this conflict may affect wider circles and thereby imperil the peace of Europe.

To this extent England is affected by the question, and it is only on this ground that Sir E. Grey has been led to send an invitation to the Governments of those countries which are not directly interested in this conflict (Germany, Italy and France), in order to test in common with them by means of a continuous exchange of ideas the possibilities of the situation, and to discuss how the differences may be most quickly settled. Following the precedent of the London conference during the last Balkan crisis, the Ambassadors of the various States mentioned resident at London should, according to the view of the British Secretary of State, keep themselves in continual contact with him for the purpose indicated. Sir E. Grey had already received answers expressed in very friendly terms from the Governments concerned, in which they concurred in the suggestion put forward. At present it was also the wish of the Secretary of State, if possible, to prevent even at the eleventh hour the outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and if this were not possible at least to prevent the conflict from causing a collision involving bloodshed; if necessary, by the Servians withdrawing without accepting battle. The reply which had reached us from Servia appeared to offer the possibility that it might provide the basis of an understanding. England would willingly be prepared in this matter to make her influence felt according to our ideas and wishes.

I thanked the Ambassador for the communication of Sir E. Grey, and I answered him that I fully appreciated the view of the Secretary of State. His point of view was, however, naturally different from mine, as England was not directly interested in the dispute between us and Servia, and the Secretary of State could not be fully informed concerning the serious significance which the questions at issue had for the Monarchy. If Sir E. Grey spoke of the possibility of preventing the outbreak of hostilities, this suggestion came too late, since our soldiers were yesterday fired at by soldiers from over the Servian frontier, and to-day war has been declared by us against Servia. I had to decline to entertain the idea of a discussion based on the Servian answer. What we asked was the integral acceptance of the ultimatum. Servia had endeavoured to get out of her difficulty by subterfuges. We knew these Servian methods only too well.

Through the local knowledge which he has gained here, Sir Maurice de Bunsen was in a position to appreciate fully our point of view, and he would be in a position to give Sir E. Grey an accurate representation of the facts.



In so far as Sir E. Grey desired to be of service to the cause of European peace, he would certainly not find any opposition from us. He must, however, reflect that the peace of Europe would not be saved by Great Powers placing themselves behind Serbia, and directing their efforts to securing that she should escape punishment.

For, even if we consented to entertain such an attempt at an agreement, Serbia would be all the more encouraged to continue on the path she has formerly followed, and this would, in a very short time, again imperil the cause of peace.

The British Ambassador assured me in conclusion that he fully understood our point of view, but, on the other hand, he regretted that, under these circumstances, the desire of the British Government to arrive at an agreement had, for the time being, no prospect of being realised. He hoped to remain in constant communication with me as that appeared to him, on account of the great danger of a European conflagration, to be of special value.

I assured the Ambassador that I was at all times at his disposal, and thereupon our conversation came to an end.

### *To Berlin*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 42

*Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*July 28, 1914.*

I REQUEST your Excellency to go at once to the Chancellor or the Secretary of State and communicate to him the following in my name: —

“According to mutually consistent reports, received from St. Petersburg, Kieff, Warsaw, Moscow and Odessa, Russia is making extensive military preparations. M. Sazonof has indeed given an assurance on his word of honour, as has also the Russian Minister of War, that mobilisation has not up to now been ordered; the latter has, however, told the German Military Attaché that the military districts which border on Austria-Hungary — Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan — will be mobilised, should our troops cross the Servian frontier.<sup>1</sup>

“Under these circumstances, I would urgently ask the Cabinet at Berlin to take into immediate consideration the question whether the attention of Russia should not be drawn, in a friendly manner, to the fact that the mobilisation of the above districts amounts to a threat against Austria-Hungary, and that, therefore, should these measures be carried out, they would be answered by the most extensive military counter measures, not only by the Monarchy but by our Ally, the German Empire.”

In order to make it more easy for Russia to withdraw, it appears to us appropriate that such a step should, in the first place, be taken

<sup>1</sup> German White Book, Exhibit 11, July 27.

by Germany alone; nevertheless we are ready to take this step in conjunction with Germany.

Unambiguous language appears to me at the present moment to be the most effective method of making Russia fully conscious of all that is involved in a threatening attitude.<sup>1</sup>

*To Berlin*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 43

*Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*July 28, 1914.*

INFORMATION has been received from the Imperial German Ambassador that Sir E. Grey has appealed to the German Government to use their influence with the Imperial and Royal Government, in order to induce them either to regard the reply received from Belgrade as satisfactory, or to accept it as a basis for discussion between the Cabinets.<sup>2</sup>

Herr von Tschirschky was commissioned to bring the British proposal before the Vienna Cabinet for their consideration.

**Belgium :**

*From Vienna*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 7

*Count Errembault de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to M. Darignou, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has notified me of the declaration<sup>3</sup> of war by Austria-Hungary against Servia.

**France :**

*From Vienna*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 75 (2)

*Official Communiqué of the Press Bureau.*<sup>4</sup>

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

THE Austrian Minister at Belgrade has returned to Vienna and presented the text of the Servian reply.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This despatch would seem to dispose of the claim sometimes made that Germany's demand on Russia to demobilise brought on the war much against the wishes of Austria-Hungary, who had been dragged in.

<sup>2</sup> British Blue Book No. 46, July 27, and No. 67, July 28.

<sup>3</sup> See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 37, July 28, and British Blue Book No. 50, same day.

<sup>4</sup> This is a brief summary of the Austro-Hungarian comments on the Serbian reply, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27.

<sup>5</sup> The Austrian Minister left Belgrade on the evening of July 25 (see Serbian Blue Book No. 41, July 25), after receiving the Serbian reply. This despatch is dated July

A spirit of insincerity pervades the whole of this reply; it makes it clear that the Servian Government have no serious intention of putting an end to the culpable toleration which has given rise to the anti-Austrian intrigues. The Servian reply contains such restrictions and limitations, not only with regard to the principle of the Austro-Hungarian *démarche*, but also with regard to the claims advanced by Austria, that the concessions which are made are without importance.

In particular, under an empty pretext, there is a refusal to accept the participation of the Austro-Hungarian officials in the prosecution of the authors of the crimes who are resident in Servian territory.

In the same way, the Servian reply to the Austrian demand that the hostile intrigues of the press should be suppressed, amounts to a refusal.

The demand with regard to the measures to be taken to prevent associations hostile to Austria-Hungary from continuing their activity under another name and form after their dissolution, has not even been considered.

Inasmuch as these claims constitute the minimum regarded as necessary for the re-establishment of a permanent peace in the south-east of the Monarchy, the Servian reply is considered to be insufficient.

That the Servian Government is aware of this, appears from the fact that they contemplate the settlement of the dispute by arbitration, and also from the fact that on the day on which their reply was due and before it was in fact submitted, they gave orders for mobilisation.

*From on board "La France"*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 76

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*On board the "La France," July 28, 1914.*

I HAVE received from Copenhagen your telegram summarising the events of Saturday;<sup>1</sup> the telegram describing the last visit of the German Ambassador,<sup>2</sup> that<sup>3</sup> relating to the mediation which Russia

28. Its number is 75 (2), which is unusual. Beginning with the second paragraph this *communiqué* is a summary of the Austro-Hungarian comments on the Serbian reply. In short it is the reply to the Serbian reply. See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, which was presented also in Paris. It is not printed in its entirety in the French Yellow Book. The editor of the French Yellow Book, however, M. Jules Cambon, former French Ambassador in Berlin, doubtless felt the unfairness of making no reference to it at all. He, therefore, added this *communiqué* as an afterthought, which accounts for the strange number 75 (2).

<sup>1</sup> Saturday was July 25, the telegram referred to was sent on July 26. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 50, also No. 56.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27.

<sup>3</sup> This is a mistranslation substituted in the official British Blue Book of Sept. 28 and in the "Collected Diplomatic Documents" for the correct translation in the *N. Y. Times* version which reads, "also the telegram with regard to," etc. This third telegram, however, has been omitted in the French Yellow Book. It would be interesting to know what it contained and what the "British *démarches* at Berlin" refer to. Cf. end of French Yellow Book No. 80, same day; but see also French Yellow Book No. 74, July 27, which may describe the *démarche* mentioned here.

advises Servia<sup>1</sup> to ask for and to the British *démarches* at Berlin, as well<sup>2</sup> as your telegram received this morning directly through the Eiffel Tower.

I fully approve the reply which you made to Baron von Schoen; the proposition which you maintained is self-evident; in the search for a peaceful solution of the dispute, we are fully in agreement with Russia, who is not responsible for the present situation, and has not taken any measure whatever which could arouse the least suspicion; but it is plain that Germany on her side would find it difficult to refuse to give advice to the Austro-Hungarian Government, whose action has provoked the crisis.

We must now continue to use the same language to the German Ambassador. Besides, this advice is in harmony with the two British proposals mentioned in your telegram.<sup>3</sup> I entirely approve the combination suggested by Sir E. Grey, and I am myself requesting M. Paul Cambon to inform him of this. It is essential that it should be known at Berlin and at Vienna that our full concurrence is given to the efforts which the British Government is making with a view to seeking a solution of the Austro-Servian dispute. The action of the four less interested Powers cannot, for the reasons given above, be exerted only at Vienna and St. Petersburg. In proposing<sup>3</sup> to exert it also at Belgrade, which means in fact between Vienna and Belgrade, Sir E. Grey grasps the logic of the situation; and, in not excluding St. Petersburg, he offers on the other hand to Germany, a method of withdrawing with perfect dignity from the *démarche* by which the German Government have caused it to be known at Paris and at London that the affair was looked upon by them as purely Austro-Servian and without any general character.

Please communicate the present telegram to our representatives with the great Powers and to our Minister at Belgrade.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

*To Viviani*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 77

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council on board the "La France."*

*Paris, July 28, 1914.*

IN spite of the assurances given, both in Berlin and Paris, by the German representatives, of the desire of their Government to assist in

<sup>1</sup> For another proposal by Russia see British Blue Book No. 44, July 27.

<sup>2</sup> The *New York Times* translation reads: "I have also received this morning your despatch direct from the Eiffel Tower." The only despatch printed under July 28 as sent to Viviani is French Yellow Book No. 77. This latter despatch, therefore, should have been printed before No. 76. It is, of course, possible that the fourth telegram mentioned in No. 76 has not been published as was the case with the third telegram.

<sup>3</sup> There were two proposals mentioned in the telegrams to which Viviani seems to reply here; cf. French Yellow Book No. 50, July 26, and No. 77, July 28. The first one contemplates pressure in Petrograd and Vienna. The second includes Belgrade, undoubtedly as the result of the urging of France, who had always contended that it was a case of mediation between Vienna and Belgrade rather than Vienna and Petrograd.

efforts for the maintenance of peace, no sincere action has been taken by them to hold back Austria; the British proposal, which consists in action by the four less-interested Powers to obtain a cessation of military operations at Vienna, Belgrade, and St. Petersburg, and in a meeting at London of the German, French, and Italian Ambassadors under the chairmanship of Sir E. Grey, with a view of seeking a solution of the Austro-Servian difficulty, meets with objections at Berlin of such a nature as must lead to failure.

The Austrian Ambassador has proceeded to announce that his Government will to-morrow take energetic measures to compel Servia to give to them the satisfaction and guarantees which they demand from that Power; Count Szecsén has given no explanation as to those measures; according to our Military Attaché at Vienna, mobilisation, dating from July 28, appears to be certain.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

*To London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 78

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 28, 1914.*

I HAVE had another visit from the German Ambassador this morning; he told me that he had no communication or official proposal to make to me, but that he came, as on the evening before, to talk over the situation and the methods to be employed to avoid action which would be irreparable. When I asked him about Austria's intentions, he declared that he did not know them, and was ignorant of the nature of the means of coercion which she was preparing.

Germany, according to Baron von Schoen, only asks that she may act with France for the maintenance of peace. Upon my observing to him that a proposal for mediation by the four Powers to which we had adhered, and which had obtained assent in principle from Italy and Germany, had been put forward by Great Britain, the Ambassador said that the German Government really only asked to associate themselves with the action of the Powers, provided that that action did not take the form of arbitration or a conference, which had been rejected by Austria.

I replied that, if it was the expression only which was an obstacle to the Austrian Government, the object might be attained by other means; the German Government are in a good position to ask Austria to allow the Powers time to intervene and find a means of conciliation.

Baron von Schoen then observed to me that he had no instructions, and only knew that Germany refused to exercise any pressure on Austria, who does not wish for a conference. He accuses the French papers of attributing to Germany an attitude which she has not taken up, alleging that she is urging Austria on; doubtless she approves Austria's attitude, but she had no knowledge of the Austrian note;

**she** did not see her way to check her too abruptly, for Austria must **have** guarantees against the proceedings of the Serbs.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

*From Vienna*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 79

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna.*

*Paris, July 28, 1914.*

THROUGH the telegrams from our Embassies which I have forwarded to you, you are aware of the British proposal for mediation by the four Powers and for a conference in London, as well as of our adherence to that suggestion, and of the conditional acceptance by Italy and of the reservations of Berlin.

Please keep yourself in touch on this subject with your British colleague, who had received the necessary instructions to acquaint the Austro-Hungarian Government with the British suggestion, as soon as his three colleagues have been authorised to make the same *démarche*; you will adapt your attitude to his.

*From London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 80

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 28, 1914.*

SIR EDWARD GREY yesterday received my Austro-Hungarian and German colleagues. The first continued to maintain that the Servian reply was unacceptable. The second used language similar to that of Baron von Schoen at Paris. He emphasised the value of moderating action by Great Britain at St. Petersburg. Sir Edward Grey replied that Russia had shown herself very moderate from the beginning of the crisis, especially in her advice <sup>1</sup> to the Servian Government, and that he would find it very embarrassing to give her pacific <sup>2</sup> advice. He added that it was at Vienna that it was necessary to act and that Germany's help was indispensable.

On the other hand the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg has telegraphed that M. Sazonof had made a proposal to the Austrian Ambassador for a conversation on the Servian business. This information has been confirmed by the British Ambassador at Vienna,

<sup>1</sup> The published despatches nowhere give clear evidence that Russia gave Serbia any advice that had a moderating influence, although the British Ambassador said that Sazonof would do so, British Blue Book No. 55, under date of July 28.

<sup>2</sup> Germany has always claimed that Russia could have been restrained by pacific advice from England. The same view was expressed in the *London Daily News* of August 1, 1914. France had also refused to exert her conciliatory influence on Russia. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27.



who has sent the information that the first interview between the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Count Szápáry had produced a good effect at the Ballplatz.

Sir Edward Grey and Sir Arthur Nicolson told me that, if an agreement could be brought about by direct discussion between St. Petersburg and Vienna, it would be a matter for congratulation, but they raised some doubts as to the success of M. Sazonof's attempt.

When Sir George Buchanan asked M. Sazonof about the eventual meeting at London of a conference of representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, to seek a solution for the present situation, the latter replied "that he had begun *pourparlers* with the Austrian Ambassador under conditions which he hoped were favourable; that, however, he had not yet received any reply to his proposal for the revision of the Servian note by the two Cabinets." If direct explanations with the Cabinet of Vienna are impracticable,<sup>1</sup> M. Sazonof declares himself ready to accept the British proposals or any other of such a nature as to bring about a favourable issue of the dispute.

In any case, at a moment when the least delay might have serious consequences, it would be very desirable that these direct negotiations should be carried on in such a way as not to hamper Sir E. Grey's action, and not to furnish Austria with a pretext for slipping out of the friendly intervention of the four Powers.

The British Ambassador at Berlin having made a determined effort to obtain Herr von Jagow's adherence to Sir E. Grey's suggestion, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that it was best to await the result of the conversation which had been begun between St. Petersburg and Vienna.<sup>2</sup> Sir E. Grey has, in consequence, directed Sir E. Goschen to suspend his *démarche* for the moment.<sup>3</sup> In addition, the news that Austria has just officially declared war against Servia, opens a new phase of the question.

PAUL CAMBON.

*From Berlin*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 81

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 28, 1914.*

M. SAZONOF's conversation with Count Szápáry<sup>4</sup> was brought to the knowledge of Herr von Jagow by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires.

<sup>1</sup> This implies that Sazonof had not accepted the British proposals whole-heartedly on the previous day, but had rather pushed his own proposal of direct conversations with Vienna.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. British Blue Book Nos. 43 and 46, July 27, and Nos. 67, 68 and 69, July 28, and Austro-Hungarian Red Book, July 27. In British Blue Book Nos. 68, 69, Sir E. Grey seems to prefer Sazonof's proposal of direct conversations to his own of a conference.

<sup>3</sup> It is nowhere stated what this *démarche* was, the despatch explaining it having been omitted from the Yellow Book; see note 3 to No. 76, same day. A possible explanation is found in the text of the German White Book, which is illustrated by Exhibit 16, July 28. See the note there.

<sup>4</sup> The only published conversation to which this can refer is the one of July 26, two days previous to this despatch. See Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26.



The Secretary of State told him that in agreement with the remarks of the German Ambassador in Russia, since the Austrian Government did not refuse to continue their conversations with the Russian Government after the expiry of the ultimatum, there was ground for hope that Count Berchtold on his side might be able to converse with M. Schebeko, and that it might be possible to find an issue from the present difficulties. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires takes a favourable view of this state of mind, which corresponds to Herr von Jagow's desire to see Vienna and St. Petersburg enter into direct relations and to release Germany. There is ground, however, for asking whether Austria is not seeking to gain time to make her preparations.

To-day I gave my support to the *démarche* made by my British colleague with the Secretary of State. The latter replied to me, as he did to Sir Edward Goschen, that it was impossible for him to accept the idea of a kind of conference at London between the Ambassadors of the four Powers, and that it would be necessary to give another form to the British suggestion to procure its realisation. I laid stress upon the danger of delay, which might bring on war, and asked him if he wished for war. He protested, and added that direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg were in progress, and that from now on he expected a favourable result.

The British and Italian Ambassadors came to see me this morning together, to talk over with me the conversation which they had had with Herr von Jagow yesterday on the subject of Sir Edward Grey's proposal. To sum up, the Secretary of State used the same language to them as to me; accepting in principle the idea of joining in a *démarche* with England, Italy, and ourselves, but rejecting any idea of a conference.

My colleagues and I thought that this was only a question of form, and the British Ambassador is going to suggest to his Government that they should change the wording of their proposal, which might take the character of a diplomatic *démarche* at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

In consequence of the repugnance shown by Herr von Jagow to any *démarche* at Vienna, Sir Edward Grey could put him in a dilemma by asking him to state himself precisely how diplomatic action by the Powers to avoid war could be brought about.

We ought to associate ourselves with every effort in favour of peace compatible with our engagements towards our ally; but to place the responsibility in the proper quarter, we must take care to ask Germany to state precisely what she wishes.

JULES CAMBON.

*From St. Petersburg*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 82

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.*

THE Austro-Hungarian Government has not yet replied to the proposal of the Russian Government suggesting the opening of direct conversations between St. Petersburg and Vienna.

M. Sazonof received the German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors this afternoon. The impression which he got from this double interview is a bad one; "Certainly," he said to me, "Austria is unwilling to converse."

As the result of a conversation which I have just had with my two colleagues I have the same impression of pessimism.

PALÉOLOGUE.

*From Vienna*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 83

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

COUNT BERCHTOLD has just declared to Sir M. de Bunsen that any intervention, aiming at the resumption of the discussion between Austria and Servia on the basis of the Servian reply, would be useless, and besides that it would be too late, as war had been officially declared at mid-day.

The attitude of my Russian colleague has never varied up to the present; in his opinion it is not a question of localising the conflict, but rather of preventing it. The declaration of war will make very difficult the initiation of *pourparlers* by the four Powers, as well as the continuation of the direct discussions between M. Sazonof and Count Szápáry.

It is held here that the formula which seemed as if it might obtain the adherence of Germany — "Mediation between Austria and Russia" — is unsuitable, inasmuch as it alleges a dispute between those two Empires which does not exist up to the present.

Among the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent resolution of Austria, the most disquieting is that Germany should have pushed her on to aggressive action against Servia in order to be able herself to enter into war with Russia and France,<sup>1</sup> in circumstances which she supposes ought to be most favourable to herself and under conditions which have been thoroughly considered.

DUMAINE.

<sup>1</sup> If this is written with sincerity it reveals the serious suspicion of Germany entertained by France. Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 42, same day, where it appears that it was not Germany who pushed on Austria-Hungary.

Germany:

*To the Governments of Germany*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 2

*The Chancellor to the Federal Governments of Germany. Confidential.  
Berlin, July 28, 1914.*

You will make the following report to the Government to which you are accredited:

In view of the facts which the Austrian Government has published in its note <sup>1</sup> to the Servian Government, the last doubt must disappear that the outrage to which the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne has fallen a victim, was prepared in Servia, to say the least with the connivance of members of the Servian Government and army. It is a product of the pan-Serb intrigues which for a series of years have become a source of permanent disturbance for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for the whole of Europe.

The pan-Serb chauvinism appeared especially marked during the Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intercession of the Powers is it to be ascribed that the provocations to which Austro-Hungary was exposed at that time, did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of future well-behaviour, which the Servian Government gave at that time, it has not kept. Under the very eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance of official Servia, the pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile continued to increase in scope and intensity. It would be compatible neither with its dignity nor with its right to self-preservation if the Austro-Hungarian Government persisted to view idly any longer the intrigues beyond the frontier, through which the safety and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened. With this state of affairs, the action as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only as justifiable.

The reply of the Servian Government to the demands which the Austro-Hungarian Government put on the 23rd inst., through its representative in Belgrade, shows that the dominating factors in Servia are not inclined to cease their former policies and agitation. There will remain nothing else for the Austro-Hungarian Government than to press its demands, if need be, through military action, unless it renounces for good its position as a great Power.

Some Russian personalities deem it their right as a matter of course and a task of Russia's, to actively become a party to Servia in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia. For the European conflagration which would result from a similar step by Russia, the "Nowoje Wremja" believes itself justified in making Germany responsible in so far as it does not induce Austria-Hungary to yield.

<sup>1</sup> This is probably an inaccurate reference, for the Chancellor undoubtedly had in mind the *dossier* (Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25) which was to be presented, and, judging by this despatch, was presented to the foreign offices in Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, Petrograd, and Constantinople. For the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7, July 22.

The Russian press thus turns conditions upside down. It is not Austria-Hungary which has called forth the conflict with Serbia, but it is Serbia which, through unscrupulous favour toward pan-Serb aspirations, even in parts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, threatens the same in her existence and creates conditions, which eventually found expression in the wanton outrage at Serajewo. If Russia believes that it must champion the cause of Serbia in this matter, it certainly has the right to do so. However, it must realise that it makes the Serb activities its own, to undermine the conditions of existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that thus it bears the sole responsibility if out of the Austro-Servian affair, which all other Great Powers desire to localise, there arises a European war. This responsibility of Russia's is evident and it weighs the more heavily as Count Berchtold has officially declared to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire Servian territory or to touch the existence of the Servian Kingdom, but only desires peace against the Servian intrigues threatening its existence.

The attitude of the Imperial Government in this question is clearly indicated. The agitation conducted by the pan-Slavs in Austria-Hungary has for its goal, with the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the scattering or weakening of the Triple Alliance with a complete isolation of the German Empire in consequence. Our own interest therefore calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary. The duty, if at all possible, to guard Europe against a universal war, points to the support by ourselves of those endeavours which aim at the localisation of the conflict, faithful to the course of those policies which we have carried out successfully for forty-four years in the interest of the preservation of the peace of Europe.

Should, however, against our hope, through the interference of Russia the fire be spread, we should have to support, faithful to our duty as allies, the neighbour-monarchy with all the power at our command. We shall take the sword only if forced to it, but then in the clear consciousness that we are not guilty of the calamity which war will bring upon the peoples of Europe.

**Germany :**

*To St. Petersburg*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 14

*Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 28th, 1914.*

We continue<sup>1</sup> in our endeavour to induce Vienna to elucidate in St. Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian action in Serbia in a manner both convincing and satisfactory to Russia. The declaration of war which has meanwhile ensued alters nothing in this matter.

<sup>1</sup> See note to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. See also German White Book, Exhibit 15, July 27.

*From Vienna*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 16<sup>1</sup>

*Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on July 28th, 1914.*

COUNT BERCHTOLD requests me to express to Your Excellency his thanks for the communication of the English mediation proposal. He states, however, that after the opening of hostilities by Servia and the subsequent declaration of war, the step appears belated.

*To St. Petersburg*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 20

*I. His Majesty to the Czar.*

*July 28th, 10.45 P.M.*

I HAVE heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Servia. The unscrupulous agitation which has been going on for years in Servia, has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit which made the Servians murder their own King and his consort still dominates that country. Doubtless You will agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved punishment.

On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty encountered by You and Your Government to stem the tide of public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope confidently that You will support me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise.

Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin,

(Signed) WILHELM.

**Great Britain :**

For British Blue Book No. 50 see below under date of July 31, 1914.

<sup>1</sup> The paragraph in the Narrative of the German White Book which these Exhibits are to illustrate reads: "We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the Conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna in which he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that either the Servian reply was sufficient, or that it be used as a basis for further negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government remarked with full appreciation of our action it had come too late, the hostilities having already been opened." This second proposal of Sir E. Grey is not mentioned in the British Blue Book. It was probably discussed in the third telegram referred to but not printed in the French Yellow Book No. 76, July 28, see also French Yellow Book No. 80, same day.

*From Paris*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 51

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —  
(Received July 28, 1914.)*

Sir,

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum from the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steps to be taken to prevent an outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

I have, etc.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 51

*Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Bienvenu-Martin.*

(Translation.)

Par une note en date du 25 de ce mois, son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a fait connaître au Gouvernement de la République que, d'après Sir Edward Grey, la seule manière d'assurer, si c'était possible, le maintien de la paix dans le cas où les rapports entre la Russie et l'Autriche deviendraient plus tendus serait une démarche commune à Vienne et à Saint-Pétersbourg des représentants de l'Angleterre, de la France, de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie en Autriche et en Russie; et il a exprimé le désir de savoir si le Gouvernement de la République était disposé à accueillir favorablement cette suggestion.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères par intérim a l'honneur de faire connaître à son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie qu'il a invité M. Jules Cambon<sup>1</sup> à se concerter avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre en Allemagne et à appuyer la

IN a note of the 25th of this month, his Excellency the British Ambassador<sup>2</sup> informed the Government of the Republic that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, the only possible way of assuring the maintenance of peace in case of the relations between Russia and Austria becoming more strained would be if the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy in Austria and Russia were to take joint action at Vienna and at St. Petersburg; and he expressed the wish to know if the Government of the Republic were disposed to welcome such a suggestion.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs *ad interim* has the honour to inform his Excellency Sir F. Bertie that he has requested M. Jules Cambon<sup>1</sup> to concert with the British Ambassador in Germany and to support any rep-

<sup>1</sup> French Ambassador in Berlin.

<sup>2</sup> Acting on instructions contained in British Blue Book No. 10, July 24. For the entire subject see the summary of events of July 24 based on the despatches of that day, where it appears that Sir E. Grey altered his original proposal at the suggestion of France.

démarche qu'ils jugeront opportune de faire auprès du Cabinet de Berlin.

Le Gouvernement de la République a, d'autre part, conformément au désir exprimé par le Gouvernement britannique et que son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie lui a transmis par une note en date du 26 de ce mois, autorisé M. Paul Cambon<sup>1</sup> à prendre part à la réunion proposée par Sir Edward Grey pour rechercher avec lui et les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne et d'Italie à Londres, les moyens de résoudre les difficultés actuelles.

Le Gouvernement de la République est prêt également à donner aux agents français à Pétersbourg, à Vienne et à Belgrade des instructions pour qu'ils obtiennent des Gouvernements russe, autrichien et serbe de s'abstenir de toute opération militaire active en attendant les résultats de cette conférence. Il estime toutefois que les chances de succès de la proposition de Sir Edward Grey reposent essentiellement sur l'action que Berlin serait disposée à Vienna [*sic*]. Une démarche auprès du Gouvernement austro-hongrois pour amener la suspension des opérations militaires paraît vouée à l'échec si l'influence de l'Allemagne ne s'est pas exercée au préalable sur le Cabinet de Vienne.

Le Garde des Sceaux, Président du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères par intérim, saisit cette occasion de renouveler, etc.

Paris, le 27 juillet, 1914.

resentation which they may consider it advisable to make to the Berlin Cabinet.

In accordance with the desire expressed by the British Government and conveyed to them by Sir F. Bertie in his note of the 26th of this month, the Government of the Republic have also authorised M. Paul Cambon<sup>1</sup> to take part in the conference which Sir E. Grey has proposed with a view to discovering in consultation with himself and the German and Italian Ambassadors in London a means of settling the present difficulties.

The Government of the Republic is likewise ready to instruct the French representatives at St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Belgrade<sup>2</sup> to induce the Russian, Austrian, and Servian Governments to abstain from all active military operations pending the results of this conference. He considers, however, that the chance of Sir E. Grey's proposal being successful depends essentially on the action which the Berlin Government would be willing to take at Vienna. Representations made to the Austro-Hungarian Government for the purpose of bringing about a suspension of military operations would seem bound to fail unless the German Government do not beforehand exercise their influence on the Vienna Cabinet.

The President of the Council *ad interim* takes the opportunity, etc.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

<sup>1</sup> French Ambassador in London.

<sup>2</sup> The frequency with which France introduces Belgrade, when Sir E. Grey's proposal contemplates only Vienna and Petrograd, is noteworthy.



*From Paris*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 52

*Note communicated by French Embassy, July 28, 1914.*

(Translation.)

LE Gouvernement de la République accepte la proposition de Sir Edward Grey relative à une intervention de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France, de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie en vue d'éviter les opérations militaires actives sur les frontières autrichiennes, russes et serbes; il a autorisé M. P. Cambon<sup>1</sup> à prendre part aux délibérations de la réunion à quatre, qui doit se tenir à Londres.

L'Ambassadeur de France à Berlin a reçu pour instructions, après s'être concerté avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Berlin, d'appuyer la démarche de ce dernier dans la forme et la mesure qui seraient jugées opportunes.

M. Viviani<sup>2</sup> est prêt à envoyer aux représentants français à Vienne, Saint-Petersbourg et Belgrade des instructions dans le sens suggéré par le Gouvernement britannique.

*Ambassade de France, Londres, le 27 juillet, 1914.*

THE Government of the Republic accept Sir Edward Grey's proposal in regard to intervention by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy with a view to avoiding active military operations on the frontiers of Austria, Russia, and Servia; and they have authorised M. P. Cambon<sup>1</sup> to take part in the deliberations of the four representatives at the meeting which is to be held in London.

The French Ambassador in Berlin has received instructions to consult first the British Ambassador in Berlin, and then to support the action taken by the latter in such manner and degree as may be considered appropriate.

M. Viviani<sup>2</sup> is ready to send to the representatives of France in Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Belgrade instructions in the sense suggested by the British Government.

*French Embassy, July 27, 1914.*

*From St. Petersburg*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 53

*M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London. — (Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28.)*

(See Russian Orange Book No. 32, July 27.)

<sup>1</sup> French Ambassador in London.

<sup>2</sup> French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

*From St. Petersburg*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 54

*M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London. — (Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28, 1914.)*

(Translation.)

*Saint-Petersbourg,  
le 15 (28) juillet, 1914.*

(Télégraphique.)

MES entretiens avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne confirment mon impression que l'Allemagne est plutôt favorable à l'intransigeance de l'Autriche.

Le Cabinet de Berlin, qui aurait pu arrêter tout le développement de la crise, paraît n'exercer aucune action sur son alliée.

L'Ambassadeur trouve insuffisante la réponse de la Serbie.

Cette attitude allemande est tout particulièrement alarmante.

Il me semble que mieux que toute autre Puissance l'Angleterre serait en mesure de tenter encore d'agir à Berlin pour engager le Gouvernement allemand à l'action nécessaire. C'est à Berlin qu'indubitablement se trouve la clef de la situation.

*St. Petersburg,  
July 15 (28), 1914.*

(Telegraphic.)

MY interviews<sup>1</sup> with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favour of the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria.

The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented<sup>2</sup> the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exerting no<sup>3</sup> influence on their ally.

The Ambassador considers that the Servian reply is insufficient.

This attitude of the German Government is most alarming.<sup>4</sup>

It seems to me that Great Britain is in a better position than any other Power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action.<sup>5</sup> There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.

*From St. Petersburg*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 55

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

WITH reference to my telegram of yesterday,<sup>6</sup> I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon and found him very conciliatory and more optimistic.

<sup>1</sup> No accounts of interviews between Sazonof and the German Ambassador are mentioned in the Russian Orange Book in telegrams of July 26, 27, or 28. For Germany's attitude, see note to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28, and German White Book, p. 554.

<sup>2</sup> This is an assertion for which no proof has been advanced in the published despatches.

<sup>3</sup> See, however, German White Book, Exhibit 15, July 27, and Exhibit 14, July 28.

<sup>4</sup> Contrast with this footnote to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28.

<sup>5</sup> That this action was taken appears from notes to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28, and German White Book, Exhibit 16, same date.

<sup>6</sup> British Blue Book No. 44, July 27.

He would, he said, use all his influence<sup>1</sup> at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to Austria, but her territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign State respected, so that she should not become Austria's vassal. He did not know whether Austria would accept friendly exchange of views which he had proposed, but, if she did, he wished to keep in close contact with the other Powers throughout the conversations that would ensue.

He again referred to the fact that the obligations undertaken by Serbia in 1908, alluded to in the Austrian ultimatum, were given to the Powers.

I asked if he had heard of your proposal with regard to conference of the four Powers, and on his replying in the affirmative, I told him confidentially of your instructions to me, and enquired whether instead of such a conference he would prefer a direct exchange of views, which he had proposed.<sup>2</sup> The German Ambassador, to whom I had just spoken, had expressed his personal opinion that a direct exchange of views would be more agreeable to Austria-Hungary.

His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the Powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place.

*From Vienna*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 56

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.*  
— (Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 27, 1914.*

THE Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversation with Baron Macchio, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told him that, having just come back from St. Petersburg, he was well acquainted with the views of the Russian Government and the state of Russian public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out with Servia it would be impossible to localise it, for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that something would be done before Servia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been the aggressors.<sup>3</sup> The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place, and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 40, July 27.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 53, same date.

<sup>3</sup> If this should prove to have been the case, it would be very important, because a less yielding attitude could be expected of Austria-Hungary if hostilities had actually been begun, not by Austria-Hungary, but by Serbia. The diplomatic documents contain no denial of this assertion.

Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satisfactory conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had yesterday<sup>1</sup> with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg. The former had agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia had been perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had practically reached an understanding as to the guarantees which Servia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behaviour. The Russian Ambassador urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be furnished with full powers to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

*From Rome*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 57

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. —  
(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, July 27, 1914.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs greatly doubts whether Germany will be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the conference, but he had hopes that military action may be practically deferred by the fact of the conference meeting at once. As at present informed, he sees no possibility of Austria receding from any point laid down in her note to Servia, but he believes that if Servia will even now accept it<sup>2</sup> Austria will be satisfied, and if she had reason to think that such will be the advice of the Powers, Austria may defer action. Servia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone.<sup>3</sup>

Telegrams from Vienna to the press here stating that Austria is favourably impressed with the declarations of the Italian Government have, the Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me, no foundation. He said he has expressed no opinion to Austria with regard to the note. He assured me both before and after communication of the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26; and Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 31, July 27.

<sup>2</sup> This passage taken together with the previous telegram would seem to imply that on this date the Powers had not yet decided to condemn the Austrian demands as altogether unacceptable. Serbia took the same view, cf. British Blue Book No. 64, same day.

<sup>3</sup> If this suggestion had been pressed events might have been different. When Sir R. Rodd sent this telegram on July 27, he may not yet have known of Sir E. Grey's announcement on that date that the British fleet had been kept mobilised. It was this announcement which according to the *London Daily News* of August 1, 1914, stiffened the backbone of the Russian war party and made war inevitable.

note, and again to-day, that Austrian Government have given him assurances that they demand no territorial sacrifices from Servia.<sup>1</sup>

*From Paris*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 58

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —  
(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 28, 1914.*

I COMMUNICATED to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon the substance of your conversation with the German Ambassador, recorded in your telegram<sup>2</sup> to Berlin of the 27th July.

His Excellency is grateful for the communication. He said that it confirms what he had heard of your attitude, and he feels confident that your observations to the German Ambassador will have a good effect in the interest of peace.

*From Paris*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 59

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —  
(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 28, 1914.*

I INFORMED the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day of your conversation with the Russian Ambassador, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday<sup>3</sup> to St. Petersburg.

He is grateful for the communication, and quite appreciates the impossibility for His Majesty's Government to declare themselves "solidaires" with Russia on a question between Austria and Servia, which in its present condition is not one affecting England. He also sees that you cannot take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna more Servian than that attributed in German and Austrian sources to the Russian Government.

German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect the integrity of Servia, but when asked whether her independence also would be respected, he gave no assurance.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> By this assurance it was hoped to satisfy all legitimate demands of Russia, as Austria-Hungary saw them. From British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, it appears that even Sazonof did not categorically reject the proposals made in this telegram.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 46, July 27.

<sup>3</sup> British Blue Book No. 47, July 27.

<sup>4</sup> It is difficult to see how the German Ambassador in Paris could have given assurances for Austria-Hungary.

*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 60

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —  
(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 28, 1914.*

SECRETARY of State spoke yesterday in the same sense as that reported in my telegram of yesterday<sup>1</sup> to my French and Italian colleagues respecting your proposal. I discussed with my two<sup>2</sup> colleagues this morning his reply, and we found that, while refusing the proposed conference, he had said to all of us that nevertheless he desired to work with us for the maintenance of general peace. We therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can only be objecting to the form<sup>3</sup> of your proposal. Perhaps he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us.

*From Vienna*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 61

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.  
— (Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

I SAW Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.

His Excellency declared that Austria-Hungary cannot delay war-like proceedings against Servia, and would have to decline any suggestion of negotiations on basis of Servian reply.<sup>4</sup>

Prestige<sup>5</sup> of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent conflict.

*From Vienna*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 62

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.  
— (Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

I SPOKE to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of your telegram of 27th July<sup>6</sup> to Berlin. I avoided the word "media-

<sup>1</sup> British Blue Book No. 43, July 27.

<sup>2</sup> The text would appear to mean the French and Italian Ambassadors, but when only two are mentioned by one of the Entente Ambassadors the reference is generally to the ambassadors of the other two Entente Powers.

<sup>3</sup> That this was the case appears from British Blue Book No. 46, July 27.

<sup>4</sup> See note to German White Book, Exhibit 16, July 28.

<sup>5</sup> Austria-Hungary believed that her prestige, i.e. her existence as a great power, was at stake, and that her action against Servia, therefore, was in self-defence.

<sup>6</sup> British Blue Book No. 46, July 27.

tion," but said that, as mentioned in your speech,<sup>1</sup> which he had just read to me, you had hopes that conversations in London between the four Powers less interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian Government would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had regarded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary; that you thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war would be declared to-day and that well-known pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not now be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to complications threatening the peace of Europe.

In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that, if in the course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes differ from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the many just complaints<sup>2</sup> which Austria-Hungary had against Servia, but from the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with Servia, you were anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandisement and which could no longer be postponed.<sup>3</sup>

*From Rome*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 63

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. —*  
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, July 28, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of 25th July to Paris.<sup>4</sup>

I have communicated substance to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who immediately telegraphed in precisely similar terms to Berlin and Vienna.

<sup>1</sup> "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Columns 931, 932, 933.

<sup>2</sup> These just complaints which are here acknowledged to have existed, were a few days later entirely lost sight of.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 61, July 28.

<sup>4</sup> A footnote in the British Blue Book gives as reference No. 27. This can hardly be the despatch referred to here. The proper despatch is either not printed, or contained in No. 36 or 37. Their dates, however, are July 26.



*From Rome*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 64

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. —  
(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, July 28, 1914.*

At the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I submit the following to you:—

In a long conversation this morning Servian Chargé d'Affaires had said he thought that if some explanations were given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene under article 5 and article 6, Servia might still accept the whole Austrian note.<sup>1</sup>

As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give such explanations to Servia, they might be given<sup>2</sup> to Powers engaged in discussions, who might then advise Servia to accept without conditions.

The Austro-Hungarian Government had in the meantime published a long official explanation of grounds on which Servian reply was considered inadequate. Minister for Foreign Affairs considered many points besides explanation—such as slight verbal difference in sentence regarding renunciation of propaganda—quite childish, but there was a passage which might prove useful in facilitating such a course as was considered practicable by the Servian Chargé d'Affaires. It was stated that co-operation of Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures. Servia was said to have wilfully<sup>3</sup> misinterpreted this. He thought, therefore, that ground might be cleared here.

I only reproduce from memory, as I had not yet received text of Austrian declaration.

Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for the immediate beginning of discussion. A wide general latitude to accept at once every point or suggestion on which he could be in agreement with ourselves and Germany had been given to Italian Ambassador.

*From Nish*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 65

*Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Nish, July 28, 1914.*

I HAVE urged on the Servian Government the greatest moderation<sup>4</sup> pending efforts being made towards a peaceful solution.

<sup>1</sup> As late as July 28, therefore, Serbia was almost ready to accept the Austro-Hungarian note. For a discussion of articles 5 and 6, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book Nos. 31 and 34, July 27, and Nos. 21, 26 and 27, July 25.

<sup>2</sup> They were so given to Russia, see references given in preceding note.

<sup>3</sup> See Austro-Hungarian comment to Serbian reply, Red Book No. 34, July 27.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 12, July 24, note 3 and No. 22, July 25. The advice for moderation was not given until after the reply had been sent.

Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged, and two Servian merchant-vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova.

*From Nish*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 66

*Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Nish, July 28, 1914.*

TELEGRAM received here that war declared by Austria.

*To Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 67

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.*

EXPLANATION given in your telegram of the 27th July<sup>1</sup> of what was my idea in proposing a conference is quite right. It would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settlement. No suggestion would be put forward that had not previously been ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom the mediating Powers could easily keep in touch through their respective allies.

But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia, I would suspend<sup>2</sup> every other sugges-

<sup>1</sup> British Blue Book No. 43, July 27.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 77, July 29. (See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29.) In view of the claim that Sir E. Grey consistently pressed his "conference" idea, this passage is of importance. The entire subject has been discussed from the German point of view by Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg in his speech before the Reichstag, Aug. 19, 1915, as follows:

The statement that the whole war might have been avoided if I had agreed to accept the suggestion of Sir Edward Grey and take part in a conference for the regulation of the Russian-Austrian question at issue has again of late been repeatedly made in England. Here are the real facts. The English proposals for a conference were delivered here by the English Ambassador on the 27th of July. The English Blue Book also shows that the Secretary of State at the Foreign Office in the conversation in question with Sir Edward Goschen—a conversation in which the Secretary designated the means proposed as unsuitable—had communicated to the English Ambassador that, according to his information from Russia, M. Sazonof was inclined to consider a direct exchange of opinion with Count Berchtold. He was of the opinion that a direct conversation between Petrograd and Vienna might lead to a satisfactory result. For that reason it was best to await the results of this conversation. Sir Edward Goschen communicated this to London and received a telegraphic answer in which Sir Edward Grey used these words:

"As long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely agree that it is the most preferable method of all."

Thus Sir Edward Grey accepted the German point of view at that time, and expressly withdrew his proposal of a conference for the time being.

However, unlike Sir Edward Grey, I did not permit matters to rest with the platonic wish that a direct conversation might ensue between Vienna and Petrograd, but did everything within my power to persuade the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian governments to discuss their differences by an exchange of opinions between their respective cabinets. I have once before declared in this very place that our endeavors

tion, as I entirely agree that it is the most preferable method of all.

I understand that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed a friendly exchange of views to the Austrian Government, and, if the latter accepts, it will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical.

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.<sup>1</sup>

at mediation, especially in Vienna, had been carried on in a manner, which, as I stated at the time, "went to the extreme limits of all that was compatible with our relations as an ally." Since this activity of mine as a mediator in the interests of preserving the peace has been repeatedly called in question in England, I shall prove by the evidence of facts that all these accusations are without foundation.

On the evening of July 29 the following communication of the Imperial Ambassador at Petrograd reached Berlin:

"M. Sazonof, who has just requested me to see him, communicates to me that the Vienna Cabinet had replied with a categorical refusal to consider the desire he had expressed to enter into direct conversations. There was therefore nothing left to do save to return to the proposal of a conversation of four, as made by Sir Edward Grey."

Since the Vienna government had in the meantime declared itself prepared for a direct exchange of views with Petrograd, it was clear that there must be some misunderstanding. I telegraphed to Vienna and made use of the opportunity once more to make a clear announcement of my own conception of the situation as a whole. My instructions to Herr von Tschirschky were as follows:

"The communication of Count Pourtalés is not in accordance with the representations which Your Excellency has made of the attitude of the Austrian-Hungarian government. Apparently there is some misunderstanding which I beg you to explain. We cannot expect of Austria-Hungary a willingness to negotiate with Serbia, with whom she is already in a state of war.<sup>1</sup> But the refusal of all interchange of opinion with Petrograd would be a grave mistake. We are indeed prepared to fulfil our duty as an ally, but should Austria-Hungary ignore our advice, we must nevertheless decline to be drawn into a world conflagration, through Austria-Hungary ignoring our advice. Your Excellency will therefore at once and with all emphasis and earnestness express yourself in this sense to Count Berchtold."

Herr von Tschirschky in answer to this communicated on July 30:

"Count von Berchtold states that, as Your Excellency assumes, there has indeed been some misunderstanding in question, and that on the part of Russia. Having already received word of this misunderstanding also through Count Szápáry, the Austrian-Hungarian Ambassador in Petrograd, and having at the same time followed our urgent suggestion that he enter into communication with Russia, he had at once given the necessary instructions to Count Szápáry."

Gentlemen, I made all this known to the British press, when excitement in England increased shortly before the outbreak of the war, and serious doubts as to our endeavors to preserve peace became audible. And now after the event, that press makes the insinuation that this occurrence had never taken place at all and that the instructions to Herr von Tschirschky had been invented in order to mislead public opinion in England. You will agree with me that this accusation is unworthy of an answer. I would also allude at the same time to the Austrian Red Book which merely confirms my presentation of the case and shows how after the aforesaid misunderstanding had been cleared up, the conversations between Petrograd and Vienna had begun to take their course, until the general mobilization of the Russian army brought them to an untimely end. I repeat, gentlemen, that we have supported the direct discussion between Vienna and Petrograd with the utmost emphasis and success.

The assertion that we, by refusing to accept the English suggestion of a conference, must accept the blame for this war, belongs to the category of those calumnies under cover of which our enemies endeavor to hide their own guilt. The war became unavoidable only through the Russian mobilisation.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 46, July 27, and German White Book, Exhibit 15, same date. The effect of Germany's continued pressure on Austria-Hungary appears from French Yellow Book No. 104, July 30. See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 44, July 29.

*To Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 68

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.*

GERMAN Government, having accepted principle of mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, if necessary, I am ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied. I will, however, keep the idea in reserve<sup>1</sup> until we see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress.

*To St. Petersburg*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 69

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.*

It is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct exchange of views between the Russian and Austrian Governments, as reported in your telegram of the 27th July.<sup>2</sup>

I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would facilitate this, but I am not quite clear as to what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes<sup>3</sup> the Ministers at Belgrade should do. Could he not first mention in an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to co-operate in some such scheme? It might then take more concrete shape.

Russia :

*To London*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 43

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London.*

[See No. 54 of British Correspondence, July 28, 1914.]

*From Fiume*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 44

*Russian Consul General at Fiume to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Fiume, July 15 (28), 1914.*

STATE of siege has been proclaimed in Slavonia, in Croatia, and at Fiume, and the reservists of all classes have also been called up.

<sup>1</sup> Again Sir E. Grey defers to Sazonof's direct conversation idea.<sup>2</sup> British Blue Book No. 55, July 27.<sup>3</sup> The proposal referring to the Ministers at Belgrade has been omitted from the despatch No. 55, to which the Official Blue Book refers here.

From Vienna

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK NO. 45

*Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Translation.)

*Vienne,  
le 15 (28) juillet, 1914.*

*Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914.*

(Télégraphique.)

(Telegraphic.)

J'AI entretenu aujourd'hui le Comte Berchtold<sup>1</sup> dans le sens des instructions de votre Excellence. Je lui fis observer, en termes les plus amicaux, combien il était désirable de trouver une solution qui, en consolidant les bons rapports entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, donnerait à la Monarchie austro-hongroise des garanties sérieuses pour ses rapports futurs avec la Serbie.

I SPOKE to Count Berchtold<sup>1</sup> to-day in the sense of your Excellency's instructions.<sup>2</sup> I brought to his notice, in the most friendly manner, how desirable it was to find a solution which, while consolidating good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, would give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy genuine guarantees for its future relations with Servia.

J'attirais l'attention du Comte Berchtold<sup>1</sup> sur tous les dangers pour la paix de l'Europe, qu'entraînerait un conflit armé entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie.

I drew Count Berchtold's<sup>1</sup> attention to all the dangers to the peace of Europe which would be involved by an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

Le Comte Berchtold<sup>1</sup> me répondit qu'il se rendait parfaitement compte du sérieux de la situation et des avantages d'une franche explication avec le Cabinet de Saint-Petersbourg. Il me dit que d'un autre côté le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, qui ne s'était décidé que très mal volontiers aux mesures énergiques qu'il avait prises contre la Serbie, ne pouvait plus ni reculer, ni entrer en discussion aucune des termes de la note austro-hongroise.

Count Berchtold<sup>1</sup> replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburg Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, who had only decided much against their will on the energetic measures which they had taken against Servia, could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.

Le Comte Berchtold<sup>1</sup> ajouta que la crise était devenue si aigue, et que l'excitation de l'opinion publique avait atteint tel degré,

Count Berchtold<sup>1</sup> added that the crisis had become so acute, and that public opinion had risen to such a pitch of excitement,

<sup>1</sup> Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> No despatch containing these instructions is printed in the Russian Orange Book.

que le Gouvernement, le voulait-il, ne pouvait plus y consentir, d'autant moins, me dit-il, que la réponse même de la Serbie donne la preuve du manque de sincérité de ses promesses pour l'avenir.

that the Government, even if they wished it, could no longer consent to such a course. This was all the more impossible, he said, inasmuch as the Servian reply itself furnished proof of the insincerity of Servia's promises for the future.

*From Berlin*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 46

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, July 15 (28), 1914.*

THE Wolff Bureau has not published the text of the Servian reply, although it was communicated to them. Up to the present this note has not appeared *in extenso* in any of the local papers, which, to all appearances, do not wish to publish it in their columns, being well aware of the calming<sup>1</sup> effect which it would have on German readers.

*From Vienna*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 47

*Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914.*

THE order for general mobilisation has been signed.<sup>2</sup>

*To London*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 48

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London.*

(Telegram.)

*St. Petersburg, July 15 (28), 1914.*

IN face of the hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia, it is necessary that Great Britain should take instant mediatory action,<sup>3</sup> and that the military measures undertaken by Austria against

<sup>1</sup> Germany undoubtedly waited until she received the Austro-Hungarian comments, which were sent by mail from Vienna on July 27 (see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 39, July 28). German newspapers are always antedated, the paper dated July 28 being issued on the evening of July 27.

<sup>2</sup> If "signed" means *issued*, this information is probably inaccurate. For a complete discussion of this subject see M. P. Price, *The Diplomatic History of the War*, Chas. Scribner's Sons, p. 69, who says "This confirms the supposition that Austria had not mobilised more than eight army corps before August 1st."

<sup>3</sup> Sazonof apparently had now given up his plan of direct conversation with Austria, which he had sought since July 26, and also Sir E. Grey's plan of a conference, and

Servia should be immediately suspended. Otherwise mediation will only serve as an excuse to make the question drag on, and will meanwhile make it possible for Austria to crush Servia completely and to acquire a dominant position in the Balkans.

Sent to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.

**Serbia :**

*From Vienna*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 45<sup>1</sup>

*Count Leopold Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. N. Pashitch, Serbian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 15/28, 1914.*

THE Royal Serbian Government not having answered in a satisfactory manner the note of July 10/23, 1914, presented by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms. Austria-Hungary consequently considers herself henceforward in state of war with Serbia.<sup>2</sup>

*To All Serbian Legations*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 46

*M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Nish, July 15/28, 1914.*

THE Austro-Hungarian Government declared war on Serbia at noon to-day by an open telegram to the Serbian Government.

*To Petrograd*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 47

*Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Your Excellency,

*Petrograd, July 15/28, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have received from M. Pashitch the following urgent telegram despatched from Nish at 2.10 P.M.

urged the other plan of British direct mediation which probably had been outlined in the third despatch referred to in French Yellow Book No. 76, July 28, but not printed in full in the Yellow Book or in the Blue Book. Cf. also British Blue Book No. 44, July 27.

<sup>1</sup> For Serbian Blue Book No. 44 see July 30, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> This was notified to the Powers in a despatch printed British Blue Book No. 50, July 28.



"The Austro-Hungarian Government declared war on Serbia to-day at noon by an open telegram to the Serbian Government."

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency of this regrettable act, which a Great Power had the courage to commit against a small Slav country which only recently emerged from a long series of heroic but exhausting battles, and I beg leave on this occasion of deep gravity for my country, to express the hope that this act, which disturbs the peace of Europe and revolts her conscience, will be condemned by the whole civilised world and severely punished by Russia, the protector of Serbia.<sup>1</sup>

I beg Your Excellency to be so kind as to lay this petition from the whole Serbian nation before the throne of His Majesty.

I take this opportunity to assure Your Excellency of my loyalty<sup>2</sup> and respect.

I have, etc.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. also the appeal of the Serbian Crown Prince, Russian Orange Book No. 6, July 24, and the Czar's reply, Russian Orange Book No. 40, July 27.

<sup>2</sup> According to one's interpretation of the Serbian relations to Russia, the word "loyalty" is either significant or merely a polite phrase.

Wednesday, July 29, 1914

SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	London, Petrograd, Paris, and Rome Berlin	Paris, Berlin, Petro- grad
Belgium	London etc.	—
France	London etc., London	Rome, Petrograd, Brus- sels, Frankfort, Mu- nich, Vienna, Berlin, London, Belgrade
Germany	Paris Emperor to Czar	Czar to Emperor
Great Britain	Rome, Berlin, Paris, Vienna	Berlin, Petrograd, Vi- enna, Rome, Con- stantinople, Nish, from Russian Am- bassador
Russia	Berlin, London and Paris, Paris	Berlin, Nish, Paris, London Serbian Crownprince to Czar.
Serbia	—	—

*Austria-Hungary* makes renewed efforts to convince the Powers of the justice of her case, and unequivocally accepts Sir E. Grey's first proposal of mediation between Petrograd and Vienna. At the same time, while refusing to discuss the "wording of the note," she is ready to have direct conversations with Petrograd on "a much broader basis of discussion in declaring that she had no desire to injure any Russian interests" nor to annex territory or to touch the "sovereignty of Serbia." She is much disturbed by French and especially Russian mobilisation and announces that the latter may force her to proceed to general mobilisation on her part.

*Belgium* announces that she has "decided to place her army upon a strengthened peace footing."

*France* continues to be suspicious of Germany, whom she holds responsible for Austria-Hungary's determination to put a stop to Serbian intrigues. While publishing many notices to the effect that Germany and Austria-Hungary were mobilising, she makes no mention of the Russian mobilisation except as measures of defence forced upon Russia. Several of the French despatches published on this day are by their contents proved to have been written earlier.

*Germany* is greatly troubled by the mobilisation going on in France and Russia and declares that if it continues she will have to declare *Kriegsgefahr*. The Emperor exchanges telegrams with the Czar begging him to intercede for peace. Germany continues her pressure on Austria to come to an understanding with Russia, and wishes to work together with Great Britain, whose neutrality she wishes to secure in case of war.

*Great Britain* believes direct conversations between Vienna and Petrograd "the best possible solution." Sir E. Grey is erroneously informed that Austria-Hungary has refused them, and reverting to his conference or mediation plan declares his willingness to accept "any method that Germany thought possible in the interests of peace." In case of war, Sir E. Grey declares, England would "have to decide what British interests required." The suggestion of a possible invasion of Belgium first broached on this day is not denounced as wrong. Sir E. Grey also

suggests that Austria should halt after taking Belgrade to give the Powers the chance of adjusting the difficulties.

*Russia* claims that Russian interests were in this case Serbian interests. She also claims that Austria-Hungary had "categorically refused to continue an exchange of ideas," and mobilises the districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kasan. Receiving France's promise of unconditional support she "hastens" her "military preparations."

*Serbia* does not publish any documents of this day.

*Italy* suggests that Austria-Hungary "convert into a binding engagement to Europe" her declaration that she wished neither "to destroy the independence of Serbia nor to acquire Serbian territory." Unfortunately this suggestion was not pressed, for Italy believed that thus "Russia might be induced to remain quiet."

### Austria-Hungary :

*To St. Petersburg, London, Paris, and Rome*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 44

*Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at St. Petersburg, London, Paris, and Rome.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

FOR your Excellency's information.

I have to-day handed to the Imperial German Ambassador the following memorandum in answer to a *démarche* made here by him :<sup>1</sup>

### *Memorandum*

The Imperial and Royal Government have received with deep gratitude information of the communication which the Imperial German Ambassador made to them on the 28th inst.<sup>1</sup> with regard to the request of the British Cabinet that the Imperial German Government should use their influence with the Vienna Cabinet that they might regard the answer from Belgrade either as satisfactory, or as a basis for discussion. So far as concerns what was said by the British Secretary of State to Prince Lichnowsky, the Imperial and Royal Government desire in the first place to draw attention to the fact that the Servian answer in no way contains an acceptance of all our demands with one single exception, as Sir E. Grey appears to assume,<sup>2</sup> but rather that on most points reservations are formulated, which materially detract from the value of the concessions which are made. The points which are not accepted are, however, precisely those which contain some guarantee for the real attainment of the end in view.

The Imperial and Royal Government cannot conceal their astonishment at the assumption that their action against Servia was directed against Russia and Russian influence in the Balkans, for this implies the supposition that the propaganda directed against the Monarchy has not merely a Servian but a Russian origin.<sup>3</sup> The basis

<sup>1</sup> This seems to refer to German White Book, Exhibit 15, July 27, and Exhibit 14, July 28. See also British Blue Book No. 84, July 29.

<sup>2</sup> British Blue Book Nos. 46 and 48, July 27.

<sup>3</sup> The logic of this inference is from the Austro-Hungarian point of view irrefutable.

of our consideration has hitherto been rather that official Russia has no connection with these tendencies, which are hostile to the Monarchy, and that our present action is directed exclusively against Serbia, while our feelings for Russia, as we can assure Sir E. Grey, are entirely friendly.

Further, the Imperial and Royal Government must point out that to their great regret they are no longer in a position to adopt an attitude towards the Servian reply in the sense of the British suggestion, since at the time of the *démarche* made by Germany a state of war between the Monarchy and Serbia had already arisen, and the Servian reply has accordingly already been outstripped by events.

The Imperial and Royal Government take this opportunity of observing that the Royal Servian Government, even before they communicated their reply, had taken steps towards the mobilisation of the Servian forces, and thereafter they allowed three days to elapse without showing any inclination to abandon the point of view contained in their reply, whereupon the declaration of war followed on our side.

If the British Cabinet is prepared to use its influence on the Russian Government with a view to the maintenance of peace between the Great Powers, and with a view to the localisation of the war which has been forced upon us by many years of Servian intrigues, the Imperial and Royal Government could only welcome this.<sup>1</sup>

*From Paris*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK NO. 45

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 29, 1914.*

FRANCE is unmistakably making certain military preparations as is announced by the newspapers, perhaps with a certain exaggeration.

As I learn in strictest confidence, Baron Schoen is commissioned to discuss these preparations<sup>2</sup> with M. Viviani to-day, and to point out that in these circumstances Germany may be compelled to take similar measures which necessarily could not be kept secret, and which could not fail to cause great public excitement when they became known. In this way the two countries, although they are only striving for peace, will be compelled to at least a partial mobilisation, which would be dangerous.

Further, in accordance with these instructions, Baron Schoen will declare that Germany has a lively desire that the conflict between us and Serbia should remain localised, and that in this Germany relies on the support of France.

<sup>1</sup> This is an unequivocal acceptance of Sir E. Grey's original proposal of mediation between Petrograd and Vienna.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, referring to "yesterday afternoon," i.e. July 29.

*From Berlin*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 46

*Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

As early as Sunday the German Government declared at St. Petersburg that Russian mobilisation would have as a consequence German mobilisation.<sup>1</sup>

Thereupon there followed on the part of Russia the reply announced in my telegram of the 27th inst.<sup>2</sup> Following this a telegram has to-day been sent to St. Petersburg, stating that owing to the further progress of the Russian measures of mobilisation Germany might be brought to mobilise.<sup>3</sup>

*From St. Petersburg*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 47

*Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

As I have learned from the German Ambassador that M. Sazonof is showing himself greatly excited over your Excellency's alleged disinclination to continue the exchange of ideas with Russia, and over the mobilisation of Austria-Hungary, which is supposed to be much more extensive than is necessary, and, therefore, directed against Russia, I visited the Minister in order to remove certain misunderstandings which seemed to me to exist.

The Minister began by making the point that Austria-Hungary categorically refused to continue an exchange of ideas. I agreed in view of your Excellency's telegram of the 28th July that your Excellency had indeed declined, after all that had occurred, to discuss the wording of the note, and in general the Austro-Hungarian-Servian conflict, but said that I must make it clear that I was in a position to suggest a much broader basis of discussion<sup>4</sup> in declaring that we had no desire to injure any Russian interests, that we had no intention, naturally on the assumption that the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia remained localised, of annexing Servian territory, and that we also had no idea of touching the sovereignty of Servia. I was convinced that your Excellency would always be ready to keep in touch with St. Petersburg with regard to Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests.

M. Sazonof gave me to understand that he had been convinced of this so far as territory was concerned, but so far as the sovereignty of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. German White Book Exhibits 10 and 10b, July 26.

<sup>2</sup> See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 33, July 27.

<sup>3</sup> Not given in the German White Book or the Russian Orange Book. Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 42, July 28.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Chancellor's Speech, note to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50, July 30.

the country was in question he must continue to hold the opinion that to force on Serbia our conditions would result in Serbia becoming a vassal State. This, however, would upset the equilibrium in the Balkans, and this was how Russian interests became involved. He returned to the question of a discussion of the note, the action of Sir E. Grey, etc., and he desired again to point out to me that Russia recognised our legitimate interest, and desired to give it full satisfaction, but that this should be clothed in a form which would be acceptable to Serbia. I expressed the view that this was not a Russian but a Servian interest, *whereupon M. Sazonof claimed that Russian interests<sup>1</sup> were in this case Servian interests*, so that I was obliged to make an end of the vicious circle by going on to a new topic.

I mentioned that I had heard that there was a feeling of anxiety in Russia, because we had mobilised eight corps for action against Serbia. M. Sazonof assured me that it was not he (who knew nothing about this) but the Chief of the General Staff who had expressed this anxiety. I endeavoured to convince the Minister that any unprejudiced person could easily be persuaded that our southern corps could not constitute a menace for Russia.

I indicated to the Minister that it would be well if his Imperial Master were informed of the true situation, more especially as it was urgently necessary, if it was desired to maintain peace, that a speedy end should be put to the military competition (*litzitieren*) which now threatened to ensue on account of false news. M. Sazonof very characteristically expressed the view that *he could communicate this to the Chief of the General Staff, for he saw His Majesty every day*.

The Minister further informed me that a Ukase would be signed to-day, which would give orders for a mobilisation in a somewhat extended form. He was able, however, to assure me in the most official way that these troops were not intended to attack us. They would *only stand to arms in case Russian interests in the Balkans should be in danger*. An explanatory note would make this clear, for the question here was one of a measure of precaution which the Emperor Nicholas had found to be justified, since we, who in any case have the advantage of quicker mobilisation, have now also already so great a start. In earnest words I drew M. Sazonof's attention to the impression which such a measure would make in our country. I went on to express doubt whether the explanatory note would be calculated to soften the impression, whereupon the Minister again gave expression to assurances regarding the harmlessness(!) of this measure.

<sup>1</sup> A possible explanation of the remark that "Russian interests were in this case Serbian interests" may be found in British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, where Sazonof cannot allow "Austria to become the predominant Power in the Balkans."

*To Berlin*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 48

*Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

I HAVE just heard from Herr von Tschirschky, that the Russian Ambassador has told him that he has been notified by his Government that the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan are being mobilised. He said that Russia was outraged in her honour as a Great Power,<sup>1</sup> and was obliged to take corresponding measures. The Russian mobilisation is confirmed by the commanders of our Galician forces, and, according to a communication from the Imperial and Royal Military Attaché, in a conversation which M. Sazonof had to-day with the German Ambassador it was no longer denied.<sup>2</sup>

I request your Excellency to bring the above without delay to the knowledge of the German Government, and at the same time to emphasise that if the Russian measures of mobilisation are not stopped without delay, our general mobilisation would have, on military grounds, to follow at once.

As a last effort to maintain the peace of Europe, I considered it desirable that our representative and the representative of Germany at St. Petersburg, and, if necessary, at Paris, should at once be instructed to declare to the Governments to whom they are accredited in a friendly manner, that the continuance of the Russian mobilisation would have as a result counter-measures in Germany and Austria-Hungary, which must lead to serious consequences.<sup>3</sup>

Your Excellency will add that, as can be understood, in our military operations against Servia we will not allow ourselves to be diverted from our path.

The Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at St. Petersburg and Paris are receiving identical instructions to make the above declaration as soon as their German colleague receives similar instructions.

*To St. Petersburg*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 49

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

In answer to your Excellency's telegram of the 29th July.

I am of course still ready to explain to M. Sazonof, through your Excellency, the various points contained in our note addressed to

<sup>1</sup> The reason why "Russia was outraged in her honour as a Great Power" is not given. The interesting part of this passage is that Austria-Hungary was not the only country which believed that her honor as a Great Power demanded a certain course of action of her.

<sup>2</sup> See German White Book, Narrative, pp. 351 to 360.

<sup>3</sup> This was evidently an attempt on Austria's part to keep the peace among the nations.



Servia which however has already been outstripped by recent events. I should also attach special importance, in accordance with the suggestion made to me through M. Schebeko, also to discussing on this occasion in a confidential and friendly manner the questions which affect directly our relations towards Russia. From this it might be hoped that it would be possible to remove the ambiguities which have arisen and to secure the development in a friendly manner of our relations towards our neighbours, which is so desirable an object.<sup>1</sup>

**Belgium :**

*To Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 8

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.*

Sir,

*Brussels, July 29, 1914.*

THE Belgian Government have decided to place the army upon a strengthened peace footing.

This step should in no way be confused with mobilisation.

Owing to the small extent of her territory, all Belgium consists, in some degree, of a frontier zone. Her army on the ordinary peace footing consists of only one class of armed militia ; on the strengthened peace footing, owing to the recall of three classes, her army divisions and her cavalry division comprise effective units of the same strength as those of the corps permanently maintained in the frontier zones of the neighbouring Powers.

This information will enable you to reply to any questions which may be addressed to you.

**France :**

*From Rome*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 84

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 29, 1914.*

THE Consulta considers that, in spite of the declaration of war by Austria on Servia, there is no reason why the diplomatic efforts for calling together a conference at London with a view to mediation should be interrupted.

BARRÈRE.

<sup>1</sup> This is another evidence that Germany's influence upon Vienna was having effect or that Austria-Hungary of her own accord was willing to try and avert a general war by making explanations to Russia.

*To St. Petersburg, London, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople.*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 85

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to St. Petersburg, London, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople, Belgrade.*

*Paris, July 29, 1914.*

THE Austro-German attitude is becoming clearer. Austria, uneasy concerning the Slav propaganda, has seized the opportunity<sup>1</sup> of the crime of Serajevo in order to punish the Servian intrigues, and to obtain in this quarter guarantees which, according as events are allowed to develop or not, will either affect only the Servian Government and army, or become territorial questions. Germany intervenes<sup>2</sup> between her ally and the other Powers and declares that the question is a local one, namely, the punishment of a political crime committed in the past, and for the future sure guarantees that the anti-Austrian intrigues will be put an end to. The German Government thinks that Russia should be content with the official and formal assurances given by Austria, to the effect that she does not seek territorial aggrandisement and that she will respect the integrity of Servia; in these circumstances the danger of war can only come from Russia, if she seeks to intervene in a question which is well defined. In these circumstances any action for the maintenance of peace must therefore take place at St. Petersburg alone.

This sophism,<sup>3</sup> which would relieve Germany from intervening at Vienna, has been maintained unsuccessfully at Paris by Herr von Schoen, who has vainly endeavoured to draw us into identical Franco-German action at St. Petersburg; it has been also expounded in London to Sir E. Grey. In France, as in England, a reply was given that the St. Petersburg Cabinet have, from the beginning, given the greatest proofs of their moderation, especially by associating themselves with the Powers in advising Servia to yield to the requirements of the Austrian note. Russia does not therefore in any way threaten peace; it is at Vienna that action must be taken; it is from there that the danger will come, from the moment that they refuse to be content with the almost complete submission of Servia to exorbitant demands; that they refuse to accept the co-operation of the Powers in the discussion of the points which remain to be arranged between Austria and Servia; and, finally, that they do not hesitate to make a declaration of war as precipitate as the original Austro-Hungarian note.

The attitude at Berlin, as at Vienna, is still dilatory. In the former capital, while protesting that the Germans desire to safe-

<sup>1</sup> The U. S. diplomatic agent, Mr. F. H. Mallett, reported to the Department of State in Washington at the time that the Serajevo murder was undoubtedly instigated by Serbia, and that a world war might ensue. See *New York Herald*, July 30, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> For Germany's explanation of her action, see German White Book, Exhibit 1, and British Blue Book No. 67, July 28, with note.

<sup>3</sup> Granting that this term is used in all sincerity, it shows how widely apart France and Germany were in viewing the events leading up to the war, since the expression of Germany's honest belief appeared as a "sophism" to France.

guard general peace by common action between the four Powers, the idea of a conference is rejected without any other expedient being suggested,<sup>1</sup> and while they refuse to take any positive action at Vienna. In the Austrian capital they would like to keep St. Petersburg in play with the illusion of an *entente* which might result from direct conversations, while they are taking action against Servia.

In these circumstances it seems essential that the St. Petersburg Cabinet, whose desire to unravel this crisis peacefully is manifest, should immediately give their adherence to the British proposal.<sup>2</sup> This proposal must be strongly supported at Berlin in order to decide Herr von Jagow to take real action at Vienna capable of stopping Austria and preventing her from supplementing her diplomatic advantage by military successes. The Austro-Hungarian Government would, indeed, not be slow to take advantage of it in order to impose on Servia, under the elastic expression of "guarantees," conditions which, in spite of all assurances that no territorial aggrandisement was being sought, would in effect modify the status of Eastern Europe, and would run the risk of gravely compromising the general peace either at once or in the near future.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

*From St. Petersburg*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 86

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

I AM now in a position to assure Your Excellency that the Russian Government will acquiesce in any measures which France and Great Britain may propose in order to maintain peace. My British colleague is telegraphing to London to the same effect.<sup>3</sup>

PALÉOLOGUE.

*From Brussels*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 87

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, July 29, 1914.*

I REPORT the following impressions of my interview with M. Davignon and with several persons in a position to have exact in-

<sup>1</sup> This is an error, see Chancellor's Speech in note to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28.

<sup>2</sup> This shows that Russia had not accepted the conference idea on July 29. France and Russia, therefore, seem to be working somewhat at variance with each other — see, however, next number.

<sup>3</sup> British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, which gives as the reason for Sazonof's willingness to have a conference that the "Austrian Government had now definitely declined direct conversation." See, however, Chancellor's Speech in note to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28.

formation. The attitude of Germany is enigmatical and justifies every apprehension; it seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian Government would have taken an initiative which would lead, according to a pre-conceived plan, to a declaration of war, without previous arrangement with the Emperor William.<sup>1</sup>

The German Government stand "with grounded arms" ready to take peaceful or warlike action as circumstances may require, but there is so much anxiety everywhere that a sudden intervention against us would not surprise anybody here. My Russian and British colleagues share this feeling.

The Belgian Government are taking steps which harmonise with the statement made to me yesterday by M. Davignon that everything will be put in readiness for the defence of the neutrality of the country.

KLOBUKOWSKI.

*From Frankfort*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 88

*M. Ronssin, French Consul-General at Frankfort, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Frankfort, July 29, 1914.*

I NOTIFY you of important movements of troops yesterday and to-night. This morning several regiments in service dress arrived here, especially by the roads from Darmstadt, Cassel, and Mayence, which are full of soldiers. The bridges and railways are guarded under the pretext <sup>2</sup> of preparations for the autumn manoeuvres.

RONSSIN.

*From Munich*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 89<sup>3</sup>

*M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Munich, July 29, 1914.*

I AM informed that the mills at Illkirch (Alsace-Lorraine) have been asked to stop delivery to their ordinary clients and to keep all their output for the army.

From Strassburg information has been received of the transport of motor guns used for firing on aeroplanes and dirigibles.

Under the pretext of a change in the autumn manoeuvres the non-commissioned officers and men of the Bavarian infantry regiments at

<sup>1</sup> This seems to have been France's firm conviction. For a discussion of Germany's influence or lack of influence on Austria-Hungary see John W. Burgess, *The European War*, A. C. McClurg & Co., Chicago.

<sup>2</sup> The annual manoeuvres in Germany begin in July. For the subject of German mobilisation see M. G. Price, *The Diplomatic History of the War*, Chas. Scribner's Sons, and E. von Mach, *Germany's Point of View*.

<sup>3</sup> See note to No. 88.

*Metz*, who were on leave in Bavaria for the harvest, received orders yesterday to return immediately.

ALLIZÉ.

*From Vienna*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 90<sup>1</sup>

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

**THE** French Consul at Prague confirms the mobilisation of the 8th army corps which had already been announced, and that of the Landwehr division of this army corps. The cavalry divisions in Galicia are also mobilising; regiments and cavalry divisions from Vienna and Budapest have already been transported to the Russian frontier. Reservists are now being called together in this district.

There is a rumour that the Austro-Hungarian Government, in order to be in a position to meet any danger, and perhaps in order to impress St. Petersburg, intend to decide on a general mobilisation of their forces on the 30th July, or the 1st August. To conclude, it is certain the Emperor will return from Ischl to Vienna to-morrow.

DUMAINE.

*From St. Petersburg*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 91

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

THE direct conversation, to which the Russian Government had invited the Austro-Hungarian Government in a friendly spirit, has been refused by the latter.<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, the Russian General Staff have satisfied themselves that Austria is hurrying on her military preparations against Russia, and is pressing forward the mobilisation which has begun on the Galician frontier. As a result the order to mobilise will be despatched to-night to thirteen army corps, which are destined to operate eventually against Austria.

In spite of the failure of his proposal, M. Sazonof accepts<sup>3</sup> the idea of a conference of the four Powers in London; further, he does not attach any importance to the title officially given to the discussions, and will support all British efforts in favour of peace.

PALÉOLOGUE.

<sup>1</sup> See note to No. 88.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, and for the error in this statement Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29.

<sup>3</sup> This contains the information given above as a separate telegram, No. 86.

*From Berlin*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 92

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

I ASKED the Secretary of State to-day <sup>1</sup> how the question of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, which seemed to him yesterday the best means of arriving at a *détente*, stood. He answered that at St. Petersburg they seemed well disposed towards them and that he had asked Vienna to take this course. He was awaiting the reply. The British Government, after seeing the suggestion of a conference rejected, had let it be known that they would view with favour the inception of such conversations between Austria and Russia, and had asked Germany to urge Austria, which the Imperial Government are not failing to do.

I asked Herr von Jagow if he had at last received the Servian reply to Austria and what he thought of it. He replied that he saw in it a basis for possible negotiation.<sup>2</sup> I added that it was just on that account that I considered the rupture by Austria, after she had received such a document, inexplicable.

The Secretary of State then remarked that with Eastern nations one could never obtain sufficient guarantees, and that Austria wished to be able to supervise the carrying out of promises made to her, a supervision which Servia refused. This, in the eyes of the Secretary of State, is the cardinal point. I answered Herr von Jagow that Servia, as she wished to remain independent, was bound to reject the control of a single Power, but that an International Commission would not have the same character. The Balkan States have more than one, for instance the Financial Commission at Athens. One could imagine, I said, for instance, among other combinations, a Provisional International Commission, charged with the duty of controlling the police inquiry demanded by Austria; it was clear, by this instance, that the reply of Servia opened the door to conversations and did not justify a rupture.

I then asked the Secretary of State if, leaving aside direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg to which Sir E. Grey had given his adherence, he did not think that common action could be exercised by the four Powers by means of their Ambassadors. He answered in the affirmative, adding that at this moment the London Cabinet were confining themselves to exercising their influence in support of direct conversations.

At the end of the afternoon the Imperial Chancellor asked the

<sup>1</sup> The contents of this telegram seem to refer to events of the previous day.

<sup>2</sup> This cannot possibly have been said on July 29, since Austria-Hungary had declared war on Serbia, and the latter had begun the hostilities on July 27, cf. British Blue Book No. 56 under date of July 28.

British Ambassador to come and see him.<sup>1</sup> He spoke to him of the proposal of Sir E. Grey for the meeting of a conference; he told him that he had not been able to accept a proposal which seemed to impose the authority of the Powers on Austria; he assured my colleague of his sincere desire for peace and of the efforts he was making to that effect at Vienna, but he added that Russia was alone able to maintain peace or let loose war.

Sir E. Goschen answered that he did not agree, and that if war broke out Austria would be chiefly responsible, for it was inadmissible for her to have broken with Servia after the reply of the latter.

Without discussing this point, the Chancellor said that he was trying his utmost to obtain direct conversations between Austria and Russia; he knew that England looked on such conversations with a favourable eye. He added that his own action would be rendered very difficult at Vienna, if it were true that Russia had mobilised fourteen army corps on the Austrian frontier. He asked my colleague to call Sir E. Grey's attention to what he had said.

Sir E. Goschen has telegraphed to London to this effect.<sup>2</sup>

The attitude of the Chancellor is very probably the result of the last interview of Sir E. Grey with Prince Lichnowsky. Up to quite the last days they flattered themselves here that England would remain out of the question, and the impression produced on the German Government and on the financiers and business men by her attitude is profound.

JULES CAMBON.

*From Vienna*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 93<sup>3</sup>

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

THE opinion of my British, Russian and Italian colleagues agrees with mine concerning the impossibility of preventing the outbreak of hostilities between Austria and Servia, since all attempts to avoid the collision have failed.

M. Schebeko had asked that the negotiations begun at St. Petersburg by MM. Sazonof and Szápáry should be continued and made more effective by special powers being conferred on the latter, but Count Berchtold has flatly refused. He showed in this way that Austria-Hungary does not tolerate any intervention which would prevent her from inflicting punishment and humiliation on Servia.

The Duke of Avarna admits that it is very probable that the imminence of a general insurrection among the Southern Slav inhab-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 71, July 28, received and listed under July 29. This interview took place on July 28, and proves that this French despatch is wrongly dated.

<sup>2</sup> British Blue Book No. 71, July 28, but received and therefore listed under July 29.

<sup>3</sup> This despatch, like the previous one, while dated July 29, must have been written before Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, which was on July 28.



itants precipitated the resolutions of the Monarchy. He still clings to the hope that, after a first success of the Austro-Hungarian arms, but not before this, mediation might be able to limit the conflict.

DUMAINE.

*To London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople, Belgrade*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 94

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople, Belgrade.*

*Paris, July 29, 1914.*

THE following communication was semi-officially made to me this morning by the German Ambassador:—

"The German Government are still continuing their efforts to obtain the consent of the Austrian Government to a friendly conversation which would give the latter an opportunity of stating exactly the object and extent of the operations in Servia. The Berlin Cabinet hope to receive declarations which will be of a kind to satisfy Russia. The German efforts are in no way impeded by the declaration of war which has occurred." A similar communication will be made at St. Petersburg.

During the course of a conversation which I had this morning with Baron von Schoen, the latter stated to me that the German Government did not know what the intentions of Vienna were. When Berlin knows how far Austria wishes to go, there will be a basis of discussion which will make conversations with a view to intervention easier.

When I observed that the military operations which had been begun would not perhaps allow any time for conversation, and that the German Government ought to use their influence at Vienna to delay them, the Ambassador answered that Berlin could not exercise any pressure, but that he hoped that the operations would not be pushed forward very actively.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

*To London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Constantinople, Rome, Belgrade*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 95

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Constantinople, Rome, Belgrade.*

*Paris, July 29, 1914.*

M. ISVOLSKY came to me by order of his Government to communicate a telegram addressed by M. Sazonof to Berlin.<sup>1</sup> It appears

<sup>1</sup> This telegram is not published either in the Russian Orange Book or the German White Book. It may be the telegram British Blue Book No. 70 published under date of July 29.

from this information that, in consequence of the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Servia, the measures of mobilisation already taken with regard to the largest part of the Austro-Hungarian army, and finally the refusal<sup>1</sup> of Count Berchtold to continue negotiations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, Russia had decided to mobilise in the provinces of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kazan. While informing the German Government to this effect, the Russian Ambassador at Berlin was instructed to add that these military precautions were not in any way directed against Germany, and also did not imply aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary; furthermore the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had not been recalled.

The Russian Ambassador also gave me the substance of two telegrams<sup>2</sup> addressed to London by M. Sazonof: the first, after pointing out that the declaration of war on Servia put an end to the conversations of the Russian Minister with the Austrian Ambassador, asked England to exercise her influence, as quickly as possible, with a view to mediation and to the immediate cessation of Austrian military operations (the continuation of which gave Austria time to crush Servia while mediation was dragging on); the second communicated the impression received by M. Sazonof from his conversations with the German Ambassador that Germany favours Austria's uncompromising attitude and is not exercising any influence on her. The Russian Minister thinks that the attitude of Germany is very disquieting,<sup>3</sup> and considers that England is in a better position than the other Powers to take steps at Berlin with a view to exercising pressure on Vienna.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

*From Rome*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 96

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 29, 1914.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has been officially informed by the Russian Ambassador that his Government, in consequence of the declaration of war by Austria on Servia and of the measures of mobilisation which were from this moment being taken by Austria, had given the order to mobilise in the districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan.<sup>4</sup> He added that this step had no aggressive character against Germany, and that the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had not been recalled.

In speaking of this communication the Marquis di San Giuliano told me that unfortunately throughout this affair Austria and Germany had been, and were still, convinced that Russia would not

<sup>1</sup> For the error of this statement see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29.

<sup>2</sup> British Blue Book Nos. 93, 2 and 3, July 30.

<sup>3</sup> This statement is not contained in the despatch presented in London.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 48, July 29.

move. In this connection he read to me a despatch from M. Bollati reporting an interview which he had had yesterday with Herr von Jagow, in which the latter had again repeated to him that he did not think that Russia would move. He based this belief on the fact that the Russian Government had just sent an agent to Berlin to treat about some financial questions. The Austrian Ambassador at Berlin also told his British colleague that he did not believe in a general war, since Russia was not in the mood or in the condition to make war.<sup>1</sup>

The Marquis di San Giuliano does not share this opinion. He thinks that if Austria contents herself with humiliating Serbia and with exacting, besides the acceptance of the note, some material advantages which do not involve her territory, Russia can still find some means of coming to an agreement with her. But if Austria wishes either to dismember Serbia or to destroy her as an independent State, he thinks that it would be impossible for Russia not to intervene by military measures.

In spite of the extreme gravity of the situation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs does not seem to me to despair of the possibility of an agreement. He thinks that England can still exercise a great deal of influence at Berlin in the direction of peace. He had yesterday, he told me, a long conversation with the British Ambassador, Sir R. Rodd,<sup>2</sup> in order to show him to what extent British intervention might be effective. He said to me in conclusion, "If your Government are of the same opinion, they could on their side make representations to this effect in London."<sup>3</sup>

BARRÈRE.

*To London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 97

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.*

*Paris, July 29, 1914.*

I SHOULD be obliged if you would ask Sir E. Grey to be good enough to renew as soon as possible at Berlin, in the form which he may consider most opportune and effective, his proposal of mediation by the four Powers, which had in principle<sup>4</sup> obtained the adherence of the German Government.

The Russian Government on their side will have expressed the same desire directly to the British Government; the declaration of war by Austria on Serbia, her sending of troops to the Austro-Russian frontier,<sup>5</sup> the consequent Russian mobilisation on the Galician

<sup>1</sup> This statement, if true, seems to disprove the assertion popularly made that Germany and Austria-Hungary wished to bring about a general war.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 57, written July 27, but received and published under date of July 28. Barrère says "yesterday," which shows that also this telegram was written, at least in part, on July 28.

<sup>3</sup> For this interview see British Blue Book No. 80, July 29.

<sup>4</sup> British Blue Book No. 46, July 27.

<sup>5</sup> There is no proof given for this assertion.

frontier have in fact put an end to the direct Austro-Russian conversations.

The explanations which the German Government are going to ask for at Vienna, in accordance with the statement of Baron von Schoen which I have reported to you, in order to learn the intention of the Austrian Government, will allow the four Powers to exercise effective action between Vienna and St. Petersburg for the maintenance of peace.

I would ask you also to point out to the British Secretary of State how important it would be for him to obtain from the Italian Government the most whole-hearted continuance of their support in co-operating in the action of the four Powers in favour of peace.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

*From London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 98

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 29, 1914.*

IN his interview to-day with my German colleague, Sir E. Grey observed that, the overtures of M. Sazonof for direct conversations between Russia and Austria not having been accepted<sup>1</sup> at Vienna, it would be well to return to his proposal of friendly intervention by the four Powers which are not directly interested. This suggestion has been accepted in principle<sup>2</sup> by the German Government, but they have objected to the idea of a conference or of mediation. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has invited Prince Lichnowsky to ask his Government that they should themselves propose a new formula. Whatever it may be, if it admits of the maintenance of peace, it will be accepted by Great Britain, France and Italy.

The German Ambassador was to have forwarded Sir E. Grey's request to Berlin immediately. In giving me an account of this conversation, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that Germany's reply to this communication and to that of Russia concerning the mobilisation of four army corps on the Austrian frontier would allow us to realise the intentions of the German Government. My German colleague having asked Sir E. Grey what the intentions of the British Government were, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that he had nothing to state for the present.

Sir E. Grey did not disguise the fact that he found the situation very grave and that he had little hope of a peaceful solution.

PAUL CAMBON.

<sup>1</sup> This error makes the round in the Entente despatches. Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29, where Austria-Hungary, while unwilling to discuss "the wording of the note," makes it "clear that I [Austro-Hungarian Ambassador] was in a position to suggest a much broader basis of discussion."

<sup>2</sup> British Blue Book No. 46, July 27.

*From Belgrade*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 99

*M. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Belgrade, July 29, 1914.*

THE Crown Prince, as soon as the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was received, telegraphed <sup>1</sup> to the Tsar to ask his help. My Russian colleague tells me that he has just communicated to M. Pashitch His Majesty's reply.

The Tsar thanks <sup>2</sup> the Prince for having turned to him at so critical a juncture; he declares that everything has been done to arrive at a peaceful solution of the dispute, and formally assures the Prince that, if this object cannot be attained, Russia will never cease to interest herself in the fate of Servia.

BOPPE.

*From St. Petersburg*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 100

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

THE German Ambassador came to tell M. Sazonof that if Russia does not stop her military preparations the German army will receive the order to mobilise.

M. Sazonof replied that the Russian preparations have been caused,<sup>3</sup> on the one hand, by the obstinate and uncompromising attitude of Austria, and on the other hand by the fact that eight Austro-Hungarian army corps are already mobilised.

The tone in which Count Pourtalès delivered this communication has decided the Russian Government this very night to order the mobilisation of the thirteen army corps which are to operate against Austria.

PALÉOLOGUE.

Germany:

*To Paris*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 17

*Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris on July 29th, 1914.*

NEWS received here regarding French preparations of war multiplies from hour to hour. I request that you call the attention of the

<sup>1</sup> Russian Orange Book No. 6, July 24.

<sup>2</sup> Russian Orange Book No. 40, July 27.

<sup>3</sup> According to this despatch part of the Russian mobilization had taken place previously, while part was to be ordered on the evening of July 29. As regards the earlier mobilization orders cf. the word of honor given by the Russian Chief of Staff, German White Book, p. 556, that up to 3 P.M., July 29, "nowhere there had been a mobilisation, viz. calling in of a single man or horse."

French Government to this and accentuate that such measures would call forth counter-measures on our part. We should have to proclaim threatening state of war (*drohende Kriegsgefahr*), and while this would not mean a call for the reserves or mobilisation, yet the tension would be aggravated. We continue to hope for the preservation of peace.

*From the Czar*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 21

*II. The Czar to His Majesty.*

*Peterhof Palace, July 29th, 1 P.M.*

I AM glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask You earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared against a weak country and in Russia the indignation which I fully share is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To prevent such a calamity as a European war would be, I urge You in the name of our old friendship to do all in Your power to restrain Your ally from going too far.

(Signed) NICOLAS.

*To St. Petersburg*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 22

*III. His Majesty to the Czar.*

*July 29th, 6.30 P.M.*

I HAVE received Your telegram and I share Your desire for the conservation of peace. However: I cannot — as I told You in my first telegram — consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an “ignominious war.” Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the promises of Serbia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable.

According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises of Serbia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of Serbia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between Your Government and Vienna, an understanding which — as I have already telegraphed You — my Government endeavours to aid with all possible effort. Naturally military measures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would undermine

my position as mediator which — upon Your appeal to my friendship and aid — I willingly accepted.

(Signed) WILHELM.

**Great Britain :**

*From St. Petersburg*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 70

*Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London, July 29, 1914.*

(1.) *Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, dated July 28, 1914.*

IN consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Serbia, the Imperial Government will announce to-morrow (29th) the mobilisation in the military circumscriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan. Please inform German Government, confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive intention against Germany.

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post.

(2.) *Telegram to Count Benckendorff.*<sup>1</sup>

The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end <sup>2</sup> to the idea of direct communications between Austria and Russia. Action by London Cabinet in order to set on foot mediation with a view to suspension of military operations of Austria against Serbia is now most urgent.

Unless military operations are stopped, mediation would only allow matters to drag on and give Austria time to crush Serbia.<sup>3</sup>

*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 71

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 28, 1914.*

AT invitation of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his Excellency this evening.<sup>4</sup> He said that he wished me to tell you that he was most anxious that Germany should work together with England for maintenance of general peace, as they had done successfully in the

<sup>1</sup> Russian Ambassador in London.

<sup>2</sup> This seems to indicate that Sazonof considered the direct conversations closed. Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29, and footnote 1 to French Yellow Book No. 98, July 29.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 95, July 29, where two telegrams from Sazonof to Count Benckendorff are mentioned. The second one is not given here. It was of a kind to arouse suspicion of Germany. There is, however, nothing either in the British Blue Book or the Russian Orange Book that would have borne it out.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 92, July 29.



last European crisis. He had not been able to accept your proposal for a conference<sup>1</sup> of representatives of the Great Powers, because he did not think that it would be effective, and because such a conference would in his opinion have had appearance of an "Areopagus" consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining Powers; but his inability to accept proposed conference must not be regarded as militating against his strong desire for effective co-operation. You could be assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and St. Petersburg to get the two Governments to discuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussions would take place and lead to a satisfactory result, but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilised fourteen army corps in the south, he thought situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilising, would have to take similar measures, and if war were to result, Russia would be entirely responsible.<sup>2</sup> I ventured to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian note, which, to my mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded by Austria, and which in any case offered a basis for discussion, surely a certain portion of responsibility would rest with her. His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Serbia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do. He reiterated his desire to co-operate with England and his intention to do his utmost to maintain general peace. "A war between the Great Powers must be avoided" were his last words.

Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here.<sup>3</sup>

*From St. Petersburg*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 72

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank you for the language you had held to the German Ambassador, as reported in

<sup>1</sup> From British Blue Book No. 46, July 27, it appears that Germany had accepted "in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers."

<sup>2</sup> This claim made on July 29 is important because later France wished to make it appear that Germany was not sincere and advanced this argument too late to deserve any credence. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 127, August 1.

<sup>3</sup> If true this would seem to disprove the charge that either Germany or Austria-Hungary was plotting to bring about a world war.

your telegram <sup>1</sup> to Berlin, substance of which I communicated to his Excellency. He took a pessimistic view of the situation, having received the same disquieting <sup>2</sup> news from Vienna as had reached His Majesty's Government. I said it was important that we should know the real intentions of the Imperial Government, and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurances which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect of Serbia's integrity and independence. I added that I was sure any arrangement for averting a European war would be welcomed by His Majesty's Government. In reply his Excellency stated that if Serbia were attacked Russia would not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points, and that order for mobilisation against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria crossed Servian frontier.

I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to give moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from the beginning I had not ceased to do so, and that the German Ambassador at Vienna should now in his turn use his restraining influence. I made it clear to his Excellency that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted if Serbia were attacked by Austria.

As regards the suggestion of conference, the Ambassador had received no instructions, and before acting with me the French and Italian Ambassadors are still waiting for their final instructions.

### *From Vienna*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK NO. 73

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.*  
— (Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

I HAVE received *note verbale* from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that, the Servian Government not having replied to note of 23rd July <sup>3</sup> in a satisfactory manner, Imperial and Royal Government is compelled itself to provide for protection of its rights, and to have recourse for that object to force of arms. Austria-Hungary has addressed to Serbia formal declaration according to article 1 of convention of 18th October, 1907, relative to opening of hostilities, and considers herself from to-day in state of war with Serbia. Austria-Hungary will conform, provided Serbia does so, to stipulations of Hague conventions of 18th October, 1907, and to Declaration of London of 26th February, 1909.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See No. 46, July 27.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. however, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 4, July 24.

<sup>4</sup> In view of later events this declaration of Austria-Hungary is very important.

*From Vienna*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 74

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.*  
— (Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

I AM informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Russian Government's suggestion<sup>1</sup> has been declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government. The suggestion was to the effect that the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict should be discussed directly between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who should be authorised accordingly.

The Russian Ambassador thinks that a conference in London of the less interested Powers, such as you have proposed, offers now the only prospect of preserving peace of Europe, and he is sure that the Russian Government will acquiesce willingly in your proposal. So long as opposing armies have not actually come in contact, all hope need not be abandoned.

*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 75

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.* —  
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

I WAS sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, who told me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late<sup>2</sup> to act upon your suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion. His Excellency had, on receiving their reply, despatched a message to Vienna, in which he explained that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been shown in the Servian reply to meet the demands of Austria, he understood entirely that, without some sure guarantees that Serbia would carry out in their entirety the demands made upon her, the Austro-Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in view of their past experience. He had then gone on to say that the hostilities which were about to be undertaken against Serbia had presumably the exclusive object of securing such guarantees, seeing that the Austrian Government had already assured the Russian Government that they had no territorial designs.

He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be correct, to speak openly in this sense.<sup>3</sup> The holding of such

<sup>1</sup> *I.e.* direct conversations. That this was an error appears from Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 44, July 29.

<sup>3</sup> Austria-Hungary did so, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29.

language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible misunderstandings.

As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna.

From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving advice at Vienna, his Excellency hoped that you would realise that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of European complications.

The fact of his communicating this information to you was a proof of the confidence which he felt in you and evidence of his anxiety that you should know he was doing his best to support your efforts in the cause of general peace, efforts which he sincerely appreciated.

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 76

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —*  
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

I FOUND Secretary of State very depressed to-day. He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a *fait accompli*. This had, in fact, now happened,<sup>1</sup> and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that Serbia's reply offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of war. He was much troubled by reports of mobilisation in Russia, and of certain military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in France. He subsequently spoke of these measures to my French colleague, who informed him that French Government had done nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled officers on leave. His Excellency denied German Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is true.<sup>2</sup> My French colleague said to Under-Secretary of State, in course of conversation, that it seemed to him that when Austria had entered Serbia, and so satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favourable for four disinterested Powers to discuss situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver complications.<sup>3</sup> Under-Secretary of State seemed to think idea worthy of consideration, as he replied that would be a different matter from conference proposed by you.

Russian Ambassador returned to-day, and has informed Imperial Government that Russia is mobilising in four southern governments.

<sup>1</sup> Germany forwarded Sir E. Grey's proposal to Vienna on July 28, and on the same day Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. From this despatch it would seem that the German Secretary of State feared lest it was his urging mediation too strongly that had induced Vienna to declare war.

<sup>2</sup> Whether Sir E. Goschen was mistaken in this statement or not, it is impossible to state at this writing. From M. P. Price, *The Diplomatic History of the War*, Chas. Scribner's Sons, chapters on Mobilisation, it would appear that the above statement was erroneous. See also E. von Mach, *Germany's Point of View*, pp. 224 ff.

<sup>3</sup> This seems to imply France's acquiescence in Austria-Hungary's war on Serbia provided she did not press it too far.

*To Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 77

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

I MUCH appreciate the language of Chancellor, as reported in your telegram of to-day.<sup>1</sup> His Excellency may rely upon it that this country will continue, as heretofore, to strain every effort to secure peace and to avert the calamity we all fear. If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to his Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe.<sup>2</sup>

*From St. Petersburg*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 78

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

PARTIAL mobilisation was ordered to-day.

I communicated the substance of your telegram of the 28th instant<sup>3</sup> to Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance with your instructions, and informed him confidentially of remarks as to mobilisation which the German Secretary of State had made to the British Ambassador at Berlin. This had already reached his Excellency from another source. The mobilisation, he explained, would only be directed against Austria.

Austrian Government had now definitely declined<sup>4</sup> direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had proposed such an exchange of views on advice of German Ambassador. He proposed, when informing German Ambassador of this refusal of Austria's, to urge that a return should be made to your proposal for a conference of four Ambassadors, or, at all events, for an exchange of views between the three Ambassadors less directly interested, yourself, and also the Austrian Ambassador if you thought it advisable. Any arrangement approved by France and England would be acceptable to him, and he did not care what form such conversations took. No time was to be lost, and the only way to avert war was for you to succeed in arriving, by mean of conversations with Ambassadors either collectively or individually, at some formula which Austria could be induced to

<sup>1</sup> See No. 75.

<sup>2</sup> This was written after Germany had found herself unable to accept Sir E. Grey's first plan of a conference, accepting it, however, in principle. Since the outbreak of the war Germany has been held responsible for the war because she rejected the conference plan. On July 29 Sir E. Grey apparently did not hold the view that Germany's refusal of accepting his conference plan either indicated Germany's determination to have war, or shut the door to all pacific efforts. See also note 2 to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 67, July 28.

<sup>4</sup> This is the same error previously made in the Entente telegrams. See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29.

accept. Throughout Russian Government had been perfectly frank and conciliatory, and had done all in their power to maintain peace. If their efforts to maintain peace failed, he trusted that it would be realised by the British public that it was not the fault of the Russian Government.

I asked him whether he would raise objections if the suggestion made in Rome telegram of the 27th July,<sup>1</sup> which I mentioned to him, were carried out. In reply his Excellency said that he would agree to anything arranged by the four Powers provided it was acceptable to Servia; he could not, he said, be more Servian than Servia.<sup>2</sup> Some supplementary statement or explanations would, however, have to be made in order to tone down the sharpness of the ultimatum.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram of the 28th instant<sup>3</sup> was one of secondary importance. Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it. Further, the German Ambassador had informed his Excellency, so the latter told me, that his Government were continuing at Vienna to exert friendly influence. I fear that the German Ambassador will not help to smooth matters over, if he uses to his own Government the same language as he did to me to-day. He accused the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilisation, and said, when I referred to all that had been recently done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters. I called his attention to the fact that Austrian consuls had warned all Austrian subjects liable to military service to join the colours, that Austria had already partially mobilised, and had now declared war on Servia. From what had passed during the Balkan crisis she knew that this act was one which it was impossible without humiliation for Russia to submit to. Had not Russia by mobilising shown that she was in earnest, Austria would have traded on Russia's desire for peace, and would have believed that she could go to any lengths. Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier immediately, and a week or more would, in any case, elapse before mobilisation was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work together.

*From Vienna*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 79

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

THERE is at present no step which we could usefully take to stop war with Servia, to which Austro-Hungarian Government are now fully committed by the Emperor's appeal to his people which has

<sup>1</sup> See No. 57, received July 28.

<sup>2</sup> For a similar phrase see British Blue Book No. 47, July 27.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 69, July 28.



been published this morning, and by the declaration of war. French and Italian Ambassadors agree with me in this view. If the Austro-Hungarian Government would convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which has been made at St. Petersburg to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence of Servia nor to acquire Servian territory, the Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might be induced to remain quiet.<sup>1</sup> This, however, the Italian Ambassador is convinced the Austrian Government would refuse to do.

*From Rome*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 80

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. —*  
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, July 29, 1914.*

IN your telegram of the 27th instant<sup>2</sup> to Berlin, German Ambassador was reported to have accepted in principle the idea of a conference. This is in contradiction with the telegram of the 27th instant<sup>3</sup> from Berlin.<sup>4</sup>

Information received by the Italian Government from Berlin shows that German view is correctly represented in Sir E. Goschen's telegram of the 27th July,<sup>5</sup> but what creates difficulty is rather the "conference," so the Minister for Foreign Affairs understands, than the principle. He is going to urge, in a telegram which he is sending to Berlin to-night, adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in London. He suggests that the German Secretary of State might propose a formula acceptable to his Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that this exchange of views would keep the door open if direct communication between Vienna and St. Petersburg fails to have any result. He thinks that this exchange of views might be concomitant with such direct communication.

The German Government are also being informed that the Italian Government would not be pardoned by public opinion here unless they had taken every possible step so as to avoid war. He is urging that the German Government must lend their co-operation in this.

He added that there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France he thought it would have a great effect.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> If the Italian Ambassador was right, it is unfortunate that no attempt was made, — at least none appear in the despatches, — to invite Austria-Hungary to take this "binding engagement."

<sup>2</sup> See No. 46, July 27.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 43, July 27.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 15, July 27, where Germany has taken action "in the sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey."

<sup>5</sup> See No. 43, July 27.

<sup>6</sup> It is interesting to have Italy use the same argument that Russia had advanced as early as July 24, British Blue Book No. 6.



Even should it prove impossible to induce Germany to take part, he would still advocate that England and Italy, each as representing one group, should continue to exchange views.<sup>1</sup>

*To Rome*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 81

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday.<sup>2</sup>

It is impossible for me to initiate discussions with Ambassadors here, as I understand from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria will not accept any discussion on basis of Servian note, and the inference of all I have heard from Vienna and Berlin is that Austria will not accept any form of mediation by the Powers as between Austria and Servia.<sup>3</sup> Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs must therefore speak at Berlin and Vienna. I shall be glad if a favourable reception is given to any suggestions he can make there.

*From Constantinople*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 82

*Mr. Beaumont, British Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, July 29, 1914.*

I UNDERSTAND that the designs of Austria may extend considerably beyond the sanjak and a punitive occupation of Servian territory. I gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador here, who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonica under Greek administration and of the assistance on which the Austrian army could count from Mussulman population discontented with Servian rule.<sup>4</sup>

*From Nish*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 83

*Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Nish, July 29, 1914.*

I HAVE been requested by Prime Minister to convey to you expression of his deep gratitude for the statement which you made on the 27th instant in the House of Commons.

<sup>1</sup> For this entire interview cf. French Yellow Book No. 96, July 29.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 64, July 28.

<sup>3</sup> Mediation between Austria and Serbia was the French wish rejected by Germany and Austria-Hungary. Germany was in favor of mediation between Vienna and Petrograd. See German White Book, Exhibit 13, July 25.

<sup>4</sup> This despatch stands alone and unsupported by any other.

*To Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 84

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

THE German Ambassador has been instructed by the German Chancellor<sup>1</sup> to inform me that he is endeavouring to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and he hopes with good success. Austria and Russia seem to be in constant touch, and he is endeavouring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburg the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings in Servia. I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution.<sup>2</sup> I would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, but my information this morning<sup>3</sup> was that the Austrian Government have declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be authorised to discuss directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict. The press correspondents at St. Petersburg had been told that Russian Government would mobilise. The German Government had said that they were favourable in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if necessary. They seemed to think the particular method of conference, consultation or discussion, or even conversations *à quatre* in London too formal a method. I urged that the German Government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the button" in the interests of peace.<sup>4</sup>

*From Berlin*BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 85<sup>5</sup>*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.*

— (Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

I WAS asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

<sup>1</sup> German White Book, Exhibit 15, July 27.<sup>2</sup> So long, therefore, as Germany was trying (see German White Book, Exhibit 14, July 28) to bring it about, she cannot be blamed for not having accepted the first conference plan.<sup>3</sup> British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, but see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29.<sup>4</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 76, July 29, and note 1.<sup>5</sup> In his Introductory Narrative, p. ix, Sir E. Grey calls this despatch a "strange response" to his appeal of mediation, No. 84. The juxtaposition of these despatches

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium,<sup>1</sup> but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire.

In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.

Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated the contents of your telegram of to-day<sup>2</sup> to his Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you.

helps to carry out this suggestion. Nor would it have been possible to prove the error of this presentation if it had not been for the last paragraph, which refers to No. 77 instead of No. 84.

The German enquiry about English neutrality was doubtless the result of disquieting information not only from Russia but also from Italy about the attempt made to have Great Britain declare her solidarity with France and Russia (cf. British Blue Book No. 80, note 5, July 29). Sir E. Grey, moreover, had two serious interviews and a private talk with the German Ambassador in the morning and on the afternoon of July 29, see British Blue Book Nos. 88 and 89. This despatch, No. 85, arrived "about midnight," British Blue Book, p. ix. In fairness, therefore, it should have been printed after No. 89 rather than after No. 84. See also note 3 to No. 90, July 29.

<sup>1</sup> This is the first mention of Belgium. It is noteworthy that a possible invasion of Belgium does not call forth the statement from Sir E. Goschen, or within the next days, from Sir E. Grey, that it would be contrary to existing treaties.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 77, same day.

*From Rome*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 86

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. —  
(Received July 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, July 29, 1914.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs thinks that moment is past for any further discussions on basis of Servian note, in view of communication made to-day by Russia at Berlin regarding partial mobilisation. The utmost he now hopes for is that Germany may use her influence at Vienna to prevent or moderate any further demands on Servia.

*To Paris*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 87

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

AFTER telling M. Cambon<sup>1</sup> to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon<sup>1</sup> that I thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France,<sup>2</sup> was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand.<sup>3</sup> Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav — a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do.<sup>4</sup> I thought it

<sup>1</sup> French Ambassador in London.

<sup>2</sup> For France's own point of view of the Morocco crisis see French Yellow Book No. 1, Annex 1. "All Germans resent our having taken their share in Morocco."

<sup>3</sup> This is contrary to the popular claim that Great Britain went into the war for the little nations.

<sup>4</sup> A very important statement.

necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.<sup>1</sup>

I am, etc.,

E. GREY.

*To Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 88

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

I TOLD the German Ambassador this afternoon of the information that I had received, that Russia had informed Germany respecting her mobilisation. I also told him of the communication<sup>2</sup> made by Count Benckendorff,<sup>3</sup> that the Austrian declaration of war manifestly rendered vain any direct conversations between Russia and Austria. I said that the hope built upon those direct conversations by the German Government yesterday had disappeared to-day. To-day the German Chancellor was working in the interest of mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg. If he succeeded, well and good. If not, it was more important than ever that Germany should take up what I had suggested to the German Ambassador this morning,<sup>4</sup> and propose some method by which the four Powers should be able to work together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed out, however, that the Russian Government, while desirous of mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military operations against Servia should

<sup>1</sup> If this despatch printed after No. 85 and referring to the neutrality of England was written after the receipt of No. 85, it is noteworthy that it contains no mention of Belgium. For the probably proper order of the despatches, however, see note 1, British Blue Book No. 85.

<sup>2</sup> British Blue Book No. 70, July 29.

<sup>3</sup> Russian Ambassador in London.

<sup>4</sup> Probably British Blue Book No. 84, July 29, although the telegram was sent to Berlin not in the morning but "about 4 o'clock on the evening of the 29th," according to the Introductory Narrative of the British Blue Book. To call 4 o'clock the "evening" is strange, but is explained by the endeavor to make No. 85 appear to be an answer to No. 84. See note 1 to British Blue Book No. 85, same day.

be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only drag on matters, and give Austria time to crush Serbia. It was, of course, too late for all military operations against Serbia to be suspended. In a short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation of some Servian territory. But even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from Serbia, stated that she would not advance further, pending an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and Russia.<sup>1</sup>

The German Ambassador said that he had already telegraphed to Berlin what I had said to him this morning.

I am, etc.,

E. GREY.

*To Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 89

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

AFTER speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation — which I hoped would continue — into thinking that we should stand aside.

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew very well, that if the issue did become such that we thought British interests<sup>2</sup> required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it in-

<sup>1</sup> This is again Sir E. Grey's original proposal, which was agreeable to Germany in principle. It was accepted by Austria-Hungary even to include negotiations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31, and for the fact that the Austro-Hungarian acceptance, which was subject to the continuation of the war, but with a "promise not to advance further," was acceptable to Sir E. Grey, see British Blue Book No. 103, July 30.

<sup>2</sup> This idea occurs several times in the despatches of July 29.

volved practically every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach for him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation.

I am, etc.

E. GREY.

*To Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 90

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

IN addition to what passed with the German Ambassador this morning,<sup>1</sup> as recorded in my telegram of the 29th July<sup>2</sup> to your Excellency, I gave the Ambassador a copy of Sir Rennell Rodd's<sup>3</sup> telegram of the 28th July<sup>4</sup> and of my reply to it.<sup>5</sup> I said I had begun to doubt whether even a complete acceptance of the Austrian demands by Servia would now satisfy Austria.<sup>6</sup> But there appeared, from what the Marquis di San Giuliano<sup>7</sup> had said, to be a method by which, if the Powers were allowed to have any say in the matter, they might bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only the latter would give them an opportunity. I could, however, make no proposal, for the reasons I have given in my telegram to you, and could only give what the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the German Ambassador for information, as long as it was understood that Austria would accept no discussion with the Powers over her dispute with Servia. As to mediation between Austria and Russia, I said it could not take the form simply of urging Russia to stand on one side while Austria had a free hand to go to any length she pleased. That would not be mediation, it would simply be putting pressure upon Russia in the interests of Austria. The German Ambassador said the view of the German Government was that Austria could not by force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a Great Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliating Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the humiliation of others. There must, of course, be some humiliation of Servia, but Austria might press things so far as to involve the humiliation of Russia.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The official reference to this interview is No. 84, but see also No. 88.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 84.

<sup>3</sup> British Ambassador in Rome.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 64.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 81.

<sup>6</sup> The question whether it would satisfy Austria-Hungary does not seem to have been asked.

<sup>7</sup> Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>8</sup> The tenor of this summary of the interview with the German Ambassador is different from that given in Nos. 84 and 88. See also No. 89.



The German Ambassador said that Austria would not take Serbian territory, as to which I observed that, by taking territory while leaving nominal Serbian independence, Austria might turn Serbia practically into a vassal State, and this would affect the whole position of Russia in the Balkans.

I observed that when there was danger of European conflict it was impossible to say who would not be drawn into it. Even the Netherlands<sup>1</sup> apparently were taking precautions.

The German Ambassador said emphatically that some means must be found of preserving the peace of Europe.

I am, etc.

To Vienna

E. GREY.

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 91

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

THE Austrian Ambassador told me to-day he had ready a long memorandum,<sup>2</sup> which he proposed to leave, and which he said gave an account of the conduct of Serbia towards Austria, and an explanation of how necessary the Austrian action was.

I said that I did not wish to discuss the merits of the question between Austria and Serbia. The news to-day seemed to me very bad for the peace of Europe. The Powers were not allowed to help in getting satisfaction for Austria, which they might get if they were given an opportunity, and European peace was at stake.

Count Mensdorff<sup>3</sup> said that the war with Serbia must proceed. Austria could not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilising again and again, as she had been obliged to do in recent years. She had no idea of territorial aggrandisement, and all she wished was to make sure that her interests were safeguarded.

I said that it would be quite possible, without nominally interfering with the independence of Serbia or taking away any of her territory, to turn her into a sort of vassal State.

Count Mensdorff<sup>3</sup> deprecated this.

In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that the Austrian action might have upon the Russian position in the Balkans, he said that, before the Balkan war, Serbia had always been regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence.<sup>4</sup>

I am, etc.

E. GREY.

<sup>1</sup> The reference to the Netherlands is omitted in the accounts of the interviews, Nos. 84, 88, 89. Since the Netherlands, however, were mentioned, other things may have been mentioned, and it is not unlikely that No. 85, containing Germany's first bid for English neutrality, was the result of the despatches received in Berlin from the German Ambassador in London. Unfortunately these are not printed in the German White Book. See also note 1 to No. 85.

<sup>2</sup> This may refer to the famous *dossier*, presented in Paris on July 27, and printed in the Yellow Book on that date. Parts, if not the whole, were surely presented also in London on that day, as appears from British Blue Book No. 48, July 27. See notes to British Blue Book No. 48 and Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25.

<sup>3</sup> Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

<sup>4</sup> The proper appraisal of this remark is only possible on the background of an extensive knowledge of the history of the Balkans since 1878.

*To Rome*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 92

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

THE Italian Ambassador made to me to-day a communication from the Marquis di San Giuliano<sup>1</sup> suggesting that the German objections to the mediation of the four Powers, a mediation that was strongly favoured by Italy, might be removed by some change in the form of procedure.

I said that I had already anticipated this by asking the German Government to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle, could be applied.

I am, etc.

E. GREY.

Russia :

*To Berlin*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 49

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.<sup>2</sup>*

(Translation.)

*Saint-Pétersbourg,  
le 16 (29) juillet, 1914.*

(Télégraphique.)

L'AMBASSADEUR d'Allemagne m'informe, au nom du Chancelier, que l'Allemagne n'a pas cessé d'exercer à Vienne une influence modératrice et qu'elle continuera cette action même après la déclaration de guerre. Jusqu'à ce matin il n'y avait aucune nouvelle que les armées autrichiennes aient franchi la frontière serbe. J'ai prié l'Ambassadeur de transmettre au Chancelier mes remerciements pour la teneur amicale de cette communication. Je l'ai informé des mesures militaires prises par la Russie, dont aucune, lui dis-je, n'était dirigée contre l'Allemagne; j'ajoutais qu'elles ne

*St. Petersburg,  
July 16 (29), 1914.*

(Telegraphic.)

THE German Ambassador informs me, in the name of the Chancellor, that Germany has not ceased to exercise a moderating influence at Vienna, and that she will continue to do so even after the declaration of war. Up to this morning there had been no news that the Austrian army has crossed the Servian frontier. I have begged the Ambassador to express my thanks to the Chancellor for the friendly tenour of this communication. I have informed him of the military measures taken by Russia, none of which, I told him, were directed against Germany; I added that neither should they

<sup>1</sup> Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.<sup>2</sup> In the British Blue Book this despatch is listed as having been sent to London.

préjugeaient pas non plus des mesures agressives contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, ces mesures s'expliquant par la mobilisation de la plus grande partie de l'armée austro-hongroise.

L'Ambassadeur se prononçant en faveur d'explications directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne et nous je répondis que j'y étais tout disposé, pour peu que les conseils du Cabinet de Berlin dont il parlait trouvent écho à Vienne.

En même temps je signalais que nous étions tout disposés à accepter le projet d'une conférence des quatre Puissances, un projet auquel, paraissait-il, l'Allemagne ne sympathisait pas entièrement.

Je dis que, dans mon opinion, le meilleur moyen pour mettre à profit tous les moyens propres à produire une solution pacifique, consisterait en une action parallèle des pourparlers d'une conférence à quatre de l'Allemagne, de la France, de l'Angleterre et de l'Italie et d'un contact direct entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, à l'instar à peu près de ce qui avait eu lieu aux moments les plus critiques de la crise de l'an dernier.

Je dis à l'Ambassadeur qu'après les concessions faites par la Serbie, un terrain de compromis pour les questions restées ouvertes ne serait pas très difficile à trouver, à condition toutefois de quelque bonne volonté de la part de l'Autriche et à condition que toutes les Puissances usent de toute leur influence dans un sens de conciliation.

be taken as aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary, their explanation being the mobilisation of the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian army.<sup>1</sup>

The Ambassador said that he was in favour of direct explanations between the Austrian Government and ourselves, and I replied that I, too, was quite willing, provided that the advice of the German Government, to which he had referred, found an echo at Vienna.

I said at the same time that we were quite ready to accept the proposal for a conference of the four Powers, a proposal with which, apparently, Germany was not in entire sympathy.

I told him that, in my opinion, the best manner of turning to account the most suitable methods of finding a peaceful solution would be by arranging for parallel discussions to be carried on by a conference of the four Powers — Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy — and by a direct exchange of views between Austria-Hungary and Russia on much the same lines as occurred during the most critical moments of last year's crisis.

I told the Ambassador that, after the concessions which had been made by Servia, it should not be very difficult to find a compromise to settle the other questions which remained outstanding, provided that Austria showed some good-will and that all the Powers used their entire influence in the direction of conciliation.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 78, August 2, where it is stated by Sasznof that Russia mobilised while Austria-Hungary was "proceeding to a general mobilisation."

*To London and Paris*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 50

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at London and Paris.**St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914.*

AT the time of my interview with the German Ambassador, dealt with in my preceding telegram, I had not yet received M. Schebeko's telegram<sup>1</sup> of the 15th (28th) July.

The contents of this telegram constitute a refusal of the Vienna Cabinet to agree to a direct exchange of views with the Imperial Government.

From now on, nothing remains for us to do but to rely entirely on the British Government to take the initiative in any steps which they may consider advisable.

*From Berlin*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 51

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, July 16 (29), 1914.*

ON my enquiry whether he had received from Vienna a reply respecting your proposal for private discussions at St. Petersburg, the Secretary of State answered in the negative.<sup>2</sup>

He declares that it is very difficult for him to produce any effect at Vienna, especially openly. He even added, in speaking to Cambon, that were pressure brought to bear too obviously, Austria would hasten to face Germany with a *fait accompli*.

The Secretary of State tells me that he received a telegram to-day from Pourtalès, stating that you seemed more inclined than you previously were to find a compromise acceptable to all parties. I replied that presumably you had been in favour of a compromise from the outset, provided always that it were acceptable, not only to Austria, but equally to Russia. He then said that it appeared that Russia had begun to mobilise on the Austrian frontier, and that he feared that this would make it more difficult for Austria to come to an understanding with us, all the more so as Austria was mobilising against Servia alone, and was making no preparations upon our frontier. I replied that, according to the information in my possession, Austria was mobilising upon the Russian frontier also, and that con-

<sup>1</sup> If this refers to Orange Book No. 45, July 28, compare it with Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29: "it does not constitute a refusal." If it refers to another despatch, such a despatch has not been printed. Cf. also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, where Sazonof is the one to break off the negotiations.

<sup>2</sup> For the reply from Vienna in reference to the conference plan see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 44, and for the Russian direct conversation plan see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, both of July 29.

sequently we had to take similar steps.<sup>1</sup> I added that whatever measures we might, perhaps, have taken on our side were in no wise directed against Germany.

*From Nish*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK NO. 52

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Nish, July 16 (29), 1914.*

THE Bulgarian Minister to-day declared to Pashitch, in the name of his Government, that Bulgaria would remain neutral.

*From Paris*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK NO. 53

*Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, July 16 (29), 1914.*

FOR the information of the President of the French Republic on his return, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had prepared a short summary<sup>2</sup> of the present political situation, approximately in the following terms: Austria, fearing internal disintegration, seized upon the assassination of the Archduke as an excuse for an attempt to obtain guarantees, which may assume the form of an occupation of Servian military lines or even Servian territory. Germany is supporting Austria. The preservation of peace depends upon Russia alone, for the question at issue must be "localised" between Austria and Servia; that question is the punishment of Servia for her previous policy and the obtaining of guarantees for the future. Germany concludes from this that a moderating influence should be exerted at St. Petersburg. This sophism has been refuted both in Paris and in London. In Paris, Baron von Schoen vainly endeavoured to induce France to adopt joint action with Germany towards Russia for the preservation of peace. The same attempts were made in London. In both capitals the answer was given that any action taken should be at Vienna, as it was Austria's inordinate demands, her refusal to discuss Servia's few reservations, and her declaration of war, that threatened to provoke a general war. France and England are unable to bring any moderating pressure to bear upon Russia, as, so far, that Power has shown the greatest moderation, more particularly in her advice to Servia to accept as much as was possible of the Austrian note. Apparently Germany has now given up the idea of pressure upon Russia only

<sup>1</sup> The important question is, "Who mobilised first?" In the Documents very contrary statements occur.

<sup>2</sup> French Yellow Book No. 85, July 29.

and inclines towards mediatory action both at St. Petersburg and at Vienna, but at the same time both Germany and Austria are endeavouring to cause the question to drag on. Germany is opposing the conference without suggesting any other practical course of action.<sup>1</sup> Austria is continuing discussions at St. Petersburg, which are manifestly of a procrastinating nature. At the same time she is taking active steps, and if these steps are tolerated, her claims will increase proportionately. It is highly desirable that Russia should lend all her support to the proposal for mediation which will be made by Sir E. Grey. In the contrary event, Austria, on the plea of "guarantees," will be able, in effect, to alter the territorial status of eastern Europe.

*From London*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 54

*Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, July 16 (29), 1914.*

I HAVE communicated the contents of your telegrams<sup>2</sup> of the 15th (28th) July to Grey. He informed the German Ambassador to-day<sup>3</sup> that the direct discussions between Russia and Austria had been fruitless, and that press correspondents were reporting from St. Petersburg that Russia was mobilising against Austria in consequence of the latter's mobilisation. Grey said that, in principle, the German Government had declared themselves in favour of mediation, but that he was experiencing difficulties with regard to the form it should take. Grey has urged that the German Government should indicate the form which, in their opinion, would enable the four Powers to have recourse to mediation to prevent war; France, Italy, and Great Britain having consented, mediation could only come into play if Germany consented to range herself on the side of peace.

*From Paris*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 55

*Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, July 16 (29), 1914.*

VIVIANI has just confirmed to me the French Government's firm determination to act in concert with Russia. This determination

<sup>1</sup> This is an error, for Germany not only urged the British "mediation" plan (see German White Book, Exhibits 15 and 16, July 28) but also the Russian direct conversations plan (see British Blue Book No. 67, note 2, July 28).

<sup>2</sup> This is a confirmation of French Yellow Book No. 95, July 29, which states that two telegrams were sent. In the Russian Orange and British Blue Books only one is given. Cf. British Blue Book No. 70, 2, July 29.

<sup>3</sup> Compare this summary with Sir E. Grey's own summary. British Blue Book Nos. 84, 88, 89, July 29.

is upheld by all classes of society and by the political parties, including the Radical Socialists who have just addressed a resolution to the Government expressing the absolute confidence and the patriotic sentiments of their party. Since his return to Paris, Viviani has telegraphed an urgent message<sup>1</sup> to London that, direct discussions between St. Petersburg and Vienna having ended, the London Cabinet should again put forward their proposal for mediation by the Powers as soon as possible under one form or another. Before seeing me to-day Viviani saw the German Ambassador, and the latter again assured him of the peaceful intentions of Germany. Viviani having pointed out that if Germany wished for peace she should hasten to give her support to the British proposal for mediation, Baron von Schoen replied that the words "conference" or "arbitration" alarmed Austria. Viviani retorted that it was not a question of words, and that it would be easy to find some other form for mediation. In the opinion of Baron von Schoen, it was necessary for the success of the negotiations between the Powers to know what Austria intended to demand from Servia. Viviani answered that the Berlin Cabinet could quite easily make this enquiry of Austria, but that, meanwhile, the Servian reply might well form the basis of discussion; he added that France sincerely desired peace, but that she was determined at the same time to act in complete harmony with her allies and friends, and that he, Baron von Schoen, might have convinced himself that this determination met with the warmest approval of the country.

*From Nish*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 56<sup>2</sup>

*Telegram from His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Serbia to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.*

DEEPLY touched by the telegram which your Majesty was pleased to address to me yesterday, I hasten to thank you with all my heart. Your Majesty may rest assured that the cordial sympathy which your Majesty feels towards my country is especially valued by us, and fills our hearts with the belief that the future of Servia is secure now that it is the object of your Majesty's gracious solicitude. These painful moments cannot but strengthen the bonds of deep attachment which bind Servia to Holy Slav Russia, and the sentiments of everlasting gratitude which we feel for the help and protection afforded to us by your Majesty will ever be cherished in the hearts of all the Serbs.

<sup>1</sup> French Yellow Book No. 97, July 29.

<sup>2</sup> Without a date but published in the Russian Orange Book among the telegrams of July 29. In the Serbian Red Book it was published as No. 44 of July 30. This may be a mistake, or it may contain a hint in the direction of the charge sometimes made that Russia wrote the Serbian State Papers.



*From Nish*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 57

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Nish, July 16 (29), 1914.*

I HAVE communicated to Pashitch the text of the telegraphic reply returned by His Majesty the Emperor to Prince Alexander. On reading it, Pashitch crossed himself and exclaimed: "The Czar is great and merciful!" He then embraced me and was overcome with emotion. The heir-apparent is expected at Nish late to-night.

*To Paris*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 58

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Paris.*

(Telegram.)

*St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914.*

THE German Ambassador to-day informed me of the decision of his Government to mobilise, if Russia did not stop her military preparations. Now, in point of fact, we only began these preparations in consequence of the mobilisation already undertaken by Austria, and owing to her evident unwillingness to accept any means of arriving at a peaceful settlement of her dispute with Servia.

As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, we have no alternative but to hasten<sup>1</sup> on our own military preparations and to assume that war is probably inevitable. Please inform the French Government of this, and add that we are sincerely grateful to them for the declaration<sup>2</sup> which the French Ambassador made to me on their behalf, to the effect that we could count fully upon the assistance of our ally, France. In the existing circumstances, that declaration is especially valuable to us.

Communicated to the Russian Ambassadors in Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany.

<sup>1</sup> This elicited Viviani's request, French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, not to "take any step which may offer Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilisation of her forces," proving that on July 30, Viviani believed that Germany had not even partially mobilised.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 55, same day.

Thursday, July 30, 1914

## SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	Petrograd	—
Belgium	—	Petrograd [Letter from Belgian Minister]
France	London and Petrograd	Petrograd, Vienna
	London	Berlin, London
Germany	Czar	Petrograd, Czar
Great Britain	Berlin, Paris, Petrograd	Vienna, Petrograd, Berlin
		Paris, Rome, Russian Ambassador
Russia	London, etc.	Nish, Berlin, London
Serbia	Czar	Petrograd

*Austria-Hungary*, while unable to have her ambassador in Petrograd discuss her Serbian note with Sazonof, was willing to discuss her relations with Russia on a much broader basis, and had already done so with the Russian Ambassador in Vienna. She regrets Russia's mobilisation against her, which is forcing her to counter measures.

*Belgium* is silent on this day, and does not publish the despatch from her Minister in Petrograd, dated July 30.

*France* renews her promise of support to Russia, but warns her in her mobilisation against "any step which may offer to Germany any pretext for a total or partial mobilisation of her forces." She therefore believes that Germany has not even partially mobilised, but nevertheless sends an alarming message concerning German military measures to Sir E. Grey, who agrees that the moment has "come to consider and discuss together every hypothesis."

*Germany* continues her pressure on Vienna, and by exchanges of royal telegrams between Berlin and London and Berlin and Petrograd endeavours to avoid war. The General Staff urges immediate mobilisation but is unsuccessful.

*Great Britain* refuses to bind herself to remain neutral in case of war, on the conditions proposed by Germany on the previous day. Sir E. Grey is even seriously considering the necessity of joining France, and tightens the bond between the two countries by making known to the British Ambassador in Paris the letters exchanged in 1912 between himself and the French Ambassador. Great Britain continues to mobilise, but does not publish the conversation with the German Ambassador in which this subject was discussed. One of the most important papers of this day (No. 105) suffers from notable inaccuracies.

*Russia* continues her mobilisation, but offers to "stop all military preparations" if Austria will declare herself "ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Serbia." Although Sazonof feels very hopeful of the success of his new offer, he alters it on the next day "as requested by the British Ambassador." Several Russian despatches printed under this date are misleading.

*Serbia* does not announce anything of importance.

## Austria-Hungary :

*To St. Petersburg*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 50

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

FOR Your Excellency's information and guidance : —

I have to-day explained to M. Schebeko that I have been informed that M. Sazonof has been hurt by my flat refusal of his proposal as to a discussion<sup>1</sup> with your Excellency, and that he is not less hurt that no exchange of ideas has taken place between myself and M. Schebeko.

With reference to the first point, I had already permitted your Excellency by telegram to give M. Sazonof any explanations he desired with regard to the note — which in any case appears to be outstripped by the outbreak of war. In any case this could only take the form of subsequent explanations, as it was never our intention to depart in any way from the points contained in the note. I had also authorised your Excellency to discuss in a friendly manner with M. Sazonof our special relations towards Russia.

That M. Sazonof should complain that no exchange of ideas had taken place between M. Schebeko and myself must rest on a misunderstanding, as M. Schebeko and myself had discussed the practical questions two days before, a fact which the Ambassador confirmed with the observation that he had fully informed M. Sazonof of this conversation.

M. Schebeko then explained why our action against Servia was regarded with such anxiety at St. Petersburg. He said that we were a Great Power which was proceeding against the small Servian State, and it was not known at St. Petersburg what our intentions in the matter were ; whether we desired to encroach on its sovereignty, whether we desired completely to overthrow it, or even to crush it to the ground. Russia could not be indifferent towards the future fate of Servia, which was linked to Russia by historical and other bonds. At St. Petersburg they had taken the trouble to use all their influence at Belgrade to induce them to accept all our conditions, though this was indeed at a time when the conditions afterwards imposed by us could not yet be known. But even with reference to these demands they would do everything they could in order to accomplish at any rate all that was possible.

I reminded the Ambassador that we had repeatedly emphasised the fact that we did not desire to follow any policy of conquest in Servia, also that we would not infringe her sovereignty, but we only desired to establish a condition of affairs which would offer us a guarantee against being disturbed by Servia. To this I added a somewhat lengthy discussion of our intolerable relations with Servia. I also

<sup>1</sup> *I.e.* of the wording of the Serbian note and Austro-Hungarian Serbian conflict in general. See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29.

gave M. Schebeko clearly to understand to how large an extent Russian diplomacy was responsible for these circumstances, even though this result might be contrary to the wishes of the responsible authorities.

In the further course of our discussion I referred to the Russian mobilisation which had then come to my knowledge. Since this was limited to the military districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kasan it had an appearance of hostility against the Monarchy. I did not know what the grounds for this might be, as there was no dispute between us and Russia. Austria-Hungary had mobilised exclusively against Servia; against Russia not a single man; and this would be observed from the single fact that the first, tenth and eleventh corps had not been mobilised. In view, however, of the fact that Russia was openly mobilising against us, we should have to extend our mobilisation too, and in this case I desired to mention expressly that this measure did not, of course, imply any attitude of hostility towards Russia, and that it was exclusively a necessary counter-measure against the Russian mobilisation.

I asked M. Schebeko to announce this to his Government, and this he promised to do.

#### Belgium :

##### *From Petrograd*

(This letter was sent via Germany, where it was captured after war had been declared, and published in the North German (official) Gazette. As appears from the letter itself a telegraphic copy of it was sent by the Nordisk cable. The authenticity of this letter has never been officially denied by the Belgian Government.)

*The Belgian Legation, St. Petersburg, 795-402. The Political Condition. July 30, 1914.*

Yesterday and the day before passed in anticipation of the events which must follow the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Servia. The most contradictory news is being spread and it has been impossible to separate truth from fiction concerning the intentions of the Imperial (Russian) Government. Only one fact is incontestable; namely, that Germany has endeavoured here, as well as in Vienna, to find a means by which to avoid a general conflict, but that she has met on the one hand the determination of the Vienna cabinet not to yield one iota and on the other the suspicion of the Petersburg cabinet as regards the assurances of Vienna that it is contemplating only the punishment, and not the acquisition of Servia.

Mr. Sazonof has declared that it was impossible for Russia not to keep herself in readiness nor to mobilise, but that these measures were not taken against Germany. This morning an official communique to the papers announced that the "reservists in a certain number of governments had been called to the colors." He who knows the reticence of the official Russian communiques may well assert that the mobilisation is general.

The German Ambassador declared this morning that he had reached the ends of his endeavours as mediator, pursued incessantly since Saturday, and that he had practically no hope left. I have just been told that the British Ambassador had expressed himself to the same effect. Latterly England proposed arbitration, but Mr. Sazonof replied, "We ourselves proposed this to Austria, who declined." The suggestion of a conference was met by Germany with the suggestion of an agreement between the cabinets. One is tempted to ask if the whole world is not wanting war, trying only to postpone the declarations of war in order to gain time..

At first England let it be known that she did not wish to be drawn into the conflict. Sir George Buchanan openly said this. To-day, however, St. Petersburg is convinced — nay, more, they have the assurance that England will support France. (*Aujourd'hui on est fermement convaincu à St. Petersburg, on en a même l'assurance que l'Angleterre soutiendra la France.*) This assurance carries great weight, and has done not a little to give the upper hand to the war party.

The Russian Government has given free rein to all pro-Servian and anti-Austrian manifestations these past days. In the cabinet meeting early yesterday morning differences of opinion still existed, and the announcement of the mobilisation was postponed. Since then a change has taken place; the war party has gained the upper hand, and to-day at four o'clock in the morning the mobilisation was publicly announced.

The army believes itself strong and is full of enthusiasm. It bases its hopes on the remarkable progress it has made since the Japanese war. The navy is still so far from the realisation of its programme of reconstruction and reorganisation that it really cannot be said to count. This was the reason which gave England's assurances of support so much weight.

As I had the honour of telegraphing (T. 10) you to-day, every hope of a peaceful solution seems to have vanished. This is the view of the diplomatic corps. For my telegram I chose the way via Stockholm by the Nordisk cable as safer than the other. This despatch I am entrusting to a private courier, who will mail it in Germany.

With the assurance of deepest respect, Mr. Secretary, I am,

(Signed) B. DE L'ESCAILLE.

France :

*To St. Petersburg and London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 101

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at St. Petersburg and London.*

*Paris, July 30, 1914.*

M. ISVOLSKY came to-night to tell me that the German Ambassador has notified M. Sazonof of the decision of his Govern-

ment to mobilise the army if Russia does not cease her military preparations.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Tsar points out that these preparations were only commenced after Austria had mobilised eight army corps<sup>1</sup> and had refused to arrange peacefully her differences with Servia. M. Sazonof declares that in these circumstances Russia can only expedite her arming and consider war as imminent, that she counts on the help of France as an ally, and that she considers it desirable that England should join Russia and France without loss of time.

France is resolved to fulfil all the obligations of her alliance.<sup>2</sup>

She will not neglect, however, any effort towards a solution of the conflict in the interests of universal peace. The conversation entered into between the Powers which are less directly interested still allows of the hope that peace may be preserved; I therefore think it would be well that, in taking any precautionary measures of defence, which Russia thinks must go on, she should not immediately take any step which may offer to Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilisation of her forces.<sup>3</sup>

Yesterday in the late afternoon<sup>4</sup> the German Ambassador came and spoke to me of the military measures which the Government of the Republic were taking, adding that France was able to act in this way, but that in Germany preparations could not be secret, and that French opinion should not be alarmed if Germany decided on them.

I answered that the French Government had not taken any step which could give their neighbours any cause for disquietude, and that their wish to lend themselves to any negotiations for the purpose of maintaining peace could not be doubted.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

*From St. Petersburg*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK NO. 102

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.*

M. SAZONOF, to whom I communicated your desire that every military measure that could offer Germany the pretext for general mobilisation<sup>5</sup> should be avoided, answered that in the course of last night the General Staff has suspended all measures of military pre-

<sup>1</sup> See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50, July 30, and that these eight army corps had been mobilised against Serbia. See also Russian Orange Book No. 78, August 2.

<sup>2</sup> France had given this declaration as early as July 24, British Blue Book No. 6, July 24.

<sup>3</sup> This is an important statement because it shows that Viviani believed on July 30 that Germany had not even partially mobilised, all earlier despatches notwithstanding. It also shows that Viviani knew the danger as soon as Germany should feel obliged to mobilise. This warning was doubtless given in reply to Russian Orange Book No. 58, July 29. Sir E. Grey knew of this message, as appears from British Blue Book No. 104, July 30.

<sup>4</sup> That is on July 29, and France did not then deny having taken military measures.

<sup>5</sup> The wording was "total or partial mobilisation," see previous despatch.

caution so that there should be no misunderstanding. Yesterday the Chief of the Russian General Staff sent for the Military Attaché of the German Embassy and gave him his word of honour that the mobilisation ordered this morning was exclusively directed against Austria.<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, in an interview which he had this afternoon with Count Pourtalès, M. Sazonof was forced to the conclusion that Germany does not wish to pronounce at Vienna the decisive word which would safeguard peace. The Emperor Nicholas has received the same impression from an exchange of telegrams which he has just had personally with the Emperor William.

Moreover, the Russian General Staff and Admiralty have received disquieting information concerning the preparations of the German army and navy.<sup>2</sup>

In giving me this information M. Sazonof added that the Russian Government are continuing none the less their efforts towards conciliation.<sup>3</sup> He repeated to me: "I shall continue to negotiate until the last moment."<sup>4</sup>

PALÉOLOGUE.

*From St. Petersburg*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 103<sup>5</sup>

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.*

THE German Ambassador came to-night and again urged on M. Sazonof, but in less categorical terms, that Russia should cease her military preparations, and affirmed that Austria would not infringe the territorial integrity of Servia: —

"It is not only the territorial integrity of Servia which we must safeguard," answered M. Sazonof, "but also her independence and her sovereignty. We cannot allow Servia to become a vassal of Austria."

M. Sazonof added: "The situation is too serious for me not to tell you all that is in my mind. By intervening at St. Petersburg while she refuses to intervene at Vienna, Germany is only seeking to gain time so as to allow Austria to crush the little Servian kingdom before Russia can come to its aid. But the Emperor Nicholas

<sup>1</sup> For a different version of the interview see German White Book, Exhibit 18, July 30.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, note 3.

<sup>3</sup> It is not clear from the Entente telegrams what would have "conciliated" Russia short of stopping the punishment of Serbia. Since Austria-Hungary was determined to mete out this punishment, a deadlock ensued. Austria-Hungary's concessions were her promise not to annex any Serbian territory and not to touch the sovereignty of Serbia, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. It nowhere appears that Russia offered any concessions. The different courses pursued by the respective countries were due to the different attitudes assumed by their allies. Germany exerted a constant pressure in Vienna, while England and France refused to take any steps in Petrograd. See French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27, and No. 81, July 28. Contrast with British Blue Book No. 104, July 30.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. note to British Blue Book No. 97, July 30.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*



is so anxious to prevent war that I am going to make a new proposal<sup>1</sup> to you in his name :

"If Austria, recognising that her dispute with Servia has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the clauses which are damaging to the sovereignty of Servia, Russia undertakes to stop all military preparations."

Count Pourtalès promised to support this proposal with his Government.

In the mind of M. Sazonof, the acceptance of this proposal by Austria would have, as a logical corollary, the opening of a discussion by the Powers in London.

The Russian Government again show by their attitude that they are neglecting nothing in order to stop the conflict.

PALÉOLOGUE.

*From Vienna*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 104

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

IN spite of the communication made yesterday by the Russian Ambassador to several of his colleagues, among them the German Ambassador, with reference to the partial mobilisation in his country, the Vienna press refrained from publishing the news. This enforced silence has just been explained at an interview of great importance between M. Schebeko and Count Berchtold, who examined at length the present formidable difficulties with equal readiness to apply to them mutually acceptable solutions.<sup>2</sup>

*From Berlin*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 105

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

HERR VON JAGOW telephoned to me at 2 o'clock that the news of the German mobilisation which had spread an hour before was false, and asked me to inform you of this urgently; the Imperial Government is confiscating the extra editions of the papers which announced it. But neither this communication nor these steps diminish my apprehension with regard to the plans of Germany.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This proposal was altered later at the request of the British Ambassador to one much less acceptable to Austria-Hungary. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 113, and see for the discussion of these changes E. von Mach, *Germany's Point of View*, pp. 142 ff.

<sup>2</sup> This was probably due to German pressure. See Chancellor's Speech in note 2 to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28.

<sup>3</sup> Germany was apparently ready to mobilise at any moment. It has been popularly stated in Germany that the General Staff urged this step ever since the first news of Russian mobilisation had become known, but that the Emperor refused his consent.

It seems certain that the Extraordinary Council held yesterday evening at Potsdam with the military authorities under the presidency of the Emperor decided on mobilisation, and this explains the preparation of the special edition of the *Lokal Anzeiger*, but that from various causes (the declaration of Great Britain that she reserved her entire liberty of action, the exchange of telegrams<sup>1</sup> between the Tsar and William II.) the serious measures which had been decided upon were suspended.

One of the Ambassadors with whom I have very close relations saw Herr von Zimmermann at 2 o'clock. According to the Under-Secretary of State the military authorities are very anxious that mobilisation should be ordered, because every delay makes Germany lose some of her advantages. Nevertheless up to the present the haste of the General Staff, which sees war in mobilisation, had been successfully prevented. In any case mobilisation may be decided upon at any moment. I do not know who has issued in the *Lokal Anzeiger*, a paper which is usually semi-official, premature news calculated to cause excitement in France.

Further, I have the strongest reasons to believe that all the measures for mobilisation which can be taken before the publication of the general order of mobilisation have already been taken here, and that they are anxious here to make us publish our mobilisation<sup>2</sup> first in order to attribute the responsibility to us.

JULES CAMBON.

*To London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 106

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.*

*Paris, July 30, 1914.*

PLEASE inform<sup>3</sup> Sir E. Gray of the following facts concerning French and German military preparations.<sup>4</sup> England will see from this that if France is resolved, it is not she who is taking aggressive steps.

You will direct the attention of Sir E. Grey to the decision taken by the Council of Ministers this morning; although Germany has made her covering dispositions a few hundred metres from the frontier along the whole front from Luxemburg to the Vosges, and has transported her covering troops to their war positions, we have kept

<sup>1</sup> These telegrams are referred to in the French Yellow Book, but not in the British Blue Book, nor were they laid before Parliament together with the Blue Book. Many people see in them a serious endeavor on the part of the Emperor to preserve the peace.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, note 4.

<sup>3</sup> This information is printed in British Blue Book No. 105, Enclosure 3, July 30. If the French Yellow Book prints the original despatch accurately, either Sir E. Grey or the French Ambassador in London must be held responsible for the alterations. For a discussion of these despatches see E. von Mach, *Germany's Point of View*, pp. 421 ff.

<sup>4</sup> This despatch to London should be compared with French Yellow Book No. 101, same day, to Petrograd, which shows that Viviani believed that Germany had not even partially mobilised on July 30.

our troops ten kilometres from the frontier and forbidden them to approach nearer.

Our plan, conceived in the spirit of the offensive, provided, however, that the fighting positions of our covering troops should be as near to the frontier as possible. By leaving a strip of territory undefended against sudden aggression of the enemy, the Government of the Republic hopes to prove that France does not bear, any more than Russia, the responsibility for the attack.

In order to be convinced of this it is sufficient to compare the steps taken on the two sides of our frontier; in France, soldiers who were on leave were not recalled until we were certain that Germany had done so five days before.

In Germany, not only have the garrison troops of Metz been pushed up to the frontier, but they have been reinforced by units transported by train from garrisons of the interior such as Trèves or Cologne; nothing like this has been done in France.

The arming of the frontier defences (clearing of trees, placing of armament, construction of batteries and strengthening of wire entanglements) was begun in Germany on Saturday, the 25th; with us it is going to be begun, for France can no longer refrain from taking similar measures.

The railway stations were occupied by the military in Germany on Saturday, the 25th; in France on Tuesday, the 28th.

Finally, in Germany the reservists by tens of thousands have been recalled by individual summons, those living abroad (the classes of 1903 to 1911) have been recalled, the officers of reserve have been summoned; in the interior the roads are closed, motor-cars only circulate with permits. It is the last stage before mobilisation. None of these measures has been taken in France.

The German army has its outposts on our frontier; on two occasions yesterday German patrols penetrated our territory. The whole 16th army corps from Metz, reinforced by part of the 8th from Trèves and Cologne, occupies the frontier from Metz to Luxemburg; the 15th army corps from Strassburg is massed on the frontier.

Under penalty of being shot, the inhabitants of the annexed parts of Alsace-Lorraine are forbidden to cross the frontier.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

*From Berlin*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 107

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

THE British Ambassador has not been informed of Germany's reply to Sir E. Grey's request. He told me that Berlin had consulted Vienna and was still waiting to hear from her ally.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This reply, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 44, July 29, was sent by telegram on that day to Petrograd, Paris, London, and Rome. See also French Yellow Book No. 104, July 30, and note.

My Russian colleague has just told me that Herr von Jagow (to whom Count Pourtalès had communicated the conciliatory formula suggested by M. Sazonof for an Austro-Russian understanding) had just told him that he found this proposal unacceptable to Austria, thus showing the negative <sup>1</sup> action of German diplomacy at Vienna.

JULES CAMBON.

*From London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 108

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 30, 1914.*

PRINCE LICHNOWSKY has not brought any reply to the request addressed to him by Sir E. Grey yesterday to obtain from the German Government a formula for the intervention of the four Powers in the interest of peace. But my German colleague questioned the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs about the military preparations of England.<sup>2</sup>

Sir E. Grey replied that they were not of an offensive character, but that in the present state of affairs on the continent it was natural to take some precautions; that in England, as in France, there was a desire to maintain peace, and that if in England, as in France, defensive measures were under consideration, it was not with the object of making any aggression.<sup>3</sup>

The information <sup>4</sup> which your Excellency has addressed to me on the subject of the military measures taken by Germany on the French frontier gave me the opportunity of remarking to Sir E. Grey that it is no longer a question of a conflict of influence between Russia and Austria-Hungary, but that there is a risk of an act of aggression which might provoke general war.

Sir E. Grey understood <sup>5</sup> my feelings perfectly, and he thinks, as I do, that the moment has come to consider and discuss together every hypothesis.

PAUL CAMBON.

*From Berlin*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 109

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

IN the interview which I had to-day with the Secretary of State, I asked Herr von Jagow what reply he had made to Sir E. Grey,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Chancellor's Speech, note 2, British Blue Book No. 67, July 28, and British Blue Book No. 95, July 30.

<sup>2</sup> No such questions are mentioned in the British Blue Book.

<sup>3</sup> This is the natural excuse for any modern state to make, since self-defence is the only excuse for military preparations anywhere.

<sup>4</sup> French Yellow Book No. 106, same day.

<sup>5</sup> From French Yellow Book No. 101, same day, it appeared that Viviani believed that Germany had not yet even partially mobilised on July 30. Contrary despatches must have been sent for effect. Did Sir E. Grey understand this, or was he imposed upon?

who had asked him to draw up himself the formula for the intervention of the disinterested Powers.

He answered that "to gain time," he had decided to act directly, and that he had asked Austria to tell him the ground on which conversations might be opened with her. This answer has the effect, under a pretext of proceeding more quickly, of eliminating Great Britain, France and Italy, and of entrusting to Herr von Tschirsky, whose Pan-German and Russophobe sentiments are well known, the duty of persuading Austria to adopt a conciliatory attitude.

Herr von Jagow then spoke to me of the Russian mobilisation on the Austrian frontier; he told me that this mobilisation compromised the success of all intervention with Austria, and that everything depended on it. He added that he feared that Austria would mobilise completely as a result of a partial Russian mobilisation, and this might cause as a counter-measure complete Russian mobilisation and consequently that of Germany.

I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he had himself told me that Germany would only consider herself obliged to mobilise if Russia mobilised on her German frontiers,<sup>1</sup> and that this was not being done. He replied that this was true, but that the heads of the army were insisting on it, for every delay is a loss of strength for the German army, and "that the words of which I reminded him did not constitute a firm engagement on his part."<sup>2</sup>

The impression which I received from this conversation is that the chances of peace have again decreased.

JULES CAMBON.

Germany:

*From St. Petersburg*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 18

*Telegram of the Military Attaché at St. Petersburg to H. M. the Kaiser on July 30, 1914.*

PRINCE TROUBETZKI said to me yesterday,<sup>3</sup> after causing Your Majesty's telegram to be delivered at once to Czar Nicolas: Thank God that a telegram of Your Emperor has come. He has just told me the telegram has made a deep impression upon the Czar, but as the mobilisation against Austria had already been ordered and Sazonof had convinced His Majesty that it was no longer possible to retreat His Majesty was sorry he could not change it any more. I then told him that the guilt for the measureless consequences lay at the door of premature mobilisation against Austria-Hungary, which after all was involved merely in a local war with Servia, for Germany's answer was clear and the responsibility rested upon Russia which ignored

<sup>1</sup> French Yellow Book No. 67, July 27.

<sup>2</sup> Immediately following the words referred to above Von Jagow had said (French Yellow Book No. 67, July 27), "If Russia attacked Austria, Germany would be obliged to attack at once on her side." An attack must be preceded by mobilisation. Jagow, therefore, cannot have meant to give a promise in the sense in which it was understood by Jules Cambon.

<sup>3</sup> For the French version of this interview see French Yellow Book No. 102, July 30.

Austria-Hungary's assurance that it had no intentions of territorial gain in Servia. Austria-Hungary mobilised against Servia and not against Russia, and there was no ground for an immediate action on the part of Russia. I further added that in Germany one could not understand any more Russia's phrase that "she could not desert her brethren in Servia," after the horrible crime of Serajevo. I told him finally he need not wonder if Germany's army were to be mobilised.

*To St. Petersburg*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 23

*IV. His Majesty to the Czar.*

*July 30th, 1 A.M.*

My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of Your Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilisation. I have told You the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has mobilised only against Servia, and only a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case, according to Your advice and that of Your Government, mobilises against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator with which You have entrusted me in such friendly manner and which I have accepted upon Your express desire, is threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests upon Your shoulders, You have to bear the responsibility for war or peace.

(Signed) WILHELM.

*From St. Petersburg*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 23a

*V. The Czar to His Majesty.*

*Peterhof, July 30th, 1914, 1.20 P.M.*

I THANK You from my heart for Your quick reply. I am sending to-night Tatisheff (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with instructions. The military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago, and for the reason of defence against the preparations of Austria. I hope with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any manner Your position as mediator which I appraise very highly. We need Your strong pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at with us.

NICOLAS.

**Great Britain :**

*From St. Petersburg*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 93

*Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London, July 30, 1914.*

(1)

*Russian Ambassador at Vienna to M. Sazonof*

[For text see Russian Orange Book No. 45, July 28. For 93, (2) and (3), see under date of July 29, Russian Orange Book Nos. 49 and 50.]



*From Vienna*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 94

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.*  
— (Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

I LEARN that mobilisation of Russian corps destined to carry out operations<sup>1</sup> on Austrian frontier has been ordered. My informant is Russian Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign Affairs here has realised, though somewhat late in the day, that Russia will not remain indifferent in present crisis. I believe that the news of Russian mobilisation will not be a surprise to the Ministry, but so far it is not generally known in Vienna this evening.<sup>2</sup> Unless mediation, which German Government declared themselves ready to offer in concert with three other Great Powers not immediately interested in the Austro-Servian dispute, be brought to bear forthwith, irrevocable steps may be taken in present temper of this country. German Ambassador feigns<sup>3</sup> surprise that Servian affairs should be of such interest to Russia. Both my Russian and French colleagues have spoken to him to-day. Russian Ambassador expressed the hope that it might still be possible to arrange matters, and explained that it was impossible for Russia to do otherwise than take an interest in the present dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could already at Belgrade to induce Servian Government to meet principal Austrian demand in a favourable spirit; <sup>4</sup> if approached in a proper manner, he thought she would probably go still further in this direction. But she was justly offended at having been completely ignored, and she could not consent to be excluded from the settlement. German Ambassador said that if proposals were put forward which opened any prospect of possible acceptance by both sides, he personally thought that Germany might consent to act as mediator in concert with the three other Powers.

I gather from what Russian Ambassador said to me that he is much afraid of the effect that any serious engagement may have upon Russian public opinion. I gathered, however, that Russia would go a long way to meet Austrian demands on Servia.

*From Vienna*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 95

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.*  
— (Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador hopes that Russian mobilisation will be regarded by Austria as what it is, viz., a clear intimation that Russia

<sup>1</sup> The meaning of this phrase is not perfectly clear, although it seems to contemplate war.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 107, same day.

<sup>3</sup> Expressions of this kind, implying motives and not confining themselves to facts, are regrettable in official documents.

<sup>4</sup> This was denied by Austria-Hungary; see Red Book No. 34, July 27.



must be consulted regarding the fate of Serbia, but he does not know how the Austrian Government are taking it. He says that Russia must have an assurance that Serbia will not be crushed, but she would understand that Austria-Hungary is compelled to exact from Serbia measures which will secure her Slav provinces from the continuance of hostile propaganda from Servian territory.<sup>1</sup>

The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the German Ambassador at Vienna is instructed<sup>2</sup> to speak seriously to the Austro-Hungarian Government against acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European war.

Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Servian feeling prevalent in Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of peace with entire sincerity.

Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew<sup>3</sup> the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it.

*From Vienna*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 96

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.*  
— (Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

THE Russian Ambassador gave the French Ambassador and myself this afternoon at the French Embassy, where I happened to be, an account of his interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he said was quite friendly. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that as Russia had mobilised, Austria must, of course, do the same. This, however, should not be regarded as a threat, but merely as the adoption of military precautions similar to those which had been taken across the frontier. He said he had no objection to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg continuing their conversations,<sup>4</sup> although he did not say that they could be resumed on the basis of the Servian reply.

On the whole, the Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had begun to make his preparations for his departure on the strength of

<sup>1</sup> This is an eminently fair statement, nor did Austria-Hungary desire more. Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29.

<sup>2</sup> For the instruction see Chancellor's Speech, note 2, British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. Contrast with this, British despatch based on French information, French Yellow Book No. 107, July 30, where Jules Cambon complains of "the negative action of German diplomacy at Vienna."

<sup>3</sup> There is no proof for this assertion.

<sup>4</sup> This is what Germany had demanded; see Chancellor's Speech, note 2, British Blue Book No. 67, July 28.

a rumour that Austria would declare war in reply to mobilisation. He now hopes that something may yet be done to prevent war with Austria.

*From St. Petersburg*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 97<sup>1</sup>

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.*

FRENCH Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. His Excellency said that German Ambassador had told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this might be so, but nevertheless Serbia would become an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar circumstances, Bokhara had become a Russian vassal. There would be a revolution in Russia, if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.

M. Sazonof<sup>1</sup> told us that absolute proof was in possession of Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia — more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland.

German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2 A.M., when former completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof<sup>2</sup> to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof<sup>2</sup> accordingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a formula<sup>3</sup> in French, of which following is translation : —

“If Austria, recognising that her conflict with Servia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages to stop all military preparations.”<sup>4</sup>

Preparations for general mobilisation will be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a European war. Excitement here has reached such a pitch that, if Austria refuses to make a concession, Russia cannot hold back, and now that she knows that Germany is arming, she can hardly postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into general mobilisation.

<sup>1</sup> This despatch refers to the interview described in French Yellow Book Nos. 102 and 103, July 30. For a full discussion of the British and French presentations, see E. von Mach, *Germany's Point of View*, pp. 428 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> This proposal was altered at the request of the British Ambassador (French Yellow Book No. 113, July 31) acting according to the wishes of Sir E. Grey, British Blue Book No. 110, July 31. Cf. also British Blue Book 103, July 30, and No. 120, July 31, received and listed under date of August 1. For a fuller discussion of these despatches see E. von Mach, *Germany's Point of View*, pp. 432 ff.

<sup>4</sup> The meaning of this phrase is “demobilisation,” as appears from British Blue Book No. 99, same day.

*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 98

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

SECRETARY of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's <sup>1</sup> telegram recording his last conversation <sup>2</sup> with you he asked Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions from here. He has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian mobilisation against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria-Hungary, who has as yet only mobilised against Servia, will probably find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace may be preserved.

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view of Russian mobilisation and military measures which he hears are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave — a measure which had been officially taken after, and not before, visit of French ambassador yesterday — Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of military preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when they mobilised they would have to mobilise on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity.

His Excellency added that telegram <sup>3</sup> received from Prince Lichnowsky <sup>1</sup> last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.

He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late last night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course, not have spoken to me in the way he had done.

<sup>1</sup> German Ambassador in London.

<sup>2</sup> This conversation is not mentioned in the British Blue Book, although Sir E. Grey related it to the French Ambassador. The report of the latter is printed in the French Yellow Book No. 108, July 30. It had reference to the "military preparations," i.e. the mobilisation of England. Probably during the same conversation the subject of the neutrality of England was discussed along the lines mentioned in British Blue Book No. 102, July 30. The British Blue Book contains no footnote to "telegram" in the second line of this despatch, but gives a footnote to "telegram" in the first line of the second before last paragraph, namely "See No. 102." For the importance of the despatch No. 102, see note to that despatch.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 102.

*From Paris*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 99

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —  
(Received July 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 30, 1914.*

PRESIDENT of the Republic tells me that the Russian Government have been informed<sup>1</sup> by the German Government that unless Russia stops her mobilisation Germany would mobilise. But a further report, since received from St. Petersburg, states that the German communication had been modified,<sup>2</sup> and was now a request to be informed on what conditions Russia would consent to demobilisation.<sup>3</sup> The answer given is that she agrees to do so on condition that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the sovereignty of Serbia and submit certain of the demands of the Austrian note, which Serbia has not accepted, to an international discussion.

President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by Austria. He is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France<sup>4</sup> in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present differences between Austria and Serbia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.

I explained to him how difficult it would be for His Majesty's Government to make such an announcement, but he said that he must maintain that it would be in the interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific. She does not desire war, and all that she has done at present is to make preparations for mobilisation so as not to be taken unawares. The French Government will keep His Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done in that way. They have reliable information that the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war. If there were a general war on the Continent it would inevitably draw England into it for the protection of her vital interests. A declaration now of her intention to support France, whose desire it is that peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany from going to war.

<sup>1</sup> Not in Russian Orange Book or German White Book, but given in French Yellow Book No. 100, July 29.

<sup>2</sup> French Yellow Book No. 103, July 30, British Blue Book No. 97, and Russian Orange Book No. 60, same day.

<sup>3</sup> Demobilisation, it appears from this, was the meaning of the phrase "stop all military preparations" given in British Blue Book No. 97, same day.

<sup>4</sup> A declaration on the part of England of her "solidarity with Russia and France" had been desired by Sazonof as early as July 24 (British Blue Book No. 6) and again on July 27 (British Blue Book No. 44). Evidently France was now trying to persuade England to take this stand at least so far as France was concerned.

*From Rome*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 100

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. —*  
*(Received July 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, July 30, 1914.*

GERMAN Ambassador told me last night that he thought Germany would be able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands if Serbia could be induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, as soon as the occupation of Belgrade had been accomplished.

I made to his Excellency the personal suggestion that some formula might be devised by Germany which might be acceptable for an exchange of views.

I see, however, that you have already made this suggestion.<sup>1</sup>

*To Berlin*BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 101<sup>2</sup>

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of 29th July.<sup>3</sup>

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality<sup>4</sup> on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.

<sup>1</sup> A probable reference to suggestion contained in British Blue Book No. 68, July 28.

<sup>2</sup> For the substance of this despatch see No. 102 and note.

<sup>3</sup> British Blue Book No. 85, July 29.

<sup>4</sup> From subsequent publications by the British and German Governments it appears that the subject of English neutrality had been frequently discussed in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the war.

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be *ipso facto* improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.

And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued<sup>1</sup> against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved.<sup>2</sup> The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.

*To Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 102<sup>3</sup>

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

I HAVE warned Prince Lichnowsky<sup>4</sup> that Germany must not count upon our standing aside in all circumstances. This is doubtless the substance of the telegram from Prince Lichnowsky to German Chancellor, to which reference is made in the last two paragraphs of your telegram of 30th July.<sup>5</sup>

*To St. Petersburg*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 103

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

GERMAN Ambassador informs me that German Government would endeavour to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian

<sup>1</sup> Such a promise at this time would seem to be unthinkable unless Germany heretofore could not have been assured that "no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her."

<sup>2</sup> Sir E. Grey here recognises that through the last Balkan crisis Germany had worked for peace as well as he himself.

<sup>3</sup> No reason appears why this despatch should not have been printed immediately after No. 98 to which it refers. The conversation there discussed followed upon the telegram, British Blue Book No. 85, July 29, and may be expected to have contained Sir E. Grey's oral answer to the Chancellor's proposal. Unfortunately the whole conversation is not given in the British Blue Book (see note to No. 98). Numbers 101 and 102, therefore, seem to contain two answers to the Chancellor's enquiry.

<sup>4</sup> German Ambassador in London.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 98.



territory in region of frontier, to promise, not to advance further, while Powers endeavoured to arrange that Serbia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria.<sup>1</sup> Territory occupied would of course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can be obtained, I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides.

Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof,<sup>2</sup> as quoted in your telegram of the 30th July,<sup>3</sup> and fears it cannot be modified ;<sup>4</sup> but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that the Powers would examine how Serbia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence.

If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighbouring Servian territory, declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion and suspension of further military preparations, provided that other Powers did the same.

It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

### *To Paris*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 104

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

You should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir G. Buchanan<sup>5</sup> of to-day,<sup>6</sup> and say that I know that he has been urging Russia not to precipitate a crisis.<sup>7</sup> I hope he may be able to support this last suggestion at St. Petersburg.

<sup>1</sup> This had been suggested by Sir E. Grey on the previous day, British Blue Book No. 88, July 29.

<sup>2</sup> Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 97.

<sup>4</sup> It does not appear why the Russian formula needed any modification, agreeing substantially with Germany's suggestions to Austria-Hungary. See also Russian Orange Book No. 60. The altered formula (British Blue Book No. 120 under date of August 1) was certainly much less acceptable to the Teutonic Powers.

<sup>5</sup> British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

<sup>6</sup> See No. 103.

<sup>7</sup> This must refer to French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, where Viviani begs Sazonof not to take "any step which may offer to Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilisation of her forces." It cannot refer to general pacific pressure brought to bear on Russia; for Russian Orange Book No. 36, July 27, and No. 53, July 29, assert that Germany had vainly tried to get France to do so. See also French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27, and French Yellow Book No. 80, July 28.



*To Paris*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 105

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

M. CAMBON reminded me to-day of the letter I had written to him two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was seriously threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do. I enclose for convenience of reference copies of the letter in question and of M. Cambon's reply. He said that the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France. He gave me a paper, of which a copy is also enclosed, showing that the German military preparations were more advanced and more on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet done.<sup>1</sup> He anticipated that the aggression would take the form of either a demand that France should cease her preparations, or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things could France admit.

I said that the Cabinet<sup>2</sup> was to meet to-morrow morning, and I would see him again to-morrow afternoon.

I am, etc.

E. GREY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 105

*Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London.*

My dear Ambassador,

*Foreign Office, November 22, 1912.*

FROM time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

<sup>1</sup> From British Blue Book No. 104 it appeared that Sir E. Grey was familiar with Viviani's despatch, French Yellow Book No. 101, which shows that Viviani knew that Germany had not yet proceeded even to partial mobilisation.

<sup>2</sup> For a fuller discussion of this and subsequent Cabinet meetings, see E. von Mach, *Germany's Point of View*, McClurg & Co., pp. 263 ff.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, etc.

Enclosure 2 in No. 105

*M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to Sir Edward Grey.*

(Translation.)

*L'Ambassade de France, Londres,  
ce 23 novembre, 1912.*

*French Embassy, London.  
November 23, 1912.*

Cher Sir Edward.

Dear Sir Edward.

PAR votre lettre en date d'hier, 22 novembre, vous m'avez rappelé que, dans ces dernières années, les autorités militaires et navales de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne s'étaient consultées de temps en temps; qu'il avait toujours été entendu que ces consultations ne restreignaient pas la liberté, pour chaque Gouvernement, de décider dans l'avenir s'ils se prêteraient l'un l'autre le concours de leurs forces armées; que, de part et d'autre, ces consultations entre spécialistes n'étaient et ne devaient pas être considérées comme des engagements obligeant nos Gouvernements à agir dans certains cas; que cependant je vous avais fait observer que, si l'un ou l'autre des deux Gouvernements avait de graves raisons d'appréhender une attaque non provoquée de la part d'une tierce Puissance, il deviendrait essentiel de savoir s'il pourrait compter sur l'assistance armée de l'autre.

Votre lettre répond à cette observation, et je suis autorisé à

You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that,

vous déclarer que, dans le cas où l'un de nos deux Gouvernements aurait un motif grave d'appréhender soit l'aggression d'une tierce Puissance, soit quelque événement menaçant pour la paix générale, ce Gouvernement examinerait immédiatement avec l'autre si les deux Gouvernements doivent agir de concert en vue de prévenir l'aggression ou de sauvegarder la paix. Dans ce cas, les deux Gouvernements délibéreraient sur les mesures qu'ils seraient disposés à prendre en commun; si ces mesures comportaient une action, les deux Gouvernements prendraient aussitôt en considération les plans de leurs états majors et décideraient alors de la suite qui devrait être donnée à ces plans.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,  
PAUL CAMBON.

in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common; if those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours, etc.

PAUL CAMBON.

Enclosure 3 in No. 105<sup>1</sup>

*French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London.*

(Translation.)

L'ARMÉE allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes-frontières, hier; par deux fois des patrouilles allemandes ont pénétré sur notre territoire. Nos avant-postes sont en retraite à 10 kilom. en arrière de la frontière. Les populations ainsi abandonnées à l'attaque de l'armée adverse protestent; mais le Gouvernement tient à montrer à l'opinion publique et au Gouvernement britannique que l'agresseur ne sera en aucun cas

THE German Army had its advance-posts on our frontiers yesterday; German patrols twice penetrated on to our territory. Our advance-posts are withdrawn to a distance of 10 kilom. from the frontier. The local population is protesting against being thus abandoned to the attack of the enemy's army, but the Government wishes to make it clear to public opinion and to the British Government that in no case will France be the aggres-

<sup>1</sup> Enclosure 3 in No. 105 was dated in the first editions of the British Blue Book, namely July 31, while No. 105 itself is dated July 30. The text of the Enclosure should be compared with French Yellow Book No. 106, on which it is based. Whether the French Ambassador or Sir E. Grey is responsible for the errors and transpositions, it is impossible to state. For a full discussion see E. von Mach, *Germany's Point of View*, pp. 421 ff., and the same author's *Why Europe is at War*, G. P. Putnam's Sons.

la France. Tout le 16<sup>e</sup> Corps de Metz renforcé par une partie du 8<sup>e</sup> venu de Trèves et de Cologne occupe la frontière de Metz au Luxembourg. Le 15<sup>e</sup> Corps d'Armée de Strasbourg a serré sur la frontière. Sous menace d'être fusillés les Alsaciens-Lorrains des pays annexés ne peuvent pas passer la frontière; des réservistes par dizaines de milliers sont rappelés en Allemagne; c'est le dernier stade avant la mobilisation: or, nous n'avons rappelé aucun réserviste.

Comme vous le voyez, l'Allemagne l'a fait. J'ajoute que toutes nos informations concordent pour montrer que les préparatifs allemands ont commencé samedi,<sup>1</sup> le jour même de la remise de la note autrichienne.

Ces éléments, ajoutés à ceux contenus dans mon télégramme d'hier, vous permettent de faire la preuve au Gouvernement britannique de la volonté pacifique de l'un et des intentions agressives de l'autre.

sor. The whole 16th corps from Metz, reinforced by a part of the 8th from Trèves and Cologne, is occupying the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg side. The 15th army corps from Strassburg has closed up on the frontier. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are prevented by the threat of being shot from crossing the frontier. Reservists have been called back to Germany by tens of thousands. This is the last stage before mobilisation, whereas we have not called back a single reservist.

As you see, Germany has done so. I would add that all my information goes to show that the German preparations began on Saturday,<sup>1</sup> the very day on which the Austrian note was handed in.

These facts, added to those contained in my telegram of yesterday, will enable you to prove to the British Government the pacific intentions of the one party and the aggressive intentions of the other.

**Russia :**

*From Nish*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 59

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Nish, July 17 (30), 1914.*

(Telegram.)

THE Prince Regent yesterday published a manifesto, signed by all the Servian Ministers, on the declaration of war by Austria against Servia. The manifesto ends with the following words: "Defend your homes and Servia with all your might." At the solemn opening of the Skupschtina the Regent read the speech from the Throne, in his own name. At the beginning of his speech he pointed out that

<sup>1</sup> The earlier editions of the British Blue Book contained no footnote to this erroneous date. The later ones print this note: "Sic: in original. The actual date of the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum was, in fact, Thursday, July 23. The Servian reply was dated Saturday, July 25, and it is clearly to the latter document that reference is intended."

the place of their convocation showed the importance of present events. He followed this with a summary of recent events — the Austrian ultimatum, the Servian reply, the efforts of the Servian Government to do their utmost to avoid war that was compatible with the dignity of the State, and, finally, the armed aggression of their most powerful neighbour against Serbia, at whose side stood Montenegro. Passing in review the attitude of the Powers towards the dispute, the Prince emphasised in the first place the sentiments which animated Russia, and the gracious communication from His Majesty the Emperor that Russia would in no case abandon Serbia.<sup>1</sup> At each mention of His Majesty the Czar and of Russia the hall resounded with loud bursts of wild cheering. The sympathy shown by France and England<sup>2</sup> was also touched upon in turn, and called forth approving plaudits from the members. The speech from the throne ended by declaring the Skupschtina open, and by expressing the hope that everything possible would be done to lighten the task before the Government.

*To Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK NO. 60

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome.*

*St. Petersburg, July 17 (30), 1914.*

(Telegram.)

THE German Ambassador, who has just left me, has asked<sup>3</sup> whether Russia would not be satisfied with the promise which Austria might give — that she would not violate the integrity of the Kingdom of Servia — and whether we could not indicate upon what conditions we would agree to suspend our military preparations. I dictated to him the following declaration to be forwarded to Berlin for immediate action :

“Si l’Autriche, reconnaissant que la question austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d’une question européenne, se déclare prête à éliminer de son ultimatum les points qui portent atteinte aux droits souverains de la Serbie, la Russie s’engage à cesser ses préparatifs militaires.”

“If Austria, recognising that the Austro-Servian question has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate the sovereign rights of Servia, Russia engages to stop her military preparations.”

Please inform me at once by telegraph what attitude the German Government will adopt in face of this fresh proof of our desire to do

<sup>1</sup> See Russian Orange Book No. 40, July 27.

<sup>2</sup> For England’s attitude a few weeks earlier, see Mr. Asquith’s speech, *London Times*, July 1, 1914, referring to the Serajevo murder. “We are once more confronted with one of those incredible crimes which almost make us despair of the progress of mankind.”

<sup>3</sup> Cf. note 2 to British Blue Book No. 99, July 30.

the utmost possible for a peaceful settlement of the question, for we cannot allow such discussions to continue solely in order that Germany and Austria may gain time for their military preparations.

*From Berlin*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 61<sup>1</sup>

*Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*  
(Telegram.) *Berlin, July 17 (30), 1914.*

I LEARN that the order for the mobilisation of the German army and navy has just been issued.

*From Berlin*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 62

*Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*  
(Telegram.) *Berlin, July 17 (30), 1914.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has just telephoned that the news of the mobilisation of the German army and fleet, which has just been announced, is false; that the news sheets had been printed in advance so as to be ready for all eventualities, and that they were put on sale in the afternoon, but that they have now been confiscated.

*From Berlin*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 63

*Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*  
*Berlin, July 17 (30), 1914.*  
(Telegram.)

I HAVE received your telegram of 16th (29th) July,<sup>2</sup> and have communicated the text of your proposal<sup>3</sup> to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I have just seen. He told me that he had received an identic telegram from the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and he then declared that he considered it impossible for Austria to accept our proposal.

<sup>1</sup> The juxtaposition of Nos. 61 and 60 makes it appear as if No. 61 contained the reply to No. 60. This cannot be the case. From French Yellow Book No. 113, July 31, and British Blue Book No. 120, July 31, printed under date of August 1, it appears that the formula was changed by Sazonof probably on July 31. This would have been impossible if Germany had issued her order for the mobilisation of her army and navy on July 30. Cf. also French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30. As a matter of fact Germany mobilised on August 1 as of August 2. See British Blue Book No. 142, August 1, and the chapter on Mobilisation in M. P. Price, *The Diplomatic History of the War*.

<sup>2</sup> British Blue Book No. 93, July 30, Enclosure No. 2, dated July 29.

<sup>3</sup> This proposal was superseded by the proposal of July 30, printed above, Orange Book No. 60. To print this despatch (No. 63) after No. 60 is misleading, because the casual reader may see in it Austria's refusal to accept the formula of No. 60, which is not the case.

*From London*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK NO. 64

*Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, July 17 (30), 1914.*

I HAVE communicated the substance of your telegrams of the 16th (29th)<sup>1</sup> and 17th (30th) July<sup>2</sup> to Grey, who looks upon the situation as most serious, but wishes to continue the discussions. I pointed out to Grey that — since you agreed with him to accept whatever proposal he might make in order to preserve peace, provided that Austria did not profit by any ensuing delays to crush Servia — the situation in which you were placed had apparently been modified. At that time our relations with Germany had not been compromised. After the declaration made by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg regarding German mobilisation, those relations had changed, and you had returned the only reply to his request that was possible from a Great Power. When the German Ambassador again visited you, and enquired what your conditions were, you had formulated them in altogether special circumstances. I also again emphasised to Grey the necessity of taking into consideration the new situation brought about by the fault of Germany in consequence of the German Ambassador's action.<sup>3</sup> Grey replied that he fully understood this, and that he would remember these arguments.

*From London*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK NO. 65

*Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, July 17 (30), 1914.*

THE German Ambassador has asked Grey<sup>4</sup> why Great Britain was taking military measures both on land and sea. Grey replied that these measures had no aggressive character, but that the situation was such that each Power must be ready.

<sup>1</sup> British Blue Book No. 93, Enclosure 2, July 30. Since the Ambassador had communicated the entire telegram to Sir E. Grey, it does not appear why he should here speak of communicating the substance. Equally confusing is the mixture of two separate proposals. See second note to previous despatch.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 97, July 30, and Russian Orange Book No. 60, same day.

<sup>3</sup> This action is described in very different terms in British Blue Book No. 97, July 30.

<sup>4</sup> Omitted in British Blue Book, see above, note 1 to British Blue Book No. 98, July 30, and French Yellow Book No. 108, same day.



Serbia :

*To St. Petersburg*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 44

*His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Nish, July 17/30, 1914.*

[For the text see Russian Orange Book No. 56, undated in the Collected Diplomatic Documents, but printed among the despatches of July 29. No reason is given why a despatch from the Serbian Crown Prince was known in Russia a day before it was published in the Serbian Blue Book as having been sent from Serbia. For Serbian Blue Book Nos. 45 to 47 see under July 28.]

*From St. Petersburg*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 48

*M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Dr. M. Spalaikovich, Serbian Minister at Petrograd.*

Sir,

*Petrograd, July 17/30, 1914.*

I HAD the honour to receive your note of July 15/28,<sup>1</sup> No. 527, in which you communicated to me the contents of the telegram received by you from His Excellency, M. Pashitch, in regard to the declaration of war on Serbia by Austria-Hungary. I sincerely regret this sad event, and will not fail to lay before His Majesty the petition by the Serbian nation, whose interpreter you are.

I have, etc.

<sup>1</sup> Not published in Russian Orange Book or Serbian Blue Book. If the date of the telegram from Sazonof, July 30, is correct it would seem that Sazonof had waited at least two days before laying Serbia's petition before the Czar. This seems incredible.

Friday, July 31, 1914

## SUMMARY OF DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	London and Petrograd, All representatives abroad	Petrograd, Paris
Belgium	London, Berlin and Paris, All representatives abroad	—
France	London, etc., Petrograd	London, Luxemburg, Petrograd Vienna, Berlin, Brussels
Germany	Rome, Petrograd, Paris	—
Great Britain	Petrograd, Berlin, Paris and Berlin, Brussels, Paris	London, Luxemburg, Petrograd, Vienna, Berlin, Brussels
Russia	London, etc.; London	Vienna, Berlin
Serbia	—	—

*Austria-Hungary* is prepared to entertain Sir E. Grey's proposal to negotiate between her and Serbia. Russia's mobilisation order, however, posted in the early hours throughout the Russian Empire, induces her to mobilise her own forces in Galicia. She nevertheless continues her direct conversations with Russia.

*Belgium* mobilises her forces but promises to observe strict neutrality. She receives assurances of the French minister *de suo*, and publishes German assurances made in the Reichstag several years ago.

*France*, having promised her unconditional support of Russia on the previous day, is trying to obtain an unconditional promise of support from Great Britain.

*Germany* is deeply stirred by the Russian order of general mobilisation, which came while Emperor and Czar were still exchanging telegrams. She says that this order is making her pacific efforts in Vienna impossible and endangering her safety. She consequently declares "Kriegsgefahrzustand" and asks Russia, in an ultimatum, to demobilise within 12 hours. At the same time she asks France to reply within 18 hours, whether she will remain neutral in a Russo-German War.

*Great Britain*: The Cabinet refuses the request of France to make her a definite promise of support. Sir E. Grey, however, or his assistant, Sir A. Nicolson, promises to bring the matter up again in the Cabinet on the next day, while Sir E. Grey himself gives Germany to understand that Great Britain would join France in case of war, making thus a declaration contrary to the decision of the Cabinet. Notes are addressed to France and Germany regarding their respective attitudes toward the neutrality of Belgium, which Sir E. Grey declares to be not "a decisive but an important factor, in determining our attitude." Sir E. Grey requests a modification of Sazonof's formula of the previous day.

*Russia* alters her formula of the previous day in which she had promised to stop her military measures, and orders the general mobilisation of her forces.

*Serbia* is silent on this day.

**Austria-Hungary:***To London and St. Petersburg*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 51

*Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at London and St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 31, 1914.

I AM telegraphing as follows to Berlin:—

Herr von Tschirschky has in accordance with his instructions yesterday communicated a discussion between Sir E. Grey and Prince

Lichnowsky in which the British Secretary of State made the following announcement to the German Ambassador : —

Sazonof has informed the British Government that after the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Servia, he is no longer in a position to deal directly with Austria-Hungary,<sup>1</sup> and he therefore requests that Great Britain will again take up her work of mediation. The Russian Government regarded the preliminary stoppage of hostilities as a condition precedent to this.

To this Russian declaration, Sir E. Grey remarked to Prince Lichnowsky that Great Britain thought of a mediation *à quatre*, and that she regarded this as urgently necessary if a general war was to be prevented.

I ask your Excellency to convey our warm thanks to the Secretary of State for the communications made to us through Herr von Tschirschky, and to declare to him that in spite of the change in the situation which has since arisen through the mobilisation of Russia, we are quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey to negotiate between us and Servia.<sup>2</sup>

The conditions of our acceptance are, nevertheless, that our military action against Servia should continue to take its course, and that the British Cabinet should move the Russian Government to bring to a standstill the Russian mobilisation which is directed against us, in which case, of course, we will also at once cancel the defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which are occasioned by the Russian attitude.

*From St. Petersburg*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 52<sup>3</sup>

*Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

THE order for the general mobilisation of the entire Army and Fleet was issued early to-day.

*To the Imperial and Royal Diplomatic Representatives*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 53

*Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Diplomatic Representatives.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 31, 1914.*

FOR your information and for use in your dealings with the Government to which you are accredited.

<sup>1</sup> The only published despatch in the British Blue Book and Russian Orange Book to which this can refer is Russian Orange Book No. 50, July 29. Here, however, it is Sazonof, while there it is Austria-Hungary who is said to have broken off the conversations. This despatch is not printed in the German White Book.

<sup>2</sup> This is an enormous concession both to Great Britain and France. Heretofore Germany and Austria-Hungary had always refused arbitration between Austria and Servia while ready to accept arbitration between Austria and Russia.

<sup>3</sup> The juxtaposition of these despatches, Nos. 51 and 52, is as unfortunate as that noted above, Russian Orange Book Nos. 60 and 61, July 30. The mobilisation was in neither case the result of the previous despatch. The Russian mobilisation was the result of a decision reached "five days ago," according to the Czar's telegram of July 30; see German White Book, Exhibit 23a.

As mobilisation has been ordered by the Russian Government on our frontier, we find ourselves obliged to take military measures in Galicia.

These measures are purely of a defensive character and arise exclusively under the pressure of the Russian measures, which we regret exceedingly, as we ourselves have no aggressive intentions of any kind against Russia, and desire the continuation of the former neighbourly relations.

*Pourparlers* between the Cabinets at Vienna and St. Petersburg appropriate to the situation are meanwhile being continued,<sup>1</sup> and from these we hope that things will quiet down all round.

*From Paris*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 54

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

GERMAN Ambassador in pursuance of the instructions of his Government has declared here that if the general mobilisation ordered by the Russian Government is not stopped within 12 hours, Germany also will mobilise. At the same time Baron Schoen has asked whether France will remain neutral in the event of a war between Germany and Russia. An answer to this is requested within eighteen hours. The time limit expires to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 o'clock in the afternoon.

*From St. Petersburg*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 55

*Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

YOUR Excellency's telegram <sup>2</sup> of the 30th July has been received.

You will have gathered from my telegram <sup>3</sup> of the 29th July, that without waiting for instructions I again resumed conversations with M. Sazonof more or less on the basis which has now been indicated to me, but that the points of view on the two sides had not materially approximated to each other.

Meanwhile, however, it has appeared from the conversations between the German Ambassador and the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Russia will not <sup>4</sup> accept as satisfactory the formal declaration that Austria-Hungary will neither diminish the territory of the Servian Kingdom nor infringe on Servian sovereignty nor injure Russian interests in the Balkans or elsewhere; since then moreover a general mobilisation <sup>5</sup> has been ordered on the part of Russia.

<sup>1</sup> A despatch explaining the resumption of the *pourparlers* seems to be lacking, unless No. 55, same day, explains it.

<sup>2</sup> Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50, July 30.

<sup>3</sup> Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29.

<sup>4</sup> In reports of these conversations this is only stated by inference. Cf. British Blue Book No. 97, July 30.

<sup>5</sup> Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 52, same day.

**Belgium :**

*To Berlin, Paris, London*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 9

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London.*

Sir,

*Brussels, July 31, 1914.*

THE French Minister came to show me a telegram from the Agence Havas reporting a state of war<sup>1</sup> in Germany, and said<sup>2</sup> : —

“I seize this opportunity to declare that no incursion of French troops into Belgium will take place, even if considerable forces are massed upon the frontiers of your country. France does not wish to incur the responsibility, so far as Belgium is concerned, of taking the first hostile act. Instructions in this sense will be given to the French authorities.”

I thanked M. Klobukowski for his communication, and I felt bound to observe that we had always had the greatest confidence in the loyal observance by both our neighbouring States of their engagements towards us. We have also every reason to believe that the attitude of the German Government will be the same as that of the Government of the French Republic.

*To All Belgian Missions Abroad*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 10

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Heads of Belgian Missions abroad.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, July 31, 1914.*

THE Minister of War informs me that mobilisation has been ordered<sup>3</sup> and that Saturday, the 1st August, will be the first day.

*To Berlin, London, Paris*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 11

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris.*

Sir,

*Brussels, July 31, 1914.*

THE British Minister asked to see me on urgent business, and made the following communication, which he had hoped for some days<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> “State of danger of war” (*Kriegsgefahrzustand*), see French Yellow Book No. 119, July 31, and British Blue Book No. 112, same day.

<sup>2</sup> It is an unusual step in diplomacy for the Minister to make such a declaration without authority to that effect having been sent. The formal declaration of the French Government was made later. Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1, 1914.

<sup>3</sup> It will be noted that Belgium ordered the mobilisation of her troops one day earlier than Germany. See German White Book, p. 559, August 1 at 5 p.m., and British Blue Book No. 127, August 1.

<sup>4</sup> No explanation is given why the British Minister could not have done so before.

to be able to present to me: Owing to the possibility of a European war, Sir Edward Grey has asked the French and German Governments separately if they were each of them ready to respect Belgian neutrality provided that no other Power violated it: —

"In view of existing treaties, I am instructed <sup>1</sup> to inform the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the above, and to say that Sir Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her neutrality, and that she desires and expects that the other Powers will respect and maintain it."

I hastened to thank Sir Francis Villiers for this communication, which the Belgian Government particularly appreciate, and I added that Great Britain and the other nations guaranteeing our independence could rest assured that we would neglect no effort to maintain our neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other Powers, in view of the excellent relations of friendship and confidence which had always existed between us, would respect and maintain that neutrality.

I did not fail to state that our military forces, which had been considerably developed in consequence of our recent reorganisation, were sufficient to enable us to defend ourselves <sup>2</sup> energetically in the event of the violation of our territory.

In the course of the ensuing conversation, Sir Francis seemed to me somewhat surprised at the speed with which we had decided to mobilise our army. I pointed out to him that the Netherlands had come to a similar decision before we had done so, and that, moreover, the recent date of our new military system, and the temporary nature of the measures upon which we then had to decide, made it necessary for us to take immediate and thorough precautions. Our neighbours and guarantors should see in this decision our strong desire to uphold our neutrality ourselves.

Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply, and stated that his Government were awaiting this reply before continuing negotiations with France and Germany, the result of which would be communicated to me.

*To Berlin, London, and Paris*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 12\*

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris.*

Sir,

*Brussels, July 31, 1914.*

In the course of the conversation which the Secretary-General of my Department had with Herr von Below this morning, he ex-

<sup>1</sup> British Blue Book No. 115, July 31.

<sup>2</sup> This should be read in the light of the Brussels Documents, published by the German Government, which reveal the close military understanding with Great Britain. The reader should decide for himself whether Belgium was in a position to defend herself also against the Allies. Germany says that this would have been impossible because Belgium had given all her military secrets to Great Britain and, therefore, also to France.

plained to the German Minister the scope of the military measures which we had taken, and said to him that they were a consequence of our desire to fulfil our international obligations, and that they in no wise implied an attitude of distrust towards our neighbours.

The Secretary-General then asked the German Minister if he knew of the conversation which he had had with his predecessor, Herr von Flotow, and of the reply which the Imperial Chancellor had instructed the latter to give.

In the course of the controversy which arose in 1911 as a consequence of the Dutch scheme for the fortification of Flushing, certain newspapers had maintained that in the case of a Franco-German war Belgian neutrality<sup>1</sup> would be violated by Germany.

The Department of Foreign Affairs had suggested that a declaration in the German Parliament during a debate on foreign affairs would serve to calm public opinion, and to dispel the mistrust which was so regrettable from the point of view of the relations between the two countries.

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied that he had fully appreciated the feelings which had inspired our representations. He declared that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality, but he considered that in making a public declaration Germany would weaken her military position in regard to France, who, secured on the northern side, would concentrate all her energies on the east.

Baron van der Elst, continuing, said that he perfectly understood the objections raised by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to the proposed public declaration, and he recalled the fact that since then, in 1913, Herr von Jagow had made reassuring declarations to the Budget Commission of the Reichstag respecting the maintenance of Belgian neutrality.

Herr von Below replied that he knew of the conversation with Herr von Flotow, and that he was certain that the sentiments expressed at that time had not changed.

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Enclosure in No. 12

*Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Berlin, May 2, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to bring to your notice the declarations respecting Belgian neutrality, as published in the semi-official *Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, made by the Secretary of State and the Minister of War, at the meeting of the Budget Committee of the Reichstag on April 29th:—

“A member of the Social Democrat Party said: ‘The approach of a war between Germany and France is viewed with apprehension

<sup>1</sup> For a full discussion of the neutrality of Belgium see A. K. Fuehr, *The Neutrality of Belgium*, Funk & Wagnalls Co.



in Belgium, for it is feared that Germany will not respect the neutrality of Belgium.'

"Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State, replied: 'Belgian neutrality is provided for by International Conventions and Germany is determined to respect those Conventions.'

"This declaration did not satisfy another member of the Social Democrat Party. Herr von Jagow said that he had nothing to add to the clear statement he had made respecting the relations between Germany and Belgium.

"In answer to fresh enquiries by a member of the Social Democrat Party, Herr von Heeringen, the Minister of War, replied: 'Belgium plays no part in the causes which justify the proposed reorganisation of the German military system. That proposal is based on the situation in the East. Germany will not lose sight of the fact that the neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by international treaty.'

"A member of the Progressive Party having once again spoken of Belgium, Herr von Jagow repeated that this declaration in regard to Belgium was sufficiently clear."

France :

*From London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK NO. 110

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 31, 1914.*

At the beginning of our conversation<sup>1</sup> to-day Sir E. Grey told me that Prince Lichnowsky had asked him this morning if Great Britain would observe neutrality in the conflict which is at hand. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that, if the conflict became general, Great Britain would not be able to remain neutral, and especially that if France were involved Great Britain would be drawn in.

I then asked Sir E. Grey concerning the Cabinet Council which took place this morning. He replied that after having examined the situation, the Cabinet had thought<sup>2</sup> that for the moment the British Government were unable to guarantee to us their intervention, that they intended to take steps to obtain from Germany and France an understanding to respect Belgian neutrality, but that before considering intervention it was necessary to wait for the situation to develop.

I asked Sir E. Grey if, before intervening, the British Government would await the invasion of French territory. I insisted on the fact

<sup>1</sup> This conversation is only very briefly touched upon in British Blue Book No. 116, same day.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 119, July 31. This was the first vote of the Cabinet to "intervene" or "pledge support" to France. For the second vote, likewise refusing, see French Yellow Book No. 126, August 1.

that the measures already taken on our frontier by Germany showed an intention to attack in the near future, and that, if a renewal of the mistake of Europe in 1870 was to be avoided, Great Britain should consider at once the circumstances in which she would give France the help on which she relied.<sup>1</sup>

Sir E. Grey replied that the opinion of the Cabinet had only been formed on the situation at the moment, that the situation might be modified, and that in that case a meeting of the Cabinet would be called<sup>2</sup> together at once in order to consider it.

Sir A. Nicolson, whom I saw on leaving the room of the Secretary of State, told me that the Cabinet would meet again to-morrow, and confidentially gave me to understand that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would be certain to renew the discussion.

According to your instructions, I have taken the necessary steps to secure that the autograph letter<sup>3</sup> which the President of the Republic has addressed to His Majesty the King of England should be given to the King this evening. This step, which will certainly be communicated to the Prime Minister to-morrow morning, will, I am sure, be taken into serious consideration by the British Cabinet.

PAUL CAMBON.

*From Luxemburg*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 111

*M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Luxemburg, July 31, 1914.*

THE Minister of State has just left the Legation; he has just told me that the Germans have closed the bridges over the Moselle at Schengen and at Remich with vehicles and the bridge at Wormeldange with ropes. The bridges at Wasserbillig and at D'Echternach over the Sûre have not been closed, but the Germans no longer allow the export from Prussia of corn, cattle or motor cars.

M. Eyschen requested me — and this was the real object of his visit — to ask you for an official declaration to the effect that France will, in case of war, respect the neutrality of Luxemburg. When I asked him if he had received a similar declaration from the German Government, he told me that he was going to the German Minister to get the same declaration.

*Postscript.* — Up to the present no special measure has been taken by the Cabinet of Luxemburg. M. Eyschen has returned from the German Legation. He complained of the measures showing suspicion which were taken against a neutral neighbour. The Minister of State has asked the German Minister for an official declaration

<sup>1</sup> If France had not relied on the help of Great Britain she might not have supported Russia.

<sup>2</sup> Contrast this with the assurance given in the next paragraph.

<sup>3</sup> This letter was published by Sir E. Grey, after repeated requests had been made, on Feb. 20, 1915.

from his Government undertaking to respect the neutrality. Herr Von Buch is stated to have replied, "That is a matter of course, but it would be necessary for the French Government to give the same undertaking."

MOLLARD.

• *To London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna and Rome*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 112

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.*

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

THE British Ambassador has handed me a note <sup>1</sup> from his Government asking the French Government to support a proposal at St. Petersburg for the peaceful solution of the Austro-Servian conflict.

This note shows that the German Ambassador has informed Sir E. Grey of the intention of his Government to try to exercise influence on the Austro-Hungarian Government after the capture of Belgrade and the occupation of the districts bordering on the frontier, in order to obtain a promise not to advance further, while the Powers endeavoured to secure that Serbia should give sufficient satisfaction to Austria; the occupied territory would be evacuated as soon as she had received satisfaction.

Sir E. Grey made this suggestion on the 29th July,<sup>2</sup> and expressed the hope that military preparations would be suspended on all sides. Although the Russian Ambassador at London has informed the Secretary of State that he fears that the Russian condition <sup>3</sup> (if *Austria, recognising that her conflict with Serbia has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which endanger the principle of Servian sovereignty, Russia undertakes to stop all military preparations*) cannot be modified, Sir E. Grey thinks that, if Austria stops her advance after the occupation of Belgrade, the Russian Government could agree to change their formula in the following way:—

That the Powers would examine how Serbia should give complete satisfaction to Austria without endangering the sovereignty or independence of the Kingdom. In case Austria after occupying Belgrade and the neighbouring Servian territory should declare herself ready, in the interests of Europe, to stop her advance and to discuss how an arrangement might be arrived at, Russia could also consent to the discussion and suspend her military preparations, provided that the other Powers acted in the same way.

In accordance with the request of Sir E. Grey, the French Government joined in the British suggestion, and in the following terms

<sup>1</sup> See British Blue Book No. 104, July 30, also British Blue Book No. 103, same day.

<sup>2</sup> British Blue Book No. 88, July 29.

<sup>3</sup> French Yellow Book No. 103, British Blue Book No. 97, July 30.

asked their Ambassador at St. Petersburg to try to obtain, without delay, the assent <sup>1</sup> of the Russian Government : —

"Please inform M. Sazonof urgently that the suggestion of Sir E. Grey appears to me to furnish a useful basis for conversation between the Powers, who are equally desirous of working for an honourable arrangement of the Austro-Servian conflict, and of averting in this manner the dangers which threaten general peace.

"The plan proposed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by stopping the advance of the Austrian army and by entrusting to the Powers the duty of examining how Serbia could give full satisfaction to Austria without endangering the sovereign rights and the independence of the Kingdom, by thus affording Russia a means of suspending all military preparations, while the other Powers are to act in the same way, is calculated equally to give satisfaction to Russia and to Austria and to provide for Serbia an acceptable means of issue from the present difficulty.

"I would ask you carefully to be guided by the foregoing considerations in earnestly pressing M. Sazonof to give his adherence <sup>2</sup> without delay to the proposal of Sir E. Grey, of which he will have been himself informed."

RENÉ VIVIANI.

*From St. Petersburg*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 113

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

THE news of the bombardment of Belgrade <sup>3</sup> during the night and morning of yesterday has provoked very deep feeling in Russia. One cannot understand the attitude of Austria, whose provocations since the beginning of the crisis have regularly followed Russia's attempts at conciliation and the satisfactory conversations exchanged between St. Petersburg and Vienna.

Nevertheless, desirous of leaving nothing undone in order to prove his sincere desire to safeguard peace, M. Sazonof informs me that he has modified <sup>4</sup> his formula, as requested by the British Ambassador, in the following way : —

"If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits

<sup>1</sup> Austria-Hungary was "quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey to negotiate between us and Serbia"; see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31.

<sup>2</sup> Russia ordered complete mobilisation instead.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. last despatch, offer of Sir E. Grey for an agreement "after the occupation of Belgrade."

<sup>4</sup> The modified formula must have been less satisfactory than the original one, French Yellow Book No. 103, July 30, because here Austria has to agree to "stay the march of her troops" while Russia merely agrees to a "waiting attitude," instead of stopping her military preparations as she had first offered to do.

that the great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government, without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude."

PALÉOLOGUE.

*To London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and Constantinople*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 114

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and Constantinople.*

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

THE efforts made up till now concurrently by Great Britain and Russia with the earnest support of France (obtained in advance for every peaceful effort) with the object of a direct understanding between Vienna and St. Petersburg, or of the mediation of the four Powers in the most appropriate form, are being united to-day; Russia, giving a fresh proof of her desire for an understanding, has hastened to reply to the first appearance of an overture<sup>1</sup> made by Germany since the beginning of the crisis (as to the conditions on which Russia would stop her military preparations) by indicating a formula, and then modifying<sup>2</sup> it in accordance with the request of Great Britain; there ought to be hope, therefore, negotiations having also been begun again between the Russian and Austrian Ambassadors that British mediation will complete at London that which is being attempted by direct negotiations at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Nevertheless, the constant attitude of Germany who, since the beginning of the conflict, while ceaselessly protesting to each Power her peaceful intentions, has actually, by her dilatory or negative<sup>3</sup> attitude, caused the failure of all attempts at agreement, and has not ceased to encourage through her Ambassador the uncompromising attitude of Vienna; the German military preparations begun since the 25th July<sup>4</sup> and subsequently continued without cessation; the immediate opposition<sup>5</sup> of Germany to the Russian formula, declared at Berlin unacceptable for Austria before that Power had even been consulted; in conclusion, all the impressions derived from Berlin bring conviction that Germany has sought to humiliate Russia, to disintegrate the Triple Entente, and if these results could not be obtained, to make war.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

<sup>1</sup> French Yellow Book No. 103, July 30.

<sup>2</sup> See note 2 to previous despatch.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Chancellor's Speech, note 2, British Blue Book No. 67, July 28.

<sup>4</sup> That this was an error appears from French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30. See also the chapters on Mobilization in M. P. Price, *The Diplomatic History of the War*, Scribner's Sons.

<sup>5</sup> There is no proof for this assertion. On the contrary Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31, seems to prove that Germany had agreed, for Austria-Hungary's statement that she was "prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey to negotiate between us and Serbia" came as the result of a communication transmitted to her by Germany. Russian Orange Book No. 67, July 31, while stating that the formula was altered at the request of Great Britain, does not say that Germany had opposed the original formula.

*From Vienna*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 115

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani—  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 31, 1914.*

GENERAL mobilisation for all men from 19 to 42 years of age was declared by the Austro-Hungarian Government this morning at 1 o'clock.

My Russian colleague still thinks that this step is not entirely in contradiction to the declaration made yesterday by Count Berchtold.

DUMAINE.

*From Berlin*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 116

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

HERR VON JAGOW sent for me and has just told me that he was very sorry to inform me that in face of the total mobilisation of the Russian army, Germany, in the interest of the security of the Empire, found herself obliged to take serious precautionary measures. What is called "Kriegsgefahrzustand" (the state of danger of war) has been declared,<sup>1</sup> and this allows the authorities to proclaim, if they deem it expedient, a state of siege, to suspend some of the public services, and to close the frontier.

At the same time a demand <sup>2</sup> is being made at St. Petersburg that they should demobilise, as well on the Austrian as on the German side, otherwise Germany would be obliged to mobilise on her side. Herr von Jagow told me that Herr von Schoen had been instructed to inform the French Government of the resolution of the Berlin Cabinet and to ask them what attitude they intended to adopt.

JULES CAMBON.

*To St. Petersburg*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 117

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

THE German Government decided at mid-day to take all military measures implied by the state called "state of danger of war."

<sup>1</sup> This proves that the previous references to "Kriegsgefahr" were erroneous. See French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, and Russian Orange Book No. 61, same day.

<sup>2</sup> Russian Orange Book No. 70, August 1 (midnight).

In communicating this decision to me at 7 o'clock this evening, Baron von Schoen added that the Government required at the same time that Russia should demobilise. If the Russian Government has not given a satisfactory reply within twelve hours Germany will mobilise in her turn.

I replied to the German Ambassador that I had no information at all<sup>1</sup> about an alleged total mobilisation of the Russian army and navy which the German Government invoked as the reason for the new military measures which they are taking to-day.

Baron von Schoen finally asked me, in the name of his Government, what the attitude of France would be in case of war between Germany and Russia. He told me that he would come for my reply to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 o'clock.

I have no intention of making any statement to him on this subject, and I shall confine myself to telling him that France will have regard to her interests. The Government of the Republic need not indeed give any account of her intentions except to her ally.

I ask you to inform M. Sazonof of this immediately. As I have already told you, I have no doubt that the Imperial Government, in the highest interests of peace, will do everything on their part to avoid anything that might render inevitable or precipitate the crisis.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

*From St. Petersburg*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 118

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, President of Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

As a result of the general mobilisation of Austria and of the measures for mobilisation taken secretly, but continuously, by Germany for the last six days,<sup>2</sup> the order for the general mobilisation of the Russian army has been given, Russia not being able, without most serious danger, to allow herself to be further out-distanced; really she is only taking military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany.

For imperative reasons of strategy the Russian Government, knowing that Germany was arming, could no longer delay the conversion of her partial mobilisation into a general mobilisation.

PALÉOLOGUE.

<sup>1</sup> This is very strange, since the Russian mobilisation was "ordered during the afternoon of July 31" (German White Book, p. 558), according to M. P. Price, *The Diplomatic History of the War*, Scribner's Sons, p. 103, and *London Times*, Sept. 11, letter by Mr. Stephen Graham, who states on the Mongolian frontier in Siberia the first telegram to mobilise came through at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 31st July.

<sup>2</sup> For the error of this and similar statements see M. P. Price's book referred to in note to previous despatch.



*From Brussels*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 119

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Vivianz  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, July 31, 1914.*

L'AGENCE HAVAS having announced that the state "of danger of war" had been declared in Germany, I told M. Davignon that I could assure him that the Government of the Republic would respect the neutrality of Belgium.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that the Government of the King had always thought that this would be so, and thanked me. The Russian Minister and the British Minister, whom I saw subsequently, appeared much pleased that in the circumstances I gave this assurance, which further, as the British Minister told me, was in accordance with the declaration of Sir E. Grey.

KLOBUKOWSKI.

Germany:

*To Rome*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 19

*Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Rome on  
July 31st, 1914.*

WE have continued to negotiate between Russia and Austria-Hungary through a direct exchange of telegrams between His Majesty the Kaiser and His Majesty the Czar, as well as in conjunction with Sir Edward Grey. Through the mobilisation of Russia all our efforts have been greatly handicapped if they have not become impossible. In spite of pacifying assurances Russia is <sup>1</sup> taking such far-reaching measures against us that the situation is becoming continually more menacing.

*To St. Petersburg*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 24

*Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 31st, 1914. Urgent.*

IN spite of negotiations still pending and although we have up to this hour made no preparations for mobilisation, Russia has mobilised her *entire* army and navy, hence also against us. On account of these Russian measures, we have been forced, for the safety of the country, to proclaim the threatening state of war, which does not yet imply mobilisation. Mobilisation, however, is bound to follow if Russia does not stop every measure of war against us and against Austria-

<sup>1</sup> The British edition has this footnote: "The German text adds here 'allen uns zugegangenen Nachrichten zufolge' (according to all the information that has reached us)".

Hungary within 12 hours, and notifies us definitely to this effect. Please to communicate this at once to M. Sazonof and wire hour of communication.<sup>1</sup>

*To Paris*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 25

*Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris on July 31st, 1914. Urgent.*

Russia has ordered mobilisation of her entire army and fleet, therefore also against us in spite of our still pending mediation.<sup>2</sup> We have therefore declared the threatening state of war which is bound to be followed by mobilisation unless Russia stops within 12 hours all measures of war against us and Austria. Mobilisation inevitably implies war. Please ask French Government whether it intends to remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made in 18 hours. Wire at once hour of inquiry. Utmost speed necessary.

Great Britain:

*From Vienna*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 50

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.*  
— (Received July 31.)

Sir,

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the Austro-Hungarian note announcing the declaration of war against Servia.

I have, etc.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 50

Copy of note verbale, dated Vienna, July 28, 1914

(Translation.)

POUR mettre fin aux menées subversives partant de Belgrade et dirigées centre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a fait parvenir à la date du 23 juillet, 1914, au Serbie une note dans laquelle se trouvait formulée une série de demandes pour l'acceptation desquelles un délai de quarante-huit

IN order to bring to an end the subversive intrigues originating from Belgrade and aimed at the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Imperial and Royal Government has delivered to the Royal Servian Government a note, dated July 23, 1914, in which a series of demands were formulated, for the acceptance of which

<sup>1</sup> Presented at midnight. See Russian Orange Book No. 70, August 1.

<sup>2</sup> The British edition adds here a footnote: "The German text adds here 'und obwohl wir selbst keinerlei Mobilmachungsmassnahmen getroffen haben' (and although we ourselves have taken no measures towards mobilisation)".

heures a été accordé a Gouvernement Royal. Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'ayant pas répondu à cette note d'une manière satisfaisante, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se trouve dans la nécessité de pourvoir lui-même à la sauvegarde de ses droits et intérêts et de recourir à cet effet à la force des armes.

L'Autriche-Hongrie, qui vient d'adresser à la Serbie une déclaration formelle conformément à l'article 1<sup>er</sup> de la convention du 18 octobre, 1907, relative à l'ouverture des hostilités, se considère dès lors en état de guerre avec la Serbie.

En portant ce qui précède à la connaissance de l'Ambassade Royale de Grande-Bretagne le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de déclarer que l'Autriche-Hongrie se conformera au cours des hostilités, sous la réserve d'un procédé analogue de la part de la Serbie, aux stipulations des conventions de La Haye du 18 octobre, 1907, ainsi qu'à celles de la Déclaration de Londres du 26 février, 1909.

L'Ambassade est priée de vouloir bien communiquer, d'urgence, la présente notification à son Gouvernement.

a delay of forty-eight hours has been granted to the Royal Government. The Royal Servian Government not having answered this note in a satisfactory manner, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms.

Austria-Hungary, who has just addressed to Servia a formal declaration, in conformity with article 1 of the convention of the 18th October, 1907, relative to the opening of hostilities, considers herself henceforward in a state of war with Servia.

In bringing the above to notice of His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to declare that Austria-Hungary will act during the hostilities in conformity with the terms of the Conventions of The Hague of the 18th October, 1907, as also with those of the Declaration of London of the 28th February, 1909, provided an analogous procedure is adopted by Servia.

The embassy is requested to be so good as to communicate the present notification as soon as possible to the British Government.

*From Rome*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 106<sup>1</sup>

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 31.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, July 30, 1914.*

I LEARNED from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me this evening, that the Austrian Government had declined<sup>2</sup> to continue

<sup>1</sup> While printed here as received on July 31, the discussion is, especially in the second paragraph, of events and proposals of July 29 and 30.

<sup>2</sup> See, however, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. Cf. also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31.

the direct exchange of views with the Russian Government. But he had reason to believe that Germany was now <sup>1</sup> disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us.

He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange of views between the four Powers should be resumed in any form which Austria would consider acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she would demand from Servia, and give a guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence nor annex territory. It would be useless to ask for anything less than was contained in the Austrian ultimatum, and Germany would support no proposal that might imply non-success for Austria. We might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once. There was still time so long as Austria had received no check. He in any case was in favour of continuing an exchange of views with His Majesty's Government if the idea of discussions between the four Powers was impossible.

*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK NO. 107 <sup>2</sup>

*Sir. E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —*  
(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

I do not know whether you have received a reply from the German Government to the communication<sup>3</sup> which you made to them through the German Ambassador in London asking whether they could suggest any method by which the four Powers could use their mediating influence between Russia and Austria. I was informed last night <sup>4</sup> that they had not had time to send an answer yet. To-day, in reply to an enquiry from the French Ambassador <sup>5</sup> as to whether the Imperial Government had proposed any course of action, the Secretary of State said that he had felt that time would be saved by communicating with Vienna direct, and that he had asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what would satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been returned.<sup>6</sup>

The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the button" as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he

<sup>1</sup> This "now" is significant. Cf. *British Blue Book No. 80, July 29.*

<sup>2</sup> See note 1 to previous despatch.

<sup>3</sup> See *British Blue Book No. 84, July 29.*

<sup>4</sup> *I.e.* July 29.

<sup>5</sup> *French Yellow Book No. 109, July 30.*

<sup>6</sup> For the answer that was returned, see *Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31.*

has not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise.

*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 108

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —*  
(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

CHANCELLOR informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilisation against Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his country defenceless while time was being utilised by other Powers; and if, as he learns is the case, military measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible to him to remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite possible that in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the German Government would take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to have an audience with the Emperor.

His Excellency added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request.

*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 109

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —*  
(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

I READ to the Chancellor this morning your answer to his appeal for British neutrality in the event of war, as contained in your telegram of yesterday.<sup>1</sup> His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram, that he received your communication without comment. He asked me to let him have the message that I had just read to him as a memorandum, as he would like to reflect upon it before giving an answer, and his mind was so full of grave matters that he could not be certain of remembering all its points. I therefore handed to him the text of your message on the understanding that it should be regarded merely as a record of conversation, and not as an official document.<sup>2</sup>

His Excellency agreed.

<sup>1</sup> British Blue Book No. 101, July 30.

<sup>2</sup> From this it would appear that Great Britain at this time did not wish to bind herself by "an official document."

*To St. Petersburg*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 110

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

I LEARN from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions by the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg has also been instructed that he may converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explanations about the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia,<sup>1</sup> and discuss suggestions and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations. If the Russian Government object to the Austrians mobilising eight army corps, it might be pointed out that this is not too great a number against 400,000 Servians.

The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Government to show goodwill in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations.

It is with great satisfaction that I have learnt that discussions are being resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will encourage them.

I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend<sup>2</sup> them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Serbia.

*To Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 111

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

I HOPE that the conversations which are now proceeding between Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling-block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances, and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Serbia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburg, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31.

<sup>2</sup> But Russia had herself offered to "stop all military operations." British Blue Book No. 97, July 30. Cf. also note 2, French Yellow Book No. 113, July 31.

on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Servian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course suspend further military operations or preparations.

You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal.

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences,<sup>1</sup> but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in.<sup>2</sup>

You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State as to proposal above.

*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 112

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —  
(Received July 31.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

ACCORDING to information<sup>3</sup> just received by German Government from their Ambassador at St. Petersburg, whole Russian army and fleet are being mobilised. Chancellor tells me that "Kriegsgefahr"<sup>4</sup> will be proclaimed at once by German Government, as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilisation is directed. Mobilisation would follow almost immediately. His Excellency added in explanation that "Kriegsgefahr"<sup>4</sup> signified the taking of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained relations with a foreign country.

This news from St. Petersburg, added his Excellency, seemed to him to put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany must certainly prepare for all emergencies.

<sup>1</sup> This is an eminently fair statement. Unfortunately it did not take into account Russia's mobilisation. From the discussion of Sazonof's formula, moreover (cf. British Blue Book No. 97, July 30, and No. 120, July 31 printed under date of August 1), it appears that Sir E. Grey himself induced Sazonof to withdraw his offer to "stop all military operations." The reason for this action is not explained in any of the published despatches.

<sup>2</sup> This declaration of Sir E. Grey was made before the Belgian question was seriously raised. The defenders of Germany have always claimed that the invasion of Belgium became necessary, because Great Britain had decided to join France at all hazards and that the risks of a French-English attack through Belgium were too great for Germany to run.

<sup>3</sup> See note to French Yellow Book No. 117, July 31.

<sup>4</sup> "Imminence of War."



I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal,<sup>1</sup> and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter.

*From St. Petersburg*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 113

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 31.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

It has been decided to issue orders for general mobilisation.<sup>2</sup>

This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia.

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.<sup>3</sup>

*To Paris*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 114

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

I STILL trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilisation in Germany it becomes essential to His Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government are prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it.<sup>4</sup>

A similar request is being addressed to German (French) Government. It is important to have an early answer.

<sup>1</sup> This proposal was accepted by Austria-Hungary; see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31.

<sup>2</sup> If this despatch is correctly dated from St. Petersburg, July 31, the British Ambassador sent this information rather late. See note to French Yellow Book No. 117, July 31.

<sup>3</sup> Considering that the Czar telegraphed on July 30 (German White Book, Exhibit 23a) that "military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago," this is a strange remark.

<sup>4</sup> If the quintuple treaty of 1839 was in force (see Sir E. Grey's phrase "existing treaties"), the qualification "so long as no other Power violates it" was contrary to the treaty, for in that case the remaining Powers were bound to make joint cause against the invader. Germany has claimed that she could not rely on Great Britain's defence of Belgium if France should have invaded it. See A. K. Fuehr, *The Neutrality of Belgium*, Funk & Wagnalls Co.

*To Brussels*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 115

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

IN view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked French and German Governments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power.

You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of their power their neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe.

You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired.

*To Paris*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 116

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

I HAVE received your telegram of yesterday's date.<sup>1</sup>

Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directly involving France, whereas in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers.

I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality.<sup>2</sup>

We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's Government to reconsider this decision.<sup>3</sup>

I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at the present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situation again directly there is a new development.

*From Paris*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 117

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —*  
(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

AT 7 o'clock this evening I was sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs. When I arrived the German Ambassador was leaving his Excellency.

<sup>1</sup> British Blue Book No. 99, July 30.

<sup>2</sup> This was probably quite true on July 31, but it had not been so up to July 29, see British Blue Book No. 80, July 29, and *ib.* No. 106, July 30, listed under date of July 31. See also French Yellow Book No. 92, July 29, last paragraph.

<sup>3</sup> French Yellow Book No. 110, July 31.

German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of the fact that orders had been given for the total mobilisation of Russian army and fleet, German Government have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the Russian Government required that Russian forces should be demobilised.

The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total mobilisation of the German army on the Russian and French frontiers if within twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply with German demand.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to you, and enquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England.

German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours terminate. He is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs tomorrow (Saturday) at 1 p.m. in order to receive the French Government's answer as to the attitude they will adopt in the circumstances.

He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports.

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador<sup>1</sup> that he is not aware of any general mobilisation of the Russian forces having taken place.

*From Vienna*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 118

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 31.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 31, 1914.*

I AM informed by Count Forgach, Under-Secretary of State, that although Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilisation, which he deplored, the Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions to inform you that mobilisation was not to be regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side. Telegrams were being exchanged between the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor, and conversations were proceeding between Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A general war might, he seriously hoped, be staved off by these efforts. On my expressing my fear that Germany would mobilise, he said that Germany must do something, in his opinion, to secure her position.<sup>2</sup> As regards Russian intervention on behalf of Servia, Austria-Hungary found it difficult to recognise such a claim. I called his attention to the fact that during the discussion of the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of Ambassadors the Russian Government had stood behind Servia, and that a compromise between the views of Russia and Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line.

<sup>1</sup> This is very strange; cf. the Czar's telegram of July 30, German White Book, Exhibit 23a, and note to French Yellow Book No. 117, July 31.

<sup>2</sup> The statement is important in view of the charge that has been made that Germany forced the war by duping Austria-Hungary when the latter was on the point of settling her differences with Russia.

Although he spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not regard the situation as desperate, I could not get from him any suggestion for a similar compromise in the present case. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above conversation.

The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has no desire to interfere unduly with Servia; that, as compared with the late Russian Minister,<sup>1</sup> the present Minister at Belgrade is a man of very moderate views; and that, as regards Austrian demands, Russia had counselled Servia to yield to them as far as she possibly could without sacrificing her independence. His Excellency is exerting himself strongly in the interests of peace.

*From Paris*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 119

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

M. CAMBON<sup>2</sup> referred to-day to a telegram<sup>3</sup> that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson<sup>4</sup> this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace.

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures<sup>5</sup> to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it.<sup>6</sup> That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.

M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday.<sup>7</sup>

I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet<sup>8</sup> to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we

<sup>1</sup> Mr. von Hartwig, whose very sudden death after the Serajevo murder has not yet been explained.

<sup>2</sup> French Ambassador in London.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. the last paragraph, French Yellow Book No. 92, July 29.

<sup>4</sup> British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>5</sup> See British Blue Book No. 85, July 29.

<sup>6</sup> British Blue Book No. 111, July 31.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 105, July 30.

<sup>8</sup> This was the first time the British Cabinet voted against joining France; see also French Yellow Book No. 110, July 31. On the next day, August 1, the Cabinet refused for the second time to declare British solidarity with France. See French Yellow Book No. 126, August 1.

should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium<sup>1</sup> might be, I would not say a decisive,<sup>2</sup> but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her.

I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have made for peace.<sup>3</sup> It could not be to England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again.

## Russia :

### *From Vienna*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK NO. 66

*Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 18 (31), 1914.*

IN spite of the general mobilisation,<sup>4</sup> my exchange of views with Count Berchtold and his colleagues continues. They all dwell upon the absence on Austria's part of any hostile intentions whatsoever against Russia, and of any designs of conquest at the expense of Servia, but they are all equally insistent that Austria is bound to carry through the action which she has begun and to give Servia a serious lesson, which would constitute a sure guarantee for the future.

<sup>1</sup> This is not mentioned in Cambon's report of Sir E. Grey's remarks in French Yellow Book No. 110, July 31.

<sup>2</sup> This statement is important.

<sup>3</sup> There is no statement here that Sir E. Grey corrected this misconception on the part of the French Ambassador.

<sup>4</sup> This may refer to the Russian mobilisation or to the counter measure of the Austro-Hungarian mobilisation.

*From St. Petersburg*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 67

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome.*

(Telegram.)

*St. Petersburg, July 18 (31), 1914.*

PLEASE refer to my telegram of 17 (30) July.<sup>1</sup> The British Ambassador, on the instructions of his Government, has informed me of the wish of the London Cabinet to make certain modifications<sup>2</sup> in the formula which I suggested yesterday to the German Ambassador. I replied that I accepted the British suggestion. I accordingly send you the text of the modified formula which is as follows:—

(Translation.)

“Si l’Autriche consent à arrêter la marche de ses armées sur le territoire serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d’une question d’intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement d’Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits d’État souverain et à son indépendance, — la Russie s’engage à conserver son attitude expectante.”

“If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory; and if, recognising that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude.”

*From Berlin*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 68

*Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, July 18 (31), 1914.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has just told me that our discussions, which were already difficult enough on account of the mobilisation against Austria, were becoming even more so in view of the serious military measures that we were taking against Germany. He said that information on this subject was reaching Berlin from all sides, and this must inevitably provoke similar measures on the part of Germany. To this I replied that, according to sure information in my possession, which was confirmed by all our compatriots arriving from

<sup>1</sup> Russian Orange Book No. 60, July 30.

<sup>2</sup> The reasons for the British wish to have the original formula modified are nowhere given. Cf. note to French Yellow Book No. 113, July 31, also British Blue Book No. 110, July 31.

Berlin, Germany also was very actively engaged in taking military measures against Russia. In spite of this, the Minister for Foreign Affairs asserts<sup>1</sup> that the only step taken in Germany has been the recall of officers from leave and of the troops from manœuvres.

*To London*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK NO. 69

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London.*

(Telegram.)

*St. Petersburg, July 18 (31), 1914.*

I HAVE requested the British Ambassador to express to Grey my deep gratitude for the firm and friendly tone which he has adopted in the discussions with Germany and Austria, thanks to which the hope of finding a peaceful issue<sup>2</sup> to the present situation need not yet be abandoned.

<sup>1</sup> For the truth of this assertion see chapters on mobilisation in M. P. Price, *The Diplomatic History of the War*, Charles Scribner's Sons.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. note 1 British Blue Book No. 119, July 31. Sir E. Grey had at last practically done what Sazonof had wished him to do as early as July 24; see British Blue Book No. 6, July 24.



**Saturday, August 1, 1914**

## SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	—	Petrograd
Belgium	Berlin, Paris and London London etc.	London, Berlin
France	London etc. London, Berlin, Brussels etc. London, Luxemburg	Berlin, Rome London, Luxemburg
Germany	Petrograd	Paris
Great Britain	Berlin, Petrograd, Vienna	Petrograd, Berlin, Paris, Vienna, Brussels, Lux- emburg
Russia	All representatives	London, Paris
Serbia	—	—

*Austria-Hungary* explains her willingness to continue direct conversations with Russia, at the same time expressing her deep concern at the Russian general mobilisation which forces her to decree her own general mobilisation.

*Belgium* receives the official assurance that France will respect the neutrality of Belgium, but "in the event of this neutrality not being respected by another Power, the French Government, to secure their own defence, might find it necessary to modify their attitude." The German "reply is awaited." Belgium instructs her representatives abroad to notify the Powers of her mobilisation in notes prepared and sent out, undated, on July 24. She commits hostile acts against Germany according to the latter's declaration, a fact which Belgium later categorically denies.

*France* orders general mobilisation, and in despatches to London endeavors to blame Germany for the coming war. She again solicits the armed intervention of Great Britain, and promises to respect Belgian and Luxemburg neutrality, with a proviso. Her assurances to Belgium contain no reference to an existing treaty, and are in wording contrary to the assumption of the existence of a treaty. Her reply to Germany is "that France would do that which her interests dictated."

*Germany* continues the exchange of royal and imperial telegrams. Russia not having replied to the German ultimatum requesting her to demobilise, Germany declares war on Russia. To the British enquiry whether she would respect Belgian neutrality her Secretary of Foreign Affairs replies that probably no answer would be returned, because by answering they "could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign"; moreover, Belgium had already committed "certain hostile acts." She orders general mobilisation, to take effect the next day, August 2.

*Great Britain*; the Cabinet for the second time refuses to commit itself in favor of France. Sir E. Grey, however, repeats his personal promises to France, at the same time refusing the German request that he formulate conditions under which Great Britain would remain neutral. No despatches concerning the mobilisation of the British army are published on this or any other day.

*Russia* refuses to reply to the German ultimatum and does not demobilise. *Serbia* is silent on this day.

**Austria-Hungary:***From St. Petersburg*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 56]

*Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, August 1, 1914.*

I VISITED M. Sazonof to-day, and told him that I had received instructions,<sup>1</sup> but that I must premise that I was entirely ignorant of the present condition of affairs created in Vienna, by the general Russian mobilisation, and that in interpreting the instructions which I had received previously, I must leave this condition out of account. I said that the two instructions of Your Excellency dealt with the misunderstanding that we had declined further negotiations with Russia. This was a mistake, as I had already, without instructions, assured him.<sup>2</sup> Your Excellency was not only quite prepared to deal with Russia on the broadest basis possible, but was also especially inclined to subject the text of our note to a discussion so far as its interpretation was concerned.

I emphasised how much the instructions of Your Excellency afforded me a further proof of goodwill, although I had to remind him that the situation created since then by the general mobilisation was unknown to me; but I could only hope that the course of events had not already taken us too far; in any case, I regarded it as my duty in the present moment of extreme anxiety to prove once again the goodwill of the Imperial and Royal Government. M. Sazonof replied that he took note with satisfaction of this proof of goodwill, but he desired to draw my attention to the fact that negotiations at St. Petersburg for obvious reasons appeared to promise less prospect of success than negotiations on the neutral *terrain* of London.<sup>3</sup> I replied that Your Excellency, as I had already observed, started from the point of view that direct contact should be maintained at St. Petersburg, so that I was not in a position to commit myself with regard to his suggestion as to London, but I would communicate on the subject with your Excellency.

**Belgium:***From London*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 13

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, August 1, 1914.*

GREAT BRITAIN has asked France and Germany separately<sup>4</sup> if they intend to respect Belgian territory in the event of its not being

<sup>1</sup> Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31.<sup>2</sup> Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 55, July 31.<sup>3</sup> If Sazonof is correctly quoted, and this would seem to be the case (cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31, third paragraph), it appears that Russia had changed her attitude, and was not now desirous of direct conversations. See Russian Orange Book No. 69, July 31.<sup>4</sup> British Blue Book No. 114, July 31.

violated by their adversary. Germany's reply is awaited. France has replied in the affirmative.<sup>1</sup>

*From Berlin*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 14

*Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

THE British Ambassador has been instructed to inquire of the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether, in the event of war, Germany would respect Belgian neutrality, and I understand that the Minister replied that he was unable to answer the question.<sup>2</sup>

*To Berlin, Paris, and London*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 15<sup>3</sup>

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 1, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the French Minister has made the following verbal communication to me:—

(Translation.)

“JE suis autorisé à déclarer qu'en cas de conflit international, le Gouvernement de la République, ainsi qu'il l'a toujours déclaré, respectera la neutralité de la Belgique. Dans l'hypothèse où cette neutralité ne serait pas respectée par une autre Puissance, le Gouvernement français, pour assurer sa propre défense, pourrait être amené à modifier son attitude.”

“I AM authorised to declare that, in the event of an international war, the French Government, in accordance with the declarations they have always made, will respect the neutrality of Belgium. In the event of this neutrality not being respected by another Power, the French Government, to secure their own defence, might find it necessary to modify their attitude.”<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See below, No. 15, same day.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 122, July 31, printed under date of August 1, and French Yellow Book No. 123, August 1, giving Germany's reason for not answering.

<sup>3</sup> This despatch should precede No. 13, same day, where it is referred to.

<sup>4</sup> See British Blue Book No. 114, July 31, note 1, and mark the wording of the French announcement, which proceeds from the principle that France is released from any obligation to respect the neutrality of Belgium “in the event of this neutrality not being respected by another Power.” Belgium was a buffer state between the belligerents. Small infractions of her neutrality could not have been avoided by either side. The principle, therefore, that any infraction by one side would release the other side from all obligations, and that the other side was, of course, the sole judge of what constituted an infraction, is the chief reason why Belgium was invaded, for if it had not been for this principle no “military necessity” would have existed for either side to contemplate even the invasion of Belgium. It was the principle accepted by Great Britain (see British Blue Book No. 114, July 31) and by France, and as events proved also by Germany. Contrast this declaration with French Yellow Book No. 122, same day.

I thanked his Excellency and added that we on our side had taken without delay all the measures necessary to ensure that our independence and our frontiers should be respected.

*To Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 16

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.*

(Telegram.) *Brussels, August 1, 1914.*

CARRY out instructions <sup>1</sup> contained in my despatch of the 25th July.

*To Rome, The Hague, Luxemburg*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 17

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at Rome, The Hague, Luxemburg.*

(Telegram.) *Brussels, August 1, 1914.*

CARRY out instructions <sup>2</sup> contained in my despatch of the 25th July.

**France:**

*To London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 120

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

Two *démarches* were made yesterday evening by the Austrian Ambassadors — the one at Paris,<sup>3</sup> which was rather vague, the other at St. Petersburg,<sup>4</sup> precise and conciliatory.

Count Szécsen came to explain to me that the Austro-Hungarian Government had officially informed Russia that it had no territorial ambition, and would not touch the sovereignty of Servia; that it also repudiates any intention of occupying the Sandjak; but that these explanations of disinterestedness only retain their force if the war remains localised to Austria and Servia, as a European war would open out eventualities which it was impossible to foresee. The Austrian Ambassador, in commenting on these explanations, gave me to understand that if his Government could not answer the questions

<sup>1</sup> Belgian Gray Book No. 2, July 24, and note.

<sup>2</sup> See note to previous despatch and Belgian Gray Book No. 3, July 24.

<sup>3</sup> Not mentioned in Austro-Hungarian Red Book. See British Blue Book No. 137, same day.

<sup>4</sup> See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 55, July 31, and Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 56, August 1.

of the Powers speaking in their own name, they would certainly answer Serbia, or any single Power asking for these conditions in the name of Serbia. He added that a step in this direction was perhaps still possible.

At St. Petersburg the Austrian Ambassador called on M. Sazonof and explained to him that his Government was willing to begin a discussion as to the basis of the ultimatum addressed to Serbia.<sup>1</sup> The Russian Minister declared himself satisfied with this declaration, and proposed that the *pourparlers* should take place in London with the participation of the Powers. M. Sazonof will have requested the British Government to take the lead in the discussion; he pointed out that it would be very important that Austria should stop her operations in Serbia.

The deduction from these facts is that Austria would at last show herself ready to come to an agreement, just as the Russian Government is ready<sup>2</sup> to enter into negotiations on the basis of the British proposal.

Unfortunately these arrangements which allowed one to hope for a peaceful solution appear, in fact, to have been rendered useless by the attitude of Germany.<sup>3</sup> This Power has in fact presented an ultimatum giving the Russian Government twelve hours in which to agree to the demobilisation of their forces not only as against Germany, but also as against Austria; this time-limit expires at noon. The ultimatum is not justified, for Russia has accepted the British proposal which implies a cessation of military preparation by all the Powers.

The attitude of Germany proves that she wishes for war. And she wishes for it against France.<sup>4</sup> Yesterday<sup>5</sup> when Herr von Schoen came to the Quai d'Orsay to ask what attitude France proposed to take in case of a Russo-German conflict, the German Ambassador, although there has been no direct dispute<sup>6</sup> between France and Germany, and although from the beginning of the crisis we have used all our efforts for a peaceful solution<sup>7</sup> and are still continuing to do so, added that he asked me to present his respects and thanks to the President of the Republic, and asked that we would be good enough to make arrangements as to him personally (*des dispositions pour sa*

<sup>1</sup> Viviani calls this an interview "yesterday evening," i.e. July 31. In the Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 56, it appears as an interview of "to-day," August 1.

<sup>2</sup> This is a vague description of the Russian attitude. Cf. note 3 to Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 56, August 1.

<sup>3</sup> Viviani blames Germany for her ultimatum. Germany claimed her ultimatum had been forced by Russia's mobilisation (British Blue Book No. 121, August 1) which Viviani does not deny as having taken place. If the student, therefore, agrees with Viviani that Germany's ultimatum spoiled the prospects of a peaceful solution, the further question arises "Was Germany's ultimatum forced by Russia's mobilisation?" In the next sentence Viviani states that the ultimatum was not justified. This is the *crux* of the whole matter. For Germany's attitude see German White Book, pp. 555 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Another evidence of the unfortunate suspicion of the French Government.

<sup>5</sup> 7 P.M., July 31, see German White Book, p. 560.

<sup>6</sup> Viviani overlooks that France had promised her support to Russia, cf. French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30: British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, French Yellow Book No. 74, paragraph 4, where Cambon says that the "relations of Germany with Vienna were no closer than those of France with Russia."

<sup>7</sup> For a fuller discussion of the French attitude, see E. von Mach, *Germany's Point of View*, pp. 216 ff.

*propre personne*); we know also that he has already put the archives of the Embassy in safety. This attitude of breaking off diplomatic relations without any direct dispute, and although he has not received any definitely negative answer, is characteristic of the determination of Germany to make war against France. The want of sincerity in her peaceful protestations is shown by the rupture which she is forcing upon Europe at a time when Austria had at last agreed <sup>1</sup> with Russia to begin negotiations.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

*From Berlin*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 121

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

MY Russian colleague received yesterday evening two telegrams <sup>2</sup> from M. Sazonof advising him that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had explained <sup>3</sup> that his Government was ready to discuss the note to Servia with the Russian Government even as to its basis; M. Sazonof answered that in his opinion these conversations should take place in London.

The ultimatum to Russia <sup>4</sup> can only do away with the last chances of peace which these conversations still seemed to leave. The question may be asked whether in such circumstances the acceptance by Austria was serious, and had not the object of throwing the responsibility of the conflict on to Russia.

My British colleague during the night made a pressing appeal <sup>5</sup> to Herr von Jagow's feelings of humanity. The latter answered that the matter had gone too far and that they must wait for the Russian answer to the German ultimatum. But he told Sir Edward Goschen that the ultimatum required that the Russians should countermand their mobilisation, not only as against Germany but also as against Austria; my British colleague was much astonished at this, and said that it did not seem possible for Russia to accept this last point. <sup>6</sup>

Germany's ultimatum coming at the very moment when an agreement seemed about to be established between Vienna and St. Petersburg, is characteristic of her warlike policy.

In truth the conflict was between Russia and Austria only, and Germany could only intervene as an ally of Austria; in these circumstances, as the two Powers which were interested as principals

<sup>1</sup> This agreement had been due to Germany's pressure; see despatches of previous days. See especially German White Book, Exhibit 14, July 28.

<sup>2</sup> Not given in Russian Orange Book.

<sup>3</sup> Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 56, August 1.

<sup>4</sup> Sent by Germany and presented at midnight, July 31-Aug. 1; see German White Book, p. 559. See note 5 to previous despatch.

<sup>5</sup> British Blue Book No. 121 under date of August 1.

<sup>6</sup> This is different from Sir E. Goschen's own report, see British Blue Book No. 121.

were prepared for conversations, it is impossible to understand<sup>1</sup> why Germany should send an ultimatum to Russia instead of continuing like all the other Powers to work for a peaceful solution, unless she desired war on her own account.

J. CAMBON.

*To London, Berlin, and Brussels*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 122

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, Berlin, and to the French Minister at Brussels.*

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

THE British Ambassador, under the instructions of his Government, came to ask me what would be the attitude of the French Government as regards Belgium in case of conflict with Germany.

I stated that, in accordance with the assurance which we had repeatedly given the Belgian Government, we intended to respect their neutrality.

It would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself brought to enter Belgian territory, with the object of fulfilling her obligations as a guaranteeing Power.<sup>2</sup>

RENÉ VIVIANI.

*From Berlin*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 123

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

THE British Ambassador has been instructed<sup>3</sup> by his Government to make to the German Government a communication identical with that which he made to you on the subject of the neutrality of Belgium.

Herr von Jagow answered that he would take the instructions of the Emperor and the Chancellor, but that he did not think an answer could be given, for Germany could not disclose her military plans in this way. The British Ambassador will see Herr von Jagow tomorrow afternoon.<sup>4</sup>

J. CAMBON.

<sup>1</sup> A comparison of this view with that presented in the German White Book, pp. 557 ff. shows how very far apart the governments of France and Germany found themselves.

<sup>2</sup> Contrast the official French declaration which contains nothing about obligations. Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 122, French Yellow Book No. 123, both of August 1.

<sup>4</sup> The part of the interview with Sir E. Goschen printed British Blue Book No. 123, in which Germany claims that Belgium has already committed "certain hostile acts" against Germany, has been omitted here.



*From Rome*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 124

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, August 1, 1914.*

I WENT to see the Marquis di San Giuliano this morning at half-past eight, in order to get precise information from him as to the attitude of Italy in view of the provocative acts of Germany and the results which they may have.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered that he had seen the German Ambassador yesterday evening. Herr von Flotow had said to him that Germany had requested the Russian Government to suspend mobilisation, and the French Government to inform them as to their intentions; Germany had given France a time limit of eighteen hours and Russia a time limit of twelve hours.

Herr von Flotow as a result of this communication asked what were the intentions of the Italian Government.

The Marquis di San Giuliano answered that as the war undertaken by Austria was aggressive and did not fall within the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, particularly in view of the consequences which might result from it according to the declaration of the German Ambassador, Italy could not take part in the war.

BARRÈRE.

*To London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 125

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople.*

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

THE German Ambassador came to see me again at 11 o'clock this morning. After having recalled to his memory all the efforts made by France towards an honourable settlement of the Austro-Servian conflict and the difficulty between Austria and Russia which has resulted from it, I put him in possession of the facts as to the *pourparlers* which have been carried on since yesterday:—

- (1) A British compromise,<sup>1</sup> proposing, besides other suggestions, suspension of military preparations<sup>2</sup> on the part of Russia, on condition that the other Powers should act in the same way; adherence of Russia to this proposal.

<sup>1</sup> This seems to refer to Sazonof's altered formula. Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 67, July 31.

<sup>2</sup> This is an error, cf. note to Russian Orange Book no. 67.

- (2) Communications from the Austrian Government<sup>1</sup> declaring that they did not desire any aggrandisement in Serbia, nor even to advance into the Sandjak, and stating that they were ready to discuss *even the basis* of the Austro-Servian question at London with the other Powers.

I drew attention to the attitude of Germany who, abandoning all *pourparlers*, presented an ultimatum to Russia at the very moment when this Power had just accepted the British formula<sup>2</sup> (which implies the cessation of military preparations<sup>3</sup> by all<sup>4</sup> the countries which have been mobilised) and regarded as imminent a diplomatic rupture with France.

Baron von Schoen answered that he did not know the developments which had taken place in this matter for the last twenty-four hours, that there was perhaps in them a "glimmer of hope" for some arrangement, that he had not received any fresh communication<sup>5</sup> from his Government, and that he was going to get information. He gave renewed protestations of his sincere desire to unite his efforts to those of France for arriving at a solution of the conflict. I laid stress on the serious responsibility which the Imperial Government would assume if, in circumstances such as these, they took an initiative which was not justified and of a kind which would irremediably compromise peace.

Baron von Schoen did not allude to his immediate departure and did not make any fresh request for an answer to his question concerning the attitude of France in case of an Austro-Russian conflict. He confined himself to saying of his own accord that the attitude of France was not doubtful.

It would not do to exaggerate the possibilities which may result from my conversation with the German Ambassador for, on their side, the Imperial Government continue the most dangerous preparations on our frontier. However, we must not neglect the possibilities, and we should not cease to work towards an agreement. On her side France is taking all military measures required for protection against too great an advance in German military preparations. She considers that her attempts at solution will only have a chance of success so far as it is felt that she will be ready and resolute if the conflict is forced on her.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 120, August 1.

<sup>2</sup> Viviani fails to mention that Russia had declared full mobilisation.

<sup>3</sup> But not demobilisation. The *status quo* cannot be long maintained when one country is mobilised and the other is not.

<sup>4</sup> The British fleet was mobilised. (See French Yellow Book No. 55, July 27.) Sir E. Grey nowhere offered to demobilise it. Cf. next number.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 74, same day.

*From London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 126

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Paris,<sup>1</sup> August 1, 1914.*

SIR EDWARD GREY said to me that, at a meeting this morning, the Cabinet had again considered the situation. As Germany had asked Great Britain to give a declaration of neutrality and had not obtained it, the British Government remained masters of their action; this could shape itself in accordance with different hypotheses.

In the first place, Belgian neutrality is of great importance to Great Britain. France has immediately renewed her engagement to respect it. Germany has explained "that she was not in a position to reply." Sir Edward Grey will put the Cabinet in possession of this answer<sup>2</sup> and will ask to be authorised to state on Monday in the House of Commons, that the British Government will not permit a violation of Belgian neutrality.

In the second place the British fleet is mobilised,<sup>3</sup> and Sir Edward Grey will propose<sup>4</sup> to his colleagues that he should state that it will oppose the passage of the Straits of Dover by the German fleet, or, if the German fleet should pass through (*venaient à le passer*), will oppose any demonstration on the French coasts. These two questions will be dealt with at the meeting on Monday. I drew the attention of the Secretary of State to the point that, if during this intervening period any incident took place, it was necessary not to allow a surprise, and that it would be desirable to think of intervening in time.

PAUL CAMBON.

*To London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 127

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.*

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

WE are warned through several channels that the German and the Austrian Governments are trying at this moment to influence England by making her believe that the responsibility for war, if it

<sup>1</sup> Probably a mistake for London.

<sup>2</sup> This appears as if the German "Belgian" reply had not been discussed at the Cabinet meeting here described. Contrast Sir E. Grey's account of the Cabinet meeting of August 1 to the German Ambassador, British Blue Book No. 123, August 1.

<sup>3</sup> Since July 24, see French Yellow Book No. 66, July 27.

<sup>4</sup> This phrase and the whole tenor of the despatch imply that the Cabinet had for the second time voted against promising to France British support. For the first refusal to vote so see French Yellow Book No. 110, July 31, where the Cabinet has declared itself unable to promise to France "their intervention," and British Blue Book No. 119, July 31.

Sir E. Grey's promise to "propose" to the Cabinet to be "authorised" to promise help to France would seem to imply that he had assured the French Ambassador of his personal wishes in this matter. He gave this assurance, or from the despatches just cited from the previous date, renewed it on the very day on which he refused Germany's request to formulate conditions under which Great Britain would remain neutral. In refusing this request of Germany, he gave as his reason that "we must keep our hands free." See British Blue Book No. 123, August 1, 1914.

breaks out, will fall on Russia.<sup>1</sup> Efforts are being made to obtain the neutrality of England by disguising the truth.<sup>2</sup>

France has not ceased in co-operation with England to advise moderation at St. Petersburg;<sup>3</sup> this advice has been listened to.

From the beginning M. Sazonof has exercised pressure on Serbia to make her accept all those clauses of the ultimatum which were not incompatible with her sovereignty.

He then engaged in a direct conversation with Austria; this was fresh evidence of his conciliatory spirit. Finally he has agreed to allow those Powers which are less interested to seek for means of composing the dispute.

In accordance with the wish expressed to him by Sir George Buchanan, M. Sazonof consented to modify<sup>4</sup> the first formula which he had put forward, and he has drawn up a second which is shown not to differ materially from the declaration which Count Szécsen made yesterday to M. de Margerie. Count Szécsen affirms that Austria has no intention of seeking territorial aggrandisement and does not wish to touch the sovereignty of Serbia. He expressly adds that Austria has no designs on the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar.

It would then seem that an agreement between Sir Edward Grey's suggestion, M. Sazonof's formula and the Austrian declarations could easily be reconciled.

France is determined, in co-operation with England, to work to the very end for the realisation of this.

But while these negotiations were going on, and while Russia in the negotiations showed a goodwill which cannot be disputed, Austria was the first<sup>5</sup> to proceed to a general mobilisation.

Russia has found herself obliged to imitate Austria, so as not to be left in an unfavourable position, but all the time she has continued ready to negotiate.

It is not necessary for me to repeat that, so far as we are concerned, we will, in co-operation with England, continue to work for the success of these *pourparlers*.

But the attitude of Germany has made it absolutely compulsory for us to make out the order for mobilisation to-day.

Last Wednesday, well in advance of Russian mobilisation, as I

<sup>1</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 134, same day.

<sup>2</sup> Or "elucidating the truth," according to one's reading of all the despatches.

<sup>3</sup> Contrast with French Yellow Book No. 80, July 28, where Paul Cambon reports that Sir E. Grey "would be much embarrassed in making pacific recommendations to the Russian Government." Also French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27. "The French step" (Germany had asked France to declare that a solidarity of pacific intentions existed between her and Germany) "in St. Petersburg would have been difficult to explain."

<sup>4</sup> Russian Orange Book No. 67, July 31. Viviani overlooks, first, that the modified formula was less acceptable, because instead of promising to "stop her military preparations" Russia merely undertook "to maintain her waiting attitude," while Austria-Hungary in the modified formula had "to stay the march of her troops," which was not demanded in the first formula, and secondly that the change was not at Austria's but at Great Britain's request; that Russia, moreover, followed it up with full mobilisation.

<sup>5</sup> This is an error. Russia's general mobilisation took place on the night of July 30, while Austria-Hungary ordered general mobilisation on August 1. For an exhaustive discussion of this point and the contradictory evidence see M. P. Price, *The Diplomatic History of the War*, Scribner's, the chapters on "Preparations and Mobilisations." See also British Blue Book No. 113, July 31 for Russian mobilisation, and British Blue Book, Nos. 127 and 135, August 1, for Austro-Hungarian mobilisation.

have already telegraphed to you, Herr von Schoen announced to me the impending publication of *Kriegsgefahrzustand*. This measure has been taken<sup>1</sup> by Germany, and under the protection of this screen, she immediately began a mobilisation in the proper sense of the word.

To-day M. Paléologue telegraphed that Count Pourtalès had notified the Russian Government of German mobilisation.<sup>2</sup>

Information which has been received by the Ministry of War confirms the fact that this mobilisation is really in full execution.<sup>3</sup>

Our decree of mobilisation is then an *essential measure* of protection. The Government have accompanied it by a proclamation signed by the President of the Republic and by all the Ministers, in which they explain that mobilisation is not war, and that in the present state of affairs it is the best means for France of safeguarding peace, and that the Government of the Republic will redouble their efforts to bring the negotiations to a conclusion.

Will you be good enough to bring all these points urgently to the notice of Sir Edward Grey, and to point out to him that we have throughout been governed by the determination not to commit any act of provocation.

I am persuaded that in case war were to break out, British opinion would see clearly from which side aggression comes, and that it would realise the strong reasons which we have given to Sir Edward Grey for asking for armed intervention on the part of England in the interest of the future of the European balance of power.<sup>4</sup>

RENÉ VIVIANI.

*From Luxemburg*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 128

*M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Luxemburg, August 1, 1914.*

THE Minister of State instructs me to ask from the French Government an assurance of neutrality similar to that which has been given to Belgium. M. Eyschen has stated that at present, as the declaration in question was made to the President of the Council of the Belgian Government by the French Minister at Brussels, he thought that the same procedure would be most suitable with regard to the Grand Duchy.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> But not as here implied "last Wednesday," i.e. July 29, but on Friday, i.e. July 31; see British Blue Book No. 112, July 31.

<sup>2</sup> To begin on August 2, German White Book, p. 559, and British Blue Book No. 142, August 1, listed under August 2.

<sup>3</sup> Seemingly contradicted by British Blue Book No. 142, same day.

<sup>4</sup> France asks for armed British intervention in the interest of the European balance of power. Sir E. Grey had personally committed himself to induce the British Cabinet so to intervene; see notes to previous despatch. This was before German troops entered Belgium. It was, however, subsequent to Germany's refusal to commit herself on the Belgian question; and no mention of Belgium is made here.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1, and note. The assurance contained no reference to a treaty or an obligation under it. The French Yellow Book despatch, however, No. 122, Aug. 1, contained such a reference. The wording of the assurance given to Luxemburg has not been published. The French despatch (see next number) describing it, however, refers to a treaty.

This is the reason why he has abstained from making a request direct to the Government of the Republic. As the Chamber of Deputies meets on Monday, M. Eyschen wishes to have the answer by that date; a similar *démarche* is being made at the same time with the German Minister at Luxemburg.

MOLLARD.

*To Luxemburg*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 129

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg.*

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

BE good enough to state to the President of the Council that in conformity with the Treaty of London, 1867,<sup>1</sup> the Government of the Republic intends to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, as they have shown by their attitude.

The violation of this neutrality by Germany would, however, be an act of a kind which would compel France from that time to be guided in this matter by care for her defence and her interests.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

*From Berlin*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 130<sup>2</sup>

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

SPECIAL editions of newspapers are being distributed in the streets of Berlin announcing that the general mobilisation of the army and the navy has been decreed and that the first day of the mobilisation is Sunday, 2nd August.

JULES CAMBON.

Germany:

*To St. Petersburg*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 26

*Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg on August 1st, 12.52 P.M. Urgent.*

IF the Russian Government gives no satisfactory reply to our demand, Your Excellency will please transmit this afternoon 5 o'clock (mid-European time) the following statement:

“Le Gouvernement Impérial s'est efforcé dès les débuts de la crise de la mener à une solution pacifique. Se rendant à un désir que

<sup>1</sup> See note to previous despatch.

<sup>2</sup> This despatch should precede No. 127, in which the information it contains is discussed. In that case, however, No. 127 would hardly have been able to contain the “information” that the German mobilisation was “really in full execution” on August 1. Either Viviani had been erroneously informed, or he misinformed the French Ambassador in London.

lui en avait été exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre était appliqué à accomplir un rôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et de St. Petersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le résultat, procéda à la mobilisation de la totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer.

"A la suite de cette mesure menaçante motivée par aucun préparatif militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire Allemand se trouva vis-à-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Impérial eût manqué de parer à ce péril il aurait compromis la sécurité et l'existence même de l'Allemagne. Par conséquent le Gouvernement Allemand se vit forcé de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies ensistant sur la cessation des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refusé de faire droit à cette demande et ayant manifesté par ce refus, que son action était dirigée contre l'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur d'ordre de mon Gouvernement de faire savoir à Votre Excellence ce qui suit :

"Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain au nom de l'Empire relève le défi et Se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie."

Please wire urgent receipt and time of carrying out this instruction by Russian time.

Please ask for your passports and turn over protection and affairs to the American Embassy.

*From Paris*

GERMAN WHITE BOOK EXHIBIT 27

*Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Paris to the Chancellor on August 1st, 1.05 P.M.*

UPON my repeated definite inquiry whether France would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war, the Prime Minister declared that France would do that which her interests dictated.

**Great Britain :**

*From St. Petersburg*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 120

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey. —(Received August 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador and asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula <sup>1</sup> as best calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your telegram of 30th July <sup>2</sup> with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July.<sup>3</sup> He trusted it would meet with your approval : <sup>4</sup> —

<sup>1</sup> Russian Orange Book No. 67, July 31.

<sup>2</sup> British Blue Book No. 103, July 30.

<sup>3</sup> British Blue Book No. 97, July 30.

<sup>4</sup> There is no desire expressed that it would meet with Austria's approval, which was the all-important thing, if peace was to be preserved. Nor does it appear what



"Si l'Autriche consentira à arrêter marche des ses troupes sur le territoire serbe, si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits d'État souverain et à son indépendance, la Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante."<sup>1</sup>

His Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to German Emperor by Emperor of Russia in reply to the former's telegram.<sup>2</sup> He said that Emperor Nicholas had begun by thanking Emperor William for his telegram and for the hopes of peaceful solution which it held out. His Majesty had then proceeded to assure Emperor William that no intention whatever of an aggressive character was concealed behind Russian military preparations. So long as conversation with Austria continued, His Imperial Majesty undertook that not a single man should be moved across the frontier; it was, however of course impossible, for reasons explained, to stop a mobilisation which was already in progress.

M. Sazonof<sup>3</sup> said that undoubtedly there would be better prospect of a peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take place in London, where the atmosphere was far more favourable, and he therefore hoped that you would see your way to agreeing to this.

His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to His Majesty's Government, who had done so much to save the situation. It would be largely due to them if war were prevented. The Emperor, the Russian Government, and the Russian people would never forget the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain.

*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 121

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —  
(Received August 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of 31st July.<sup>4</sup>

I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him most earnestly to accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war.

a new formula could do, after Russia had ordered her general mobilisation in the night of July 30-31. See note 5 to French Yellow Book No. 127, same day.

<sup>1</sup> TRANSLATION. — "If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory; if, recognising that the dispute between Austria and Servia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Servia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude."

<sup>2</sup> None of these telegrams were published in the British Blue Book or mentioned in the speeches of Sir E. Grey or Mr. Asquith which induced Parliament to vote for war.

<sup>3</sup> Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>4</sup> See British Blue Book No. 111, July 31.

He expressed himself very sympathetically towards your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day ;<sup>1</sup> this communication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately countermand her mobilisation against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilise at once.

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilise in south as well. He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilisation was only directed against Austria.<sup>2</sup>

His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited favourable consideration, and in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had sent in their answer to the German demand.<sup>3</sup>

He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions — and telegraphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature — but Russia's mobilisation had spoilt everything.<sup>4</sup>

*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 122

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —  
(Received August 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

NEUTRALITY of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir F. Bertie.<sup>5</sup>

I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.

It appears from what he said that German Government consider

<sup>1</sup> German White Book, Exhibit 24, July 31 ; the German ultimatum.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 121, August 1, note 5.

<sup>3</sup> The obvious reason for this was that Germany felt herself threatened by the Russian general mobilisation.

<sup>4</sup> Contrast this view with the one expressed by France, French Yellow Book No. 120, August 1, and note 5.

<sup>5</sup> British Blue Book No. 114, July 31.

that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium.<sup>1</sup> As an instance of this,<sup>2</sup> he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already.

I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote.

In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply<sup>3</sup> returned to you by the French Government.

*To Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 123

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day that the reply<sup>4</sup> of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country.<sup>5</sup> If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance<sup>6</sup> as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting,<sup>7</sup> and as I was authorised to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality we would engage to remain neutral.<sup>8</sup>

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free,<sup>9</sup> and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 79 and enclosures where under date of August 29 Belgium explains the embargo as not an hostile act. It is, however, very remarkable that this charge against Belgium could be made by Germany, without Great Britain to whom it was made at once challenging its accuracy. Nor does it appear from the published documents that Sir E. Grey was at all troubled by it or enquired about it, or felt called upon to deny it.

<sup>2</sup> No other hostile acts are mentioned in the diplomatic documents published at the outbreak of the war. Subsequently Germany published the "Brussels documents" which she had discovered in the Belgian archives after taking Brussels. In these documents "military conversations" between Great Britain and Belgium were discussed. For these documents see pp. 577 ff.

<sup>3</sup> For this reply see Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1, 1914.

<sup>4</sup> British Blue Book No. 122, July 31, printed under date of August 1.

<sup>5</sup> No mention is made of existing treaties, a violation of which on the part of Germany has often been given as the reason for Great Britain to join the war.

<sup>6</sup> Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1. It must be remembered that as European friendships had shaped themselves, France and Germany were not in the same position, although Great Britain had addressed to them identical questions. For France the question was: "Will Great Britain remain neutral or be my ally?" For Germany it was: "Will Great Britain remain neutral or be my enemy?"

<sup>7</sup> Contrast this with French Yellow Book No. 126, August 1, and note 2.

<sup>8</sup> This is what Great Britain had done in 1870.

<sup>9</sup> Compare this with Sir E. Grey's personal engagements toward France; French Yellow Book No. 126, August 1, and note 3.

strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.<sup>1</sup>

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.<sup>2</sup>

I am, etc.

E. GREY.

*From Paris*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 124

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —*  
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

ON the receipt at 8.30 to-night of your telegram of this afternoon,<sup>3</sup> I sent a message to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. He received me at 10.30 to-night at the Élysée, where a Cabinet Council was being held. He took a note of the enquiry as to the respecting by France of the neutrality of Belgium which you instructed me to make.

He told me that a communication had been made to you by the German Ambassador in London of the intention of Germany to order a general mobilisation of her army if Russia do not demobilise at once. He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the circumstances, and begs an answer may be made by His Majesty's Government at the earliest moment possible.

Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German Embassy is packing up.<sup>4</sup>

*From Paris*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 125

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —*  
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>5</sup>

Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister for

<sup>1</sup> No valid reason is given in the British Blue Book why Sir E. Grey did not formulate such conditions. From the reference given in the previous despatches, however, it appears that Sir E. Grey was personally too deeply committed to France. (See especially French Yellow Book No. 126, August 1.) Nor did Sir E. Grey mention this German request either in the subsequent cabinet meetings or in Parliament. His excuse offered weeks later that the German Ambassador had made this request unofficially seems to be contradicted by the despatch itself. It is not customary to repeat unofficial offers in instructions to Ambassadors, at least without saying so. Cf. for instance British Blue Book No. 125, August 1, and Belgian Gray Book No. 24, August 3.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. note 9, page 388.

<sup>3</sup> British Blue Book No. 114, July 31.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 120, August 1.

<sup>5</sup> British Blue Book No. 124.

Foreign Affairs to your enquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. It is as follows: <sup>1</sup>—

French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity in order to assure defence of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously <sup>2</sup> renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day.<sup>3</sup>

*From Paris*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 126

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

I HAVE had conversation with the Political Director, who states that the German Ambassador was informed, on calling at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning,<sup>4</sup> that the French Government failed to comprehend the reason which prompted his communication of yesterday evening. It was pointed out to his Excellency that general mobilisation in Russia had not been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general mobilisation,<sup>5</sup> and that the Russian Government were ready to demobilise<sup>6</sup> if all Powers did likewise. It seemed strange to the French Government that in view of this and of the fact that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Government should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St. Petersburg requiring immediate demobilisation by Russia. There were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French Government and had requested an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The Ambassador was informed that the French Government considered that this was an extraordinary proceeding.

The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs again this evening, said nothing about demanding his passports, but he stated that he had packed up.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Belgian Gray Book no. 15, August 1.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. end of note 7, British Blue Book No. 123, August 1.

<sup>3</sup> Belgian Gray Book No. 9, July 31.

<sup>4</sup> See French Yellow Book No. 125, same day.

<sup>5</sup> This is an error, see French Yellow Book No. 127, same day, and note 5; also British Blue Book No. 127, same date.

<sup>6</sup> Contrast French Yellow Book No. 125, same day, "suspension of military preparations," which is *not* the same as "demobilisation." See also note 5 to this despatch in French Yellow Book.

<sup>7</sup> This is not given in the exhaustive French despatch describing this interview, French Yellow Book No. 125, same day.

*From Vienna*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 127

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.*  
— (Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, August 1, 1914.*

GENERAL mobilisation of army and fleet.

*From Brussels*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 128

*Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.* —  
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Brussels, August 1, 1914.*

BELGIAN neutrality.

The instructions conveyed in your telegram of yesterday <sup>1</sup> have been acted upon.

Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold <sup>2</sup> her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbours were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies.

[For British Blue Book No. 129 see under August 2.]

*To Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 130

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

WE are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly detained steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British merchant-ships.

I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships has been ordered.

You should request German Government to send immediate orders that they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty's Government, on their side, are most anxious to avoid any

<sup>1</sup> British Blue Book No. 115, July 31, expecting Belgium to observe neutrality.

<sup>2</sup> This seems to contradict Belgian Gray Book No. 38, August 4, where the Belgian Foreign Minister relates that Belgium had refrained from appealing to the guaranteeing Powers as late as 6 A.M. on August 4, and probably later. On Aug. 3, at 10 A.M., the Belgian Cabinet definitely voted not to appeal to the Powers.

incident of an aggressive nature, and the German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take any step which would make the situation between us impossible.

*To Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 131

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

I STILL believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war.<sup>1</sup>

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.

Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters.

*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 132

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

FOLLOWING telegram from M. Sazonof<sup>2</sup> to Count Benckendorff<sup>3</sup> of the 31st July communicated to me to-day:<sup>4</sup>

"(Urgent.)

"Formule amendée conformément à la proposition anglaise: 'Si Autriche consent à arrêter la marche de ses troupes sur le territoire serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement austro-hongrois sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits d'État souverain et à son indépendance, la Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante.'"<sup>5</sup>

(Above communicated to all the Powers.)

<sup>1</sup> Sir E. Grey here overlooks the fact that general mobilisation by one nation on the frontier of another has always been sufficient cause for the latter to "defend itself by instant war." See Elihu Root quoted above, note 4 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 28, July 26.

Sir E. Grey nowhere asked Russia to demobilise.

<sup>2</sup> Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> Russian Ambassador in London.

<sup>4</sup> See British Blue Book No. 120, July 31, printed under date of August 1, and Russian Orange Book No. 67, July 31.

<sup>5</sup> TRANSLATION. — "Formula amended in accordance with the English proposal: 'If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recog-



*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 133

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

M. DE ETTER<sup>1</sup> came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonof,<sup>2</sup> dated the 31st July, which are as follows:—

"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared<sup>3</sup> the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers.

"M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory."

(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.)

*From Paris*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 134

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

PRESIDENT of the Republic has informed me that German Government<sup>4</sup> were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility, that it was only after a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation; that, although the measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobilisation, they are not so designated; that a French general mobilisation will become necessary in self-defence, and that France is already forty-eight hours<sup>5</sup> behind Germany as regards German military preparations; that the French troops have ordered not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other

nising that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude."

<sup>1</sup> Counsellor of Russian Embassy in London.

<sup>2</sup> Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 56, August 1.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 127, August 1, where it reads: "The German and the Austrian Governments." For the several points see the notes to the French Yellow Book despatch.

<sup>5</sup> No such claim is made either in French Yellow Book Nos. 125 or 127, same date.

hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions on it;<sup>1</sup> that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war.

*From St. Petersburg*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 135

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

INFORMATION reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that though the situation has been changed by the mobilisation of Russia they would in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace be ready to consider favourably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The effect of this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Servia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilisation of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilisation.<sup>2</sup>

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilisation, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter should be discussed with German Government also by Russian Government.

*From Paris*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 136

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

MINISTER of War informed military attaché this afternoon that orders had been given at 3.40<sup>3</sup> for a general mobilisation of the French Army. This became necessary because the Minister of War knows that, under the system of "Kriegszustand,"<sup>4</sup> the Germans have

<sup>1</sup> The German claim was to the very opposite effect; see Speech of the Chancellor, August 4, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> Contrast this with the French claims in despatches of this day that Russia had been forced to general mobilisation by a previous Austrian general mobilisation.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. German White Book, p. 560, 5 P.M., the latter being Berlin instead of Paris time.

<sup>4</sup> "State of war."

called up six classes. Three classes are sufficient to being their covering troops up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve. This, he says, being tantamount to mobilisation, is mobilisation under another name.<sup>1</sup>

The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army corps on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. It is therefore of the utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of 10 kilom. has been left between the French troops and German frontier. The French troops will not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilisation is one for purely defensive purposes.

*From Vienna*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 137

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

I SAW the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning. He supplied me with the substance of a telegram which the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris.<sup>2</sup> In this telegram his Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian Government to impair the sovereign rights of Servia or to obtain territorial aggrandisement. The Ambassador added that he was further instructed to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no truth in the report which had been published in Paris to the effect that Austria-Hungary intended to occupy the sanjak.

Count Mensdorff<sup>3</sup> called again later at the Foreign Office. He informed me of a telegram<sup>4</sup> sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg by Count Berchtold,<sup>5</sup> and gave me the substance.

It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador, whom he sent for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburg that the "door had been banged" by Austria-Hungary on all further conversations. The Russian Ambassador promised to do this. Count Berchtold repeated on this occasion to the Russian Ambassador the assurance which had already been given at St. Petersburg, to the effect that neither an infraction of Servian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Servian territory was being contemplated by Austria-Hungary.

Special attention was called by Count Mensdorff<sup>3</sup> to the fact that

<sup>1</sup> None of this seems to be based on facts. See M. P. Price, *The Diplomatic History of the War*, Scribner's, the chapters on "Preparations and Mobilisations."

<sup>2</sup> Not printed in French Yellow Book, but mentioned *ib.* No. 120, same day.

<sup>3</sup> Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

<sup>4</sup> Probably Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50, although this is dated July 30, and Sir E. Grey says "sent yesterday," i.e. July 31.

<sup>5</sup> Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

this telegram contains a statement to the effect that conversations at St. Petersburg had not been broken off by Austria-Hungary.

[For British Blue Book Nos. 138 and 139 see under August 2.]

*From Paris*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 140

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —  
(Received August 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

THE Minister of War again sent for the military attaché this evening, as he said he wished to keep him informed of the situation. He laid great stress on the fact that the zone of 10 kilom., which he had arranged between the French troops and the German frontier, and which was still occupied by peasants, was a proof of the French endeavours to commit no provocative act.<sup>1</sup>

**Russia :**

*To Russian Representatives Abroad*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 70

*Secret Telegram to Russian Representatives abroad.*

(Telegram.)

*July 19 (August 1), 1914.*

AT midnight the German Ambassador announced <sup>2</sup> to me, on the instruction of his Government, that if within 12 hours, that is by midnight on Saturday, we had not begin to demobilise, not only against Germany, but also against Austria, the German Government would be compelled to give the order for mobilisation. To my enquiry whether this meant war, the Ambassador replied in the negative, but added that we were very near it.

*From London*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 71

*Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, July 19 (August 1), 1914.*

GREY tells me that he has telegraphed <sup>3</sup> to Berlin that in his opinion the last formula accepted by the Russian Government offers the best prospect as a basis of negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. At the same time he expressed the hope that no Great Power would open hostilities before this formula had been considered.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. note 3 to British Blue Book No. 134, August 1.

<sup>2</sup> German White Book, Exhibit 24, July 31.

<sup>3</sup> Probably British Blue Book No. 131, same day.

*From London*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK NO. 72

*Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, July 19 (August 1), 1914.*

THE British Government have enquired <sup>1</sup> of the French and German Governments whether they will respect the neutrality of Belgium.

France answered in the affirmative,<sup>2</sup> but the German Government stated <sup>3</sup> that they could not give any definite answer to the question.

*From Paris*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK NO. 73

*Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, July 19 (August 1), 1914.*

THE Austrian Ambassador yesterday <sup>4</sup> saw Viviani and declared to him that Austria, far from harbouring any designs against the integrity of Servia, was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Servia with the other Powers. The French Government are much exercised at Germany's extraordinary military activity on the French frontier, for they are convinced that, under the guise of *Kriegszustand*,<sup>5</sup> mobilisation is in reality being carried out.

*From Paris*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK NO. 74

*Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, July 19 (August 1), 1914.*

ON the receipt in Paris of the telegram <sup>6</sup> from the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reporting the communication made to you by the German Ambassador respecting Germany's decision to order general mobilisation to-day, the President of the French Republic signed the order for mobilisation. Lists of the reservists recalled to the colours are being posted up in the streets. The German Ambassador has just visited Viviani,<sup>7</sup> but told him nothing fresh, alleging the impossibility of deciphering the telegrams he has received.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> British Blue Book No. 115, July 31.

<sup>2</sup> Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1.

<sup>3</sup> British Blue Book No. 122, August 1.

<sup>4</sup> French Yellow Book No. 120, August 1. British Blue Book No. 137, same day.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 127, August 1, and notes 5 and 6.

<sup>6</sup> No such telegram is printed in the French Yellow Book. On the eventful August 1 not a single despatch exchanged between Paris and Petrograd has been printed in the French Yellow Book.

<sup>7</sup> See French Yellow Book No. 125, August 1.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *ib.*, where Viviani quotes the German Ambassador as saying that "he had received no fresh communication from his government."

Viviani informed him of the signature of the order for mobilisation issued in reply to that of Germany, and expressed to him his amazement that Germany should have taken such a step at a moment when a friendly exchange of views was still in progress between Russia, Austria, and the Powers. He added that mobilisation did not necessarily entail war, and that the German Ambassador might stay in Paris as the Russian Ambassador had remained in Vienna and the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg.

*From Paris*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 75

*Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, July 19 (August 1), 1914.*

I HEAR from the President that during the last few days the Austrian Ambassador emphatically assured both the President of the Council of Ministers and him that Austria had declared to Russia that she was ready to respect both the territorial integrity of Serbia and also her sovereign rights, but that Russia had intentionally received this declaration in silence. I contradicted this flatly.<sup>1</sup>

*From Berlin*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 76

*Note presented by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 19 (August 1), at 7.10 P.M.*

(Translation.)

LE Gouvernement Impérial s'est efforcé dès les débuts de la crise de la mener à une solution pacifique. Se rendant à un désir qui lui en avait été exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre s'était appliqué à accomplir un rôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et de Saint-Petersbourg, lorsque, la Russie, sans en attendre le résultat, procéda à la mobilisation de la totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer. A la suite de cette mesure mena-

THE Imperial German Government have used every effort since the beginning of the crisis to bring about a peaceful settlement. In compliance with a wish expressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, the German Emperor had undertaken, in concert with Great Britain, the part of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg; but Russia, without waiting for any result, proceeded to a general mobilisation of her forces both on land and sea. In consequence of this threatening step, which was not

<sup>1</sup> It is not clear whether the Russian Ambassador contradicted the assertion, that Austria-Hungary had made this declaration or that Russia had received it in silence. For Austria-Hungary's declaration see Austro-Hungarian Red Book Nos. 47, July 29, 55, July 31, and 56, August 1.

cante ne motivée par aucun présage militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire allemand s'est trouvé vis-à-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Impérial eût manqué de parer à ce péril, il aurait compromis la sécurité et l'existence même de l'Allemagne. Par conséquent le Gouvernement allemand se vit forcé de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies en insistant sur la cessation des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refusé de faire droit à (n'ayant pas cru devoir répondre à <sup>1</sup>) cette demande et ayant manifesté par ce refus (cette attitude <sup>2</sup>) que son action était dirigée contre l'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur, d'ordre de mon Gouvernement, de faire savoir à votre Excellence ce qui suit : —

Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom de l'Empire, relevant le défi, se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie.

justified by any military proceedings on the part of Germany,<sup>1</sup> the German Empire was faced by a grave and imminent danger. If the German Government had failed to guard against this peril, they would have compromised the safety and the very existence of Germany. The German Government were, therefore, obliged to make representations to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias and to insist upon a cessation of the aforesaid military acts. Russia having refused to comply with (not having considered it necessary to answer <sup>2</sup>) this demand, and having shown by this refusal (this attitude <sup>3</sup>) that her action was directed against Germany, I have the honour, on the instructions of my Government, to inform your Excellency as follows : —

His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the German Empire, accepts the challenge, and considers himself at war with Russia.

<sup>1</sup> Les mots placés entre parenthèses se trouvent dans l'original. Il faut supposer que deux variantes avaient été préparées d'avance et que par erreur elles ont été insérées toutes les deux dans la note.

<sup>2</sup> The words in parentheses occur in the original. It must be supposed that two variations had been prepared in advance, and that, by mistake, they were both inserted in the note.

<sup>3</sup> This sentence contains the *cruz* of the question. Students should ask themselves (a) Did Russian mobilisation contain an element of danger for Germany? (b) If it did, was Germany justified in replying to it with an ultimatum? (c) Was the Russian general mobilisation justified by any military action previously taken by Germany?



Sunday, August 2, 1914

## SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	—	Berlin
Belgium	London etc.	Luxemburg German Minister
France	All representatives London etc. London	Luxemburg, Petrograd, London, German Ambassador
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	Paris, Berlin	Berlin, Petrograd, Paris, Vienna, Brussels, Lux- emburg
Russia	Announcement by Sazonof to all representatives	—
Serbia	—	—

*Austria-Hungary* is notified of Germany's declaration of war on Russia.

*Belgium* is notified of Germany's entry on Luxemburg territory, and receives herself an ultimatum from Germany at 7 o'clock in the evening; *i.e.* many hours after the British Government had promised their support to France.

*France* announces to her representatives instances of Germany's troops crossing her frontier and committing hostile acts, and receives the promise of support from the British Government for which she had been working since July 27.

*Germany* sends troops into Luxemburg, thus violating the neutrality of the duchy, but assuring her that the military measures taken are not a hostile act but are "solely measures intended to assure the use of the railways which have been leased to the Empire" against any attack of the French army. She promises Luxemburg a complete indemnity for any damage.

Germany notifies Belgium that she has received "reliable information" of French intentions to march through Belgium, and feels herself therefore forced in self-defence to contemplate entering Belgian territory. If Belgium "should oppose the German troops," Germany would "to her regret be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy." If the troops are not opposed, guarantees are offered for the future integrity and independence of Belgium, and the payment for any damage done.

*Great Britain* promises her support to France during the forenoon, independently of whether or no German troops should invade Belgium. She is silent on the movement of her own troops.

*Russia* defends herself against Germany's attempt "to foist" on Russia the "responsibility" for the war, claiming that Germany "neither could, nor had the right to, doubt" the many proofs of Russia's "desire for peace." The fact of Russia's general mobilisation is minimised.

*Serbia* is silent.

**Austria-Hungary :**

*From Berlin*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 57

*Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 2, 1914.*

THE SECRETARY OF STATE has just informed me that no answer has been received from Russia to the German demand.

The Russian troops have crossed the German frontier at Schwidden (southeast of Bialla).

Russia has thus attacked Germany.

Germany, therefore,<sup>1</sup> regards herself as at war with Russia.

The Russian Ambassador has this morning received his passports; he intends to leave to-day.

**Belgium :**

*From Luxembourg*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 18

*M. Eyschen, President of the Luxembourg Government, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency with the following facts: On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

*To Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 19

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg*

Sir, *Brussels, August 2, 1914.*

I WAS careful to warn the German Minister through M. de Bassompierre that an announcement in the Brussels press by M. Klobukowski, French Minister, would make public the formal declaration which the latter had made to me on the 1st August. When I next met Herr von Below he thanked me for this attention, and added that up to the present he had not been instructed to make us an official communication, but that we knew his personal opinion as to the feelings of security, which we had the right to entertain towards our eastern

<sup>1</sup> This is not the reason given in the declaration of war, Russian Orange Book No. 76, August 1.

neighbours. I at once replied that all that we knew of their intentions, as indicated in numerous previous conversations, did not allow us to doubt their perfect correctness towards Belgium. I added, however, that we should attach the greatest importance to the possession of a formal declaration, which the Belgian nation would hear of with joy and gratitude.

*From Berlin*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 20

*Note presented by Herr von Below Salekse, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Kaiserlich Deutsche Gesandtschaft in Belgien. *Brüssel, den 2. August, 1914.*

Imperial German Legation in Belgium. — *Brussels, August 2, 1914.*

(Translation.)

(Très Confidentiel.)

DER Kaiserlichen Regierung liegen zuverlässige Nachrichten vor über den beabsichtigten Aufmarsch französischer Streitkräfte an der Maas-Strecke Givet-Namur. Sie lassen keinen Zweifel über die Absicht Frankreichs, durch belgisches Gebiet gegen Deutschland vorzugehen.

Die Kaiserliche Regierung kann sich der Besorgniss nicht erwehren, dass Belgien, trotz besten Willens, nicht im Stande sein wird, ohne Hülfe einen französischen Vormarsch mit so grosser Aussicht auf Erfolg abzuwehren, dass darin eine ausreichende Sicherheit gegen die Bedrohung Deutschlands gefunden werden kann. Es ist ein Gebot der Selbsterhaltung für Deutschland, dem feindlichen Angriff zu vorzukommen. Mit dem grössten Bedauern würde es daher

(Very Confidential.)<sup>1</sup>

RELIABLE information has been received by the German Government to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory against Germany.

The German Government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite of the utmost goodwill, will be unable, without assistance, to repel<sup>2</sup> so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success to afford an adequate guarantee against danger to Germany. It is essential for the self-defence of Germany that she should anticipate any such hostile attack. The German Government would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of hostility

<sup>1</sup> This ultimatum was presented at 7 P.M. (see Belgian Gray Book No. 38, August 4), i.e. many hours after the British Government had promised their support to France; cf. British Blue Book No. 148, August 2, where Sir E. Grey says: "After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following memorandum."

<sup>2</sup> This is the same argument Great Britain advanced in her second military conversation with Belgium. See p. 580 and also note to Belgian Gray Book No. 22, August 3.

die deutsche Regierung erfüllen, wenn Belgien einen Akt der Feindseligkeit gegen sich darin erblicken würde, dass die Massnahmen seiner Gegner Deutschland zwingen, zur Gegenwehr auch seinerseits belgisches Gebiet zu betreten.

Um jede Missdeutung auszuschliessen, erklärt die Kaiserliche Regierung das Folgende:

1. Deutschland beabsichtigt keinerlei Feindseligkeiten gegen Belgien. Ist Belgien gewillt, in dem bevorstehenden Kriege, Deutschland gegenüber eine wohlwollende Neutralität einzunehmen, so verpflichtet sich die deutsche Regierung, beim Friedensschluss Besitzstand und Unabhängigkeit des Königreichs in vollem Umfang zu garantieren.

2. Deutschland verpflichtet sich unter obiger Voraussetzung, das Gebiet des Königreichs wieder zu räumen, sobald der Friede geschlossen ist.

3. Bei einer freundschaftlicher Haltung Belgiens ist Deutschland bereit, im Einvernehmen mit den Königlich Belgischen Behörden alle Bedürfnisse seiner Truppen gegen Barzahlung anzukaufen und jeden Schaden zu ersetzen, der etwa durch deutsche Truppen verursacht werden könnte.

4. Sollte Belgien den deutschen Truppen feindlich entgegen treten, insbesondere ihrem Vorgehen durch Widerstand der Maas-Befestigungen oder durch Zerstörungen von Eisenbahnen, Strassen, Tunneln oder sonstigen Kunstbauten Schwierigkeiten bereiten, so wird Deutschland zu seinem Bedauern gezwungen sein, das Königreich als Feind zu betrachten. In diesem Falle würde

against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory.

In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, the German Government make the following declaration:—

1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the German Government bind themselves, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full.

2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace.

3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in co-operation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all necessities for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity for any damage that may have been caused by German troops.

4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a resistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

In this event, Germany can undertake no obligations towards

Deutschland dem Königreich gegenüber keine Verpflichtungen übernehmen können, sondern müsste die spätere Regelung des Verhältnisses beider Staaten zu einander der Entscheidung der Waffen überlassen.

Die Kaiserliche Regierung giebt sich der bestimmten Hoffnung hin, dass diese Eventualität nicht eintreten, und dass die Königliche Belgische Regierung die geeigneten Massnahmen zu treffen wissen wird, um zu verhindern, dass Vorkommnisse, wie die vorstehend erwähnten, sich ereignen. In diesem Falle würden die freundschaftlichen Bande, die beide Nachbarstaaten verbinden, eine weitere und dauernde Festigung erfahren.

Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two States must be left to the decision of arms.

The German Government, however, entertain the distinct hope that this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian Government will know how to take the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the friendly ties which bind the two neighbouring States will grow stronger and more enduring.

France :

*From Luxemburg*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 131

*M. Eyschen, Minister of State for Luxemburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to bring to your Excellence's notice the following facts : —

On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

*The Minister of State,  
President of the Government.*

EYSCHEN.

*From Luxemburg*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 132<sup>1</sup>

*M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.*

THE Minister of State for Luxemburg, M. Eyschen, has just received, through Herr von Buch, German Minister at Luxemburg, a telegram from Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire, saying that the military measures taken by Germany in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act against this country, but are solely measures tended to assure the use of the railways which have been leased to the Empire against the eventual attack of a French army. Luxemburg will receive a complete indemnity for any damage.

MOLLARD.

*From Berlin*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 133

*Note handed in by the German Ambassador.*

*Paris, August 2, 1914.*

THE German Ambassador has just been instructed, and hastens to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the military measures taken by Germany in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg do not constitute an act of hostility. They must be considered as purely preventive measures taken for the protection of the railways, which, under the treaties between Germany and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, are under German administration.

VON SCHOEN.

*From St. Petersburg*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 134

*W. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, August 2, 1914.*

YESTERDAY at ten minutes past seven in the evening the German Ambassador handed to M. Sazonof a declaration of war by his Government; he will leave St. Petersburg to-day.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has not received any instructions from his Government as to the declaration of war.

PALÉOLOGUE.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 129, same day.

*To the Representatives of France Abroad*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 135

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to the Representatives of France abroad.*

*Paris, August 2, 1914.*

THE Russian Ambassador informs me that Germany has just declared war on Russia, notwithstanding the negotiations which are proceeding, and at a moment when Austria-Hungary was agreeing to discuss with the Powers even the basis of her conflict with Servia.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

*To London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 136

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople.*

*Paris, August 2, 1914.*

THIS morning, French territory was violated by German troops at Ciry and near Longwy. They are marching on the fort which bears the latter name. Elsewhere the Custom House at Delle<sup>1</sup> has twice been fired upon. Finally, German troops have also violated this morning the neutral territory of Luxemburg.

You will at once use this information to lay stress on the fact that the German Government is committing itself to acts of war against France without provocation<sup>2</sup> on our part, or any previous declaration of war, whilst we have scrupulously respected the zone of ten kilometres which we have maintained, even since the mobilisation, between our troops and the frontier.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

*From London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 137

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, August 2, 1914.*

AFTER the meeting of the Cabinet held this morning, Sir Edward Grey made the following declaration<sup>3</sup> to me:—

“I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile

<sup>1</sup> See below, French Yellow Book No. 139, same day.

<sup>2</sup> The German Chancellor in his speech in the Reichstag on August 4 laid the blame for the first border hostilities on the French. For translation of this speech see pp. 573–576. See also for the German charges, Belgian Gray Book No. 21, August 3.

<sup>3</sup> For different wording see French Yellow Book No. 143, August 3, and notes to British Blue Book No. 148, August 2.



operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

Afterwards in speaking to me of the neutrality of Belgium and that of Luxemburg, the Secretary of State reminded me that the Convention of 1867, referring to the Grand Duchy, differed from the Treaty referring to Belgium, in that Great Britain was bound to require the observance of this latter convention without the assistance of the other guaranteeing Powers, while with regard to Luxemburg all the guaranteeing Powers were to act in concert.

The protection of Belgian neutrality is here considered so important that Great Britain will regard its violation by Germany as a *casus belli*. It is a specially British interest <sup>1</sup> and there is no doubt that the British Government, faithful to the traditions of their policy, will insist upon it, even if the business world, in which German influence is making tenacious efforts, exercises pressure to prevent the Government committing itself against Germany.

PAUL CAMBON.

*To London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK NO. 138

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.*

*Paris, August 2, 1914.*

I NOTE the points contained in your telegrams of the 27th,<sup>2</sup> 30th,<sup>3</sup> 31st<sup>4</sup> July and the 1st August,<sup>5</sup> and in that which you have sent to me to-day.<sup>6</sup>

In communicating to the Chambers the declaration which Sir Edward Grey has made to you, the text of which is contained in your last telegram, I will add that in it we have obtained from Great Britain a first assistance which is most valuable to us.

In addition, I propose to indicate that the help which Great Britain intends to give to France for the protection of the French coasts or the French merchant marine, will be used in such a way that our navy will also, in case of a Franco-German conflict, be supported by the British fleet in the Atlantic as well as in the North

<sup>1</sup> This is a very important statement, for if it is true, Great Britain, even if entering the war because Belgian neutrality was infringed, did so for reasons of national self-interest, and not merely to defend the rights of a smaller nation.

<sup>2</sup> French Yellow Book No. 63. Other despatches of the same day but without bearing on the question at hand here, are Nos. 68, 69, and 71.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.* No. 108.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.* No. 110.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.* No. 128.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.* No. 137.

The coupling of these despatches shows that the final promise contained in No. 137 is the result of diplomatic efforts begun by France, certainly not later than on July 27. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 63, July 27.

Sea and Channel. In addition I would note that British ports could not serve as places for revictualling for the German fleet.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

*To Berlin*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 139

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin.*

*Paris, August 2, 1914.*

GERMAN troops having to-day violated the eastern frontier at several points I request you immediately to protest in writing to the German Government. You will be good enough to take as your text the following note which, in the uncertainty of communications between Paris and Berlin, I have addressed directly to the German Ambassador:—

"The French administrative and military authorities in the eastern district have just reported several acts which I have instructed the Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin to bring to the knowledge of the Imperial Government.

"The first has taken place at Delle in the district of Belfort; on two occasions the French Customs station in this locality has been fired upon by a detachment of German soldiers. North of Delle<sup>1</sup> two German patrols of the 5th mounted Jaegers crossed the frontier this morning and advanced to the villages of Joncherey and Baron, more than ten kilometres from the frontier. The officer who commanded the first has blown out the brains of a French soldier. The German cavalry carried off some horses which the French mayor of Suarce was collecting and forced the inhabitants of the commune to lead the said horses.

"The Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin has been instructed to make a formal protest to the Imperial Government against acts which form a flagrant violation of the frontier by German troops in arms, and which are not justified by anything in the present situation. The Government of the Republic can only leave to the Imperial Government the entire responsibility for these acts."

RENÉ VIVIANI.

Great Britain:

*From Luxembourg*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 129<sup>2</sup>

*Minister of State, Luxembourg, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 2.)*

(Translation.)

*Luxembourg, 2 août, 1914.*

*Luxembourg, August 2, 1914.*

(Télégraphique.)

(Telegraphic.)

MINISTRE d'État du Luxembourg Eyschen vient de recevoir

THE Luxembourg Minister of State, Eyschen, has just received

<sup>1</sup> Cf. above, No. 136, same day.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. French Yellow Book No. 132, same day.

par l'intermédiaire du Ministre d'Allemagne à Luxembourg, M. de Buch, un télégramme du Chancelier de l'Empire allemand Bethmann-Hollweg disant que les mesures militaires à Luxembourg ne constituent pas un acte hostile contre le Luxembourg, mais sont uniquement des mesures destinées à assurer contre attaque éventuelle d'une armée française. L'exploitation des voies ferrées affermées à l'Empire Luxembourg recevra complète indemnité pour dommages éventuels.

through the German Minister in Luxembourg, M. de Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor of the German Empire, Bethmann-Hollweg, to the effect that the military measures taken in Luxembourg do not constitute a hostile act against Luxembourg, but are only intended to insure against a possible attack of a French army. Full compensation will be paid to Luxembourg for any damage caused by using the railways which are leased to the Empire.

[For British Blue Book Nos. 130 to 137 see under August 1.]

*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 138

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 2.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of to-day.<sup>1</sup>

I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary of State, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If therefore Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilised against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilise, had caused Germany to mobilise also. Russia had said that her mobilisation did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilised for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had therefore ordered mobilisation, and the German representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within a certain

<sup>1</sup> British Blue Book No. 131, August 1.

time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to an answer as creating a state of war.<sup>1</sup>

*From St. Petersburg*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 139

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 2.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, August 1, 1914.*

My telegram of 31st July.<sup>2</sup>

The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor to the German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency yesterday.<sup>3</sup> No progress whatever was made.

In the evening <sup>4</sup> M. Sazonof <sup>5</sup> had an interview with the Austrian Ambassador who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to deflect the conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Servia. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory; but the real question which they had to solve at this moment was whether Austria was to crush Servia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal,<sup>6</sup> or whether she was to leave Servia a free and independent State. In these circumstances, while the Servian question was unsolved, the abstract discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia was a waste of time. The only place where a successful discussion of this question could be expected was London, and any such discussion was being made impossible by the action of Austria-Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually unfortified town, to bombardment.

M. Sazonof <sup>7</sup> informed the French Ambassador and myself this morning of his conversation <sup>8</sup> with the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Servia. It was clear that Austrian domination of Servia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence

<sup>1</sup> Russian Orange Book No. 76, August 1.

<sup>2</sup> British Blue Book No. 120, under date of August 1.

<sup>3</sup> *I.e.* yesterday of July 31 or July 30. See French Yellow Book 102, July 30. There is no apparent reason why an event reported in Paris of July 30 and so printed in the French Yellow Book should appear in the British Blue Book under date of August 2.

<sup>4</sup> The date of this interview is doubtful. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador received his instructions by telegram sent from Vienna July 30, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50, and acknowledged by him, *ib.* No. 55, July 31. In this latter despatch he refers to an "uninstructed" interview on July 29. "In the evening" cannot refer to July 31. It may refer to July 30, but since no such interview is mentioned by the Ambassador in Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 55, it possibly refers to July 29.

<sup>5</sup> Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>6</sup> This occurred in interview between Sazonof and the German Ambassador on July 29. See British Blue Book No. 97, July 30.

<sup>7</sup> Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>8</sup> From the preceding notes it is clear that the date of this conversation cannot be fixed.

of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought that she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburg: the former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war.<sup>1</sup> M. Sazonof was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavours he had made to avoid a war. No suggestion held out to him had been refused. He had accepted the proposal for a conference of four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for direct conversation between Austria and Russia; but Germany and Austria-Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive replies or had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian Government to order mobilisation, and the mobilisation of Germany had created a desperate situation.<sup>2</sup>

M. Sazonof added that the formula, of which the text is contained in my telegram of 31st July,<sup>3</sup> had been forwarded by the Russian Government to Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the frontier was crossed by German troops. In no case would Russia begin hostilities first.

I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agreement of France and Germany can be obtained to keep their armies mobilised on their own sides of the frontier, as Russia has expressed her readiness to do,<sup>4</sup> pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis.

[For British Blue Book No. 140 see under August 1.]

*From Vienna*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK NO. 141

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 2.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, August 1, 1914.*

I AM to be received to-morrow by Minister for Foreign Affairs. This afternoon he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors. I have just been informed by the Russian Ambassador of German

<sup>1</sup> For a similar statement see British Blue Book No. 71, July 29.

<sup>2</sup> This almost sounds as if Russia claimed that she had a right to mobilise, but that her neighbor had not.

<sup>3</sup> British Blue Book No. 120, under date of August 1.

<sup>4</sup> For Germany's reason for her belief that Russia could wait, while she could not, see previous despatch.

ultimatum<sup>1</sup> requiring that Russia should demobilise within twelve hours. On being asked by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield to this curt summons meant war, the German Ambassador replied that Germany would be forced to mobilise if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador at Vienna thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that as mobilisation is too expensive to be kept for long, Germany will attack Russia at once. He says that the so-called mobilisation of Russia amounted to nothing more than that Russia had taken military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany.<sup>2</sup> There seems to be even greater tension between Germany and Russia than there is between Austria and Russia. Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence.<sup>3</sup> He says that Russia had no intention to attack Austria. He is going again to-day to point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that most terrific consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his Excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and that his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here.<sup>4</sup> The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first.<sup>5</sup>

It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being considered.<sup>6</sup> There is great anxiety to know what England will do. I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course, if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany.

*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 142

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —*  
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

ORDERS have just<sup>7</sup> been issued for the general mobilisation of the navy and army, the first day of mobilisation to be 2nd August.

<sup>1</sup> This ultimatum was presented on July 31. German White Book, Exhibit 25. It seems incredible that the Russian Ambassador refrained from telling this to Sir M. de Bunsen until the next day.

<sup>2</sup> The despatches of the previous days disprove this. Germany sent her ultimatum after Russia had mobilised, and did not herself order general mobilisation until August 1 to take effect on August 2. See British Blue Book No. 138 under date of August 2, and next number.

<sup>3</sup> They were guaranteed by Germany on July 29. See British Blue Book No. 97. July 30.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. previous despatch where he is called a Russophobe.

<sup>5</sup> This is contradicted by the statement discussed in note 1 (page 411) to the previous despatch, No. 140.

<sup>6</sup> This statement is unsupported by any evidence contained in the French Yellow Book.

<sup>7</sup> This despatch disposes of the statements found in previous despatches to the effect that Germany had mobilised earlier.

*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 143

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —*  
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

DETENTION of British merchant ships at Hamburg.

Your telegram of 1st August<sup>1</sup> acted on.

Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance, has promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to proceed without delay.

*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 144

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —*  
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 2, 1914.*

SECRETARY of State has just informed me that, owing<sup>2</sup> to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now in a state of war. ~~THE DECLARATION OF WAR~~

*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 145

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —*  
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 2, 1914.*

My telegram of 1st August.<sup>3</sup>

Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to allow British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must be regarded as a special favour to His Majesty's Government, as no other foreign ships have been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other precautions being taken.

*From Brussels*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 146

*Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. —*  
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Brussels, August 2, 1914.*

THE news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg has been officially confirmed to the Belgian Government.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> British Blue Book No. 130, August 1.

<sup>2</sup> The declaration of war does not contain this reason. Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 76, August 1.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 143.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 18, August 2, and British Blue Book next despatch.



*From Luxembourg*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 147

*Minister of State, Luxembourg, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 2.)*

(Translation.)

(Télégraphique.)

*Luxembourg, le 2 août, 1914.*

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence les faits suivants :

Dimanche, 2 août, de grand matin, les troupes allemandes, d'après les informations qui sont parvenues au Gouvernement Grand ducal à l'heure actuelle, ont pénétré sur le territoire luxembourgeois par les ponts de Wasserbillig et de Remich, se dirigeant spécialement vers le sud du pays et vers la ville de Luxembourg, capitale du Grand Duché. Un certain nombre de trains blindés avec des troupes et des munitions ont été acheminés par la voie de chemin de fer de Wasserbillig à Luxembourg, où l'on s'attend de les voir arriver. D'un instant à l'autre, ces faits impliquent des actes manifestement contraire à la neutralité du Grand Duché garantie par le Traité de Londres de 1867. Le Gouvernement luxembourgeois n'a pas manqué de protester énergiquement contre cette agression auprès des représentants de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne à Luxembourg. Une protestation identique va être transmise télégraphiquement au Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères à Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

*Luxembourg, August 2, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice the following facts : —

On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxembourg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxembourg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxembourg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxembourg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

To Paris

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 148

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.

AFTER the Cabinet this morning<sup>1</sup> I gave M. Cambon the following memorandum:—

"I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding<sup>2</sup> His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."<sup>3</sup>

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.

M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow — in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a *casus belli*. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> At two previous meetings the Cabinet had refused to make any promises to France; see French Yellow Book Nos. 110, July 31, and 126, August 1, and note 4.

This promise was given before Germany's ultimatum to Belgium, see Belgian Gray Book No. 201, August 2.

<sup>2</sup> This is the very opposite of French Yellow Book No. 143, August 3: "is to be regarded as binding the British Government. Sir E. Grey assured me of this."

<sup>3</sup> This formula is different from the one given in French Yellow Book No. 143, August 3, and quoted by Viviani in the Chamber of Deputies, French Yellow Book No. 159, August 4. In both the last sentence reads "from that moment on England and Germany would be in a state of war." There are then two distinct formulas. The one appears in British Blue Book No. 148, French Yellow Book No. 137, Aug. 2, and in the Speech in Parliament by Sir E. Grey printed as an appendix to the British Blue Book. The other occurs in French Yellow Book No. 143, August 3, and No. 159, August 4.

<sup>4</sup> British Blue Book No. 123, August 1.

*To Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 149

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.*YOUR telegram of 1st August.<sup>1</sup>

I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily unloaded from the British steamship *Sappho* at Hamburg and detained. Similar action appears to have been taken with regard to other British vessels loaded with sugar.

You should inform Secretary of State that, for reasons stated in my telegram of 1st August,<sup>2</sup> I most earnestly trust that the orders already sent to Hamburg to allow the clearance of British ships covers also the release of their cargoes, the detention of which cannot be justified.

**Russia :**

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 77

*Announcement by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting  
Recent Events.*

*July 20 (August 2), 1914.*

A GARBLED version of the events of the last few days having appeared in the foreign press, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs considers it his duty to publish the following brief account of the diplomatic discussions during the period under review:—

On the 10th (23rd) July, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade presented a note to the Prime Minister of Servia, in which the Servian Government were accused of having fostered the pan-Serb movement, which had led to the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. Austria-Hungary, therefore, demanded of the Servian Government, not only the condemnation in the most formal manner of the above-mentioned propaganda, but also the adoption, under Austrian supervision, of a series of measures for the discovery of the plot, for the punishment of any Servian subjects who had taken part in it, and for the prevention of any future attempts at assassination upon Austrian soil. A time limit of forty-eight hours was given to the Servian Government within which to reply to this note.

The Russian Government, to whom the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had communicated the text of the note seventeen hours after its presentation at Belgrade, having taken note of the demands contained therein, could not but perceive that some of these demands were impossible of execution as regards their substance, whilst others were presented in a form which was incompatible with the dignity of an independent State. Russia considered that the humiliation of Servia, involved in these demands, and

<sup>1</sup> British Blue Book No. 143, under date of August 2.<sup>2</sup> British Blue Book No. 130, August 1.

equally the evident intention of Austria-Hungary to secure her own hegemony in the Balkans, which underlay her conditions,<sup>1</sup> were inadmissible. The Russian Government, therefore, pointed out to Austria-Hungary in the most friendly manner that it would be desirable to re-examine the points contained in the Austro-Hungarian note. The Austro-Hungarian Government did not see their way to agree to a discussion of the note. The moderating influence of the four Powers at Vienna was equally unsuccessful.

Despite the fact that Serbia had reprobated the crime,<sup>2</sup> and had shown herself ready to give Austria satisfaction to an extent beyond the expectations,<sup>3</sup> not only of Russia, but also of the other Powers — despite these facts, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade considered the Servian reply insufficient and left the town.

Recognising the exaggerated nature of the demands made by Austria, Russia had previously<sup>4</sup> declared that she could not remain indifferent, while not desisting from doing her utmost to find a peaceful issue which might prove acceptable<sup>5</sup> to Austria, and spare the latter's self-respect as a Great Power. At the same time Russia let it be clearly understood that she could accept a peaceful settlement of the question only so far as it involved no humiliation of Serbia as an independent State. Unhappily all the efforts of the Russian Government to this end were fruitless. The Austro-Hungarian Government, which had shunned any attempt at conciliatory intervention by the Powers in the Austrian dispute with Serbia, proceeded to mobilise and declared war officially against Serbia, and the following day Belgrade was bombarded. The manifesto which accompanied the declaration of war openly accuses Serbia of having prepared and carried out the crime of Serajevo. Such an accusation of a crime at common law, launched against a whole people and a whole State, aroused, by its evident inanity,<sup>6</sup> widespread sympathy for Serbia throughout all classes of European society.

In consequence of this behaviour of the Austro-Hungarian Government in spite of Russia's declaration that she could not remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia, the Russian Government considered it necessary to order mobilisation in the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan. This decision was rendered necessary by the fact that since the date when the Austro-Hungarian note was communicated to the Servian Government, and since the first steps taken by Russia, five days had elapsed, and yet the Vienna Cabinet had not taken one step to meet Russia halfway in her efforts towards peace. Indeed, quite the contrary; for the mobilisation of half of the Austro-Hungarian army had been ordered.

The German Government were kept informed of the steps taken

<sup>1</sup> This implies to Austria-Hungary a motive which may or may not have been hers.

<sup>2</sup> No evidence for this has been given.

<sup>3</sup> This is denied by Austria-Hungary. See the despatches of July 26, especially Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27.

<sup>4</sup> This is not clear.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. British Blue Book No. 120, under date of August 1, note 4.

<sup>6</sup> The "dossier," Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25, takes a different view.

by Russia. At the same time it was explained to them that these steps were only the result of the Austrian preparations, and that they were not in any way aimed at Germany. Simultaneously, the Russian Government declared that Russia was ready to continue discussions with a view to a peaceful settlement of the dispute, either in the form of direct negotiations with Vienna or, as suggested by Great Britain, in the form of a conference of the four Great Powers not directly interested, that is to say, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.

This attempt on the part of Russia was, however, equally unsuccessful. Austria-Hungary declined<sup>1</sup> a further exchange of views with Russia, and the Vienna Cabinet was unwilling to join the proposed conference of the Powers.

Nevertheless Russia did not abandon her efforts for peace. When questioned by the German Ambassador as to the conditions on which we would still agree to suspend our preparations, the Minister for Foreign Affairs declared<sup>2</sup> that these conditions were Austria's recognition that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed a European character, and a declaration by her that she agreed not to insist upon such of her demands as were incompatible with the sovereign rights of Servia.

Germany considered<sup>3</sup> this Russian proposal unacceptable to Austria-Hungary. At that very moment news of the proclamation of general mobilisation<sup>4</sup> by Austria-Hungary reached St. Petersburg.

All this time hostilities were continuing on Servian territory, and Belgrade was bombarded afresh.

The failure of our proposals for peace compelled us to extend the scope of our precautionary military measures.<sup>5</sup>

The Berlin Cabinet questioned us on this, and we replied that Russia was compelled to begin preparations<sup>6</sup> so as to be ready for every emergency.

But while taking this precautionary step, Russia did not on that account abandon her strenuous efforts to find some solution of the situation, and she announced that she was ready to accept any proposed settlement of the problem that might be put forward, provided it complied with the conditions laid down by her.

In spite of this conciliatory communication, the German Government on the 18th (31st) July demanded of the Russian Government that they should suspend their military measures by midday on the 19th July (1st August), and threatened, should they fail to comply, to proceed to general mobilisation.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This is denied by Austria-Hungary. See Red Book No. 50, July 30.

<sup>2</sup> British Blue Book No. 97, July 30.

<sup>3</sup> There is no evidence of this anywhere. The formula was changed at England's request, British Blue Book No. 132, August 1.

<sup>4</sup> Russia's general mobilisation took place on July 31. That of Austria-Hungary on August 1. See British Blue Book No. 127, August 1.

<sup>5</sup> This is contradicted by the previous note.

<sup>6</sup> "Begin preparations" is hardly the word for general mobilisation.

<sup>7</sup> In this sentence the Russian general mobilisation of July 31 is called "military measures" while the German order of August 1 as of August 2, is properly called what it is, general mobilisation.

On the following day, the 19th July (1st August), the German Ambassador, on behalf of his Government, forwarded a declaration of war<sup>1</sup> to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

*To Russian Representatives Abroad*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK NO. 78

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Representatives abroad.*

(Telegram.)

*St. Petersburg, July 20 (August 2), 1914.*

It is quite evident that Germany is now doing her utmost to foist upon us the responsibility for the rupture. We were forced to mobilise by the immense responsibility which would have fallen upon our shoulders if we had not taken all possible precautionary measures at a time when Austria, while confining herself to discussions of a dilatory nature, was bombarding Belgrade and was undertaking<sup>2</sup> general mobilisation.

The Emperor of Russia had promised the German Emperor that he would take no aggressive action<sup>3</sup> as long as the discussions with Austria continued. With such a guarantee, and after so many proofs of Russia's desire for peace,<sup>4</sup> Germany neither could, nor had the right to, doubt our declaration that we would joyfully accept any peaceful settlement compatible with the dignity and independence of Servia. Any other solution, besides being entirely incompatible with our own dignity, would assuredly have upset the European balance of power by securing the hegemony of Germany. The European — nay, the world-wide — character of this dispute<sup>5</sup> is infinitely more important than the pretext from which it springs. By her decision to declare war upon us, at a moment when negotiations were in progress between the Powers, Germany has assumed a heavy responsibility.

<sup>1</sup> Russian Orange Book No. 76, August 1.

<sup>2</sup> This statement is more accurate than that contained in previous despatch. See Russian Orange Book No. 77 note 10.

<sup>3</sup> General mobilisation is universally looked upon as an aggressive act in itself.

<sup>4</sup> Nobody before had called a general mobilisation a "proof of a desire for peace."

<sup>5</sup> The previous sentence shows that so far as Russia is concerned she did not believe that Prussianism or frightfulness or the invasion of Belgium, but the European balance of power, would supply the motive for England to enter the war.

Monday, August 3, 1914

## SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	—	—
Belgium	London, etc. King George German Minister	London
France	London, London, etc. All representatives Berlin, Munich	The Hague, Brussels, London German Ambassador
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	Paris	Berlin, Brussels
Russia	—	—
Serbia	—	—

*Austria-Hungary* is silent on this day.

*Belgium* refuses to accede to the German ultimatum and appeals to Great Britain for "diplomatic intervention." To the informal offer of military assistance she replies, to the French Minister, that she is "making no appeal at present to the guarantee of the Powers."

*France* offers her military assistance to Belgium, who declines it with thanks. She denies the German accusations of having violated Belgian neutrality, and having committed hostile acts against Germany. When the latter declares war on her, she recalls her diplomatic agents from Germany, and lodges with the latter formal protest against her violations of Luxemburg and Belgian neutrality.

*Germany* declares war on France at 6.45 P.M. citing as reasons several unlawful and hostile acts on the part of France, whom she also charges with having violated Belgian neutrality.

*Great Britain* issues only one important despatch. It contains the Italian intention not to enter the war on the side of her allies of the Triple Alliance. This Italian declaration is sent by Sir E. Grey to the British Ambassador in Paris on the authority of the French Ambassador in London.

*Russia* is silent on this day.

*Serbia* is silent.

**Belgium :**

*From Berlin*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 21

*Memorandum of an Interview asked for at 1.30 A.M., on August 3, by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister, with Baron van der Elst, Secretary-General to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*

AT 1.30 A.M. the German Minister asked to see Baron van der Elst. He told him that he had been instructed by his Government to inform the Belgian Government that French dirigibles had thrown bombs, and that a French cavalry patrol had crossed the frontier in violation of international law, seeing that war had not been declared.<sup>1</sup>

The Secretary-General asked Herr von Below where these incidents had happened, and was told that it was in Germany. Baron van der

<sup>1</sup> Similar charges against Germany were made by France; see French Yellow Book No. 136, August 2.



Elst **then** observed that in that case he could not understand the object of this communication. Herr von Below stated that these acts, **which** were contrary to international law, were calculated to lead **to** the supposition that other acts, contrary to international law, would **be** committed by France.

*To Berlin*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 22

*Note communicated by M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister.*

*Brussels, August 3, 1914 (7 A.M.).*

**THE** German Government stated in their note of the 2nd August,<sup>1</sup> 1914, that according to reliable information French forces intended to march on the Meuse viâ Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of the best intentions, would not be in a position to repulse, without assistance, an advance of French troops.<sup>2</sup>

The German Government, therefore, considered themselves compelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian territory. In these circumstances, Germany proposed to the Belgian Government to adopt a friendly attitude towards her, and undertook, on the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions to their full extent. The note added that if Belgium put difficulties in the way of the advance of German troops, Germany would be compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two States to the decision of arms.

This note had made a deep and painful impression<sup>3</sup> upon the Belgian Government.

The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contradiction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1, in the name of the French Government.

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her international obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader.<sup>4</sup>

The treaties of 1839, confirmed<sup>5</sup> by the treaties of 1870, vouch for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and notably of the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia.

<sup>1</sup> Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2.

<sup>2</sup> This is exactly the same argument advanced by Great Britain in the second of the Brussels documents (see p. 580) when the British officer claimed that the British troops would enter Belgium even unasked.

<sup>3</sup> The ring of sincerity in this sentence is lessened after having studied the document mentioned in the previous note.

<sup>4</sup> It would, however, have been almost hopeless, for since Great Britain had the military secrets of Belgium, France had them also, undoubtedly. See documents mentioned in preceding notes.

<sup>5</sup> It had been claimed in Parliament in 1870 that the treaties of 1870 invalidated those of 1839. See the editor's *Germany's Point of View*, the chapters on Belgium.

Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations,<sup>1</sup> she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, and she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her neutrality.

The attack upon her independence<sup>2</sup> with which the German Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law.

The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honour of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe.

Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilisation<sup>3</sup> of the world, they refuse to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality.

If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon their rights.

*To St. Petersburg, Berlin, London, Paris, Vienna, and The Hague*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 23

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at St. Petersburg, Berlin, London, Paris, Vienna, The Hague.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

AT 7 P.M. last night Germany presented a note proposing friendly neutrality. This entailed free passage through Belgian territory, while guaranteeing the maintenance of the independence of Belgium and of her possessions on the conclusion of peace, and threatened, in the event of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time limit of twelve hours was allowed within which to reply.

Our answer<sup>4</sup> has been that this infringement of our neutrality would be a flagrant violation of international law. To accept the German proposal would be to sacrifice the honour of the nation. Conscious of her duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel any attack by all the means in her power.

*To Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 24

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 3, 1914 (12 noon).*

As you are aware, Germany has delivered to Belgium an ultimatum which expires this morning, 3rd August, at 7 A.M. As no act of

<sup>1</sup> Germany claims that this is not true in view of the Brussels documents.

<sup>2</sup> Germany had explicitly disclaimed making any attack on the "independence" of Belgium.

<sup>3</sup> The writer here forgot the chapter of Belgian atrocities in the Congo.

<sup>4</sup> See preceding despatch.

war there Powers. has occurred up to the present, the Cabinet has decided that there is, for the moment, no need to appeal to the guaranteeing Powers.

The French Minister has made the following statement to me upon the subject:—

(Translation.)

“Sans être chargé d’une déclaration de mon Gouvernement, je crois cependant, m’inspirant de ses intentions connues, pouvoir dire que si le Gouvernement Royal faisait appel au Gouvernement français, comme Puissance garante de sa neutralité, nous répondrions immédiatement à son appel; si cet appel n’était pas formulé, il est probable, à moins bien entendu que le souci de sa propre défense ne détermine des mesures exceptionnelles, qu’il attendra pour intervenir que la Belgique ait fait un acte de résistance effective.”

“Although I have received no instructions<sup>1</sup> to make a declaration from my Government, I feel justified, in view of their well-known intentions, in saying that if the Belgian Government were to appeal to the French Government as one of the Powers guaranteeing their neutrality, the French Government would at once respond to Belgium’s appeal;<sup>2</sup> if such an appeal were not made, it is probable that—unless of course exceptional measures were rendered necessary in self-defence—the French Government would not intervene until Belgium had taken some effective measure of resistance.”

I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support which the French Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and I informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal at present to the guarantee of the Powers, and that they would decide later what ought to be done.<sup>3</sup>

### *To King George*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 25

*His Majesty the King of the Belgians to His Majesty King George.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

REMEMBERING the numerous proofs of your Majesty’s friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England

<sup>1</sup> It is unusual for diplomatic agents to speak without instructions or, as it is called, *de suo*, and even more unusual to include such informal remarks in the official books of despatches. The French Minister to Belgium had once before spoken *de suo*. See Belgian Gray Book No. 9, July 31.

When M. Davignon gave a running review of the events leading up to August 4, and quoted this despatch (No. 24) in No. 38, he felt constrained to explain the unusual procedure of the French Minister by interpolating the words “in view of the rapid march of events.”

<sup>2</sup> This appeal it was decided not to make as late as 10 o’clock, August 4. See Belgian Gray Book No. 38.

<sup>3</sup> For this reply see also French Yellow Book No. 142, and British Blue Book No. 151, both August 3. In the British Blue Book the French offer consists of “five French army corps.” Since that can hardly be interpolated, the above declaration cannot be accurate, although it has been printed in quotation marks.

in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention<sup>1</sup> of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.

*From London*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 26

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, August 3, 1914.*

I SHOWED your telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has laid it before the Cabinet. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed me that if our neutrality is violated it means war with Germany.<sup>2</sup>

**France:**

*From The Hague*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 140

*M. Marcelin Pellet, French Minister at The Hague, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*The Hague, August 3, 1914.*

THE German Minister called yesterday on the Minister for Foreign Affairs to explain the necessity under which, as he said, Germany was placed of violating the neutral territory of Luxemburg, adding that he would have a fresh communication to make to him to-day. He has now this morning announced the entry of German troops into Belgium in order, as he has explained, to prevent an occupation of that country by France.

PELLET.

*From Brussels*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 141

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

YESTERDAY evening the German Minister handed to the Belgian Government an ultimatum<sup>3</sup> stating that his Government, having learnt that the French were preparing for operations in the districts

<sup>1</sup> Cf. No. 24, same day, and No. 38, August 4. The appeal here made is only for "diplomatic intervention." Such diplomatic intervention was of course out of the question, since the British Cabinet, on August 2, had authorised Sir Edward Grey to promise to France British assistance in the war against Germany. Cf. British Blue Book No. 148, August 2.

<sup>2</sup> See note to preceding despatch, and to French Yellow Book No. 143 and British Blue Book No. 148, both of August 2, and Belgian Gray Book No. 23, August 3.

<sup>3</sup> Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2.

of Givet and of Namur, were compelled to take steps, the first of which was to invite the Belgian Government to inform them, within seven <sup>1</sup> hours, if they were disposed to facilitate military operations in Belgium against France. In case of refusal the fortune of war would decide.

The Government of the King answered <sup>2</sup> that the information as to the French movements appeared to them to be inaccurate in view of the formal assurances which had been given by France, and were still quite recent; that Belgium, which since the establishment of her Kingdom, has taken every care to assure the protection of her dignity and of her interests, and has devoted all her efforts to peaceful development of progress, strongly protests against any violation of her territory from whatever quarter it may come: and that, supposing the violation takes place, she will know how to defend with energy her neutrality, which has been guaranteed by the Powers, and notably by the King of Prussia.

KLOBUKOWSKI.

*From Brussels*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 142

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

To the assurance which I gave him that if Belgium appealed to the guarantee of the Powers against the violation of her neutrality by Germany, France would at once respond to her appeal, the Minister for Foreign Affairs answered:

"It is with great sincerity that we thank the Government of the Republic for the support which it would eventually be able to offer us, but under present conditions we do not appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. At a later date the Government of the King will weigh the measures which it may be necessary to take."<sup>3</sup>

*From London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 143

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, August 3, 1914.*

SIR EDWARD GREY has authorised me to inform you that you could state to Parliament that he was making explanations to the

<sup>1</sup> This is an error. It was 12 hours, see also Belgian Gray Book No. 38, August 4. The ultimatum was presented at 7 P.M. on August 2, and expired at 7 A.M. on August 3. It was presented several hours after Great Britain had promised her support on the sea to France, which made her an ally of France without any reference to Belgium. See British Blue Book No. 148, August 2.

<sup>2</sup> Belgian Gray Book No. 22, August 3.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 24, August 3, and note 3. Also British Blue Book No. 151, August 3.

Commons as to the present attitude of the British Government, and that the chief of these declarations would be as follows:—

"In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered the North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the object of attacking the French coasts or the French navy and of harassing French merchant shipping, the British fleet would intervene in order to give to French shipping its complete protection, in such a way that from that moment Great Britain and Germany would be in a state of war."<sup>1</sup>

Sir Edward Grey explained to me that the mention of an operation by way of the North Sea implied protection against a demonstration in the Atlantic Ocean.

The declaration concerning the intervention of the British fleet must be considered as binding<sup>2</sup> the British Government. Sir Edward Grey has assured me of this and has added that the French Government were thereby authorised to inform the Chambers of this.

On my return to the Embassy I received your telephonic<sup>3</sup> communication relating to the German ultimatum addressed to Belgium. I immediately communicated it to Sir Edward Grey.

PAUL CAMBON.

*From London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 144

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, August 3, 1914.*

JUST as Sir Edward Grey was starting this morning for the meeting of the Cabinet, my German colleague, who had already seen him yesterday, came to press him to say that the neutrality of Great Britain did not depend upon respecting Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey refused all conversation on this matter.<sup>4</sup>

The German Ambassador has sent to the press a *communiqué* saying that if Great Britain remained neutral Germany would give up all naval operations and would not make use of the Belgian coast as a *point d'appui*.<sup>5</sup> My answer is that respecting the coast is not respecting the neutrality of the territory, and that the German ultimatum is already a violation of this neutrality.

PAUL CAMBON.

<sup>1</sup> For the different wording of this formula see notes to British Blue Book No. 148, August 2, and French Yellow Book No. 137, August 2.

<sup>2</sup> See despatches mentioned in preceding note.

<sup>3</sup> This is very important, because it suggests that besides the *written* communications which are printed in the official Books of documents, other communications were exchanged between London and Paris, and undoubtedly other places too.

<sup>4</sup> This may account for the fact that this matter is not mentioned in the British Blue Book.

<sup>5</sup> Obviously done to allay any fear of Germany in Great Britain.

*From London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 145

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, August 3, 1914.*

SIR EDWARD GREY has made the statement regarding the intervention of the British fleet.<sup>1</sup> He has explained, in considering the situation, what he proposed to do with regard to Belgian neutrality; and the reading of a letter from King Albert asking for the support of Great Britain has deeply stirred the House.

The House will this evening vote the credit which is asked for; from this moment its support is secured to the policy of the Government, and it follows public opinion which is declaring itself more and more in our favour.

PAUL CAMBON.

*To London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 146

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.*

*Paris, August 3, 1914.*

I AM told that the German Ambassador is said to have stated to the Foreign Office that yesterday morning eighty French officers in Prussian uniform had attempted to cross the German frontier in twelve motor cars at Walbeck, to the west of Geldern, and that this formed a very serious violation of neutrality on the part of France.

Be good enough urgently to contradict this news, which is pure invention, and to draw the attention of the Foreign Office to the German campaign of false news which is beginning.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

*From Berlin*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 147

*Letter handed by the German Ambassador to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, during his farewell audience, August 3, 1914, at 6.45 P.M.*

M. le Président,

THE German administrative and military authorities have established a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on German territory by French military aviators. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the terri-

<sup>1</sup> Which statement did he make, the one of French Yellow Book No. 137, August 2, or of *ib.* No. 143, August 3? In Sir E. Grey's speech given in British Blue Book of Sept. 28, the former is given. In Viviani's speech of August 4, French Yellow Book No. 159, the latter is quoted as having been given by Sir E. Grey.



tory of that country; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg.<sup>1</sup>

I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power.

At the same time I have the honour to bring to the knowledge of your Excellency that the German authorities will detain French mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity.

My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end, it only remains for me to request your Excellency to be good enough to furnish me with my passports, and to take the steps you consider suitable to assure my return to Germany, with the staff of the Embassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the German Consulate General in Paris.

Be good enough, M. le Président, to receive the assurances of my deepest respect.

(Signed) SCHOEN.

*To the French Representatives Abroad*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 148

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Representatives abroad.*

*Paris, August 3, 1914.*

THE German Ambassador has asked for his passports and is leaving this evening with the staffs of the Embassy, the German Consulate General and the Bavarian Legation. Baron von Schoen has given as his reason the establishment by the German administrative and military authorities of acts of hostility which are said to have been committed by French military aviators accused of having flown over territory of the Empire and thrown bombs. The Ambassador adds that the aviators are said to have also violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over Belgian territory. "In the presence of these acts of aggression," says the letter of Baron von Schoen, "the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power."

I formally challenged the inaccurate allegations of the Ambassador, and for my part I reminded him that I had yesterday addressed to him a note<sup>2</sup> protesting against the flagrant violations of the French frontier committed two days ago by detachments of German troops.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *New York Evening Post*, July 22, 1916, referring to "Facts about the War" published by the Paris Chamber of Commerce, in which Dr. Schwalbe is cited as writing in the *Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift*, on May 18, to the effect that his investigations cleared the French of the charge of having dropped bombs on Nuremberg.

<sup>2</sup> French Yellow Book Nos. 136 and 139, August 2, and note to No. 136.

*To Berlin*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK NO. 149

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin.*

*(Telegram communicated to French Representatives abroad.)*

*Paris, August 3, 1914.*

I REQUEST you to ask for your passports and to leave Berlin at once with the staff of the Embassy, leaving the charge of French interests and the care of the archives to the Spanish Ambassador. I request you at the same time to protest in writing against the violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg by German troops, of which notice has been given by the Prime Minister of Luxemburg; against the ultimatum addressed to the Belgian Government by the German Minister at Brussels to force upon them the violation of Belgian neutrality and to require of that country that she should facilitate military operations against France on Belgian territory; finally against the false allegation of an alleged projected invasion of these two countries by French armies, by which he<sup>1</sup> has attempted to justify the state of war which he declares henceforth exists between Germany and France.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

*To Munich*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK NO. 150

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich.*

*Paris, August 3, 1914.*

BE good enough to inform the Royal Bavarian Government that you have received instructions to adapt your attitude to that of our Ambassador at Berlin and to leave Munich.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

<sup>1</sup> "He" does not refer to the last person mentioned, which was the "German Minister at Brussels" (for whose remarks see Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2, 1914), but to the German Ambassador in Paris, not mentioned in this despatch, for it was he who "attempted to justify, etc." (see French Yellow Book No. 147, August 3). This proves parts of the original despatch have been excised.

*To London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Berne, Constantinople, The Hague, Copenhagen, Christiania, Stockholm, Bucharest, Athens, Belgrade.*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 151

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Representatives at London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Berne, Constantinople, The Hague, Copenhagen, Christiania, Stockholm, Bucharest, Athens, Belgrade.*

*Paris, August 3, 1914.*

I LEARN from an official Belgian source <sup>1</sup> that German troops have violated Belgian territory at Gemmerich in the district of Verviers.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

Great Britain :

*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 150

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 3.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 3, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of 2nd August: Detention of British ships at Hamburg.

No information available.

*From Brussels*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 151

*Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 3.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

FRENCH Government have offered through their military attaché the support of five French army corps to the Belgian Government.<sup>2</sup> Following reply has been sent to-day: —

“We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think it necessary to take.”

<sup>1</sup> No such account is contained in the Belgian Gray Book, according to which, (No. 40, August 4,) the “armed forces of Germany” entered Belgium “this morning.” Cf. also Belgian Gray Book No. 30, August 4, which announces the violation of Belgian territory at Gemmerich. This French despatch is, therefore, probably erroneously dated August 3, because no “official Belgian source” could have made the above statement truthfully on August 3.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 24 and French Yellow Book No. 142, both of August 3, and note 3 to Belgian despatch.

To Paris

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 152

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 3, 1914.

ON the 1st instant the French Ambassador made the following communication:<sup>1</sup>—

“In reply to the German Government’s intimation of the fact that ultimatums had been presented to France and Russia, and to the question as to what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano<sup>2</sup> replied:—

“‘The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral.’”

In making this communication, M. Cambon<sup>3</sup> was instructed to lay stress upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive but an aggressive war, and that, for this reason, the *casus fœderis* under the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise.

I am, etc.

E. GREY.

<sup>1</sup> No reason is apparent why this Italian declaration should be sent by Sir E. Grey to the British Ambassador in Paris on the authority of the French Ambassador in London. There should have been an official Italian declaration available.

<sup>2</sup> Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> French Ambassador in London.

Tuesday, August 4, 1914.

## SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	—	London
Belgium	London, Paris Madrid, Berlin German Minister Belgian Ministers at Entente capitals Entente Ministers in Brussels	The Hague, Berlin, London  German Minister  British Minister
France	Representatives of the Powers in Paris	Brussels London Copenhagen
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	Berlin, Brussels	Brussels, Berlin
Russia	—	—
Serbia	Berlin	—

*Austria-Hungary* is discussing the possibility of maintaining friendly relations with Great Britain.

*Belgium* dismisses the German Minister, and issues to the Entente Ministers her version of the events leading up to the break with Germany. She decides, at first, not to call on the armed intervention or assistance of the guaranteeing Powers under the Treaty of 1839, but late in the day decides to do so.

*France* issues a protest on what she calls Germany's violation of the Hague Conventions and the Treaty of 1839, addressing her protest to "the Representatives of the Powers at Paris."

*Germany* notifies Belgium that to her "deep regret" she finds herself "compelled to take those measures of defence already foreshadowed as indispensable in view of the menace of France;" and orders her troops to enter Belgian territory.

*Great Britain* sends an ultimatum to Germany concerning the neutrality of Belgium. Since she, however, announces herself to be the ally of France, who is at war with Germany, even the acceptance by Germany of the terms of the ultimatum could not have kept Great Britain neutral. At the same time she urges Belgium to resist the expected invasion with force of arms, this being her reply to Belgium's appeal for diplomatic intervention, which as the ally of France she could, of course, not render.

*Russia* does not enter into the discussion on this day.

*Serbia* recalls her minister and consuls from Germany.

**Austria-Hungary :***From London*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 58

*Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*London, August 4, 1914.*

I HAVE just seen Sir E. Grey. The British Government have sent to Germany an ultimatum<sup>1</sup> on account of Belgium. They expect a reply at 12 o'clock to-night.

Sir E. Grey said to me that at present there was no reason why he

<sup>1</sup> British Blue Book No. 159, same day.

should make any communication to the Imperial and Royal Government, and there was no cause why a conflict should arise between us, so long as we were not in a condition of war with France. In any case, he hoped that we would not begin hostilities without the formality<sup>1</sup> of a previous declaration of war. He does not intend to recall Sir M. de Bunsen.

Should we be at war with France, it would indeed be difficult for Great Britain, as the ally<sup>2</sup> of France, to co-operate with her in the Atlantic, and not in the Mediterranean.

Belgium :

*From Berlin*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 27

*Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(The original is in French.)

*Brussels, August 4, 1914 (6 A.M.).*

(Translation.)

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'AI été chargé et j'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que par suite du refus opposé par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi aux propositions bien intentionnées que lui avait soumises le Gouvernement Impérial, celui-ci se verra, à son plus vif regret, forcé d'exécuter — au besoin par la force des armes — les mesures de sécurité exposées comme indispensables vis-à-vis des menaces françaises.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

(Signé) VON BELOW.

Sir,

IN accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that in consequence of the refusal of the Belgian Government to entertain the well-intentioned proposals made to them by the German Government, the latter, to their deep regret, find themselves compelled to take — if necessary by force of arms — those measures of defence already foreshadowed<sup>3</sup> as indispensable, in view of the menace of France.

<sup>1</sup> The use of this word is strange here in view of III Convention 2d Hague Conference, Article 1 :

"The contracting powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence without previous and explicit warning." This Convention had been ratified by Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Russia.

In this connection it may be asked how Belgium could ratify a Convention concerning the opening of hostilities, if she was regarded, in 1907, as possessing a neutrality guaranteed by treaty.

<sup>2</sup> If Sir E. Grey is correctly quoted, the use of this word is significant ; and the question naturally arises "Since when was Great Britain the *ally* of France?" Sir E. Grey had been authorised by the British Cabinet in the morning of August 2 (British Blue Book No. 148) to promise France their support. If Great Britain was the *ally* of France when she sent her ultimatum about Belgium to Germany, the ethics of such a course are doubtful, in view of the fact that France and Germany were at war. Cf. also French Yellow Book No. 158, August 4, where President Poincaré refers to Great Britain as an ally of France. Cf. also Serbian Blue Book No. 38, July 25. The whole sentence is, of course, a future condition, referring to the possibility of a war between Austria-Hungary and France. No futurity idea, however, attaches to the term "as the ally of France."

<sup>3</sup> Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2.

*From London*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 28

*Note communicated by Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

I AM instructed to inform the Belgian Government that if Germany brings pressure to bear upon Belgium with the object of forcing her to abandon her attitude of neutrality, His Britannic Majesty's Government expect Belgium to resist with all the means at her disposal.<sup>1</sup>

In that event, His Britannic Majesty's Government are prepared to join Russia and France, should Belgium so desire, in tendering at once joint assistance to the Belgian Government with a view to resisting any forcible measures adopted by Germany against Belgium, and also offering a guarantee<sup>2</sup> for the maintenance of the future independence and integrity of Belgium.

*From the Hague*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 29

*Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*The Hague, August 4, 1914.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday evening that the Netherlands Government would perhaps be obliged, owing to the gravity of the present situation, to institute war buoying on the Scheldt.

M. Loudon read me the draft of the note which would announce this decision to me.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the note in question which was communicated to me yesterday evening.

As you will observe, the Scheldt will only be closed at night. By day navigation will be possible, but only with Dutch pilots who have been furnished with the necessary nautical instructions. In this way both Dutch interests in the defence of their territory, and Belgian interests in the navigation of Antwerp will be safeguarded.

You will note that the Netherlands Government further ask that in the event of the war buoying being carried out, we should cause the lightships *Wielingen* and *Wandelaar* to be withdrawn in order to facilitate the maintenance of the neutrality of Dutch territory.

I would point out that the phrase used in this note, "sailing up the Scheldt," is not sufficiently explicit; sailing down would be

<sup>1</sup> Belgium had asked for British "diplomatic intervention," Belgian Gray Book No. 25, August 3.

<sup>2</sup> This is the same guarantee as was offered by Germany, who guaranteed "the possessions and the independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full" (Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2). "Neutrality" is omitted both in the British and German guarantees. Cf. British Blue Book No. 155, August 4.



mitted under the same conditions. The Minister has, however, given me this assurance.

As soon as the Netherlands Government have decided upon this exceptional measure I shall be informed of it.

About six hours are necessary to carry out war buoying.

I will at once telegraph to you.

---

Note enclosed in No. 29

The Netherlands Government may be compelled, in order to maintain the neutrality of Dutch territory, to institute war buoying upon the Scheldt, that is to say, to move or modify a portion of the actual arrangement of buoys and lights.

At the same time this special arrangement of buoys has been so drawn up that when it is brought into force it will still be possible to sail up the Scheldt as far as Antwerp by day, but only with Dutch pilots who have been furnished with the necessary nautical instructions. In thus acting the Netherlands Government are convinced that they will be able to serve equally both the Dutch interests in the defence of Netherlands territory and Belgian interests in the navigation of Antwerp.

After the establishment of war buoying on the Scheldt, there would be no further reason to enter the tidal water of Flushing at night, and as the presence of the lightships *Wielingen* and *Wandelaar* is not indispensable to navigation by day, the Netherlands Government would be much obliged if the Belgian Government would be good enough, in the event of the establishment of war buoying, to withdraw these boats in order to facilitate the maintenance of the neutrality of Dutch territory.

*To London and Paris*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 30

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at London and Paris.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

THE General Staff announces that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.<sup>1</sup>

*To Berlin*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 31

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that from to-day the Belgian Government are unable to recognise your diplomatic

<sup>1</sup> See French Yellow Book No. 151, August 3, and note.

status and cease to have official relations with you. Your Excellency will find enclosed the passports necessary for your departure with the staff of the legation.

*From Berlin*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 32

*Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir, *Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 4th August, and to inform you that I have entrusted the custody of the German Legation of Brussels to the care of my United States colleague.

*To Madrid*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 33

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

(Telegram.) *Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

PLEASE ask the Spanish Government if they will be good enough to take charge of Belgian interests in Germany, and whether in that event they will issue the necessary instructions to their Ambassador at Berlin.

*To Berlin*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 34

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin.*

(Telegram.) *Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

THE German Minister is leaving to-night;<sup>1</sup> you should ask for your passports. We are requesting the Spanish Government to authorise the Spanish Ambassador to be good enough to take charge of Belgian interests in Germany.

*From Berlin*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 35

*Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir, *Berlin, August 4, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of part of the speech made to-day in the Reichstag by the Imperial

<sup>1</sup> At the request of Belgium; see Belgian Gray Book No. 31, same date.

Chancellor on the subject of the infamous violation of Belgian neutrality:—

"We are in a state of legitimate defence, and necessity knows no law.

"Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have perhaps already entered Belgium. This is contrary to the dictates of international law. France has, it is true, declared at Brussels that she was prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as it was respected by her adversary. But we knew that France was ready to invade Belgium. France could wait; we could not. A French attack upon our flank in the region of the Lower Rhine might have been fatal. We were, therefore, compelled to ride roughshod over the legitimate protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. For the wrong which we are thus doing, we will make reparation as soon as our military object is attained.

"Anyone in such grave danger as ourselves, and who is struggling for his supreme welfare, can only be concerned with the means of extricating himself; we stand side by side with Austria."

It is noteworthy that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg recognises, without the slightest disguise, that Germany is violating international law by her invasion of Belgian territory and that she is committing a wrong against us.

*From London*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 36

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*London, August 4, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that in the House of Commons this afternoon the Prime Minister made a fresh statement with regard to the European crisis.

After recalling the principal points set forth yesterday by Sir E. Grey, the Prime Minister read:—

1. A telegram received from Sir F. Villiers this morning which gave the substance of the second ultimatum<sup>1</sup> presented to the Belgian Government by the German Government, which had been sent to you this morning (see No. 27).

2. Your telegram informing me of the violation of the frontier at Gemmenich,<sup>2</sup> a copy of which I have given to Sir A. Nicolson.

3. A telegram which the German Government addressed to its Ambassador in London this morning with the evident intention of misleading popular opinion as to its attitude. Here is the translation as published in one of this evening's newspapers:—

"Please<sup>3</sup> dispel any mistrust which may subsist on the part of

<sup>1</sup> Belgian Gray Book No. 27, same day. This is in no sense a second ultimatum, but rather a declaration of the entrance of armed German forces.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.* No. 30, same day.

<sup>3</sup> See British Blue Book No. 157, August 4.

the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively the formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory.

"Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality.

"It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the time territorial acquisitions at the expense of Holland.

"Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information.<sup>1</sup>

"Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance."

Mr. Asquith then informed the House that in answer to this note of the German Government the British Government had repeated their proposal<sup>2</sup> of last week, namely, that the German Government should give the same assurances as to Belgian neutrality as France had given last week both to England and to Belgium. The British Cabinet allowed the Berlin Cabinet till midnight to reply.<sup>3</sup>

*From London*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 37<sup>4</sup>

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, August 4, 1914.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed the British Ministers in Norway, Holland, and Belgium, that Great Britain expects that these three kingdoms will resist German pressure and observe neutrality.<sup>5</sup> Should they resist they will have the support of Great Britain, who is ready in that event, should the three above-mentioned Governments desire it, to join France and Russia, in offering an alliance to the said Governments, for the purpose of resisting the use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2. Germany has not published this information.

<sup>2</sup> Germany could have, and according to British Blue Book No. 123, August 1, last two paragraphs, probably would have accepted this proposal if Great Britain would have coupled with it the promise that she would do what she had done in 1870, i.e. agree to make common cause in the interest of Belgium with either France or Germany against the one who would violate Belgian neutrality. This Great Britain, however, could not do, because she had promised her support to France on August 2. British Blue Book No. 148.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 58, same day. Mr. Asquith neglected to tell Parliament that when Great Britain sent her request to Germany concerning Belgium, she was no longer neutral, but bound by a vote of the Cabinet (cf. British Blue Book No. 148, August 2) to support France who since 6.45 P.M. the previous day had been at war with Germany.

<sup>4</sup> This despatch was later cancelled, Belgian Gray Book No. 39, same day. It has been omitted from the British Blue Book.

<sup>5</sup> This despatch is important, because Sir E. Grey is here quoted as placing the neutrality of Norway, Holland, and Belgium on a par. It has often been claimed since that Belgian neutrality was of a different order, not voluntary, but imposed by the treaty of 1839.

future independence and integrity of the three kingdoms.<sup>1</sup> I observed to him that Belgium was neutral in perpetuity. The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered: This is in case her neutrality is violated.<sup>2</sup>

*To Paris, London, and St. Petersburg*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 38

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you of the course of recent events as regards the relations of Belgium with certain of the Powers which guarantee her neutrality and independence.

On the 31st July the British Minister made me a verbal communication<sup>3</sup> according to which Sir E. Grey, in anticipation of a European war, had asked the German and French Governments separately if each of them were resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium should that neutrality not be violated by any other Power.

In view of existing treaties, Sir F. Villiers was instructed to bring this step to the knowledge of the Belgian Government, adding that Sir E. Grey presumed that Belgium was resolved to maintain her neutrality, and that she expected other Powers to respect it.

I told the British Minister that we highly appreciated this communication, which was in accordance with our expectation, and I added that Great Britain, as well as the other Powers who had guaranteed our independence, might rest fully assured of our firm determination to maintain our neutrality; nor did it seem possible that our neutrality could be threatened by any of those States, with whom we enjoyed the most cordial and frank relations. The Belgian Government, I added, had given proof of this resolution by taking from now on all such military measures as seemed to them to be necessitated by the situation.

In his turn the French Minister made a verbal communication<sup>4</sup> on August 1st to the effect that he was authorised to inform the Belgian Government that in case of an international war the French Government, in conformity with their repeated declarations, would respect Belgian territory, and that they would not be induced to modify their attitude except in the event of the violation of Belgian neutrality by another Power.

<sup>1</sup> There is no promise here of maintaining the "treaty-imposed neutrality" of Belgium.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the "Brussels documents," pp. 577 ff. The Belgian Minister wished to distinguish between the neutrality of his country, and the neutrality of the other two kingdoms.

The omission of Sweden and Denmark in this despatch is noteworthy.

<sup>3</sup> Belgian Gray Book No. 11, July 31.

<sup>4</sup> Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1, but see also *ib.* No. 9, July 31.

I thanked his Excellency, and added that we had already taken all the necessary precautions to ensure respect of our independence and our frontiers.

On the morning of the 2nd August I had a fresh conversation<sup>1</sup> with Sir F. Villiers, in the course of which he told me that he had lost no time in telegraphing our conversation of July 31st to his Government, and that he had been careful to quote accurately the solemn declaration which he had received of Belgium's intention to defend her frontiers from whichever side they might be invaded. He added: "We know that France has given you formal assurances, but Great Britain has received no reply from Berlin on this subject."

The latter fact did not particularly affect me, since a declaration from the German Government might appear superfluous in view of existing treaties.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the Secretary of State had reaffirmed, at the meeting of the committee of the Reichstag of April 29th, 1913, "that the neutrality of Belgium is established by treaty which Germany intends to respect."

The same day Herr von Below Saleske, the German Minister, called at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 7 o'clock, and handed to me the enclosed note (see No. 20). The German Government gave the Belgian Government a time limit of twelve hours within which to communicate their decision.

No hesitation was possible as to the reply called for by the amazing proposal of the German Government. You will find a copy enclosed. (See No. 22.)

The ultimatum expired at 7 A.M. on August 3rd. As at 10 o'clock no act of war had been committed, the Belgian Cabinet decided that there was no reason for the moment to appeal to the guaranteeing powers.

Towards mid-day the French Minister questioned me upon this point, and said:—

"Although in view of the rapid march of events<sup>3</sup> I have as yet received no instructions to make a declaration from my Government, I feel justified, in view of their well-known intentions, in saying that if the Belgian Government were to appeal to the French Government as one of the Powers guaranteeing their neutrality, the French Government would at once respond to Belgium's appeal; if such an appeal were not made it is probable that—unless, of course, exceptional measures were rendered necessary in self-defence—the French Government would not intervene until Belgium had taken some effective measure of resistance."

I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support which the French Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and I informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal at present to the guarantee of the Powers, and that they would decide later what ought to be done.

<sup>1</sup> Not previously mentioned in the Belgian Gray Book.

<sup>2</sup> "Treaties" do not seem to have been mentioned in the conversation with the German Minister. See Belgian Gray Book No. 19, August 2.

<sup>3</sup> These words are added here to the despatch as published Belgian Gray Book No. 24, August 3.

Finally, at 6 A.M. on August 4th, the German Minister made the following communication to me. (See No. 27.)

The Cabinet is at the present moment deliberating on the question of an appeal to the Powers guaranteeing our neutrality.

*From London*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 39

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, August 4, 1914.*

GREAT BRITAIN this morning called<sup>1</sup> upon Germany to respect Belgian neutrality. The ultimatum says that whereas the note addressed by Germany to Belgium threatens the latter with an appeal to the force of arms if she opposes the passage of German troops; and whereas Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich; and whereas Germany has refused to give Great Britain a similar assurance to that given last week by France; therefore Great Britain must once again demand a satisfactory reply on the subject of the respect of Belgian neutrality and of the treaty to which Germany, no less than Great Britain, is a signatory. The ultimatum expires at midnight.

In consequence of the British ultimatum to Germany, the British proposal which I telegraphed to you is cancelled for the time being. (See No. 37.)

*To London, Paris, and St. Petersburg*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 40

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to British, French, and Russian Ministers at Brussels.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

THE Belgian Government regret to have to announce to your Excellency that this morning the armed forces of Germany entered Belgian territory in violation of treaty engagements.

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to resist by all the means in their power.<sup>2</sup>

Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory.<sup>3</sup>

There should be concerted and joint action, to oppose the forcible measures taken by Germany against Belgium, and, at the same time, to guarantee the future maintenance of the independence and integrity<sup>4</sup> of Belgium.

<sup>1</sup> British Blue Book No. 159, August 4.

<sup>2</sup> This is in reply to Great Britain's request, Belgian Gray Book No. 28, August 4.

<sup>3</sup> This decision was apparently reached at the Cabinet meeting mentioned in the last paragraph of No. 38, same day. See also Belgian Gray Book No. 42, August 5.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. note 2 to Belgian Gray Book No. 28, same day.



I thanked his Excellency, and added that we had already taken all the necessary precautions to ensure respect of our independence and our frontiers.

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*From London*

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(Telegram.)

*London, August 4, 1914.*

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In consequence of the British ultimatum to Germany, the British proposal which I telegraphed to you is cancelled for the time being. (See No. 37.)

*To London, Paris, and St. Petersburg*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 40

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to British, French, and Russian Ministers at Brussels.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

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The Belgian Government are firmly determined to resist by all the means in their power.<sup>2</sup>

Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory.<sup>3</sup>

There should be concerted and joint action, to oppose the forcible measures taken by Germany against Belgium, and, at the same time, to guarantee the future maintenance of the independence and integrity<sup>4</sup> of Belgium.

<sup>1</sup> British Blue Book No. 159, August 4.

<sup>2</sup> This is in reply to Great Britain's request, Belgian Gray Book No. 28, August 4.

<sup>3</sup> This decision was apparently reached at the Cabinet meeting mentioned in the last paragraph of No. 38, same day. See also Belgian Gray Book No. 42, August 5.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. note 2 to Belgian Gray Book No. 28, same day.

Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake the defence of her fortified places.

**France :**

*From Brussels*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 152

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

THE Chief of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sends me a letter by which "the Government of the King declare that they are firmly decided to resist <sup>1</sup> the aggression of Germany by all means in their power. Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France and Russia to co-operate as guarantors in the defence of her territory.

"There would be a concerted and common action having as its object the resistance of forcible measures employed by Germany against Belgium, and at the same time to guarantee the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium in the future.

"Belgium is glad to be able to declare that she will ensure the defence of her fortified places."

KLOBUKOWSKI.

*From London*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 153

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, August 4, 1914.*

SIR EDWARD GREY has asked me to come and see him immediately in order to tell me that the Prime Minister would to-day make a statement <sup>2</sup> in the House of Commons that Germany had been invited to withdraw her ultimatum to Belgium and to give her answer to Great Britain before 12 o'clock to-night.

PAUL CAMBON.

*From Brussels*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 154

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

THIS morning the German Minister informs <sup>3</sup> the Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, that in consequence of the refusal of the Belgian

<sup>1</sup> Belgian Gray Book No. 40, same day.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 36, same day.

<sup>3</sup> Belgian Gray Book No. 27, same day.

Government the Imperial Government find themselves compelled to carry out by force of arms those measures of protection which are rendered indispensable by the French threats.

KLOBUKOWSKI.

[For French Yellow Book No. 155 see under August 6, and for No. 156 see under August 5.]

*To the Representatives of all the Powers at Paris*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK NO. 157

*Notification by the French Government to the Representatives of the Powers at Paris.*

THE German Imperial Government, after having allowed its armed forces to cross the frontier, and to permit various acts of murder and pillage on French territory; after having violated the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg in defiance of the stipulations of the Convention of London, 11th May, 1867, and of Convention V. of the Hague, 18th October, 1907, *on the rights and duties of Powers and persons in case of war on land* (Articles 1 and 2), Conventions which have been signed by the German Government; after having addressed an ultimatum to the Royal Government of Belgium with the object of requiring passage for German troops through Belgian territory in violation of the Treaties of the 19th April, 1839, which had been signed by them,<sup>1</sup> and in violation of the above Convention of the Hague

Have declared war on France at 6.45 P.M. on the 3rd August, 1914.

In these circumstances the Government of the Republic find themselves obliged on their side to have recourse to arms.

They have in consequence the honour of informing by these presents the Government of . . . that a state of war exists between France and Germany dating from 6.45 P.M. on 3rd August, 1914.

The Government of the Republic protest before all civilised nations, and especially those Governments<sup>2</sup> which have signed the Conventions and Treaties referred to above, against the violation by the German Empire of their international engagements, and they reserve full right for reprisals which they might find themselves brought to exercise against an enemy so little regardful of its plighted word.

The Government of the Republic, who propose to observe the principles of the law of nations, will, during the hostilities, and assuming that reciprocity will be observed, act in accordance with the International Conventions signed by France concerning the law of war on land and sea.

<sup>1</sup> Only in so far as one assumes that signatures of the kingdom of Prussia are binding on the German Empire. In 1871 the kingdom of Prussia ceased to exist as a Power in relation to foreign Powers, voluntarily sinking herself in the Federation of German States, called the German Empire. See chapter on German Constitution in the editor's *Germany's Point of View*.

<sup>2</sup> This includes the Government of the United States. The American Government has not published its reply.

The present notification, made in accordance with Article 2 of the Third Convention of the Hague of the 18th October, 1907, relating to the opening of hostilities and handed to . . .

*Paris, August 4, 1914, 2 P.M.*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 158

*Message from M. Poincaré, President of the Republic, read at the Extraordinary Session of Parliament, August 4, 1914.*

*(Journal Officiel of the 5th August, 1914.)*

*(The Chamber rises and remains standing during the reading of the message.)*

"Gentlemen,

"FRANCE has just been the object of a violent and premeditated attack, which is an insolent defiance of the law of nations. Before any declaration of war had been sent to us, even before the German Ambassador had asked for his passports, our territory has been violated.<sup>1</sup> The German Empire has waited till yesterday evening to give at this late stage the true name to a state of things which it had already created.

"For more than forty years the French, in sincere love of peace, have buried at the bottom of their heart the desire for legitimate reparation.

"They have given to the world the example of a great nation which, definitely raised from defeat by the exercise of will, patience and labour, has only used its renewed and rejuvenated strength in the interest of progress and for the good of humanity.

"Since the ultimatum<sup>2</sup> of Austria opened a crisis which threatened the whole of Europe, France has persisted in following and in recommending on all sides a policy of prudence, wisdom and moderation.

"To her there can be imputed no act, no movement, no word, which has not been peaceful and conciliatory.

"At the hour when the struggle is beginning, she has the right, in justice to herself, of solemnly declaring that she has made, up to the last moment, supreme efforts<sup>3</sup> to avert the war now about to break out, the crushing responsibility for which the German Empire will have to bear before history. *(Unanimous and repeated applause.)*

"On the very morrow of the day when we and our allies<sup>4</sup> were

<sup>1</sup> Cf. note to French Yellow Books No. 136, also *ib.* No. 139, both of August 2; also Belgian Gray Book No. 21, August 3.

<sup>2</sup> Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 8 under date of July 22.

<sup>3</sup> See the discussion of these efforts in the editor's *Germany's Point of View*, chapters on the French Yellow Book.

<sup>4</sup> Since Russia was the only other ally of France at this time, this includes Great Britain, although the time limit of her ultimatum had not expired when this speech was delivered. See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 58, same day. Even more important is the time reference here, August 1, implying that France considered Great Britain an ally even then in spite of the fact that the British Government had repeatedly denied that an alliance existed between them and France. Cf. below, note 7.

publicly expressing our hope of seeing negotiations which had been begun under the auspices of the London Cabinet carried to a peaceful conclusion, Germany suddenly declared war upon Russia, she has invaded the territory of Luxemburg, she has outrageously insulted the noble Belgian nation (*loud and unanimous applause*), our neighbour and our friend, and attempted treacherously to fall upon us while we were in the midst of diplomatic conversation. (*Fresh and repeated unanimous applause.*)

“But France was watching. As alert as she was peaceful, she was prepared;<sup>1</sup> and our enemies will meet on their path our valiant covering troops, who are at their post and will provide the screen behind which the mobilisation of our national forces will be methodically completed.

“Our fine and courageous army, which France to-day accompanies with her maternal thought (*loud applause*) has risen eager to defend the honour of the flag and the soil of the country. (*Unanimous and repeated applause.*)

“The President of the Republic, interpreting the unanimous feeling of the country, expresses to our troops by land and sea the admiration and confidence of every Frenchman (*loud and prolonged applause*).

“Closely united in a common feeling, the nation will persevere with the cool self-restraint of which, since the beginning of the crisis, she has given daily proof. Now, as always, she will know how to harmonise the most noble daring and most ardent enthusiasm with that self-control which is the sign of enduring energy and is the best guarantee of victory (*applause*).

“In the war which is beginning France will have Right on her side, the eternal power of which cannot with impunity be disregarded by nations any more than by individuals (*loud and unanimous applause*).

“She will be heroically defended by all her sons; nothing will break their sacred union before the enemy; to-day they are joined together as brothers in a common indignation against the aggressor, and in a common patriotic faith (*loud and prolonged applause and cries of ‘Vive la France’*).

“She is faithfully helped by Russia, her ally (*loud and unanimous applause*); she is supported by the loyal friendship<sup>2</sup> of Great Britain (*loud and unanimous applause*).

“And already from every part of the civilised world sympathy and good wishes are coming to her. For to-day once again she stands before the universe for Liberty, Justice and Reason (*loud and repeated applause*). ‘Haut les cœurs et vive la France!’ (*unanimous and prolonged applause*).

“RAYMOND POINCARÉ.”

<sup>1</sup> Much injustice has been done to France by her pro-allies friends who have claimed that France was unprepared.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. above, note 6. Here, but not there, a distinction is made between the relations of France with Russia and those with Great Britain.

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 159

*Speech delivered by M. René Viviani, President of the Council in the Chamber of Deputies, August 4, 1914.*

*(Journal Officiel, August 5, 1914.)*

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council.*

Gentlemen,

THE German Ambassador yesterday left Paris after notifying us of the existence of a state of war.

The Government owe to Parliament a true account of the events which in less than ten days have unloosed a European war and compelled France, peaceful and valiant, to defend her frontier against an attack, the hateful injustice of which is emphasised by its calculated unexpectedness.

This attack, which has no excuse, and which began before we were notified of any declaration of war, is the last act of a plan, whose origin and object I propose to declare before our own democracy and before the opinion of the civilised world.

As a consequence of the abominable crime which cost the Austro-Hungarian Heir-Apparent and the Duchess of Hohenburg their lives, difficulties arose between the Cabinets of Vienna and Belgrade.

The majority of the Powers were only semi-officially informed of these difficulties up till Friday, July 24th, the date on which the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors communicated to them a circular which the press has published.

The object of this circular was to explain and justify an ultimatum delivered the evening before to Servia by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade.

This ultimatum in alleging the complicity of numerous Servian subjects and associations in the Serajevo crime, hinted that the official Servian authorities themselves were no strangers to it. It demanded a reply from Servia by 6 o'clock on the evening of Saturday, July 25th.

The Austrian demands, or at any rate many of them,<sup>1</sup> without doubt struck a blow at the rights of a sovereign State. Notwithstanding their excessive character, Servia, on July 25th, declared that she submitted to them almost without reserve.<sup>2</sup>

This submission, which constituted a success for Austria-Hungary a guarantee for the peace of Europe, was not unconnected with the advice tendered to Belgrade from the first moment by France, Russia and Great Britain.<sup>3</sup>

The value of this advice was all the greater since the Austro-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 31, July 27, where Sazonof "found seven of the ten points admissible without very great difficulty; only the two points . . . seemed to him to be unacceptable in their present form," etc.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Introductory remarks to the despatches of July 26.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. the despatches of July 24, 25, 26 where it is pointed out that no such advice was actually given.



Hungarian demands had been concealed<sup>1</sup> from the Chanceries of the Triple Entente, to whom in the three preceding weeks the Austro-Hungarian Government had on several occasions given an assurance that their claims would be extremely moderate.

It was, therefore, with natural astonishment that the Cabinets of Paris, St. Petersburg and London learned on 26th July that the Austrian Minister at Belgrade, after a few minutes' examination, declared that the Servian reply was unacceptable, and broke off diplomatic relations.

This astonishment was increased by the fact that on Friday, the 24th, the German Ambassador came and read to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs a *note verbale*<sup>2</sup> asserting that the Austro-Servian dispute must remain localised, without intervention by the great Powers, or otherwise "incalculable consequences" were to be feared. A similar *démarche* was made on Saturday, the 25th,<sup>3</sup> at London and at St. Petersburg.<sup>4</sup>

Need I, Gentlemen, point out to you the contrast between the threatening expressions used by the German Ambassador at Paris and the conciliatory sentiments which the Powers of the Triple Entente had just manifested by the advice which they gave to Servia to submit?<sup>5</sup>

Nevertheless, in spite of the extraordinary character of the German *démarche*, we immediately, in agreement with our Allies<sup>6</sup> and our friends, took a conciliatory course and invited Germany to join in it.

We have had from the first moment regretfully to recognise that our intentions and our efforts met with no response at Berlin.

Not only did Germany appear wholly unwilling to give to Austria-Hungary the friendly advice which her position gave her the right to offer, but from this moment and still more in the following days, she seemed to intervene between the Cabinet at Vienna and the compromises suggested by the other Powers.<sup>7</sup>

On Tuesday, 28th July, Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia. This declaration of war, with its aggravation of the state of affairs brought about by the rupture of diplomatic relations three days before, gave ground for believing that there was a deliberate desire for war, and a systematic programme for the enslavement<sup>8</sup> of Servia.

Thus there was now involved in the dispute not only the independence of a brave people, but the balance of power<sup>9</sup> in the Bal-

<sup>1</sup> France knew of them before Austria-Hungary published them, French Yellow Book Nos. 13 and 14, July 19.

<sup>2</sup> French Yellow Book No. 28, July 24.

<sup>3</sup> This is a mistake. See British Blue Book No. 9, July 24.

<sup>4</sup> Russian Orange Book No. 8, also July 24.

<sup>5</sup> See note 3, p. 446.

<sup>6</sup> Note the plural which seems to include Great Britain.

<sup>7</sup> For the error of this view see the French despatches of those days, and the discussion of them in the editor's *Germany's Point of View*, chapters on the French Yellow Book.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Austria-Hungary's promise *not* to annex Serbian territory nor to touch the sovereignty of Serbia. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29.

<sup>9</sup> This was the question which interested Russia most; cf. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, last paragraph.

kans, embodied in the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, and consecrated by the moral support of all the great Powers.

However, at the suggestion of the British Government with its constant and firm attachment to the maintenance of the peace of Europe, the negotiations were continued, or, to speak more accurately, the Powers of the Triple Entente tried to continue them.

From this common desire sprang the proposal for action<sup>1</sup> by the Four Powers, England, France, Germany and Italy, which was intended, by assuring to Austria all legitimate satisfaction, to bring about an equitable adjustment of the dispute.

On Wednesday, the 29th,<sup>2</sup> the Russian Government, noting the persistent failure of these efforts, and faced by the Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war, fearing the military destruction of Servia, decided as a precautionary measure to mobilise the troops of four military districts, that is to say, the formations echeloned along the Austro-Hungarian frontier exclusively.

In taking this step, the Russian Government were careful to inform the German Government that their measures, restricted as they were and without any offensive character towards Austria, were not in any degree directed against Germany.

In a conversation with the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs acknowledged this without demur.

On the other hand, all the efforts made by Great Britain, with the adherence of Russia and the support of France, to bring Austria and Servia into touch under the moral patronage of Europe were encountered at Berlin with a predetermined negative of which the diplomatic despatches afford the clearest proof.

This was a disquieting situation which made it probable that there existed at Berlin intentions which had not been disclosed. Some hours afterwards this alarming suspicion was destined to become a certainty.

In fact Germany's negative attitude gave place thirty-six hours later to positive steps which were truly alarming. On the 31st July Germany, by proclaiming "a state of danger of war,"<sup>3</sup> cut the communications between herself and the rest of Europe, and obtained for herself complete freedom to pursue against France in absolute secrecy military preparations which, as you have seen, nothing could justify.

Already for some days, and in circumstances difficult to explain, Germany had prepared for the transition of her army from a peace footing to a war footing.<sup>4</sup>

From the morning of the 25th July, that is to say even before the expiration of the time limit given to Servia by Austria, she had

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the Introductory Remarks to the despatches of these days, and the letter from the Belgian Minister in Petrograd printed under date of July 30.

<sup>2</sup> According to the Czar's telegram to the German Emperor of July 30, the Russian mobilisation was decided upon five days before, i.e. July 25.

<sup>3</sup> Viviani entirely omits to mention that this was the result of Russia's order of general mobilisation.

<sup>4</sup> There is no evidence for this statement.

confined to barracks the garrisons of Alsace-Lorraine. The same day she had placed the frontier-works in a complete state of defence. On the 26th, she had indicated to the railways the measures preparatory for concentration. On the 27th, she had completed requisitions and placed her covering troops in position. On the 28th, the summons of individual reservists had begun and units which were distant from the frontier had been brought up to it.<sup>1</sup>

Could all these measures, pursued with implacable method, leave us in doubt of German's intentions?

Such was the situation when, on the evening of the 31st July, the German Government, which, since the 24th, had not participated by any active step in the conciliatory efforts of the Triple Entente,<sup>2</sup> addressed an ultimatum to the Russian Government under the pretext that Russia had ordered a general mobilisation<sup>3</sup> of her armies, and demanded that this mobilisation should be stopped within twelve hours.

This demand, which was all the more insulting in form because a few hours earlier the Emperor Nicholas II., with a movement at once confiding and spontaneous, had asked the German Emperor for his mediation, was put forward at a moment when, on the request of England<sup>4</sup> and with the knowledge of Germany,<sup>5</sup> the Russian Government was accepting a formula of such a nature as to lay the foundation for a friendly settlement of the Austro-Servian dispute and of the Austro-Russian difficulties by the simultaneous arrest of military operations and of military preparations.

The same day this unfriendly *démarche* towards Russia was supplemented by acts which were frankly hostile towards France; the rupture of communications by road, railway, telegraph and telephone, the seizure of French locomotives on their arrival at the frontier, the placing of machine guns in the middle of the permanent way which had been cut, and the concentration of troops on this frontier.

From this moment we were no longer justified in believing in the sincerity of the pacific declarations which the German representative continued to shower upon us (*hear, hear*).

We knew that Germany was mobilising under the shelter of the "state of danger of war."

We learnt that six classes of reservists had been called up, and that transport was being collected even for those army corps which were stationed a considerable distance from the frontier.

As these events unfolded themselves, the Government, watchful and vigilant, took from day to day, and even from hour to hour, the measures of precaution which the situation required; the general mobilisation of our forces on land and sea was ordered.

<sup>1</sup> There is no evidence for these statements, all of which seem to be disproved by French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, where Viviani acknowledges that Germany had taken, up to then, no steps for even partial mobilisation, for if she had, it would have been impossible to urge Russia not to take any measures which "may offer to Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilisation of her forces."

<sup>2</sup> This is disproved by the despatches of those days.

<sup>3</sup> No excuse for the general Russian mobilisation is offered.

<sup>4</sup> British Blue Book No. 132, August 1, and note.

<sup>5</sup> No evidence for this statement has been published.

The same evening, at 7.30, Germany, without waiting<sup>1</sup> for the acceptance by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg of the English proposal, which I have already mentioned, declared war on Russia.

The next day, Sunday, the 2nd August, without regard for the extreme moderation of France, in contradiction to the peaceful declarations of the German Ambassador at Paris, and in defiance of the rules of international law, German troops crossed our frontier at three different points.

At the same time, in violation of the Treaty of 1867, which guaranteed with the signature of Prussia the neutrality of Luxemburg, they invaded the territory of the Grand Duchy and so gave cause for a protest by the Luxemburg Government.

Finally, the neutrality of Belgium also was threatened. The German Minister, on the evening of the 2nd August, presented to the Belgian Government an ultimatum<sup>2</sup> requesting facilities in Belgium for military operations against France, under the lying pretext that Belgian neutrality was threatened by us; the Belgian Government refused, and declared<sup>3</sup> that they were resolved to defend with vigour their neutrality, which was respected by France and guaranteed by treaties, and in particular by the King of Prussia. (*Unanimous and prolonged applause.*)

Since then, Gentlemen, the German attacks have been renewed, multiplied, and accentuated. At more than fifteen points our frontier has been violated. Shots have been fired at our soldiers and Customs officers. Men have been killed and wounded. Yesterday<sup>4</sup> a German military aviator dropped three bombs on Lunéville.<sup>5</sup>

The German Ambassador, to whom as well as to all the great Powers, we communicated these facts, did not deny them or express his regrets for them. On the contrary, he came yesterday evening to ask me for his passports, and to notify us of the existence of a state of war, giving as his reason, in the teeth of all the facts, hostile acts committed by French aviators in German territory in the Eifel district, and even on the railway near Carlsruhe and near Nuremberg. This is the letter<sup>6</sup> which he handed to me on the subject:—

“M. le Président,

“The German administrative and military authorities have established a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on German territory by French military aviators. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg.

<sup>1</sup> Because the time limit had expired.

<sup>2</sup> Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2.

<sup>3</sup> Belgian Gray Book No. 22, August 3.

<sup>4</sup> Belgian Gray Book, August 3.

<sup>5</sup> For a similar charge made by Germany against France, see Belgian Gray Book, No. 21, August 3. Since the interview there mentioned took place at 1.30 a.m. the French attacks there mentioned must have taken place on August 2.

<sup>6</sup> French Yellow Book No. 147, August 3.

"I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform your Excellency that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power.

"At the same time, I have the honour to bring to the knowledge of your Excellency that the German authorities will retain French mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity.

"My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end it only remains for me to request your Excellency to be good enough to furnish me with my passports, and to take the steps you consider suitable to assure my return to Germany, with the staff of the Embassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the German Consulate General in Paris.

"Be good enough, M. le Président, to receive the assurances of my deepest respect.  
(Signed) SCHOEN."

Need I, Gentlemen, lay stress on the absurdities of these pretexts which they would put forward as grievances? At no time has any French aviator penetrated into Belgium, nor has any French aviator committed either in Bavaria or any other part of Germany any hostile act. The opinion of Europe has already done justice to these wretched inventions. (*Loud and unanimous applause.*)

Against these attacks, which violate all the laws of justice and all the principles of public law, we have now taken all the necessary steps; they are being carried out strictly, regularly, and with calmness.

The mobilisation of the Russian army also continues with remarkable vigour and unrestrained enthusiasm (*unanimous and prolonged applause, all the deputies rising from their seats.*) The Belgian army, mobilised with 250,000 men, prepares with a splendid passion and magnificent ardour to defend the neutrality and independence of their country. (*Renewed loud and unanimous applause.*)

The entire British fleet is mobilised<sup>1</sup> and orders have been given to mobilise the land forces.<sup>2</sup> (*Loud cheers, all the deputies rising to their feet.*)

Since 1912<sup>3</sup> *pourparlers* had taken place between English and French General Staffs and were concluded by an exchange of letters between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs yesterday evening communicated these letters to the House of Commons, and I have the honour, with the consent of the British Government, to acquaint you with the contents of these two documents.

My dear Ambassador,

*Foreign Office, November 22, 1912.*

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been

<sup>1</sup> And had been mobilised since July 24. See French Yellow Book No. 66, July 27.

<sup>2</sup> No date is given for this order, nor is it mentioned in the British Blue Book.

<sup>3</sup> This is an error. The letters referred to were of 1912, but these *pourparlers* had been taking place for years previous. See first line of first letter below.

understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed resistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, etc.,  
E. GREY.

To this letter our Ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, replied on the 23rd November, 1912:—

Dear Sir Edward,

*London, November 23, 1912.*

You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common; if those

measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours, etc.,

PAUL CAMBON.

In the House of Commons the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs spoke<sup>1</sup> of France amidst the applause of the members in a noble and warm-hearted manner and his language has already found an echo deep in the hearts of all Frenchmen (*loud and unanimous applause*). I wish in the name of the Government of the Republic to thank the British Government from this tribune for their cordial words and the Parliament of France will associate itself in this sentiment (*renewed, prolonged and unanimous applause*).

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made in particular the following declaration:<sup>2</sup>

"In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered the North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the object of attacking the French coasts or the French navy and of harassing French merchant shipping, the British fleet would intervene in order to give to French shipping its complete protection in such a way that from that moment Great Britain and Germany would be in a state of war."

From now onwards, the British fleet protects our northern and western coasts against a German attack. Gentlemen, these are the facts. I believe that the simple recital of them is sufficient to justify the acts of the Government of the Republic. I wish, however, to make clear the conclusion to be drawn from my story and to give its true meaning to the unheard-of attack of which France is the victim.

The victors of 1870 have, at different times, as you know, desired<sup>3</sup> to repeat the blows which they dealt us then. In 1875, the war which was intended to complete the destruction of conquered France was only prevented by the intervention of the two Powers to whom we were to become united at a later date by ties of alliance and of friendship (*unanimous applause*), by the intervention of Russia and of Great Britain (*prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet*).

Since then the French Republic, by the restoration of her national forces and the conclusion of diplomatic agreements unswervingly adhered to, has succeeded in liberating herself from the yoke which even in a period of profound peace Bismarck was able to impose upon Europe.

She has re-established the balance of power in Europe,<sup>4</sup> a guarantee of the liberty and dignity of all.

<sup>1</sup> No date is here given. It was August 3. See Sir E. Grey's speech of that date.

<sup>2</sup> For the wording of this declaration which is different from that published in the British Blue Book see French Yellow Book Nos. 137, August 2; and 143, August 3 and notes.

<sup>3</sup> Germany has always denied this desire.

<sup>4</sup> A noteworthy reference to this bugbear of European politics.



Gentleman, I do not know if I am mistaken, but it seems to me that this work of peaceful reparation, of liberation and honour finally ratified in 1904 and 1907, with the genial co-operation of King Edward VII of England and the Government of the Crown (*applause*), this is what the German Empire wishes to destroy to-day by one daring stroke.

Germany can reproach us with nothing.

Bearing in silence in our bosom for half a century the wound which Germany dealt us we have offered to peace an unprecedented sacrifice (*loud and unanimous applause*).

We have offered other sacrifices in all the discussions which since 1904 German diplomacy has systematically provoked, whether in Morocco or elsewhere in 1905, in 1906, in 1908, in 1911.<sup>1</sup>

Russia also has given proof of great moderation at the time of the events of 1908, as she has done in the present crisis.

She observed the same moderation, and the Triple Entente with her, when in the Eastern crisis of 1912 Austria and Germany formulated demands, whether against Servia or against Greece, which still were, as the event proved, capable of settlement by discussion.

Useless sacrifices, barren negotiations, empty efforts, since to-day in the very act of conciliation we, our allies and ourselves, are attacked by surprise (*prolonged applause*).

No one can honestly believe that we are the aggressors. Vain is the desire to overthrow the sacred principles of right and of liberty to which nations, as well as individuals, are subject; Italy with that clarity of insight possessed by the Latin intellect, has notified us that she proposes to preserve neutrality (*prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet*).

This decision has found in all France an echo of sincerest joy. I made myself the interpreter of this feeling to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires when I told him how much I congratulated myself that the two Latin sisters, who have the same origin and the same ideal, a common and glorious past, are not now opposed to one another (*renewed applause*).

Gentlemen, we proclaim loudly the object of their attack — it is the independence, the honour, the safety, which the Triple Entente has regained in the balance of power<sup>2</sup> for the service of peace. The object of attack is the liberties of Europe, which France, her allies and her friends, are proud to defend (*loud applause*).

We are going to defend these liberties, for it is they that are in dispute, and all the rest is but a pretext.

France, unjustly provoked, did not desire war, she has done everything to avert it. Since it is forced upon her, she will defend herself against Germany and against every Power which has not yet declared its intentions, but joins with the latter in a conflict between the two countries. (*Applause, all the deputies rising to their feet.*)

<sup>1</sup> For France's attitude toward Germany as it appears from the despatches of the French Yellow Book, see the editor's *Germany's Point of View*, chapters on the French Yellow Book.

<sup>2</sup> See above.

A free and valiant people that sustains an eternal ideal, and is wholly united to defend its existence; a democracy which knows how to discipline its military strength, and was not afraid a year ago to increase its burden as an answer to the armaments of its neighbour; a nation armed, struggling for its own life and for the independence of Europe — here is a sight which we are proud to offer to the on-lookers in this desperate struggle, that has for some days been preparing with the greatest calmness and method. We are without reproach. We shall be without fear. (*Loud applause, all the deputies rising to their feet.*) France has often proved in less favourable circumstances that she is a most formidable adversary when she fights, as she does to-day, for liberty and for right (*applause*).

In submitting our actions to you, Gentlemen, who are our judges, we have, to help us in bearing the burden of our heavy responsibility, the comfort of a clear conscience and the conviction that we have done our duty (*prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet*).

RENÉ VIVIANI.

Great Britain :

*To Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 153

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

THE King of the Belgians has made an appeal<sup>1</sup> to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms:—

“Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty’s friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty’s Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.”

His Majesty’s Government are also informed that the German Government have delivered to the Belgian Government a note<sup>2</sup> proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours.

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused<sup>3</sup> this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

His Majesty’s Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty<sup>4</sup> to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made

<sup>1</sup> Belgian Gray Book No. 25, August 3.

<sup>2</sup> Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2.

<sup>3</sup> Belgian Gray Book No. 22, August 3.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Sir E. Grey’s despatch, Belgian Gray Book No. 37, August 4.

upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.

*From Brussels*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 154

*Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. —  
(Received August 4.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

GERMAN Minister has this morning addressed note<sup>1</sup> to Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that as Belgian Government have declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces.

*To Brussels*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 155

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power,<sup>2</sup> and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years.

*To Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 156

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

I CONTINUE to receive numerous complaints from British firms as to the detention of their ships at Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and other German ports. This action on the part of the German authorities is totally unjustifiable. It is in direct contravention of international

<sup>1</sup> Belgian Gray Book No. 27, same day.

<sup>2</sup> This is in reply to the appeal for "diplomatic intervention," see British Blue Book No. 153, same day, and notes to Belgian Gray Book No. 24, August 3, and No. 38, August 4.

law and of the assurances given to your Excellency by the Imperial Chancellor. You should demand the immediate release of all British ships if such release has not yet been given.

*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 157<sup>1</sup>

*German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London. — (Communicated by German Embassy, August 4.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 4, 1914.*

PLEASE dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.

*From Brussels*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 158

*Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 4.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

MILITARY attaché has been informed at War Office that German troops have entered Belgian territory,<sup>2</sup> and that Liège has been summoned to surrender by small party of Germans who, however, were repulsed.

*To Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 159

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

WE hear that Germany has addressed note<sup>3</sup> to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be com-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 36, same day.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 30, same day.

<sup>3</sup> Belgian Gray Book No. 27, same day.

pelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed<sup>1</sup> that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined<sup>2</sup> to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning<sup>3</sup> be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

**Serbia :**

*From Nish*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 49

*M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to  
Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Nish, July 22/August 4, 1914.*

PLEASE inform the Imperial Government that you have received instructions to leave<sup>4</sup> Germany, together with the staffs of the Legation and Consulate. You should leave immediately.

<sup>1</sup> Belgian Gray Book No. 30, same day.

<sup>2</sup> British Blue Book No. 122, under date of August 1.

<sup>3</sup> British Blue Book No. 153, same date.

<sup>4</sup> This was a natural order, because Austria-Hungary was at war with Serbia, and Germany was the former's ally. The diplomatic documents do not contain the declaration of war between Germany and Serbia.

Wednesday, August 5, 1914

## SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	Petrograd	—
Belgium	Ministers at Entente Capitals All Representatives abroad Madrid	London, Berlin, Madrid Paris, The Hague British Minister
France	President's message Viviani's speech	Luxemburg
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	—	—
Russia	—	—
Serbia	—	—

*Austria-Hungary* sends note to her Ambassador in Russia declaring war on Russia.

*Belgium* protests against the invasion of her territory to all "Countries having Diplomatic Relations" with her.

*France* joins Great Britain and Russia in declaring their willingness to co-operate "in the defence of Belgian territory."

*Germany* requests the departure from Luxemburg of the Entente Ministers.

*Great Britain* declares war on Germany as of 11 A.M., and informs Belgium that she considers "joint action with a view to resisting Germany to be in force."

*Russia* declares her willingness to coöperate with France and Great Britain "in the defence of Belgian territory."

**Austria-Hungary:***To St. Petersburg*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK NO. 59

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.**(Translated from the French.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, August 5, 1914.*

I ASK Your Excellency to hand over the following note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

"On the instructions of his Government, the undersigned, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, has the honour to inform His Excellency the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs as follows:—

"In view of the threatening attitude adopted by Russia in the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Servia; and of the fact that, according to a communication from the Berlin Cabinet, Russia has seen fit, as a result of that conflict, to open hostilities against Germany; and whereas Germany is consequently at war with Russia; Austria-Hungary therefore considers herself also at war with Russia from the present moment."

After handing over this note Your Excellency will ask that passports may be prepared, and you will leave without delay with the

entire staff of the Embassy with the exception of any members who are to be left behind. At the same time M. Schebeko is being furnished with his passport by us.

**Belgium :**

*From London*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 41

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, August 5, 1914.*

GERMANY, having rejected the British proposals, Great Britain has informed her that a state of war existed between the two countries as from 11 o'clock.

*To Paris, London, and St. Petersburg*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 42

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 5, 1914.*

AFTER the violation of Belgian territory at Gemmenich,<sup>1</sup> Belgium appealed <sup>2</sup> to Great Britain, France, and Russia through their representatives at Brussels, to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory.

Belgium undertakes the defence of her fortified places.

*To Paris, London, and St. Petersburg*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 43

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 5, 1914.*

IN my despatch of August 4 (see No. 38) I had the honour to inform you of the sequence of events which had attended the international relations of Belgium from July 31st to August 4th. I added that the Cabinet was considering the question whether Belgium, whose territory had been invaded since the morning, should appeal to the guarantee of the Powers.

The Cabinet had decided in the affirmative when the British Minister informed me that the proposal which he had communicated to me, and according to which the British Government were disposed to respond favourably to our appeal to her as a guaranteeing Power, was cancelled for the time being.<sup>3</sup> (See No. 37.)

<sup>1</sup> Belgian Gray Book No. 30, August 4.

<sup>2</sup> Belgian Gray Book No. 40, same day.

<sup>3</sup> This paragraph is not clear. What had Sir E. Grey's offer, Belgian Gray Book No. 37, or its cancellation, *ib.* No. 39, to do with the decision of the Cabinet?



A telegram from London made it clear that this change of attitude was caused by an ultimatum from Great Britain giving Germany a time limit of ten hours within which to evacuate Belgian territory and to respect Belgian neutrality. (See No. 39.) During the evening, the Belgian Government addressed to France, Great Britain, and Russia, through their respective representatives at Brussels, a note, of which a copy is enclosed herewith. (See No. 40.)

As you will observe, Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory and in the maintenance for the future of the independence and integrity of her territory. She will herself undertake the defence of her fortified places.

As yet we are not aware how our appeal has been received.

*To the Belgian Heads of Missions in all Countries having Diplomatic Relations with Belgium.*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 44

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Heads of Missions in all Countries<sup>1</sup> having Diplomatic Relations with Belgium.*

Sir,

Brussels, August 5, 1914.

By the treaty of April 18th, 1839, Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria, and Russia declared themselves guarantors of the treaty concluded on the same day between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. The treaty runs: "Belgium shall form a State independent and perpetually neutral." Belgium has fulfilled all her international obligations, she has accomplished her duty in a spirit of loyal impartiality,<sup>2</sup> she has neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality and to cause that neutrality to be respected.

In these circumstances the Belgian Government have learnt with deep pain that the armed forces of Germany, a Power guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, have entered Belgian territory in violation of the obligations undertaken by treaty.

It is our duty to protest with indignation against an outrage against international law provoked by no act of ours.

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to repel by all the means in their power the attack thus made upon their neutrality, and they recall the fact that, in virtue of article 10 of The Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in the case of war by land, if a neutral Power repels, even by force, attacks on her neutrality such action cannot be considered as a hostile act.

I have to request that you will ask at once for an audience with

<sup>1</sup> This includes the United States.

<sup>2</sup> This is denied by Germany in view of the Brussels documents which show that Belgium had given her military secrets to Great Britain.

the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read this despatch to his Excellency, handing him a copy. If the interview cannot be granted at once you should make the communication in question in writing.

*From Berlin*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 45

*Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, August 5, 1914.*

I HAVE received my passports and shall leave Berlin to-morrow morning for Holland with the staff of the legation.

*From Madrid*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 46

*Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*St. Sebastian, August 5, 1914.*

THE Spanish Government undertake the custody of Belgian interests in Germany, and are to-day sending telegraphic instructions to their Ambassador at Berlin.

(See No. 33.)

*From Paris*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 47

*Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Paris, August 5, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the notification of a state of war between France and Germany, which has been communicated to me to-day.

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Enclosure in No. 47.

(See French Yellow Book No. 157, August 4.)

*From London*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 48

*Communication of August 5, from Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

I AM instructed to inform the Belgian Government that His Britannic Majesty's Government consider joint action with a view to

resisting Germany to be in force and to be justified by the Treaty of 1839.

*From London*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 49

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, August 5, 1914.*

GREAT BRITAIN agrees to take joint action in her capacity of guaranteeing Power for the defence of Belgian territory. The British fleet will ensure the free passage of the Scheldt for the provisioning of Antwerp.

*From The Hague*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 50

*Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*The Hague, August 5, 1914.*

THE war buoying is about to be established.

(See No. 29.)

*To Madrid*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 51

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 5, 1914.*

PLEASE express to the Spanish Government the sincere thanks of the Belgian Government.

(See No. 46.)

*To Paris, London, and St. Petersburg*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 52

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 5, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the French and Russian Ministers made a communication to me this morning informing me of the willingness of their Governments to respond to our appeal, and to co-operate with Great Britain in the defence of Belgian territory.

France :

*From Luxemburg*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 156

*M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Doumergue, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Paris, August 5, 1914.*

THE Minister of State came to see me at the Legation this morning, Tuesday, 4th August, 1914, at about half-past eight o'clock, in order to notify me that the German military authorities required my departure. On my answering that I would only give way to force M. Eyschen said that he understood my feelings in this matter, and it was just for that reason that he had himself come to make this communication which cost him so much, for it was just because force was used that he asked me to leave. He added that he was going to bring me written proof of this.

I did not conceal from M. Eyschen the grief and anxiety which I had in leaving my fellow-countrymen without defence, and asked him to be good enough to undertake their protection ; this he promised to do.

Just as he was leaving he handed me the enclosed letter (Enclosure I.) which is the answer of the Luxemburg Government to the declaration which I had made the evening before, according to telegraphic instructions of M. Viviani.

About 10 o'clock, the Minister of State came again to the Legation and left me with a short note from himself, a certified copy of the letter which the German Minister had addressed to him on the subject of my departure from Luxemburg. (Enclosures II. and III.)

At the same time he told me that he had informed Herr von Buch that the Luxemburg Government would be entrusted with the protection of the French and would have charge of the Legation and the Chancery. This news did not seem to be agreeable to my German colleague, who advised M. Eyschen to move me to entrust this responsibility to the Belgian Minister. I explained to the Minister of State that the situation was peculiar. As I was accredited to Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess and as my country was not in a state of war with Luxemburg, it was in these circumstances clearly indicated that it should be the Luxemburg Government which should look after the safety of my fellow-countrymen. M. Eyschen did not insist, and again accepted the service which I entrusted to him.

The Minister of State then asked me to be good enough to leave quietly in order to avoid any demonstration, which, as he said, would not fail to bring about reprisals on the part of the German military authorities against the French. I answered that I attached too much value to the safety of my countrymen to compromise it and that he had nothing to fear.

My departure, which was required to take place as soon as possible, was fixed for two o'clock; it was at the same time understood that I should leave in my motor car. As to a safe conduct, M. Eyschen told me that the German Minister was at that very moment at the German headquarters to ask for it, and that he would take care that I received it in good time.

At a quarter-past two the Minister of State accompanied by M. Henrion, Councillor of the Government, came to take leave of me and to receive the keys of the Legation and those of the Chancery.

He told me that orders had been given for my free passage, and that I must make for Arlon by way of the Merle, Mamers and Arlon roads. He added that a German officer would wait for me at the Merle road in order to go in front of my motor car.

I then left the Legation and made my way to Arlon by the road which had been determined on, but I did not meet anyone.

Your Excellency will have the goodness to find the enclosed text of the letter which I sent to the Minister of State before leaving my post (Enclosure IV.).

MOLLARD.

#### ENCLOSURE I

*M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the Government, to M. Mollard, French Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Luxemburg.*

Sir,

*Luxemburg, August 4, 1914.*

IN an oral communication made yesterday evening, your Excellency has had the goodness to bring to my knowledge that in accordance with the Treaty of London of 1867, the Government of the Republic intended to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg as they had shown by their attitude, but that the violation of this neutrality by Germany was nevertheless of such a kind as to compel France henceforth to be influenced in this matter by the care for her defence and her interests.

You will allow me to point out clearly that the decision of the Government of the Republic is based solely on the act of a third Power for which in truth the Grand Duchy is not responsible.

The rights of Luxemburg must then remain intact.

The German Empire has formally declared that only a temporary occupation of Luxemburg entered into their intentions.

I am glad to believe that the Government of the Republic will have no difficulty in establishing with me the fact that at all times and in all circumstances the Grand Duchy has fully and loyally fulfilled all the obligations of every kind which rested on it in virtue of the Treaty of 1867.

I remain, etc.,

EYSCHEN.

*Minister of State, President of the Government.*

## ENCLOSURE II

*Private Letter from M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the Government, to M. Mollard, French Minister, at Luxemburg.*

Sir,

A SHORT time ago I had with very great regret to inform you of the intentions of General von Fuchs with regard to your sojourn in Luxemburg.

As I had the honour to tell you, I asked for confirmation in writing of the decision taken by the military authorities in this matter.

Enclosed is a copy of a letter which I have at this moment received from the German Minister.

He has assured me that in carrying out this step there will be no want of the respect due to your position and person.

Be good enough to receive the renewed expression of my regret and my deep regard. EYSCHEN.

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ENCLOSURE III

*To His Excellency the Minister of State, Dr. Eyschen.*

Your Excellency,

IN accordance with the instructions of his Excellency General Fuchs, I have the honour to ask you to be good enough to request the French Minister, M. Mollard, to leave Luxemburg as soon as possible and to return to France; otherwise the German military authorities would find themselves under the painful necessity of placing M. Mollard under the charge of a military escort and in the last extremity of proceeding to his arrest.

I beg your Excellency to have the goodness on this occasion to receive the assurance of my deepest regard. VON BUCH.

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ENCLOSURE IV

*M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to His Excellency M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the Government of Luxemburg.*

Sir,

*Luxemburg, August 4, 1914.*

I HAVE just received your communication and I submit to force.

Before leaving Luxemburg it is my duty to provide for the fortunes and safety of my fellow-countrymen. Knowing the spirit of justice and equity of the Luxemburg Government, I have the honour to ask your Excellency to take them under your protection, and to watch over the safety of their lives and goods.

At the same time I will ask your Excellency to take charge of the Legation and the offices of the Chancery.

I should be much obliged to your Excellency if you would be good enough to lay before Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess the expression of my deepest respect, and my excuses for not having been able myself to express them to her.

In thanking you for all the marks of sympathy which you have given me I beg you to receive renewed assurances of my deep regard.

ARMAND MOLLARD.



Thursday, August 6, 1914

## SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FOREIGN OFFICE OF	SENT DESPATCHES TO	RECEIVED DESPATCHES FROM
Austria-Hungary	London	—
Belgium	The Hague	The Hague
France	—	—
Germany	—	—
Great Britain	—	—
Russia	—	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador
Serbia	German Legation	Berlin

*Austria-Hungary* presents her declaration of war to Russia.

*Belgium* is informed by *Holland* of war regulations established for the navigation of the Scheldt.

*Germany* and *Serbia* sever diplomatic relations, and the former in so doing lays the entire blame for the war on Russia for having ordered general mobilisation just when Germany was hopeful of success in her attempt at mediation.

**Austria-Hungary :***To London*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 60

*Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, August 6, 1914.*

I HAVE received Your Excellency's telegram of the 4th August.<sup>1</sup>

I ask you to assure Sir E. Grey that we will in no case open hostilities against Great Britain without a previous formal declaration of war, but that we also expect that Great Britain will observe towards us a similar attitude, and that she will not undertake any hostile act against us before formally declaring war.

**Belgium :***From The Hague*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 53

*Jonkheer de Weede, Netherlands Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 6, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of the special edition of the *Staatscourant*, containing the declaration of the neutrality of the Netherlands in the war between Belgium and Germany, and between Great Britain and Germany.

<sup>1</sup> Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 58, August 4.

Enclosure to No. 53

LAWS, DECREES, NOMINATIONS, ETC.

*Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, and the Colonies.*

(Translation.)

LES Ministres des Affaires Étrangères, de la Justice, de la Marine, de la Guerre et des Colonies, autorisés à cette fin par Sa Majesté la Reine, portent à la connaissance de tous ceux que la chose concerne, que le Gouvernement néerlandais observera dans la guerre qui a éclaté entre les Puissances amies des Pays-Bas, Grande-Bretagne et Allemagne, et Belgique et Allemagne, une stricte neutralité, et qu'en vue de l'observation de cette neutralité les dispositions suivantes ont été arrêtées :

ARTICLE 1

Dans les limites du territoire de l'État, comprenant le territoire du Royaume en Europe, outre les colonies et possessions dans d'autres parties du monde, aucun genre d'hostilités n'est permis et ce territoire ne peut servir de base pour des opérations hostiles.

ARTICLE 2

Ni l'occupation d'une partie quelconque du territoire de l'État par un belligérant, ni le passage à travers ce territoire par voie de terre par des troupes ou des convois de munitions appartenant à un des belligérants ne sont permis non plus que le passage à travers le territoire situé à l'intérieur des eaux territoriales néerlandaises par des navires de guerre ou des bâtiments des belligérants assimilés à ceux-ci.

THE Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, and the Colonies, authorised to that effect by her Majesty the Queen, make known to all whom it may concern that the Netherlands Government will observe strict neutrality in the war which has broken out between Great Britain and Germany, and Belgium and Germany, Powers friendly to the Netherlands, and that, with a view of the observance of this neutrality, the following dispositions have been taken :—

ARTICLE 1

Within the limits of the territory of the State, including the territory of the Kingdom in Europe and the colonies and possessions in other parts of the world, no hostilities of any kind are permitted, neither may this territory serve as a base for hostile operations.

ARTICLE 2

Neither the occupation of any part of the territory of the State by a belligerent nor the passage across this territory by land is permitted to the troops or convoys of munitions belonging to the belligerents, nor is the passage across the territory situated within the territorial waters of the Netherlands by the warships or ships assimilated thereto of the belligerents permitted.

## ARTICLE 3

Les troupes ou les militaires, appartenant aux belligérants ou destinés à ceux-ci et arrivant sur le territoire de l'État par voie de terre seront immédiatement désarmés et internés jusqu'à la fin de la guerre.

Les navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés à ces derniers, appartenant à un belligérant, qui contreviendront aux prescriptions des articles 2, 4 ou 7, ne pourront quitter ce territoire avant la fin de la guerre.

## ARTICLE 4

Les navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés à ces derniers, qui appartiennent à un belligérant, n'auront pas accès au territoire de l'État.

## ARTICLE 5

La disposition de l'article 4 n'est pas applicable :

1° aux navires de guerre ou bâtiments d'un belligérant assimilés à ces derniers, et qui par suite d'avarie ou de l'état de la mer sont tenus d'entrer dans un des ports ou rades de l'État. Les navires pourront quitter les dits ports ou rades dès que les circonstances qui les ont contraints de s'y réfugier auront cessé d'exister ;

2° aux navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés, appartenant à un belligérant, et qui font escale dans un port ou une rade situés dans le territoire des colonies et possessions d'outre-mer, exclusivement dans le but de compléter leur provision de denrées alimentaires ou de combustibles. Ces navires devront repartir dès que les circonstances qui les ont forcés

## ARTICLE 3

Troops or soldiers belonging to the belligerents or destined to them arriving in the territory of the State by land will be immediately disarmed and interned until the termination of the war.

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, who contravenes the provisions of articles 2, 4, or 7 will not be permitted to leave the said territory until the end of the war.

## ARTICLE 4

No warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to any of the belligerents shall have access to the said territory.

## ARTICLE 5

The provisions of article 4 do not apply to : —

1. Warships or ships assimilated thereto which are forced to enter the ports or roadstead of the State on account of damages or the state of the sea. Such ships may leave the said ports or roadsteads as soon as the circumstances which have driven them to take shelter there shall have ceased to exist.

2. Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent which anchor in a port or roadstead in the colonies or oversea possessions exclusively with the object of completing their provision of foodstuffs or fuel. These ships must leave as soon as the circumstances which have forced them to anchor shall have ceased to exist, subject to

à faire escale ont cessé d'exister, avec cette condition que le séjour en rade ou dans le port ne pourra durer plus de vingt-quatre heures ;

3° aux navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés, appartenant à un belligérant, et qui sont utilisés exclusivement pour une mission religieuse, scientifique, ou humanitaire.

#### ARTICLE 6

Les navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés appartenant à un belligérant, ne peuvent réparer leurs avaries dans les ports ou rades de l'État qu'en tant que cette réparation est indispensable à la sécurité de la navigation, et ils ne pourront en aucune façon accroître leurs capacités de combat.

#### ARTICLE 7

Les navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés, appartenant à un belligérant, et qui, au commencement de la guerre, se trouveraient sur le territoire de l'État, sont tenus de le quitter dans les vingt-quatre heures de la publication de la présente.

#### ARTICLE 8

Si des navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés appartenant à divers belligérants se trouvent en même temps, dans les conditions visées à l'article 5, dans une même partie du monde, et sur le territoire de l'État, un délai d'au moins vingt-quatre heures doit s'écouler entre le départ des navires de chacun des belligérants. A moins de circonstances spéciales, l'ordre de départ est déterminé par l'ordre

the condition that their stay in the roadstead or port shall not exceed twenty-four hours.

3. Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent employed exclusively on a religious, scientific, or humanitarian mission.

#### ARTICLE 6

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent may only execute such repairs in the ports and roadsteads of the State as are indispensable to their seaworthiness, and they may in no way increase their fighting capacities.

#### ARTICLE 7

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent who may at the commencement of war be within the territory of the State must leave within twenty-four hours from the moment of the publication of this declaration.

#### ARTICLE 8

If warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to different belligerents find themselves at the same time, in the conditions set forth in article 5, in the same part of the world and within the territory of the State, a delay of at least twenty-four hours must elapse between the departure of each respective belligerent ship. Except in special circumstances, the order of departure shall be determined by the order of arrival.

d'arrivée. Un navire de guerre ou un bâtiment assimilé, appartenant à un belligérant, ne peut quitter le territoire de l'État que vingt-quatre heures après le départ d'un navire de commerce portant le pavillon de l'autre belligérant.

A warship or ship assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent may only leave the territory of the State twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant ship which flies the flag of another belligerent.

#### ARTICLE 9

Les navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés, appartenant à un belligérant, visés à l'article 5 et à l'article 7, ne peuvent être ravitaillés en denrées alimentaires dans les ports et les rades du pays que dans la mesure nécessaire pour parfaire leurs provisions jusqu'à la limite normale du temps de paix.

De même, ils ne peuvent charger de combustible que dans la mesure nécessaire pour pouvoir atteindre, avec la provision qu'ils ont encore à bord, le port le plus rapproché de leur propre pays.

Un même bâtiment ne peut être ravitaillé à nouveau en combustible qu'à l'expiration d'une période de trois mois au moins après son précédent ravitaillement dans le territoire de l'État.

#### ARTICLE 9

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent to which articles 5 and 7 are applicable may only be provisioned with foodstuffs in the ports and roadsteads of the country to the extent necessary to bring their provisions up to the normal limit in time of peace.

Similarly they can only be supplied with fuel to the extent necessary to enable them, with the stock they already have on board, to reach the nearest port of their own country.

The same vessel cannot again be provided with fuel until a period of at least three months shall have elapsed since it was last provisioned in the territory of the State.

#### ARTICLE 10

Une prise ne peut être amenée dans le territoire que lorsqu'elle est incapable de naviguer, qu'elle tient mal la mer, qu'elle manque de combustible ou de denrées alimentaires.

Elle doit s'éloigner dès que la cause de son entrée dans le territoire cesse d'exister.

Si elle ne le fait pas, l'ordre lui sera donné de partir immédiatement; en cas de refus, il

#### ARTICLE 10

A prize may only be brought into Dutch territory if such prize is unnavigable, or unseaworthy, or short of fuel or foodstuffs.

Such prize must leave as soon as the reasons which caused her to enter Dutch territory cease to exist.

Should such prize fail to do so, immediate orders shall be given her to leave. In the event of a

sera fait usage des moyens disponibles pour libérer la prise avec ses officiers et son équipage et pour interner l'équipage placé à bord par le belligérant qui a fait la prise.

refusal, all possible means shall be employed to liberate the prize, with her officers and crew, and to intern the crew placed on board by the belligerent who has taken it as prize.

ARTICLE 11

Il est interdit, sur le territoire de l'État, de former des corps combattants ou d'ouvrir des bureaux de recrutement au profit des belligérants.

ARTICLE 11

It is forbidden in State territory, to form a corps of combatants or to open recruiting offices on behalf of the belligerents.

ARTICLE 12

Il est interdit, sur le territoire de l'État, de prendre du service à bord de navires de guerre ou de bâtiments assimilés.

ARTICLE 12

It is forbidden, in State territory, to take service on board warships or ships assimilated thereto.

ARTICLE 13

Il est interdit, sur le territoire de l'État, d'aménager, d'armer ou d'équiper des navires destinés à des fins militaires au profit d'un belligérant, ou de fournir ou conduire à un belligérant de tels navires.

ARTICLE 13

It is forbidden, in State territory, to equip, arm, or man vessels intended for military purposes on behalf of a belligerent, or to furnish or deliver such vessels to a belligerent.

ARTICLE 14

Il est interdit, sur le territoire de l'État, de fournir des armes ou des munitions à des navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés appartenant à un belligérant, ou de leur venir en aide d'une manière quelconque en vue de l'augmentation de leur équipage ou de leur aménagement.

ARTICLE 14

It is forbidden in State territory to supply arms or ammunition to warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, or to come to their assistance in any manner whatsoever with a view to augment their crew or their equipment.

ARTICLE 15

Il est interdit, sur le territoire de l'État, sauf autorisation préalable des autorités locales compétentes, de faire des réparations

ARTICLE 15

It is forbidden in State territory failing previous authorisation by the competent local authorities, to repair warships or

aux navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés appartenant à un belligérant, ou de leur fournir des provisions de bouche ou de combustible.

#### ARTICLE 16

Il est interdit, sur le territoire de l'État, de coopérer au dégréement ou à la réparation de prises, sauf en ce qui est nécessaire pour les rendre propres à tenir la mer; ainsi que d'acheter des prises ou des marchandises confisquées, et de les recevoir en échange, en don ou en dépôt.

#### ARTICLE 17

Le territoire de l'État comprend la mer côtière sur une largeur de 3 milles marins à raison de 60 par degré de latitude, à partir de la laisse de la basse mer.

En ce qui concerne les baies cette distance de 3 milles marins est mesurée à partir d'une ligne droite tirée à travers la baie aussi près que possible de l'entrée, au point où l'ouverture de la baie ne dépasse pas 10 milles marins, à raison de 60 par degré de latitude.

#### ARTICLE 18

En outre, l'intention est attirée sur les articles 100, 1°, et 205 du Code pénal; *Indisch Staatsblad*, 1905, No. 62; Art. 7, 4°, de la loi sur la qualité de Néerlandais et sur le domicile (*Nederlandsch Staatsblad*, 1892, No. 268; 1910, No. 216); art. 2, No. 3, de la loi sur la qualité de sujet néerlandais (*Nederlandsch Staatsblad*, 1910, No. 55; *Indisch Staatsblad*, 1910, No. 296; art. 54 et 55

ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, or to supply them with victuals or fuel.

#### ARTICLE 16

It is forbidden in State territory to take part in the dismantling or repairing of prizes except in so far as is necessary to make them seaworthy; also to purchase prizes or confiscated goods, and to receive them in exchange, in gift, or on deposit.

#### ARTICLE 17

The State territory comprises the coastal waters to a distance of 3 nautical miles, reckoning 60 to the degree of latitude, from low-water mark.

As regards inlets, this distance of 3 nautical miles is measured from a straight line drawn across the inlet at the point nearest the entrance where the mouth of the inlet is not wider than 10 nautical miles, reckoning 60 to the degree of latitude.

#### ARTICLE 18

Further, attention is called to Articles 100, Section 1, and 205 of the Penal Code; *Indisch Staatsblad*, 1905, No. 62; Article 7, Section 4, of the Law respecting the status of Netherlands nationality, and respecting domicile (*Nederlandsch Staatsblad*, 1892, No. 268; 1910, No. 216); Article 2, No. 3, of the Law respecting the status of Netherlands nationality (*Nederlandsch Staatsblad*, 1910,



du Code pénal de Suriname; art. 54 et 55 du Code pénal de Curaçao).

De même, l'attention des commandants de navires, armateurs et affréteurs, est attirée sur le danger et les inconvénients, auxquels ils s'exposeraient en ne respectant pas le blocus effectif des belligérants, en transportant de la contrebande de guerre ou des dépêches militaires pour les belligérants (à moins qu'il ne s'agisse du service postal régulier) ou en exécutant pour eux d'autres services de transport.

Quiconque se rendrait coupable d'actes prévus ci-dessus, s'exposerait à toutes les conséquences de ces actes, et ne pourrait obtenir à cet égard aucune protection ni intervention du Gouvernement néerlandais.

No. 55; *Indisch Staatsblad*, 1910, No. 296; Articles 54 and 55 of the Penal Code of Surinam; Articles 54 and 55 of the Penal Code of Curaçoa).

Similarly, the attention of commanding officers, owners, and charterers of ships is called to the dangers and inconveniences to which they would expose themselves by disregarding the effective blockade of belligerents, by carrying contraband of war, or military despatches for belligerents (except in the course of the regular postal service), or by rendering them other transport services.

Any person guilty of the acts aforesaid would expose himself to all the consequences of those acts and would not be able, as regards them, to obtain any protection or intervention on the part of the Netherlands Government.

### *To the Hague*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 54

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 6, 1914.*

PLEASE communicate the following note to the Netherlands Government:—

THE Belgian Government have taken note of the establishment of war buoying on the Scheldt and of the fact that the Netherlands Government will ensure the maintenance of navigation.

It would be convenient that navigation should be possible from 30 minutes before sunrise to 30 minutes after sunset, and that the exchange of pilots should take place at Bath.

With every desire to fall in with the requests of the Netherlands Government, the Belgian Government think that it is desirable in the interests of the littoral ports to retain the lightships of *Wielingen* and of *Wandelaar*, and also the buoys of the *Wielingen* Channel.

(See No. 50.)

*From The Hague*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 55

*Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*The Hague, August 6, 1914.*

NAVIGATION on the Scheldt is allowed from daybreak and so long as it is light. The Wielingen buoys will be replaced. The exchange of pilots at Hansweert is easier and better organised. Are you particularly anxious to have Bath?

France :

*From Copenhagen*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 155

*M. Bapst, French Minister at Copenhagen, to M. Doumergue, Minister for Foreign Affairs.**Copenhagen, August 6, 1914.*

THE French Ambassador at Berlin asks me to communicate to your Excellency the following telegram :—

I have been sent to Denmark by the German Government. I have just arrived at Copenhagen. I am accompanied by all the staff of the Embassy and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Darmstadt with his family. The treatment which we have received is of such a nature that I have thought it desirable to make a complete report on it to your Excellency by telegram.

On the morning of Monday, the 3rd August, after I had, in accordance with your instructions, addressed to Herr von Jagow a protest against the acts of aggression committed on French territory by German troops, the Secretary of State came to see me. Herr von Jagow came to complain of acts of aggression which he alleged had been committed in Germany, especially at Nuremberg and Coblenz by French aviators, who according to his statement "had come from Belgium." I answered that I had not the slightest information as to the facts to which he attached so much importance and the improbability of which seemed to me obvious; on my part I asked him if he had read the note which I had addressed to him with regard to the invasion of our territory by detachments of the German army. As the Secretary of State said that he had not yet read this note I explained its contents to him. I called his attention to the act committed by the officer commanding one of the detachments who had advanced to the French village of Joncherey, ten kilometres within our frontier, and had blown out the brains of a French soldier whom he had met there. After having given my opinion of this act I added: "You will admit that under no circum-

stances could there be any comparison between this and the flight of an aeroplane over foreign territory carried out by private persons animated by that spirit of individual courage by which aviators are distinguished.

"An act of aggression committed on the territory of a neighbour by detachments of regular troops commanded by officers assumes an importance of quite a different nature."

Herr von Jagow explained to me that he had no knowledge of the facts of which I was speaking to him, and he added that it was difficult for events of this kind not to take place when two armies filled with the feelings which animated our troops found themselves face to face on either side of the frontier.

At this moment the crowds which thronged the Pariser Platz in front of the Embassy and whom we could see through the window of my study, which was half-open, uttered shouts against France. I asked the Secretary of State when all this would come to an end.

"The Government has not yet come to a decision," Herr von Jagow answered. "It is probable that Herr von Schoen will receive orders to-day to ask for his passports and then you will receive yours." The Secretary of State assured me that I need not have any anxiety with regard to my departure, and that all the proprieties would be observed with regard to me as well as my staff. We were not to see one another any more and we took leave of one another after an interview which had been courteous and could not make me anticipate what was in store for me.

Before leaving Herr von Jagow I expressed to him my wish to make a personal call on the Chancellor, as that would be the last opportunity that I should have of seeing him.

Herr von Jagow answered that he did not advise me to carry out this intention as this interview would serve no purpose and could not fail to be painful.

At 6 o'clock in the evening Herr von Langwerth brought me my passports. In the name of his Government he refused to agree to the wish which I expressed to him that I should be permitted to travel by Holland or Belgium. He suggested to me that I should go either by way of Copenhagen, although he could not assure me a free passage by sea, or through Switzerland via Constance.

I accepted this last route; Herr von Langwerth having asked me to leave as soon as I possibly could it was agreed, in consideration of the necessity I was under of making arrangements with the Spanish Ambassador, who was undertaking the charge of our interests, that I should leave on the next day, the 4th August, at 10 o'clock at night.

At 7 o'clock, an hour after Herr von Langwerth had left, Herr von Lancken, formerly Councillor of the Embassy at Paris, came from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to tell me to request the staff of my Embassy to cease taking meals in the restaurants. This order was so strict that on the next day, Tuesday, I had to have recourse to the authority of the Wilhelmstrasse to get the Hotel Bristol to send our meals to the Embassy.

At 11 o'clock on the same evening, Monday, Herr von Langwerth came back to tell me that his Government would not allow our return by way of Switzerland under the pretext that it would take three days and three nights to take me to Constance. He announced that I should be sent by way of Vienna. I only agreed to this alteration under reserve, and during the night I wrote the following letter to Herr von Langwerth : —

"M. le Baron,

*Berlin, August 3, 1914.*

"I have been thinking over the route for my return to my country about which you came to speak to me this evening. You propose that I shall travel by Vienna. I run the risk of finding myself detained in that town, if not by the action of the Austrian Government, at least owing to the mobilisation which creates great difficulties similar to those existing in Germany as to the movements of trains.

"Under these circumstances I must ask the German Government for a promise made on their honour that the Austrian Government will send me to Switzerland, and that the Swiss Government will not close its frontier either to me or to the persons by whom I am accompanied, as I am told that that frontier has been firmly closed to foreigners.

"I cannot then accept the proposal that you have made to me unless I have the security which I ask for, and unless I am assured that I shall not be detained for some months outside my country.

"JULES CAMBON."

In answer to this letter on the next morning, Tuesday, the 4th August, Herr von Langwerth gave me in writing an assurance that the Austrian and Swiss authorities had received communications to this effect.

At the same time M. Miladowski, attached to the Consulate at Berlin, as well as other Frenchmen, was arrested in his own house while in bed. M. Miladowski, for whom a diplomatic passport had been requested, was released after four hours.

I was preparing to leave for Vienna when, at a quarter to five, Herr von Langwerth came back to inform me that I would have to leave with the persons accompanying me at 10 o'clock in the evening, but that I should be taken to Denmark. On this new requirement I asked if I should be confined in a fortress supposing I did not comply. Herr von Langwerth simply answered that he would return to receive my answer in half an hour. I did not wish to give the German Government the pretext for saying that I had refused to depart from Germany. I therefore told Herr von Langwerth when he came back that I would submit to the order which had been given to me but "that I protested."

I at once wrote to Herr von Jagow a letter of which the following is a copy :

"Sir,

*Berlin, August 4, 1914.*

"More than once your Excellency has said to me that the Imperial Government, in accordance with the usages of international courtesy, would facilitate my return to my own country and would give me every means of getting back to it quickly.

"Yesterday, however, Baron von Langwerth, after refusing me access to Belgium and Holland, informed me that I should travel to Switzerland via Constance. During the night I was informed that I should be sent to Austria, a country which is taking part in the present war on the side of Germany. As I had no knowledge of the intentions of Austria towards me, since on Austrian soil I am nothing but an ordinary private individual, I wrote to Baron von Langwerth that I requested the Imperial Government to give me a promise that the Imperial and Royal Austrian authorities would give me all possible facilities for continuing my journey and that Switzerland would not be closed to me. Herr von Langwerth has been good enough to answer me in writing that I could be assured of an easy journey and that the Austrian authorities would do all that was necessary.

"It is nearly five o'clock, and Baron von Langwerth has just announced to me that I shall be sent to Denmark. In view of the present situation, there is no security that I shall find a ship to take me to England and it is this consideration which made me reject this proposal, with the approval of Herr von Langwerth.

"In truth no liberty is left me and I am treated almost as a prisoner. I am obliged to submit, having no means of obtaining that the rules of international courtesy should be observed towards me, but I hasten to protest to your Excellency against the manner in which I am being treated.

JULES CAMBON."

Whilst my letter was being delivered I was told that the journey would not be made direct but by way of Schleswig. At 10 o'clock in the evening, I left the Embassy with my staff in the middle of a great assembly of foot and mounted police.

At the station the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was only represented by an officer of inferior rank.

The journey took place with extreme slowness. We took more than twenty-four hours to reach the frontier. It seemed that at every station they had to wait for orders to proceed. I was accompanied by Major von Rheinbaben of the Alesandra Regiment of the Guard and by a police officer. In the neighbourhood of the Kiel Canal the soldiers entered our carriages. The windows were shut and the curtains of the carriages drawn down; each of us had to remain isolated in his compartment and was forbidden to get up or to touch his luggage. A soldier stood in the corridor of the carriage before the door of each of our compartments which were kept open, revolver in hand and finger on the trigger. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires, the women and children and everyone were subjected to the same treatment.

At the last German station about 11 o'clock at night, Major von Rheinbaben came to take leave of me. I handed to him the following letter to Herr von Jagow.

"Sir,

*Wednesday Evening, August 5, 1914.*

"Yesterday before leaving Berlin, I protested in writing to your Excellency against the repeated change of route which was imposed upon me by the Imperial Government on my journey from Germany.

"To-day, as the train in which I was passed over the Kiel Canal an attempt was made to search all our luggage as if we might have hidden some instrument of destruction. Thanks to the interference of Major von Rheinbaben, we were spared this insult. But they went further.

"They obliged us to remain each in his own compartment, the windows and blinds having been closed. During this time, in the corridors of the carriages at the door of each compartment and facing each one of us, stood a soldier, revolver in hand, finger on the trigger, for nearly half an hour.

"I consider it my duty to protest against this threat of violence to the Ambassador of the Republic and the staff of his Embassy, violence which nothing could even have made me anticipate. Yesterday I had the honour of writing to your Excellency that I was being treated almost as a prisoner. To-day I am being treated as a dangerous prisoner. Also I must record that during our journey which from Berlin to Denmark has taken twenty-four hours, no food has been prepared nor provided for me nor for the persons who were travelling with me to the frontier.

JULES CAMBON."

I thought that our troubles had finished, when shortly afterwards Major von Rheinbaben came, rather embarrassed, to inform me that the train would not proceed to the Danish frontier if I did not pay the cost of this train. I expressed my astonishment that I had not been made to pay at Berlin and that at any rate I had not been forewarned of this. I offered to pay by a cheque on one of the largest Berlin banks. This facility was refused me. With the help of my companions I was able to collect, in gold, the sum which was required from me at once, and which amounted to 3,611 marks 75 pfennig. This is about 5,000 francs in accordance with the present rate of exchange.<sup>1</sup>

After this last incident, I thought it necessary to ask Major von Rheinbaben for his word of honour as an officer and a gentleman that we should be taken to the Danish frontier. He gave it to me, and I required that the policeman who was with us should accompany us.

In this way we arrived at the first Danish station, where the Danish Government had had a train made ready to take us to Copenhagen.

I am assured that my British colleague and the Belgian Minister, although they left Berlin after I did, travelled by the direct route to

<sup>1</sup> Subsequently the sum thus required from M. Jules Cambon was given to the Spanish Ambassador to be repaid to the French Ambassador.

Holland. I am struck by this difference of treatment, and as Denmark and Norway are, at this moment, infested with spies, if I succeed in embarking in Norway, there is a danger that I may be arrested at sea with the officials who accompany me.

I do not wish to conclude this despatch without notifying your Excellency of the energy and devotion of which the whole staff of the Embassy has given unceasing proof during the course of this crisis. I shall be glad that account should be taken of the services which on this occasion have been rendered to the Government of the Republic, in particular by the Secretaries of the Embassy and by the Military and Naval Attachés.

JULES CAMBON.

**Russia :**

*From Vienna*

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK No. 79

*Note presented by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs on July 24 (August 6), 1914, at 6 P.M.*

ON the instructions of his Government, the undersigned, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, has the honour to inform his Excellency the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs as follows : —

(Translation.)

“Vu l'attitude menaçante prise par la Russie dans le conflit entre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et la Serbie et en présence du fait qu'en suite de ce conflit la Russie d'après une communication du Cabinet de Berlin a cru devoir ouvrir les hostilités contre l'Allemagne et que celle-ci se trouve par conséquent en état de guerre avec ladite Puissance, l'Autriche-Hongrie se considère également en état de guerre avec la Russie à partir du présent moment.”

“in view of the threatening attitude adopted by Russia in the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Servia; and of the fact that, according to a communication from the Berlin Cabinet, Russia has seen fit, as a result of that conflict, to open hostilities against Germany; and whereas Germany is consequently at war with Russia; Austria-Hungary therefore considers herself also at war with Russia from the present moment.”

**Serbia :**

*To Berlin*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 50

*The Royal Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the German Legation at Nish.*

*Nish, July 21/August 6, 1914.*

THE Royal Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to inform the Imperial Legation that, in view of the state of war



which now exists between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, and of that between Russia and Germany, the ally of Austria-Hungary, the Royal Serbian Government, in view of the solidarity of her interests with Russia and her allies, considers the mission of Baron Gieslingen, the Imperial German Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary, to be at an end. The Royal Serbian Government requests His Excellency to leave Serbian territory with the staff of the Legation. The necessary passports are enclosed herewith.

*From Berlin*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 51

*Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 24/August 6, 1914.*

ON the occasion of my visit to the Under-Secretary of State, M. Zimmermann, for the purpose of breaking off diplomatic relations, he stated, in the course of conversation, that Germany had always cherished friendly feelings towards Serbia, and that he regretted that owing to the political *groupement* our relations had to be broken off. He blames Russia only, as the instigator of Serbia, for the developments which have occurred, and which will have grave consequences for all nations. If Russia, at the last moment — just when it appeared possible that an armed conflict might be avoided — had not ordered the mobilisation of her whole forces, there would have been no war, for Germany had used her whole influence in Austria-Hungary in order to bring about an understanding with Russia. Austria-Hungary would have probably been satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade, when negotiations would have begun with a view to regularising the relations between Serbia and Austria.

**Friday, August 7, 1914**

Despatches published only by Belgium who suggests that the European war between the white races be not carried into Africa.

*To the Hague*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 56

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at the Hague.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 7, 1914.*

PLEASE express to the Netherlands Government the sincere thanks of the Belgian Government for the measures taken to secure navigation on the Scheldt. The Belgian Government are in agree-

ment with the Netherlands Government on the subject of the extent of navigation. They had proposed Bath, but accept Hanswert, since this port has better facilities for the exchange of pilots.

*To Paris and London*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 57

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris and London.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 7, 1914.*

BELGIUM trusts that the war will not be extended to Central Africa. The Governor of the Belgian Congo has received instructions to maintain a strictly defensive attitude. Please ask the French Government [British Government] whether they intend to proclaim the neutrality of the French Congo [British colonies in the conventional basin of the Congo], in accordance with article 11 of the General Act of Berlin. A telegram from Boma reports that hostilities are probable between the French and Germans in the Ubangi.

*To Paris and London*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 58

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris and London.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 7, 1914.*

WITH reference to my telegram of this morning, I have the honour to request you to bring to the notice of the French [British] Government the following information: —

While instructions have been sent to the Governor-General of the Congo to take defensive measures on the common frontiers of the Belgian colony and of the German colonies of East Africa and the Cameroons, the Belgian Government have suggested to that officer that he should abstain from all offensive action against those colonies.

In view of the civilising mission common to colonising nations, the Belgian Government desire, in effect, for humanitarian reasons, not to extend the field of hostilities to Central Africa. They will, therefore, not take the initiative of putting such a strain on civilisation in that region, and the military forces which they possess there will only go into action in the event of their having to repel a direct attack on their African possessions.

I should be glad to learn whether the French [British] Government share this view and in that case whether it is their intention, during the present conflict, to avail themselves of article 11 of the General Act of Berlin to neutralise such of their colonies as are contained in the conventional basin of the Congo.

I am addressing an identic communication to your colleague at London (Paris).

**Saturday, August 8, 1914**

*France* complains of Austro-Hungarian troops having been sent to Germany; and seems favorably inclined to accept the Belgian proposal that the war be not carried into Africa.

*Great Britain* publishes as an addition to her White Papers (later called Blue Book) Sir E. Goschen's final report including a description of the last interview with the German Chancellor in which the now famous expression "a scrap of paper" occurs.

**Austria-Hungary :**

*From Paris*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 61

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.*

*(Translated from the French.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, August 8, 1914.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to go and see him in order to communicate to me that, according to positive information which has reached him, the Innsbruck Army Corps has been brought to the French frontier. M. Doumergue wishes to know without delay if this information is correct, and if it is so, what is the intention of the Imperial and Royal Government. As France is at war with Germany the despatch of our troops to the French frontier is, according to the views held by the Minister, not consistent with the existing condition of peace between Austria-Hungary and France. M. Dumaine is commissioned to make a similar communication to Your Excellency.

**Belgium :**

*From Paris*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 59

*Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Paris, August 8, 1914.*

I HAVE had the honour of speaking to the President of the Republic with respect to your telegram of yesterday. I had received it during the evening and had immediately communicated it to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. They asked for time to consider it before answering.

M. Poincaré has promised me to speak on this subject to-day to the Minister of the Colonies. At first sight he could see little difficulty in proclaiming the neutrality of the French Congo, but he nevertheless reserves his reply. He believes that acts of war have already taken place in the Ubangi. He has taken the opportunity to remind me that the protection accorded us by France extends also to our colonies and that we have nothing to fear.

Great Britain :

*From Berlin*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 160<sup>1</sup>

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.*

Sir,

*London, August 8, 1914.*

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant <sup>2</sup> I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow <sup>3</sup> at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be. "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date,<sup>4</sup> and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave

<sup>1</sup> This despatch was not contained in the original edition of the Blue Book. It contains Sir E. Goschen's recollections of his last day in Berlin.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 153, August 4. <sup>3</sup> German Secretary of State. <sup>4</sup> See No. 159, August 4.

his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow<sup>1</sup> expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated.<sup>2</sup> His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word — "neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded — just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow<sup>1</sup> wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for break-

<sup>1</sup> German Secretary of State.

<sup>2</sup> For the Chancellor's account of this interview see his speech in the Reichstag, June 5, 1916: "Sir Edward Goschen was during this interview so shaken to his depths that from a natural feeling of decency I have always refrained from speaking of it publicly, since what happened was personal and human."

ing solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 P.M. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never despatched.<sup>1</sup>

At about 9.30 P.M. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow<sup>2</sup> a written summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann<sup>3</sup> said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermann<sup>3</sup> left me, a flying sheet, issued by the *Berliner Tageblatt*, was circulated stating that Great Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before His Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the embassy was soon overpowered, and the attitude of the mob became more threatening. We took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing-room, where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was

<sup>1</sup> This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.

<sup>2</sup> German Secretary of State.

<sup>3</sup> German Under-Secretary of State.

getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happening. Herr von Jagow<sup>1</sup> at once informed the Chief of Police, and an adequate force of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantness occurred.

After order had been restored Herr von Jagow<sup>1</sup> came to see me and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behaviour of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not been authorised by the Government; in fact, the Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement should be issued, and he had replied, "Certainly not, until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision to that effect that only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbourhood of the embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to disturbances. It was the "pestilential '*Tageblatt*,'" which had somehow got hold of the news, that had upset his calculations. He had heard rumours that the mob had been excited to violence by gestures made and missiles thrown from the embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology could have been more full and complete.

On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor sent one of His Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message:—

"The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those titles."

I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery.

On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow<sup>1</sup> and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel handed me my passports — which I had earlier in the day demanded in writing — and told me that he had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood

<sup>1</sup> German Secretary of State.



that I preferred the route *viâ* the Hook of Holland to that *viâ* Copenhagen; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed to this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr von Jagow couched in the most friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such articles as time allowed.

The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter Station, while the embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrangements ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A retired colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds which thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped from insulting us; but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier.

Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behaviour of my staff under the most trying circumstances possible. One and all, they worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval and military attachés, secretaries, and the two young attachés buckled to their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside and inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring for advice and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support, often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so readily and cheerfully gave to me.

I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all by my American colleague, Mr. Gerard,<sup>1</sup> and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us and to make arrangements for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to himself, and his calmness and *savoir-faire* and his firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and able hands.

I have, etc.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

<sup>1</sup> American Ambassador in Berlin.

Sunday, August 9, 1914

*Austria-Hungary* denies the participation of her troops in the war against France.

*Belgium* receives a courteous note from Germany offering peace, the fortress of Liège having fallen into German hands.

*France* wishes to offer to Germany the neutrality of the possessions in the Congo basin in Africa.

**Austria-Hungary :**

*To Paris*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 62

*Count Berchtold to Count Szécsen at Paris.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, August 9, 1914.*

WITH reference to Your Excellency's telegram of the 8th instant.<sup>1</sup>

After conferring with the General Staff I authorise Your Excellency to inform the French Government that the information regarding the participation of our troops in the Franco-German war is a complete invention. I have expressed myself in a similar manner to M. Dumaine.

**Belgium :**

*From The Hague*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 60

*Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*The Hague, August 9, 1914.*

THE Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs has begged me to convey to you the following information, the United States Minister at Brussels having declined to do so :—

The fortress of Liège has been taken by assault after a brave defence. The German Government most deeply regret that bloody encounters should have resulted from the attitude of the Belgian Government towards Germany. Germany is not coming as an enemy into Belgium, it is only through the force of circumstances that she has had, owing to the military measures of France, to take the grave decision of entering Belgium and occupying Liège as a base for her further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has upheld the honour of its arms by its heroic resistance to a very superior force, the German Government beg the King of the Belgians and the Belgian Government to spare Belgium the further horrors of war. The German Government are ready for any compact with Belgium which can be reconciled with their arrangements with France. (See No. 70.) Germany once more gives her solemn assurance that it is not

<sup>1</sup> Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 61.

her intention to appropriate Belgian territory to herself and that such an intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is still ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so.

The United States Ambassador had asked his colleague to undertake this attempt at mediation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has accepted this mission without enthusiasm. I have undertaken it to oblige him.

*From Paris*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 61

*Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, August 9, 1914.*

THE French Government are strongly inclined to proclaim the neutrality of the possessions in the conventional basin of the Congo and are begging Spain to make the suggestion at Berlin.

**Monday, August 10, 1914**

*France breaks off diplomatic relations with Austria-Hungary.  
Belgium refuses the German offer of peace.*

**Austria-Hungary:**

*From Paris*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 63

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.*

*(Translated from the French.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, August 10, 1914.*

I HAVE received your telegram of the 9th August<sup>1</sup> and communicated at once the contents to M. Doumergue. The Minister, who had received a similar telegraphic report from M. Dumaine concerning his conversation with Your Excellency, admitted that our troops are not on the French frontier, but he maintains that he has positive information that an Austro-Hungarian army corps has been brought to Germany, and that this makes it possible for that Empire to withdraw her troops from those districts which are occupied by our soldiers, and that in the opinion of the Minister this amounts to a facilitation of German military operations. I repeatedly drew the attention of the Minister to the wording of the answer of Your Excellency, and he has admitted that it is not possible to speak of an effective participation of our troops in the Franco-German war, but he insisted that it is undeniable that our troops are present on German territory, and that this is equivalent to the provision of military assistance to Germany. In

<sup>1</sup> Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 62.

these circumstances he has authorised the French Ambassador at Vienna to ask for his passports without delay, and to leave Vienna to-day with the entire staff of the Embassy. The Minister informed me that in view of this position, my presence here can be of no use; indeed in view of the excitement of the populace it might give occasion to regrettable occurrences which he desired to avoid. He offered to place a train at my disposal from to-night onwards in order that I might leave France. I answered that it was impossible for me to receive instructions from Your Excellency before the evening, but that in view of the recall of M. Dumaine, I asked him to have my passport prepared.

**Belgium :**

*From The Hague*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 62

*Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*The Hague, August 10, 1914.*

IN response to a call on the telephone, yesterday evening at 9 o'clock, I went to the Department for Foreign Affairs.

Jonkheer Loudon told me that my German colleague had just left his room, and had handed him a document which the United States representative at Brussels had declined to forward to you.

The United States official in charge of the German Legation at Brussels stated that he had received no special instructions from Washington to intervene officially with the Belgian Government in the interest of Germany.

The United States Minister consequently telegraphed to his colleague at The Hague, who informed the German representative of Mr. Whitlock's refusal.

The German Government, therefore, took the initial step by approaching the United States Ambassador at Berlin.

In these circumstances, and in view of the urgency of these matters, Herr von Müller begged Jonkheer Loudon to act as the intermediary of the German Government in this negotiation with you.

His Excellency read me the German text of the document. I did not hide my astonishment at this attempt at mediation, and its poor chance of success in this form; but, solely in order to oblige the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, I promised to telegraph to you immediately; and this I did yesterday.

You will find the German document enclosed in original and translation.

Enclosure 1 in No. 62.

Enclosure 2 in No. 62.

(Translation)

DIE Festung Lüttich ist nach  
tapfrer Gegenwehr im Sturm ge-

THE fortress of Liège has been  
taken by assault after a brave

nommen worden. Die Deutsche Regierung bedauert es auf das tiefste, dass es infolge der Stellungnahme der Belgischen Regierung gegen Deutschland zu blütigen Zusammenstößen gekommen ist. Deutschland kommt nicht als Feind nach Belgien. Nur unter dem Zwang der Verhältnisse hat es angesichts der militärischen Massnahmen Frankreichs den schweren Entschluss fassen müssen, in Belgien einzurücken und Lüttich als Stützpunkt für seine weiteren militärischen Operationen besetzen zu müssen. Nachdem die Belgische Armee in heldenmutigem Widerstand gegen die grosse Überlegenheit ihre Waffenehre auf das glänzendste gewahrt hat, bittet die Deutsche Regierung seine Majestät den König und die Belgische Regierung, Belgien die weiteren Schrecken des Krieges zu ersparen. Die Deutsche Regierung ist zu jedem Abkommen mit Belgien bereit das sich irgendwie mit Rücksicht auf seine (*voir pièce No. 70*) Auseinandersetzung mit Frankreich vereinigen lässt. Deutschland versichert nochmals feierlichst, dass es nicht von der Absicht geleitet gewesen ist sich Belgisches Gebiet anzueignen, und dass ihm diese Absicht durchaus fern liegt. Deutschland ist noch immer bereit das Belgische Königreich unverzüglich zu räumen, sobald die Kriegslage es ihm gestattet. "Der hiesige Amerikanische Botschafter ist mit diesem Vermittlungsversuch seines Brüsseler Kollegen einverstanden."

defence. The German Government most deeply regret that bloody encounters should have resulted from the Belgian Government's attitude towards Germany. Germany is not coming as an enemy into Belgium. It is only through the force of circumstances that she has had, owing to the military measures of France, to take the grave decision of entering Belgium and occupying Liège as a base for her further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has upheld the honour of its arms in the most brilliant manner by its heroic resistance to a very superior force, the German Government beg the King of the Belgians and the Belgian Government to spare Belgium the horrors of war. The German Government are ready for any compact with Belgium which can in any way be reconciled with their arrangements with France. (See No. 70.) Germany gives once more her solemn assurance that she has not been animated by the intention of appropriating Belgian territory for herself, and that such an intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is still ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so.

The United States Ambassador here concurs in this attempt at mediation by his colleague in Brussels.

*To The Hague*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 63

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,  
Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 10, 1914.*

THE Belgian Government have received the proposals made to them by the German Government through the intermediary of the Netherlands Government. They will forward a reply shortly.

(See No. 62 Enclosures.)

*To The Hague*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 64

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,  
Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 10, 1914.*

DOUBT exists as to the meaning of the word "*Auseinandersetzung*," which you translate by "arrangement." Please ascertain whether the German Government have in mind any arrangements which we may have come to with France, or a settlement of the dispute between France and Germany.

*To London, St. Petersburg, and Paris*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 65

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the British,  
Russian, and French Ministers at Brussels.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 10, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the Belgian Minister at The Hague, at the request of the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, has forwarded to us the following proposal from the German Government. (See No. 62, Enclosure 2.)

The Belgian Government propose to return the following reply to this communication :—

(Translation.)

"La proposition que nous fait le Gouvernement allemand reproduit la proposition qui avait été formulée dans l'ultimatum du 2 août. Fidèle à ses devoirs internationaux, la Belgique ne peut que réitérer sa réponse à cet ultimatum, d'autant plus que

"The proposal made to us by the German Government repeats the proposal formulated in their ultimatum of August 2. Faithful to her international obligations, Belgium can only reiterate her reply to that ultimatum, the more so as since August 3 her

depuis le 3 août sa neutralité a été violée, qu'une guerre douloureuse a été portée sur son territoire, et que les garants de sa neutralité ont loyalement et immédiatement répondu à son appel." neutrality has been violated, a distressing war has been waged on her territory, and the guarantors of her neutrality have responded loyally and without delay to her appeal."

The Belgian Government consider that the Powers guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium should have cognisance of these documents.

*To London, Paris, and St. Petersburg*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 66

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 10, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you of the circumstances which led to the departure of the Belgian representative from Luxemburg.

The General Officer commanding the German troops in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg informed the German Minister in that town, on August 8, of the desire of the military authorities for the departure of the Belgian representative at the Grand Ducal Court.

Herr von Buch addressed to Monsieur Eyschen, President of the Government, a note, of which the following is a translation : —

"Your Excellency,

*"Luxemburg, August 8, 1914.*

"In consequence of the completely hostile attitude adopted by Belgium towards Germany, the military authorities find themselves obliged to insist upon the departure of the Belgian Minister from Luxemburg.

"His Excellency the General Officer commanding begs Count van den Steen de Jehay to arrange his journey home in such a way that he may be able, within twenty-four hours, to see General von Ploetz at Coblenz, with a view to settling the details of the further stages of his journey. It is impossible for him to travel except via Trèves-Coblenz.

(Signed) "VON BUCH."

Monsieur Eyschen forwarded this note the same day to Count van den Steen de Jehay, accompanied by a letter in the following terms : —

"Sir,

*"Luxemburg, August 8, 1914.*

"I greatly regret to have to communicate to you the enclosed copy of a note from the German Minister, informing me that the German military authorities demand your departure.

"You will find in it the conditions which they attach thereto.

"Herr von Buch told me that the military authorities advise you



to travel by railway, as an attempt to carry out your journey by motor would expose you to being too frequently stopped for reasons connected with the control of the roads. But the choice is left to you.

"The German Minister will come to me for your answer.

"I cannot tell you how painful it is to me to fulfil my present task. I shall never forget the pleasant relations which have existed between us, and I hope that your journey may be carried out under the best possible conditions.

(Signed) "EYSCHEN."

The Belgian Government, considering that the Grand Ducal Government had no choice in their attitude, and that the course they had been obliged to adopt in no way implied any discourteous intentions towards the King of the Belgians or towards Belgium, decided that there was no reason, in these circumstances, for requesting the Luxemburg Chargé d'Affaires to leave Belgium.

**Tuesday, August 11, 1914**

*Austria-Hungary endeavors to maintain friendly relations with Great Britain.*

**Austria-Hungary :**

*To London*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 64

*Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.*

*Vienna, August 11, 1914.*

THE French Government have commissioned their Ambassador here to ask for his passports on the ground that an Austro-Hungarian army corps has been sent to Germany, whereby it has been possible for the German army staff to withdraw their troops from those German districts which are occupied by our contingents. This measure of our general staff indicates in his view the grant of military assistance to Germany.

Your Excellency should bring to the knowledge of the British Government that according to information obtained from a reliable source the assertion made by the French Government is unfounded.

**Belgium :**

*From Washington*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 67

*Mr. Whitlock, United States Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 11, 1914.*

THE United States Legation received a telegram to-day from Washington, conveying the information that the United States Government had, at the request of the German Government, con-

sented, as a matter of international courtesy, to undertake the protection of German subjects in Belgium.

In accordance with the instructions contained in this telegram, we will, therefore, if you see no objection, undertake to use our good and friendly offices with the Belgian Government for the protection of German subjects. The pleasant relations which we have had with you in this matter up to the present convince me that we may continue them with the same object on the same pleasant footing.

*From London .*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 68

*Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 11, 1914.*

I HAVE telegraphed to Sir E. Gray the German communication and the proposed reply.

I have received instructions to express to your Excellency the entire concurrence of His Britannic Majesty's Government. The latter can only declare their approval of the terms of the reply which the Belgian Government propose to give to this attempt to sow discord between the Powers at present united for the defence of the treaties violated by Germany.

*From Paris*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 69

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 11, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the French Government give their entire concurrence to the reply which the Belgian Government propose to return to the new German ultimatum.

That reply is one which was to be expected from a Government and a people who have so heroically resisted the hateful violation of their territory.

France will continue to fulfil her duties as a guaranteeing Power of Belgian neutrality and as a faithful friend of Belgium.

(See No. 65)

Wednesday, August 12, 1914

*Great Britain declares war on Austria-Hungary.*

**Austria-Hungary :**

*From London*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK NO. 65

*Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.*

*(Translated from the French.)*

*(Telegraphic.)*

*London, August 12, 1914.*

I HAVE just received from Sir E. Grey the following communication : —

At the request of the French Government, who are not in a position to communicate direct with your Government, I have to make to you the following communication : —

The Austro-Hungarian Government, after declaring war on Servia, and thus taking the first initiative to the hostilities in Europe, have, without any provocation on the part of the Government of the French Republic, extended the war to France : —

(1) After Germany had in succession declared war on Russia and France, the Austro-Hungarian Government have joined in the conflict by declaring war against Russia, which was already fighting on the side of France.

(2) According to information from numerous trustworthy sources Austria has sent troops to the German frontier under circumstances which amounted to a direct menace to France.

In view of these facts the French Government are obliged to inform the Austro-Hungarian Government that they will take all measures which make it possible for them to answer these actions and these threats.

Sir E. Grey adds : —

As a breach with France has been brought about in this way the British Government feel themselves obliged to announce that Great Britain and Austria-Hungary will be in a state of war as from 12 o'clock to-night.

**Belgium :**

*From The Hague*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 70

*Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*(Telegram.)*

*The Hague, August 12, 1914.*

THE German text contained a mistake : instead of "*seine Auseinandersetzung*," it should read "*ihre*," and thus be translated "their conflict with France."

(See No. 64.)

*To The Hague*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 71

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 12, 1914.*

PLEASE communicate the following telegram to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs: —

“The proposal made to us by the German Government repeats the proposal which was formulated in the ultimatum of August 2nd. Faithful to her international obligations, Belgium can only reiterate her reply to that ultimatum, the more so as since August 3rd, her neutrality has been violated, a distressing war has been waged on her territory, and the guarantors of her neutrality have responded loyally and without delay to her appeal.

**Thursday, August 13, 1914**

**Belgium :**

*From St. Petersburg*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 72

*M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*St. Petersburg, August 13, 1914.*

PLEASE thank the Belgian Government for their communication, and express to them the pleasure which the Russian Government feel at their firm and dignified attitude, upon which they are heartily to be congratulated.

(See No. 65.)

*From The Hague*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 73

*Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*The Hague, August 13, 1914.*

I HAD the honour to receive your telegram of yesterday, and I at once communicated to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Belgian reply to the second German proposal.

His Excellency undertook to forward the Belgian communication to the German Minister forthwith.

(See No. 71.)

[Of Friday, August 14, and Saturday, August 15, no despatches are published.]

**Sunday, August 16, 1914**

*France changes her attitude about not carrying the war into Africa.*

*Serbia publishes the recollections of her former Minister in Vienna of the events leading up to the war.*

**Belgium :**

*From Paris*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 74

*Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Paris, August 16, 1914.*

IN the course of a conversation which I had this morning with M. de Margerie, I turned the conversation to colonial affairs and to the action which you had instructed me to take in your telegram and your despatch of the 7th instant.

M. de Margerie reminded me that the French Government had approached Spain, but the latter had not answered before knowing the views of Great Britain. It seems that the latter has still given no answer.

M. de Margerie considered that in view of the present situation Germany should be attacked wherever possible; he believes that such is also the opinion of Great Britain, who certainly has claims to satisfy; France wishes to get back that part of the Congo which she had been compelled to give up in consequence of the Agadir incident.

M. de Margerie added that a success would not be difficult to obtain.

(See Nos. 57 and 58.)

**Serbia :**

*From Vienna*

SERBIAN BLUE BOOK No. 52

*M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Nish, August 3/16, 1914.*

FROM June 17/30 the Serbian Legation at Vienna was practically surrounded by police and gendarmes, while the staff were under constant police supervision. Our movements and our communications with the outer world were, as you can imagine, rendered extremely difficult; the attitude of the population towards the Legation and its staff was inclined to be menacing.

After the beginning of July (o.s.) even telegraphic communication with you became difficult, while matters developed with such rapidity

that I was unable to report to you some of the events which preceded our armed conflict with Austria-Hungary. I accordingly do so now.

Up to the end of June (o.s.) the whole question of the Serajevo outrage appeared to be developing normally. At the commencement of July, however, a change took place as regards the question of the consequences of the Serajevo affair. There were no tangible proofs that a radical change had taken place, but it was to some extent indicated by certain vague signs and symptoms which betrayed the existence of some hidden intentions. First of all, the Vienna and Budapest press, in conformity with instructions issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, ceased to publish reports of the magisterial enquiry relating to the Serajevo outrage. The press began also to represent the whole matter as a question which must be settled between Serbia and Austria-Hungary alone — eventually by war.

Moreover, statements to this effect were communicated to the leading Vienna newspapers by the German Embassy. Exceptions were: the semi-official *Fremdenblatt*, which was, in general, more moderate in the tone of its articles; *Die Zeit*; and the *Arbeiter Zeitung*.

Simultaneously with this new attitude on the part of the press, a very unsettled condition of affairs developed on the Bourse, such as it had not witnessed during the whole course of recent events in the Balkans. In private conversations also and in high financial circles the "settlement with Serbia" was declared to be the only way out of the general financial and economic crisis prevailing in Austria-Hungary ever since the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under secret instructions it was ordered that gold should be gradually withdrawn from circulation, and a corresponding rise in exchange took place.

A further indication was the clumsy explanation given of the reasons which had induced the Minister for War, Krobatin, and the Chief of the General Staff, Hetzendorf, to interrupt their leave of absence and return to Vienna. The Chief of Staff constantly travelled to the south, east, and north of Austria, and at that time had had an interview with the Chief of the German General Staff, Count Moltke, in Bohemia, I believe, at Carlsbad.

All the reserves which had been called out for the June manoeuvres in Bosnia and Herzegovina were kept with the colours beyond the stipulated period.

The number of soldiers belonging to the permanent establishment in Austria-Hungary allowed to go home on short leave of absence in order to gather in the harvest, and to attend to other private affairs, was much larger than is usually the case; at the same time those whose duties were of a military-administrative nature were called upon in ever increasing numbers.

Another indication was the non-committal nature of the answers given to several interpellations in the Hungarian Diet by the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Tisza, a statesman who is very clear in his political statements.

The attitude of the Ballplatz was especially characteristic. None of the usual weekly receptions by Count Berchtold was held. They suddenly ceased at the Ballplatz to discuss the Serajevo outrage with the representatives of foreign countries; or, if discussion did arise, it seemed as if instructions had been issued on the subject; that is to say, it was mentioned to everyone in such a manner as to dispel all apprehensions and suspicion that Austria-Hungary was preparing some serious step against Serbia. They acknowledged that some step would be undertaken at Belgrade as soon as the results of the magisterial enquiry should have sufficiently established the connection between Belgrade and the Serajevo outrage. But at the same time it was said that this step would not be such as to give rise to any uneasiness. The Russian Ambassador, who spoke several times on the subject with Count Forgach, in the absence of Count Berchtold, was unable to discover the true nature of Austria's intentions. M. Schebeko told me that Count Szápáry, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Petrograd, who, for family reasons, was at that time stopping in Vienna, had said to him that the step to be taken at Belgrade would be of conciliatory character. According to M. Schebeko, Count Szápáry had also assured M. Sazonof that the intended Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia would not be such as to cause Russia any dissatisfaction. The French Ambassador, M. Dumaine, who, under instructions from his Government, had drawn the attention of the Ballplatz to the complications which might arise should the eventual demands which it was intended to make of Serbia not be of a moderate nature, was told by the principal Under-Secretary Baron Macchio, that the Austro-Hungarian Government, appreciating the friendly and conciliatory action of the French Government, would only put forward such demands, embodied in a note to the Serbian Government, as Serbia would be able to accept without difficulty. I drew the attention of the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente to the fact that such an assurance might well conceal the true nature of the intentions of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and that the Powers of the Triple Entente might then be confronted by certain *faits accomplis* which Europe would be compelled to accept in order to avoid a general European war.

The line followed by the Ballplatz was, moreover, comparatively successful, as all those of my colleagues whom I saw during that period were more or less dissuaded from believing that Austria-Hungary contemplated any serious step which could provoke European complications. Many of the members of the diplomatic body were so firmly convinced of this that they were preparing at that time to quit Vienna on long leave of absence at various watering places.

Nevertheless, it was known that a note was being drawn up at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs which would contain the accusations against Serbia, and also the demands of Austria-Hungary. This task was entrusted to Count Forgach, formerly Austro-Hungarian Minister in Serbia. At the same time it was universally believed that of the foreign representatives, the German Ambassador, Herr von



Tschirsky, was the only one who was kept informed of the note even in its minutest details, while I had reason to believe that he was also co-operating in drafting it. In view of the above, the representatives of the friendly Powers agreed with me in thinking that the note would impose very difficult terms on Serbia, but that there would be no unacceptable demands. When the contents of the note were published all of them were surprised, not to say dumfounded.

In the same way as the contents of the note were kept secret, a similar amount of secrecy was observed in regard to the date of its presentation. On the very day that the note was presented at Belgrade, the French Ambassador had a prolonged conversation with the Principal Under-Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs — Count Berchtold was again absent at Ischl — on the subject of the note. Yet Baron Macchio did not tell M. Dumaine that the note would be presented at Belgrade that afternoon, and published in the newspapers on the following day.

On the publication in the Vienna papers on the morning of July 11/24 of the contents of the note, which Baron Giesl had presented to the Serbian Government, a feeling of dejection came over the friends both of Serbia and of the peace of Europe. It was only then realised that serious European complications might ensue, though it was not believed that it was the intention of the Austro-Hungarian Government to provoke them. This feeling of depression was increased by the tone of the articles in the Viennese newspapers, with the exception of *Die Zeit* and *Arbeiter Zeitung*, and by demonstrations in the streets, which clearly showed that war would be a most welcome solution — a war with Serbia, of course.

On that day, after having two or three conversations, I realised that an armed conflict between Serbia and the Dual Monarchy was inevitable, even should Serbia accept all the demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian Note, from the first to the last. The attitude of the people in the streets towards our Legation was such that I expected even personal attacks upon the members of the staff.

The French Ambassador, the British Ambassador, and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires held the view that the step taken by Austria-Hungary should be considered not as a note but as an ultimatum. They disapproved of the form, the contents, and the time *limit of the note*; they also declared it to be unacceptable.

In the course of conversation with them on the subject of the note I pointed out that those passages in it which dealt with the order by the King to the Army, with the dismissal of officers and Government officials, and especially that which referred to the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian officials in the "Suppression of the subversive movement in Serbia against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy," would be unacceptable as not being compatible with the dignity and sovereignty of Serbia. Only a victorious war, I said, could enforce the acceptance of conditions which were so humiliating to an independent State. In reply to their enquiry whether it would not perhaps be better to accept the conditions and avoid war

for the present, I said that the Austro-Hungarian Note, which amounted in fact to a declaration of war upon Serbia, was worded in such a way that, even if Serbia should accept all the conditions without reserve, Austria-Hungary would still find an excuse for her army to march into Serbia at any time. It was in the belief that the conflict would be limited to Serbia and Austria-Hungary that Austria-Hungary had drafted such a note.

To M. Dumaine, Sir M. de Bunsen, and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, *the unexpected character* of the note was the cause not only of surprise but also of alarm, in view of the complications which they feared might ensue. The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, previously to the presentation of the note, had stated on several occasions to his colleagues that Russia could not remain indifferent to any step taken by Austria-Hungary, which might have as an object the humiliation of Serbia. He also expressed the same view at the Ballplatz. Hence the apprehension felt by the three Ambassadors, who at once foresaw the possibility of war between Russia and Austria-Hungary.

The day after the note was presented, Prince Koudacheff went to see Count Berchtold to discuss the matter. In reply to his statement, that the note as it stood was unacceptable, and that Russia could not watch with indifference the humiliation of Serbia, Count Berchtold said that Austria-Hungary had been obliged to take this step, as her very existence was threatened; that she could not withdraw nor alter the demands made in the note, and that he considered that the matter in dispute concerned Serbia and Austria-Hungary alone and that no other Power had any grounds for interference.

Count Berchtold's reply did not allow of any further doubts as to the intention of Austria-Hungary to chastise Serbia by force of arms without the consent of the European concert. From conversations which I had at that time with the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente — who during the whole of that difficult period showed every kindness and attention to me and to the staff of the Legation — it seemed quite clear that Austria-Hungary had been assured, and felt convinced, that the Serbo-Austro-Hungarian conflict would be localised, as she would otherwise not have decided upon a note which undoubtedly meant war. It was also clear that Austria-Hungary was confirmed in this impression especially — and perhaps solely — by Herr von Tschirsky, the German Ambassador in Vienna. Herr von Tschirsky was the only one who thought, and even stated publicly, that Russia would remain quiet while Austria-Hungary carried out her punitive expedition against Serbia. He declared that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would easily control the Panslavists, in the same way as he had done last year, and that Russia was not disposed at the moment to begin a discussion of the many vexed questions in Europe and Asia which were her main concern. It was necessary, according to Herr von Tschirsky, to give Serbia a lesson. Russia had no right to interfere. As far as Germany, he said, was concerned, she was in the fullest sense of the word conscious of

what she was doing in giving Austria-Hungary her support in the matter.

These statements of Herr von Tschirsky have induced many to hold the opinion that Germany desired to provoke a European war, on the ground that it was better to have war with Russia before the latter had completed her military reorganisation, *i.e.*, before the spring of 1917. This point of view had formerly been freely discussed and even written about in Vienna. "The longer the matter is postponed the smaller will become the chances of success of the Triple Alliance." On the other hand, rumours from the most authoritative diplomatic sources in Berlin reached me in Vienna, to the effect that the Wilhelmstrasse did not approve of Austria's policy on this question, and that Herr von Tschirsky has exceeded the instructions given to him.

The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, on his return from Petrograd, did his utmost at the Ballplatz to obtain an extension of the brief time limit given the Serbian Government for a reply to the Austro-Hungarian Note, and to discover some way which might lead to an exchange of views between Vienna and Petrograd in regard to the whole question, but until July 13/26, when we met, his efforts had proved unavailing. From the conversations I then had with him, I gathered that the Austro-Hungarian Note, in its contents and in its form, was regarded as a challenge to Russia and not to Serbia, and that Russia would not permit the humiliation of Serbia, even if war were to be the price.

On the day of my departure from Vienna, M. Schebeko told me that, in spite of the many great difficulties to be overcome, there was a prospect of arriving at a solution by which an armed conflict might be avoided by means of discussion between the Russian Government and Count Szápáry. A feeling of depression, however, prevailed in Vienna as soon as reports began to be spread that the Austro-Serbian conflict would bring about a war between Russia and the Dual Monarchy.

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Monday, August 17, 1914

*Great Britain declines the Belgian proposal not to carry the war into Africa.*

**Belgium :**

*From London*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 75

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*London, August 17, 1914.*

IN reply to your despatch of August 7th, I have the honour to inform you that the British Government cannot agree to the Bel-

gian proposal to respect the neutrality of the belligerent powers in the conventional basin of the Congo.

German troops from German East Africa have already taken the offensive against the British Central African Protectorate. Furthermore, British troops have already attacked the German port of Dar-es-Salaam, where they have destroyed the wireless telegraphy station.

In these circumstances, the British Government, even if they were convinced from the political and strategical point of view of the utility of the Belgian proposal, would be unable to adopt it.

The British Government believe that the forces they are sending to Africa will be sufficient to overcome all opposition. They will take every step in their power to prevent any risings of the native population.

France is of the same opinion as Great Britain on account of German activity which has been noticed near Bonar and Ekododo.

(See Nos. 57 and 58.)

[Of Tuesday, and Wednesday, August 18, and 19, no despatches have been published.]

#### Thursday, August 20, 1914

*Austria-Hungary* receives from Japan a copy of the latter's ultimatum to Germany.

**Austria-Hungary :**

*From Tokio*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 66

*The Japanese Ambassador to Count Berchtold.*  
(Translated from the English.)

My Lord,

Vienna, August 20, 1914.

YOUR Excellency will doubtless have already received information from his Excellency Baron Müller of the communication which was addressed to the German Government by my Government on the 15th inst. Nevertheless I take the liberty, although I have not received any instructions to do so, to enclose herewith for your Excellency's personal information, a copy of a telegram bearing on the matter which I have received from Tokio.

#### *Enclosure*

The Japanese Government, who have taken the present situation into their earnest consideration, have, in accordance with a complete understanding made with the British Government, for the purpose of strengthening and maintaining general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia, which is one of the aims of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, decided to take common action with Great Britain in giving effect to

the necessary measures for this purpose. Nevertheless, before proceeding with measures of this kind, the Japanese Government have thought it proper to address a friendly request to the German Government, which was communicated to them on the 15th August, 1914, in the following words : —

“(1) All German warships must be withdrawn at once from the waters in the neighbourhood of Japan and China. The ships that cannot be withdrawn must be disarmed.

“(2) The German Government must unconditionally and without compensation hand over to the Japanese authorities the whole of the leased territory of Kiao-chau before the 16th September, 1914, for the purpose of handing this territory back to China.

“The Japanese Government have informed the German Government that, in case an answer intimating unconditional compliance with the above-mentioned demands is not received before Sunday, the 23rd, at mid-day, they will proceed as appears necessary to them.

“It is earnestly to be hoped that the above-mentioned demands, for a reply to which so ample time is given, will be agreed to by the German Government; should they, however, not comply with this demand, a course of action which would be deplored, the Japanese Government will be obliged to take the necessary measures to attain their end.”

The grounds on which the Imperial Government base their present attitude is, as already mentioned, none other than to maintain the common interests of Japan and Great Britain, which are set out in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, by establishing a basis of a lasting peace in the territory of Eastern Asia. The Japanese Government have in no respect the intention of embarking upon a policy of territorial expansion, nor do they entertain any other selfish designs. For this reason the Imperial Japanese Government are resolved to respect with the greatest care the interests of third Powers in Eastern Asia and to refrain from injuring them in any degree.

[Of Friday, August 21, no despatches have been published.]

### **Saturday, August 22, 1914**

*Austria-Hungary declares war on Belgium.*

**Austria-Hungary :**

*To Brussels*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK NO. 67<sup>1</sup>

*Count Berchtold to Count Clary at Brussels.*

*(Translated from the French.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, August 22, 1914.*

I ASK your Excellency to communicate the following to the Royal Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs at once : —

“I have the honour to bring the following to the knowledge of

<sup>1</sup> See Belgian Gray Book No. 77, August 28.

your Excellency in accordance with the instructions of our Government: —

Whereas Belgium, having refused to accept the proposals made to her on several occasions by Germany, is affording her military assistance to France and Great Britain, both of which Powers have declared war upon Austria-Hungary, and whereas as has just been proved, Austrian and Hungarian nationals in Belgium have had to submit, under the very eyes of the Belgian authorities, to treatment contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity, and inadmissible even towards subjects of an enemy State, therefore Austria-Hungary finds herself obliged to break off diplomatic relations, and considers herself, from this moment, in a state of war with Belgium.

I am leaving the country with the staff of the Legation, and I am entrusting the protection of my countrymen to the Minister of the United States in Belgium.

Count Errembault de Dudzele has received his passports from the Imperial and Royal Government.

**Sunday, August 23, 1914**

*Germany* refuses to reply to the Japanese ultimatum and gives the Japanese Ambassador his passports.

**Austria-Hungary:**

*From Berlin*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 68

*Prince Hohenlohe to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 23, 1914.*

THE Foreign Office has informed the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires that the Imperial German Government do not intend to send an answer to the Japanese ultimatum. The German Government have instructed their Ambassador at Tokio, after the expiration of the time allowed by Japan at 12 o'clock to-day, to leave Japan, and they will, at the same time, furnish the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires here with his passports.

At mid-day the Chargé d'Affaires was furnished with his passports, and he will leave Berlin early to-morrow morning with the staff of the Embassy.

**Monday, August 24, 1914**

*Austria-Hungary* makes common cause with Germany against Japan.

**Austria-Hungary:**

*To Tokio*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 69

*Count Berchtold to Freiherr von Müller at Tokio.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, August 24, 1914.*

THE Commander of S.M.S. *Elisabeth* has been instructed to take part in the fighting at Tsingtau. I ask your Excellency, in view

Of the action taken by Japan against our Ally, the German Empire, to ask for your passports. You should inform the Consulates, and you should travel to America with the colony and the staff of the Embassy and of the Consulates. Your Excellency should entrust the protection of our countrymen and their interests to the American Ambassador. The Japanese Ambassador here is being furnished with his passports.

### Wednesday, August 26, 1914

**Belgium :**

*From Elizabethville*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 76

*M. Tombeur, Belgian Vice-Governor of the Katanga, to M. Renkin; Belgian Minister for the Colonies.*

(Telegram.)

*Elizabethville, August 26, 1914.*

THE Germans are continuing their skirmishes on Tanganyika and attacked the port of Lukuga, on August 22nd. Two of their natives were killed and two wounded. Fresh attacks are expected.

[Of Thursday, August 27, 1914, no despatches have been published.]

### Friday, August 28, 1914

**Belgium :**

*From The Hague*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 77<sup>1</sup>

*Count Clary and Aldringen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Forwarded through the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs.)

(Telegram.)

*The Hague, August 28, 1914.*

ON the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to inform your Excellency as follows :—

(Translation.)

“Vu que la Belgique, après avoir refusé d’accepter les propositions qui lui avaient été adressées à plusieurs reprises par l’Allemagne, prête sa coopération militaire à la France et à la Grande-Bretagne, qui, toutes deux ont déclaré la guerre à l’Au-

“Whereas Belgium, having refused to accept the proposals made to her on several occasions by Germany, is affording her military assistance to France and Great Britain, both of which Powers have declared war upon Austria-Hungary, and whereas

<sup>1</sup> See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 67, August 22. No reason appears why this despatch is printed here with a delay of six days.



triche-Hongrie, et en présence du fait que, comme il vient d'être constaté, les ressortissants autrichiens et hongrois se trouvant en Belgique ont, sous les yeux des autorités Royales, dû subir un traitement contraire aux exigences les plus primitives de l'humanité et inadmissibles même vis-à-vis des sujets d'un État ennemi, l'Autriche-Hongrie se voit dans la nécessité de rompre les relations diplomatiques et se considère dès ce moment en état de guerre avec la Belgique. Je quitte le pays avec le personnel de la légation et confie la protection de mes administrés au Ministre des États-Unis d'Amérique en Belgique. De la part du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal les passeports sont remis au Comte Errembault de Dudzeele.

(Signé) "CLARY."

as has just been proved, Austrian and Hungarian nationals in Belgium have had to submit, under the very eyes of the Belgian authorities, to treatment contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity and inadmissible even towards subjects of an enemy State, therefore Austria finds herself obliged to break off diplomatic relations and considers herself from this moment in a state of war with Belgium. I am leaving the country with the staff of the legation and I am entrusting the protection of Austrian interests to the United States Minister in Belgium. The Austro-Hungarian Government are forwarding his passports to Count Errembault de Dudzeele."

### Saturday, August 29, 1914

*Belgium* defends herself against the charge of having committed, previous to August 1, "certain hostile acts" against Germany.

**Belgium :**

*To The Hague*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK No. 78

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

(Telegram.)

*Antwerp, August 29, 1914.*

PLEASE inform the Austrian Legation through the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I have received Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Belgium, and add the following : —

"La Belgique a toujours entretenu des relations d'amitié avec tous ses voisins sans distinction. Elle a scrupuleusement rempli les devoirs que la neutralité lui impose. Si elle n'a pas cru

"Belgium has always entertained friendly relations with all her neighbours without distinction. She had scrupulously fulfilled the duties imposed upon her by her neutrality. If she

ouvoir accepter les propositions de l'Allemagne, c'est que celles-ci avaient pour objet la violation des engagements qu'elle a pris à la face de l'Europe, engagements qui ont été les conditions de la création du Royaume de Belgique. Elle n'a pas cru qu'un peuple, quelque faible qu'il soit, puisse méconnaître ses devoirs et sacrifier son honneur en s'inclinant devant la force. Le Gouvernement a attendu, non seulement les délais de l'ultimatum, mais la violation de son territoire par les troupes allemandes avant de faire appel à la France et à l'Angleterre, garantes de sa neutralité au même titre que l'Allemagne et l'Autriche-Hongrie, pour coopérer au nom et en vertu des traités à la défense du territoire belge.

“En repoussant par les armes les envahisseurs, elle n'a même pas accompli un acte d'hostilité aux termes de l'article 10 de la Convention de La Haye sur les droits et devoirs des Puissances neutres.

“L'Allemagne a reconnu elle-même que son agression constitue une violation du droit des gens, et ne pouvant la justifier elle a invoqué son intérêt stratégique.

“La Belgique oppose un démenti formel à l'affirmation que les ressortissants autrichiens et hongrois auraient subi en Belgique un traitement contraire aux exigences les plus primitives de l'humanité.

“Le Gouvernement Royal a donné, dès le début des hostilités, les ordres les plus stricts quant à la sauvegarde des personnes et des propriétés austro-hongroises.

(Signé) “DAVIGNON.”

has not been able to accept Germany's proposals, it is because those proposals contemplated the violation of her engagements toward Europe, engagements which form the conditions of the creation of the Belgian Kingdom. She has been unable to admit that a people, however weak they may be, can fail in their duty and sacrifice their honour by yielding to force. The Government have waited, not only until the ultimatum had expired, but also until Belgian territory had been violated by German troops, before appealing to France and Great Britain, guarantors of her neutrality, under the same terms as are Germany and Austria-Hungary, to co-operate in the name and in virtue of the treaties in defence of Belgian territory. By repelling the invaders by force of arms, she has not even committed an hostile act as laid down by the provisions of article 10 of The Hague Convention respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers.

“Germany herself has recognised that her attack constitutes a violation of international law, and, being unable to justify it, she has pleaded her strategical interests.

“Belgium formally denies the allegation that Austrian and Hungarian nationals have suffered treatment in Belgium contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity.

“The Belgian Government, from the very commencement of hostilities, have issued the strictest orders for the protection of Austro-Hungarian persons and property.”

*To Belgian Ministers Abroad*

BELGIAN GRAY BOOK NO. 79

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers abroad.*

Sir, *Antwerp, August 29, 1914.*

UNDER date of the 17th August, I addressed a despatch<sup>1</sup> to the Belgian Minister at London, in which I felt bound to call attention to certain allegations made by the German Government which are mentioned in the Blue Book<sup>2</sup> recently published by the British Government.

I have the honour to enclose for your information a copy of the despatch in question and of its enclosures.

I request that you will bring its contents to the notice of the Government to which you are accredited.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 79.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count de La-laing, Belgian Minister at London.*

Sir, *Brussels, August 17, 1914.*

THE Blue Book recently published by the British Government contains (see No. 122, p. 92) the text of a telegram despatched from Berlin on the 31st July by Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, in which the following passage occurs:—

"It appears from what he [his Excellency the Secretary of State] said, that the German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already."

The incident to which the German Secretary of State alluded in his conversation with Sir E. Goschen, and which he considered as a hostile act on the part of Belgium, doubtless refers to the application of the Royal decree of the 30th July, which provisionally prohibited the export from Belgium of certain products. As you will see from the explanation in the following paragraph, the incident with which we are reproached has in no wise the character which Germany has wished to attribute to it.

The Royal decrees dated the 30th July and published in the *Moniteur belge* the following day forbade, provisionally, the export, both by land and by sea, of a series of products, more especially of cereals. On the 31st July the German Minister at Brussels called my attention to the fact that the Antwerp customs were detaining cargoes of grain addressed to Germany, which, as they were merely transhipped in our port, were in reality only in *transit*. Herr von

<sup>1</sup> Not previously printed.

<sup>2</sup> British Blue Book No. 122, July 31, printed under date of August 1.

Below Saleske requested that the vessels carrying these cargoes should be allowed to depart freely. The very day on which the German Minister's request was received, the Foreign Office brought the matter to the notice of the Ministry of Finance, and the following day, the 2nd August, that Department informed us that instructions had been forwarded to the Belgian Customs giving full and entire satisfaction to Germany.

I cannot do better than enclose, for your information, copies of the correspondence exchanged on this subject with Herr Below Saleske. You will observe that nothing in our attitude can be taken as showing any hostile dispositions towards Germany; the steps taken by the Belgian Government at that time were nothing more than those simple precautions which it is the right and duty of every State to adopt in such exceptional circumstances.

It would be as well that you should address a communication to the British Government in order to explain the real facts of the case.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 79.

*Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Brussels, July 31, 1914.*

I AM informed from Antwerp that the Customs have forbidden the despatch of vessels containing cargoes of grain for Germany.

In view of the fact that it is not in this case a question of the *export* of grain, but of grain in *transit*, the goods in question having been merely transshipped at Antwerp, I have the honour to ask your good offices in order that the vessels in question may be allowed to leave for Germany.

At the same time I beg your Excellency to inform me if the port of Antwerp is closed for the transit of those goods specified in the *Moniteur* of to-day.

Awaiting your Excellency's reply at your earliest possible convenience, I have, etc.

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Enclosure 3 in No. 79.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 1, 1914.*

IN reply to your Excellency's note of the 31st July, I have the honour to inform you that the Belgian decree of the 30th July concerns only the export and not the transit of the products mentioned.

I at once communicated your note to the Minister of Finance and begged him to issue precise instructions to the Customs officials in order that any error in the application of the above-mentioned decree might be avoided.

Enclosure 4 in No. 79.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels.*

Sir,

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

WITH reference to the note which your Excellency was good enough to address to me on the 31st July, I have the honour to inform you that the Minister of Finance has instructed the Customs that the prohibitions established by the Royal decrees of the 30th July last, only apply to actual exports, and do not, therefore, extend to goods regularly declared in transit at the time of import. Moreover, when duty-free goods are declared to be for actual consumption, although they are really intended for export, they are commonly the object of special declarations of free entry which are considered as transit documents. In short, if it should happen that such goods had been declared as for consumption without restriction, as though they were to remain in the country, the Customs would still allow them to leave the country as soon as it had been duly established by despatch receipts, bills of lading, etc., that they were to be exported forthwith in transit.

I would add that the export of grain with which your note deals was authorised on the 1st August.

(See note, page 509.)

**Tuesday, September 1, 1914**

*Great Britain publishes as an addition to her White Papers (later Blue Book) Sir Maurice de Bunsen's, former British Ambassador in Vienna, recollections of the events of the last days preceding the war.*

*From Vienna*

BRITISH BLUE BOOK No. 161

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador in Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.*

Sir,

London, September 1, 1914.

THE rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now to add a few comments.

The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note to Serbia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except Herr von Tschirsky,<sup>1</sup> who must have been aware of the tenour if not of the actual words of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see through the veil. On the 22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs,

<sup>1</sup> German Ambassador at Vienna.

by whom he was left under the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, and that the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the second of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under-Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me on the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presentation about the time we were speaking.

So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days when events compelled him to return. It might have been supposed that Duke Avarna, Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtold<sup>1</sup> during this critical time. In point of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on the 15th July the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed to you the following day. It is true that during all this time the *Neue Freie Presse* and other leading Viennese newspapers were using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Servia. The official *Fremdenblatt*, however, was more cautious, and till the note was published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European complications.

On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by Servia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known later in the evening that the Servian reply had been rejected and that Baron Giesl<sup>2</sup> had broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning.

The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most part of organised processions through the principal streets ending up at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations against the Russian Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the principal embassies during those days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna and, as I was informed, in many other principal cities of the Mon-

<sup>1</sup> Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade.

archy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Serbia, and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be said the determination, of the people, except presumably in portions of the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Serbia during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the recent Balkan war. Count Berchtold's <sup>1</sup> peace policy had met with little sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punishment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Serbia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war against Serbia by a partial Russian mobilisation against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisation, and Russia again responded with results which have passed into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Paper on the European Crisis.<sup>2</sup> On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold and urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in the House of Commons<sup>3</sup> on the previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far; Austria was that day declaring war on Serbia, and she could never accept the conference which you had suggested should take place between the less interested Powers on the basis of the

<sup>1</sup> Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)."

<sup>3</sup> See "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, columns 931-933.



Servian reply. This was a matter which must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Serbia, and pointed out that whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her policy, His Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart.

His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversation that, though he had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellency maintained a most friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed with the invasion of Servia.

The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von Tschirscky<sup>1</sup> abstained from inviting my co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szápáry<sup>2</sup> with full powers to continue at St. Petersburg the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof.<sup>3</sup> Count Berchtold<sup>4</sup> refused at the time, but two days later (30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised against Austria, he received M. Schebeko<sup>5</sup> again, in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburg. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was informed by M. Schebeko<sup>5</sup> that Count Szápáry<sup>2</sup> had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M.

<sup>1</sup> German Ambassador in Vienna.

<sup>2</sup> Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

<sup>3</sup> Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>4</sup> Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>5</sup> Russian Ambassador in Vienna.

Sazonof<sup>1</sup> that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Serbia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof,<sup>1</sup> M. Schebeko<sup>2</sup> added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of Serbia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorff,<sup>3</sup> to the effect that Austria had neither "banged the door" on compromise nor cut off the conversations.<sup>4</sup> M. Schebeko<sup>2</sup> to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold,<sup>5</sup> and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach,<sup>6</sup> had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schebeko<sup>2</sup> repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise.

Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history.

Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko<sup>2</sup> had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on the 6th August, when Count Berchtold<sup>5</sup> informed the foreign missions at Vienna that "the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been instructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austria-Hungary considered herself also at war with Russia."

M. Schebeko<sup>2</sup> left quietly in a special train provided by the Austro-Hungarian Government on the 7th August. He had urgently requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground that Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna.

<sup>1</sup> Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> Russian Ambassador in Vienna.

<sup>3</sup> Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 137, August 1.

<sup>5</sup> Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>6</sup> Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

On the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received from Count Berchtold <sup>1</sup> the categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's assurance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French frontier, but that none were moving from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replace German troops employed at the front. These two statements were made by Count Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine, under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador's departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps of the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris was in the throes of a revolution, and that the President of the Republic had been assassinated.

The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by special editions of the newspapers about midday on the 4th August. An abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons, and also of the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the 4th August, appeared the same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of these days transpired. The *Neue Freie Presse* was violently insulting towards England. The *Fremdenblatt* was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgian neutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alternative but to take part in the war.

The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, but scarcely mentioned in the newspapers.

On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of the previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my passport or to make any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at the same time that His Majesty's Government of course expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us without the notice required by diplomatic usage.

On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform Count Mensdorff, <sup>2</sup> at the request of the French Government, that a complete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on the ground that Austria had declared war on Russia who was already fighting on the side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to the German frontier under conditions that were a direct menace to France. The rupture having been brought about with France in this way, I was to ask for my passport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion,

<sup>1</sup> Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist between the two countries from midnight of the 12th August.

After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency would take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mr. Theo Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold<sup>1</sup> received me at mid-day. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram from Count Mensdorff<sup>2</sup> has just come in but had not yet been brought to him. His Excellency received my communication with the courtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at war with France, though diplomatic relations with that country had been broken off. I explained in a few words how circumstances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided useless argument. Then I ventured to recommend to his Excellency's consideration the case of the numerous stranded British subjects at Carlsbad, Vienna, and other places throughout the country. I had already had some correspondence with him on the subject, and his Excellency took a note of what I said, and promised to see what could be done to get them away when the stress of mobilisation should be over. Count Berchtold agreed to Mr. Phillpotts, till then British consul at Vienna under Consul-General Sir Frederick Duncan, being left by me at the Embassy in the capacity of *Chargé des Archives*. He presumed a similar privilege would not be refused in England if desired on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Government. I took leave of Count Berchtold with sincere regret, having received from the day of my arrival in Vienna, not quite nine months before, many marks of friendship and consideration from his Excellency. As I left I begged his Excellency to present my profound respects to the Emperor Francis Joseph, together with an expression of my hope that His Majesty would pass through these sad times with unimpaired health and strength. Count Berchtold was pleased to say he would deliver my message.

Count Walterskirchen, of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, was deputed the following morning to bring me my passport and to acquaint me with the arrangements made for my departure that evening (14th August). In the course of the day Countess Berchtold and other ladies of Vienna society called to take leave of Lady de Bunsen at the embassy. We left the railway station by special train for the Swiss frontier at 7 p.m. No disagreeable incidents occurred. Count Walterskirchen was present at the station on behalf of Count Berchtold. The journey was necessarily slow, owing to the encumbered state of the line. We reached Buchs, on the Swiss frontier,

<sup>1</sup> Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

early in the morning of the 17th August. At the first halting place there had been some hooting and stone throwing on the part of the entraining troops and station officials, but no inconvenience was caused, and at the other large stations on our route we found that ample measures had been taken to preserve us from molestation as well as to provide us with food. I was left in no doubt that the Austro-Hungarian Government had desired that the journey should be performed under the most comfortable conditions possible, and that I should receive on my departure all the marks of consideration due to His Majesty's representative. I was accompanied by my own family and the entire staff of the embassy, for whose untiring zeal and efficient help in trying times I desire to express my sincere thanks. The Swiss Government also showed courtesy in providing comfortable accommodation during our journey from the frontier to Berne, and, after three days' stay there, on to Geneva, at which place we found that every provision had been made by the French Government, at the request of Sir Francis Bertie, for our speedy conveyance to Paris. We reached England on Saturday morning, the 22nd August.

I have, etc. MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

(See note, p. 509.)

Friday, September 4, 1914

France :

*To the French Ambassadors and Ministers Abroad*

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK No. 160

# DECLARATION OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

(September 4, 1914)

## DECLARATION

*M. Delcassé, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors and Ministers abroad.*

*Paris, September 4, 1914.*

THE following declaration has this morning been signed at the Foreign Office at London : —

"The undersigned duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments hereby declare as follows : —

"The British, French and Russian Governments mutually engage not to conclude peace separately during the present war. The three Governments agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed, no one of the Allies will demand terms of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other Allies.

(Signed)

" PAUL CAMBON.

COUNT BENCKENDORFF.

EDWARD GREY."

This declaration will be published to-day.

DELCASSÉ.



## **PART TWO**

**THE PARTS OF THE SEVERAL OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS  
OF DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS NOT PRINTED UNDER  
PART ONE**





## I. The Austro-Hungarian Red Book

Servian names are spelt as in the German original according to the Croatian stem. The following is the signification of the sounds :—

- š = sh in the English "ship."
- č = ch in the English "church."
- ć = (the same, softer).
- c = ts in the English "mats."
- j = y in the English "yell."
- gj = dj in the English "adjourn."
- ž = j in the French "jour."

### INTRODUCTION

SINCE the dynasty of the Karageorgević ascended the blood-stained throne of Servia, and surrounded itself with those who had conspired against the life of King Alexander, the Kingdom has continually, though by different paths and with varied intensity, pursued the aim of undermining by hostile propaganda and revolutionary plots, those territories of Austria-Hungary which are inhabited by the Southern Slavs, in order to tear them away from the Monarchy, whenever the general political condition might be favourable to the realisation of the Great-Servian claims.

To what a pitch the hopes of the kingdom on the Save had been raised, and how near she thought herself to the attainment of their aspirations, appeared in the embittered animosity and the deep disappointment which were created in this crazy and deluded country by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and which brought her to the verge of war.

Left in the lurch by Russia, the protecting Power, who did not at the moment consider herself sufficiently prepared, in the spring of 1909 the Servian Government found themselves compelled to give a solemn declaration before Europe, that they recognised the new political and international conditions which had been created by the annexation, and to acknowledge that the interests of Servia had not been affected thereby. They were also compelled to dissolve the gangs of armed men which had been raised against the Monarchy, and to undertake for the future to maintain friendly relations with Austria-Hungary.

The expectations were not fulfilled that it would now be possible for the Monarchy to live in peace and good neighbourly relations with Servia, as she had lived during the rule of the Obrenović, and, as was then the case, to show good will to, and further the interests of this State, which owes to Austria-Hungary the recognition of her independence at the Berlin Congress. The Servian Government who,

by their promise, were under an obligation to maintain friendly and neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary, permitted their press to foment hatred against the Monarchy in an unprecedented way; they permitted associations formed on Servian territory under the leadership of high officers, civil servants, teachers and judges, publicly to pursue their aims with the object of stirring up revolution in the territories of Austria-Hungary; they did not prevent prominent members of their military and civil administration from poisoning the public conscience in such a way that common assassination was regarded as the best weapon in the struggle against the Monarchy. From the atmosphere created by this malicious agitation there sprang up a whole series of murderous attacks on high functionaries of the Monarchy, which ended in the execrable crime against the exalted person of the heir to the throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, which had been carefully prepared in Servia. However, the sacrifice of his life for the Fatherland, by which our enemies in their mad folly expected that the downfall of the Monarchy would be accelerated, brought all the peoples of Austria-Hungary together in fiery unanimity around the dynasty. The whole world learned how unshakable were the foundations on which the Monarchy rests, and how firmly and loyally her sons cling to one another. All felt it; there was no room for any doubt that our honour, our self-respect and our deepest interest peremptorily demanded that we should deal with the criminal conspiracies of Servia and obtain guarantees for the security of Austria-Hungary.

The unhappy experience which the Imperial and Royal Government had had with this dishonest neighbour showed us the only way by which our interests could be secured.

It was necessary to present to Servia all such demands and to require from her such guarantees as would ensure the punishment of the accomplices in this shameful outrage and the suppression of the Great-Servian projects. Since the unparalleled patience of Austria-Hungary had been interpreted as weakness by Servia, the Belgrade Government must be made to understand that the Monarchy was determined if necessary to go to the utmost limit in order to maintain her prestige and the integrity of her territories; and that she could not tolerate any longer the intrigues of the Save Kingdom, which were meant to deceive the Powers, by an apparent agreement to the demands of Austria-Hungary, while at the same time she kept open the possibility of continuing her underhand attack against the Monarchy as she had done after the solemn promise of 1909. Against the usual Servian tactics of using the most reprehensible means to work for the separation of the Southern-Slav territories of Austria-Hungary, and then, when the Monarchy called her to account, of seeking protection and impunity from the Powers, there was only one way open to the Imperial and Royal Government of protecting their territory, and making an end of the injury done to their commercial life by the constant repetition of the intolerable attacks engendered by Servian aspirations if they were to avoid endangering the peace

**Of Europe.** From the beginning, the Imperial and Royal Government met the apprehensions of the Powers with the assurance that the Monarchy would not go beyond what was necessary for the protection of her own interests, and did not propose any annexation of territory. Within these limits, which she had imposed upon herself, she must, however, insist that the controversy with Serbia should be carried through as a question directly concerning Austria-Hungary and this State. The request made by Russia for an extension of the time given to Serbia for answering our demands would have given the Belgrade Government an opportunity for new subterfuges and for further procrastination, and would have opened the door to the interference of single Powers in the interests of Serbia. It was therefore necessary to refuse any prolongation of the time limit. Although before sending her crafty and evasive answer, Serbia had ordered general mobilisation, and thereby publicly proclaimed her hostility, the Monarchy waited two days before proceeding to a declaration of war. The suggestion of the British Government that the settlement of the Servian controversy should be entrusted to a conference of the Powers did not reach Vienna until after the opening of hostilities, and was therefore outstripped by events. This proposal was, however, in itself, not well suited to securing the interests of the Monarchy. Nothing but the integral acceptance of the Austro-Hungarian demands on the part of the Belgrade Government would have given a guarantee for a tolerable relationship with Serbia. The Entente Powers, however, were guided by the desire of substituting for the effective demands of Austria-Hungary, which were painful to Serbia, a method of compromise, by which every security for a future correct attitude on the part of the Save Kingdom would have been lost, and Serbia would have been encouraged to continue her endeavours to bring about a separation of the Southern territories of Austria-Hungary.

When the Imperial and Royal Government demanded from Serbia that she should punish those accomplices in the crime of Serajevo who were in Servian territory, and fulfil the duties which are a necessary condition for friendly relationship between neighbouring States, their only object was to protect our dynasty from outrage and the territory of the Monarchy from criminal intrigues. They were representing the common interest of the civilised world that murder and outrage should not be used with impunity as a weapon in political controversy, and that Serbia should not continue incessantly to menace the peace of Europe by her aspirations.

The Entente Powers were guilty of a serious wrong when, under the spell of their own political interests, they closed their ears to these postulates of public morality and humanity, and ranged themselves beside the Kingdom with its load of guilt. Had they listened to the assurances of the Monarchy which, by her conservative policy and her love of peace during the violent changes which had taken place in the Balkan Peninsula, had gained full right to their confidence, and had they maintained a waiting attitude towards the Servian conflict, the

world-war would have been avoided. It is they who must be made answerable before history for the immeasurable suffering which has come upon the human race.

There can be no doubt that the small Servian State would never have ventured, with an animosity which was scarcely concealed, to work for the separation from the great neighbouring Monarchy of the territories which were inhabited by Southern Slavs, if she had not been sure of the secret approval and protection of Russia, and if she had not been able to depend on the powerful pan-Slavist tendency in the Empire of the Czar forcing the Russian Government, if necessary, to come to the aid of the Kingdom in her struggle for the realisation of the Great-Servian projects.

In the course of the two last centuries the Russian Empire has extended over gigantic areas with the elementary force of a glacier, and has, again and again, subdued fresh races under the Muscovite rule, suppressing their culture, religion and language. As the supreme and inflexible aim of this restless pressure towards universal dominion there stands before her the possession of the Dardanelles, which would secure to the Russian Empire predominance in the near East and in Asia Minor, and gain for Russian exports an opening independent of the will of other countries.

As the realisation of these plans would injure important interests of Austria-Hungary and Germany, and as it was therefore bound to encounter the inevitable opposition of these Powers, it was the endeavour of Russian policy to weaken their power of resistance. The powerful central European union which barred the way to the universal dominion of Russia must be shattered, and Germany must be isolated. The first step was to hem in the Hapsburg Monarchy by the creation of the Balkan Union, and to undermine its authority by the pan-Slavist and Servian intrigues in its frontier territories. A necessary condition for carrying out this plan was the overthrow and expulsion of the Turks in order that the increased power of the Christian Balkan States should be available against the two central Powers.

When the Balkan Union broke up owing to the quarrel over the territory which had been torn from Turkey, and the Russian plans were threatened with failure, "the Protector of the Slavs" allowed Bulgaria to be overthrown, humiliated and deprived of the largest share of the territory which she had won. The Balkan Union which, after the overthrow of the Turks, could now be directed rather against Austria-Hungary and Germany, and could be used by Russia and France for changing the relations of the European Powers, was to be set on foot again by the prospect of the acquisition of fresh territories, planned at the cost of the Monarchy, through a successive pushing forward of frontier from east to west. In this criminal game of Russian diplomacy, which threatened the existence of the Monarchy and the peace of the world, Servia was a catspaw which Russia would not give up even in order to avoid general war.

The Imperial and Royal Government — and the documents pro-

vided in this collection give ample evidence of this — again and again almost up to the outbreak of war assured the Cabinet of St. Petersburg that they would not violate any Russian interest, would not annex any Servian territory, and would not touch the sovereignty of Servia, and that they were ready to enter into negotiations with the Russian Government on Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests. Russia, however, had not expressed herself as satisfied with the solemn declarations of the Imperial and Royal Government; as early as the 24th July, in the communiqué of that date, she assumed a threatening tone, and on the 29th July, although Austria-Hungary had not mobilised a single man against Russia, she ordered the mobilisation of the military districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kasan; this was a threat to the Monarchy; on the 31st July she ordered general mobilisation, disregarding the repeated warnings of the Imperial and Royal Ambassador, and the declaration of the German Government, which had been made on the 26th, that preparatory military measures on the part of Russia would force Germany to counter measures which must consist in the mobilisation of the army, and that mobilisation meant war.

On the 24th July the Imperial and Royal Ambassador in conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, laid stress on the peaceful disposition of the Monarchy. Her only object was to make an end to the menace to our dynasty from Servian bombs, and to our territory from the revolutionary machinations of Servia.

The attainment of this end was a vital question to the Monarchy. She could not, therefore, allow herself to be terrorised by the possibility of a conflict with Russia, in the event of that country taking Servia under her protection; she must make an end of the intolerable situation, that a Russian charter should give the Servian Kingdom continued impunity in her hostility to Austria-Hungary.

On the 30th July the British Secretary of State again suggested that Austria-Hungary, in her conflict with Servia, should avail herself of the mediation of the Powers. Guided by their desire to do the utmost in their power to maintain general peace, the Imperial and Royal Government declared themselves ready to accept this mediation. The honour and the interest of Austria-Hungary, however, required that this should not take place under the pressure of the threatening measures of Russia. It was, therefore, a paramount necessity for her to require that the hostile measures of mobilisation in the Empire of the Czar should, first of all, be revoked. This demand the St. Petersburg Cabinet answered by mobilising the whole of the Russian forces.

In alliance with the self-seeking policy of Great Britain, and the desire for *revanche* of the French Republic, the St. Petersburg Government disdained no means of securing predominance in Europe to the Triple Entente and paving the way for their boldest schemes.

Russia's unscrupulous hands tried to weave the threads of her policy into a snare to be cast over the head of the Monarchy. When Austria-Hungary, following the dictates of self-preservation, deter-

mined to tear the web to pieces, Russia attempted to stay the hand of the Imperial and Royal Government and to humiliate the Monarchy.

Exposed to the greatest danger in their vital interests, Austria-Hungary and Germany saw themselves confronted with the choice of protecting their rights and their safety, or of giving way before the threats of Russia.

They took the road pointed out by honour and duty.



## II. The French Yellow Book

## CHAPTER I

## WARNINGS (1913)

## No. 1

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Jonnart,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, March 17, 1913.*

OUR naval and military attachés are sending to their respective Ministers reports on the new German military law. I take this opportunity of drawing the attention of your Excellency to these important documents.

The consideration of the financial expedients by which Germany intends to provide for these military measures is the sole cause of the delay in the publication of the definite proposals of the Government. In spite of the patriotism with which the rich classes affect to accept the sacrifices asked of them, they are none the less, particularly the business circles, dissatisfied with the financial measures which have been announced, and they feel that a compulsory levy imposed in times of peace creates a formidable precedent for the future. On the other hand, the Federal Governments have strongly opposed an innovation which grants to the Empire resources derived from direct taxation. Hitherto, taxation of this kind has been reserved to the Federal States, and the latter see in the surrender of this principle a new declaration of the corporate unity (*personnalité*) of the Empire, constituting a distinct diminution of their own sovereign power.

However this may be, in increasing the strength of the German army the Empire desires to leave nothing to chance in the event of a possible crisis.

The German changes have produced a result unexpected by that country, viz., the proposal of the Government of the Republic to re-establish the three years' service, and the manly determination with which this proposal has been welcomed in France. The surprise occasioned by these proposals has been utilised by the Imperial Government for the purpose of insisting on the absolute necessity of an increase of German military strength; the German proposals are represented as a reply to our own. The reverse is the case, since the immense military effort which France is undertaking is but the consequence of German initiative.

The Imperial Government is constantly rousing patriotic sentiment. Every day the Emperor delights to revive memories of 1813. Yesterday evening a military tattoo went through the streets of Berlin, and speeches were delivered in which the present situation was compared to that of a hundred years ago. The trend of public opinion will find an echo in the speeches which will be delivered next month

in the Reichstag, and I have reason to fear that the Chancellor himself will be forced to allude in his statements to the relations of France and Germany. It was of course to be expected that national patriotism would be worked up just when fresh sacrifices are being required, but to compare the present time to 1813 is to misuse an historical analogy. If, to-day, there is anything corresponding to the movement which a hundred years ago roused Germans to fight the man of genius who aspired to universal dominion, it is in France that such a counterpart would have to be sought, since the French nation seeks but to protect itself against the domination of force.

Nevertheless, it is true that the state of public opinion in both countries makes the situation grave.

JULES CAMBON.

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ENCLOSURE I

*Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Serret, Military Attaché to the French Embassy at Berlin, to M. Etienne, Minister of War.*

*Berlin, March 15, 1913.*

THE patriotic movement which has manifested itself in France has caused real anger in certain circles.

I do not, indeed, mean to say that the virulent article in the *Kölnische Zeitung* is the expression of prevalent opinion. It is rather the angry outburst of an impulsive journalist, which has been immediately disavowed by the Government.

However, in spite of its want of good manners the article in the *Kölnische Zeitung* cannot be disregarded; several important newspapers have approved of its substance, if not of its form, and it appears to express a real feeling, a latent anger.

It is interesting to note this fact, because it throws very vivid light on the meaning of the present armaments.

For some time now it has been quite a common thing to meet people who declare that the military plans of France are extraordinary and unjustified. In a drawing room a member of the Reichstag who is not a fanatic, speaking of the three years' service in France, went so far as to say, "It is a provocation; we will not allow it." More moderate persons, military and civil, glibly voice the opinion that France with her forty million inhabitants has no right to compete in this way with Germany.

To sum up, people are angry, and this anger is not caused by the shrieking of certain French papers, to which sober-minded people pay little attention. It is a case of vexation. People are angry at realising that in spite of the enormous effort made last year, continued and even increased this year, it will probably not be possible this time to outrun France completely.

To outdistance us, since we neither will nor can be allied with her, is Germany's real aim. I cannot insist too much on the fact that the impending legislation, which French public opinion is too apt to con-

sider as a spontaneous outburst, is but the inevitable and expected consequence of the law of June, 1912.

This law, while creating two new army corps, had deliberately, according to German fashion, left regiments and other large units incomplete. It was evident that there would be no long delay in filling in the gaps.<sup>1</sup> The Balkan crisis, coming just at the right moment, furnished a wonderful opportunity for exploiting the centenary of the War of Liberation, and obtaining with greater ease sacrifices through the memory of those made in days gone by, and that too at a time when Germany was opposed to France.

In order to show clearly the genesis of this military programme, I beg to recall what was written by my predecessor Colonel Pellé a year ago, when the law of 1912 was published :

"We are discovering every day how deep and lasting are the feelings of injured pride and revenge provoked against us by the events of last year.

"The Treaty of the 4th November 1911 has proved a complete disillusion.

"The feeling is the same in all parties. All Germans, even the Socialists, bear us a grudge for having taken away their share in Morocco.

"It seemed a year or so ago, as if the Germans had set out to conquer the world. They considered themselves so strong that no one would dare to oppose them. Limitless possibilities were opening out for German manufactures, German trade, German expansion.

"Needless to say, these ideas and ambitions have not disappeared to-day. Germany still requires outlets for commercial and colonial expansion. They consider that they are entitled to them, because their population is increasing every day, because the future belongs to them. They consider us, with our forty million inhabitants, as a second rate power.

"In the crisis of 1911, however, this second rate power successfully withstood them, and the Emperor and the Government gave way. Public opinion has forgiven neither them nor us. *People are determined that such a thing shall never happen again.*"

And at the moment when the second and formidable part of the programme is about to be realised, when German military strength is on the point of acquiring that final superiority which, should the occasion arise, would force us to submit to humiliation or destruction, France suddenly refuses to abdicate, and shows, as Renan said, "her eternal power of renaissance and resurrection." The disgust of Germany can well be understood.

Of course the Government points to the general situation in Europe and speaks of the "Slav Peril." As far as I can see, however, public opinion really seems indifferent to this "Peril," and yet it has accepted with a good grace, if not with welcome, the enormous burdens of these two successive laws.

<sup>1</sup> The problem which is set us to-day would, therefore, only be set again a few years later, and in a much more acute fashion, since the decrease of our contingents is continually lowering the number of our effectives on a peace footing.

On the 10th March last, being the centenary of the *levée en masse* of Germany against France, in spite of a downpour of rain, a huge crowd surged to the military parade in front of the Schloss, in the middle of the Tiergarten, in front of the statues of Queen Louise and Frederick William III., which were surrounded by heaps of flowers.

These anniversaries, recalling as they do the fight with France, will be repeated the whole year through. In 1914 there will be a centenary of the first campaign in France, the first entry of the Prussians into Paris.

To sum up, if public opinion does not actually point at France, as does the *Kölnische Zeitung*, we are in fact, and shall long remain, the nation aimed at. Germany considers that for our forty millions of inhabitants our place in the sun is really too large.

Germans wish for peace — so they keep on proclaiming, and the Emperor more than anyone — but they do not understand peace as involving either mutual concessions or a balance of armaments. They want to be feared and they are at present engaged in making the necessary sacrifices. If on some occasion their national vanity is wounded, the confidence which the country will feel in the enormous superiority of its army will be favourable to an explosion of national anger, in the face of which the moderation of the Imperial Government will perhaps be powerless.

It must be emphasised again that the Government is doing everything to increase patriotic sentiment by celebrating with éclat all the various anniversaries of 1813.

The trend of public opinion would result in giving a war a more or less national character. By whatever pretext Germany should justify the European conflagration, nothing can prevent the first decisive blows being struck at France.

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#### ENCLOSURE II

*M. de Faramond, Naval Attaché to the French Embassy at Berlin, to  
M. Baudin, Minister of Marine.*

*Berlin, March 15, 1913.*

IN reporting on the examination of the Naval budget by the Financial Committee of the Reichstag, I said that no Naval law would be introduced this year having as its object an increase of the fleet, and that the whole of the military effort would be directed against us.

Although the new Bill, having for its object the increase of the German effectives, has not yet been presented to the Reichstag, we know that it deals with "an increase of military strength of immense scope," to use the expression of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.

The official newspapers have also referred to the military proposal in terms which enable us to consider the communiqué of the *Lokal Anzeiger* as accurate.

The German effectives reach at the present moment 720,000 men. We are, therefore, entitled to conclude that on the 1st October, 1914,

the Imperial army will be raised to a figure not far removed from 860,000.

The importance of this figure would not be so great if the provisions of the proposed legislation (as far as one can gather from the official newspapers) did not tend, as, in fact, those of the law of 1912 tend, to place the army corps nearest to our frontier in a state which most nearly approaches a war footing, in order to be able on the very day of the outbreak of hostilities, to attack us suddenly with forces very much stronger than our own. It is absolutely imperative for the Imperial Government to obtain success at the very outset of the operations.

The conditions under which the German Emperor would nowadays commence a campaign against France are not those of forty years ago. At the commencement of the war of 1870 the Prussian General Staff had considered the possibility of a victorious French offensive, and Moltke, seeing that we might conceivably get as far as Mayence, remarked to his sovereign, "There they will come to a stop." William II. cannot allow a retreat to enter into his calculations, although the German soldier is no longer to-day what he was forty years ago, a plain religious man, ready to die at the order of his king. When it is remembered that at the last elections 4,000,000 votes were cast by the Socialists and that the franchise is only obtained in Germany at the age of 25, it may be presumed that the active army, composed of young men from 20 to 25, must contain in its ranks a considerable proportion of Socialists.

It would indeed be foolish to think that the German Socialists will throw down their rifles on the day when France and Germany come to blows; but it will be very important that the Imperial Government should persuade them that on the one hand we are the aggressors, and on the other that they can have entire confidence in the direction of the campaign and its final result.

On the last occasion when the recruits for the Guard took the oath at Potsdam I was struck to hear the Emperor take as a theme for his address to the young soldiers "the duty of being braver and more disciplined in adversity than in success."

And it is because a German defeat at the outset would have such an incalculable effect on the Empire, that we find in all the plans worked out by the General Staff proposals for a crushing offensive movement against France.

In reality the Imperial Government wishes to be in a position to meet all possible eventualities. It is from the direction of France that the danger seems to them greatest. The *Kölnische Zeitung* has said as much in an article both spiteful and violent, the form rather than the substance of which has been disavowed by the Wilhelmstrasse.

But we must be willing to realise that the opinion expressed by the *Kölnische Zeitung* is at the present moment that of the immense majority of the German people.

In this connection I think it is interesting to quote a conversation which a member of our Embassy had the other evening with the old

Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, as it may serve to reflect the opinions which dominate Court circles.

Referring to the new German military proposals Prince Donnersmarck spoke as follows : —

“French people are quite wrong in thinking that we harbour evil designs and want war. But we cannot forget that in 1870 popular opinion forced the French Government to make a foolish attack on us before they were ready. Who can assure us that public opinion, which in France is so easily inflamed, will not force the Government to declare war? It is against this danger that we wish to protect ourselves.”

And the Prince added : “I have even been considered in France as one of those responsible for the war of 1870. That is quite false. Even if I took part in the war after it had begun, I did my utmost to prevent its outbreak. A short time before the war, happening to be at a dinner where there were some of the most important personages of the Imperial Government, I expressed my regret at the hostile sentiments which were already becoming manifest between France and Prussia. The answer was that, if I spoke like that, it was because I was afraid of a struggle in which the issue would certainly be unfavourable to Prussia. I replied, ‘No, it is not because I am afraid that I repudiate the idea of war between France and Prussia, but rather because I think that it is in the interest of both countries to avoid war. And since you have referred to the possible result of such a struggle I will give you my opinion. I am convinced that you will be beaten and for this reason. In spite of the brilliant qualities which I recognise are possessed by the French and which I admire, you are not sufficiently accurate; by accuracy I do not mean arriving in time at a meeting, but I mean punctuality in the whole sense of the word. Frenchmen, who have a great facility for work, are not as punctual as Germans in the fulfilment of their duty. In the coming war that nation will be victorious whose servants from the top of the ladder to the bottom will do their duty with absolute exactitude, however important or small it may be.’” And Prince Donnersmarck added : “An exactitude which played so great a rôle forty years ago in moving an army of 500,000 men will have a far greater importance in the next war, when it will be a question of moving masses far more numerous.”

In this way the old Prince gave expression to the confidence shared by all Germans in the superiority of their military organisation.

When I spoke above of the new German proposal I only alluded to increased effectives. But the proposal will include also an increase of material and of defence works, the details of which are not known, but some idea of which may be gained by the figure estimated to be necessary to meet the expenses, viz., 1,250,000,000 francs.

The carrying into effect of the law of the quinquennium of 1911 did not necessitate any special financial measures.

The military and naval law of 1912 has been provisionally covered by the Budget surplus of the years 1910 and 1911, by the reform of the law with regard to alcohol and by delaying the reduction

of the tax on sugar. (These last two resources only represent together the sum of 60,000,000 francs.)

It must also be remembered that large loans have recently been raised by the Empire and Prussia: 500,000,000 marks on the 29th January, 1912, and 350,000,000 marks on the 7th March, 1913. Quite an important part of these loans must have been applied to military expenses.

The military law of 1913 will require quite exceptional financial measures.

According to the indications given by the semi-official press, the "non-recurring" expenditure will amount to a milliard marks, while the "permanent" annual expenditure resulting from the increase of effectives will exceed 200,000,000 marks.

It seems certain that the "non-recurring" expenditure will be covered by a war contribution levied on capital. Small fortunes would be exempted and those above 20,000 marks would be subject to a progressive tax. Presented in this guise the war tax would not be objected to by the Socialists, who will be able, in accordance with their usual tactics, to reject the principle of the military law and at the same time to pass the votes which assure its being carried into effect.

The Government are afraid that among the rich and bourgeois classes this extraordinary tax of a milliard levied exclusively on acquired capital will cause permanent discontent. Accordingly they are doing everything in their power to persuade those on whom so heavy an exaction is to be levied that the security of the Empire is threatened, establishing for the purpose an analogy between the war-like times of 1813 and the present day.

By noisy celebrations of the centenary of the War of Independence it is desired to convince people of the necessity of sacrifice, and to remind them that France is to-day, as 100 years ago, their hereditary enemy.

If it is established that the German Government are doing their utmost to secure that the payment of this enormous tax should be made in full, and not by way of instalment, and if, as some of the newspapers say, the whole payment is to be complete before 1st July, 1914, these facts have a formidable significance for us, for nothing can explain such haste on the part of the military authorities to obtain war treasure in cash to the amount of a milliard.

With regard to the manner in which the permanent expenditure resulting from the application of the laws of 1912 to 1913 is to be met, nothing has yet been said. Further legislation will certainly be necessary in order that the required annual amounts may be forthcoming.

To sum up: In Germany the execution of military reforms always follows very closely the decision to carry them out. All the provisions made by the law of the quinquennium of 1911 and by the law of 1912 have already been put into operation. It is quite possible that part of the material, the purchase of which will be authorised by the new law, is already in course of manufacture. Military secrets



are so well kept here that it is extremely difficult to follow the changes in *personnel* and *matériel*.

With 700,000 men under arms (without counting the very large number of reservists who are at the present time in training), a perfect military organisation and a public opinion which can be swayed by the warlike appeals of the Military and Naval Leagues, the German people is at the present moment a very dangerous neighbour.

If the three years' service is adopted and immediately applied in France, the conditions will be less unequal next year. The German effectives will still be considerably more numerous than ours, but the call to the Colours of all available contingents will no longer allow any selection, and will bring into the ranks of the German army elements of inferior quality and even some undesirable individuals. The morale of the active army will deteriorate.

Germany has wished to upset the equilibrium of the two camps which divide Europe by a supreme effort beyond which they can do little more.

They did not think that France was capable of a great sacrifice. Our adoption of the three years' service will upset their calculations.

FARAMOND.

## No. 2

*M. Étienne, Minister of War, to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Paris, April 2, 1913.*

I HAVE just received from a reliable source an official secret report concerning the strengthening of the German army. The report is divided into two parts; the first consisting of general statements, the second dealing with technicalities and describing in the greatest detail, for each branch of the service, the measures to be adopted. Especially striking are the instructions with regard to the employment of motor-traction and the utilisation of aircraft.

I have the honour to enclose a copy of the first part of this document, which seems to merit your attention.

ÉTIENNE.

## ENCLOSURE

*Memorandum on the strengthening of the German Army.*

*Berlin, March 19, 1913.*

### I. — GENERAL MEMORANDUM ON THE NEW MILITARY LAWS

THE increase has taken place in three stages: —

(1) The Conference of Algeiras has removed the last doubt with regard to the existence of an *Entente* between France, Great Britain, and Russia. Moreover we have seen that Austria-Hungary was

obliged to keep some of her forces mobilised against Servia and Italy; finally our fleet was not at that time sufficiently strong. At the end of the dispute the first matter taken in hand was the strengthening of our coast defences and the increase of our naval forces. To meet the British plan of sending an Expeditionary Force of 100,000 men to the Continent, it would be necessary to make a better formation of reserves to be used according to circumstances in the protection of the Coast, in fortresses and in siege operations. It was already clear at that time that it would be absolutely necessary to make a great effort.

(2) The French having violated the Morocco Conventions brought on the incident of Agadir. At that time the progress made by the French army, the moral recovery of the nation, the technical advance in the realm of aviation and of machine guns rendered an attack on France less easy than in the previous period. Further, an attack by the British fleet had to be considered. This difficult situation opened our eyes to the necessity for an increase in the army. This increase was from this moment considered as a minimum.

(3) The war in the Balkans might have involved us in a war in support of our ally. The new situation in the south of Austria-Hungary lessened the value of the help which this ally could give us. On the other hand, France was strengthened by a new *loi des cadres*; it was accordingly necessary to anticipate the date of execution contemplated by the new military law.

Public opinion is being prepared for a new increase in the active army, which would ensure Germany an honourable peace and the possibility of properly ensuring her influence in the affairs of the world. The new army law and the supplementary law which should follow will enable her almost completely to attain this end.

Neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French chauvinists, nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending *Deutschum* (German influence) all the world over.

The French may arm as much as they wish, they cannot in one day increase their population. The employment of an army of black men in the theatre of European operations will remain for a long time a dream, and in any case be devoid of beauty.

## II. — AIM AND OBLIGATIONS OF OUR NATIONAL POLICY, OF OUR ARMY, AND OF THE SPECIAL ORGANISATIONS FOR ARMY PURPOSES

Our new army law is only an extension of the military education of the German nation. Our ancestors of 1813 made greater sacrifices. It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword that has been put into our hands and to hold it ready for defence as well as for offence. *We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French.* We must accustom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity, in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries. We must act

with prudence so as not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid the crises which might injure our economic existence. We must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak (*Losschlagen*) should be considered as a relief, because after it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We must prepare for war from the financial point of view; there is much to be done in this direction. We must not arouse the distrust of our financiers, but there are many things which cannot be concealed.

We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand we must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that we should open up relations, by means of well-chosen agents, with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case of a European war. Of course in case of war we should openly recognise these secret allies; and on the conclusion of peace we should secure to them the advantages which they had gained. These aims are capable of realisation. The first attempt which was made some years ago opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these relations were not sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it or not it will be necessary to resort to preparations of this kind, in order to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion.

Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to be carefully prepared and by material means. They must break out simultaneously with the destruction of the means of communication; they must have a controlling head to be found among the influential leaders, religious or political. The Egyptian School is particularly suited to this purpose; more and more it serves as a bond between the intellectuals of the Mohammedan World.

However this may be, we must be strong in order to annihilate at one powerful swoop our enemies in the east and west. But in the next European war it will also be necessary that the small states should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions their armies and their fortified places can be rapidly conquered or neutralised; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Holland, so as to prevent our enemy in the west from gaining territory which they could use as a base of operations against our flank. In the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark or Scandinavia, especially as in any event we shall provide for the concentration of a strong northern army, capable of replying to any menace from this direction. In the most unfavourable case, Denmark might be forced by Great Britain to abandon her neutrality; but by this time the decision would already have been reached both on land and on sea. Our northern army, the strength of which could be largely increased by Dutch formations, would oppose a very active defence to any offensive measures from this quarter.

In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and

we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against France, and thus protecting our flank.

As was stated above, the situation with regard to the small states on our northwestern frontier cannot be viewed in quite the same light. This will be a vital question for us, and our aim must be to take the offensive with a large superiority from the first days. For this purpose it will be necessary to concentrate a large army, followed up by strong Landwehr formations, which will induce the small states to follow us or at least to remain inactive in the theatre of operations, and which would crush them in the event of armed resistance. If we could induce these states to organise their system of fortification in such a manner as to constitute an effective protection for our flank we could abandon the proposed invasion. But for this, army reorganisation, particularly in Belgium, would be necessary in order that it might really guarantee an effective resistance. If, on the contrary, their defensive organisation was established against us, thus giving definite advantages to our adversary in the west, we could in no circumstances offer Belgium a guarantee for the security of her neutrality. Accordingly, a vast field is open to our diplomacy to work in this country on the lines of our interests.

The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after the complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An ultimatum with a short time-limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international law.

Such are the duties which devolve on our army and which demand a striking force of considerable numbers. If the enemy attacks us, or if we wish to overcome him, we will act as our brothers did a hundred years ago; the eagle thus provoked will soar in his flight, will seize the enemy in his steel claws and render him harmless. We will then remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire, the County of Burgundy and a large part of Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French; that thousands of brother Germans in the Baltic provinces are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national question that Germany's former possessions should be restored to her.

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No. 3

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, May 6, 1913.*

I WAS talking this evening to the Secretary of State about the conference of Ambassadors and the results obtained at the meeting in London yesterday. The crisis with which Europe was threatened is in his opinion over, but only temporarily. "It seems to me," said Herr von Jagow, "that we are travelling in a mountainous district. We have just reached a difficult pass and we see other heights rising

in front of us." "The height which we have just surmounted," I replied, "was, perhaps, the most difficult to cross."

The crisis which we have just gone through has been very serious. Here the danger of war has been considered imminent. I have proof of the anxiety of the German Government by a number of facts which it is important that your Excellency should know.

I received yesterday a visit from one of my colleagues with whom I maintain special and cordial relations. On the occasion of the visit he paid to Herr von Jagow, the latter asked my colleague confidentially what was exactly the situation of Russia in the Far East, and whether this Power had at the present time any cause for fear which might necessitate the retention of its troops in that quarter. The Ambassador answered him that he knew of nothing, absolutely nothing, which could be a cause of preoccupation for the Russian Government, and that the latter have their hands free in Europe.

I said above that the danger of war had been regarded here as extremely near. The Government have not been satisfied with investigating the position in the Far East; preparations have even been made here.

The mobilisation of the German army is not restricted to the recall of reservists to their barracks. There is in Germany a preliminary measure which we have not got, and which consists in warning officers and men of the reserve to hold themselves ready for the call, in order that they may make the necessary arrangements. It is a general call to "attention," and it requires an incredible spirit of submission, discipline, and secrecy such as exists in this country, to make a step of this kind possible. If such a warning were given in France, a thrill would run through the whole country, and it would be in the papers the next day.

This warning was given in 1911 during the negotiations which I was carrying on with regard to Morocco.

Now it has been given again about ten days ago — that is to say, at the moment of the Austro-Albanian tension. I know that this is so, and I have it from several different sources, notably from officers of the reserve who have told it to their friends in the strictest confidence. These gentlemen have taken the necessary measures to put aside in a safe the means of existence for their families for a year. It has even been said that it was for this reason that the Crown Prince, who was to make the trial trip on the *Imperator*, did not embark.

The decision which occasioned this preliminary mobilisation order is quite in keeping with the ideas of the General Staff. On this point I have been informed of some remarks made in a German *milieu* by General von Moltke, who is considered here as the most distinguished officer of the German army.

The intention of the General Staff is to act by surprise. "We must put on one side," said General von Moltke, "all commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has become necessary it is essential to carry it on in such a way as to place all the chances in one's own favour. Success alone justifies war. Germany

cannot and ought not to leave Russia time to mobilise, for she would then be obliged to maintain on her Eastern frontier so large an army that she would be placed in a position of equality, if not of inferiority, to that of France. Accordingly," added the General, "we must anticipate our principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances to one of going to war, and begin it without delay in order ruthlessly to crush all resistance."

This represents exactly the attitude of military circles and it corresponds to that of political circles; the latter, however, do not consider Russia, in contradistinction to us, as a necessary enemy.

This is what was being thought and said privately a fortnight ago.

From these events the following conclusions may be drawn which comprise the facts stated above; these people are not afraid of war, they fully accept its possibility and they have consequently taken the necessary steps. *They wish to be always ready.*

As I said, this demands qualities of secrecy, discipline and of persistence; enthusiasm alone is not sufficient. This lesson may form a useful subject of meditation when the Government of the Republic ask Parliament for the means of strengthening the defences of the country.

JULES CAMBON.

#### No. 4

*M. Allizé, French Minister in Bavaria, to M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Munich, July 10, 1913.*

FROM a political point of view people are asking what is the object of the new armaments. Recognising that no one threatens Germany, they consider that German diplomacy had already at its disposal forces sufficiently large and alliances sufficiently powerful to protect German interests with success. As I pointed out the day after the Morocco agreement of 1911, it is thought that the Imperial Chancery will be as incapable in the future as in the past, of adopting an active foreign policy and of achieving, at least in this sphere, successes which would justify the burdens which the nation has assumed.

This frame of mind is all the more a cause of anxiety as the Imperial Government would find themselves supported by public opinion in any enterprise on which they might energetically embark, even at the risk of a conflict. The state of war to which all the events in the East have accustomed people's minds for the last two years appears no longer like some distant catastrophe, but as a solution of the political and economic difficulties which will continue to increase.

May the example of Bulgaria exercise a salutary influence on Germany. As the Prince Regent recently said to me, "The fortune of war is always uncertain; every war is an adventure, and the man is a fool who risks it believing himself sure of victory."

ALLIZÉ.



*Report to M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs (on Public Opinion in Germany according to the Reports of the Diplomatic and Consular Agents).*

*Paris, July 30, 1913.*

FROM observations which our agents in Germany have been able to collect from persons having access to the most diverse circles, it is possible to draw the conclusion that two feelings sway and irritate men's minds: —

(1) The Treaty of the 4th November, 1912, is considered a disappointment for Germany;

(2) France — a new France — undreamed of prior to the summer of 1911 is considered to be a warlike country, and to want war.

Members of all the parties in the Reichstag, from the Conservatives to the Socialists, representing the most different districts of Germany, university people from Berlin, Halle, Jena, and Marburg, students, elementary school teachers, commercial clerks, bank clerks, bankers, artisans, merchants, manufacturers, doctors, lawyers, editors of Democratic and Socialistic newspapers, Jewish publicists, members of trade unions, clergymen and shopkeepers from the Mark of Brandenburg, country squires from Pomerania and shoemakers from Stettin celebrating the 505th anniversary of their association, country gentlemen, officials, priests, and large farmers from Westphalia, are unanimous on these two points, with very slight differences corresponding to their position in society or their political party. Here is a synthesis of all these opinions:

The Treaty of the 4th November is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of the incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the Empire is not safe without a new Bismarck; it is a national humiliation, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige, all the more serious because up to 1911 the military supremacy of Germany was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerlessness of the Republic were a sort of German dogma.

In July, 1911, the "Coup of Agadir" made the Morocco question for the first time a national question affecting the life and expansion of the Empire. The revelations and the press campaign which followed, have sufficiently proved how the campaign has been organised, what Pan-German greed it had awakened, and what hatred it had left behind. If the Emperor was discussed, the Chancellor unpopular, Herr von Kiderlen was the best-hated man in Germany last winter. However, he begins to be merely thought little of, for he allows it to be known that he will have his revenge.

Thus, during the summer of 1911, German public opinion became restive when confronted with French opinion with regard to Morocco. And the attitude of France, her calmness, her re-born spiritual unity, her resolution to make good her rights right up to the end, the fact that she has the audacity not to be afraid of war, these things are the



most persistent and the gravest cause of anxiety and bad temper on the part of German public opinion.

Why then did not Germany go to war during the summer of 1911, since public opinion although not so unanimous and determined as French public opinion, was certainly favourable? Apart from the pacific disposition of the Emperor and the Chancellor, military and financial reasons made themselves felt.

But these events of 1911 have caused a profound disillusionment in Germany. A new France united, determined, resolved not to be intimidated any longer, has emerged from the shroud in which she had been seen burying herself for the last ten years. Public opinion in Germany, from December to May, from the columns of the press of all parties, which reproached the Imperial Government for their incapacity and cowardice has discovered with surprise mingled with irritation that the country conquered in 1870 had never ceased since then to carry on war, to float her flag and maintain the prestige of her arms in Asia and Africa, and to conquer vast territories; that Germany on the other hand had lived on her reputation, that Turkey is the only country in which during the reign of William II. she had made moral conquests, and these were now compromised by the disgrace of the Morocco solution. Each time that France made a colonial conquest this consolation was offered: — "Yes, but that does not prevent the decadence, anarchy, and dismemberment of France at home."

The public were mistaken and public opinion was misled.

Given this German public opinion that considers France as longing for war, what can be augured for the future as regards the possibility and proximity of war?

German public opinion is divided into two currents on the question of the possibility and proximity of war.

There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are unorganised and have no popular leaders. They consider that war would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride, Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armour plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war would profit Great Britain.

The forces consist of the following elements: —

The bulk of the workmen, artisans and peasants, who are peace-loving by instinct.

Those members of the nobility detached from military interests and engaged in business, such as the *grands seigneurs* of Silesia and a few other personages very influential at Court, who are sufficiently enlightened to realise the disastrous political and social consequences of war, even if successful.

Numerous manufacturers, merchants and financiers in a moderate way of business, to whom war, even if successful, would mean bankruptcy, because their enterprises depend on credit, and are chiefly supported by foreign capital.

Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, and Schleswig-Holstein —

conquered, but not assimilated and sullenly hostile to Prussian policy. There are about 7,000,000 of these annexed Germans.

Finally, the Governments and the governing classes in the large southern states — Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and the Grand Duchy of Baden — are divided by these two opinions: — an unsuccessful war would compromise the Federation from which they have derived great economic advantages; a successful war would only profit Prussia and Prussianisation, against which they have difficulty in defending their political independence and administrative autonomy.

These classes of people either consciously or instinctively prefer peace to war; but they are only a sort of makeweight in political matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or they are silent social forces, passive and defenceless against the infection of a wave of warlike feeling.

An example will make this idea clear: — The 110 Socialist members of the Reichstag are in favour of peace. They would be unable to prevent war, for war does not depend upon a vote of the Reichstag, and in the presence of such an eventuality the greater part of their number would join the rest of the country in a chorus of angry excitement and enthusiasm.

Finally it must be observed that these supporters of peace believe in war in the mass because they do not see any other solution for the present situation. In certain contracts, especially in publishers' contracts, a clause has been introduced cancelling the contract in the case of war. They hope, however, that the will of the Emperor on the one side, France's difficulties in Morocco on the other, will be for some time a guarantee of peace. Be that as it may, their pessimism gives free play to those who favour war.

People sometimes speak of a military party in Germany. The expression is inaccurate, even if it is intended to convey the idea that Germany is the country where military power is supreme, as it is said of France that it is the country where the civil power is supreme. There exists a state of mind which is more worthy of attention than this historical fact, because it constitutes a danger more evident and more recent. There is a war party, with leaders, and followers, a press either convinced or subsidised for the purpose of creating public opinion; it has means both varied and formidable for the intimidation of the Government. It goes to work in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, and a determination that is at once thrilling and fixed.

Those in favour of war are divided into several categories; each of these derives from its social caste, its class, its intellectual and moral education, its interests, its hates, special arguments which create a general attitude of mind and increase the strength and rapidity of the stream of warlike desire.

Some want war because in the present circumstances they think it is *inevitable*. And, as far as Germany is concerned, the sooner the better.

Others regard war as necessary for economic reasons based on over-

population, over-production, the need for markets and outlets; or for social reasons, *i.e.*, to provide the outside interests that alone can prevent or retard the rise to power of the democratic and socialist masses.

Others, uneasy for the safety of the Empire, and believing that time is on the side of France, think that events should be brought to an immediate head. It is not unusual to meet, in the course of conversation or in the pages of patriotic pamphlets, the vague but deeply rooted conviction that a free Germany and a regenerated France are two historical facts mutually incompatible.

Others are bellicose from "Bismarckism" as it may be termed. They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into discussions with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of law and right in negotiations and conferences where they have not always found it easy to get right on their side, even when they have a preponderating force. From their still recent past they derive a sense of pride ever fed by personal memories of former exploits, by oral traditions, and by books, and irritated by the events of recent years. Angry disappointment is the unifying force of the *Wehrvereine*, and other associations of Young Germany.

Others again want war from a mystic hatred of revolutionary France; others finally from a feeling of rancour. These last are the people who heap up pretexts for war.

Coming to actual facts, these feelings take concrete form as follows:—The country squires represented in the Reichstag by the Conservative party want at all costs to escape the death duties, which are bound to come if peace continues. In the last sitting of the session which has just closed, the Reichstag agreed to these duties in principle. It is a serious attack on the interests and privileges of the landed gentry. On the other hand this aristocracy is military in character, and it is instructive to compare the Army List with the year book of the nobility. War alone can prolong its prestige and support its family interest. During the discussions on the Army Bill, a Conservative speaker put forward the need for promotion among officers as an argument in its favour. Finally, this social class which forms a hierarchy with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realises with dread the democratisation of Germany and the increasing power of the Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered. Not only does a formidable movement hostile to agrarian protection threaten its material interests, but in addition, the number of its political representatives decreases with each legislative period. In the Reichstag of 1878, out of 397 members, 162 belonged to the aristocracy; in 1898, 83; in 1912, 57. Out of this number 27 alone belong to the Right, 14 to the Centre, 7 to the Left, and one sits among the Socialists.

The higher bourgeoisie, represented by the National Liberal Party, the party of the contented spirits, have not the same reasons as the squires for wanting war. With a few exceptions, however, they are bellicose. They have their reasons, social in character.

The higher bourgeoisie is no less troubled than the aristocracy at the democratisation of Germany. In 1871 they had 125 members in the Reichstag; in 1874, 155; in 1887, 99; in 1912, 45. They do not forget that in the years succeeding the war they played the leading rôle in parliament, helping Bismarck in his schemes against the country squires. Uneasily balanced to-day between Conservative instincts and Liberal ideas, they look to war to settle problems which their parliamentary representatives are painfully incapable of solving. In addition, doctrinaire manufacturers declare that the difficulties between themselves and their workmen originate in France, the home of revolutionary ideas of freedom — without France industrial unrest would be unknown.

Lastly, there are the manufacturers of guns and armour plate, big merchants who demand bigger markets, bankers who are speculating on the coming of the golden age and the next war indemnity — all these regard war as good business.

Amongst the "Bismarckians" must be reckoned officials of all kinds, represented fairly closely in the Reichstag by the Free Conservatives or Imperial Party. This is the party of the "pensioned," whose impetuous sentiments are poured out in the *Post*. They find disciples and political sympathisers in the various groups of young men whose minds have been trained and formed in the public schools and universities.

The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits, develop a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by statistics Germany's need for a colonial and commercial empire commensurate with the industrial output of the Empire. There are sociological fanatics who go even further. The armed peace, so they say, is a crushing burden on the nations, it checks improvement in the lot of the masses, and assists the growth of socialism. France by clinging obstinately to her desire for revenge opposes disarmament. Once for all she must be reduced, for a century, to a state of impotence; that is the best and speediest way of solving the social problem.

Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers and other apologists of German *Kultur* wish to impose upon the world a way of thinking and feeling specifically German. They wish to wrest from France that intellectual supremacy which according to the clearest thinkers is still her possession. From this source is derived the phraseology of the Pan-Germans and the ideas and adherents of the *Kriegsvereine*, *Wehrvereine* and other similar associations too well known to need particular description. It is enough to note that the dissatisfaction caused by the treaty of November 4th has considerably swelled the membership of colonial societies.

We come finally to those whose support of the war policy is inspired by rancour and resentment. These are the most dangerous. They are recruited chiefly among diplomatists. German diplomatists are now in very bad odour in public opinion. The most bitter are those who since 1905 have been engaged in the negotiations between France and Germany; they are heaping together and reckoning up their

grievances against us, and one day they will present their accounts in the war press. It seems as if they were looking for grievances chiefly in Morocco, though an incident is always possible in any part of the globe where France and Germany are in contact.

They must have their revenge, for they complain that they have been duped. During the discussion on the Army Bill one of these warlike diplomatists exclaimed, "Germany will not be able to have any serious conversation with France until she has every sound man under arms."

In what terms will this conversation be couched? The opinion is fairly widely spread, even in Pan-German circles, that Germany will not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances and the tendencies of the Emperor. But when the moment comes, she will have to try in every possible way to force France to attack her. Offence will be given if necessary. That is the Prussian tradition.

Must war then be considered as inevitable?

It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk, if France can make it clear to the world that the *Entente Cordiale* and the Russian alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but realities which exist and will make themselves felt. The British fleet inspires a wholesome terror. It is well known, however, that victory on sea will leave everything in suspense. On land alone can a decisive issue be obtained.

As for Russia, even though she carries greater weight in political and military circles than was the case three or four years ago, it is not believed that her co-operation will be sufficiently rapid and energetic to be effective.

People's minds are thus getting used to consider the next war as a duel between France and Germany.

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No. 6

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, November 22, 1913.*

I HAVE received from an absolutely reliable source an account of a conversation which took place a fortnight ago between the Emperor and the King of the Belgians, in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff — General von Moltke. This conversation, it appears, has made a profound impression on King Albert. I am in no way surprised at the impression he gathered, which corresponds with what I have myself felt for some time. Enmity against us is increasing, and the Emperor has ceased to be the friend of peace.

The person addressed by the Emperor had thought up till then, as did all the world, that William II., whose personal influence had been exerted on many critical occasions in support of peace, was still in the same state of mind. He found him this time completely changed. The German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of peace against the warlike tendencies of certain parties in Germany. William

II. has come to think that war with France is inevitable, and that it must come sooner or later. Naturally he believes in the crushing superiority of the German army and in its certain success.

General von Moltke spoke exactly in the same strain as his sovereign. He, too, declared war to be necessary and inevitable, but he showed himself still more assured of success, "for," he said to the King, "this time the matter must be settled, and your Majesty can have no conception of the irresistible enthusiasm with which the whole German people will be carried away when that day comes."

The King of the Belgians protested that it was a travesty of the intentions of the French Government to interpret them in that sense; and to let oneself be misled as to the sentiments of the French nation by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible spirits or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators.

The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff nevertheless persisted in their point of view.

During the course of this conversation the Emperor moreover seemed overstrained and irritable. As William II. advances in years, family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the court, and especially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater empire over his mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of the popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of the Pan-Germans, and who does not regard the position occupied by the Empire in the world as commensurate with its power. Perhaps the reply of France to the last increase of the German army, the object of which was to establish the incontestable supremacy of Germany, is, to a certain extent, responsible for his bitterness, for, whatever may be said, it is realised that Germany cannot go much further.

One may well ponder over the significance of this conversation. The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff may have wished to impress the King of the Belgians and induce him not to make any opposition in the event of a conflict between us. Perhaps Germany would be glad to see Belgium less hostile to certain aspirations lately manifested here with regard to the Belgian Congo, but this last hypothesis does not seem to me to fit in with the interposition of General von Moltke.

For the rest, the Emperor William is less master of his impatience than is usually supposed. I have known him more than once to allow his real thoughts escape him. Whatever may have been the object of the conversation related to me, the revelation is none the less of extreme gravity. It tallies with the precariousness of the general situation and with the state of a certain shade of public opinion in France and Germany.

If I may be allowed to draw a conclusion, I would submit that it would be well to take account of this new factor, namely, that the Emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which were formerly repugnant to him, and that, to borrow from him a phrase which he likes to use, "we must keep our powder dry."

JULES CAMBON.

### III. The German White Book

*Foreign Office, Berlin, August, 1914.*

ON June 28th the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne, Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated by a member of a band of Servian conspirators. The investigation of the crime through the Austro-Hungarian authorities has yielded the fact that the conspiracy against the life of the Arch-Duke and successor to the throne was prepared and abetted in Belgrade with the co-operation of Servian officials, and executed with arms from the Servian State arsenal. This crime must have opened the eyes of the entire civilised world, not only in regard to the aims of the Servian policies directed against the conservation and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also concerning the criminal means which the pan-Serb propaganda in Servia had no hesitation in employing for the achievement of these aims.

The goal of these policies was the gradual revolutionising and final separation of the southeasterly districts from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and their union with Servia. This direction of Servia's policy has not been altered in the least in spite of the repeated and solemn declarations of Servia in which it vouchsafed a change in these policies towards Austria-Hungary as well as the cultivation of good and neighbourly relations.

In this manner for the third time in the course of the last 6 years Servia has led Europe to the brink of a world-war.

It could only do this because it believed itself supported in its intentions by Russia.

Russia, soon after the events brought about by the Turkish revolution in 1908, endeavoured to found a union of the Balkan states under Russian patronage and directed against the existence of Turkey. This union, which succeeded in 1911 in driving out Turkey from a greater part of her European possessions, collapsed over the question of the distribution of spoils. The Russian policies were not dismayed over this failure. According to the idea of the Russian statesmen a new Balkan union under Russian patronage should be called into existence, headed no longer against Turkey, now dislodged from the Balkans, but against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It was the idea that Servia should cede to Bulgaria those parts of Macedonia which it had received during the last Balkan war, in exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina which were to be taken from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in with this plan it was to be isolated, Roumania attached to Russia with the aid of French propaganda, and Servia promised Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

Under these circumstances it was clear to Austria that it was not compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation of the monarchy to view idly any longer this agitation across the border. The Imperial and Royal Government appraised Germany of this conception and asked for our opinion. With all our heart we were able



to agree with our ally's estimate of the situation, and assure him that any action considered necessary to end the movement in Serbia directed against the conservation of the monarchy would meet with our approval.

We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies. We could not, however, in these vital interests of Austria-Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to take a yielding attitude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our assistance in these trying days. We could do this all the less as our own interests were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs under one Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thus making untenable the position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe. A morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian pan-Slavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our easterly and westerly neighbours. We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia, but have not participated in her preparations.

Austria chose the method of presenting to the Servian Government a note, in which the direct connection between the murder at Serajevo and the pan-Serb movement, as not only countenanced but actively supported by the Servian Government, was explained, and in which a complete cessation of this agitation, as well as a punishment of the guilty, was requested. At the same time Austria-Hungary demanded as necessary guarantee for the accomplishment of her desire the participation of some Austrian officials in the preliminary examination on Servian territory and the final dissolution of the pan-Serb societies agitating against Austria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal Government gave a period of 48 hours for the unconditional acceptance of its demands.

The Servian Government started the mobilisation of its army one day after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian note.

As after the stipulated date the Servian Government rendered a reply which, though complying in some points with the conditions of Austria-Hungary, yet showed in all essentials the endeavour through procrastination and new negotiations to escape from the just demands of the monarchy, the latter discontinued her diplomatic relations with Serbia without indulging in further negotiations or accepting further Servian assurances, whose value, to its loss, she had sufficiently experienced.

From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of war with Serbia, which it proclaimed officially on the 28th of July by declaring war.

From the beginning of the conflict we assumed the position that there were here concerned the affairs of Austria *alone*, which it would

See exhibits  
1 and 2.

have to settle with Servia. We therefore directed our efforts toward the localising of the war, and toward convincing the other powers that Austria-Hungary had to appeal to arms in justifiable self-defence, forced upon her by the conditions. We emphatically took the position that no civilised country possessed the right to stay the arm of Austria in this struggle with barbarism and political crime, and to shield the Servians against their just punishment. In this sense we instructed our representatives with the foreign powers.

See exhibit  
3.

Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government communicated to the Russian Government that the step undertaken against Servia implied merely a defensive measure against the Serb agitation, but that Austria-Hungary must of necessity demand guarantees for a continued friendly behaviour of Servia towards the monarchy. Austria-Hungary had no intention whatsoever to shift the balance of power in the Balkan.

In answer to our declaration that the German Government desired, and aimed at, a localisation of the conflict, both the French and the English Governments promised an action in the same direction. But these endeavours did not succeed in preventing the interposition of Russia in the Austro-Servian disagreement.

See exhibit  
4.

See exhibit  
5.

The Russian Government submitted an official communiqué on July 24th, according to which Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the Servo-Austrian conflict. <sup>1</sup>The same was declared by the Russian Secretary of Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonof, to the German Ambassador, Count Pourtales, in the afternoon of July 26th. The German Government declared again, through its Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only wished peace at her frontiers. After the official explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia that it did not claim territorial gain in Servia, the decision concerning the peace of the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburg.

<sup>1</sup> NOTE. — This passage takes a somewhat different form in the German text, a translation of which is as follows: —

"The same was declared by the Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonof, to the Imperial Ambassador, Count Pourtales. (See exhibit 4.) On the afternoon of July 26th the Imperial and Royal (*that is the Austrian*) Government declared again through its Ambassador at St. Petersburg that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only wished peace on her frontiers. (See exhibit 5.) In the course of the same day, however, the first news of Russian mobilisation reached Berlin. (See exhibits 6, 7, 8, and 9.) On the evening of the 26th, the German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were instructed energetically to point out the danger of this Russian mobilisation. (See exhibits 10, 10a, and 10b.) After the official explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia that she did not claim territorial gain in Servia, the decision concerning the peace of the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburg. On the same day the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government."

The same day the first news of Russian mobilisation reached Berlin in the evening.

See ex  
6, 7, 8

The German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were instructed to energetically point out the danger of this Russian mobilisation. The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government : <sup>1</sup>

See ex  
10, 10a

“Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilising the army.

“But mobilisation means war.

“As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilisation would be directed against both Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of the Servian kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume an attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Servia as Austria-Hungary does not intend to question the latter. It will be easy in the further development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding.”

On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Suchomlinof, gave the German military attaché his word of honour that no order to mobilise had been issued, merely preparations were being made, but not a horse mustered, nor reserves called in. If Austria-Hungary crossed the Servian frontier, the military districts directed towards Austria, *i.e.*, Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobilised, under no circumstances those situated on the German frontier, *i.e.*, St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. Upon inquiry into the object of the mobilisation against Austria-Hungary, the Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging his shoulders and referring to the diplomats. The military attaché then pointed to these mobilisation measures against Austria-Hungary as extremely menacing also for Germany.

See ex  
11.

In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobilisation came at a rapid rate. Among it was also news about preparations on the German-Russian frontier, as for instance the announcement of the state of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison.

On July 27th, the first information was received concerning preparatory measures taken by France: the 14th Corps discontinued the manœuvres and returned to its garrison.

In the meantime we had endeavoured to localise the conflict by most emphatic steps.

<sup>1</sup> See note on preceding page.

See exhibit  
12.

On July 26th, Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal to submit the differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia to a conference of the Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy under his chairmanship. We declared in regard to this proposal that we could not, however much we approved the idea, participate in such a conference, as we could not call Austria in her dispute with Servia before a European tribunal.

France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, but it foundered upon Austria's declining it, as was to be expected.

*Faithful to our principle that mediation should not extend to the Austro-Servian conflict, which is to be considered as a purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our endeavours to bring about an understanding between these two powers.*

See exhibits  
13,  
14.

*We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna in which he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that either the Servian reply was sufficient, or that it be used as a basis for further negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government remarked with full appreciation of our action that it had come too late, the hostilities having already been opened.*

See exhibit  
15.

See exhibit  
16.

*In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, and we advised Vienna to show every possible advance compatible with the dignity of the monarchy.*

Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken by the military preparations of Russia and France.

See exhibit  
17.

On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official notification in Berlin that four army districts had been mobilised. At the same time further news was received concerning rapidly progressing military preparations of France, both on water and on land.

On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg had an interview with the Russian Foreign Secretary, in regard to which he reported by telegraph, as follows :

"The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my Government to participate in a quadruple conference<sup>1</sup> to find means to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those demands which touch upon the sovereignty of Servia. I could merely promise to report the conversation and took the position that, after Russia had decided upon the baneful step of mobilisation, every exchange of ideas ap-

<sup>1</sup> NOTE. — The German word translated "conference" is *Konversation*: the German text also contains the words *auf freundschaftlichem Wege* ("in a friendly manner").

peared now extremely difficult, if not impossible. Besides, Russia now was demanding from us in regard to Austria-Hungary the same which Austria-Hungary was being blamed for with regard to Servia, *i.e.*, an infraction of sovereignty. Austria-Hungary having promised to consider the Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial aspiration — a great concession on the part of a state engaged in war — should therefore be permitted to attend to its affairs with Servia alone. There would be time at the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance towards the sovereignty of Servia.

“I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire Austro-Servian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general European conflagration, and I endeavoured to present to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger.

“It was impossible to dissuade Sasonof from the idea that Servia could not now be deserted by Russia.”

On July 29th, the German Military Attaché at St. Petersburg wired the following report on a conversation with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian army:

“The Chief of the General Staff has asked me to call on him, and he has told me that he has just come from His Majesty. He has been requested by the Secretary of War to reiterate once more that everything had remained as the Secretary had informed me two days ago. He offered confirmation in writing and gave me his word of honour in the most solemn manner that nowhere there had been a mobilisation, *viz.*, calling in of a single man or horse up to the present time, *i.e.*, 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He could not assume a guarantee for the future, but he could emphasise that in the fronts directed towards our frontiers His Majesty desired no mobilisation.

“As, however, I had received here many pieces of news concerning the calling in of the reserves in different parts of the country, also in Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the general that his statements placed me before a riddle. On his officer's word of honour he replied that such news was wrong, but that possibly here and there a false alarm might have been given.

“I must consider this conversation as an attempt to mislead us as to the extent of the measures hitherto taken in view of the abundant and positive information about the calling in of reserves.”

In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons for its threatening attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly pointed out that Austria-Hungary had commenced no conversation in St. Petersburg. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg was therefore instructed on July 29th, at our suggestion, to enter into such conversa-

tion with Sasonof. Count Szápáry was empowered to explain to the Russian minister the note to Servia, though it had been overtaken by the state of war, and to accept any suggestion on the part of Russia as well as to discuss with Sasonof all questions touching directly upon the Austro-Russian relations.

See exhibit  
19.

Shoulder to shoulder with England we laboured incessantly and supported every proposal in Vienna from which we hoped to gain the possibility of a peaceable solution of the conflict. We even as late as the 30th of July forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, as basis for negotiations, that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in Servia, *i.e.*, after her march into Servia. We thought that Russia would accept this basis.

During the interval from July 29th to July 31st<sup>1</sup> there appeared renewed and cumulative news concerning Russian measures of mobilisation. Accumulation of troops on the East Prussian frontier and the declaration of the state of war over all important parts of the Russian west frontier allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobilisation was in full swing against us, while simultaneously all such measures were denied to our representative in St. Petersburg on word of honour.

Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the Anglo-German mediation, whose tendencies and basis must have been known in St. Petersburg, could possibly have been received in Berlin, Russia ordered a general mobilisation.

See exhibits  
18, 20, 21,  
22, 23, 23a.

During the same days, there took place between His Majesty the Kaiser and Czar Nicolas an exchange of telegrams in which His Majesty called the attention of the Czar to the menacing character of the Russian mobilisation during the continuance of his own mediating activities.

On July 31st, the Czar directed the following telegram to His Majesty the Kaiser:

"I thank You cordially for Your mediation which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilisation. It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give You my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in

<sup>1</sup> NOTE. — The following words appear here in the German text: *während diese unsere Bemühungen um Vermittelung, von der englischen Diplomatie unterstützt, mit steigender Dringlichkeit fortgeführt wurden* ("whilst these endeavours of ours for mediation were being continued with increasing energy, supported by English diplomacy").

the grace of God, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe.

“Your cordially devoted

“NICOLAS.”

This telegram of the Czar crossed with the following, sent by H. M. the Kaiser, also on July 31st, at 2 p.m.:

“Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my aid I have engaged in mediation between Your Government and the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place, Your troops were being mobilised against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already communicated to You, my mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country forces me to measures of defence. I have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire civilised world. It rests in your hand to avert it. No one threatens the honour and peace of Russia which might well have awaited the success of my mediation. The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction, especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue those military preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary.”

Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobilisation of all the Russian forces, obviously directed against us and already ordered during the afternoon<sup>1</sup> of the 31st of July, was in full swing. Notwithstanding, the telegram of the Czar was sent at 2 o'clock that same afternoon.

After the Russian general mobilisation became known in Berlin, the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed on the afternoon of July 31st to explain to the Russian Government that Germany declared the state of war as counter-measure against the general mobilisation of the Russian army and navy which must be followed by mobilisation if Russia did not cease its military measures against Germany and Austria-Hungary within 12 hours, and notified Germany thereof.

At the same time the Imperial Ambassador in Paris was instructed to demand from the French Government a

See exhibit  
24.

<sup>1</sup> NOTE. — The German text says here *Vormittag* (morning).



See exhibit  
25.

declaration within 18 hours, whether it would remain neutral in a Russo-German war.

The Russian Government destroyed through its mobilisation, menacing the security of our country, the laborious action at mediation of the European cabinets.<sup>1</sup> The Russian mobilisation, in regard to the seriousness of which the Russian Government was never allowed by us to entertain a doubt, in connection with its continued denial, shows clearly that Russia wanted war.

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered his note to M. Sasonof on July 31st at 12 o'clock midnight.

The reply of the Russian Government has *never* reached us.

*Two hours after the expiration of the time limit* the Czar telegraphed to H.M. the Kaiser, as follows :

"I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that You are forced to mobilise, but I should like to have from You the same guarantee which I have given You, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence Your urgent reply."

To this H.M. the Kaiser replied :

"I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to Your Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilise my army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers."

As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the receipt of a reply to our inquiry, H.M. the Kaiser ordered the mobilisation of the entire German Army and Navy on August 1st, at 5 p.m.

The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed that, in the event of the Russian Government not giving a satisfactory reply within the stipulated time, he should declare that we considered ourselves in a state of war after the refusal of our demands. However, before a

<sup>1</sup> NOTE. — The German text adds here *kurz vor dem Erfolge* ("just as it was on the point of succeeding").

confirmation of the execution of this order had been received, that is to say, already in the afternoon of August 1st, *i.e.*, the same afternoon on which the telegram of the Czar, cited above, was sent, Russian troops crossed our frontier and marched into German territory. See exhibit 26.

Thus Russia began the war against us.

Meanwhile the Imperial Ambassador in Paris put our question to the French Cabinet on July 31st at 7 P.M.

The French Prime Minister gave an equivocal and unsatisfactory reply on August 1st at 1 P.M., which gave no clear idea of the position of France, as he limited himself to the explanation that France would do that which her interests demanded. See exhibit 27. A few hours later, at 5 P.M., the mobilisation of the entire French Army and Navy was ordered.

On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities.

**IV. The British Blue Book****INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS****(1)**

On the 23rd June, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the Emperor of Austria, Heir to the Throne, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, left Vienna to attend army manœuvres in the Province of Bosnia. On Sunday, the 28th, he visited Serajevo, the capital of the province, and made a progress through the town accompanied by his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg. While passing through the streets their automobile was fired on by an assassin. Both the Archduke and Duchess were killed.

No crime has ever aroused deeper or more general horror throughout Europe; none has ever been less justified. Sympathy for Austria was universal. Both the Governments and the public opinion of Europe were ready to support her in any measures, however severe, which she might think it necessary to take for the punishment of the murderer and his accomplices.

It immediately appeared, from the reports of our representatives abroad, that the press and public opinion of Austria-Hungary attributed much of the responsibility for the crime to the Servian Government, which was said to have encouraged a revolutionary movement amongst the Serb populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

That there had for many years been a strong Serb nationalist movement in these two provinces there is no doubt. This movement in an earlier form had swept the provinces, then part of the Turkish Empire, into the insurrection against the Turkish Government in the seventies of last century, culminating in the war of 1877-8 between Russia and Turkey. It had continued when Austria took over the administration of the provinces under the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Austria then pledged her word to Turkey that her occupation should not "detract from the rights of sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan over these provinces." Thirty years later, however, in 1908, she suddenly proclaimed their annexation to her Empire. On the 7th October of that year, the annexation was celebrated in Serajevo by the firing of salutes and ringing of cathedral bells, amid scenes of official rejoicing and popular apathy. Servian nationalist feeling immediately asserted itself, and the Servian Government protested to the Powers against the annexation as a "deep injury done to the feelings, interests, and rights of the Servian people." Servia's attitude, coupled with the resentment felt by Russia and certain other Great Powers, nearly brought about a European war; but after six months of extreme tension she was induced to make a declaration abandoning her protest and promising to live on good terms with Austria. Her nationalist aspirations still continued, however, and were strengthened by her successes in the Balkan wars of 1912-13

— successes which were compromised by Austria's opposition to her territorial expansion. As Serbia grew, Austrian suspicion of her designs deepened.

(2)

In the light of this history the storm of anti-Servian feeling which swept Austria-Hungary after the Serajevo murders is easily understood. It was a feeling based on patriotism and loyalty. Europe was disposed to excuse its exaggerations and to sympathise with its motives.

But the dangers to European peace which it involved were immediately evident from the reports which reached the Government in London. Anti-Serb riots took place at Serajevo and Agram. The members of the Serb party in the Provincial Council of Croatia were assailed by their colleagues with cries of "Servian assassins." Mobs in Vienna threatened the Servian Legation. The Austrian press, almost without exception, used the most unbridled language, and called for the condign punishment of Serbia. There were signs that the popular resentment was shared, and perhaps encouraged, by the Austrian Government. Both the British and also the German Government knew that the peace might be disturbed.

In view of these reports, it naturally became incumbent on disinterested Powers to exercise what influence they possessed in a direction which would reconcile justice with peace. Unfortunately, though the attitude of public opinion in Austria, and, to a less degree, also in Germany, was plain, the intentions of the Austrian Government remained almost equally obscure. The Austrian Foreign Office maintained an attitude of reticence towards the British and Russian Ambassadors. On the 7th July the Government were careful to make a public announcement that a joint meeting of the Cabinets of Austria and Hungary, which had just taken place, was only concerned with the question of domestic measures to repress the Pan-Serb propaganda in Bosnia. On the 8th July the Minister-President of Hungary made, on the whole, a pacific speech in the Hungarian Parliament, defending the loyalty of the majority of the Serb subjects of the Empire. On the 11th July the Servian Minister at Vienna had no reason to anticipate a threatening communication from the Austrian Government, and as late as the 22nd July, the day before the Austrian ultimatum was delivered at Belgrade, the Minister-President of Hungary stated in Parliament that the situation did not warrant the opinion that a serious turn of events was necessary or even probable.

His Majesty's Government had therefore largely to fall back on conjecture. It was known that the situation might become serious, but it was also known that Serbia had made professions of readiness to accept any demands compatible with the sovereignty of an independent State. It was known that the opinion of the Russian and French — and also of the German — Governments was that the

Servian Government was not itself to blame for the crime, but that Servia must be ready to investigate and put an end to the propaganda which had apparently led to it, and which was said to have originated in part on Servian soil. Sir E. Grey advised Servia to show herself moderate and conciliatory. He promised the German Ambassador to use his influence with the Russian Government in the same direction. More could not be done, for no actual evidence had yet been furnished that Servian territory had in fact been made the base for revolutionary operations. It was only known that a court-martial had been set up at Serajevo, the proceedings before which were secret. The Servian Government stated that they were only waiting for the Austrian Government to communicate the evidence thus collected before setting their own investigations on foot. The Servian Government also stated that both the assassins implicated were Austrian subjects, and that on a previous occasion the Austrian Government had informed the Servian Government, in reply to enquiries, that one of these men was harmless and was under their protection. It was remembered that Austria had tried on previous occasions to fasten guilt on the Servian Government by means of police evidence brought forward in Austrian courts, and had failed. It was therefore assumed on all sides that, before Austria took any action, she would disclose to the public her case against Servia. When Sir E. Grey said this to the German Ambassador on the 20th July, the latter replied that he certainly assumed that Austria would act upon some case that would be known; but, as a matter of fact, His Majesty's Government did not receive any statement of the evidence on which Austria had founded her ultimatum till the 7th August.

It was, therefore, necessary to wait. The situation was as clear as it could be made till Austria would consent to throw off her reticence. There was nothing doubtful in the general international situation, no incalculable element which Austria could not take into full consideration. Whatever she did, she would know accurately the consequences of her action. The Triple Alliance and the Triple *Entente* remained as they had always been. We had been quite recently assured that no new secret element had been introduced into the former, and Sir E. Grey had stated emphatically in Parliament on the 11th June that the latter had remained unchanged so far as we were concerned. Russia's interest in the Balkans was well known. As late as the 23rd May the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the Duma the policy of the "Balkans for the Balkans," and it was known that any attack on a Balkan State by any great European Power would be regarded as a menace to that policy. If Servia was, as the Austrian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey on the 29th July, "regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence"; if Servia was to be humiliated; then assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent. It was not a question of the policy of Russian statesmen at St. Petersburg, but of the deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations bred in the Russian people by more than two centuries of development. These things had been, as Sir E. Grey said to Parliament in March,

1913, in discussing the Balkan war, "a commonplace in European diplomacy in the past." They were the facts of the European situation, the products of years of development, tested and retested during the last decade. Patient work might change them, but the product of years could not be pushed aside in a day.

(3)

Yet two days were as much as Austria decided to allow for the task. On the 23rd July she showed her hand. She delivered an ultimatum at Belgrade and required an answer in forty-eight hours. She made ten demands, directed towards the elimination from Servian national life of everything which was hostile to Austria. These demands involved the suppression of newspapers and literature, the suppression of nationalist societies, a reorganisation of the Government schools, the dismissal of officers from the army, the participation of Austrian officials in judicial proceedings in Servia, the arrest of two specified men, the prevention of all traffic in arms across the frontier, a full explanation of anti-Austrian utterances, and immediate notification of the enforcement of these measures. In addition, the Servian Government was to publish on the front page of the *Official Journal* a prescribed statement, which amounted to a full recantation of her alleged errors, and a promise of amendment. A very brief summary was annexed to the ultimatum, giving the bare findings of the secret trial at Serajevo, with no corroborative evidence. No independent nation had ever been called on to accept a greater humiliation.

Between the delivery of this ultimatum and the declaration of war between Great Britain and Germany there was an interval of only twelve days. In the whirl of negotiations which now followed, there was no time to draw breath and ponder. At the outset, therefore, it may be well to explain definitely the British attitude towards the Austrian ultimatum.

Austria was under provocation. She had to complain of a dangerous popular movement against her government. What evidence she might have against the Servian Government no one in Europe then knew. Great Britain had no interest in the Balkans, except one. She desired the consolidation and progressive government of the Balkan States; she desired, in the words recently used by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Duma, that "the Balkan Governments should recognise that, in the matter of strengthening a State, the acquisition of territory is insufficient; the devotion and confidence of the new citizens must be enlisted." The dispute between Austria and Servia did not necessarily affect that interest; it was a dispute between two Governments with which Great Britain had nothing to do. Sir E. Grey, therefore, consistently stated that he had no concern in that dispute; that he had no title to intervene between Austria and Servia; that he would express no opinion on the merits of the ultimatum. But there was the other side. If the dispute affected the interests of Russia, then the peace of Europe was at stake;

and, from the first, Sir E. Grey told the Austrian Government that he did not see how Russia, interested as she was in Serbia, could take any but a most serious view of such a formidable document as the ultimatum. The peace of Europe must be maintained, and it could only be maintained, as Mr. Asquith had said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan crisis, by a "spirit of forbearance, patience, and self-sacrifice" — by a "loyal spirit of give and take on the part of the Great Powers directly concerned." It was as the agent of this spirit of conciliation alone that Great Britain intervened in the European crisis.

(4)

On the 23rd July the Austrian Ambassador told Sir E. Grey that an ultimatum was being handed to Serbia. For the first time Sir E. Grey heard that "there would be something in the nature of a time limit." He immediately expressed his grave alarm. Next morning the text of the ultimatum was handed to him, and he learnt that the time limit was forty-eight hours. He confessed to the German Ambassador that, as no time had been left for deliberation, he felt helpless. There was no time to advise Russia or to influence Serbia.

At this critical moment everything depended on Germany. As the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said a little later, "the key of the situation was to be found in Berlin." What was Germany's attitude? Privately, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his doubts as to the ultimatum; officially, the German Government called it "equitable and moderate," and said that they "desired urgently the localisation of the conflict." Everyone desired that; but it was no time for phrases. The same morning the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had summoned the French and British Ambassadors in St. Petersburg, had said that Austria's step meant imminent war, and had asked for the support of Great Britain and France. The French Ambassador had pledged the support of France, as was well known to be inevitable under the terms of her alliance. The next morning the Russian Government stated publicly that Russia could not remain indifferent to the Austro-Servian conflict. The next evening troops in Vienna had to be called out to guard the Russian Embassy from hostile crowds. "Localisation" was a good phrase, but we had to deal with facts. Austria had surprised Europe, and with surprise had come universal alarm.

During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at peace. Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be extended. Great Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great Britain urged Germany to join in pressing the Austrian Government. All that Berlin consented to do was to "pass on" the message to Vienna.

Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy should work together at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of conciliation. Italy assented; France assented; Russia



declared herself ready; Germany said she had no objection, "if relations between Austria and Russia became threatening."

Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Belgrade were instructed to advise Serbia to go as far as possible to meet Austria.

But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not extend, had expired; and after all Serbia did not need advice. On the afternoon of Saturday, the 25th, she returned to Austria a reply which amounted to an acceptance of all Austria's demands, subject on certain points to the delays necessary for passing new laws and amending her Constitution, and subject to an explanation by Austria-Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Servian judicial proceedings. The reply went far beyond anything which any Power — Germany not excepted — had ever thought probable. But the same day the British Ambassador at Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press left the impression that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported that the impression left on his mind was that the Austrian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable. In spite of the conciliatory nature of Serbia's reply, the Austrian Minister left Belgrade the same evening, and Serbia ordered a general mobilisation.

But an outline of the Servian reply had been communicated to Sir E. Grey an hour or two before it was delivered. He immediately expressed to Germany the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin again contented itself with "passing on" the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna through the German Ambassador there. The fate of the message so passed on may be guessed from the fact that the German Ambassador told the British Ambassador directly afterwards that Serbia had only made a pretence of giving way, and that her concessions were all a sham.

(5)

During the next four days, 26th to 29th July, there was only one question before Europe — how could Russia and Austria be brought to an agreement? It was evident that Russia did not believe that Austria would, or could, stop short of the absolute ruin of the Servian State, if she once actually attacked it. Here again, the question was not merely one of Government policy; the popular sentiment of two nations was involved. Austria indeed professed, no doubt with perfect honesty, that she would take no territory from Serbia. But the Austrian Ministers were being borne along on a wave of violent popular enthusiasm. They said themselves that they would be swept from power if they did not follow the popular desire for a conflict with Serbia. Would this popular enthusiasm be content with any mere punitive expedition against the enemy? Surely not. Russia, therefore, openly said that she would have to intervene if Serbia were attacked; but she promised Austria on the 27th that she would use all her influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to

re satisfaction to Austria, and only asked Austria to delay hostilities in order to give time for deliberation. Austria refused, saying it was too late. She declared war on Servia on the 28th. Russia ordered a partial mobilisation on the 29th.

But meanwhile Sir Edward Grey had proposed that the German, Italian, and French Ambassadors should meet him in London, to discuss the best means towards a settlement. Italy and France at once accepted; Russia said she was ready to stand aside; but Germany refused. She did not like what she called "a court of arbitration," and proposed instead direct negotiations between Russia and Austria. These negotiations actually began, as we have seen in the last paragraph, but they were cut short by the Austrian declaration of war against Servia. Austria then apparently considered that the moment for such negotiations was passed. She had, moreover, refused to discuss the Servian reply in any way, and it was difficult to see, after that refusal, what Russia could negotiate with her about. Russia, therefore, fell back on Sir E. Grey's proposal for a conference of Ambassadors in London, which she had originally expressed her readiness to accept. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs urged Sir E. Grey to induce Germany to indicate in what way she would consent to work for a settlement.

This brings the narrative of events down to Wednesday, the 29th July. Russia was mobilising partially in her southern provinces. Austrian troops were bombarding Belgrade. But, on the other hand, better news was coming from Berlin. Up to the 28th at least, both Germany and Austria had seemed unwilling to admit that the situation was really serious; Russia, it was said, was unprepared, and France was in no condition to go to war. Germany had said, in reply to Sir E. Grey's repeated advances, that she did not like to make representations to Vienna for fear of stiffening Austria's attitude. But on the evening of the 28th the German Chancellor assured the British Ambassador that he was trying to mediate at Vienna and St. Petersburg. On the strength of this assurance and similar assurances made by the German Ambassador in London on the 29th, Sir E. Grey telegraphed to Berlin once more, in accordance with the request of the Russian Government, urging the German Government, if they did not like the idea of the Ambassadors' conference in the form he had suggested it, to suggest any other form they pleased. "Mediation," he said, "was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would press the button on the interests of peace." The telegram was despatched at about 4 o'clock on the evening of the 29th.

(6)

This appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange response. About midnight, a telegram arrived at the Foreign Office from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. The German Chancellor had sent for him late at night. He had asked if Great Britain would

promise to remain neutral in a war, provided Germany did not touch Holland and took nothing from France but her colonies. He refused to give any undertaking that Germany would not invade Belgium, but he promised that, if Belgium remained passive, no territory would be taken from her.

Sir E. Grey's answer was a peremptory refusal, but he added an exhortation and an offer. The business of Europe was to work for peace. That was the only question with which Great Britain was concerned. If Germany would prove by her actions now that she desired peace, Great Britain would warmly welcome a future agreement with her whereby the whole weight of the two nations would be thrown permanently into the scale of peace in years to come.

For the next two days peace proposals and negotiations continued, some initiated and all supported by Great Britain. There remained a spark of hope. But from the British point of view the face of Europe henceforward was changed. On the 29th July the only conflict in progress had been on the frontiers of Servia and Austria; the only fear of further war had lain in the relations of Russia and Austria. Germany's declarations were pacific; Russia had said she desired nothing but a period of peace to allow for her internal development; France would not fight except to help her ally. There had seemed no insuperable difficulty in keeping the peace; it was only a question of allaying the mutual suspicion between Vienna and St. Petersburg. But now a new element of danger had been introduced. Great Britain now knew that Germany was contemplating an attack on France. She knew more. The independence of the Low Countries had for centuries been considered as one of the strongest means of securing the peace of Europe. Their position and the nature of the country rendered them the natural battlefield of Northern Europe. If it was made impossible for a Great Power to invade them, war would become increasingly difficult and dangerous. With the growth of the idea of a fixed system of international law founded on treaties, the neutrality of Belgium had been devised as a permanent safeguard to this end. As such, it had been consecrated by two international treaties signed by all the Powers, and recognised by two generations of statesmen. Now, when the peace of Europe was our one object, it was found that Germany was preparing to tear out the main rivet of that peace.

Germany's position must be understood. She had fulfilled her treaty obligations in the past; her action now was not wanton. Belgium was of supreme military importance in a war with France; if such a war occurred, it would be one of life and death; Germany feared that, if she did not occupy Belgium, France might do so. In face of this suspicion, there was only one thing to do. The neutrality of Belgium had not been devised as a pretext for wars, but to prevent the outbreak of wars. The Powers must reaffirm Belgian neutrality in order to prevent the war now threatened. The British Government, therefore, on Friday, the 31st July, asked the German and French Governments for an engagement to respect Belgium's neutral-

ity, and the Belgian Government for an engagement to uphold it. France gave the necessary engagement the same day; Belgium gave it the day after; Germany returned no reply. Henceforward there could be no doubt of German designs.

Meanwhile, on the 30th and 31st negotiations continued between Russia and Austria. On the 29th Germany had suggested to Austria that she should stop as soon as her troops had occupied Belgrade. Late on the same night Russia offered to stop all military preparations, if Austria would recognise that the conflict with Servia had become a question of general European interest, and would eliminate from her ultimatum the points which involved a violation of the sovereignty of Servia. As the result of this offer, Russia was able to inform His Majesty's Government on the 31st that Austria had at last agreed to do the very thing she had refused to do in the first days of the crisis namely, to discuss the whole question of her ultimatum to Servia. Russia asked the British Government to assume the direction of these discussions. For a few hours there seemed to be a hope of peace.

(7)

At this moment, on Friday, the 31st, Germany suddenly despatched an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should countermand her mobilisation within twelve hours. Every allowance must be made for the natural nervousness which, as history has repeatedly shown, overtakes nations when mobilisation is under way. All that can be said is that, according to the information in the possession of His Majesty's Government, mobilisation had not at the time proceeded as far in Russia as in Germany, although general mobilisation was not publicly proclaimed in Germany till the next day, the 1st August. France also began to mobilise on that day. The German Secretary of State refused to discuss a last proposal from Sir E. Grey for joint action with Germany, France, and Italy until Russia's reply should be received, and in the afternoon the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg presented a declaration of war. Yet on this same day, Saturday, the 1st, Russia assured Great Britain that she would on no account commence hostilities if the Germans did not cross the frontier, and France declared that her troops would be kept 6 miles from her frontier so as to prevent a collision. This was the situation when very early on Sunday morning, the 2nd August, German troops invaded Luxemburg, a small independent State whose neutrality had been guaranteed by all the Powers with the same object as the similar guarantee of Belgium. The die was cast. War between Germany, Russia, and France had become inevitable.

Only one question now remained for this country. His Majesty's Government failed in their attempts to secure a general peace. Should they now remain neutral? The grounds on which that question was decided are clearly set forth in the statements of Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith in Parliament, which are contained in this volume,<sup>1</sup> and no

<sup>1</sup> See Part II.

additional explanations are needed here. But one fact may be emphasised. From the 24th July, when Russia first asked for British support, to the 2nd August, when a conditional promise of naval assistance was given to France, Sir E. Grey had consistently declined to give any promise of support to either of our present allies. He maintained that the position of Great Britain was that of a disinterested party whose influence for peace at Berlin and Vienna would be enhanced by the knowledge that we were not committed absolutely to either side in the existing dispute. He refused to believe that the best road to European peace lay through a show of force. We took no mobilisation measures except to keep our fleet assembled, and we confined ourselves to indicating clearly to Austria on the 27th July, and to Germany on the 29th July, that we could not engage to remain neutral if a European conflagration took place. We gave no pledge to our present allies, but to Germany we gave three times — on the 30th July, the 31st July, and the 1st August — a clear warning of the effect which would be produced on our attitude and on the sentiment of the British people by a violation of the neutrality of Belgium.

After Germany's declaration of war on Russia on the afternoon of the 1st, the Tsar telegraphed to His Majesty the King as follows: "In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have done all in my power to avert war." It is right to say that His Majesty's Government believe this to be a true statement of the attitude both of Russia and France throughout this crisis. On the other hand, with every wish to be fair and just, it will be admitted that the response of Germany and Austria gave no evidence of a sincere desire to save the peace of Europe.

*Foreign Office, Sept. 28, 1914.*

### **PART THREE**

**DOCUMENTS FREQUENTLY QUOTED BUT NOT CONTAINED IN THE OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF COLLECTED DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS**





## I. THE CHANCELLOR'S SPEECH IN THE REICHSTAG

August 4, 1914

[Translated from the *Berliner Tageblatt* of August 5, 1914]

A TERRIBLE fate is breaking over Europe. For forty-four years after winning in war the respect of the world for our German Empire, we have lived in peace, and have guarded the peace of Europe. In peaceful labour we have grown strong and mighty; and people have envied us. In nervy patience we have suffered hostilities to be fanned in the east and the west, and fetters to be forged against us. The wind was sown there and now we have the whirlwind. We wanted to go on living and working in peace, and like a silent vow, from the Emperor down to the youngest recruit, this was the will: "Our sword shall not be drawn except in a just cause." Now the day has come when we must draw it. Russia has put the torch to our house. We have been forced into a war with Russia and France.

Gentlemen, a number of papers penned in the stress of hurrying events have been distributed to you. Let me single out the facts which characterise our action.

From the first moment of the Austrian conflict we strove and laboured that this conflict might be confined to Austria-Hungary and Servia. All the cabinets, notably the English cabinet, took the same ground, only Russia insisted that she should have to say a word. This was the beginning of the danger threatening Europe. As soon as the first definite news of military preparations in Russia reached us we declared in St. Petersburg, kindly but firmly, that military preparations against us would force us to take similar steps, and that mobilisation and war are not far apart. Russia assured us in the most friendly way that she was taking no measures against us. England in the meanwhile was trying to mediate between Austria and Servia, and was receiving our hearty support. On July 28, the Emperor telegraphed to the Czar asking him to consider that Austria had the right and the duty to protect herself against the Greater-Servian plots which threatened to undermine her existence. The Emperor called the Czar's attention to their common monarchical interest against the crime of Serajevo, and asked the Czar to help him personally to smooth away the difficulties between Vienna and St. Petersburg. At about the same time, and before he had received this telegram, the Czar asked the Emperor to help him and to counsel moderation in Vienna. The Emperor accepted the part of mediator, but he had hardly begun to act, when Russia mobilised all her troops

against Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary on the other hand had mobilised only her army corps on the Servian frontier, and two other corps in the north, but far removed from Russia. The Emperor at once pointed out to the Czar that the Russian mobilisation made his mediation, undertaken at the Czar's request, very difficult if not impossible. We nevertheless continued our mediation, — even to the extreme limit permitted by our alliance. During this time, Russia of her own accord repeated her assurance that she was making no military preparations against us.

Then came July 31. In Vienna a decision was due. We had already succeeded so far that Vienna had renewed her personal exchange of opinion with St. Petersburg, which had stopped for some time. But even before a decision was taken in Vienna, we received the news that Russia was mobilising her entire army — that is, she was mobilising also against us. The Russian Government, which from our repeated representations knew what a mobilisation on our frontier meant, did not notify us, and gave us no explanatory reply. Nor until the afternoon of July 31st a telegram was received from the Czar in which he said that his army was taking no provocative attitude toward us. The Russian mobilisation, however, on our frontier had been vigorously begun as early as during the night of July 30th. Thus while we were still trying to mediate in Vienna, at Russia's request, the whole Russian military force rose on our long, almost open frontier. And France, while she was not yet mobilising, confessed that she was making military preparations. And we? We had intentionally refrained, up to that moment, from calling a single reservist to the colors — for the sake of the peace of Europe. Should we now be waiting longer, and until the Powers between whom we are wedged in would choose their own moment of attack?

To expose Germany to this danger would have been a crime! For this reason we demanded at once, on July 31st, that Russia demobilise, which action alone could still have preserved the peace of Europe. The Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg was simultaneously instructed to declare that we should have to consider ourselves at war with Russia if she declined. The Imperial Ambassador has followed his instructions.

Even to-day we do not yet know Russia's reply to our demand that she demobilise. No telegraphic news has reached us, although the telegraph went on for a while communicating many less important matters. So it came that when the time limit was long past the Emperor was obliged to mobilise our military forces, at five o'clock in the afternoon of August 1st.

At the same time, we had to ask for assurances as to the attitude of France. She replied to our definite enquiry whether she would be neutral in a Russian-German war by saying that she would do what her interests demanded. This was an evasion of our question, if not a negative reply. The Emperor nevertheless ordered that the French frontier be respected in its entirety. This order has been

rigorously obeyed with one single exception. France, who mobilized at the same hour that we did declared that she would respect a zone of ten kilometers on our frontier. And what did really happen? Bomb throwing, flyers, cavalry scouts, and companies invading Alsace-Lorraine. Thus France attacked us before war had been declared.

As regards the one exception mentioned, I have received this report from the General Staff: "As regards France's complaints concerning our transgressing her frontier, only one case is to be acknowledged. Contrary to definite orders, a patrol of the 14th Army Corps, led it would seem by an officer, crossed the frontier on August 2d. It appears that all were shot except one man, who returned. But long before this one act of crossing the frontier took place, French flyers dropped bombs as far from France as South Germany, and near the Schlucht pass, French troops made an attack on our frontier guards. Thus far our troops have confined themselves to the protection of our frontier." This is the report of the General Staff.

We have been forced into a state of self-defence, and the necessity of self-defence knows no other law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and have perhaps already been obliged to enter Belgian territory. That is against the rules of international law. It is true that the French government announced in Brussels that it would respect Belgian neutrality as long as its opponents would do so. But we knew that France was ready for an invasion of Belgium.

France could afford to wait. We could not wait. An attack on our flank might have been fatal. We were therefore obliged to disregard the protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian governments. For the wrong we have done thereby we shall try to atone, as soon as our military end is obtained. People, who like ourselves, are fighting for their lives and homes must think of naught but how they may survive.<sup>1</sup>

Gentlemen, we are standing shoulder to shoulder with Austria-Hungary. As regards the attitude of England, Sir Edward Grey's remarks in the lower house of Parliament yesterday have shown what her stand will be. We have assured the English government that we shall not attack the north coast of France as long as England remains neutral, and that we shall not infringe the territorial integrity and independence of Belgium. This assurance I here repeat before the whole world; and I may add, that as long as England remains neutral, we shall not even take any hostile measures against the French merchant marine, provided France will treat our merchantmen in the same way.

Gentlemen, this was the course of events. Germany enters this war with a clear conscience. We are fighting to protect the fruits

<sup>1</sup> The German word *durchhauen* has been translated in the English press "hack their way through." While the German word *hauen* and the English word "hack" are akin, their meanings, and even more their connotated meanings are very different. "Hack their way through" suggests brutal methods, which the word *durchhauen* does not.

of our peaceful labor and our heritage of the great past: We are fighting for our future. The fifty years are not yet past during which Moltke used to say we should have to remain armed if we were to protect our heritage and our achievements of 1870.

Now the supreme hour has come which will test our people. But it finds us ready and full of confidence. Our army is in the field, our fleet is well prepared, and back of them stands the whole German people. — THE WHOLE GERMAN PEOPLE!

[For Sir E. Grey's two speeches, August 3, 1914, and Mr. Asquith's three speeches, August 4, 5, 6, 1914, see the facsimile reproduction of the British Blue Book, pp. 89 to 98.

For President Poincaré's message August 5, and M. Viviani's speech on the same day, see French Yellow Book Nos. 158, 159, August 5, 1914.]

## II. THE "BRUSSELS" DOCUMENTS

*Found by the German Government in Brussels and published in facsimile in a special Supplement to the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" of November 25, 1914.*

(1)

(Translation)

*Letter [from the Chief of the Belgian General Staff] to the [Belgian] Minister of War respecting the Confidential Interviews.*  
(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Brussels, April 10, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to furnish herewith a summary of the conversations which I have had with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, which I have already reported to you verbally.

His first visit was in the middle of January. Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston told me of the pre-occupation of the British General Staff concerning the general political situation and the existing possibilities of war. Should Belgium be attacked, it was proposed to send about 100,000 men.

The lieutenant-colonel having asked me how we should interpret such a step, I answered that, from the military point of view, it could only be advantageous; but that this question of intervention had also a political side, and that I must accordingly consult the Minister of War.

Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston replied that his Minister at Brussels would speak about it to our Minister for Foreign Affairs.

He continued as follows: The disembarkation of the British troops would take place on the French coast, in the neighbourhood of Dunkirk and Calais, in such a manner that the operation might be carried out in the quickest possible way.<sup>1</sup> Landing at Antwerp would take much longer, as larger transports would be required, and, moreover, the risk would be greater.

This being so, several other points remained to be decided, viz., transport by rail, the question of requisitions to which the British Army might have recourse, the question of the chief command of the allied forces.

He enquired whether our arrangements were adequate to secure the defence of the country during the crossing and transport of the British troops — a period which he estimated at about ten days.

I answered that the fortresses of Namur and Liège were safe against a surprise attack, and that in four days our field army of 100,000 men

<sup>1</sup> The following marginal note occurs in the facsimile:—

(Translation)

"The entry of the English into Belgium would only take place after the violation of our neutrality by Germany."

would be ready to take the field. After having expressed his entire satisfaction at what I had said, my visitor emphasised the following points: (1) Our conversation was absolutely confidential; (2) it was in no way binding on his Government; (3) his Minister, the British General Staff, he, and myself were the only persons then aware of the matter; (4) he did not know whether his Sovereign had been consulted.

At a subsequent meeting Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston assured me that he had never received any confidential information from other military attachés about our army. He then gave me a detailed statement of the strength of the British forces: we might rely on it that, in twelve or thirteen days, two army corps, four cavalry brigades, and two brigades of mounted infantry would be landed.

He asked me to study the question of the transport of these forces to that part of the country where they would be most useful, and with this object in view he promised me a detailed statement of the composition of the landing force.

He reverted to the question of the effective strength of our field army, and considered it important that no detachments from that army should be sent to Namur and Liège, as those fortresses were provided with adequate garrisons.

He drew my attention to the necessity of letting the British Army take full advantage of the facilities afforded under our regulations respecting military requirements. Finally, he laid stress on the question of the chief command.

I replied that I could say nothing on the latter point, and I promised that I would study the other questions with care.

Later, the British military attaché confirmed his previous estimate: twelve days at least were indispensable to carry out the landing on the coast of France. It would take much longer (from one to two and a half months) to land 100,000 men at Antwerp.

On my objecting that it would be useless to wait till the disembarkation was finished, before beginning the transport by rail, and that it would be better to send on the troops by degrees as they arrived on the coast, Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston promised me precise details of the daily disembarkation table.

With regard to the question of military requirements, I informed my visitor that that question would easily be arranged.

As the plans of the British General Staff advanced, the details of the problem were worked out with greater precision. The colonel assured me that half the British Army could be landed in eight days, and the remainder at the end of the twelfth or thirteenth day, except the mounted infantry, on which we could not count till later.

Nevertheless, I felt bound once more to urge the necessity of knowing the numbers to be landed daily, so as to work out the railway arrangements for each day.

The British attaché then spoke to me of various other questions, viz.: (1) The necessity of maintaining secrecy about the operations, and of ensuring that the Press should observe this carefully; (2) the advantages there would be in attaching a Belgian officer to each

British staff, an interpreter to each commanding officer, and gendarmes to each unit to help the British military police.

At another interview Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston and I examined the question of combined operations in the event of a German attack directed against Antwerp, and on the hypothesis of our country being crossed in order to reach the French Ardennes.

Later on, the colonel signified his concurrence in the scheme I had laid before him, and assured me of the assent of General Grierson, Chief of the British General Staff.

Other questions of secondary importance were likewise disposed of, particularly those respecting intermediary officers, interpreters, gendarmes, maps, illustrations of uniforms, English translations of extracts from certain Belgian regulations, the regulation of customs dues chargeable on the British supplies, hospital accommodation for the wounded of the allied army, etc. Nothing was settled as to the possible control of the Press by the Government or the military authorities.

In the course of the last meetings which I had with the British attaché he communicated to me the daily disembarkation table of the troops to be landed at Boulogne, Calais and Cherbourg. The distance of the latter place, included owing to certain technical considerations, would cause a certain delay. The first corps would be landed on the tenth day, the second corps on the fifteenth day. Our railways would carry out the transport operations in such a way that the arrival of the first corps, either towards Brussels-Louvain or towards Namur-Dinant, would be completed on the eleventh day and that of the second corps on the sixteenth day.

I finally urged once again, as forcibly as was within my power, the necessity of accelerating the transport by sea in order that the British troops might be with us between the eleventh and the twelfth day; the very best and most favourable results would accrue from the concerted and simultaneous action by the allied forces. On the other hand, a serious check would ensue if such co-operation could not be achieved. Colonel Barnardiston assured me that everything would be done with that end in view.

In the course of our conversations I took the opportunity of convincing the military attaché of our resolve to impede the enemies' movements as far as lay within our power, and not to take refuge in Antwerp from the outset. Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, on his side, informed me that he had at present little confidence in the support or intervention of Holland. He likewise confided to me that his Government intended to move the British base of supplies from the French coast to Antwerp as soon as the North Sea had been cleared of all German warships.

At all our interviews the colonel regularly communicated to me any confidential information he possessed respecting the military condition and general situation of our eastern neighbour, etc. At the same time he laid stress on the imperative need for Belgium to keep herself well informed of what was going on in the neighbouring Rhine country.



I had to admit to him that in our country the intelligence service beyond the frontier was not, in times of peace, directly under our General Staff. We had no military attachés at our legations. I took care, however, not to admit to him that I was unaware whether the secret service, prescribed in our regulations, was organised or not. But it is my duty here to call attention to this state of affairs, which places us in a position of glaring inferiority to that of our neighbours, our possible enemies.

*Major-General,  
Chief of General Staff.*

(Initialled)

*Note.* — When I met General Grierson at Compiègne at the manoeuvres of 1906 he assured me that the reorganisation of the British army would result not only in ensuring the landing of 150,000 men, but in enabling them to take the field in a shorter period than had been previously estimated.

*End of September 1906.*

(Initialled)

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(2)

(Translation)

(Confidential.)

The British military attaché asked to see General Jungbluth. These gentlemen met on the 23rd April.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the general that Great Britain had, available for despatch to the Continent, an army composed of six divisions of infantry and eight brigades of cavalry, in all 160,000 men. She had also all that she needed for home defence. Everything was ready.

The British Government, at the time of the recent events, would have immediately landed troops on our territory, even if we had not asked for help.

The general protested that our consent would be necessary for this.

The military attaché answered that he knew that, but that as we were not in a position to prevent the Germans passing through our territory, Great Britain would have landed her troops in any event.

As to the place of landing, the military attaché was not explicit. He said the coast was rather long; but the general knows that Mr. Bridges made daily visits to Zeebrugge from Ostend during the Easter holidays.

The general added that, after all, we were, besides, perfectly able to prevent the Germans from going through.

*April 24, 1912.*

### III. THE ALLIED ANSWER TO THE "BRUSSELS" DOCUMENTS

No. 1

*Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels.*<sup>1</sup>

Sir,

*Foreign Office, April 7, 1913.*

IN speaking to the Belgian Minister to-day I said, speaking unofficially, that it had been brought to my knowledge that there was apprehension in Belgium lest we should be the first to violate Belgian neutrality. I did not think that this apprehension could have come from a British source.

The Belgian Minister informed me that there had been talk, in a British source which he could not name, of the landing of troops in Belgium by Great Britain, in order to anticipate a possible despatch of German troops through Belgium to France.

I said that I was sure that this Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government would be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it. What we had to consider, and it was a somewhat embarrassing question, was what it would be desirable and necessary for us, as one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, to do if Belgian neutrality was violated by any Power. For us to be the first to violate it and to send troops into Belgium would be to give Germany, for instance, justification for sending troops into Belgium also. What we desired in the case of Belgium, as in that of other neutral countries, was that their neutrality should be respected, and as long as it was not violated by any other Power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory.

I am, etc.,  
E. GREY.

No. 2

*Extract from a Despatch from Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated December 23, 1911. (From the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," October 13, 1914.)*

(Translation)

From the French side the danger threatens not only in the south from Luxemburg; it threatens us along our whole common frontier. For this assertion we are not dependent only on surmises. We have positive facts to go upon.

The combinations of the *Entente cordiale* include, without doubt, the thought of an enveloping movement from the north. If that were

<sup>1</sup> A record of this dispatch was communicated by Sir F. Villiers to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

not the case, the plan of fortifying Flushing would not have evoked such an outcry in Paris and London. No secret was made there about the reasons why it was wished that the Scheldt should remain unfortified. The object was to be able to ship a British garrison without hindrance to Antwerp, and to obtain in our country a base of operations for an offensive in the direction of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia, and then to carry us along with them, which would not have been difficult. For after giving up our national place of refuge, we should by our own fault have deprived ourselves of any possibility of resisting the demands of our doubtful protectors after being so foolish as to admit them to it. The equally perfidious and naïf revelations of Colonel Barnardiston at the time of the conclusion of the *Entente cordiale* showed us clearly what was intended. When it became evident that we were not to be intimidated by the alleged threatening danger of the closing of the Scheldt, the plan was not indeed abandoned, but altered in so far as the British auxiliary force was not to be landed on the Belgian coast, but in the nearest French harbours. The revelations of Captain Faber, which have been no more denied than the information of the newspapers by which they were confirmed or elaborated in certain particulars, are evidence of this. This British army, landed at Calais and Dunkirk, would not march along our frontier to Longwy in order to reach Germany. It would immediately invade us from the north-west. This would gain for it the advantage of going into action at once, of meeting the Belgian army in a region where we cannot obtain support from any fortress, in the event of our wishing to risk a battle. It would make it possible for it to occupy provinces rich in every kind of resource, but in any case to hinder our mobilisation or to allow it only when we had formally pledged ourselves to complete mobilisation solely for the benefit of Great Britain and her allies.

I would strongly urge that a plan of action should be drawn up for this eventuality also. This is demanded as much by the requirements of our military defence as by the conduct of our foreign policy in the case of a war between Germany and France.

No. 3

*Circular Telegram addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Representatives abroad.*<sup>1</sup>

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, October 14, 1914.*

THE story of an alleged Anglo-Belgian agreement of 1906 published in the German press, and based on documents said to have been found at Brussels, is only a story which has been reproduced in various forms and denied on several occasions. No such agreement has ever existed.

As the Germans well know, General Grierson is dead, and Colonel

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was sent on receipt of a summary of the documents contained in No. 4, issued by the German Government on the 13th October in advance of the publication of the documents themselves.

(now General) Barnardiston is commanding the British forces before Tsing-tao. In 1906 General Grierson was on the General Staff at the War Office and Colonel Barnardiston was military attaché at Brussels. In view of the solemn guarantee given by Great Britain to protect the neutrality of Belgium against violation from any side, some academic discussions may, through the instrumentality of Colonel Barnardiston, have taken place between General Grierson and the Belgian military authorities as to what assistance the British army might be able to afford to Belgium should one of her neighbours violate that neutrality. Some notes with reference to the subject may exist in the archives at Brussels.

It should be noted that the date mentioned, namely, 1906, was the year following that in which Germany had, as in 1911, adopted a threatening attitude towards France with regard to Morocco, and, in view of the apprehensions existing of an attack on France through Belgium, it was natural that possible eventualities should be discussed.

The impossibility of Belgium having been a party to any agreement of the nature indicated, or to any design for the violation of Belgian neutrality, is clearly shown by the reiterated declarations that she has made for many years past that she would resist to the utmost any violation of her neutrality from whatever quarter and in whatever form such violation might come.

It is worthy of attention that these charges of aggressive designs on the part of other Powers are made by Germany, who, since 1906, has established an elaborate network of strategical railways leading from the Rhine to the Belgian frontier through a barren thinly-populated tract, deliberately constructed to permit of the sudden attack upon Belgium which was carried out two months ago.

No. 4

*Viscount Haldane, Lord High Chancellor, to Dr. A. E. Shipley, Master of Christ's College, Cambridge.*

Dear Master of Christ's,

*November 14, 1914.*

THE enclosed memoranda have been specially prepared for me by the Foreign Office in answer to your question.

Yours truly,

(Signed) HALDANE.

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Enclosure 1

*Memorandum*

It is quite untrue that the British Government had ever arranged with Belgium to trespass on her country in case of war, or that Belgium had agreed to this. The strategic dispositions of Germany, especially as regards railways, have for some years given rise to the apprehension that Germany would attack France through Belgium. Whatever

military discussions have taken place before this war have been limited entirely to the suggestion of what could be done to defend France if Germany attacked her through Belgium. The Germans have stated that we contemplated sending troops to Belgium. We had never committed ourselves at all to the sending of troops to the Continent, and we had never contemplated the possibility of sending troops to Belgium to attack Germany. The Germans have stated that British military stores had been placed at Maubeuge, a French fortress near the Belgian frontier, before the outbreak of the war, and that this is evidence of an intention to attack Germany through Belgium. No British soldiers and no British stores were landed on the Continent till after Germany had invaded Belgium, and Belgium had appealed to France and England for assistance. It was only after this appeal that British troops were sent to France; and, if the Germans found British munitions of war in Maubeuge, these munitions were sent with our expedition to France after the outbreak of the war. The idea of violating the neutrality of Belgium was never discussed or contemplated by the British Government.

The extract enclosed, which is taken from an official publication of the Belgian Government, and the extract from an official statement by the Belgian Minister of War, prove that the Belgian Government had never connived, or been willing to connive, at a breach of the Treaty that made the maintenance of Belgian neutrality an international obligation. The moment that there appeared to be danger that this Treaty might be violated, the British Government made an appeal for an assurance from both France and Germany, as had been done in 1870 by Mr. Gladstone, that neither of those countries would violate the neutrality of Belgium if the other country respected it. The French agreed, the Germans declined to agree. The appeal made by the British Government is to be found in the Parliamentary White Paper published after the outbreak of the war (see No. 114 of British Correspondence, page 87). The reason why Germany would not agree was stated very frankly by Herr von Jagow, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Edward Goschen, our Ambassador in Berlin; and it is recorded in the second White Paper (see No. 160 of British Correspondence, page 110) that we published. The attitude of the British Government throughout has been to endeavour to preserve the neutrality of Belgium, and we never thought of sending troops to Belgium until Germany had invaded it, and Belgium had appealed for assistance to maintain the international Treaty.

We have known for some years past that, in Holland, in Denmark, and in Norway, the Germans have inspired the apprehension that, if England was at war with Germany, England would violate the neutrality of those countries and seize some of their harbours. This allegation is as baseless as the allegation about our intention to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and events have shown it to be so. But it seems to be a rule with Germany to attribute to others the designs that she herself entertains; as it is clear now that, for some long time past, it has been a settled part of her strategic plans to attack

France through Belgium. A statement is enclosed which was issued by us on October 14 last, dealing with this point.

This memorandum and its enclosures should provide ample material for a reply to the German statements.

*Foreign Office, 9th November, 1914.*

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Enclosure 2

*Despatch No. 22 in the Belgian Gray Book.*

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Enclosure 3

*Extract from "The Times" of 30th September, 1914.*

NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM

*Official Statement*

The German press has been attempting to persuade the public that if Germany herself had not violated Belgian neutrality France or Great Britain would have done so. It has declared that French and British troops had marched into Belgium before the outbreak of war. We have received from the Belgian Minister of War an official statement which denies absolutely these allegations. It declares, on the one hand, that "before August 3 not a single French soldier had set foot on Belgian territory," and again, "it is untrue that on August 4 there was a single English soldier in Belgium." It adds:—

For long past Great Britain knew that the Belgian army would oppose by force a "preventive" disembarkation of British troops in Belgium. The Belgian Government did not hesitate at the time of the Agadir crises to warn foreign Ambassadors, in terms which could not be misunderstood, of its formal intention to compel respect for the neutrality of Belgium by every means at its disposal, and against attempts upon it from any and every quarter.

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Enclosure 4

*Circular Telegram addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Representatives abroad on the 14th October, 1914.*

See above No. 3 of "The Allied Answer to the Brussels Documents."

#### IV. NEGOTIATIONS OF PRINCE LICHNOWSKY WITH SIR EDWARD GREY

(Published in the *North German Gazette*, September 6, 1914)

ACCORDING to reports to hand, Sir Edward Grey declared in the House of Commons that the publication by the German Government of the German-English exchange of telegrams before the war was incomplete. Prince Lichnowsky, it is declared, cancelled by telegram his report on the well-known telephone conversation immediately he was informed that a misunderstanding existed. This telegram, it is asserted, was not published. The *Times*, apparently upon information from official sources, made the same assertion, adding the comment that the telegram had been suppressed by the German Government in order that it might accuse England of perfidy and prove Germany's love of peace.

In answer to this we are able to state that such a telegram is non-existent. Apart from the telegram already published, which was dispatched from London at 11 A.M., Prince Lichnowsky on August 1st sent the following telegram :

First, at 1.15 P.M.

" . . . Sir Edward Grey's private secretary has just been to see me to say that the Minister desired to make proposals to me regarding England's neutrality, even for the event that we should go to war with Russia as well as with France. I shall see Sir Edward Grey this afternoon, and shall report immediately."

Second, at 5.30 P.M.

"Sir Edward Grey has just read to me the following declaration, which has been unanimously framed by the cabinet :

" 'The reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way clear to give the same positive reply as that which has been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here, while on the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.'

"In answer to my question as to whether, on condition that we respected the Belgian neutrality, he could give me a definite declaration concerning the neutrality of Great Britain, the Minister replied that that was impossible for him to do, but that this question would nevertheless play an important part in public opinion here. If we should violate the Belgian neutrality in a war with France, a reversal of sentiment would certainly result and this would make it difficult for the Government here to assume a friendly neutrality. For the



present there was not the slightest intention of taking hostile action against us. It would be the desire to avoid that if it should be in any way possible. It would, however, be difficult to draw a line marking how far we might go before there would be intervention from here. He recurred again and again to Belgian neutrality and expressed the opinion that this question would play an important part in any event. He had wondered whether it were not possible that we and France should remain armed against each other without attacking each other in case of a Russian war. I asked him whether he was in a position to declare to me that France would enter into a compact to that effect. Since we neither desired to destroy France nor to acquire parts of her territory, I was able to believe that we could enter into an agreement of such a sort, which would insure us the neutrality of Great Britain.

"The Minister said he would make inquiries; he did not overlook the difficulties of holding the armies of both sides inactive."

Third, at 8.30 P.M.:

"My report made early to-day is cancelled by my report of this evening. Since absolutely no positive English proposal has been submitted, further steps along the line of the instructions given me are superfluous."

As will be observed, these telegrams contain no sort of indication that there had been a misunderstanding, and nothing concerning the assertion made from the English side of a clearing up of the alleged misunderstanding.

## V. DOCUMENTS FOUND IN THE POSSESSION OF MR. GRANT-WATSON, SECRETARY OF THE BRITISH LEGATION

(Published in the *North German Gazette*, December 15th, 1914)

NEW and important proofs have been found of the Anglo-Belgian complicity. Some time ago Mr. Grant-Watson, the Secretary of the British Legation, was arrested in Brussels. He had remained at the legation quarters, after the legation had been transferred to Antwerp and later to Havre. The said gentleman was recently caught trying to do away with some documents, which he had carried away unnoticed from the legation when arrested. An examination of the papers revealed that they were official documents, with data of the most intimate character concerning the Belgian mobilisation and the defence of Antwerp, dating from the years 1913 and 1914. They include circular orders to the higher Belgian officers in command, bearing the signature in facsimile of the Belgian Minister of War and of the Belgian General Staff, and also a note concerning a conference of the "*Commission de la base d'approvisionnements à Anvers*," on May 27th, 1913. The fact that these papers were found in the British Legation shows sufficiently that the Belgian Government had no military secrets to hide from the British Government, and that both governments, with regard to military matters, are in very close touch with each other.

There is also a hand-written note of special interest which was found among the papers that the British Secretary endeavoured to destroy. It follows:

### *Renseignements*<sup>1</sup>

1. Les officiers français ont reçu ordre de rejoindre dès le 27, après-midi.

2. Le même jour le chef de Gare de Feignies a reçu ordre de concentrer vers Maubeuge tous les wagons fermés disponible, en vue du transport de troupes.

Communiqué par la Brigade de gendarmerie de Frameries.

Feignies, it may be remarked, is a railway station in France on the road from Maubeuge to Mons, about three kilometres from the Belgian frontier; Frameries is on the same line in Belgium, ten kilometres from the frontier.

From this notice it must be gathered that France had already made her first mobilisation plans on July 27, and that the British

<sup>1</sup> Translation: 1. The French officers have received orders to join the colors by the 27th in the afternoon.

2. For the same day the Superintendent of the railway station of Feignies has received orders to collect in the direction of Maubeuge all available closed coaches, with a view to the transport of troops.

Legation immediately received information thereof from Belgian sources.

The material thus discovered furnishes an additional and valuable proof — if indeed any may be needed — of the relations existing between England and Belgium. It shows anew that Belgium had sacrificed her own neutrality in favor of the Entente, and that she was an active member of the coalition which had been formed to fight the German Empire. For England, on the other hand, Belgian neutrality really was nothing but a "scrap of paper," to which she appealed when it was in her interest, and which she disregarded when she found it expedient to do so. It is obvious that the British Government made use of the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany only as a pretext to justify the war against us before the world and before the British people.

VI. TELEGRAMS AND LETTERS EXCHANGED BETWEEN  
THE ROYAL AND IMPERIAL COURTS OF LONDON,  
BERLIN, AND PETROGRAD, AND BETWEEN KING  
GEORGE AND PRESIDENT POINCARÉ

## I

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY KING GEORGE AND  
HIS MAJESTY THE CZAR

(Published in the British Press on the 5th August, 1914)

No. 1

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan (St. Petersburg).*

*Foreign Office, 1st August, 1914.*

You should at once apply for an audience with His Majesty the Emperor, and convey to him the following personal message from the King: —

“My Government has received the following statement from the German Government: —

“On July 29 the Russian Emperor requested the German Emperor by telegraph to mediate between Russia and Austria. The Emperor immediately declared his readiness to do so. He informed the Russian Emperor of this by telegraph, and took the required action at Vienna. Without waiting for the result of this action Russia mobilised against Austria. By telegraph the German Emperor pointed out to the Russian Emperor that hereby his attempt at mediation would be rendered illusory. The Emperor further asked the Russian Emperor to suspend the military operations against Austria. This, however, did not happen. In spite of this the German Government continued its mediation at Vienna. In this matter the German Government have gone to the farthest limit of what can be suggested to a Sovereign State which is the ally of Germany. The proposals made by the German Government at Vienna were conceived entirely on the lines suggested by Great Britain, and the German Government recommended them at Vienna for their serious consideration. They were taken into consideration at Vienna this morning. During the deliberations of the (Austrian) Cabinet, and before they were concluded, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported the mobilisation of the entire Russian army and fleet. Owing to this action on the part of Russia the Austrian answer to the German proposals for mediation, which were still under consideration, was not given. This action on the part of Russia is also directed against Germany — that is to say, the Power whose mediation had been invoked by the Russian Emperor. We were bound to reply with serious counter measures to this action, which we were obliged to consider as hostile, unless we were prepared to endanger the safety of our

country. We are unable to remain inactive in face of the Russian mobilisation on our frontier. We have therefore informed Russia that unless she were prepared to suspend within twelve hours the warlike measure against Germany and Austria, we should be obliged to mobilise, and this would mean war. We have asked France if she would remain neutral during a German-Russian war.'

"I cannot help thinking that some misunderstanding has produced this deadlock. I am most anxious not to miss any possibility of avoiding the terrible calamity which at present threatens the whole world. I therefore make a personal appeal to you to remove the misapprehension which I feel must have occurred, and to leave still open grounds for negotiation and possible peace. If you think I can in any way contribute to that all-important purpose, I will do everything in my power to assist in reopening the interrupted conversations between the Powers concerned. I feel confident that you are as anxious as I am that all that is possible should be done to secure the peace of the world."

---

No. 2

*His Majesty the Czar to His Majesty King George.*

*1st August, 1914.*

I would gladly have accepted your proposals had not German Ambassador this afternoon presented a note to my Government declaring war. Ever since presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade, Russia has devoted all her efforts to finding some pacific solution of the question raised by Austria's action. Object of that action was to crush Servia and make her a vassal of Austria. Effect of this would have been to upset balance of power in Balkans, which is of such vital interest to my Empire. Every proposal, including that of your Government, was rejected by Germany and Austria, and it was only when favourable moment for bringing pressure to bear on Austria had passed that Germany showed any disposition to mediate. Even then she did not put forward any precise proposal. Austria's declaration of war on Servia forced me to order a partial mobilisation, though, in view of threatening situation, my military advisers strongly advised a general mobilisation owing to quickness with which Germany can mobilise in comparison with Russia. I was eventually compelled to take this course in consequence of complete Austrian mobilisation, of the bombardment of Belgrade, of concentration of Austrian troops in Galicia, and of secret military preparations being made in Germany. That I was justified in doing so is proved by Germany's sudden declaration of war, which was quite unexpected by me, as I have given most categorical assurances to the Emperor William that my troops would not move so long as mediation negotiations continued.

In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have

done all in my power to avert war. Now that it has been forced on me, I trust your country will not fail to support France and Russia. God bless and protect you.

## II

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN LONDON AND BERLIN, 30TH JULY-  
2ND AUGUST, 1914

(Published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of the 20th  
August, 1914)

## No. 1

*His Royal Highness Prince Henry of Prussia to His Majesty King  
George, dated 30th July, 1914.*

I ARRIVED here yesterday and have communicated what you were so good as to say to me at Buckingham Palace last Sunday to William, who was very thankful to receive your message.

William, who is very anxious, is doing his utmost to comply with the request of Nicholas to work for the maintenance of peace. He is in continual telegraphic communication with Nicholas, who has to-day confirmed the news that he has ordered military measures which amount to mobilisation, and that these measures were taken five days ago.

We have also received information that France is making military preparations while we have not taken measures of any kind, but may be obliged to do so at any moment if our neighbours continue their preparations. This would then mean a European war.

If you seriously and earnestly desire to prevent this terrible misfortune, may I propose to you to use your influence on France and also on Russia that they should remain neutral. In my view this would be of the greatest use. I consider that this is a certain and, perhaps, the only possible way of maintaining the peace of Europe. I might add that Germany and England should now more than ever give each other mutual support in order to prevent a terrible disaster, which otherwise appears inevitable.

Believe me that William is inspired by the greatest sincerity in his efforts for the maintenance of peace. But the military preparations of his two neighbours may end in compelling him to follow their example for the safety of his own country, which otherwise would remain defenceless. I have informed William of my telegram to you, and I hope that you will receive my communication in the same friendly spirit which has inspired it.

(Signed) HENRY.

## No. 2

*His Majesty King George to His Royal Highness Prince Henry of  
Prussia, dated 30th July, 1914.*

THANKS for your telegram. I am very glad to hear of William's efforts to act with Nicholas for the maintenance of peace. I earnestly

desire that such a misfortune as a European war — the evil of which could not be remedied — may be prevented. My Government is doing the utmost possible in order to induce Russia and France to postpone further military preparations, provided that Austria declares herself satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighbouring Servian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her demands, while at the same time the other countries suspend their preparations for war. I rely on William applying his great influence in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. In this way he will prove that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Please assure William that I am doing all I can, and will continue to do all that lies in my power, to maintain the peace of Europe.

(Signed) GEORGE.

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No. 3

*His Majesty the Emperor William to His Majesty King George, dated 31st July, 1914.*

MANY thanks for your friendly communication. Your proposals coincide with my ideas and with the communication which I have this evening received from Vienna, and which I have passed on to London. I have just heard from the Chancellor that intelligence has just reached him that Nicholas this evening has ordered the mobilisation of his entire army and fleet. He has not even awaited the result of the mediation in which I am engaged, and he has left me completely without information. I am travelling to Berlin to assure the safety of my eastern frontier, where strong Russian forces have already taken up their position.

(Signed) WILLIAM.

---

No. 4

*His Majesty King George to His Majesty the Emperor William, dated 1st August, 1914.*

MANY thanks for your telegram of last night. I have sent an urgent telegram<sup>1</sup> to Nicholas, in which I have assured him of my readiness to do everything in my power to further the resumption of the negotiations between the powers concerned.

(Signed) GEORGE.

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No. 5

*German Ambassador at London to the German Imperial Chancellor, dated 1st August, 1914.*

SIR EDWARD GREY has just called me to the telephone and has asked me whether I thought I could declare that in the event of

<sup>1</sup> See page 590.



France remaining neutral in a German-Russian war we would not attack the French. I told him that I believed that I could assume responsibility for this.

(Signed) LICHNOWSKY.

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No. 6

*His Majesty the Emperor William to His Majesty King George, dated 1st August, 1914.*

I HAVE just received the communication of your Government offering French neutrality under the guarantee of Great Britain. To this offer there was added the question whether, under these conditions, Germany would refrain from attacking France. For technical reasons the mobilisation which I have already ordered this afternoon on two fronts — east and west — must proceed according to the arrangements made. A counter order cannot now be given, as your telegram unfortunately came too late, but if France offers me her neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the English army and navy, I will naturally give up the idea of an attack on France and employ my troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not be nervous. The troops on my frontier are at this moment being kept back by telegraph and by telephone from crossing the French frontier.

(Signed) WILLIAM.

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No. 7

*German Imperial Chancellor to the German Ambassador at London, dated 1st August, 1914.*

GERMANY is ready to agree to the English proposal in the event of England guaranteeing with all her forces the unconditional neutrality of France in the conflict between Germany and Russia. Owing to the Russian challenge German mobilisation occurred to-day before the English proposals were received. In consequence our advance to the French frontier cannot now be altered. We guarantee, however, that the French frontier will not be crossed by our troops until Monday, the 3rd of August, at seven P.M., in case England's assent is received by that time.

(Signed) BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

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No. 8

*His Majesty King George to His Majesty the Emperor William, dated 1st August, 1914.*

IN answer to your telegram, which has just been received, I believe that there must be a misunderstanding with regard to a suggestion which was made in a friendly conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey when they were discussing how

an actual conflict between the German and the French army might be avoided, so long as there is still a possibility of an agreement being arrived at between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward Grey will see Prince Lichnowsky early to-morrow morning in order to ascertain whether there is any misunderstanding on his side.

(Signed) GEORGE.

No. 9

*German Ambassador at London to the German Imperial Chancellor, dated 2nd August, 1914.*

THE suggestions of Sir Edward Grey based on the desire of creating the possibility of lasting neutrality on the part of England, were made without any previous inquiry of France and without knowledge of the mobilisation, and have since been given up as quite impracticable.

(Signed) LICHNOWSKY.

III

TELEGRAMS FROM THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR AT LONDON TO THE GERMAN IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR, 1ST AUGUST, 1914

(Published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of the 6th September, 1914)

No. 1

*1st August, 1.15 p.m.*

. . . SIR EDWARD GREY'S Private Secretary has just been to see me in order to say that the Minister wishes to make proposals to me for the neutrality of England, even in the case that we had war with Russia and France. I see Sir Edward Grey this afternoon and will communicate at once.

No. 2

*1st August, 5.30 p.m.*

SIR EDWARD GREY has just read to me the following declaration which has been unanimously adopted by the Cabinet:—

"The reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same positive reply as that which has been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here, while, on the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it,

it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country."

On my question whether, on condition that we would maintain the neutrality of Belgium, he could give me a definite declaration with regard to the neutrality of Great Britain, the Minister answered that that was impossible, but that this question would play a great part in public opinion in this country. If we violated Belgian neutrality in a war with France there would certainly be a change in public opinion which would make it difficult for the Cabinet here to maintain friendly neutrality. For the time there was not the slightest intention to proceed in a hostile manner against us. It would be their desire to avoid this if there was any possibility of doing so. It was, however, difficult to draw a line up to which we could go without intervention on this side. He turned again and again to Belgian neutrality, and was of opinion that this question would also play a great part.

He had also thought whether it was not possible that we and France should, in case of a Russian war, stand armed opposite to one another without attacking. I asked him if he would be in a position to arrange that France would assent to an agreement of this kind. As we wanted neither to destroy France nor to annex portions of French territory, I could think that we would give our assent to an arrangement of this kind which would secure for us the neutrality of Great Britain. The Minister said he would make inquiries; he also recognised the difficulties of holding back the military on both sides.

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No. 3

*1st August, 8.30 p.m.*

My communication of this morning is cancelled by my communication of this evening. As there is no positive English proposal before us, any further step in the sense of the message I sent is superfluous.

IV

TELEGRAM FROM HIS MAJESTY THE CZAR TO HIS MAJESTY THE  
EMPEROR WILLIAM

(Published in the Russian Press on the 31st January, 1915)

*29th July, 1914.*

THANKS for your telegram,<sup>1</sup> which is conciliatory and friendly, whereas the official message presented to-day by your Ambassador to my Minister was conveyed in a very different tone. I beg you to explain this divergency. It would be right to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to The Hague Tribunal. I trust in your wisdom and friendship.

<sup>1</sup> German White Book, No. 20.

V

LETTERS EXCHANGED BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY KING GEORGE AND  
THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC

(Published in the British Press on the 20th February, 1915)

No. 1

*The President of the French Republic to His Majesty King George.*

Dear and Great Friend,

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

IN the grave events through which Europe is passing, I feel bound to convey to your Majesty the information which the Government of the Republic have received from Germany. The military preparations which are being undertaken by the Imperial Government, especially in the immediate neighbourhood of the French frontier, are being pushed forward every day with fresh vigour and speed. France, resolved to continue to the very end to do all that lies within her power to maintain peace, has, up to the present, confined herself solely to the most indispensable precautionary measures. But it does not appear that her prudence and moderation serve to check Germany's action; indeed, quite the reverse. We are, perhaps, then, in spite of the moderation of the Government of the Republic and the calm of public opinion, on the eve of the most terrible events.

From all the information which reaches us it would seem that war would be inevitable if Germany were convinced that the British Government would not intervene in a conflict in which France might be engaged; if, on the other hand, Germany were convinced that the *entente cordiale* would be affirmed, in case of need, even to the extent of taking the field side by side, there would be the greatest chance that peace would remain unbroken.

It is true that our military and naval arrangements leave complete liberty to your Majesty's Government, and that, in the letters exchanged in 1912<sup>1</sup> between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon, Great Britain and France entered into nothing more than a mutual agreement to consult one another in the event of European tension, and to examine in concert whether common action were advisable.

But the character of close friendship which public feeling has given in both countries to the entente between Great Britain and France, the confidence with which our two Governments have never ceased to work for the maintenance of peace, and the signs of sympathy which your Majesty has ever shown to France, justify me in informing you quite frankly of my impressions, which are those of the Government of the Republic and of all France.

It is, I consider, on the language and the action of the British Government that henceforward the last chances of a peaceful settlement depend.

We, ourselves, from the initial stages of the crisis, have enjoined upon our Ally an attitude of moderation from which they have not

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 337 f., and Facsimile of British Blue Book, pp. 90 f.

swerved. In concert with Your Majesty's Government, and in conformity with Sir E. Grey's latest suggestions, we will continue to act on the same lines.

But if all efforts at conciliation emanate from one side, and if Germany and Austria can speculate on the abstention of Great Britain, Austria's demands will remain inflexible, and an agreement between her and Russia will become impossible. I am profoundly convinced that at the present moment, the more Great Britain, France, and Russia can give a deep impression that they are united in their diplomatic action, the more possible will it be to count upon the preservation of peace.

I beg that your Majesty will excuse a step which is only inspired by the hope of seeing the European balance of power definitely reaffirmed.

Pray accept the expression of my most cordial sentiments.

R. POINCARÉ.

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No. 2

*His Majesty King George to the President of the French Republic.*

Dear and Great Friend, *Buckingham Palace, August 1, 1914.*

I most highly appreciate the sentiments which moved you to write to me in so cordial and friendly a spirit, and I am grateful to you for having stated your views so fully and frankly.

You may be assured that the present situation in Europe has been the cause of much anxiety and preoccupation to me, and I am glad to think that our two Governments have worked so amicably together in endeavouring to find a peaceful solution of the questions at issue.

It would be a source of real satisfaction to me if our united efforts were to meet with success, and I am still not without hope that the terrible events which seem so near may be averted.

I admire the restraint which you and your Government are exercising in refraining from taking undue military measures on the frontier and not adopting an attitude which could in any wise be interpreted as a provocative one.

I am personally using my best endeavours with the Emperors of Russia and of Germany towards finding some solution by which actual military operations may at any rate be postponed, and time be thus given for calm discussion between the Powers. I intend to prosecute these efforts without intermission so long as any hope remains of an amicable settlement.

As to the attitude of my country, events are changing so rapidly that it is difficult to forecast future developments; but you may be assured that my Government will continue to discuss freely and frankly any point which might arise of interest to our two nations with M. Cambon.

Believe me,

M. le Président,

(Signed) GEORGE R. I.

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**K. U. K. MINISTERIUM DES AUSSERN.**

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**DIPLOMATISCHE AKTENSTÜCKE**

**ZUR**

**VORGESCHICHTE DES KRIEGES**

**1914.**



**WIEN 1915.**  
**AUS DER K. K. HOF UND STAATSDRUCKEREI.**



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1.

**Legationsrat Ritter von Storck an Graf Berchtold.**

*Belgrad, 29. Juni 1914.*

Wir alle stehen noch immer derart unter dem erschütternden Eindruck der gestrigen Katastrophe, daß es mir schwer fällt, mit der nötigen Fassung, Sachlichkeit und Ruhe das blutige Drama in Sarajevo von hier aus entsprechend zu beurteilen. Ich bitte daher, mich vorläufig auf die Registrierung einiger Tatsachen beschränken zu dürfen.

Gestern — den 15./28. — wurde der Jahrestag der Schlacht am Amsel-felde festlicher als sonst begangen und der serbische Patriot Miloš Obilić gefeiert, der 1389 mit zwei Gefährten den siegreichen Murad meuchlings erstochen hat.

Wo Serben leben, gilt Obilić als der Nationalheros. An die Stelle der Türken sind aber — dank der unter der Ägide der königlichen Regierung gezüchteten Propaganda und der seit Jahren betriebenen Preßhetze — nunmehr wir als die Erbfeinde getreten.

Den drei jugendlichen Sarajevoer Attentätern Princip, Čabrinović und dem dritten unbekannten Bombenwerfer scheint daher eine Wiederholung des Dramas auf dem Kossovopolje vorgeschwebt zu haben. Sie haben noch eine unschuldige Frau miterschossen und mögen glauben, damit ihr Vorbild noch übertroffen zu haben.

Jahrelang ist in Serbien Haß gegen die Monarchie gesät worden. Die Saat ist aufgegangen und Mord ward geerntet.

Die serbische Regierung hat auf die zirka 5 Uhr nachmittags bekanntgewordene Nachricht hin die Obilić-Feier um 10 Uhr abends offiziell abstoppen lassen; inoffiziell und in der Dunkelheit hat sie aber noch geraume Zeit weiter gedauert.

Die Leute sollen sich vor Freude in die Arme gefallen sein (Augenzeugen) und man hörte Bemerkungen wie: „recht ist ihnen geschehen, wir haben das schon lange erwartet,“ oder „das ist die Rache für die Annexion.“

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2.

**Legationsrat Ritter von Storck an Graf Berchtold.**

Telegramm.

*Belgrad, 30. Juni 1914.*

Ich richtete heute an den Generalsekretär des Auswärtigen Amtes, Herrn Gruić, die naheliegende Frage, welche Maßregeln die königliche Polizei ergriffen habe, respektive zu ergreifen gedenke, um die Fäden des Attentats, welche notorisch nach Serbien hinüberspielen, zu verfolgen.

Seine Erwiderung lautete, daß sich die serbische Polizei bisher mit dem Gegenstand überhaupt nicht befaßt hätte.

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3.

**Generalkonsul Jehlitschka an Graf Berchtold.**

*Uskub 1. Juli 1914.*

Am 15./28. Juni wurde in Pristina der Vidov-Dan (Frohnleichnamstag), an welchem sich diesmal die Schlacht auf dem Amselfelde (1389) zum 525. Male jährte, zum ersten Male offiziell als „Befreiungsfest“ der serbischen Nation gefeiert.

Seit vier Monaten hatte ein eigenes Festkomitee daran gearbeitet, dieses Fest zu einem möglichst feierlichen und zu einer großartigen nationalserbischen Demonstration zu gestalten.

Die bezügliche Propaganda setzte gleichzeitig in Kroatien, Dalmatien und Bosnien, hauptsächlich aber in Ungarn ein, den Teilnehmern wurde freie Fahrt auf den serbischen Staatsbahnen, billige Unterkunft und Verpflegung, Unterstützung seitens der Behörden etc. zugesagt.

Die Agitation war eine energische und zielbewußte.

Zur Festfeier in Pristina wurden die Gäste mit Extrazügen gebracht.

Die verschiedenen Festreden schwelgten in den historischen Reminiszenzen, welche sich an den Schauplatz des Festes knüpften, um schließlich mehr oder minder das bekannte Thema von der Vereinigung aller Serben und der „Befreiung der unterjochten Brüder“ jenseits der Donau und der Save, ferner in Bosnien und Dalmatien zu variieren.

Als sich in den Abendstunden die Nachricht von der entsetzlichen Schandtats, deren Schauplatz Sarajevo gewesen war, verbreitete, bemächtigte sich der fanatisierten Menge eine Stimmung, welche ich nach den zahlreichen Beifalläußerungen, welche mir von meinen absolut verlässlichen Gewährsmännern gemeldet werden, nicht anders als unmenschlich bezeichnen kann.

Angesichts dieser Haltung der Bevölkerung, welche in gleicher Weise auch in Üsküb zu Tage trat, fallen alle Versuche der serbischen Presse, die moralische Verantwortung für die Tat, welche von einer repräsentativen Versammlung mit solch unverhohlener Genugtuung aufgenommen wird, von Serbien abzuschütteln, in ein erbärmliches Nichts zusammen.

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#### Graf Szécsen an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm.

*Paris, 4. Juli 1914.*

Ich habe heute Herrn Poincaré den Dank der k. u. k. Regierung für sein Beileid übermittelt.

Auf die serbenfeindlichen Demonstrationen bei uns anspielend, erwähnte er, daß nach der Ermordung des Präsidenten Carnot in ganz Frankreich alle Italiener den ärgsten Verfolgungen seitens der Bevölkerung ausgesetzt waren.

Ich machte ihn darauf aufmerksam, daß die damalige Bluttat mit keinerlei antifranzösischer Agitation in Italien im Zusammenhange stand, während man jetzt zugeben muß, daß in Serbien seit Jahren mit allen erlaubten und unerlaubten Mitteln gegen die Monarchie gehetzt wird.

Zum Schlusse sprach Herr Poincaré die Überzeugung aus, die serbische Regierung werde uns bei der gerichtlichen Untersuchung und der Verfolgung eventueller Mitschuldiger das größte Entgegenkommen zeigen. Einer solchen Pflicht könne sich kein Staat entziehen.

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**Gerent Herr Hoffehner an Graf Berchtold.***Nisch, 6. Juli 1914.*

Die Nachricht vom entsetzlichen, nur zu wohlgelungenen Attentate in Sarajevo rief hier Sensation im vollsten Sinne des Wortes hervor. Von Bestürzung oder aber Entrüstung war so gut wie nichts zu bemerken, in weitaus vorherrschendem Maße kamen nur Empfindungen der Genugtuung, ja der Freude, und dies vielfach ganz unverhüllt, ohne jede Zurückhaltung, nicht selten in ganz roher Form zum Ausdruck. Dies gilt hauptsächlich für die sogenannten führenden Kreise, die Intelligenz, wie Berufspolitiker, Lehrpersonen, Beamte, Offiziere und die Studentenschaft. Etwas zurückhaltender zeigte sich noch die Kaufmannschaft.

Alle Erklärungen, die seitens serbischer amtlicher Stellen oder einzelner höherer Persönlichkeiten abgegeben wurden und die Entrüstung über das Attentat und dessen Verurteilung zum Ausdruck bringen sollen, müssen als bitterste Ironie auf den wirken, der Gelegenheit hatte, in den jüngst verflossenen Tagen in nächster Nähe Einblicke in das Gefühlsleben der serbischen intelligenten Bevölkerung zu gewinnen.

Der Gefertigte hatte am Tage des Attentates gegen 9 Uhr abends ohne Ahnung noch vom Geschehenen ein hiesiges Gartenkaffee besucht und wurde hier zuerst von einem Bekannten über das ganz bestimmt aufgetretene Gerücht in Kenntnis gesetzt. Es war eine Pein sondergleichen zu beobachten und zu hören, wie eine förmlich fröhliche Stimmung die zahlreichen Gäste des Lokales erfaßt hatte, mit welcher ersichtlichen Genugtuung man über die Tat debattierte und wie Ausrufe der Freude, des Hohnes und Spottes aufflatterten — selbst den an Ausbrüche des hier herrschenden politischen Fanatismus seit langem Gewöhnten mußten diese Wahrnehmungen aufs äußerste deprimieren!

**Freiherr von Giesl an Graf Berchtold.***Belgrad, 21. Juli 1914.*

Ich bin nunmehr — nach dem unglückseligen Verbrechen vom 28. Juni — wieder seit einiger Zeit auf meinem Posten und kann mir erlauben, über die hier herrschende Stimmung ein Urteil abzugeben.

Seit der Annexionskrise, waren die Beziehungen zwischen der Monarchie und Serbien auf Seite des letzteren durch nationalen Chauvinismus, Feindseligkeit und eine wirksame Propaganda der großserbischen Aspirationen in unseren von Serben bewohnten Ländern vergiftet, seit den letzten beiden Balkankriegen hat der Erfolg Serbiens diesen Chauvinismus zum Paroxismus gesteigert, dessen Ausbrüche stellenweise den Stempel des Wahnsinns tragen.

Es sei mir erspart, hierfür Beweise und Beispiele erbringen zu müssen, sie sind überall und immer in den Kreisen der politischen Gesellschaft wie unter dem niederen Volke, in allen Parteien billig zu haben! Ich stelle es als bekanntes Axiom hin, daß die Politik Serbiens auf die Abtrennung der von Südslawen bewohnten Gebiete und in weiterer Folge auf die Vernichtung der Monarchie als Großmacht aufgebaut ist und nur dieses eine Ziel kennt.

Niemand, der auch nur acht Tage in dem hiesigen politischen Milieu zu leben und zu wirken bemüht ist, wird sich dieser Wahrheit verschließen.

Infolge der jüngsten Ereignisse, welche die hiesigen politischen Stimmungen beeinflussen, und dazu rechne ich das Attentat in Sarajevo, den Tod Hartwigs und die Wahlkampagne, hat sich der Haß gegen die Monarchie noch vertieft.

Das Attentat in Sarajevo hat den Serben den bevorstehenden Zerfall der habsburgischen Staaten — auf welchen man schon früher seine Hoffnungen setzte — als in kürzester Zeit zu erwarten, den Abfall der von Südslawen bewohnten Gebiete der Monarchie, die Revolution in Bosnien-Herzegowina und die Unverlässlichkeit der slawischen Regimenter — als feststehende Tatsachen vorgegahelt und brachte System und scheinbare Berechtigung in ihren nationalistischen Wahnsinn.

Das so verhaßte Österreich-Ungarn erscheint den Serben nunmehr ohnmächtig und kaum mehr würdig, einen Krieg mit ihm zu führen — zum Hasse gesellt sich die Verachtung — es fällt ohne Mühe als zermürbter Körper in den Schoß des in naher Zukunft zu verwirklichenden großserbischen Reiches.

Blätter, welche nicht zu den allerextremsten gehören, besprechen in täglichen Artikeln die Ohnmacht und den Zerfall der Nachbarmonarchie und beschimpfen ohne Scheu und Furcht vor Abndung ihre Organe. Sie machen selbst vor der erhabenen Person unseres Herrschers nicht Halt. Sogar das Regierungsorgan weist auf die Zustände in Österreich-Ungarn als auf die einzigen Ursachen des fluchwürdigen Verbrechens hin. Die Furcht vor Verantwortung besteht nicht mehr. Das serbische Volk wird seit Jahrzehnten durch die Presse erzogen und die jeweilige Politik hängt von der Parteipresse ab; eine Frucht dieser Erziehung ist die großserbische Propaganda und ihre abscheuliche Ausgeburt, das Attentat vom 28. Juni.

Ich übergehe die an Wahnwitz streifenden, von der „Times“ als „tobstüchtig“ bezeichneten Anklagen und Verdächtigungen anlässlich des Todes

Hartwigs, überhaupt die lügenhafte Preßkampagne, welche aber die Serben in der Überzeugung bestärken dürfte, daß die Regierung und die Vertreter Österreich-Ungarns vogelfrei sind, und Bezeichnungen wie Mörder, Lump, infamer Österreicher etc. für uns als schmückende Beiwörter gelten müssen.

Der Tod Hartwigs hat in der Erkenntnis der Schwere dieses Verlustes in der serbischen politischen Welt einen fanatischen Kultus des Verstorbenen ausgelöst und man ließ sich dabei nicht allein von der Dankbarkeit für die Vergangenheit, sondern auch von der Sorge um die Zukunft leiten und überbot sich in sklavischer Unterwürfigkeit vor Rußland, um dessen Wohlwollen für kommende Zeiten zu sichern.

Als dritter Faktor vereinigt die Wahlkampagne alle Parteien auf der Plattform der Feindseligkeiten gegen Österreich-Ungarn. Keine der auf die Regierungsgewalt aspirierenden Parteien will in den Verdacht kommen, eines schwächlichen Nachgebens gegenüber der Monarchie für fähig gehalten zu werden. So wird die Wahlkampagne unter dem Schlagworte der Bekämpfung Österreich-Ungarns geführt.

Man hält die Monarchie aus inneren und äußeren Gründen für ohnmächtig, zu jeder energischen Aktion unfähig und glaubt, daß die ernstesten Worte, die schon an maßgebenden Stellen bei uns gesprochen worden sind, nur Bluff seien.

Die Urlaube des k. u. k. Kriegsministers und Chefs des Generalstabes haben in der Überzeugung bestärkt, daß die Schwäche Österreich-Ungarns nunmehr evident ist.

Ich habe die Geduld Euer Exzellenz etwas länger in Anspruch zu nehmen mir erlaubt, nicht weil ich mit Vorstehendem etwas Neues zu bringen glaubte, sondern weil ich diese Schilderung als Ausgang zu der sich aufdrängenden Konklusion betrachte, daß eine Abrechnung mit Serbien, ein Krieg um die Großmachtstellung der Monarchie, ja um ihre Existenz als solche, auf die Dauer nicht zu umgehen ist.

Versäumen wir es, Klarheit in unser Verhältnis zu Serbien zu bringen, so werden wir mitschuldig an den Schwierigkeiten und der Ungunst der Verhältnisse bei einem künftigen Kampfe, der doch, ob früher oder später, ausgetragen werden muß.

Für den lokalen Beobachter und den Vertreter der österreichisch-ungarischen Interessen in Serbien stellt sich die Frage so, daß wir eine weitere Schädigung unseres Prestiges nicht mehr ertragen können.

Sollten wir daher entschlossen sein, weitgehende Forderungen, verbunden mit wirksamer Kontrolle — denn nur eine solche könnte den Augiasstall der großserbischen Wühlarbeit reinigen — zu stellen, dann müßten alle möglichen

Konsequenzen überblickt werden und es muß von Anfang an der starke und feste Wille bestehen, durchzuhalten.

Halbe Mittel, ein Stellen von Forderungen, langes Parlamentieren und schließlich ein faules Kompromiß wäre der härteste Schlag, der Österreich-Ungarns Ansehen in Serbien und seine Machtstellung in Europa treffen könnte.

## 7.

### Graf Berchtold an Freiherrn von Giesl in Belgrad.

*Wien, am 22. Juli 1914.*

Euer Hochwohlgeboren wollen die nachfolgende Note am Donnerstag, den 23. Juli nachmittags, der königlichen Regierung überreichen:

„Le 31 mars 1909 le Ministre de Serbie à Vienne a fait d'ordre de son Gouvernement au Gouvernement I. et R. la déclaration suivante:

„La Serbie reconnaît qu'elle n'a pas été atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli créé en Bosnie-Herzégovine et qu'elle se conformera par conséquent à telle décision que les Puissances prendront par rapport à l'article XXV du Traité de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des Grandes Puissances, la Serbie s'engage dès à présent à abandonner l'attitude de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a observée à l'égard de l'annexion depuis l'automne dernier, et elle s'engage, en outre, à changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers l'Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre désormais avec cette dernière sur le pied d'un bon voisinage.“

Or, l'histoire des dernières années, et notamment les événements douloureux du 28 juin, ont démontré l'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement subversif dont le but est de détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement Serbe est arrivé à se manifester au delà du territoire du Royaume par des actes de terrorisme, par une série d'attentats et par des meurtres.

Le Gouvernement Royal Serbe, loin de satisfaire aux engagements formels contenus dans la déclaration du 31 mars 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement: il a toléré l'activité criminelle des différentes sociétés et affiliations dirigées contre la Monarchie, le langage effréné de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'attentats, la participation d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans les agissements subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans l'instruction publique, toléré enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe à la haine de la Monarchie et au mépris de ses institutions.

Cette énonciation sera portée simultanément à la connaissance de l'Armée Royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majesté le Roi et sera publiée dans le bulletin officiel de l'Armée.

Le Gouvernement Royal Serbe s'engage en outre.

1° à supprimer toute publication qui excite à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie et dont la tendance générale est dirigée contre son intégrité territoriale,

2° à dissoudre immédiatement la société dite „Narodna Odbrana“, à confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, et à procéder de la même manière contre les autres sociétés et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent à la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise; le Gouvernement Royal prendra les mesures nécessaires pour que les sociétés dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activité sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme,

3° à éliminer sans délai de l'instruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie,

4° à éloigner du service militaire et de l'administration en général tous les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et dont le Gouvernement I. et R. se réserve de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gouvernement Royal,

5° à accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement I. et R. dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirigé contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie,

6° à ouvrir une enquête judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe;

des organes, délégués par le Gouvernement I. et R., prendront part aux recherches y relatives,

7° à procéder d'urgence à l'arrestation du commandant Voja Tankosić et du nommé Milan Čiganović, employé de l'Etat Serbe, compromis par les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo,

8° à empêcher, par des mesures efficaces, le concours des Autorités Serbes dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière;

à licencier et punir sévèrement les fonctionnaires du service-frontière de Sabac et de Ložnica, coupables d'avoir aidé les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontière,

9° à donner au Gouvernement I. et R., des explications sur les propos injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger qui, malgré leur position officielle, n'ont pas hésité après l'attentat du 28 juin de

Cette tolérance coupable du Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'avait pas cessé au moment où les événements du 28 juin dernier en ont démontré au monde entier les conséquences funestes:

Il résulte des dépositions et aveux des auteurs criminels de l'attentat du 28 juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a été tramé à Belgrade, que les armes et explosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient être munis, leur ont été donnés par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes faisant partie de la „Narodna Odbrana“ et enfin que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a été organisé et effectué par des chefs du service-frontière serbe.

Les résultats mentionnés de l'instruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement I. et R. de poursuivre plus longtemps l'attitude de longanimité expectative qu'il avait observée pendant des années vis-à-vis des agissements concentrés à Belgrade et propagés de là sur les territoires de la Monarchie; ces résultats lui imposent au contraire le devoir de mettre fin à des menées qui forment une menace perpétuelle pour la tranquillité de la Monarchie.

C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement I. et R. se voit obligé de demander au Gouvernement Serbe l'énonciation officielle qu'il condamne la propagande dirigée contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage à supprimer, par tous les moyens, cette propagande criminelle et terroriste.

Afin de donner un caractère solennel à cet engagement, le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie fera publier à la première page du Journal officiel en date du 26/13 juillet l'énonciation suivante:

„Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ses agissements criminels.

Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé à la propagande susmentionnée et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auquel le Gouvernement Royal s'était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 mars 1909.

Le Gouvernement Royal qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du Royaume que dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer.“

Cette énonciation sera portée simultanément à la connaissance de l'Armée Royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majesté le Roi et sera publiée dans le bulletin officiel de l'Armée.

Le Gouvernement Royal Serbe s'engage en outre.

1° à supprimer toute publication qui excite à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie et dont la tendance générale est dirigée contre son intégrité territoriale,

2° à dissoudre immédiatement la société dite „Narodna Odbrana“, à confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, et à procéder de la même manière contre les autres sociétés et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent à la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise; le Gouvernement Royal prendra les mesures nécessaires pour que les sociétés dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activité sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme,

3° à éliminer sans délai de l'instruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomentier la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie,

4° à éloigner du service militaire et de l'administration en général tous les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et dont le Gouvernement I. et R. se réserve de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gouvernement Royal,

5° à accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement I. et R. dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirigé contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie,

6° à ouvrir une enquête judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe;

des organes, délégués par le Gouvernement I. et R., prendront part aux recherches y relatives,

7° à procéder d'urgence à l'arrestation du commandant Voja Tanković et du nommé Milan Čiganović, employé de l'Etat Serbe, compromis par les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo,

8° à empêcher, par des mesures efficaces, le concours des Autorités Serbes dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière;

à licencier et punir sévèrement les fonctionnaires du service-frontière de Šabac et de Ložnica coupables d'avoir aidé les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontière,

9° à donner au Gouvernement I. et R., des explications sur les propos injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger qui, malgré leur position officielle, n'ont pas hésité après l'attentat du 28 juin de

s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une manière hostile envers la Monarchie austro-hongroise enfin

10° d'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement I. et R. de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents.

Le Gouvernement I. et R. attend la réponse du Gouvernement Royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi 25 de ce mois à 6 h du soir.

Un mémoire concernant les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo à l'égard des fonctionnaires mentionnés aux points 7 et 8 est annexé à cette Note.\*

L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le tribunal de Sarajevo contre Gavril Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicité y relative, crime commis par eux le 28 juin dr., a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations suivantes:

1° Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son séjour à Sarajevo, l'archiduc François Ferdinand fut formé à Belgrade par Gavril Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, le nommé Milan Čiganović et Trifko Grabež avec le concours du commandant Voja Tankosić.

2° Les 6 bombes et les 4 pistolets Browning avec munitions, moyennant lesquels les malfaiteurs ont commis l'attentat, furent livrés à Belgrade à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež par le nommé Milan Čiganović et le commandant Voja Tankosić.

3° Les bombes sont des grenades à la main provenant du dépôt d'armes de l'armée serbe à Kragujevac.

4° Pour assurer la réussite de l'attentat, Čiganović enseigna à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež la manière de se servir des grenades et donna, dans une forêt près du champ de tir à Tropschider, des leçons de tir avec pistolets Browning à Princip et Grabež.

5° Pour rendre possible à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež de passer la frontière de Bosnie-Herzégovine et d'y introduire clandestinement leur contrebande d'armes, un système de transport secret fut organisé par Čiganović.

D'après cette organisation l'introduction en Bosnie-Herzégovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut opérée par les Capitaines-frontière de Šabac (Rade Popović) et de Ložnica ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbić de Ložnica avec le concours de divers particuliers.



Gelegentlich der Übergabe der vorstehenden Note wollen Euer Hochwohlgeboren mündlich hinzufügen, daß Sie beauftragt seien — falls Ihnen nicht inzwischen eine vorbehaltlose zustimmende Antwort der königlichen Regierung zugekommen sein sollte — nach Ablauf der in der Note vorgesehenen, vom Tage und von der Stunde Ihrer Mitteilung an zu rechnenden 48stündigen Frist, mit dem Personale der k. u. k. Gesandtschaft Belgrad zu verlassen.

## 8.

**Graf Berchtold an die k. u. k. Botschafter in Berlin, Rom, Paris, London,  
St. Petersburg und Konstantinopel.**

*Wien, 22. Juli 1914.*

Le Gouvernement I. et R. s'est vu obligé d'adresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois, par l'entremise du Ministre I. et R. à Belgrade, la Note suivante au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie. (Siehe Weisung an den k. u. k. Gesandten in Belgrad vom 22. Juli 1914.)

J'ai l'honneur d'inviter Votre Excellence de vouloir porter le contenu de cette Note à la connaissance du Gouvernement auprès duquel Vous êtes accrédité, en accompagnant cette communication du commentaire que voici:

Le 31 mars 1909 le Gouvernement Royal Serbe a adressé à l'Autriche-Hongrie la déclaration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus.

Le lendemain même de cette déclaration la Serbie s'est engagée dans une politique tendant à inspirer des idées subversives aux ressortissants serbes de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et à préparer ainsi la séparation des territoires austro-hongrois, limitrophes à la Serbie.

La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle:

Des sociétés et affiliations ne tardèrent pas à se former qui, soit ouvertement, soit clandestinement, étaient destinées à créer des désordres sur le territoire austro-hongrois. Ces sociétés et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des généraux et des diplomates, des fonctionnaires d'Etat et des juges, bref les sommités du monde officiel et inofficiel du Royaume.

Le journalisme serbe est presque entièrement au service de cette propagande, dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent leurs lecteurs à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie voisine ou à des attentats dirigés plus ou moins ouvertement contre sa sûreté et son intégrité.

Un grand nombre d'agents est appelé à soutenir par tous les moyens l'agitation contre l'Autriche-Hongrie et à corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays.

L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens serbes, esprit dont les annales du Royaume portent les sanglantes empreintes, a subi une récrudescence depuis la dernière crise balkanique; des individus ayant fait partie des bandes jusque là occupées en Macédoine, sont venus se mettre à la disposition de la propagande terroriste contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

En présence de ces agissements auxquels l'Autriche-Hongrie est exposée depuis des années, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gouvernement Serbe a manqué au devoir que lui imposait la déclaration solennelle du 31 mars 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contradiction avec la volonté de l'Europe et avec l'engagement qu'il avait pris vis-à-vis de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

La longanimité du Gouvernement I. et R. à l'égard de l'attitude provocatrice de la Serbie était inspirée du désintéressement territorial de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de l'espoir que le Gouvernement Serbe finirait tout de même par apprécier à sa juste valeur l'amitié de l'Autriche-Hongrie. En observant une attitude bienveillante pour les intérêts politiques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement I. et R. espérait que le Royaume se déciderait finalement à suivre de son côté une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait surtout à une pareille évolution dans les idées politiques en Serbie, lorsque, après les événements de l'année 1912, le Gouvernement I. et R. rendit possible par une attitude désintéressée et sans rancune l'agrandissement si considérable de la Serbie.

Cette bienveillance manifestée par l'Autriche-Hongrie à l'égard de l'Etat voisin n'a cependant aucunement modifié les procédés du Royaume qui a continué à tolérer sur son territoire une propagande dont les funestes conséquences se sont manifestées au monde entier le 28 juin dr., jour, où l'héritier présomptif de la Monarchie et son illustre épouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot tramé à Belgrade.

En présence de cet état de choses le Gouvernement I. et R. a dû se décider à entreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes démarches à Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouvernement Serbe à arrêter le mouvement incendiaire menaçant la sûreté et l'intégrité de la Monarchie austro-hongroise.

Le Gouvernement I. et R. est persuadé qu'en entreprenant cette démarche, il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisées qui ne sauraient admettre que le régicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impunément dans la lutte politique, et que la paix européenne fût continuellement troublée par les agissements partant de Belgrade.

C'est à l'appui de ce qui précède que le Gouvernement I. et R. tient à la disposition du Gouvernement . . . . . un dossier

élucidant les menées serbes et les rapports existant entre ses menées et le meurtre du 28 juin.

Une communication identique est adressée aux Représentants Impériaux et Royaux auprès des autres Puissances Signataires.

Vous êtes autorisé de laisser une copie de cette dépêche entre les mains de Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

## 9.

## Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London.

Telegramm.

Wien, 23. Juli 1914.

Da unter den Ententemächten England am ehesten für eine objektive Beurteilung unseres heutigen Schrittes in Belgrad zu gewinnen sein dürfte, ersuche ich Euer Exzellenz bei der Konversation, die Sie am 24. l. M. gelegentlich der Überreichung der Zirkularnote im Foreign Office haben werden, unter anderem auch darauf hinzuweisen, daß es Serbien in der Hand gehabt hätte, den ersten Schritten, die es unsererseits erwarten mußte, die Spitze abzubrechen, wenn es seinerseits spontan das Notwendige vorgekehrt hätte, um auf serbischem Boden eine Untersuchung gegen die serbischen Teilnehmer am Attentat vom 28. Juni l. J. einzuleiten und die Verbindungen aufzudecken, die hinsichtlich des Attentates erwiesenermaßen von Belgrad nach Sarajevo führen.

Die serbische Regierung hat bis heute, obwohl eine Anzahl notorisch bekannter Indizien nach Belgrad weisen, in diesem Belange nicht nur nichts unternommen, sie hat vielmehr die vorhandenen Spuren zu verwischen getrachtet.

So ist einem telegraphischen Bericht unserer Gesandtschaft in Belgrad zu entnehmen, daß der durch die übereinstimmenden Aussagen der Attentäter kompromittierte serbische Staatsbeamte Čiganović am Tage des Attentates noch in Belgrad weilte, drei Tage darauf aber, als sein Name in den Zeitungen genannt wurde, die Stadt bereits verlassen hatte. Bekanntlich erklärte auch schon der serbische Preßchef, daß Čiganović in Belgrad völlig unbekannt sei.

Was die kurze Befristung unserer Forderungen anbelangt, so ist dieselbe auf unsere langjährigen Erfahrungen serbischer Verschleppungskünste zurückzuführen.

Wir können die Forderungen, deren Erfüllung wir von Serbien verlangen und die eigentlich im Verkehr zwischen Staaten, die in Friede und Freundschaft leben sollen, nur Selbstverständliches enthalten, nicht zum Gegenstand von Verhandlungen und Kompromissen machen und können mit Rücksicht auf unsere volks-

wirtschaftlichen Interessen nicht riskieren, eine politische Methode, wonach Serbien die entstandene Krise nach seinem Belieben zu verlängern in der Hand hätte, zu akzeptieren.

## 10.

**Graf Mensdorff an Graf Berchtold.**

Telegramm.

*London, 24. Juli 1914.*

Zirkularnote Sir E. Grey eben übergeben, der sie aufmerksam durchgelesen. Bei Punkt 5 fragte er, wie das zu verstehen sei, Einsetzung Organe unserer Regierung in Serbien wäre gleichbedeutend mit Aufhören staatlicher Unabhängigkeit Serbiens. Ich erwiderte, Kollaboration von z. B. Polizeiorganen tangiere keineswegs Staatssouveränität.

Er bedauerte Befristung, weil dadurch die Möglichkeit benommen würde, die erste Erregung zu beruhigen und auf Belgrad einzuwirken, uns eine befriedigende Antwort zu geben. Ein Ultimatum könne man immer noch stellen, wenn Antwort nicht annehmbar.

Ich führte lange unseren Standpunkt aus (Notwendigkeit Abwehr von unausgesetzten subversiven Unternehmungen, welche Gebiet der Monarchie bedrohen, Verteidigung unserer vitalsten Interessen, vollkommenster Mißerfolg der vielfach bewiesenen bisherigen konziliananten Haltung gegenüber Serbien, das jetzt über drei Wochen Zeit hatte, aus eigenem Antrieb Untersuchung gegen Teilnahme Attentat einzuleiten etc.).

Der Herr Staatssekretär wiederholte seine Bedenken gegen kurze Befristung, anerkannte aber, daß das, was über Mitschuld an Verbrechen von Sarajevo gesagt wird, sowie manche unserer Verlangen berechtigt seien.

Er würde ganz bereit sein, die Angelegenheit als eine solche zu betrachten, die nur Österreich-Ungarn und Serbien berühre. Er ist aber sehr „apprehensiv“, daß mehrere Großmächte in einen Krieg verwickelt werden könnten. Von Rußland, Deutschland, Frankreich sprechend bemerkte er, die Bestimmungen des französisch-russischen Bündnisses dürften ungefähr so lauten, wie die des Dreibundes.

Ich legte ihm ausführlich unseren Standpunkt dar und wiederholte entschieden, daß in diesem Falle wir fest bleiben müßten, um uns doch einigermaßen Garantien zu schaffen, nachdem bisherige serbische Erklärungen niemals

eingehalten wurden. Ich begreife, daß er zunächst nur die Frage der Rückwirkung auf europäischen Frieden erwäge, er müsse aber auch, um unseren Standpunkt zu würdigen, sich in unsere Lage versetzen.

Er wollte nicht in eine nähere Diskussion über dieses Thema eingehen, müsse auch noch Note genauer studieren. Er zitiere zunächst den deutschen und den französischen Botschafter, da er mit den Alliierten Österreich-Ungarns und Rußlands, die aber selbst keine direkten Interessen in Serbien haben, vor allem in Gedankenaustausch treten müsse.

# 11.

## Graf Szécsen an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm.

*Paris, 24. Juli 1914.*

Soeben dem mit der Vertretung des abwesenden Ministers des Äußern betrauten Herrn Justizminister Weisung vom 22. l. M. vorgelesen und Kopie hinterlassen. Herr Bienvenu Martin, der durch heutige Morgenblätter vom Inhalt unserer Demarche in Belgrad beiläufig informiert war, schien durch meine Mitteilung ziemlich impressioniert. Ohne sich in eine nähere Erörterung des Textes einzulassen, gab er bereitwillig zu, daß die Ereignisse der letzten Zeit und die Haltung der serbischen Regierung ein energisches Einschreiten unsererseits ganz begreiflich erscheinen lassen.

Punkt 5 der in Belgrad überreichten Note schien dem Herrn Minister besonders aufzufallen, denn er ließ sich denselben zweimal vorlesen.

Der Herr Minister dankte mir für meine Mitteilung, die, wie er sagte, eingehend geprüft werden würde. Ich nahm die Gelegenheit wahr, um zu betonen, daß es sich um eine Frage handle, die direkt zwischen Serbien und uns ausgetragen werden muß, daß es aber im allgemeinen europäischen Interesse liege, wenn die Unruhe, die seit Jahren durch die serbische Wühlarbeit gegen uns aufrechterhalten werde, endlich einem klaren Zustand Platz mache.

Alle Freunde des Friedens und der Ordnung, und zu diesen zähle ich Frankreich in erster Linie, sollten daher Serbien ernstlich raten, seine Haltung gründlich zu ändern und unseren berechtigten Forderungen Rechnung zu tragen.

Der Herr Minister gab zu, daß Serbien die Pflicht habe, gegen etwaige Komplizen der Mörder von Sarajevo energisch vorzugehen, welcher Pflicht es

sich wohl nicht entziehen werde. Unter nachdrücklicher Betonung der Sympathie Frankreichs für Österreich-Ungarn und der zwischen unseren beiden Ländern bestehenden guten Beziehungen, sprach er Hoffnung aus, daß die Streitfrage friedlich, in einer unseren Wünschen entsprechenden Weise ausgetragen werden wird.

Der Herr Minister vermied jeden Versuch, die Haltung Serbiens irgendwie zu beschönigen oder zu verteidigen.

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12.

**Graf Szécsen an Graf Berchtold.**

Telegramm.

*Paris, 24. Juli 1914.*

Baron Schoen wird auftraggemäß heute hier mitteilen, daß unsere Kontroverse mit Serbien nach Ansicht Berliner Kabinetts eine Angelegenheit sei, die nur Österreich-Ungarn und Serbien angehe.

Anknüpfend hieran wird er zu verstehen geben, daß, falls dritte Staaten sich einmischen wollten, Deutschland, getreu seinen Allianzverpflichtungen, auf unserer Seite sein wird.

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13.

**Graf Szécsen an Graf Berchtold.**

Telegramm.

*Paris, 24. Juli 1914.*

Baron Schoen hat die ihm aufgetragene Demarche soeben ausgeführt.

Herr Bienvenu Martin hat ihm gesagt, er könne sich noch nicht definitiv äußern, soviel könne er aber schon jetzt sagen, daß die französische Regierung auch der Ansicht sei, unsere Kontroverse mit Serbien ginge nur Belgrad und Wien an und daß man hier hoffe, daß die Frage eine direkte und friedliche Lösung finden werde.

Dem hiesigen serbischen Gesandten wurde bereits der Rat gegeben, seine Regierung möge in allen Punkten soweit als nur möglich nachgeben, freilich mit der Einschränkung: „insoferne ihre Souveränitätsrechte nicht tangiert werden“.

Baron Schoen betonte die europäische Notwendigkeit, daß der Herd ewiger Beunruhigung in Belgrad endlich aus der Welt geschafft werden müsse.

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**Graf Szápáry an Graf Berchtold.****Telegramm.***St. Petersburg, 24. Juli 1914:*

Der Herr Minister des Äußern empfing mich, indem er mir sagte, er wisse, was mich zu ihm führe und erkläre mir gleich, daß er zu meiner Demarche keine Stellung nehmen würde. Ich begann mit der Verlesung meines Auftrages. Der Minister unterbrach mich das erste Mal bei der Erwähnung der Serie von Attentaten und fragte auf meine Aufklärungen, ob denn erwiesen sei, daß diese alle in Belgrad ihren Ursprung hätten? Ich betonte, daß sie Ausfluß der serbischen Aufwiegelung seien. Im weiteren Verlauf der Verlesung äußerte er, er wisse, worum es sich handle: Wir wollten Serbien den Krieg machen und dies solle der Vorwand sein. Ich replizierte, daß unsere Haltung in den letzten Jahren ein hinreichender Beweis sei, daß wir Serbien gegenüber Vorwände weder suchen noch brauchen. Die geforderten solennen Enunziationen riefen nicht den Widerspruch des Herrn Ministers hervor; er versuchte nur immer wieder zu behaupten, daß Pasić sich bereits in dem Sinne ausgesprochen habe, was ich richtig stellte. „Il dira cela 25 fois si vous voulez“, sagte er. Ich sagte ihm, niemand wende sich bei uns gegen Serbiens Integrität oder Dynastie. Am lebhaftesten erklärte sich Herr Sazonow gegen die Auflösung der „Narodna Odbrana“, die Serbien niemals vornehmen werde. Weiteren Widerspruch von Seite des Herrn Ministers löste die Beteiligung von k. u. k. Funktionären an der Unterdrückung der subversiven Bewegung aus. Serbien werde also daheim nicht mehr der Herr sein! „Sie werden dann immer wieder intervenieren wollen und welches Leben werden Sie da Europa bereiten!“ Ich erwiderte, es werde, wenn Serbien guten Willen hat, ein ruhigeres sein, als bisher.

Den an die Mitteilung der Note angefügten Kommentar hörte der Herr Minister ziemlich ruhig an; bei dem Passus, daß wir uns in unseren Gefühlen mit jenen aller zivilisierten Nationen eins wissen, meinte er, dies sei ein Irrtum. Mit allem mir zu Gebote stehenden Nachdruck verwies ich darauf, wie traurig es wäre, wenn wir in dieser Frage, bei der alles im Spiele sei, was wir Heiligstes hätten und, was immer der Herr Minister sagen wolle, auch in Rußland heilig sei, kein Verständnis in Rußland fänden. Der Herr Minister suchte die monarchische Seite der Angelegenheit zu verkleinern.

Das zur Verfügung der Regierungen gehaltene Dossier betreffend, meinte Herr Sazonow, wozu wir uns diese Mühe gegeben hätten, wo wir doch bereits ein Ultimatum erlassen hätten. Dies beweise am besten, daß wir eine unparteiische Prüfung des Falles gar nicht anstreben. Ich sagte ihm, daß für unser Vorgehen in dieser zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und Serbien spielenden Angelegenheit die durch unsere eigene Untersuchung erzielten Resultate genügen und wir nur

bereit seien, den Mächten weitere Aufschlüsse, falls dieselben sie interessieren, zu geben, weil wir nichts zu verheimlichen hätten.

Herr Sazonow meinte, jetzt nach dem Ultimatum sei er eigentlich gar nicht neugierig. Er stellte die Sache so dar, als ob es uns darauf ankomme, unbedingt mit Serbien Krieg zu führen. Ich erwiderte, wir seien die friedliebendste Macht der Welt, was wir wollten, sei nur Sicherung unseres Territoriums vor fremden revolutionären Umtrieben und unserer Dynastie vor Bomben.

Im Verlaufe der weiteren Erörterungen ließ Herr Sazonow nochmals Bemerkung fallen, daß wir jedenfalls eine ernste Situation geschaffen hätten.

Trotz der relativen Ruhe des Herrn Ministers war seine Stellungnahme eine durchaus ablehnende und gegnerische.

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## 15.

### **Communiqué des russischen Amtsblattes.**

*St. Petersburg, 24. Juli 1914.*

Die St. Petersburger Telegraphenagentur meldet:

Das amtliche Organ veröffentlicht folgendes Communiqué:

Die kaiserliche Regierung, lebhaft besorgt durch die überraschenden Ereignisse und durch das an Serbien durch Österreich-Ungarn gerichtete Ultimatum, verfolgt mit Aufmerksamkeit die Entwicklung des österreichisch-ungarisch-serbischen Konfliktes, in welchem Rußland nicht indifferent bleiben kann.

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## 16.

### **Graf Szápáry an Graf Berchtold.**

Telegramm.

*St. Petersburg, 24. Juli 1914.*

Nach fünfstündigem Ministerrate hat Herr Sazonow abends den deutschen Botschafter empfangen und mit ihm eine lange Unterredung gehabt.

Der Herr Minister vertrat hiebei die wahrscheinlich als Resultat des Ministerrates zu betrachtende Ansicht, der österreichisch-ungarisch-serbische Streit sei keine auf diese Staaten beschränkte Angelegenheit, sondern eine europäische, da der



im Jahre 1909 durch eine serbische Deklaration erfolgte Ausgleich unter den Auspizien ganz Europas vollzogen worden sei.

Der Herr Minister hob hervor, daß ihn besonders der Umstand unangenehm berührt habe, daß Österreich-Ungarn die Prüfung eines Dossiers angeboten habe, während bereits ein Ultimatum ergangen sei. Rußland würde eine internationale Prüfung des von uns zur Verfügung gestellten Dossiers verlangen. Mein deutscher Kollege machte Herrn Sazonow sofort darauf aufmerksam, daß Österreich-Ungarn eine Einmischung in seine Differenz mit Serbien nicht akzeptieren werde und daß auch Deutschland seinerseits eine Zumutung nicht annehmen könne, welche der Würde des Bundesgenossen als Großmacht zuwiderlaufe.

Im weiteren Verlaufe des Gespräches erklärte der Herr Minister, daß dasjenige, was Rußland nicht gleichgültig hinnehmen könne, die eventuelle Absicht Österreich-Ungarns wäre „de dévorer la Serbie“. Graf Pourtalès erwiderte, daß er eine solche Intention bei Österreich-Ungarn nicht annehme, da dies dem eigensten Interesse der Monarchie zuwiderlaufen würde. Österreich-Ungarn sei wohl nur daran gelegen „d'infliger à la Serbie le châiment justement mérité“. Herr Sazonow habe seine Zweifel daran ausgedrückt, ob Österreich-Ungarn, selbst wenn hierüber Erklärungen vorliegen würden, sich hieran genügen lassen würde.

Die Unterredung schloß mit einem Appell Herrn Sazonows, Deutschland möge mit Rußland an der Erhaltung des Friedens zusammenarbeiten. Der deutsche Botschafter versicherte dem russischen Minister, daß Deutschland gewiß nicht den Wunsch habe, einen Krieg zu entfesseln, daß es aber selbstverständlich die Interessen seines Bundesgenossen voll vertrete.

17.

**Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London.**

Telegramm.

Wien, 24. Juli 1914.

Zu Euer Exzellenz gestrigem Telegramm.

Ersuche, Sir E. Grey sofort aufzuklären, daß unsere gestrige Demarche in Belgrad nicht als formelles Ultimatum zu betrachten sei, sondern daß es sich um eine befristete Demarche handle, die, wie Euer Exzellenz Sir E. Grey streng vertraulich mitteilen wollen, — wenn die Frist fruchtlos abläuft — einstweilen nur von dem Abbruche der diplomatischen Beziehungen und von dem Beginne

notwendiger militärischer Vorbereitungen gefolgt sein wird, da wir unbedingt entschlossen sind, unsere berechtigten Forderungen durchzusetzen.

Euer Exzellenz sind ermächtigt beizufügen, daß wir allerdings, wenn Serbien nach Ablauf des Termines nur unter dem Drucke unserer militärischen Vorbereitungen nachgeben würde, es zum Ersatze der uns erwachsenen Kosten verhalten müßten; bekanntlich mußten wir zweimal (1908 und 1912) Serbiens wegen mobilisieren.

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## 18.

**Graf Berchtold an Graf Szápáry in St. Petersburg.**

*Wien, 24. Juli 1914.*

Ich habe den russischen Geschäftsträger am 24. Juli vormittags empfangen und ihn versichert, daß ich spezielles Gewicht darauf lege, ihn sobald als möglich von unserem Schritte in Belgrad in Kenntnis zu setzen und ihm diesbezüglich unseren Standpunkt darzulegen.

Indem Fürst Kudascheff für diese Aufmerksamkeit dankte, verhehlte er mir nicht seine Beunruhigung über unser kategorisches Vorgehen gegen Serbien, wobei er bemerkte, daß man in St. Petersburg immer präokkupiert gewesen sei, ob nicht unsere Demarche die Form einer Demütigung für Serbien annehmen werde, was nicht ohne Reperkussion in Rußland bleiben könnte.

Ich ließ es mir angelegen sein, den russischen Geschäftsträger in dieser Richtung zu beruhigen. Unser Ziel bestehe darin, die unhaltbare Situation Serbiens zur Monarchie zu klären und zu diesem Zwecke die dortige Regierung zu veranlassen, einerseits die gegen den derzeitigen Bestand der Monarchie gerichteten Strömungen öffentlich zu desavouieren und durch administrative Maßnahmen zu unterdrücken, andererseits uns die Möglichkeit zu bieten, uns von der gewissenhaften Durchführung dieser Maßnahmen Rechenschaft zu geben. Ich führte des längeren aus, welche Gefahr ein weiteres Gewährenlassen der großserbischen Propaganda nicht nur für die Integrität der Monarchie, sondern auch für das Gleichgewicht und den Frieden in Europa nach sich ziehen würde und wie sehr alle Dynastien, nicht zuletzt die russische, durch die Einbürgerung der Auffassung bedroht erscheinen, daß eine Bewegung ungestraft bleiben könne, die sich des Mordes als eines nationalistischen Kampfmittels bedient.

Schließlich verwies ich darauf, daß wir keine Gebietserwerbung, sondern bloß die Erhaltung des Bestehenden bezweckten, ein Standpunkt, der bei der russischen Regierung Verständnis finden müsse.

Fürst Kudascheff bemerkte darauf, daß er den Standpunkt seiner Regierung nicht kenne und auch nicht wisse, wie sich Serbien zu den einzelnen Forderungen stellen werde.

Zum Schlusse unserer Unterredung betonte der Herr Geschäftsträger, daß er nicht ermangeln werde, seiner Regierung die Auskünfte zur Kenntnis zu bringen, die ich ihm über unseren Schritt gegeben, namentlich auch in der Richtung, daß unsererseits keine Demütigung Serbiens beabsichtigt sei.

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## 19.

**Graf Berchtold an die k. u. k. Botschafter in Berlin, Rom, Paris, London, St. Petersburg und Konstantinopel.**

*Wien, 25. Juli 1914.*

Im Anbuge erhalten Euer Exzellenz das in der Zirkularnote an die Mächte angekündigte Dossier, das die großserbische Propaganda und ihre Zusammenhänge mit dem Sarajevoer Attentate zum Gegenstande hat.

Euer Exzellenz wollen dieses Dossier zur Kenntnis der dortigen Regierung bringen.

### **Memoire.**

Die von Serbien ausgegangene Bewegung, die sich zum Ziele gesetzt hat, die südslawischen Teile Österreich-Ungarns von der Monarchie loszureißen, um sie mit Serbien zu einer staatlichen Einheit zu verbinden, reicht weit zurück.

In ihren Endzielen stets gleich bleibend und nur in ihren Mitteln und an Intensität wechselnd, hat diese Propaganda auf serbischem Boden zur Zeit der Annexionskrise einen ihrer Höhepunkte erreicht. Den schützenden Mantel der Heimlichkeiten abstreifend, war sie damals mit dem Einbekenntnisse ihrer Tendenzen offen hervorgetreten und hatte versucht, unter der Patronanz der serbischen Regierung mit allen ihr zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln zur Verwirklichung ihrer Absichten zu gelangen.

Während die gesamte serbische Presse in gehässigen, die Tatsachen entstellenden Ausfällen zum Kampfe gegen die Monarchie aufrief, bildeten sich — von anderen Propagandamitteln abgesehen — Assoziationen, die diesen Kampf vorbereiteten.

An Bedeutung ragte unter diesen die Narodna odbrana hervor. Aus einem damals bestandenen revolutionären Komitee hervorgegangen, war diese als Privatverein konstituierte, jedoch vom Belgrader Auswärtigen Amte völlig abhängige Organisation von serbischen Militär- und Zivilfunktionären ins Leben gerufen worden. Als ihre Gründer fungierten unter anderen: General Božo Janković, die ehemaligen Minister Ljuba Jovanović, Ljuba Davidović und Velislav Vulović, der Direktor der Staatsdruckerei Živojin Dačić und die damaligen Hauptleute, jetzt Majore Voja Tankosić und Milan Pribičević. Dieser Verein hatte sich die Bildung und Ausrüstung von Freischaren für den bevorstehenden Krieg gegen die österreichisch-ungarische Monarchie zum Ziele gesetzt. (Siehe Beilage 2.)

Ein anschauliches Bild der damaligen Tätigkeit der Narodna odbrana liefert unter anderem die Aussage des vom Kreisgerichte in Sarajevo als Zeugen vernommenen bosnisch-herzegowinischen Landesangehörigen Trifko Krstanović, der sich zu jener Zeit in Belgrad befand und der, nebst anderen Angehörigen der Monarchie, von der Narodna odbrana als Komitatschi angeworben war. Mit etwa 140 anderen Bandenmitgliedern war Krstanović anfangs 1909 nach einer für die Ausbildung von Banden in Čuprija (Bezirk Jagodina) errichteten und von den Hauptleuten Voja Tankosić und Dušan Putnik geleiteten Schule gebracht worden. Als Lehrer fungierten dort ausschließlich serbische Offiziere. General Božo Janković und Hauptmann Milan Pribičević inspizierten diesen dreimonatlichen Bandenkurs in regelmäßigen Zeitabschnitten.

Dort erhielten die angehenden Komitatschis Unterricht im Schießen und Werfen von Bomben, im Minenlegen, Sprengen von Eisenbahnen, Tunnels und Brücken sowie im Zerstören von Telegraphenleitungen. Ihre Aufgabe war es, nach den Aufträgen ihrer Befehlshaber die neuerworbenen Kenntnisse in Bosnien und der Herzegowina in die Tat umzusetzen.

Durch diese ganz öffentlich betriebene und von der serbischen Regierung geförderte Aktion der Narodna odbrana wurde damals der Bandenkrieg gegen Österreich-Ungarn vorbereitet. Angehörige der Monarchie wurden hiebei zum Verrate an ihrem Vaterlande verleitet und systematisch dazu erzogen, als serbische Emissäre heimtückische Angriffe gegen die Verteidigungsmittel ihrer Heimat zu richten.

Diese Periode der aggressiven Aspirationen fand ihren Abschluß mit der von der serbischen Regierung am 31. März 1909 abgegebenen Erklärung, in welcher sich diese mit der durch die Annexion Bosniens und der Herzegowina geschaffenen völker- und staatsrechtlichen Neuordnung abfinden zu wollen erklärte und feierlich versprach, mit der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie in Hinkunft in freundschaftlichen Beziehungen leben zu wollen.

Mit dieser Erklärung schien auch das Ende der eine stete Quelle der Unruhe bildenden Bewegung gegen Österreich-Ungarn gekommen und der Weg

zu einer wirklich freundschaftlichen Annäherung Serbiens an die Monarchie betreten. Der Förderung durch die serbische Regierung beraubt und von ihr pflichtgemäß bekämpft, hätte die monarchiefeindliche Propaganda nur mehr ein schattenhaftes, dem baldigen Untergange geweihtes Dasein fristen können. Dagegen hätten die zwischen den südslawischen Teilen der Monarchie und Serbien auf sprachlichem, ethnischem und kulturellem Gebiete bestehenden Berührungspunkte zur Verrichtung gemeinsamer, vom Geiste gegenseitiger Freundschaft und paralleler Interessen getragener Kulturarbeit führen müssen.

Diese Erwartungen haben sich jedoch nicht erfüllt.

Die monarchiefeindlichen Aspirationen sind geblieben und unter den Augen der serbischen Regierung, die nichts getan hat, um diese Bewegung zu unterdrücken, hat die gegen Österreich-Ungarn gerichtete Propaganda nur noch an Breite und Tiefe gewonnen. Der Haß gegen die Monarchie wurde wacherhalten und durch stets neue Anfachung zu einem unversöhnlichen gestaltet. Mit den alten, der geänderten Situation angepaßten und durch neue Methoden ergänzten Mitteln wurde das Volk Serbiens „zum unvermeidlichen Vernichtungskampfe“ gegen Österreich-Ungarn aufgerufen. Systematisch wurden geheimnisvolle Fäden nach den südslawischen Gebieten der Monarchie gesponnen und deren Bürger zum Verrate am Vaterlande geworben.

Vor allem hat die serbische Presse seither nicht aufgehört, in diesem Geiste zu wirken.

Nicht weniger als 81 in Serbien erscheinenden Zeitschriften mußte bis heute wegen ihres die inländischen Strafgesetze verletzenden Inhaltes das Postdebit entzogen werden.

Kaum eine der Strafnormen, welche die erhabene Person des Monarchen, die Mitglieder Allerhöchstseines Hauses und die Integrität des Staates schützen, ist seitens der serbischen Blätter unverletzt geblieben. Einige wenige aus der überreichen Fülle dieses Materials entnommene, aus verschiedenen Zeitpunkten stammende Proben dieser Preßstimmen sind in der Beilage 1 zusammengestellt.

Ohne in eine detaillierte Besprechung dieser Äußerungen der öffentlichen Meinung Serbiens einzugehen, muß immerhin bemerkt werden, daß sie die Annexion Bosniens und der Herzegowina trotz der serbischerseits erfolgten Anerkennung dieses Aktes nach wie vor als einen an Serbien verübten Raub, der einer Remedur bedarf, hinstellen, ein Gedanke, der nicht bloß in den Blättern schärfster Richtung in allen Variationen ihrer unflätigen Sprache immer wiederkehrt, sondern der auch in der dem Belgrader Auswärtigen Amte so nahestehenden „Samouprava“ in kaum verhüllter Form ausgesprochen wird (lit. b der Beilage 1).

Ebenso kann nicht unterlassen werden, das Augenmerk darauf zu lenken, wie das am 15. Juni 1910 in Sarajevo von Bogdan Zerajić verübte Attentat

gegen den Landes-Chef von Bosnien und der Herzegowina, Feldzeugmeister von Varešanin, publizistisch verwertet wurde.

Wie bekannt, hatte sich Zerajić unmittelbar nach der Tat entleibt und vor deren Verübung seine gesamten Papiere verbrannt. Unter diesen Umständen vermochten die Motive seines Anschlages nicht vollkommen klargestellt zu werden. Immerhin konnte man aber aus einem bei ihm gefundenen Abzeichen schließen, daß er Krapotkinschen Ideen huldigte. Auch die geführten Erhebungen deuteten darauf hin, daß man es mit einem auf anarchistischen Grundlagen beruhenden Verbrechen zu tun hatte.

Dies hinderte jedoch die Presse Serbiens nicht, den Attentäter als serbischen Nationalhelden zu feiern und seine Tat zu verherrlichen. Ja, die „Politika“ verwahrte sich förmlich dagegen, daß Zerajić Anarchist gewesen sei und reklamierte ihn als „heldenmütigen Serben, dessen Name jeder Serbe mit Achtung und Schmerz nennen wird“.

Das Datum des 18. August\*) desselben Jahres hielt die „Politika“ für eine passende Gelegenheit, sich mit dem Anschläge des Zerajić, „dessen Name im Volke wie etwas „Heiliges“ genannt werde“, neuerlich zu befassen und das Attentat in einem Gedichte zu feiern (lit. a der Beilage 1).

So wurde dieses Verbrechen, das mit den Aspirationen auf Territorien der Monarchie nichts zu tun hatte, für die Förderung dieser Ideen ausgebeutet und durch die Glorifizierung des Zerajić der Mord ganz ausdrücklich als ein rühmliches und nachahmenswertes Mittel im Kampfe für die Verwirklichung dieser Gedanken anerkannt. Diese Sanktionierung des Mordes als einer vollkommen zulässigen Methode im Kampfe gegen die Monarchie kehrt später in den Blättern bei Besprechung des von Jukić verübten Attentates gegen den königlichen Kommissär von Cuvaj wieder (lit. c der Beilage 1).

Diese nicht nur in Serbien verbreiteten, sondern — wie später gezeigt werden wird — auf wohlorganisierten Schleichwegen in die Monarchie eingeschmuggelten Zeitungen waren es, die bei den breiten Massen jene Stimmungen erzeugten und wacherhielten, welche einen fruchtbaren Nährboden für die Machenschaften der monarchiefeindlichen Assoziationen boten.

Zum Zentralkunkte dieser von Vereinen betriebenen Agitation wurde die Narodna odbrana. Dieselben Personen, die zur Zeit der Annexion an der Spitze des Vereines gestanden waren, bildeten auch jetzt seine Leitung; wieder findet man hier, wie seinerzeit, als die energischsten und tätigsten Organisatoren die heftigsten Gegner der Monarchie; den General Božo Janković, den Direktor der Staatsdruckerei Živojin Dačić sowie die Majore Milan Pribičević und Voja Tankosić. Organisatorisch auf eine in die Breite und Tiefe gehende Basis gestellt und hierarchisch straff gegliedert (siehe Beilage 2 unter „Organisation“), besaß

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\*) Geburtstag Seiner k. und k. Apostolischen Majestät.

die Narodna odbrana bald zirka 400 Ausschüsse, die eine lebhafte Agitation entfalteten.

Hiezu kam, daß die Narodna odbrana zu dem Schützenbunde (mit 762 Vereinen), dem Sokolbunde „Dušan Silni“ (mit 2500 Mitgliedern), dem olympischen Klub, dem Reitervereine „Knez Mihajlo“, dem Jägerbunde und der Kulturliga in engste Verbindung trat und zahlreiche andere Vereine in ihre Dienste stellte, die alle, von der Narodna odbrana geführt und unterstützt, in deren Sinn wirken. In steter gegenseitiger Durchdringung gelangten diese Vereine zu einer förmlichen Amalgamierung, so daß sie heute eigentlich alle nur Glieder des einen Körpers der Narodna odbrana sind.

So spannte die Narodna odbrana über ganz Serbien ein engmaschiges Netz der Agitation, mit welchem sie alle für ihre Ideen Empfänglichen an sich zog.

Welches aber der Geist ist, in dem die Narodna odbrana wirkt, das geht mit genügender Klarheit schon aus ihren offiziellen Vereinspublikationen hervor.

In ihren Statuten im Kleide eines Kulturvereines auftretend, dem nur die geistige und körperliche Entwicklung der Bevölkerung Serbiens sowie deren materielle Kräftigung am Herzen liegt, enthüllt die Narodna odbrana in ihrem Vereinsorgane (siehe Beilage 2) den wahren und einzigen Grund ihres Daseins, ihr sogenanntes „reorganisiertes Programm“, nämlich:

In „fanatischer und unermüdlicher Arbeit“ dem serbischen Volke unter dem Vorwande, daß ihm die Monarchie „seine Freiheit und Sprache nehmen, ja Serbien zerschmettern“ wolle, die „heilige Wahrheit“ zu predigen, daß es eine unerläßliche Notwendigkeit ist, gegen Österreich-Ungarn, diesen seinen „ersten und größten Feind“, den „Ausrottungskampf mit Gewehr und Kanone“ zu führen und das Volk „mit allen Mitteln“ auf diesen Kampf vorzubereiten, der zu führen ist, „zur Befreiung der unterworfenen Gebiete“, in denen „7 Millionen unterjochter Brüder schmachten“.

Ausschließlich im Dienste dieser Idee stehen die „Kulturbestrebungen“ der Narodna odbrana, als bloße Mittel zur Organisation und Erziehung des Volkes für den ersehnten Vernichtungskampf gegen die Monarchie.

In eben diesem Geiste wirken aber alle der Narodna odbrana affilierten Vereine, wofür der Sokolverein in Kragujevac als Beispiel dienen möge (siehe Beilage 3).

Wie bei der Narodna odbrana, so stehen auch hier Offiziere, Professoren und Staatsbeamte an der Spitze.

Die Ansprache, mit welcher der Vereinspräsident Major Kovačević die Jahresversammlung im Jahre 1914 eröffnete, verzichtet vollkommen darauf, das Turnen, das doch der eigentliche Zweck eines Sokolvereines ist, zu erwähnen und befaßt sich ausschließlich mit der „Vorbereitung zum Kampfe“ gegen den „gefährlichen, herzlosen, lüsternen, lästigen und gefräßigen Feind im Norden“.



der „Millionen serbischer Brüder Freiheit und Recht nimmt und sie in Sklaverei und Ketten hält“.

In dem Verwaltungsberichte dieses Vereines treten die sachlichen Ausführungen ganz in den Hintergrund und geben nur die Stichworte für das Bekenntnis des wahren „Zieles der Handlungen der Verwaltung“ ab, nämlich: die Vorbereitung der nationalen Entwicklung und der Stärkung der „unterdrückten Nation“ zu dem Ende, damit sie ihr „noch nicht erfülltes Programm, ihre noch nicht erfüllte Arbeit“ zu Ende führen und jene „große Tat“ vollbringen könne, „die sich in nächster Zeit abspielen wird“: „die Befreiung der jenseits der Drina wohnenden Brüder, welche die Leiden des Gekreuzigten erdulden“.

Ja sogar der Kassier benützt seinen Kassenbericht zu dem Mahnrufe, man müsse „Falken erziehen“, die imstande sind, den „noch nicht befreiten Brüdern die Freiheit zu bringen“.

Ebenso wie bei der Narodna odbrana die Kulturbestrebungen, ist also bei den Sokols die turnerische Betätigung nicht Selbstzweck, sondern ein bloßes Mittel im Dienste ebenderselben Propaganda, die mit denselben Gedanken, ja fast mit den gleichen Worten betrieben wird.

Wenn nun die Narodna odbrana das „Volk“ zum Vernichtungskampfe gegen die Monarchie aufruft, wendet sie sich nicht nur an das Volk in Serbien, sondern an alle südslawischen Völkerschaften. Gelten doch der Narodna odbrana die südslawischen Gebiete der Monarchie als „unsere unterworfenen serbischen Gebiete“. (Siehe auch Beilage 4). So sollen also auch die südslawischen Angehörigen der Monarchie an dieser „nationalen Arbeit“ teilnehmen; so soll auch jenseits der serbischen Grenze diese „gesunde, notwendige Arbeit“ verrichtet werden. Und auch auf dem Boden der Monarchie sucht die Narodna odbrana jene „Helden für diesen heiligen Kampf“, denen Obilić, der Mörder Murads, als nachstrebenswertes Beispiel nationaler Opferwilligkeit voranleuchten soll.

Um aber die „Brüder außerhalb Serbiens“ zur Teilnahme an der „Arbeit privater Initiative“ anzuapornen, unterhält die Narodna odbrana eine lebhafte Verbindung mit den „Brüdern jenseits der Grenze“. Wie diese Verbindung geartet ist, wird in dem Vereinsorgane nicht gesagt, wohl deshalb, weil dies zu jenem Teile der „Gesamtarbeit“ gehört, der „aus mehrfachen Gründen weder wiedergegeben werden darf noch kann“.

Wie umfangreich dieser Zweig ihrer Tätigkeit ist, läßt sich aus dem Umstande erkennen, daß sowohl der Zentralausschuß der Narodna odbrana als auch einzelne ihrer Kreisausschüsse eigene Sektionen für „auswärtige Angelegenheiten“ besitzen.

Diese „auswärtige“ Tätigkeit der Narodna odbrana und ihrer Affilierten ist eine äußerst vielseitige.



Das, weil behördlich kontrollierbar, relativ ungefährlichste Mittel dieser Agitation sind die Vortragsreisen, welche hervorragende Vereinsmitglieder der Narodna odbrana nach den südöstlichen Teilen der Monarchie unternehmen, wo sie in verschiedenen Vereinen über nationale und kulturelle Fragen sprechen. Diese Anlässe bieten den Vortragenden die von ihnen gesuchte und wohl den vornehmlichsten Zweck dieser Reisen bildende Gelegenheit, in halben, dem Kenner verständlichen Worten und Wendungen im Sinne der wahren Tendenzen dieser Vereine zu wirken.

Unter diesen Emissären nimmt nebst anderen auch der schon mehrmals erwähnte Direktor der serbischen Staatsdruckerei Živojin Dačić eine hervorragende Stellung ein, jener Živojin Dačić, der am 8. August 1909 einen „Aufruf“ an das serbische Volk erließ, in welchem er Österreich-Ungarn als den Feind Serbiens bezeichnete und zur Vorbereitung auf den Kampf mit der Monarchie ermahnte. Wiederholt unternahm Dačić Agitationsreisen nach den südöstlichen Teilen der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie. Bei einem solchen Vortrage in Karlovci (1912) legte er seine sonst beobachtete Vorsicht ab und trat geradezu für die „Vereinigung aller Serben gegen den gemeinsamen Feind“ ein, als den er in nicht mißzuverstehenden Andeutungen Österreich-Ungarn hinstellte.

Bedenklicher sind die Beziehungen, welche die im Geiste der Narodna odbrana wirkenden serbischen Korporationen unter dem Deckmantel der Interessen- und Kulturgemeinschaft mit Vereinen in der Monarchie angeknüpft haben, denn die gegenseitigen deputativen oder korporativen Besuche dieser Vereine, die sich einer genaueren behördlichen Kontrolle entziehen, werden serbischerseits zu allerlei monarchiefeindlichen Machenschaften benützt.

So hat sich beispielsweise ein zu der bekannten Feier des Sarajevoer Prosvjetaverienes im September 1912 entsendeter Delegierter der Narodna odbrana nicht gescheut (siehe Beilage 6) bei diesem Anlasse im geheimen bosnische Mitglieder für seinen Verein anzuwerben. Die Entsendung eines Vertreters des Kragujevacer Sokolvereines zu dieser Feier sollte den „Brüdern in Bosnien“ sagen: „Wir haben Euer nicht vergessen; die Flügel des Falken der Sumadija sind noch mächtig“, ein Gedanke, der im intimen Verkehre wohl einen ganz anderen, den früher dargelegten Tendenzen dieses Vereines adäquateren Ausdruck gefunden haben wird. (Siehe Beilage 3.) Was die Vorgänge anbelangt, die sich bei den in Serbien abgehaltenen Zusammenkünften dieser Art abspielen, so entziehen sich diese allerdings einer auf vollkommen sicherer Basis stehenden Kenntnis der k. und k. Behörden, denen ja für diese Fälle nur schwer kontrollierbare konfidentielle Mitteilungen zur Verfügung stehen. In diesem Zusammenhange wäre des Besuches von Agramer Studenten in Serbien im April 1912 zu gedenken, der auf serbischer Seite durch die Veranstaltung eines offiziellen militärischen Empfanges, ja sogar einer Truppenparade zu Ehren dieser Studenten zu einer derart suggestiven Demonstration gestaltet wurde, daß der Verwaltungsbericht des

Kragujevacer Sokolvereines sagen darf, dieses „Ereignis bedeutet den Anfang und Keim einer großen Tat, die sich in der nächsten Zukunft abspielen wird“, „ein Keim, der reifen wird, wenn die Volksseele noch mehr aufwallt“, „bis es keine Schranken gibt, die sie nicht niederreißen könnte“.

Erst vor kurzem ist es zur Kenntnis der Behörden der Monarchie gelangt, daß die Sokolvereine Serbiens einige analoge Korporationen in der Monarchie dazu bestimmt haben, sich mit ihnen in einem bisher geheim gehaltenen Verbande zu vereinigen, dessen Charakter bisher noch nicht ganz klargestellt ist, da die Erhebungen darüber derzeit noch fort dauern. Immerhin lassen die schon jetzt erzielten Ergebnisse der Nachforschungen vermuten, daß man hier einem der Wege auf die Spur gekommen ist, auf dem die subversiven Tendenzen der serbischen Sokols und ihrer Freunde einzelnen verführten und irregeleiteten Personengruppen in der Monarchie eingepflanzt werden.

Diese auf breitere Schichten gemünzte, mehr vorbereitende Propaganda tritt aber an Bedeutung gegenüber jener „auswärtigen Arbeit“ in den Hintergrund, die von der Narodna odbrana und ihren Freunden in der Agitation von Mann zu Mann geleistet wird. Hier ist jenes Gebiet, auf dem ihre traurigsten Erfolge liegen.

Durch ihre geheimen Vertrauensmänner und Emissäre trägt sie das Gift der Aufwieglung in die Kreise der Erwachsenen ebenso wie der urteilslosen Jugend.

So haben beispielsweise, von Milan Pribičević verleitet, die ehemaligen Honvedoffiziere V. B., D. K., V. N. und der kroatisch-slawnische Gendarmerie-leutnant V. K. den Heeresdienst in der Monarchie unter bedenklichen Umständen verlassen und sich nach Serbien gewendet, wo sie inzwischen allerdings manche ihrer Hoffnungen getäuscht sehen und wenigstens zum Teile daran denken, in die von ihnen verratene Heimat zurückzukehren.

Die von Serbien aus in die mittleren Schulen Kroatiens und Bosniens getragene Agitation ist leider so bekannt, daß sie einer Exemplifizierung nicht bedarf. Weniger bekannt aber ist es, daß die wegen schwerer disziplinärer Vergehen aus kroatischen und bosnischen Schulen Ausgeschlossenen in Serbien mit offenen Armen aufgenommen, oft sogar von Staats wegen unterstützt und zu Feinden der Monarchie erzogen werden. Die serbischen Schulen mit ihren monarchiefeindlichen Lehrbehelfen und ihrer großen Zahl von Professoren und Lehrern, die in den Reihen der Narodna odbrana stehen, sind allerdings geeignete Anstalten zur Erziehung derartiger Adepten. Ein besonders beachtenswerter Fall dieser Art mag hier als Beispiel Erwähnung finden. Im März 1914 waren mehrere Schüler der Lehrerpräparandie in Pakrac (Kroatien) wegen eines Streikes relegiert worden. Dieselben wandten sich nach Serbien, wo sie zum Teile sofort als Lehrer Anstellungen erhielten, zum Teile in einer Lehrerbildungsanstalt untergebracht wurden. Mit monarchiefeindlichen Kreisen in Verbindung stehend, hat einer dieser Relegierten öffentlich erklärt, er und seine Leute würden zur Zeit der Anwesenheit des Herrn Erzherzog-Thronfolgers in Bosnien den Beweis liefern,

daß Bosnien serbisches Land sei. Recht merkwürdig mutet es an, daß der königlich serbische Kreispräfekt in Krajna, wie hier ergänzend bemerkt sei, dreien aus dem Kreise dieser so arg kompromittierten Studenten gerade zur Zeit der Anwesenheit des Herrn Erzherzogs Franz Ferdinand in Bosnien serbische Pässe ausstellte, in denen er sie fälschlich als serbische Staatsangehörige bezeichnete, obwohl er deren kroatische Heimatsberechtigung kennen mußte. Mit diesen Pässen ausgerüstet, vermochten die drei Präparandisten unbemerkt nach der Monarchie zu gelangen, wobei sie jedoch erkannt und angehalten wurden.

Mit all dem wäre aber die „auswärtige“ Tätigkeit der Narodna odbrana noch lange nicht erschöpfend charakterisiert.

Schon seit längerer Zeit war die k. und k. Regierung durch konfidentielle Meldungen darüber unterrichtet, daß die Narodna odbrana den von ihr gewünschten Krieg gegen die Monarchie auch militärisch insoferne vorbereite, als sie in der Monarchie Emissäre halte, die nach gewohnter Bandenart im Falle des Ausbruches von Feindseligkeiten die Zerstörung von Transport-Mitteln und -Einrichtungen bewirken und Revolten sowie Paniken hervorrufen sollten. (Siehe Beilage 7.)

Das im Jahre 1913 beim Kreisgerichte in Sarajevo gegen Jovo Jagličić und Genossen eingeleitete Strafverfahren wegen Verbrechens der Ausspähung (Beilage 6) hat die Bestätigung dieser vertraulichen Mitteilungen gebracht. So wie zur Zeit ihrer Gründung steht auch heute noch die Vorbereitung des Bandenkrieges auf dem Programme der Narodna odbrana, wozu noch ergänzend die Entwicklung einer Spionagetätigkeit trat.

So ist das heutige sogenannte „reorganisierte Programm“ der Narodna odbrana in Wahrheit ein erweitertes Programm: Den „Ausrottungskampf“ gegen die Monarchie vorzubereiten, ja herbeizuführen und dann wieder „die alte rote Fahne der Narodna odbrana“ zu entfalten.

Aus dieser Atmosphäre des offen und geheim geschürten Hasses gegen die Monarchie, verbunden mit einer sich jenseits aller Verantwortlichkeit dünkenden Agitation, die im Kampfe gegen Österreich-Ungarn alle Mittel für zulässig erachtet und hierbei ganz ungescheut den gemeinen Mord als deren wirksamstes empfiehlt, mußten schließlich, auch ohne weiteres Zutun der monarchiefeindlichen Kreise Serbiens, Akte des Terrorismus entstehen.

Am 8. Juni 1912 gab Lukas Jukić gegen den königlichen Kommissär in Agram, von Cuvaj, einen Schuß ab, durch den der im Wagen sitzende Banalrat von Hervoić tödlich verletzt wurde. Auf der Flucht erschoss Jukić einen ihn verfolgenden Polizeimann und verletzte zwei weitere.

Wie aus der öffentlich durchgeführten Hauptverhandlung bekannt ist, finden sich in den Ideen des Jukić die grundlegenden Gedanken der von der Narodna odbrana propagierten Pläne wieder. Wenn sich Jukić auch schon seit einiger Zeit mit Attentatsplänen trug, so kamen diese doch erst zur Reife, als er am

18. April 1912 den Ausflug der Agramer Studenten nach Belgrad mitgemacht hatte. Bei den zu Ehren der Besucher veranstalteten rauschenden Festlichkeiten war Jukić zu verschiedenen Personen in Beziehung getreten, die dem Kreise der Narodna odbrana angehörten und mit denen er politische Gespräche führte. Wenige Tage später war Jukić wieder in Belgrad und hier erhielt er von einem serbischen Major eine Bombe und von einem Genossen die Browningpistole, mit der er das Attentat vollführte.

Die in Agram aufgefundene Bombe war nach dem Gutachten der Sachverständigen in einem Arsenale zu militärischen Zwecken erzeugt worden.

Noch war der Anschlag des Jukić nicht vergessen, als am 18. August 1913 der aus Amerika zugereiste Stephan Dojčić in Agram ein Attentat gegen den königlichen Kommissär Baron Skerlec verübte — eine Tat, die der von Serbien aus organisierten Verhetzung der in Amerika lebenden Südslaven entsprang — gleichfalls ein Werk der „auswärtigen“ Propaganda der Narodna odbrana und ihrer Gesinnungsgenossen.

Die von dem Serben T. Dimitrijević verfaßte, in Chicago gedruckte Broschüre „Natrag u staro ognjiste vaše“ mit ihren maßlosen Ausfällen gegen Seine k. und k. Apostolische Majestät und ihrer Aufforderung an die Serben der Monarchie, im Hinblick auf ihre baldige „Befreiung“ nach Serbien heimzuwandern, zeigt den Parallelismus dieser in Amerika mit voller Freiheit der Bewegung betriebenen, von Serbien aus geleiteten Propaganda und jener, die von Serbien aus in die Gebiete der Monarchie getragen wird.

Und wieder kaum nach Jahresfrist war Agram der Schauplatz eines, diesmal mißglückten Attentates.

Am 20. Mai l. J. versuchte Jakob Schäfer im Agramer Theater einen Anschlag auf den Banus Freiherrn von Skerlec, woran er im letzten Augenblicke durch einen Polizeibeamten gehindert wurde. Die Untersuchung ergab den Bestand eines Komplottes, dessen Seele Rudolf Hercigonja war. Aus den Aussagen Hercigonjas und seiner fünf Mitangeklagten ergab sich, daß auch dieses Attentat seinen Ausgang von Serbien nahm.

An einem gescheiterten Versuche zur Befreiung des Jukić beteiligt, war Hercigonja nach Serbien geflüchtet (Oktober 1912), wo er gemeinsam mit seinem Komplizen Marojan Jakšić mit Komitatschis und Mitgliedern der Narodna odbrana verkehrte. Wie schon so oft bei den durch viel zu frühe Beschäftigung mit Fragen der Politik überhitzten jugendlichen Gemütern, war das Ergebnis dieses korrumpierenden Verkehrs auch diesmal ein unheilvolles. Hercigonja kehrte mit dem in Belgrad verkündeten Dogma zurück, daß die südslawischen Länder Österreich-Ungarns von der Monarchie abgetrennt und mit dem Königreiche vereinigt werden mußten. Dazu hatte er in dem Kreise, in dem er dort verkehrte, die Lehre eingesogen, daß dieses Ziel durch die Ausführung von

Attentaten auf hochstehende Persönlichkeiten und führende Politiker der Monarchie anzustreben sei, da es nur durch diese Mittel verwirklicht werden könne.

In diesem Sinne wirkte dann Hercigonja in Agram auf seine Freunde ein, deren einige er für seine Ideen gewann. Im Vordergrund seiner Pläne stand die Verübung eines Anschlages auf den Thronfolger Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand.

Wenige Monate vorher waren gegen Luka Aljinović Erhebungen wegen hochverräterischer Propaganda geführt worden. Im Zuge dieses Verfahrens hatten drei Zeugen ausgesagt, Aljinović habe vor ihnen erklärt, er hätte im Jahre 1913 in Belgrad zu Propagandazwecken, speziell aber zur Ausführung eines Attentates auf den Herrn Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand von der Narodna odbrana 100 Dinar und die gleiche Summe von einer geheimen Studentenvereinigung bekommen.

Man sieht, wie sich die verbrecherische Agitation der Narodna odbrana und der ihr Gleichgesinnten in letzter Zeit auf die Person des Herrn Erzherzog-Thronfolgers konzentrierte.

Aus allen diesen Feststellungen gelangt man zu dem Schlusse, daß die Narodna odbrana mit den um sie gruppierten monarchiefeindlichen Kreisen Serbiens seit kurzem den Zeitpunkt für gekommen erachtete, die von ihr verbreiteten Lehren durch Taten verwirklichen zu lassen.

Beachtenswert ist aber, daß sie sich hiebei damit begnügte, für diese Taten die Anregungen zu geben und dort, wo diese Anregungen auf fruchtbaren Boden gefallen waren, die materiellen Hilfsmittel zu deren Verwirklichung beizustellen, daß sie aber die einzige gefährliche Rolle bei dieser Propaganda der Tat ausschließlich der von ihr verhetzten und verführten Jugend der Monarchie zuschob, die ganz allein die Lasten dieses traurigen „Heldentums“ zu tragen hat.

Alle Züge dieser Mache finden sich in der Entstehungsgeschichte des tiefbetrübenden Attentates vom 28. Juni wieder. (Beilage 8.)

Princip und Grabež tragen den Typus der schon in der Schule von den Gedanken der Narodna odbrana vergifteten Jugend.

In Belgrad, im Kreise einer von diesen Ideen erfüllten Studentenschar verkehrend, trug sich Princip mit Attentatsplänen gegen den Herrn Erzherzog-Thronfolger Franz Ferdinand, gegen den sich damals aus Anlaß seiner Reise nach den annektierten Ländern der Haß der monarchiefeindlichen Elemente Serbiens besonders akzentuiert hatte.

Ihm gesellte sich der im selben Kreise verkehrende Čabrinović bei, dessen wechselnde, radikal-revolutionären Ansichten nach seinem eigenen Geständnisse unter dem Einflusse seiner Belgrader Umgebung und der Lektüre der serbischen Blätter in die gleiche monarchiefeindliche und zur Propaganda der Tat neigende Richtung gedrängt wurden.

Dank seiner bereits vorhandenen Dispositionen erlag Grabež diesem Milieu, in das er erst später trat, sehr rasch.

Soweit aber dieses Komplott auch gediehen und so fest der Entschluß der Verschwörer auch gewesen sein mag, zur Ausführung des Attentates zu schreiten, so wäre es doch nie zu dessen Verübung gekommen, wenn sich nicht, gleichwie im Falle Jukić, Leute gefunden hätten, die den Komplizen die Mittel zur Verübung des Anschlages zur Verfügung gestellt hätten. Denn es fehlte ihnen, wie Princip und Čabrinović ausdrücklich bestätigen, an den nötigen Waffen, ebenso aber auch an Geld zu deren Anschaffung.

Interessant ist es nun zu sehen, wo sich die Komplizen ihre Werkzeuge zu verschaffen suchten. Milan Pribičević und Živojin Dačić, diese beiden führenden Männer der Narodna odbrana, waren die ersten, an die sie als sichere Helfer in ihrer Not dachten, offenbar deshalb, weil es im Kreise der Attentatslustigen bereits zur Tradition geworden ist, die Mordwerkzeuge von diesen Repräsentanten der Narodna odbrana zu beziehen. Der zufällige Umstand, daß diese beiden Männer zur kritischen Zeit nicht in Belgrad weilten, vereitelte allerdings diesen Plan, doch waren Princip und Čabrinović deshalb nicht verlegen, eine andere Unterstützungsstelle zu finden, jenen Milan Ciganović, einen gewesenen Komitatschi, jetzt Beamten der serbischen Eisenbahndirektion in Belgrad, gleichfalls ein aktives Mitglied der Narodna odbrana, welcher in deren Geschichte zuerst im Jahre 1909 als Zögling der Bandenschule in Čuprija (Beilage 5) auftaucht. In ihrer Erwartung hatten sich denn auch Princip und Čabrinović nicht getäuscht, denn bei Ciganović fanden sie sofort die erbetene Unterstützung.

Dieser und durch dessen Vermittlung sein Freund, der schon mehrmals genannte königlich serbische Major Voja Tankosić, ebenfalls einer der Führer der Narodna odbrana, der im Jahre 1908 Leiter der Bandenschule in Čuprija gewesen war (Beilage 5), traten nun als geistige Leiter und entscheidende Förderer an die Spitze des Komplotts, das sie mit einer abstoßenden, für die moralischen Qualitäten der ganzen monarchiefeindlichen Bewegung bezeichnenden Selbstverständlichkeit billigten. Nur ein leises Bedenken hatten sie zuerst — ob die drei Verschwörer auch fest entschlossen wären, die Tat zu wagen — ein Bedenken, das unter ihrer suggestiven Mithilfe allerdings bald schwand. Dann aber waren sie zu jeder Hilfe bereit. Tankosić stellte 4 Brownings mit Munition und Reisegeld zur Verfügung; 6 Handgranaten aus serbischen Armeebeständen bildeten die Vervollständigung der Ausrüstung, eine Bewaffnung, die nach ihrer Zusammenstellung und Herkunft Reminiszenzen an den Fall Jukić wachruft. Um den Erfolg der Aktion besorgt, verfügte Tankosić die Unterweisung der Verschwörer im Schießen, eine Aufgabe, der sich Čiganović mit dem bekannten Erfolge unterzog. Eine spezielle, nicht erbetene Fürsorge entwickelten aber Tankosić und Čiganović zur Geheimhaltung des Komplottes: sie stellten Zyankali mit der Weisung bei, daß sich die Täter nach vollbrachtem Anschläge damit entleiben, ein Akt der Fürsorge, der in erster Linie ihnen

zugute kommen mußte, da die Wahrung des Geheimnisses sie auch noch den geringen Gefahren entrückte, die sie bei dieser Unternehmung auf sich nehmen mußten. Der sichere Tod für die Opfer ihrer Verführung, die volle Sicherheit für sich, das ist die bereits bekannte Devise der Narodna odbrana.

Um die Ausführung des Attentatsplanes zu ermöglichen, mußten die Bomben und Waffen unbemerkt nach Bosnien eingeschmuggelt werden. Auch hier tritt Čiganović helfend auf, er schreibt den Verschwörern eine genaue Reiseroute vor und sichert ihnen für ihr Einschleichen nach Bosnien die Unterstützung der serbischen Grenzbehörden. Die Art, wie dieser selbst von Prinzip als „mysteriös“ bezeichnete Transport organisiert war und durchgeführt wurde, läßt keinen Zweifel darüber offen, daß dies ein wohl vorbereiteter und für die geheimnisvollen Zwecke der Narodna odbrana schon oft begangener Schleichweg war. Mit einer Selbstverständlichkeit und Sicherheit, die nur der Gewohnheit entspringen können, stellten die Grenzhauptleute in Šabac und Loznica ihren Verwaltungsapparat für diesen Zweck zur Verfügung. Ohne Störungen vollzog sich dieser geheimnisvolle Transport mit seinem komplizierten System von stets wechselnden Führern, die wie durch Zauberkraft herbeigerufen, immer zur Stelle waren, wenn man sie brauchte. Ohne nach dem Zwecke dieser merkwürdigen Reise einiger unreifer Studenten zu fragen, ließen die serbischen Behörden, auf die Weisung des ehemaligen Komitatschis und untergeordneten Bahnbeamten Čiganović hin, diesen glatt funktionierenden Apparat spielen. Sie brauchten übrigens nicht zu fragen, denn nach den erhaltenen Weisungen war ihnen wohl klar, daß hier wieder eine „Mission“ der Narodna odbrana zu erfüllen war. Der Anblick des Arsenal's von Bomben und Revolvern entlockte denn auch dem Finanzwachmanne Grbić nur ein wohlwollend zustimmendes Lächeln, wohl ein ausreichender Beweis dafür, wie sehr man auf dieser „Straße“ an den Anblick derartiger Konterbande gewöhnt war.

Schwere Schuld hat die königlich serbische Regierung auf sich geladen, als sie all dies geschehen ließ.

Zur Pflege freundnachbarlicher Beziehungen zu Österreich-Ungarn verpflichtet, hat sie ihrer Presse gestattet, den Haß gegen die Monarchie zu verbreiten; hat sie es zugelassen, daß auf ihrem Boden etablierte Vereinigungen unter Führung hoher Offiziere, Staatsbeamter, Lehrer und Richter öffentlich eine Kampagne gegen die Monarchie führen, die auf die Revolutionierung ihrer Bürger abzielt; hat sie es nicht verhindert, daß an der Leitung ihrer Militär- und Zivilverwaltung beteiligte, aller moralischen Hemmungen bare Männer das öffentliche Gewissen derart vergiften, daß ihm in diesem Kampfe der gemeine Meuchelmord als die beste Waffe scheint.



**Serbische Preßstimmen.**

- a) Die „Politika“ brachte am 18. August 1910 anlässlich des 80. Geburtstages Seiner k. und k. Apostolischen Majestät ein großes Bild des Bogdan Zerajić, der zwei Monate vorher gegen den Landeschef von Bosnien, Freiherrn von Varešanin, ein Attentat verübt hatte. In dem dazu gehörigen Artikel hieß es: „Vor zwei Monaten, am 2. Juni (a. St.), gerade am Tage der Eröffnung des bosnisch-herzegowinischen Landtages, versuchte ein junger Serbe, der Student Bogdan Zerajić, in Sarajevo den Landes-Chef von Bosnien und der Herzegowina, den General Marian Varešanin zu töten. Fünf Schüsse feuerte Zerajić auf diesen Renegaten, der sich seine Karriere im berühmten Volksaufstande in Rakovica durch Vergießung des Blutes seiner leiblichen Brüder gesichert hatte, durch einen merkwürdigen Zufall gelang es nicht, ihn zu töten. Dann jagte sich der tapfere und selbstbewußte Zerajić die sechste und letzte Kugel in den Kopf und stürzte sofort tot zusammen. In Wien verstanden sie sehr gut, daß Zerajić das Attentat nicht deshalb verübte, weil er russische und revolutionäre Schriften gelesen, sondern daß er dies als edler Sprosse eines Volkes getan hatte, das auf diese blutige Weise gegen die Fremdherrschaft protestieren wollte. Deshalb trachteten sie, diese ganze Sache möglichst schnell zu vertuschen und — was gegen ihre Gewohnheit ist — eine Affaire zu vermeiden, welche die österreichische Regierung in Bosnien und der Herzegowina noch mehr kompromittiert hätte. In Wien wünschte man, daß jedes Andenken an Zerajić ausgelöscht und seinem Attentate jede Bedeutung abgesprochen werde. Aber gerade diese Furcht vor dem toten Zerajić und das Verbot, daß sein Name in ganz Bosnien und der Herzegowina erwähnt werde, bewirkten, daß sein Name im Volke wie etwas Heiliges genannt wird, heute, am 18. August, vielleicht mehr als jemals.

Am heutigen Tage zünden auch wir eine Kerze auf seinem Grabe an und rufen: „Ehre dem Zerajić!“

Hieran schloß sich ein Gedicht, dessen Inhalt in Übersetzung lautet:

„Bosnien lebt, noch ist es nicht tot,  
Umsonst habt Ihr seinen Leib begraben;  
Noch sprüht es Feuer, das gefesselte Opfer,  
Noch ist's nicht Zeit, das Grablied zu singen.



Mit Satanshand scharret auf Ihr die Grube,  
 Aber der lebende Tote will nicht in die Gruft;  
 Kaiser, hörtest Du? im Blitz des Revolvers  
 Sausen die bleiernen Kugeln gegen Deinen Thron!  
 Das sind nicht Sklaven, das ist herrliche Freiheit,  
 Die aus der kühnen Hand des Unterjochten leuchtet!  
 Was zittert so dieses schreckliche Golgatha?  
 Petrus zog das Schwert, Christus zu schirmen.  
 Seine Hand sank, aber aus dem Blute  
 Werden tausende tapfere Hände sich erheben;  
 Dieser Schuß war nur der erste Bote  
 Der glorreichen Ostern nach Golgathas Peinen.“

- b) Am 8. Oktober 1910 brachten anlässlich des Jahrestages der Annexion Bosniens und der Herzegowina „Politika“ und „Mali Journal“, von denen letzteres mit schwarzem Rande erschien, Artikel, in denen sie sich in heftigen Angriffen gegen Österreich-Ungarn ergingen. Europa müsse sich überzeugen, daß das serbische Volk noch immer an die Revanche denke. Der Tag der Revanche müsse kommen, dafür bürgten die fieberhaften Anstrengungen Serbiens zwecks Organisation seiner Wehrmacht, sowie die Stimmung und der Haß des serbischen Volkes gegen die Nachbarmonarchie.

Aus dem gleichen Anlaß schrieb die „Samouprava“ am 9. Oktober 1910: „Schimpfworte und Exzesse sind kein Mittel, um den wahren Patriotismus zum Ausdruck zu bringen. Nur stille und würdige Arbeit führt zum Ziele!“

- c) Am 18. April 1911 hieß es in der „Politika“: „Außer einigen Zynikern würde es niemand in Serbien gerne sehen, wenn König Peter nach Wien oder Budapest reisen sollte. Durch die Annexion Bosniens und der Herzegowina ist ein für allemal die Möglichkeit einer Freundschaft zwischen Serbien und Österreich-Ungarn zerstört worden. Das fühlt jeder Serbe.“
- d) Die „Beogradske Novine“ schreiben am 18. April 1911: „Auch die meisten Regierungsmänner mißbilligen die geplante Reise des Königs Peter zu Kaiser Franz Joseph. Der Sturm der Entrüstung, der sich wegen des Planes dieser Reise des Königs des ganzen Serbentums bemächtigt hat, ist vollkommen begreiflich.“
- e) Das „Mali Journal“ vom 19. April 1911 sagt: „Ein Besuch des Königs Peter beim Herrscher von Österreich-Ungarn wäre eine Beleidigung des ganzen Serbentums. Durch diesen Besuch würde Serbien das Recht auf die Piemontrolle verlieren. Die Interessen Serbiens können sich niemals mit den Interessen Österreichs decken.“

- f) Am 23. April 1911 führen „Politika“, „Mali Journal“, „Tribuna“, „Beogradske Novine“ und „Večernje Novosti“ zu dem Plane eines Besuches König Peters am Wiener Hofe aus: Zwischen Serbien und Österreich-Ungarn könne niemals Freundschaft existieren. Der geplante Besuch des Königs Peter sei daher für Serbien eine „schändliche Kapitulation“, eine „Demütigung Serbiens“, eine „feierliche Sanktionierung aller Verbrechen und Missetaten, die Österreich-Ungarn an Serbien und dem serbischen Volke begangen habe“.
- g) Am 18. April 1912 schreibt „Trgovinski Glasnik“ in einem mit „Der Zerfall in Österreich“ überschriebenen Artikel: „In Österreich-Ungarn herrscht ein Zerfall nach allen Seiten. Was jenseits der Donau und Save geschieht, das ist nicht mehr eine deutsche, magyarische, böhmische oder kroatische Krise, das ist eine allgemeine österreichische Krise, eine Krise der Dynastie selbst. Wir Serben können mit Zufriedenheit einer solchen Entwicklung der Dinge in Österreich zusehen.“
- h) In einem „Die Grenzen Albaniens“ betitelten Artikel greift der „Balkan“ Österreich-Ungarn mit folgenden Ausführungen an: Wenn Europa zu schwach sei, um Österreich Halt zu gebieten, würden Montenegro und Serbien dies tun, indem sie Österreich zurufen: „Halt, weiter geht es nicht! Ein Krieg zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und Serbien ist unanableiblich. Wir haben das türkische Reich zerstückelt, wir werden auch Österreich zerstückeln. Einen Krieg haben wir beendet, jetzt stehen wir vor einem zweiten.“
- i) „Večernje Novosti“ vom 22. April 1913 richten einen Aufruf an das serbische reisende Publikum und an die serbischen Kaufleute, sie mögen die Donau-Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft boykottieren. Niemand solle mit den Schiffen dieser österreichischen Gesellschaft fahren oder Waren transportieren lassen. Alle, die dies täten, würden von einem Ausschusse mit Geldbußen bestraft. Die Gelder würden der Komitatschikasse zufließen, welche für die Verwendung im kommenden Kriege mit Österreich bestimmt sei.
- k) Die „Tribuna“ vom 26. Mai 1913 schreibt aus Anlaß der Besitzergreifung Ada Kalehs durch Österreich-Ungarn: „Das schwarz-gelbe verbrecherische Österreich hat wieder einen räuberischen Trick durchgeführt. Es ist ein Dieb, der, wenn er nicht einen ganzen Sack Geld stehlen kann, sich auch mit einem Dinar begnügt.“
- l) Am 10. Juni 1913, anläßlich der Wiederkehr des Jahrestages des Attentates auf den königlichen Kommissär in Agram durch den Studenten Luka Jukić brachten die serbischen Blätter Gedenkartikel. In einem Artikel der „Pravda“ heißt es: „Es muß aus tiefster Seele wehe tun, daß nicht jeder so gehandelt hat, wie unser Jukić. Wir haben keinen Jukić mehr,

aber wir haben den Haß, wir haben den Zorn, wir haben heute zehn Millionen Jukić. Wir sind fest überzeugt, daß Jukić bald durch sein Arrestfenster den letzten Kanonenschuß der Freiheit vernehmen wird.“

- m) „Mali Journal“ vom 7. Oktober 1913 bringt an leitender Stelle einen Artikel, in welchem Österreich-Ungarn die Existenzberechtigung abgesprochen wird und die slawischen Nationalitäten aufgefordert werden, den Angriffskampf, den Serbien zu unternehmen gedenke, zu unterstützen.
- n) Der „Piëmont“ vom 8. Oktober 1913 schreibt zu dem Gedächtnistage der Annexion: „Heute sind es fünf Jahre, daß mittels eines kaiserlichen Dekretes die Souveränität des Habsburger Szepters über Bosnien und die Herzegowina ausgebreitet wurde. Den Schmerz, der an diesem Tage dem serbischen Volke zugefügt wurde, wird das serbische Volk noch durch Jahrzehnte fühlen. Beschämt und vernichtet stöhnte das serbische Volk verzweifelt. Das Volk legt das Gelübde ab, Rache zu üben, um durch einen heroischen Schritt zur Freiheit zu gelangen. Dieser Tag hat die bereits eingeschlafene Energie geweckt und der wiederbelebte Held wird eines Tages die Freiheit suchen. Heute, wo serbische Gräber die alten serbischen Länder zieren, wo die serbische Kavallerie die Schlachtfelder von Mazedonien und Altserbien betreten hat, wendet sich das serbische Volk, nachdem es seine Aufgabe im Süden beendet hat, der entgegengesetzten Seite zu, von wo das Stöhnen und Weinen des serbischen Bruders gehört wird, wo der Galgen haust. Serbische Soldaten, die heute in Dušans Reiche mit jenen Albanesen kämpfen, die gegen uns der Staat aufwiegelte, welcher uns Bosnien und Herzegowina nahm, legten heute das Gelübde ab, daß sie gegen die „zweite Türkei“ ebenso vorgehen werden, wie sie mit Gottes Hilfe gegen die Balkan-Türkei vorgegangen sind. Sie legen dieses Gelübde ab und hoffen, daß der Tag der Rache naht. Eine Türkei verschwand. Der gute serbische Gott wird geben, daß auch die „zweite Türkei“ verschwindet.“
- o) Das „Mali Journal“ vom 4. November 1913 schreibt: „Jedes Streben nach einer Annäherung an Österreich-Ungarn kommt einem Verrate an dem serbischen Volke gleich. Serbien muß sich mit den Tatsachen abfinden und immer vor Augen halten, daß es in Österreich-Ungarn seinen gefährlichsten Feind hat, den energisch zu bekämpfen die heiligste Pflicht jeder serbischen Regierung sein muß.“
- p) Am 14. Jänner 1914 heißt es in der „Pravda“: „Unsere Neujahrswünsche gelten in erster Linie unseren noch nicht befreiten, unter fremder Knechtschaft seufzenden Brüdern. Die Serben mögen aushalten; nach Kossovo kam Kumanovo und unser Siegeszug ist noch nicht beendet.“
- q) „Novosti“ vom 18. Jänner 1914 brachten ein Bild der Wasserweihe in Bosnien mit folgendem Text: „Auch in Orten, die unter fremdem Joche

seufzen, bewahren die Serben ihre Sitten, bis sie der Tag der Freiheit in heller Begeisterung finden wird.“

- r) Die „Zastava“ gesteht im Jänner 1914: „Serbien eifert die österreichisch-ungarischen Serben zur Revolution an.“
  - s) Das „Mali Journal“ vom 9. März 1914 schreibt: „Serbien kann das Säbelrasseln Franz Ferdinands anlässlich der Skutariaffaire nie vergessen.“
  - t) Am 4. April 1914 schreibt die „Zastava“: „Die österreichischen Staatsmänner, die nur eine Politik des Hasses, eine Bürokratenpolitik führen, nicht aber eine weit ausblickende Politik, bereiten selbst den Untergang ihres Staates vor.“
  - u) Die „Pravda“ vom 8. April 1914 sagt: „Österreich hat heute seine Existenzberechtigung verloren.“
  - v) In den Osternummern (April 1914) geben alle serbischen Blätter der Hoffnung Ausdruck, daß auch die nichtbefreiten, unterjochten, gedrückten Brüder bald eine frohe Auferstehung feiern werden.
  - w) In der „Tribuna“ vom 23. April 1914 heißt es: „Die Pazifisten haben ein neues Schlagwort erfunden, das vom „Patriotismus Europas“. Dieses Programm kann aber nur dann verwirklicht werden, wenn Österreich aufgeteilt wird.“
  - x) Das „Mali Journal“ vom 12. Mai 1914 schreibt: „Was im Privatleben Verbrechen heißt, nennt man in Österreich Politik. Die Geschichte kennt ein Ungeheuer und dieses Ungeheuer heißt Österreich.“
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Beilage 2.

**Auszug aus dem vom Zentralausschusse des Vereines „Narodna odbrana“ herausgegebenen Vereinsorgane gleichen Namens. (Narodna odbrana, izdanje stredišnjog odbora narodne odbrane. Beograd, 1911. Nova stamparija „Davidović“, Dečanska ulica br. 14, Ljub. Davidoviča.)**

In einer kurzen Einleitung wird zunächst bemerkt, daß diese Broschüre „keine vollkommene, erschöpfende Wiedergabe der Gesamtarbeit der Narodna odbrana bilde, da sie dies aus mehrfachen Gründen weder sein darf noch sein kann“.

Diese Schrift ist in drei Abschnitte geteilt, deren erster aus XIV Kapiteln besteht und programmatischer Natur ist, während der zweite Abschnitt einen Bericht über die Vereinstätigkeit enthält und im dritten Beispiele für die Organisation ähnlicher ausländischer Vereine angeführt werden.

Im I. Kapitel „Entstehung und Tätigkeit der ersten Narodna odbrana“ wird bemerkt, daß dieser Verein anlässlich der in Serbien durch die Annexion Bosniens und der Herzegowina entstandenen Volksbewegung mit folgenden Zielen gegründet wurde:

1. Hebung, Ermutigung und Stärkung des Nationalgefühls.
2. Einschreibung und Sammlung von Freiwilligen.
3. Formierung von Freiwilligeneinheiten und deren Vorbereitung zur bewaffneten Aktion.
4. Sammlung von freiwilligen Beiträgen, Geld und anderen Erfordernissen zur Verwirklichung ihrer Aufgabe.
5. Organisierung, Ausrüstung und Einexerzierung einer besonderen aufständischen Truppe (Komitee), bestimmt zu besonderer und selbständiger Kriegsführung.
6. Entwicklung einer Aktion in allen anderen Richtungen der Verteidigung des serbischen Volkes.

Anknüpfend hieran wird bemerkt, daß durch die Anerkennung der Annexion seitens der Großmächte dieser ganzen Arbeit des Vereines ein Ende bereitet worden ist, worauf unter Beibehaltung der bestehenden Vereinsverfassung zu einer Reorganisation des Programmes und zu neuer Arbeit geschritten worden sei, damit bei Wiederholung eines ähnlichen Anlasses „die alte rote Kriegsfahne der Narodna odbrana wieder entfaltet werden könne“.

Im II. Kapitel „Die neue heutige Narodna odbrana“ wird zunächst ausgeführt: „Man hat zur Zeit der Annexion die Erfahrung gemacht, daß Serbien für den Kampf, den ihm die Verhältnisse auferlegen, nicht vorbereitet ist und daß dieser Kampf, den Serbien aufzunehmen hat, viel ernster und schwieriger ist, als man dachte; die Annexion war nur einer der Schläge, den die Feinde Serbiens gegen dieses Land geführt hätten, ein Schlag, dem bereits viele andere Schläge vorangegangen sind, und dem noch andere folgen werden. Damit ein neuer Überfall Serbien nicht ebenso unvorbereitet trifft, ist es notwendig, sich vorzubereiten; zu arbeiten.“ Als Ziel dieser in den breitesten Schichten des Volkes zu leistenden „Arbeit“ wird die „Vorbereitung des Volkes zum Kampfe in allen Richtungen der nationalen Arbeit, entsprechend den heutigen Zeiterfordernissen“ bezeichnet und werden als Mittel hierzu „Stärkung des nationalen Bewußtseins, körperliche Übungen, das wirtschaftliche und gesundheitliche Wohlergehen, Hebung der Kultur etc.“ hervorgehoben, „insoweit auf diesem Gebiete neben dem Staate der einzelne und die Gesellschaft wirken kann und muß“.

Das Kapitel III „Die drei Hauptaufgaben“ beginnt mit dem Hinweise darauf, daß die Annexion gelehrt habe, das Nationalbewußtsein in Serbien sei nicht so stark, als es in einem Lande sein sollte, welches als ein kleiner Teil von 3 Millionen die Hoffnung und Stütze für 7 Millionen des unterjochten serbischen Volkes bilde. Die erste Aufgabe des Vereines bestehe daher in der Stärkung des nationalen Bewußtseins. Die zweite Aufgabe sei die Pflege körperlicher Übungen, die dritte die Erzielung einer richtigen Wertung dieser sportlichen Betätigung.

In dem IV. „Vom Schießwesen“ handelnden Kapitel wird der Wert einer guten Ausbildung im Schießen speziell für die serbischen Verhältnisse hervorgehoben, da dort die militärische Ausbildung nur 6 Monate dauere. Diese Ausführungen konkludieren in dem Satze:

„Einem neuen Schlage, wie die Annexion einer war, muß ein neues Serbien entgegentreten, worin jeder Serbe vom Kinde bis zum Greise ein Schütze ist.“

Kapitel V, welches das „Verhältnis der Narodna odbrana zur Sokolschaft“ behandelt, beginnt mit einem allgemeinen kulturpolitischen Exkurs über die Bedingungen der Kräfte der Staaten. Hierbei wird auf den Niedergang der Türkei verwiesen und anknüpfend hieran gesagt:

„Die alten Türken vom Süden her verschwinden nach und nach und nur noch ein Teil unseres Volkes leidet unter ihrer Herrschaft. Aber neue Türken kommen vom Norden, furchtbarer und gefährlicher als die alten. Kulturell und wirtschaftlich stärker, gehen die nördlichen Feinde auf uns los. Sie wollen uns unsere Freiheit, unsere Sprache nehmen, uns zerschmettern. Die Vorzeichen

des Kampfes, der da kommt, sind fühlbar. Das serbische Volk steht vor der Frage, sein oder nicht sein“

„Was wollen wir mit den Vorträgen“, lautet die Überschrift des VII. Kapitels, dessen wesentlichster Inhalt sich in dem Satze erschöpft:

„Die Narodna odbrana veranstaltete Vorträge, welche mehr oder weniger Agitationsvorträge waren. Es wurde das Programm unserer neuen Arbeit entwickelt. Bei jedem Vortrage wurde von der Annexion gesprochen, von der Arbeit der alten Narodna odbrana und den Aufgaben der neuen. Die Vorträge werden nie aufhören Agitationsvorträge zu sein, sie werden sich jedoch immer mehr nach den einzelnen Fächern entwickeln und sich mit allen Fragen unseres gesellschaftlichen und nationalen Lebens befassen.“

In den Kapiteln VIII „Tätigkeit der Frau in der Narodna odbrana“, IX „Detail- und Kleinarbeit“ und X „Renaissance der Gesellschaft“ wird unter Hinweis auf die Aufgaben der Narodna odbrana die Vorbereitung und Vertiefung der Vereinsarbeit und die Notwendigkeit einer Regenerierung der Individuen, des Volkes und des Staates behandelt.

Das Kapitel XI „Neue Obiliće und Singjelice“ \*) sagt einleitend:

„Es ist ein Irrtum zu behaupten, Kossovo sei gewesen und vorüber. Wir befinden uns mitten im Kossovo. Unser heutiges Kossovo ist die Finsternis und Unkenntnis, in welcher unser Volk lebt. Die anderen Gründe des neuen Kossovo leben an den Grenzen im Norden und Westen: Die Deutschen, Österreicher und Schwabas mit ihrem Vordringen gegen unseren serbischen und slawischen Süden.“ Anknüpfend hieran wird unter Hinweis auf die Heldentaten des Obilić und Singjelic auf die Notwendigkeit der Aufopferung im Dienste der Nation hingewiesen und gesagt: „Die nationale Arbeit ist mit Opfern verbunden, namentlich in der Türkei und in Österreich, wo solche Arbeiter von den Behörden verfolgt, in den Kerker und an den Galgen gebracht werden. Auch für diesen Kampf gegen die Finsternis und Unwissenheit sind solche Helden nötig. Die „Narodna odbrana“ zweifelt nicht, daß im Kampfe mit Gewehr und Kanone gegen die Schwabas und unsere sonstigen Feinde, dem wir entgegengehen, unser Volk eine Reihe von Helden stellen wird. Doch ist die Narodna odbrana damit nicht zufrieden, denn sie betrachtet auch die heutigen sogenannten friedlichen Verhältnisse als Krieg und fordert gleichfalls Helden für diesen heutigen Kampf, den wir in Serbien und jenseits der Grenze führen.“

\*) Miloš Obilić (auch Kobilić) schlich sich — nach der serbischen Tradition — nach der Schlacht auf dem Amselfelde in das türkische Lager und ermordete dort Sultan Murad (von Kállay, „Geschichte der Serben“, I. Bd.). Stephan Singjelic, Knes von Resara, spielte während des serbischen Aufstandes (1807—1810) eine Rolle. 1809 verteidigte Singjelic die Redoute von Tschagar gegen die Türken und soll sich, da er der Übermacht nicht gewachsen war, mit einem Teile der Seinen und mit zahlreichen Türken in die Luft gesprengt haben. (von Kállay, „Die Geschichte des serbischen Aufstandes.“)

Über die „Verbindung mit den Brüdern und Freunden“ handelt das XII. Kapitel, dessen wesentlichster Inhalt sich in folgenden Sätzen zusammen-drängt:

„Zu den Hauptaufgaben der Narodna odbrana gehört die Aufrechterhaltung der Verbindung mit unseren nahen und ferneren Brüdern jenseits der Grenze und unseren übrigen Freunden in der Welt. Mit dem Worte „Volk“ meint die Narodna odbrana unser ganzes Volk, nicht nur jenes in Serbien. Sie hofft, daß die von ihr in Serbien geleistete Arbeit den Brüdern außerhalb Serbiens ein Ansporn zu lebhafterer Teilnahme an der Arbeit privater Initiative werde, damit der heutige neue Aufschwung für die Schaffung einer kräftigen serbischen Narodna odbrana in allen serbischen Gebieten unter einem vor sich gehe.“

„Zwei wichtige Aufgaben“ benennt sich Kapitel XIII, welches ausführt:

„Indem wir auf dem Standpunkte stehen, daß durch die Annexion Bosniens und der Herzegowina das Vordringen gegen unsere Länder vom Norden her vollkommen zutage getreten ist, erachtet die Narodna odbrana und nennt dem Volke Österreich als unseren ersten und größten Feind.“ Diese Arbeit (nämlich Österreich dem serbischen Volke als dessen größten Feind zu bezeichnen) betrachtet der Verein nach den folgenden Ausführungen als eine gesunde, notwendige Aufgabe, als seine Grundpflicht. Dann fährt die Broschüre fort:

„Wie einst die Türken vom Süden auf uns losgegangen sind, so geht heute Österreich vom Norden her auf uns los. Wenn die Narodna odbrana die Notwendigkeit des Kampfes mit Österreich predigt, so predigt sie eine heilige Wahrheit unserer nationalen Lage.“

Der durch diese Propaganda entstehende Haß gegen Österreich sei allerdings nicht das Ziel, sondern die natürliche Konsequenz der Arbeit, deren Zweck die Selbsterhaltung und Freiheit sei. Wenn hierbei der Haß gegen Österreich aufkeime, so sei es Österreich, welches ihn durch sein Vorgehen säe, welches Vorgehen den „Kampf gegen Österreich bis zu dessen Ausrottung auferlegt“.

Nach einem Lobe der modernen Auffassung der nationalen Idee wird bemerkt, daß bei Besprechung der „Befreiung und Vereinigung“ zu viel mit Phrasen gearbeitet werde. Dem Volke müsse gesagt werden:

„Die Befreiung unserer unterworfenen serbischen Gebiete und deren Vereinigung mit Serbien ist für unseren Herrn, unseren Kaufmann, unseren Bauer notwendig wegen der fundamentalsten Bedürfnisse der Kultur, des Handels, wegen des Brotes und des Raumes. In dieser Erkenntnis wird das Volk mit größerer Opferwilligkeit bei der nationalen Arbeit zugreifen. Unserem Volke muß gesagt werden, daß die Freiheit Bosniens für dasselbe notwendig ist, nicht nur aus Mitleid mit den dortselbst leidenden Brüdern, sondern wegen des Handels und der Verbindung mit dem Meere.



Die „beiden Aufgaben“ der Narodna odbrana werden dann nochmals in folgendem Schlußsatze zusammengefaßt: „Neben der Aufgabe, dem Volke die ihm seitens Österreichs drohende Gefahr zu erklären, hat die Narodna odbrana noch die wichtige Aufgabe, unter vollständiger Wahrung der heiligen nationalen Erinnerungen dieses neue, gesunde und in seinen Folgen mächtige Erfassen des Nationalismus und der Arbeit zum Zwecke der Befreiung und Vereinigung in das Volk zu tragen.“

Das XIV., Schlußkapitel, beginnt mit einem Appell an die Regierung und das Volk Serbiens, sich mit allen Mitteln für den Kampf vorzubereiten, „den die Annexion vorangezeigt hat“.

In folgendem Satze wird hierauf die Tätigkeit der Narodna odbrana nochmals rekapituliert:

„Indem die Narodna odbrana zeitgemäß, den veränderten Verhältnissen entsprechend wirkt, dabei alle zur Zeit der Annexion geknüpften Verbindungen aufrechterhält, ist sie heute dieselbe, die sie zur Zeit der Annexion war. Sie ist auch heute odbrana (Wehr), sie ist auch heute Narodna (des Volkes). Sie versammelt auch heute um ihre Fahne die Staatsbürger Serbiens, wie sie sie zur Annexionszeit versammelt hat. Damals rief man nach dem Kriege, heute ruft man nach der Arbeit, damals wurden Meetings, Demonstrationen, freiwillige Komitees, Gewehre und Bomben verlangt, heute wird die stille, fanatische, unermüdliche Arbeit und wieder Arbeit in der Richtung der Aufgaben und Pflichten verlangt, welche wir vorgeführt haben, als vorläufige Vorbereitung für den Kampf mit Gewehr und Kanone, welcher kommen wird.“

Über die Organisation der Narodna odbrana enthält diese Broschüre und der Jahresbericht dieses Vereines folgende Daten:

Ein Zentralausschuß mit dem Sitze in Belgrad, leitet alle Agenden der Narodna odbrana. Diesem sind alle anderen Ausschüsse der Narodna odbrana untergeordnet. Der Zentralausschuß teilt sich in vier Sektionen: für kulturelle Arbeit, für körperliche Fortbildung, für die finanzielle Gebarung und für auswärtige Angelegenheiten.

Kreisausschüsse mit dem Sitze an den Orten der politischen Kreisbehörden leiten die Vereinsangelegenheiten in den betreffenden Kreisen. Jeder Kreisausschuß teilt sich in je eine Sektion für kulturelle Arbeit (Vorstand ist der im Orte befindliche Obmann einer Filiale der „Kulturliga“), für körperliche Fortbildung (Vorstand ist ein im Orte befindliches Mitglied des Schützen-, Sokol-, Jäger-, Reitervereines) und für finanzielle Gebarung; bei einzelnen Kreisausschüssen besteht auch eine Sektion für auswärtige Angelegenheiten.

Bezirksausschüsse mit dem Sitze an den Orten der politischen Bezirksbehörden leiten die Vereinsangelegenheiten in den betreffenden Bezirken.

Ortsausschüsse sind die leitenden Organe in den einzelnen Orten.

Vertrauensmänner befinden sich in jenen Orten im Innern des Landes, wo die Notwendigkeit, einen Ausschuß zu bilden, nicht besteht.

Vereine, „welche mit der Arbeit der Organisation der Narodna odbrana in engster Verbindung stehen“ und von dieser in jeder Hinsicht unterstützt werden, sind: der Schützenbund mit 762 Vereinen, der Sokolbund „Dušan Silni“ mit 2500 Mitgliedern, der olympische Klub, der Reiterverein „Knez Mihajlo“, der Jägerbund und die Kulturliga.

Alle diese Vereine sind ähnlich organisiert wie die Narodna odbrana, benützen auch deren Lokalitäten, bezw. Vereinshäuser, deren Bibliotheken etc.; angesehene Mitglieder dieser Vereine sind Sektionsvorstände in den Ausschüssen der Narodna odbrana.

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**Auszug aus dem „Bericht über die Tätigkeit des Sokolvereines Dušan Silni in Kragujevac in den Jahren 1912 und 1913“ (Kragujevac, Druckerei „Budućnost“ Tih. Lekić 1914).**

An der Spitze dieses Berichtes ist die Ansprache abgedruckt, mit welcher der Präsident des Vereines, der königlich serbische Major Kovačević, die Jahresversammlung im Jänner 1914 begrüßte.

„Es ist Euch bekannt“, begann der Präsident, „daß das Sokolwesen, im Kampfe gegen den Germanismus entstanden, eine rein slawische Institution ist, welche das Ziel verfolgt, alle slawischen Brüder zu vereinigen, zu begeistern und durch Kultur und Gewalt für den Kampf gegen den Feind des Slawentums vorzubereiten.

Wir Serben als ein Teil der großen Slawengemeinschaft haben die Sokolidee aufgenommen und der gemeinschaftlichen Arbeit für unser und unserer Brüder Wohlergehen und Glück zugestimmt.

Auch wir Serben wollen im Geiste des Sokols leben und arbeiten, denn wir wünschen die Müden und Matten zu beleben, die Schwachen und Verkümmerten zu stärken, die Gefangenen und Gefesselten zu befreien. Wir haben dies auch jetzt und in den früheren Kriegen getan. Wir haben einen Teil unserer Brüder von dem Übermute des Feindes im Süden befreit. Wir haben ihnen die Fesseln aufgerissen, sie der Qualen entledigt und ihnen die Freiheit gegeben, damit sie in ihr das Glück, die Gleichheit und Brüderschaft fühlen.“

Nach einigen Worten der Lobpreisung dieser „edlen Arbeit“, welche „einen Teil der großen Sokolidee verwirklichte“, fuhr Major Kovačević fort:

„Aber meine Brüder und Schwestern, unser Feind im Norden ist gefährlicher und herzloser, weil er kulturell und ökonomisch stärker ist.

Dieser Feind ist in seinen Gelüsten unersättlich; er hält Millionen unserer Brüder in Sklaverei und Ketten. Er nahm ihnen die Freiheit und das Recht und unterwarf sie alle seinen Diensten. Die Brüder murren, rufen und bitten um je raschere Hilfe.

Wir dürfen sie nicht auf Gnade und Ungnade diesem fürchterlichen und gefräßigen Feinde überlassen. Wir müssen ihnen je eher zu Hilfe eilen, weil dies zu tun unsere Pflicht ist. Könnten wir denn schließlich glücklich sein, wenn so viele Brüder in Sklaverei leben, leiden und murren?

Brüder und Schwestern!

Der Feind ist gefährlich, lüstern und lästig. Seien wir immer auf der Hut!

Arbeiten wir mit noch größerer Lust und Aufopferung. Seien wir genau in der heiligen Sokolpflicht, treu und ausharrend.

Bereiten wir uns zum Kampfe und für die gerechte Sokolidée vor.

Vereinigen und gesellen wir uns zu unzählbaren Sokolschwärmen und denken wir immer an jene Wahrheit, welche die serbischen Sokolaßen auf ihrer Fahne geschrieben haben: Daß nur ein gesundes, kräftiges, nationalbewußtes und gut organisiertes Volk geeignet ist, sich zu verteidigen, zu kämpfen und zu siegen“.

An diese Ansprache des Präsidenten schließt sich der Bericht des Verwaltungsausschusses an. Nach einer Schilderung der Erfolge der letzten Kriege, welche den Verein während zweier Jahre an einer Betätigung hinderten, heißt es dort: „Es kam der Tag, an dem wir zu unserer Arbeit zurückkehren, weil unser Programm noch nicht erfüllt, weil unsere Aufgabe noch nicht beendet ist. Noch ein großer Teil unseres Volkes erduldet die Leiden des gekreuzigten Christus; wir haben noch unsere Brüder jenseits der Drina zu besuchen; wir haben noch die Stadt Sarajevo und das Vermächtnis des heiligen Sava\*) aufzusuchen; wir haben das Heimatland des Marina Novak, des Deli Radivoj und des alten Vujadin zu besichtigen; wir haben das Gebirge Romanija zu überschreiten und zu sehen, warum sich Travnik in Nebel gehüllt hat, es muß einmal jenes Lied aufhören: Aoj, Bosnien, Du Waisenkind vor Gott, hast Du nirgends Leute Deines Stammes . . .“

Nach einer Besprechung diverser Unternehmungen des Vereines wird betont, daß der Verein zu den „Brüdervereinen jenseits der Save und Drina“ Beziehungen unterhielt und speziell die Entsendung von Delegierten zu der in Sarajevo abgehaltenen Jubelfeier der Prosvjeta betont. Hiezu bemerkt der Bericht: „Durch Absendung der Repräsentanten zu den Brüdern nach Bosnien beabsichtigte der Ausschuß, denselben hiemit zu sagen: „Wir haben Euer nicht vergessen, die Flügel des Falken der Šumadija sind noch mächtig.“

Nach eingehender Schilderung eines Besuches der Agramer Studenten in Serbien\*\*) und der Fahnenweihe des „Verbandes der nüchternen Jugend“ schließt der Verwaltungsbericht mit folgenden Sätzen:

„Diese Erscheinungen — die Ankunft der Brüder Kroaten in der Šumadija und die Zusammenkunft der „nüchternen Jugend“ aus allen Gegenden des Serbentums weiß die Verwaltung richtig zu würdigen und man wird nicht übertreiben, wenn man sagt, daß diese Ereignisse den Anfang und Keim einer großen Tat bedeuten, die sich in der nächsten Zukunft abspielen wird.

\*) Der hl. Sava ist Schutzpatron der Serben (gestorben 1236). Ducatus sancti Save heißt Herzegowina. Vermächtnis des hl. Sava ist also mit Herzegowina gleichbedeutend.

\*\*) Dieser Besuch der Agramer Studenten (April 1912) in Belgrad, Niš, Semendria u. s. w. wurde in Serbien zu einer großen, monarchiefeindlichen Demonstration benützt. Den Ausführgen wurden militärische Ehren erwiesen, es fanden in der Militärakademie und im Offizierskasino Déjeuners und Bälle statt. In Niš wurde zu Ehren der Besucher sogar eine militärische Parade abgehalten.

Sie sind der Ausdruck eines großen, bisher noch stillen Erwachens des nationalen Bewußtseins und der Stärke einer unterdrückten Nation, welcher man nicht erlaubt, daß sie sich emporhebt und einigt. Noch eine Zeitlang und dieser Keim wird reifen und wenn die Volksseele noch mehr aufwallt, wird es keine Schranken geben, die sie nicht zerreißen kann, keine Hindernisse, die sie auf ihrem Wege nicht wird niederreißen können. Die Arbeit an der Kräftigung dieser Macht, die Mithilfe und Beschleunigung des Laufes dieser nationalen Entwicklung, die Vorbereitung und die Unterstützung dieser Idee war der Verwaltung stets das Ziel ihrer Handlungen.“

Der Bericht des Kassiers führt vorerst alle jene an, die dem Verein ihre Unterstützung liehen. Nebst einer Reihe von Mitgliedern des Kragujevacer Kreisausschusses werden hiebei dankend erwähnt:

Der Kreisausschuß der „Narodna odbrana“ in Kragujevac, insbesondere dessen Rittersektion, die dem Sokolvereine öfters mit reichlichen Unterstützungen zu Hilfe kam; der Direktor des Gymnasiums in Kragujevac, der den Sokolen „ständig seine väterliche Aufmerksamkeit zeigte“; der Divisionskommandant der Šumadija, der den Verein reichlich unterstützte; der Präsident des Kreisgerichtes in Kragujevac, der Kreisvorstand und der Gemeindevorstand in Kragujevac.

Nachdem der Kassier der im Kriege gefallenen Vereinsmitglieder gedacht hat, schließt er seinen Bericht mit folgenden Worten:

„Nach dem so glänzenden Siege über einen Teil unseres Feindes hofft die Vereinsleitung, daß Ihr alle von nun ab noch mehr, fester und lieber Euch der Tätigkeit des Sokoltums widmen werdet, damit Ihr in unserem Falkenhorst Falken erzieht, die im gegebenen Zeitpunkte eines Tages in der Lage sein werden, hoch aufzufliegen und auf ihren mächtigen Schwingen auch allen unseren noch nicht befreiten Brüdern Brüderschaft, Liebe und Freiheit zu bringen.“

Der Jahresbericht ist unterfertigt von dem Majore M. J. Kovačević als Präses, dem Gerichtssekretär D. V. Brzaković als Sekretär und von 10 Vorstandsmitgliedern, unter denen sich zwei Professoren (Emil Lukić und Milan Janković) sowie ein weiterer Offizier (Infanteriemajor Michael Vasić) befinden.

Aus diesem Jahresberichte und aus einer von dem Kragujevacer Sokolvereine dem „Srpski Soko“ in Tuzla zur Ausfüllung zugesendeten, gleichfalls vom Major Kovačević und Gerichtssekretär Brzaković gezeichneten Tabelle geht hervor, daß die Sokolvereine in Serbien mit einzelnen derartigen Vereinen in der Monarchie in einem bisher nicht bekannt gewesenen engeren Verbande stehen.

### **Das serbische Amtsblatt im Dienste der Narodna odbrana.**

Dem serbischen Amtsblatte „Srpski novine“ vom 28. Juni 1914 (n. St.) lag als Beilage ein Aufruf der „Narodna Odbrana“ bei, der allen Abonnenten des Blattes zugestellt wurde.

In diesem Aufrufe finden sich die folgenden Stellen:

„Brüder und Schwestern! Nur ein Teil des Kossovo wurde gerächt, nur ein Teil des St. Veittages (Vidovdan) gesühnt. Ebenso weit und breit, wie die Gebiete sind, in denen unsere Volkssprache gehört wird — die serbische, kroatische und slowenische — von Kikinda bis Monastir, von Triest bis Carevo-Solo, ebenso weit und breit ist die Bedeutung des St. Veittages und des Kossovo. So viel nationale Seelen auf diesem Territorium weinen, so viel Ketten unserer Brüder knirschen, so viel Arbeit ist noch zu leisten, so viel haben wir noch zu opfern. Der St. Veittag konnte früher für uns einen Tag der Trauer bedeuten, aber heute, wo wir schon tief in die neue Geschichte des Volkes geschritten sind, wo hinter uns große und glorreiche nationale Geschehnisse stehen und uns noch größere und glorreichere erwarten, heute, wo wir in der Mitte des Schaffens des großen nationalen Staates stehen, heute muß für uns der St. Veittag ein Tag großer Freude und Stolzes wegen des Geschehenen sein, da es aus ihm entsprossen ist und noch mehr wegen dessen, was kommen wird. Serben und Serbinnen! Millionen unserer Brüder. Slowenen, Kroaten und Serben außerhalb unserer Grenzen schauen heute auf uns, die Kinder des Königreiches, und ihre Brust wölbt die Freude und die Hoffnung, indem sie unsere heutige majestätische Manifestation für die nationale Sache betrachten. Dem Mutigen hilft Gott! Vorwärts alle! Es ruft uns derjenige Teil unserer geheiligten Aufgabe, der noch unverwirklicht geblieben ist. Am St. Veittage 1914 in Belgrad.

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Beilage 5.**Zeugenaussage des Trifko Krstanović über die Narodna odbrana.**

Der Bäckergehilfe Trifko Krstanović in Zavidovici wurde von einer Gendarmeriepatrouille in der Nacht vom 6. zum 7. Juli 1914 verhaftet, weil durch eine, kurz nach Verübung des Attentates gegen den Herrn Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand von ihm gemachte Äußerung, dieses Attentat sei zu erwarten gewesen, der Verdacht entstanden war, daß er von dem Komplotte Kenntnis gehabt habe.

Er wurde deshalb dem Kreisgerichte in Sarajevo eingeliefert. Bei der Abhörung des Verhafteten ergab sich, daß seine Äußerung den gegen ihn rege gewordenen Verdacht nicht rechtfertigte, da sie, lediglich auf seinen früheren Kenntnissen von der Tätigkeit der Narodna odbrana beruhend, bloß der Ausdruck seiner Überzeugung gewesen war, daß bei der in Serbien gegen die österr.-ungar. Monarchie und speziell gegen den Herrn Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand entfalteten Agitation eine derartige Tat erwartet werden mußte. Das gegen Krstanović eingeleitete Verfahren wurde deshalb mangels jedes Tatbestandes eingestellt und der Genannte mit Rücksicht auf seine für die Untersuchung wichtigen Kenntnisse über die Tätigkeit der Narodna odbrana als Zeuge einvernommen.

Ein die hier interessierenden Umstände betreffender Auszug aus diesem am 19. Juli 1914 aufgenommenen Zeugenprotokolle folgt hiemit:

„Im Herbste des Jahres 1908 überschritt ich auf der Mokra Gora bei Višegrad die Grenze nach Serbien, um mir Beschäftigung zu suchen. Zuerst kam ich nach Bajina Bašta im Bezirke Užice und da ich dort keinerlei Beschäftigung fand, ging ich nach Belgrad, wo ich gerade zu der Zeit der Verkündigung der Annexion Bosniens und der Herzegowina einlangte. Da ich sah, daß wegen der Annexion in der Bevölkerung eine große Bewegung und Erregung entstanden war und daß ich keinerlei Beschäftigung werde finden können, ging ich in das k. u. k. Konsulat und ersuchte, mich nach Hause abzufertigen. Dort sagte man mir, daß ich nachmittags kommen möge und daß man mich dann in die Heimat abfertigen werde. Als ich jedoch aus dem Konsulate hinausging, erwischte mich auf der Straße ein Gendarm und fragte mich, woher ich sei; in der Meinung, ich sei ein Spion, führte er mich in eine Karaula. Hier verhörte man mich und als ich ihnen sagte, daß ich gerne nach Hause möchte, begann mich ein Unteroffizier zu schmähen, wieso ich jetzt aus Serbien wolle, da sie gerade jetzt mehr Leute brauchen, weil es zu

einem Kriege mit Österreich kommen könnte. Als ich ihm sagte, daß ich nichts zum Leben habe, antwortete er mir, daß ich volle Versorgung finden werde, wenn ich mich in das Komitee einschreibe. Ich war in jener Not damit einverstanden und ein Gendarm führte mich in das Gasthaus „Zelenom Vijencu“ („zum grünen Kranz“) und stellte mich dort dem Voja Tankosić, dem Führer des Komitees und Kapitän im regulären Heere vor. Hier beim „grünen Kranze“ wurde ich in Kost und Wohnung genommen und wie ich sah, waren hier auch andere vom Komitee wohnhaft. Voja Tankosić sagte mir, daß es der Zweck des Komitees sei, sich zu unterrichten im Bombenwerfen, in der Zerstörung von Brücken, Tunnels, Telegraphen und Eisenbahnen, und zwar deshalb, weil es leicht zu einem Kriege zwischen Serbien und Österreich kommen könnte. Hierauf führte mich ein Mann in ein ärarisches kleineres Haus neben dem Finanzministerium, wo die Kanzleien des Komitees sich befanden und hier in der Kanzlei traf ich Milan Pribičević, welcher mich in das Komitee einschrieb. Bei dieser Einschreibung fragte mich Milan Pribičević, ob mir Voja Tankosić gesagt habe, welche Pflichten ich als Komita habe, worauf ich antwortete: „ja“. Er sagte mir, daß die Eingeschriebenen tüchtig, stark und opferwillig sein müßten. Damals waren wir etwa 70 eingeschrieben. In Belgrad haben wir nichts gemacht. Nach etwa 1½ Monaten teilte uns unser Führer Tankosić mit, daß die Großmächte unser Komitee verboten haben und daß wir uns aus Belgrad entfernen und irgendwo in einem verlorenen Orte verstecken müssen, wohin Fremde nicht kommen. Auf diese Weise sandten sie uns in die Stadt Čuprija. Hier übten uns ein die Offiziere Voja Tankosić, Dušan Putnik, Zivko Gvozdić und Mitar Djinović, der in die montenegrinische Bombenaffäre verwickelt war und in Montenegro erschossen wurde. Es war uns verboten, mit den übrigen Leuten zu verkehren, damit man nichts von unserem Zwecke erfahre und auch nichts davon, wie viele wir wären. Wir übten uns in dem Werfen von Bomben, in dem Errichten von Minen und in der Zerstörung von Telegraphen, Eisenbahnen, Tunnels und Brücken. Alle 14 Tage kamen zu uns Milan Pribičević, General Božo Janković, der Apotheker Škarić, der Abgeordnete Zivko Rafajlović, ein gewisser Glisić Milutin, Beamter im Finanzministerium, und diese sahen zu, wie wir übten und beglichen jedesmal für uns die Kosten der Verpflegung. Unsere Lehrer sagten uns, daß wir Komitees, sobald der Krieg verkündigt sei, voraus gehen werden, hinter uns die Freiwilligen und dann das reguläre Heer. In Čuprija waren wir etwa 140 Mann. Wir bekamen außer der Kost, Wohnung und Kleidung je 25 Para täglich für Tabak. Die Schule dauerte beiläufig 3 Monate, d. h. bis März 1909. Dann sagten uns die Mitglieder des Ausschusses, daß wir entlassen wären, daß jeder gehen könne, wohin er wolle, denn die Annexion Bosniens und der Herzegowina sei von den Großmächten anerkannt und unser Komitee habe keinen Zweck mehr. Bei der Auflösung des Komitees sagte mir General Božo Janković, daß ich in



den Dienst des Božo Milanović in Šabac trete und 50 Dinar monatlich Lohn erhalte. Er sagte mir nicht, welcher Dienst das sein werde. Ich nahm an, weil ich mich als Komitee gegenüber dem General Janković zu folgen verpflichtet fühlte und auch da ich nichts zum Leben hatte und mir ein Brot suchen mußte. So kam ich im März 1909 nach Šabac und meldete mich bei Božo Milanović, Kaufmann in Šabac. General Janković hatte mir gesagt, daß Božo Milanović der Vorstand der Narodna odbrana in Šabac sei und daß ich bei ihm in dieser Narodna odbrana dienen werde. Als ich dem Božo Milanović das Schreiben des Generals gab und er es gelesen hatte, sagte er mir, daß ich ihm treu dienen und seine Aufträge ausführen müsse. Der hauptsächlichste Dienst werde für mich sein Briefe auszutragen, wohin sie eben lauten. Falls ich einen Brief nicht dorthin tragen werde, wohin er gerichtet sei und falls irgend jemand anderer zu diesem Briefe käme, so sei das mit meinem Leben verbunden. Gleich nächsten Tages gab mir Božo Milanović einen geschlossenen Brief, den ich zu Čedo Lukić, Finanzwachtmeister in Serbisch-Rača, tragen sollte. Am Wege nach Rača, im Orte Bogatić, stellte mich der Bezirkskapetan, nahm mir den Brief ab, öffnete und las ihn. In dem Brief stand, daß Lukić sofort drei Boote kaufen solle, damit sie fertig wären, falls sie gebraucht würden. Dem Briefe waren 100 Dinar beigegeschlossen. Bei dieser Gelegenheit sagte mir der Kapetan, daß vom Ministerium der strenge Auftrag gekommen sei, daß die Komitatschi auf eigene Faust nichts tun dürfen, damit nicht eine internationale diplomatische Intervention provoziert werde. Ich kehrte nach Šabac zurück und meldete dem Božo Milanović, was mir geschehen war. Božo Milanović wendete sich an den Kreispräfekten und dieser ordnete an, daß mir der Revolver, den mir der Kapetan in Bogatić abgenommen hatte, zurückgestellt werde. Auch ordnete er an, daß der Kapetan den Brief an Čedo Lukić, an welchen er lautete, zu expedieren habe. Derartige Briefe habe ich vom März 1909 bis zum Oktober 1910 ausgetragen, und zwar habe ich während dieser Zeit nach Serbisch-Rača 43 Briefe, nach Ložnica 55 Briefe, nach Zvornik 5, nach Ljubivija 2 Briefe getragen und nach Koviljača weiß ich nicht wie viele. Ich habe mir deswegen gemerkt, wie oft ich in jedem Orte war, weil diese Orte von Šabac sehr weit entfernt sind. Die Briefe habe ich an die Leiter der Zollämter in den betreffenden Orten getragen und von diesen habe ich wieder Briefe als Antwort erhalten und zu Božo Milanović getragen. Ich erinnere mich, daß ich auch einigemal Briefe nach Šepačka Ada getragen habe. Mein Gehilfe im Austragen von Briefen war ein gewisser Vaso Erić, gebürtig aus Srebrenica. Nach Belgrad habe ich Briefe von Božo Milanović jede Woche getragen und an Milan Pribičević und Božo Janković zugestellt. Von dem Inhalte dieser Briefe habe ich nichts gewußt und hat mir auch niemand hierüber etwas gesagt. Soviel ich sehen konnte, waren die Briefe, welche Božo Milanović absandte, nicht chiffriert, während die Briefe, welche

die Zollamtsleiter sendeten, mit besonderen Zeichen geschrieben waren, was ich beobachtet habe, als sie Božo Milanović öffnete. Einmal brachte ich dem Božo Milanović ein solches chiffriertes Schreiben, ich glaube aus Zvornik, und dieser sendete mich mit dem Schreiben zu Mika Atanasijević, Professor in Šabac, damit er es dechiffriere. Dieser vollführte das, wie er das gewöhnlich tat; aber vielleicht vergaß er den Brief zu schließen, so daß ich ihn lesen konnte. In dem Briefe stand, daß von sicherer Seite gemeldet werde, daß Geld mit dem Bildnisse des Thronfolgers zu prägen sei und daß dies ein Zeichen sei, daß Kaiser Franz Joseph abdizieren werde. Etwa nach 8 Monaten meiner Dienstleistung bei Božo Milanović gab mir Božo seine Visitenkarte, auf welcher ein Totenkopf aufgezeichnet war und auf der aufgeschrieben stand, daß ich zum Vertrauten (povjerenik) der Narodna odbrana ernannt sei. Bei dieser Gelegenheit sagte er mir, daß es sich um Spionage handle.....

Von dem Offizier Dušan Opterkić, dem Mitgliede der Narodna odbrana, erfuhr ich einmal, daß die Narodna odbrana in Bosnien und Herzegowina 23 Mitglieder habe. Sonst ist mir aber nicht bekannt, ob und welche Organisation die Narodna odbrana in Bosnien hat. Hin und wieder gab mir Milan Pribičević einen Revolver oder aber Geld zum Ankauf eines Revolvers, damit ich ihn den Finanzern an der Grenze gebe, welche als Komitatschis dienten, da sie keinen Revolver hatten und auch kein Geld, um sich einen solchen selbst zu kaufen. Wie mir scheint, gab ihnen Milan Pribičević diese zur Ehrung, weil sie eben Komitatschis waren. Eine andere Beschäftigung mit Waffen hatte ich nicht.

Einmal bekam ich zur Zeit meiner Dienstleistung von Božo Milanović den Auftrag, mit einem Manne zu einem Bauern in Lijesnica an der Drina zu gehen und dieser Bauer werde uns informieren und alles, was notwendig wird, zeigen, damit wir zwei den Ljubo Stanarić, serbischen Reserveoffizier, der nach Bijeljina geflüchtet war, töten. Der Ausschuß der Narodna odbrana hatte nämlich erfahren, daß Ljubo Stanarić für den serbischen Staat gefährlich sei und hatte beschlossen, daß er getötet werden solle.

Von Božo Milanović erhielten ich und jener Mann den Auftrag, an einem bestimmten Orte über die Drina zu gehen und Ljubo Stanarić, der gerade am Ufer der Drina auf der bosnischen Seite im Bijeljiner Bezirke wohnhaft ist, zu töten. Ich und jener Mann waren in die Drina gestiegen, aber weil das Wasser tief war und wir auch sahen, daß Ljubo mit dem Gewehr auf der Schulter um sein Haus herumgehe, kehrten wir zum Hause jenes Bauern zurück. Weil ich sah, daß wir ihn mit dem Messer nicht töten können, sendete ich jenen Mann nach Šabac, damit er Božo Milanović melde, daß es nicht möglich sei, den Stanarić auf diese Weise, wie er wolle, nämlich mit dem Messer, zu töten. Daraufhin erhielt ich vom Božo Milanović den Auftrag, daß wir ihn auf jeden Fall töten. Dann haben wir uns entschlossen, ihn mit dem Gewehre zu erschießen. Dieser Mann, der mit mir war, hatte nach dem Auf-

trage des Božo auf Stanarićić zu schießen und ihn zu töten und ich hatte zu kontrollieren, ob dieser Auftrag ausgeführt werde. Inzwischen jedoch kam ein berittener Gendarm und brachte vom Kreispräfekten in Šabac den Auftrag, daß wir zurückkehren und von der ursprünglichen Absicht abstecken sollen. Und so kehrten wir nach Šabac zurück.

Im Oktober 1910 verlangte ich vom Božo Milanović, daß er mir den Lohn erhöhe und als er mir das nicht tun wollte, bedankte ich mich für den Dienst. Aus Šabac ging ich nach Belgrad, wo ich mit dem General Janković zusammentraf, der mich verhaften ließ, deshalb, weil ich den Gehorsam aufgesagt habe. Sie zogen mich durch verschiedene Gefängnisse, etwa durch zwei Monate und alles deswegen, weil ich ihnen den Gehorsam aufgesagt hatte und sie sich fürchteten, daß ich ihre Geheimnisse verrate. Zum Schlusse entschieden sich die Behörden, mich nach Bosnien zu expedieren. In Šabac sagte mir ein Gefangener, daß es sich um mein Leben handelt. Die Gendarmen begleiteten mich bis Zvornik, wo sie mich den bosnischen Gendarmen übergaben. So kam ich im Dezember 1910 nach Bosnien.

Von irgend einer Schwarzen Hand weiß ich nichts Bestimmtes mit Ausnahme dessen, was ich von dieser Hand in serbischen Zeitungen gelesen habe. Heute erinnere ich mich nicht daran, was von dieser Schwarzen Hand in Zeitungen geschrieben war. Ebenso weiß ich nichts von der Schwarzen Liste. In Serbien herrschte nach der Annexion ein allgemeiner Unwille und Haß gegen die Person des österreichischen Thronfolgers, denn er war allgemein als ein Blutfreund der Serben angesehen.

Im übrigen berief sich Krstanović auf seine früheren Angaben, von denen bloß die folgenden zur Ergänzung der vorstehenden Aussage von Interesse sind.

Das Komitee, in das Krstanović durch Milan Pribičević aufgenommen wurde, gelangte von der Norodna odbrana zur Aufstellung. In der Schule in Čuprija befanden sich 20—22 Angehörige aus der Monarchie. Unter den Schülern war auch Milan Čiganović.

In der Schule zu Čuprija wurde gelehrt, daß die Komitees bereit sein müssen, auf Befehl der Norodna odbrana nach Bosnien zu gehen und dort nach den von ihren Vorgesetzten erhaltenen Aufträgen zu handeln.

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**Auszug aus den Akten des Kreisgerichtes in Sarajevo über das Strafverfahren gegen Jovo Jagličić und Genossen wegen Verbrechens der Ausspähung.**

Im Jahre 1913 wurde eine von Jovo Jagličić und mehreren Komplizen in Bosnien zugunsten Serbiens betriebene Ausspähungsaktion aufgedeckt. Das hierauf in Sarajevo eingeleitete Strafverfahren lieferte unter anderem auch folgendes, einen Einblick in die Methoden der großserbischen Propaganda und speziell der Narodna odbrana bietendes Materiale.

Jovo Jagličić gab an, daß er im Monate August oder September 1912 zum ersten Male dem gewesenen Viehrevisor in Foča, Petar Klarić genannt Pešut, begegnete, welcher im Herbst 1912 nach Montenegro geflüchtet und dann Komitatschi geworden war.

Bei der ersten Zusammenkunft fragte Klarić den Jagličić, ob er den Rade Milošević aus Kalinovik kenne und meinte auf die Antwort des letzteren, daß Milošević im Spital schwer krank liege: „Schade, wenn er stirbt, wir haben Merkwürdiges gesprochen, hat er Dir nichts davon erwähnt?“ Auf die verneinende Antwort erwiderte Klarić: „Ich hätte Dir etwas Wichtiges mitzuteilen, wir sind Serben und müssen etwas Wichtiges für Serbien tun, komme zu mir in meine Kanzlei“. Dort entspann sich nun zwischen ihnen folgendes Gespräch:

„Jovan, ich will Dir etwas erzählen, ich kenne Dich noch nicht, ob Du mich verraten wirst? Ich sage es Dir trotzdem und wenn Du das Herz hast verrate mich!“

Auf die Frage des Jagličić, um was es sich denn handle, antwortete Klarić: „Bruder, in Serbien existiert ein Verein „Narodna odbrana“. In diesen Verein sollen viele Leute eintreten; es sind auch schon viele in Bosnien und der Herzogowina sowie in der ganzen Monarchie angeworben; es gibt Leute dabei von Intelligenz und Wohlhabende, das sind große Köpfe, und wenn es die können, warum sollen es nicht auch wir tun, damit wir auch etwas dazu beitragen“.

Auf die Frage, welche Ziele dieser Verein verfolgt, antwortete Klarić:

„Der Verein verfolgt den Zweck: z. B. Du bist in Kalinovik, Du meldest mir, was es dort Neues gibt, wie viel Militär, Kanonen, Munition, verschiedene Gewehre, wer kommt, wer geht u. dgl. Wir haben eine geheime Schrift „Chiffre“ und korrespondieren mit derselben. Wenn Du treu bist, erhältst Du sie auch.“

Jagličić hatte Furcht, daß Klarić ihn nur ausforsche, um ihn dann zu verraten und ersuchte ihn daher, er solle ihm einige Namen von Mitgliedern nennen, worauf Klarić eine Zeitlang nachdachte und dem Jagličić dann einen Namen nannte, der diesem Vertrauen einflößte.

Hierauf sagte ihm Klarić: „Soll ich Dir den „Chiffre“ geben?“ Jagličić war damit einverstanden. Klarić, welcher den Chiffre auswendig kannte, schrieb ihn auf einen Zettel auf und übergab ihn dem Jagličić.

Bei einer anderen Gelegenheit erzählte Klarić von seinem Aufenthalt in Banja-Koviljača (bei Ložnica), wo er durch den serbischen Hauptmann Todorović\*) Unterricht im Bombenwerfen erhalten hat und sagte auf die Frage des Beschuldigten, warum er dies gelernt habe: „Wenn es zu etwas kommt, wie ich Dir bereits gesagt habe, ist es notwendig, daß ich mit Bomben umzugehen verstehe, daß ich Dich einübe und Du dann die anderen, damit Pulvermagazine und sonstige wichtige Objekte in die Luft gesprengt werden, weil wir in diesem Falle Bomben aus Serbien erhalten werden“

Hierauf beschrieb Klarić das Aussehen der Bomben und sagte, daß er bereits Leute angeworben habe, welche im Falle eines Krieges die Telegraphen- und Telephondrähte durchschneiden werden.

Bei diesen Zusammenkünften erfuhr Jagličić von Klarić auch, daß es zu den Aufgaben der Mitglieder der Narodna odbrana gehört, österreichisch-ungarische Soldaten zur Fahnenflucht zu verleiten, Freiwillige (Komitatschis) anzuwerben, Banden zu organisieren, Objekte und Depots zu sprengen u. s. w. Auch teilte ihm Klarić mit, daß selbst die chiffrierte Korrespondenz zwischen den serbischen und bosnischen Mitgliedern nicht der Post anvertraut, sondern durch sichere Boten über die Grenze befördert wird.

Klarić hat dem Jagličić weiters erzählt, daß gelegentlich der Prosvjetafeier (im September 1912) mit der zu dieser entsendeten Deputation aus Serbien auch ein serbischer Major in Sarajevo im Hotel „Europe“ gewohnt hat\*\*), welchem Klarić Mitglieder der Narodna odbrana zuführte, die dieser beeidete.

Von einem Spione erfuhr Jagličić, daß Bomben nach Sarajevo kommen werden oder schon gekommen sind, daß diese das Aussehen von Seifenstücken haben\*\*\*) und daß man auch diesem Spione 2—3 Stücke senden oder daß er sich solche abholen werde.

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\*) Hauptmann Kosta Todorović war damals tatsächlich Grenzkommissär und Leiter des serbischen Kundschaftsdienstes für die Grenzstrecke Rača—Ljuboijs

\*\*) Zu der Prosvjetafeier war der serbische Major Mika Janković als serbischer Delegierter erschienen.

\*\*\*) Die bei dem Sarajevoer Attentate gegen Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand verwendeten und die im Jahre 1913 in der Save bei Brčko gefundenen, aus dem königl. serbischen Arsenal in Kragujevac stammenden Bomben können tatsächlich mit Seifenstücken verglichen werden.

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Beflage 7.**Aus konfidentiellen Meldungen über die „Narodna odbrana“.**

Die Leitung der Narodna odbrana besteht aus Vertretern aller Parteirichtungen, um auch die Fortschrittler und die Gegner der Verschwörer zu gewinnen. Ihr eigentlicher Spiritus rector ist der jetzige Major Pribičević. Die Sekretärstelle ist immer mit einem beurlaubten Offizier besetzt.

Aufgabe der Narodna odbrana ist es, in den südslawischen Teilen Österreich-Ungarns eine wirksame Propaganda in Militär- und Zivilkreisen zu entwickeln, um so eine Revolution vorzubereiten, eventuelle Mobilisierungen zu stören, Paniken und Revolten hervorzurufen u. s. w.

Die Organisation besitzt in der Monarchie mehrere Vertrauensmänner und Emissäre, die eine stille Propaganda von Mann zu Mann betreiben. Einzelne haben spezielle Missionen, um bei wichtigen Brücken, Knotenpunkten etc. einige Leute — womöglich Eisenbahnbeamte — anzuwerben, welche die Aufgabe haben, im geeigneten Momente etwa erhaltene Weisungen durchzuführen oder durchführen zu lassen.

Der Verkehr zwischen den Mitgliedern der Narodna odbrana wird möglichst durch persönliche Fühlungnahme bewerkstelligt.

Als Mitglieder werden hauptsächlich junge Leute, Arbeiter, Eisenbahner geworben.

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**Auszug aus den Akten des bosnisch-herzegowinischen Kreisgerichtes in Sarajevo über die dort anhängige Untersuchung gegen Gavrilo Princip und Genossen wegen des am 28. Juni 1914 an Seiner k. und k. Hoheit dem Herrn Erzherzoge Franz Ferdinand von Österreich-Este und ihrer Hoheit der Frau Herzogin Sophie von Hohenberg verübten Verbrechens des Mordmordes.**

### **I. Die Tat und die Täterschaft.**

Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, Trifko Grabež, Vaso Čubrilović und Četres Popović sind geständig, in Gemeinschaft mit dem flüchtigen Mehemed Mehmedbašić ein Komplott zur Ermordung des Herrn Erzherzogs Franz Ferdinand gebildet und mit Bomben, teilweise auch mit Browningpistolen ausgerüstet, Höchstdemselben am 28. Juni 1914 auf Seiner Rundfahrt durch Sarajevo zwecks Verübung des geplanten Attentates aufgelauert zu haben.

Nedeljko Čabrinović ist geständig, als erster unter den Verschwörern gegen den Wagen des Herrn Erzherzogs eine Bombe geschleudert zu haben, die ihr Ziel verfehlte und die beim Explodieren lediglich Insassen des dem erzherzoglichen Automobile folgenden Wagens verletzte.

Gavrilo Princip ist geständig, aus einer Browningpistole zwei Schüsse gegen das erzherzogliche Automobil abgegeben zu haben, durch welche der Herr Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand und die Frau Herzogin Sophie von Hohenberg tödlich verletzt wurden.

Beide Täter geben die Mordabsicht bei Verübung der Tat zu.

Diese Geständnisse haben durch die gepflogenen Erhebungen ihre volle Bestätigung gefunden und ist festgestellt, daß weiland Herr Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand und weiland Frau Herzogin Sophie von Hohenberg an den Folgen der von Gavrilo Princip auf sie abgegebenen Revolverschüsse gestorben sind.

### **II. Entstehung des Komplotts.**

Die Beschuldigten haben, im wesentlichen übereinstimmend, vor dem Untersuchungsrichter nachstehende Angaben gemacht:

Im April 1914 faßte Princip während seines Aufenthaltes in Belgrad, wo er in dortigen Kaffeehäusern mit vielen serbischen Studenten verkehrte, den Plan zur Ausführung eines Attentates auf weiland Herrn Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand.

Diese Absicht hat er mit dem ihm bekannten, damals gleichfalls in Belgrad anwesenden Čabrinović besprochen, der sich damals schon mit dem gleichen Gedanken trug und der zur Teilnahme an dem Attentate sofort bereit war. Über die Verübung eines Anschlages auf den Herrn Erzherzog wurde in dem Kreise, in dem Princip und Čabrinović verkehrten, oft gesprochen, da der Herr Erzherzog als gefährlicher Feind des serbischen Volkes galt.

Die zur Ausführung der Tat nötigen Bomben und Waffen wollten sich Princip und Čabrinović, da sie selbst die Mittel zu deren Ankauf nicht besaßen, zuerst von dem serbischen Major Milan Pribičević oder von der Narodna odbrana beschaffen. Da aber Major Pribičević und das maßgebende Mitglied des genannten Vereines, Živojin Dačić, zu jener Zeit verreist waren, beschlossen sie zu trachten, die Waffen von dem ihnen bekannten ehemaligen Komitatschi und derzeitigen Staatsbahnbeamten Milan Ciganović zu erhalten.

Nun trat Princip durch Vermittlung eines intimen Bekannten des Ciganović mit diesem in Verbindung. Ciganović suchte hierauf den Princip auf, sprach mit ihm über das geplante Attentat, das er vollkommen billigte und erklärte zunächst, daß er es sich noch überlegen wolle, ob er die Waffen hiezuhin beistellen solle. Auch Čabrinović sprach mit Ciganović wegen der Waffen.

Zu Ostern zog Princip den gleichfalls in Belgrad anwesenden Trifko Grabež ins Vertrauen, der sich nach seinem Geständnisse gleichfalls zur Mitwirkung an dem Attentate bereit erklärte.

In der folgenden Zeit hatte Princip wiederholt Gespräche mit Ciganović über die Ausführung des Attentates.

Inzwischen hatte sich Ciganović wegen des geplanten Attentates auch mit dem ihm eng befreundeten serbischen Major Voja Tankosić ins Einvernehmen gesetzt, der dann für diese Zwecke die Browningpistolen zur Verfügung stellte.

Grabež gesteht in Übereinstimmung mit den Angaben des Princip und Čabrinović zu, am 24. Mai in Begleitung des Ciganović den Major Tankosić über dessen Wunsch in seiner Wohnung besucht zu haben. Nach der Vorstellung habe Tankosić dem Grabež gesagt: „Bist Du dieser, bist Du entschlossen?“ worauf Grabež erwiderte: „Ich bin es“. Als Tankosić dann fragte: „Versteht Ihr aus dem Revolver zu schießen?“ und Grabež hierauf verneinend antwortete, sagte Tankosić zu Ciganović: „Ich werde Dir einen Revolver geben, gehe und unterrichte sie im Schießen“.

Hierauf führte Ciganović den Princip und den Grabež zur Militärschießstätte in Topčider und erteilte ihnen in einem bei der Schießstätte liegendem Walde Unterricht im Schießen mit Browningpistolen auf Ziele. Hierbei erwies sich Princip als der bessere Schütze. Ciganović hat den Princip, Grabež und Čabrinović auch mit dem Gebrauche der ihnen später übergebenen Bomben vertraut gemacht.



Am 27. Mai 1914 übergab Ciganović dem Princip, Čabrinović und Grabež nach deren übereinstimmenden Geständnissen 6 Bomben, 4 Browningrevolver und genügende Mengen Munition, sowie eine Glastube mit Zyankali, damit sie sich zwecks Wahrung des Geheimnisses nach verübter Tat vergiften. Überdies gab ihnen Ciganović Geld.

Schon zu Ostern hatte Princip den Danilo Ilić von seinem Attentatsplane unterrichtet. Bei der Rückkehr nach Sarajevo ersuchte er nun diesen, einige weitere Personen zu werben, die sich an dem Attentate beteiligen, damit es sicher gelinge. Hierauf hat Ilić nach seinem Geständnisse den Jaso Čubrilović, Četro Popović und Mehemed Mehmedbašić hiezu geworben.

### III. Herkunft der Bomben.

Bei Verübung des Attentates war nur eine der Bomben zur Verwendung gelangt. Die übrigen fünf Bomben wurden später von der Polizei in Sarajevo zustande gebracht.

Diese Bomben sind nach dem Gutachten der gerichtlichen Sachverständigen serbische Handgranaten, die fabrikmäßig erzeugt wurden und für militärische Zwecke bestimmt waren. Sie sind identisch mit den 21 Bomben, die im Jahre 1913 in der Save bei Brčko gefunden wurden und die sich zum Teile noch in der Originalpackung befanden, aus der sich mit Sicherheit ergab, daß sie aus dem serbischen Waffenlager in Kragujevac stammten.

Damit ist festgestellt, daß auch die bei dem Attentate gegen den Herrn Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand verwendeten Granaten aus den Vorräten des Kragujevacer Armeedepots stammen.

Grabež nennt die ihm und seinen Komplizen übergebenen Granaten ganz spontan „Kragujevacer Bomben“

### IV. Transport der drei Attentäter und der Waffen von Serbien nach Bosnien.

Prinzip gibt hierüber folgendes an:

Ciganović sagte dem Čabrinović, Grabež und Princip, sie sollten ihren Weg über Šabac und Ložnica nach Tuzla nehmen und sich dort an Miško Jovanović wenden, der die Waffen übernehmen werde. Zunächst sollten sie nach Šabac gehen und sich dort beim Grenzhauptmanne Major Rade Popović melden, für den er ihnen einen Zettel mitgab, den Princip übernahm. Am 28. Mai verließen die drei Komplizen mit den Waffen Belgrad. In Šabac übergab Prinzip den Zettel, den er von Ciganović erhalten hatte dem Major Popović, der hierauf alle drei auf das Kommando führte und ihnen einen Passierschein ausstellte, in welchem bestätigt wurde, daß einer von ihnen Finanzwachmann und die beiden

anderen dessen Kameraden seien. Der Passierschein enthielt auch den Namen dieses angeblichen Finanzwachmannes, doch habe er den Namen vergessen. Gleichzeitig übergab ihnen Major Popović ein geschlossenes Schreiben für den Grenzhauptmann in Ložnica, der Pravanović, Prdanović oder Predojević hieß.

Princip, Čabrinović und Grabež übernachteten in Šabac und reisten am nächsten Morgen mit der Bahn nach Ložnica, und zwar auf Grund des ihnen vom Major Popović ausgefertigten Passierscheines mit halber Fahrkarte. Mittags kamen sie in Ložnica an und übergaben dem dortigen Grenzhauptmann den Brief des Majors Popović, in dem es hieß: „Schau, daß Du diese Leute empfängst und sie durchführst, wo Du weißt.“ Der Grenzhauptmann sagte, er werde seine Finanzwachleute von der Grenze rufen und die drei dem sichersten Manne anvertrauen. Darauf telephonierte er und bestellte die drei Komplizen für den nächsten Morgen, 7 Uhr, in seine Kanzlei.

Am anderen Morgen vereinbarten die drei Verschwörer, daß Čabrinović mit dem Passe des Grabež offen den Weg nach Zvornik nehme, Princip und Grabež aber die Grenze heimlich überschreiten. Dieser Plan wurde mit dem Grenzhauptmann besprochen und hiebei beschlossen, daß ein Finanzwachmann aus Lješnica, namens Grbić, den Princip und Grabež in seine Karaula mitnehmen und über die Grenze bringen solle. Čabrinović ging dann zu Fuß nach Banja Koviljača in der Richtung gegen Zvornik. Princip und Grabež fuhren mit dem Finanzwachmann Grbić nach Lješnica, wo sie die Bomben und den Revolver in einem Hotelzimmer ablegten. Hiebei sah der Finanzwachmann Grbić diese Objekte. Princip selbst bezeichnete diese Reise als mystisch.

Grabež sagte im wesentlichen konform mit Princip aus und fügte ergänzend bei, Grbić habe gelacht, als er die Bombe und die Revolver sah und lediglich gefragt, wohin in Bosnien sie mit diesen Bomben gingen. Der Finanzwachmann habe sich jedenfalls gedacht, daß Grabež und Princip eine Mission hätten.

Grbić und ein zweiter Finanzwachmann haben den Princip und Grabež auf einem Kahne zu einer Insel in der Drina gebracht. Dort wies sie Grbić an, auf einen Bauer zu warten, der sie abholen werde. Sie übernachteten auf der Insel in einem Bauernhäuschen, wohin Grbić sie gewiesen hatte. Am nächsten Tage kam ein Bauer, der sie während der Nacht zuerst durch einen Sumpf und dann über das Gebirge bis in die Nähe von Priboj brachte, wo er sie wieder dem dortigen Lehrer Čubrilović, der bereits auf sie gewartet zu haben schien, zur Weiterbeförderung übergab.

Dieser brachte sie dann weiter nach Tuzla zu Miško Jovanović.

Čabrinović sagte über die Vorgänge der Reise bis zu dem Momente, in dem er sich von Princip und Grabež trennte, im wesentlichen übereinstimmend mit diesen aus und fügte nur ergänzend bei, daß Major Popović ihnen erzählt habe, er sei erst am Tage vor ihrer Ankunft in Šabac aus Belgrad gekommen.

In Ložnica beschlossen Čabrinović, Princip und Grabež sich zu trennen, da es zu gefährlich wäre, wenn sie zu dritt gingen. Der Grenzhauptmann in Ložnica, dem sie hievon Mitteilung machten, lobte ihren Plan und gab dem Čabrinović einen Brief für den Lehrer M. Jaklojević in Mali-Zvornik mit. Čabrinović übergab hierauf die von ihm getragenen Bomben, Browning und Munition dem Princip und Grabež und ging in Begleitung eines ihm beigegebenen Finanzwachmannes nach Mali-Zvornik.

Dort fand er den Lehrer Jaklojević, dem er den Brief des Grenzhauptmannes von Ložnica übergab. Dieser avisierte hierauf den serbischen Grenzposten. Als Čabrinović später mit dem Lehrer zu diesem Grenzposten kam, wartete dort bereits ein Mann auf sie, der sie mit einem Kahne über die Drina nach Groß-Zvornik in Bosnien brachte.

Von dort begab sich dann Čabrinović nach Tuzla zu Miško Jovanović.

#### Nachtrag.

Knapp vor Abschluß dieses Memoires wird vom Kreisgerichte in Sarajevo ein Zeugenprotokoll vorgelegt, aus dem sich ergibt, daß ein Angehöriger der Monarchie einige Tage vor dem 28. Juni d. J. dem k. und k. Konsulate in Belgrad die Meldung erstatten wollte, daß er vermute, es bestehe der Plan auf Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand während seiner Anwesenheit in Bosnien ein Attentat zu verüben. Dieser Mann soll nun durch Belgrader Polizeiorgane, die ihn unmittelbar vor dem Betreten des k. und k. Konsulates aus nichtigen Gründen verhafteten, an der Erstattung dieser Meldung verhindert worden sein. Aus den in dem fraglichen Zeugenprotokolle enthaltenen Angaben würde folgen, daß die betreffenden Polizeiorgane von dem geplanten Attentate Kenntnis gehabt und diesen Mann nur verhaftet hätten, um ihn an der Erstattung der Anzeige zu hindern.

Da diese Angaben noch nicht nachgeprüft sind, kann über deren Stichhaltigkeit im gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkte noch kein Urteil abgegeben werden. Mit Rücksicht auf die hierüber schwebenden Erhebungen entziehen sich die näheren Details der Zeugenaussage derzeit einer genaueren Wiedergabe.

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### Die serbische Presse über das Attentat.

- a) Das Belgrader Blatt „Balkan“ schreibt am 29. Juni über die beiden Attentäter:

Nedeljko Čabrinović, von Beruf Typograph, war von anarchistischen Ideen erfüllt und als unruhiger Geist bekannt. Er weilte bis vor 20 Tagen in Belgrad, wohin er nach dem Kriege kam und in der Staatsdruckerei beschäftigt war. Vor seiner Abreise erklärte er, daß er sich nach Triest begeben, wo er in einer neuen Druckerei Arbeit bekommen werde. Gavrilo Princip weilte gleichfalls bis vor kurzem in Belgrad. Während des Krieges hat er sich als Freiwilliger gemeldet, wurde jedoch nicht angenommen, weshalb er Belgrad verließ. Er kehrte aber zu Weihnachten des vorigen Jahres wieder nach Belgrad zurück, besuchte eine Zeitlang das Gymnasium und verließ Belgrad fast zu gleicher Zeit wie Čabrinović, jedoch auf einem anderen Wege als dieser. Princip war schweigsam, nervös, lernte gut, verkehrte mit einigen gleichfalls aus Bosnien und der Herzegowina stammenden Mittelschülern und in der letzten Zeit auch mit Čabrinović. Er neigte sozialistischen Ideen zu, obwohl er ursprünglich der fortschrittlichen Jugend angehört hat. Princip ist ebenso wie Čabrinović in Sarajevo aufgewachsen; beide verband seit ihrer Kindheit eine unzertrennliche Freundschaft.

- b) Der „Piëmont“ vom 1. Juli verweist darauf, daß nach dem lauten Proteste des Attentäters Zerajić der Protest Princip's gefolgt sei. Das Werk des letzteren finde gleichfalls seine Aufklärung im bosnischen Regierungssystem. Der Umstand, daß Princip den Racheakt am heiligen Nationaltag Vidovdan verübte, welcher für die Vornahme der Manöver gewählt worden war, lasse die Verzweiflungstat des jungen Märtyrers verständlicher und natürlicher erscheinen.

(Das Blatt wurde wegen dieses Artikels von der Polizei konfisziert, die Konfiskation jedoch tags darauf von der ersten Instanz des Belgrader Gerichtes annulliert.)

- c) Der jungradikale „Odjek“ vom 3. Juli sagt: man habe den Herrn Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand am Tage des nationalen Enthusiasmus nach Sarajevo gesendet, um eine brutale Manifestation der Gewalt und Unterwerfung zu feiern.

Dieser brutale Akt mußte brutale Gefühle des Widerstandes, des Hasses und der Rache herausfordern.

- (d) Das nationalistische Parteiorgan „Srpska Zastava“ vom 3. Juli sagt in einem Artikel, betitelt „Verdächtigungen und Drohungen: „Das Attentat stellt sich immer mehr als ein Erzeugnis der ungesunden Verhältnisse in der Monarchie dar. Andererseits ruft die wilde Verfolgung des serbischen Volkes in Bosnien und der Herzegowina den Abscheu der ganzen zivilisierten Welt hervor.“
- e) Das fortschrittliche Blatt „Pravda“ vom 3. Juli schreibt: „Die Wiener Politik ist zynisch. Sie beutet den Tod des unglücklichen Paares für ihre abscheulichen Ziele gegen das serbische Volk aus.“
- f) Die „Agence des Balkans“ vom 3. Juli meldet: „Die in Bosnien und der Herzegowina gegen die Serben verübten Verbrechen sind unter den Auspizien und auf direkte Anstiftung der österreichisch-ungarischen Zivil- und Militärbehörden begangen worden.“
- g) Die „Pravda“ vom 4. Juli sagt: „Alle bisher in Österreich begangenen Morde und Attentate haben stets eine und dieselbe Quelle gehabt. Die unterdrückten Völker der Monarchie mußten zu dieser Art des Protestes greifen, weil ihnen kein anderer Weg möglich war. In einem Chaos der Schreckensherrschaft ist es natürlich und vollkommen begreiflich, daß sich die Ära der Attentate eingebürgert hat.
- h) Der „Balkan“ vom 5. Juli bemerkt, daß Österreich-Ungarn „wegen Verfolgung Unschuldiger unter internationale Kontrolle gestellt werden müßte“; denn Österreich-Ungarn sei weniger konsolidiert als die Türkei.
- i) Das „Mali Journal“ vom 7. Juli schreibt: „Ein Sprößling des Mittelalters wurde dieser Tage in Sarajevo ermordet. Ermordet hat ihn ein Knabe, der das Leid um sein geknechtetes engeres Vaterland bis zum Paroxysmus fühlte, das Leid, das ihm die Räuber der Länder seiner Väter angetan haben. Was hat daraufhin das offizielle Österreich-Ungarn getan? Es hat mit allgemeinen Massakrierungen, Plünderungen und Zerstörungen des serbischen Lebens und Eigentums geantwortet. Durch solches Heldentum zeichnen sich nur die Nichtsnutzigen aus. Die Feigen sind immer große Helden, wenn sie sicher sind, daß ihnen nichts geschehen wird. Man vergleiche nur Princip und Čabrinović mit diesen Helden und man wird gleich den großen Unterschied merken. Zivilisation und Gerechtigkeit sind in Österreich-Ungarn eine große Lüge.“
- j) Die „Tribuna“ vom 7. Juli sagt: „Wir sind der Ansicht, daß die Mordtat von Sarajevo bestellt wurde, um die Ausrottung der Serben mit einem Schlag durchzuführen.“
- k) Der „Piémont“ vom 8. Juli meldet aus Bajina Baschka, daß die österreichischen Behörden in Bosnien ein Christenmassaker vorbereiten.

- l) Der „Balkan“ vom 8. veröffentlicht einen Bericht aus Bosnien unter dem Titel „Bartholomäusnacht in Sarajevo“ und tritt für einen allgemeinen Boykott gegen alle in Serbien lebenden Österreicher ein.
- m) Das „Mali Journal“ vom 8. fordert zum Boykott gegen die Donau-Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft auf.
- n) Unter dem Titel „Nichts aus Österreich-Ungarn!“ schreibt die „Tribuna“ vom 8., es sei am besten, aus Österreich-Ungarn nichts zu beziehen, auch die österreichischen und ungarischen Bäder nicht zu besuchen und keine Ärzte aus Österreich-Ungarn zu berufen. Die Privatinitiative könne in der angedeuteten Richtung viel ausrichten. Der Staat und die Behörden haben sich darein nicht einzumischen. Es sei genügend, an die Bürger zu appellieren.
- o) Die „Stampa“ vom 8. behauptet, daß die Sarajevoer Polizei die verhafteten Attentäter der unmenschlichsten und schamlosesten Tortur aussetze, um von ihnen unwahre Geständnisse zu erpressen, auf Grund welcher dann Anklagen gegen das serbische Volk erhoben werden sollen.
- p) Die „Agence des Balkans“ vom 9. meldet aus Belgrad: „Absolut sichere Privatmeldungen kündigen an, daß in Bosnien und der Herzegowina ein allgemeines Massaker der Serben unmittelbar bevorstehe.“
- q) Anknüpfend an die Äußerung des Premierministers Asquith bei der Mitteilung der Nachricht vom Tode des Herrn Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand, daß er für das Schicksal der Menschheit besorgt sei, veröffentlicht der „Balkan“ am 9. Juli einen historischen Überblick über die Ereignisse der letzten 40 Jahre, aus dem er ableitet, daß das serbische Volk in diesem Zeitraume den furchtbaren Qualen der jesuitischen Politik Österreich-Ungarns ausgesetzt war. Schließlich mußte Herr Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand, wie alle Söhne Loyolas, welche nur im Blute der Menschen arbeiten und dem Prinzip, „der Zweck heiligt die Mittel“, huldigen, vom Schicksal ereilt und ein Opfer des Jesuitismus werden, wie es auch das ganze Österreich-Ungarn werden wird. Durch den Untergang Österreich-Ungarns aber soll der Menschheit Ruhe und Frieden gegeben werden. Wenn man alle diese Wahrheiten resumiert, dann kommt man zum Schlusse, daß Asquith ruhigen Gemüts die Todesnachricht hätte mit den Worten begleiten können: „Ich bin für das Schicksal der Menschheit nicht mehr besorgt“.
- r) Die „Politika“ vom 9. Juli führt im Leitartikel unter der Überschrift „Unverschämte Lügen“ aus: „Die Art und Weise, wie die Untersuchung über das Sarajevoer Attentat geführt wird, läßt offen erkennen, welche Ziele Österreich dabei verfolgt. Da die Attentäter ungeachtet aller Torturen, denen sie ausgesetzt sind, nicht das sagen wollen, was man von ihnen verlangt, wurden andere Individuen ausfindig gemacht, die sich bereit erklärten, unter gewissen Bedingungen eine gewisse Mitschuld an dem

Attentate einzugestehen, zugleich aber alle jene zu beschuldigen, die Österreich unangenehm sind. Diese Methode ist vorläufig gelungen, denn die gedungenen Individuen erzählen alles, was man von ihnen will und die österreichische Polizei sorgt dafür, daß diese Lügen sofort nach allen Windrichtungen verbreitet werden. Österreich hat ja kein Schamgefühl und es glaubt, daß sich jemand finden werde, der solchen Lügen Glauben schenkt.“

- s) Die „Stampa“ vom 9. sagt, es sei noch nicht alles, was sich in Bosnien und der Herzegowina ereignet hat, aufgedeckt und in die Öffentlichkeit gedrungen! Das werde strengstens verheimlicht. Die Wahrheit werde aber dennoch früher oder später an die Oberfläche kommen. Das blutdürstige Österreich will sich eben an serbischem Blute satt trinken und tut es auch. Es verlautet, daß es heute ungefähr 10.000 Verwundete und Tote in Bosnien gebe.
- t) Die „Politika“ vom 10. Juli richtet maßlose Beleidigungen gegen Mitglieder des Allerhöchsten Kaiserhauses.
- u) Das Handelsblatt „Trgovinski Glasnik“ vom 10. Juli spricht von der Verderbtheit und Skrupellosigkeit der österreichisch-ungarischen Politik, die es jesuitisch, rücksichtslos und unehrenhaft nennt. Sie sei dem serbischen Volke in Österreich-Ungarn eine Mahnung, daß es nicht in einem Kulturstaate lebe, welcher Leben und Eigentum garantiere, sondern daß es stets bereit und bewaffnet sein müsse, sich vor der Räuberei der Behörden und der Regierung zu verteidigen. Nach den letzten Ereignissen dürfe das serbische Volk nicht mehr wie ein Lamm warten, welches jeden Tag abgeschlachtet werden könnte, sondern wie ein Löwe, der bereit ist zur blutigen Abwehr.
- v) In der „Štampa“ vom 10. Juli heißt es: Nichts sei ewig und auch Österreich-Ungarn werde nicht ewig in Bosnien und der Herzegowina bleiben. Die Zeit sei nicht fern, wo die Serben, welche die Macht der Türken brachen und die Bulgaren strafen, um die Ivan Planina am Trebevic kreisen werden.
- w) Die „Pravda“ vom 10. Juli fordert unter dem Titel „Boykott gegen die Nichtsnutzigen“ zum Boykott der österreichischen Firmen in Belgrad sowie der österreichischen Waren auf und sagt, es sei Pflicht der „Narodna odbrana“, die strengste Durchführung des Boykotts zu überwachen.
- x) Der „Zvono“ vom 16. Juli erklärt Princip als Sohn der Gräfin Lonyay, dem die Aufgabe zuteil wurde, den Tod des Kronprinzen Rudolf an dessen Mörder, Herrn Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand, zu rächen.
- y) Das „Mali Journal“ vom 19. Juli veröffentlicht einen Bericht, worin es heißt: Princip sei von einem österreichisch-ungarischen Agenten zum Attentat

angestiftet worden. In Wien sage man, der wahre Schuldige sei nur in der österreichisch-ungarischen Gesandtschaft in Belgrad zu finden.

- s) Das führende jungradikale Blatt „Odjek“ vom 20. Juli schreibt: „Österreich-Ungarn gibt durch hundert Beweise kund, daß es den Titel des kranken Mannes in Europa erwerben will. Während in Serbien nicht ein einziger österreichischer Bürger belästigt worden ist, wurden in Bosnien und der Herzegowina Dörfer und Städte geplündert. Diese Tatsache ist ein neuer Beweis dafür, um wie viel Serbien kulturell und moralisch höher steht als Österreich-Ungarn.“
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### **Der Ortsausschuß der Narodna odbrana in Nisch über das Attentat gegen den Herrn Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand.**

Dem k. und k. Ministerium des Äußern ist von einem verlässlichen Konfidenten, dessen Name gegebenenfalls bekanntgegeben wird, eine vertrauliche Mitteilung zugekommen, wonach der Ortsausschuß der Narodna odbrana in Nisch kürzlich eine Sitzung abhielt, in welcher der Vorsitzende dieses Ausschusses, der Direktor der Nischer Strafanstalt Jaša Nenadović, auf das gegen den Herrn Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand verübte Attentat zu sprechen kam und hiebei folgendes ausführte.

Serbien mußte sich diesmal unbedingt eines Mittels wie das Attentat gegen den Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand bedienen, weil eben dieser wegen seines aggressiven und exzentrischen Charakters eine eminente und fatale Gefahr für Serbien und möglicherweise auch für weitere slawische Kreise bedeutete. Er hätte, wäre er am Leben geblieben, in Kürze Serbien zum Kriege herausgefordert oder es angegriffen, in welchem Falle Serbien, das ja jetzt materiell so geschwächt und mit seiner Armeeorganisation noch nicht fertig ist, unbedingt verloren gewesen wäre. Nun aber ist durch den Sarajevoer Mord Serbien gerettet und damit einer jener aus dem Wege geräumt, die Serbien gefährlich sind. Serbien wird jetzt einige Jahre lang Ruhe haben, da der neue Thronfolger es sich wohl überlegen wird, in den Spuren seines Vorgängers zu wandeln.

Wenn er auch wußte, so führte der Redner weiter aus, daß die Ermordung des Erzherzogs Franz Ferdinand für Österreich-Ungarn ein schwerer Schlag und großer Schmerz sein wird und daß darauf Torturen für unser dort lebendes Volk folgen werden, so hätte er doch nicht gedacht, daß seine Voraussetzungen in solchem Maße eintreffen und daß die Kroaten sich derart benehmen werden. Hätten ihm doch seine Freunde in Bosnien und der Herzegowina auch versichert, daß die österreichisch-ungarischen Behörden feige sind und in ihrem Auftreten nicht übertreiben dürfen; leider aber hätten sich diese Freunde und durch sie auch wir getäuscht. Wenn es so weiter andauert, so müssen Revolver und Bomben erst recht ihre wahre Rolle spielen. Was immer auch der serbische Gott gibt, auf diese Art darf man es nicht weiter gehen lassen.

Die Ausführungen des Redners fanden bei seinen Zuhörern vollste Zustimmung.

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**Nachträge nach Schluß des Druckes.****1. Zu Beilage 8.**

Der Lehrer Čubrilović, welcher bei Priboj die Führung des Princip und Grabež übernahm, hat ein volles Geständnis abgelegt, aus dem sich folgende wichtige Daten ergeben.

Im Jahre 1911 wurde Čubrilović aus Anlaß eines Sokolausfluges nach Šabac durch Božo Fović, einem Vorstandsmitgliede der Narodna odbrana, in die Ziele dieses Vereines eingeweiht und dann zum Kommissär der Narodna odbrana in Zvornik (Bosnien) bestellt. Über seine Einladung wurde später Miško Jovanović zum Kommissär der Narodna odbrana für Tuzla ernannt.

Als Mittelsmann beim Verkehre mit der Narodna odbrana fungierte ein Bauer, eben derselbe Bauer, der den Princip und Grabež mit der Mitteilung zu Čubrilović brachte, er führe zwei serbische Studenten mit Waffen zu ihm. Als er dies erfuhr, habe er gewußt, daß dies eine „Botschaft“ der Narodna odbrana sei. Princip und Grabež haben ihm gesagt, daß sie Bomben und Revolver bei sich haben, um ein Attentat gegen den Herrn Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand auszuführen.

**2. Monarchiefeindliche Bilder im Belgrader Kriegsministerium.**

Vor dem Empfangssaale des königlich serbischen Kriegsministeriums befinden sich an der Wand vier allegorische Bilder, von denen drei Darstellungen von serbischen Kriegserfolgen sind, während das vierte die Verwirklichung der monarchiefeindlichen Tendenzen Serbiens versinnbildlicht.

Über einer Landschaft, teils Gebirge (Bosnien), teils Ebene (Südungarn) geht die „zora“, die Morgenröte der serbischen Hoffnungen auf. Im Vordergrund steht eine bewaffnete Frauengestalt, auf deren Schild die Namen aller „noch zu befreienden Provinzen“: Bosnien, Herzegowina, Vojvodina, Syrmien, Dalmatien etc. stehen.

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## 20.

**Graf Berchtold an Sektionschef Freiherrn von Macchio in Wien.**

Telegramm.

*Lambach, 25. Juli 1914.*

Russischer Geschäftsträger telegraphiert mir, er sei von seiner Regierung dringend beauftragt, eine Fristerstreckung für das Ultimatum an Serbien zu verlangen. Ich ersuche Euer Exzellenz, ihm in meinem Namen zu antworten, daß wir eine Verlängerung der Frist nicht zugeben können. Euer Exzellenz wollen hinzufügen, daß Serbien auch nach dem Abbruche der diplomatischen Beziehungen durch uneingeschränkte Annahme unserer Forderungen eine friedliche Lösung herbeiführen kann, doch würden wir in diesem Falle genötigt sein, den Rückersatz aller unserer durch militärische Maßnahmen verursachten Kosten und Schäden von Serbien zu verlangen.

## 21.

**Graf Berchtold an Graf Szápáry in St. Petersburg.**

Telegramm.

*Bad Ischl, 25. Juli 1914.*

Zu Euer Exzellenz Information und Regelung Ihrer Sprache:

Der russische Geschäftsträger hat heute vormittag beim Herrn Ersten Sektionschef vorgesprochen, um im Namen seiner Regierung den Wunsch auszudrücken, daß die in unserer Note an Serbien angegebene Frist verlängert werden möge.

Dieses Ersuchen wurde damit begründet, daß die Mächte von unserem Schritt überrascht worden seien und daß die russische Regierung es als eine natürliche Rücksicht des Wiener Kabinettes gegen die anderen Kabinette betrachten würde, wenn den letzteren Gelegenheit gegeben würde, die Grundlagen unserer Mitteilung an die Mächte zu prüfen und das von uns in Aussicht gestellte Dossier zu studieren.

Der Herr Erste Sektionschef antwortete dem Herrn Geschäftsträger, daß er seine Ausführungen sofort zu meiner Kenntnis bringen werde; er könne ihm aber schon jetzt sagen, daß keine Aussicht bestehe, daß eine Verlängerung der angegebenen Frist von unserer Seite gewährt würde. Was die Gründe anbelange, die die russische Regierung zur Erhärtung des von ihr vorgebrachten Wunsches angeführt habe, so schienen dieselben auf einer irrtümlichen

Voraussetzung zu beruhen. Unsere Note an die Mächte hätte keineswegs den Zweck verfolgt, dieselben einzuladen, ihre gegenständliche Auffassung bekannt zu geben, sondern nur den Charakter einer Information gehabt, die wir als eine Pflicht internationaler Höflichkeit angesehen hätten. Im übrigen betrachteten wir unsere Aktion als eine nur uns und Serbien berührende Angelegenheit, zu der wir trotz unserer seit Jahren bekundeten Geduld und Langmut durch die Entwicklung der Verhältnisse zur Verteidigung unserer vitalsten Interessen sehr gegen unseren Wunsch gezwungen worden sind.

## 22.

**Freiherr von Giesl an Graf Berchtold.**

Telegramm.

*Belgrad, 25. Juli 1914.*

Ministerrat gestern abends und heute früh zusammengetreten, nach mehrfachen Versionen soll mir Antwort auf unsere Note noch vor Ablauf der Frist übergeben werden. Wie ich höre, wird Hofzug zusammengestellt; Geld der Nationalbank und der Eisenbahn sowie die Akten des Ministeriums des Äußern werden in das Innere des Landes gebracht. Einige meiner Kollegen sind der Auffassung, daß sie der Regierung folgen müssen, speziell auf der russischen Gesandtschaft wird gepackt.

Garnison hat in Feldausrüstung Stadt verlassen. Munitionsdepots der Festung wurden evakuiert. Am Bahnhof starker militärischer Verkehr. Die Sanitätskolonnen haben Belgrad in der Richtung nach Süden verlassen. In Befolgung der mir inzwischen zugekommenen Weisungen werden wir im Falle Abbruches mit dem Zuge 6 Uhr 30 von Belgrad abreisen.

## 23.

**Freiherr von Giesl an Graf Berchtold.**

Telegramm.

*Serlin, 25. Juli 1914.*

Um 3 Uhr nachmittags wurde in Serbien die allgemeine Mobilisierung angeordnet.

**Freiherr von Giesl an Graf Berchtold.**

Telegramm.

*Semlin, 25. Juli 1914.*

Ich habe infolge ungentügender Antwort der königlich serbischen Regierung auf unsere am 23. l. M. gestellten Forderungen die diplomatischen Beziehungen mit Serbien für abgebrochen erklärt und mit Personal der Gesandtschaft Belgrad verlassen.

Die Antwortnote wurde mir 2 Minuten vor 6 Uhr abends übergeben.

**Note der königlich serbischen Regierung vom 12./25. Juli 1914.**

Le Gouvernement Royal serbe a reçu la communication du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal du 10 de ce mois et il est persuadé que sa réponse éloignera tout malentendu qui menace de gêner les bons rapports de voisinage entre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et le Royaume de Serbie.

Le Gouvernement Royal est conscient que les protestations qui ont apparues tant à la tribune de la Skoupchtina Nationale que dans les déclarations et les actes des représentants responsables de l'Etat, protestations qui furent coupées court par la déclaration du Gouvernement serbe faite le 18 mars 1909, ne se sont plus renouvelées vis-à-vis la grande Monarchie voisine, en aucune occasion, et que depuis ce temps, autant de la part des Gouvernements Royaux qui se sont succédés, que de la part de leurs organes aucune tentative n'a été faite dans le but de changer l'état de chose politique et juridique créé en Bosnie-Herzégovine. Le Gouvernement Royal constate que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal n'a fait aucune représentation sauf en ce qui concerne un livre scolaire, et au sujet de laquelle le Gouvernement I. et R. a reçu une explication entièrement satisfaisante. La Serbie a de nombreuses fois donné des preuves de sa politique pacifique et modérée pendant la durée de la crise balkanique et c'est grâce à la Serbie et au sacrifice qu'elle a fait dans l'intérêt exclusif de la paix européenne que cette paix a été préservée.

Le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas être rendu responsable pour des manifestations d'un caractère privé telle que les articles des journaux et le travail paisible des sociétés, manifestations qui se produisent dans presque tous les pays comme une chose ordinaire et qui échappent en règle générale au contrôle officiel. D'autant moins que le Gouvernement Royal, lors de la solution de toute une série de questions qui se sont présentées entre la Serbie et

l'Autriche-Hongrie a montré une grande prévenance et a réussi de cette façon à en régler le plus grand nombre au profit du progrès des deux pays voisins.

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Royal a été péniblement surpris par les affirmations d'après lesquelles des personnes du Royaume de Serbie auraient participé à la préparation de l'attentat commis à Saraïevo. Il s'attendait à ce qu'il soit invité à collaborer à la recherche de tout ce qui se rapporte à ce crime et il était prêt, pour prouver par des actes son entière correction, à agir contre toutes les personnes à l'égard desquelles des communications lui seraient faites.

Se rendant donc au désir du Gouvernement I. et R., le Gouvernement Royal est disposé à remettre au tribunal tout sujet serbe, sans égard à sa situation et à son rang pour la complicité duquel dans le crime de Saraïevo des preuves lui seraient fournies et spécialement il s'engage à faire publier à la première page du Journal Officiel en date du 13/26 juillet l'énonciation suivante:

„Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne toute propagande qui serait dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie c'est à dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels.“

„Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que certains officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé, d'après la communication du Gouvernement I. et R., à la propagande susmentionnée et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvernement Royal s'était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 mars 1909.“

„Le Gouvernement, qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'une immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du Royaume que dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer.“

Cette énonciation sera portée à la connaissance de l'Armée Royale par un ordre du jour au nom de Sa Majesté le Roi, par son Altesse Royale le Prince Héritier Alexandre et sera publiée dans le prochain bulletin officiel de l'Armée.

Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en outre:

1° d'introduire à sa première convocation régulière de la Skoupchtina, une disposition dans la loi de la Presse par laquelle sera punie de la manière la plus sévère la provocation à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie austro-hongroise ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance générale serait dirigée contre l'intégrité territoriale de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Il se charge lors de la révision de la Constitution qui est prochaine, à faire introduire dans l'article XXII de la Constitution un amendement de telle sorte que les publi-

cations ci-dessus puissent être confisquées, ce qui actuellement aux termes catégoriques de l'article XII de la Constitution est impossible.

2° Le Gouvernement ne possède aucune preuve — et la note du Gouvernement L et R. ne lui en fournit non plus aucune — que la société „Narodna Odbrana“ et autres sociétés similaires aient commis jusqu'à ce jour quelque acte criminel de ce genre par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Néanmoins le Gouvernement Royal acceptera la demande du Gouvernement L et R. et dissoudra la société „Narodna Odbrana“ et toute autre société qui agirait contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

3° Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage à éliminer sans délai de l'instruction publique en Serbie tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fermenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, quand le Gouvernement L et R. lui fournira des faits et des preuves, de cette propagande.

4° Le Gouvernement Royal accepte de même à éloigner du service militaire et de l'administration les officiers et fonctionnaires pour lesquels l'enquête judiciaire aura prouvé qu'ils sont coupables, d'actes dirigés contre l'intégrité du territoire de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et il attend que le Gouvernement L et R. lui communique ultérieurement les noms et les faits de ces officiers et fonctionnaires aux fins de la procédure qui doit s'ensuivre.

5° Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la portée de la demande du Gouvernement L et R. que la Serbie s'engage à accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du Gouvernement L et R., mais il déclare qu'il admettra la collaboration qui répondrait aux principes du droit international et à la procédure criminelle, ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage.

6° Le Gouvernement Royal — cela va de soi — considère de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquête contre qui sont ou qui éventuellement auraient été mêlés au complot du 15/28 juin et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du Royaume. Quant à la participation de cette enquête des organes des autorités austro-hongroises, qui seraient délégués à cet effet par le Gouvernement L et R. le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas l'accepter, car ce serait une violation de la Constitution et de la loi sur la procédure criminelle. Cependant dans des cas concrets des communications sur les résultats de l'instruction en question pourraient être données aux organes austro-hongrois.

7° Le Gouvernement Royal a fait procéder dès le soir même de la remise de la note à l'arrestation du Comandant Voïslav Tankositch.

Quant à Milan Ziganovitch qui est sujet de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et qui jusqu'au 15 juin était employé (comme aspirant) à la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore être découvert et un mandat d'amener a été lancé contre lui. Le Gouvernement L et R. est prié de vouloir bien dans la forme

accoutumée faire connaître le plus tôt possible les présomptions de culpabilité ainsi que les preuves éventuelles de leur culpabilité qui ont été recueillies jusqu'à ce jour par l'instruction à Sarajevo aux fins d'enquête ultérieure.

8° Le Gouvernement serbe renforcera et étendra les mesures prises pour empêcher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière.

Il va de soi qu'il ordonnera de suite une enquête et punira sévèrement les fonctionnaires des frontières sur la ligne Šabac—Loznica, qui ont manqué leurs devoirs et laissé passer les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo.

9° Le Gouvernement Royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les propos que ses fonctionnaires tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger ont tenus après l'attentat dans des interviews et qui, d'après l'affirmation du Gouvernement I. et R., ont été hostiles envers la Monarchie dès que le Gouvernement I. et R. lui aura indiqué les passages en question de ces propos et dès qu'il aura démontré que les propos employés ont en effet été tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, au sujet de quoi le Gouvernement Royal lui-même aura soin de recueillir des preuves et convictions.

10° Le Gouvernement Royal informera le Gouvernement I. et R. de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents, en tant que cela n'a pas été déjà fait par la présente note, aussitôt que chaque mesure aura été ordonnée et exécutée.

Dans le cas où le Gouvernement I. et R. ne serait pas satisfait de cette réponse, le Gouvernement Royal serbe, considérant qu'il est de l'intérêt commun de ne pas précipiter la solution de cette question, est prêt comme toujours d'accepter une entente pacifique, soit en remettant cette question à la décision du Tribunal International de la Haye soit aux Grandes Puissances qui ont pris part à l'élaboration de la déclaration que le Gouvernement serbe a faite le 18/31 mars 1909.

## 26.

### Graf Berchtold an Graf Szápáry in St. Petersburg.

*Wien, 25. Juli 1914.*

In dem Augenblicke, wo wir uns zu einem ernsten Vorgehen gegen Serbien entschlossen haben, sind wir uns natürlich auch der Möglichkeit eines sich aus der serbischen Differenz entwickelnden Zusammenstoßes mit Rußland bewußt gewesen. Wir konnten uns aber durch diese Eventualität nicht in unserer Stellungnahme gegenüber Serbien beirren lassen, weil grundlegende staatspolitische Konsiderationen uns vor die Notwendigkeit stellten, der Situation ein Ende zu machen, daß ein russischer Freibrief Serbien die dauernde, ungestrafte und unstrafbare Bedrohung der Monarchie ermögliche.



Für den Fall, als Rußland den Moment für die große Abrechnung mit den europäischen Zentralmächten bereits für gekommen erachten sollte und daher von vornherein zum Krieg entschlossen wäre, erscheint allerdings nachstehende Instruierung Euer Exzellenz überflüssig.

Es wäre aber immerhin denkbar, daß Rußland, nach der eventuellen Ablehnung unserer Forderungen durch Serbien und angesichts der sich für uns ergebenden Notwendigkeit eines bewaffneten Vorgehens, mit sich selbst zu Rate ginge und daß es sogar gewillt sein könnte, sich von den kriegslustigen Elementen nicht mitreißen zu lassen.

Dieser Situation sind die nachfolgenden Darlegungen angepaßt, die Euer Exzellenz im gegebenen Moment und in der Ihnen geeignet erscheinenden Weise und nach der von Ihnen zu ermessenden Opportunität bei Herrn Sazonow und dem Herrn Ministerpräsidenten verwerten wollen:

Ich setze im allgemeinen voraus, daß Euer Exzellenz unter den gegenwärtigen Verhältnissen ein enges Einvernehmen mit Ihrem deutschen Kollegen hergestellt haben, der seitens seiner Regierung gewiß beauftragt worden sein dürfte, der russischen Regierung keinen Zweifel darüber zu lassen, daß Österreich-Ungarn im Falle eines Konfliktes mit Rußland nicht allein stehen würde.

Darüber gebe ich mich keiner Illusion hin, daß es nicht leicht sein wird, für unseren unvermeidlich gewordenen Schritt in Belgrad bei Herrn Sazonow Verständnis zu finden.

Es gibt aber ein Moment, das seinen Eindruck auf den russischen Minister des Äußern nicht verfehlen kann und das ist die Betonung des Umstandes, daß die österreichisch-ungarische Monarchie, dem von ihr seit Jahrzenten festgehaltenen Grundsatz entsprechend, auch in der gegenwärtigen Krise und bei der bewaffneten Austragung des Gegensatzes zu Serbien keinerlei eigennützige Motive verfolgt.

Die Monarchie ist territorial saturiert und trägt nach serbischem Besitz kein Verlangen. Wenn der Kampf mit Serbien uns aufgezwungen wird, so wird dies für uns kein Kampf um territorialen Gewinn, sondern lediglich ein Mittel der Selbstverteidigung und Selbsterhaltung sein.

Der Inhalt des Zirkularerlasses, der an sich schon beredt genug ist, wird in das rechte Licht gerückt durch das Dossier über die serbische Propaganda gegen die Monarchie und die Zusammenhänge, die zwischen dieser Propaganda und dem Attentat vom 28. Juni bestehen.

Auf dieses Dossier wollen Euer Exzellenz die Aufmerksamkeit des Herrn russischen Ministers ganz speziell lenken und dartun, es sei eine in der Geschichte singuläre Erscheinung, daß eine Großmacht die aufrührerischen Umtriebe eines angrenzenden kleinen Staates durch so lange Zeit mit so beispielloser Langmut geduldet hätte wie Österreich-Ungarn jene Serbiens.

Wir wollten keine Politik gegen das Aufstreben der christlichen Balkanstaaten machen und haben daher — trotzdem uns der geringe Wert serbischer Versprechungen bekannt war — nach der Annexionskrise vom Jahre 1908 zugelassen, daß sich Serbien beinahe um das Doppelte vergrößere.

Seitdem hat die subversive Bewegung, die in Serbien gegen die Monarchie genährt wird, so exzessive Formen angenommen, daß die Lebensinteressen Österreich-Ungarns und selbst unsere Dynastie durch die serbische Wühlarbeit bedroht erscheinen.

Wir müssen annehmen, daß das konservative, kaisertreue Rußland ein energisches Vorgehen unsererseits gegen diese Bedrohung aller staatlichen Ordnung begreiflich und sogar notwendig finden wird.

Wenn Euer Exzellenz in Ihrem Gespräch mit Herrn Sazonow an diesem Punkte angelangt sein werden, wird der Moment gekommen sein, an die Aufstellung unserer Beweggründe und Absichten den Hinweis zu knüpfen, daß wir zwar — wie Euer Exzellenz bereits in der Lage gewesen wären darzulegen — keinen territorialen Gewinn anstreben und auch die Souveränität des Königreiches nicht anzutasten gedächten, daß wir aber andererseits zur Durchsetzung unserer Forderungen bis zum Äußersten gehen würden.

Daß wir bisher, soweit es an uns lag, bestrebt waren, den Frieden zu erhalten, den auch wir als das kostbarste Gut der Völker betrachten, zeige der Verlauf der letzten 40 Jahre und die geschichtliche Tatsache, daß unser Allergnädigster Herr Sich den glorreichen Namen eines Hüters des Friedens erworben hat.

Wir würden eine Störung des europäischen Friedens schon deshalb auf das lebhafteste bedauern, weil wir stets der Ansicht waren, daß das Erstarken der Balkanstaaten zur staatlichen und politischen Selbständigkeit unseren Beziehungen zu Rußland zum Vorteil gereichen würde, auch alle Möglichkeit eines Gegensatzes zwischen uns und Rußland beseitigen würde und weil wir immer bereit waren, die großen politischen Interessen Rußlands bei unserer eigenen politischen Orientierung zu berücksichtigen.

Eine weitere Duldung der serbischen Umtriebe würde unsere staatliche Existenz untergraben und unseren Bestand als Großmacht, daher auch das europäische Gleichgewicht, in Frage stellen. Wir sind aber überzeugt, daß es Rußlands eigenstes, von seinen friedlichen Staatsleitern wohlverstandenes Interesse ist, daß das gegenwärtige europäische, für den Weltfrieden so nützliche Gleichgewicht erhalten bleibe. Unsere Aktion gegen Serbien, in welcher Form immer sie erfolgt, ist eine durchaus konservative und ihr Zweck die notwendige Erhaltung unserer europäischen Stellung.

**Graf Berchtold an Graf Szápáry in St. Petersburg.****Telegramm.***Wien, 25. Juli 1914.*

Da Punkt 5 unserer Forderungen, nämlich die Beteiligung von k. u. k. Funktionären bei der Unterdrückung der subversiven Bewegung in Serbien, besonderen Widerspruch Herrn Sazonows hervorgerufen, wollen Euer Exzellenz sich über diesen Punkt streng vertraulich dahin äußern, daß dessen Einschaltung lediglich praktischen Rücksichten entsprang und keineswegs der Absicht, die Souveränität Serbiens zu tangieren. Wir denken bei Punkt 5 „collaboration“ an die Errichtung eines geheimen „bureau de sûreté“ in Belgrad, welches nach Art der analogen russischen Einrichtungen in Paris funktionieren und mit der serbischen Polizei und Verwaltungsbehörde kooperieren würde.

**Graf Szápáry an Graf Berchtold.****Telegramm.***St. Petersburg, 26. Juli 1914.*

Aus Anlaß von Gerüchten über russische Mobilisierungsmaßnahmen hat Graf Pourtalès den russischen Minister in der ernstesten Weise darauf aufmerksam gemacht, daß heutzutage Mobilisierungsmaßnahmen als diplomatisches Druckmittel höchst gefährlich seien. Denn in diesem Falle gelange die rein militärische Erwägung der Generalstäbe zum Wort und wenn in Deutschland einmal auf den Knopf gedrückt werde, sei die Sache unaufhaltsam. Herr Sazonow versicherte dem deutschen Botschafter unter Ehrenwort, daß die bezüglichen Gerüchte unrichtig seien, daß bisher kein Pferd und kein Reservist eingezogen sei und daß es sich lediglich um vorbereitende Maßnahmen in den Militärbezirken Kiew und Odessa, vielleicht Kasan und Moskau handle.

Unmittelbar nachher erhielt der kaiserlich deutsche Militärattaché per Kurier spät abend eine Einladung zu Kriegsminister Suchomlinow, welcher sich darauf berief, daß Graf Pourtalès dem Minister des Äußern über die russischen Rüstungen gesprochen habe und da der Botschafter einzelne militärische Details mißverstanden haben könnte, nehme er Gelegenheit, ihn ausführlicher zu informieren. In folgendem mir zur Verfügung gestellten Telegramm des Grafen Pourtalès nach Berlin sind die diesfälligen Mitteilungen des Majors von Eggeling zusammengefaßt:

Militärattaché meldet über Gespräch mit russischem Kriegsminister: Herr Sazonow hat ihn gebeten, mich über militärische Lage aufzuklären. Der Herr Kriegsminister gab mir sein Ehrenwort, daß noch keinerlei Mobilmachungsordre ergangen sei. Vorläufig würden lediglich vorbereitende Maßnahmen getroffen, kein Pferd ausgehoben, kein Reservist eingezogen. Wenn Österreich serbische

Grenze überschreite, werden auf Österreich gerichtete Militärbezirke Kiew, Odessa, Moskau, Kasan mobilisiert. Unter keinen Umständen an deutscher Front, Warschau, Wilna, St. Petersburg. Man wünscht dringend Frieden mit Deutschland. Auf meine Frage, zu welchem Zweck die Mobilisierung gegen Österreich, Achselzucken und Hinweis auf Diplomaten. Sprach dem Herrn Minister aus, daß man bei uns Würdigung für freundschaftliche Absicht zeigen, aber auch Mobilisierung gegen Österreich allein als sehr bedrohlich ansehen werde. Herr Minister betonte nachdrücklichst und wiederholt dringendes Bedürfnis und Wunsch auf Frieden.

## 29.

**Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London.**

Telegramm.

Wien, 26. Juli 1914.

Herr von Tschirschky teilte mir auftragsgemäß heute mit, laut eines in London am 25. d. M., 3 Uhr nachmittags, aufgegebenen Telegrammes des Fürsten Lichnowsky habe Sir E. Grey diesem die Skizze einer Antwortnote Serbiens übersendet und in dem begleitenden Privatschreiben bemerkt, daß er hoffe, das Berliner Kabinett würde sich angesichts des versöhnlichen Tenors dieser Antwort in Wien für deren Annahme verwenden.

Ich halte es für angezeigt, daß Euer Exzellenz dem Herrn Staatssekretär gegenüber auf die Sache zurückkommen und ihn darauf aufmerksam machen, daß fast zur selben Zeit, als er dieses Schreiben an Fürst Lichnowsky richtete, nämlich gestern um 3 Uhr nachmittags, Serbien bereits die allgemeine Mobilisierung seiner Arme angeordnet hat, was beweist, daß in Belgrad zu einer friedlichen Austragung der Sache keine Neigung bestand. Die Überreichung der, wie es scheint, schon vorher nach London telegraphierten Antwort an den k. und k. Gesandten in Belgrad fand mit einem unseren Forderungen nicht entsprechenden Inhalte erst um 6 Uhr nach erfolgter Ausschreibung der Mobilisierung statt.

## 30.

**Graf Berchtold an die k. u. k. Botschafter in Berlin, Rom, London, Paris und St. Petersburg.**

Telegramm.

Wien, 26. Juli 1914.

Wir haben, nachdem Serbien die von uns aufgestellten Forderungen abgelehnt hat, die diplomatischen Beziehungen zu diesem Lande abgebrochen.

Ich ersuche Euer Exzellenz nunmehr, sich sofort zum Herrn Minister des Äußern oder dessen Stellvertreter zu begeben und sich ihm gegenüber beiläufig in folgender Weise auszusprechen:

Die königlich serbische Regierung hat es abgelehnt, die Forderungen, welche wir zur dauernden Sicherung unserer von ihr bedrohten vitalsten Interessen an sie stellen mußten, zu erfüllen, womit sie bekundet hat, daß sie ihre subversiven, auf die stete Beunruhigung einiger unserer Grenzgebiete und ihre schließliche Lostrennung aus dem Gefüge der Monarchie gerichteten Bestrebungen aufzugeben, nicht willens sei.

Zu unserem Bedauern und sehr gegen unseren Willen sind wir dadurch in die Notwendigkeit versetzt worden, Serbien durch die schärfsten Mittel zu einer grundsätzlichen Änderung seiner bisherigen feindseligen Haltung zu zwingen.

### 31.

#### Graf Szápáry an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm.

*St. Petersburg, 27. Juli 1914.*

Soeben lange Unterredung mit Herrn Sazonow gehabt. Sagte dem Herrn Minister, ich hätte den Eindruck, daß man über den Charakter unserer Aktion in Rußland in Irrtümern befangen sei. Man imputiere uns, hiemit einen Vorstoß auf den Balkan unternehmen und den Marsch nach Salonich oder gar nach Konstantinopel antreten zu wollen. Andere wieder gingen so weit, unsere Aktion nur als den Auftakt eines Präventivkrieges gegen Rußland zu bezeichnen. All dies sei irrig, zum Teile geradezu unvernünftig. Das Ziel unserer Aktion sei Selbsterhaltung und Notwehr gegenüber einer feindseligen, unsere Integrität bedrohenden Propaganda des Wortes, der Schrift und der Tat. Niemandem in Österreich-Ungarn falle es ein, russische Interessen bedrohen oder gar Handel mit Rußland suchen zu wollen. Das Ziel jedoch, das wir uns vorgesetzt, seien wir unbedingt entschlossen zu erreichen und der Weg, den wir gewählt hätten, schien uns der zweckdienlichste. Da es sich aber um eine Aktion der Notwehr handle, könne ich ihm nicht verhehlen, daß man sich bei einer solchen durch gar keine wie immer gearteten Konsequenzen beirren lassen könne.

Herr Sazonow stimmte mir bei. Unser Ziel, wie ich es ihm geschildert habe, sei ein vollkommen legitimes, aber er meine, der Weg, den wir zu dessen Erreichung verfolgen, sei nicht der sicherste. Die Note, die wir überreicht hätten, sei in der Form nicht glücklich. Er habe sie seitdem studiert und wenn ich Zeit hätte, möchte er sie nochmals mit mir durchschauen. Ich bemerkte, daß ich zu seiner Disposition sei, aber weder autorisiert sei, den Notentext mit ihm zu diskutieren, noch denselben zu interpretieren. Seine Bemerkungen seien aber natürlich von Interesse. Der Herr Minister nahm sodann alle Punkte der Note durch und fand heute von den zehn Punkten sieben ohne allzu große Schwierigkeiten annehmbar, nur die zwei Punkte, betreffend die Mitwirkung von k. u. k.

Funktionären in Serbien und den Punkt, betreffend die Entlassung von unsererseits zu bezeichnenden Offizieren und Beamten, fand er in dieser Form unannehmbar. Bezüglich der beiden ersten Punkte war ich in der Lage eine authentische Interpretation im Sinne Euer Exzellenz Telegrammes vom 25. d. M. zu geben, bezüglich des dritten meinte ich, daß er eine notwendige Forderung sei. Übrigens seien die Dinge im Rollen. Die Serben hätten schon gestern mobilisiert und was sich seither noch ereignet habe, sei mir unbekannt.

## 32.

**Graf Berchtold an Graf Szápáry in St. Petersburg.**

Telegramm.

*Wien, 27. Juli 1914.*

Ich ermächtige Euer Exzellenz, Herrn Sazonow gegenüber sich dahin auszusprechen, daß, solange der Krieg zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und Serbien lokalisiert bleibe, die Monarchie irgendwelche territoriale Eroberungen keineswegs beabsichtige.

## 33.

**Graf Szögyény an Graf Berchtold.**

Telegramm.

*Berlin, 27. Juli 1914.*

Herr Sazonow erklärte dem deutschen Botschafter, er könne ihm „garantieren, daß russischerseits keine Mobilisierung vorgenommen worden sei; allerdings wären gewisse notwendigste militärische Vorsorgen getroffen.“

Deutscher Militärattaché in St. Petersburg meldet, daß „russischer Kriegsminister ihm sein Ehrenwort gegeben habe, daß nicht ein Mann, noch ein Pferd mobilisiert sei; doch seien natürlicherweise gewisse militärische Vorsorgen getroffen worden“; Vorsorgen, die, wie der deutsche Militärattaché seiner Meldung als von sich aus hinzufügt, „allerdings ziemlich weitgehend seien.“

## 34.

**Graf Berchtold an die k. u. k. Botschafter in Berlin, Rom, London, Paris und St. Petersburg.***Wien, 27. Juli 1914.*

In der Anlage erhalten Euer — den mit unseren Bemerkungen versehenen Text der Note, welche die königlich serbische Regierung unterm 25. I. M. an den k. u. k. Gesandten in Belgrad gerichtet hat.

**Übersetzung.**

Die königl. serbische Regierung hat die Mitteilung der k. und k. Regierung vom 10. d. M. erhalten und ist überzeugt, daß ihre Antwort jedes Mißverständnis zerstreuen wird, welches die freundschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie und dem Königreiche Serbien zu stören droht.

Die königliche Regierung ist sich bewußt, daß der großen Nachbarmonarchie gegenüber bei keinem Anlasse jene Proteste erneuert wurden, die seinerzeit sowohl in der Skupschtina, als auch in Erklärungen und Handlungen der verantwortlichen Vertreter des Staates zum Ausdruck gebracht wurden und die durch die Erklärung der serbischen Regierung vom 18. März 1909 ihren Abschluß gefunden haben, sowie weiters, daß seit jener Zeit weder von den verschiedenen einander folgenden Regierungen des Königreiches, noch von deren Organen der Versuch unternommen wurde, den in Bosnien und der Herzegowina geschaffenen politischen und rechtlichen Zustand zu ändern. Die königliche Regierung stellt fest, daß die k. und k. Regierung in dieser Richtung keinerlei Vorstellungen erhoben hat, abgesehen von dem Falle eines Lehrbuches, hinsichtlich dessen die

**Anmerkungen.**

Die königl. serbische Regierung beschränkt sich darauf festzustellen, daß seit Abgabe der Erklärung vom 18. März 1909 von Seite der serbischen Regierung und ihrer Organe kein Versuch zur Änderung der Stellung Bosniens und der Herzegowina unternommen wurde.

Damit verschiebt sie in bewußt willkürlicher Weise die Grundlagen unserer Demarche, da wir nicht die Behauptung aufgestellt haben, daß sie und ihre Organe in dieser Richtung offiziell irgend etwas unternommen hätten.

Unser Gravamen geht vielmehr dahin, daß sie es trotz der in der zitierten Note übernommenen Verpflichtungen unterlassen hat, die gegen die territoriale Integrität der Monarchie gerichtete Bewegung zu unterdrücken.

Ihre Verpflichtung bestand also darin, die ganze Richtung ihrer Politik zu ändern und zur österreichisch-unga-

k. und k. Regierung eine vollkommen befriedigende Aufklärung erhalten hat. Serbien hat während der Dauer der Balkankrise in zahlreichen Fällen Beweise für seine pazifistische und gemäßigte Politik geliefert und es ist nur Serbien und den Opfern, die es ausschließlich im Interesse des europäischen Friedens gebracht hat, zu danken, wenn dieser Friede erhalten geblieben ist.

Die königliche Regierung kann nicht für Äußerungen privaten Charakters verantwortlich gemacht werden, wie es Zeitungsartikel und die friedliche Arbeit von Gesellschaften ist, Äußerungen, die fast in allen Ländern ganz gewöhnliche Erscheinungen sind und die sich im allgemeinen der staatlichen Kontrolle entziehen. Dies umsoweniger, als die königliche Regierung bei der Lösung einer ganzen Reihe von Fragen, die zwischen Serbien und Österreich-Ungarn aufgetaucht waren, großes Entgegenkommen bewiesen hat, wodurch es ihr gelungen ist, deren größeren Teil zugunsten des Fortschrittes der beiden Nachbarländer zu lösen.

Die königliche Regierung war deshalb durch die Behauptungen, daß Angehörige Serbiens an der Vorbereitung des in Sarajevo verübten Attentates teilgenommen hätten, schmerzlich überrascht. Sie hatte erwartet, zur Mitwirkung bei den Nachforschungen über dieses Verbrechen eingeladen zu werden und war bereit, um ihre volle Korrektheit durch Taten zu beweisen, gegen alle Personen vorzugehen, hinsichtlich

rischen Monarchie in ein freundschaftliches Verhältnis zu treten, nicht bloß die Zugehörigkeit Bosniens zur Monarchie offiziell nicht anzutasten.

Die Behauptung der königl. serbischen Regierung, daß die Äußerungen der Presse und die Tätigkeit von Vereinen privaten Charakter haben und sich der staatlichen Kontrolle entziehen, steht im vollen Widerspruche zu den Einrichtungen moderner Staaten, selbst der freiheitlichsten Richtung auf dem Gebiete des Preß- und Vereinsrechtes, das einen öffentlich rechtlichen Charakter hat und Presse sowie Vereine der staatlichen Aufsicht unterstellt. Übrigens sehen auch die serbischen Einrichtungen eine solche Aufsicht vor. Der gegen die serbische Regierung erhobene Vorwurf geht eben dahin, daß sie es gänzlich unterlassen hat, ihre Presse und ihre Vereine zu beaufsichtigen, deren Wirken im monarchiefeindlichen Sinne sie kannte.

Diese Behauptung ist unrichtig; die serbische Regierung war über den gegen ganz bestimmte Personen bestehenden Verdacht genau unterrichtet und nicht nur in der Lage, sondern auch nach ihren internen Gesetzen verpflichtet,



welcher ihr Mitteilungen zugekommen wären.

Den Wünschen der k. und k. Regierung entsprechend, ist die königliche Regierung somit bereit, dem Gerichte ohne Rücksicht auf Stellung und Rang jeden serbischen Staatsangehörigen zu übergeben, für dessen Teilnahme an dem Sarajevoer Verbrechen ihr Beweise geliefert werden sollten; sie verpflichtet sich insbesondere auf der ersten Seite des Amtsblattes vom 13./26. Juli folgende Enunziation zu veröffentlichen:

„Die königl. serbische Regierung verurteilt jede Propaganda, die gegen Österreich-Ungarn gerichtet sein sollte, d. h. die Gesamtheit der Bestrebungen, die in letzter Linie auf die Losreißung einzelner Gebiete von der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie abzielen und sie bedauert aufrichtig die traurigen Folgen dieser verbrecherischen Machenschaften.

Die königliche Regierung bedauert, daß laut der Mitteilung der k. und k. Regierung gewisse serbische Offiziere und Funktionäre an der eben genannten Propaganda mitgewirkt und daß diese damit die freundschaftlichen Beziehungen gefährdet hätten, zu deren Beobachtung sich die königliche Regierung durch die Erklärung vom

ganz spontan Erhebungen einzuleiten. Sie hat in dieser Richtung gar nichts unternommen.

Unsere Forderung lautete:

„Die königl. serbische Regierung verurteilt die gegen Österreich-Ungarn gerichtete Propaganda . . .“

Die von der königl. serbischen Regierung vorgenommene Änderung der von uns geforderten Erklärung will sagen, daß eine solche gegen Österreich-Ungarn gerichtete Propaganda nicht besteht oder daß ihr eine solche nicht bekannt ist. Diese Formel ist unaufrichtig und hinterhältig, da sich die serbische Regierung damit für später die Ausflucht reserviert, sie hätte die derzeit bestehende Propaganda durch diese Erklärung nicht desavouiert und nicht als monarchiefeindlich anerkannt, woraus sie weiter ableiten könnte, daß sie zur Unterdrückung einer der jetzigen Propaganda gleichen nicht verpflichtet sei.

Die von uns geforderte Formulierung lautete:

„Die königliche Regierung bedauert, daß serbische Offiziere und Funktionäre . . . . . mitgewirkt haben . . . . .“

Auch mit dieser Formulierung und dem weiteren Beisatze „laut der Mitteilung der k. und k. Regierung“ verfolgt die serbische Regierung den bereits

31. März 1909 feierlich . verpflichtet hatte.

„Die Regierung....“ gleichlautend mit dem geforderten Texte.

Die königliche Regierung verpflichtet sich weiters:

1. Anlässlich des nächsten ordnungsmäßigen Zusammentrittes der Skupschtina in das Preßgesetz eine Bestimmung einzuschalten, wonach die Aufreizung zum Hasse und zur Verachtung gegen die Monarchie sowie jede Publikation strengstens bestraft würde, deren allgemeine Tendenz gegen die territoriale Integrität Österreich-Ungarns gerichtet ist.

Sie verpflichtet sich anlässlich der demnächst erfolgenden Revision der Verfassung in den Artikel XXII des Verfassungsgesetzes einen Zusatz aufzunehmen, der die Konfiskation derartiger Publikationen gestattet, was nach den klaren Bestimmungen des Artikels XXII der Konstitution derzeit unmöglich ist.

oben angedeuteten Zweck, sich für die Zukunft freie Hand zu wahren.

Wir hatten gefordert:

„1. Jede Publikation zu unterdrücken, die zum Hasse und zur Verachtung gegen die Monarchie aufreizt und deren allgemeine Tendenz gegen die territoriale Integrität der Monarchie gerichtet ist.“

Wir wollten also die Verpflichtung Serbiens herbeiführen, dafür zu sorgen, daß derartige Preßangriffe in Hinkunft unterbleiben; wir wünschten also einen bestimmten Erfolg auf diesem Gebiete sichergestellt zu wissen.

Statt dessen bietet uns Serbien die Erlassung gewisser Gesetze an, welche als Mittel zu diesem Erfolge dienen sollen, u. zw.:

a) ein Gesetz, womit die fraglichen monarchiefeindlichen Preßäußerungen subjektiv bestraft werden sollen, was uns ganz gleichgültig ist, umsomehr als bekanntermaßen die subjektive Verfolgung von Preßdelikten äußerst selten möglich ist und bei einer entsprechend laxen Behandlung eines solchen Gesetzes auch die wenigen Fälle dieser Art nicht zur Bestrafung kommen würden; also ein Vorschlag, der unserer Forderung in keiner Weise entgegenkommt, da er uns nicht die geringste Garantie für den von uns gewünschten Erfolg bietet;

b) ein Nachtragsgesetz zu Art. XXII der Konstitution, das die Konfiskation gestatten würde — ein Vorschlag, der uns gleichfalls nicht befriedigen kann, da der Bestand eines solchen Gesetzes

2. Die Regierung besitzt keinerlei Beweise dafür und auch die Note der k. und k. Regierung liefert ihr keine solchen, daß der Verein „Narodna odbrana“ und andere ähnliche Gesellschaften bis zum heutigen Tage durch eines ihrer Mitglieder irgendwelche verbrecherischen Handlungen dieser Art begangen hätten. Nichtsdestoweniger wird die königliche Regierung die Forderung der k. und k. Regierung annehmen und die Gesellschaft Narodna odbrana sowie jede Gesellschaft, die gegen Österreich-Ungarn wirken sollte, auflösen.

3. Die königlich serbische Regierung verpflichtet sich ohne Verzug aus

in Serbien uns nichts nützt, sondern nur die Verpflichtung der Regierung, es auch anzuwenden, was uns aber nicht versprochen wird.

Diese Vorschläge sind also vollkommen unbefriedigend — dies umso mehr, als sie auch in der Richtung evasiv sind, daß uns nicht gesagt wird, innerhalb welcher Frist diese Gesetze erlassen würden und daß im Falle der Ablehnung der Gesetzesvorlage durch die Skupschtina — von der eventuellen Demission der Regierung abgesehen — alles beim alten bliebe.

Die monarchiefeindliche Propaganda der Narodna odbrana und der ihr affilierten Vereine erfüllt in Serbien das ganze öffentliche Leben; es ist daher eine ganz unzulässige Reserve, wenn die serbische Regierung behauptet, daß ihr darüber nichts bekannt ist.

Ganz abgesehen davon ist die von uns aufgestellte Forderung nicht zur Gänze erfüllt, da wir überdies verlangt haben:

Die Propagandamittel dieser Gesellschaften zu konfiszieren;

die Neubildung der aufgelösten Gesellschaften unter anderem Namen und in anderer Gestalt zu verhindern.

In diesen beiden Richtungen schweigt das Belgrader Kabinett vollkommen, so daß uns auch durch die gegebene halbe Zusage keine Garantie dafür geboten ist, daß dem Treiben der monarchiefeindlichen Assoziationen, insbesondere der Narodna odbrana, durch deren Auflösung definitiv ein Ende bereitet wäre.

Auch in diesem Falle verlangt die serbische Regierung erst. Nachweise

dem öffentlichen Unterrichte in Serbien alles auszuschneiden, was die gegen Österreich-Ungarn gerichtete Propaganda fördern könnte, falls ihr die k. und k. Regierung tatsächliche Nachweise für diese Propaganda liefert.

4. Die königliche Regierung ist auch bereit, jene Offiziere und Beamten aus dem Militär- und Zivildienste zu entlassen, hinsichtlich welcher durch gerichtliche Untersuchung festgestellt wird, daß sie sich Handlungen gegen die territoriale Integrität der Monarchie haben zuschulden kommen lassen; sie erwartet, daß ihr die k. und k. Regierung zwecks Einleitung des Verfahrens die Namen dieser Offiziere und Beamten und die Tatsachen mitteilt, welche denselben zur Last gelegt werden.

5. Die königliche Regierung muß bekennen, daß sie sich über den Sinn und die Tragweite jenes Begehrens der k. und k. Regierung nicht volle Rechen-

dafür, daß im öffentlichen Unterrichte Serbiens eine monarchiefeindliche Propaganda getrieben wird, während sie doch wissen muß, daß die bei den serbischen Schulen eingeführten Lehrbücher in dieser Richtung zu beanstehenden Stoff enthalten und daß ein großer Teil der serbischen Lehrer im Lager der Narodna odbrana und der ihr affilierten Vereine steht.

Übrigens hat die serbische Regierung auch hier einen Teil unserer Forderung nicht so erfüllt, wie wir es verlangt haben, indem sie in ihrem Text den von uns gewünschten Beisatz „sowohl was den Lehrkörper als auch was die Lehrmittel anbelangt“, wegließ — ein Beisatz, welcher ganz klar zeigt, wo die monarchiefeindliche Propaganda in der serbischen Schule zu suchen ist.

Indem die königlich serbische Regierung die Zusage der Entlassung der fraglichen Offiziere und Beamten aus dem Militär- und Zivildienst an den Umstand knüpft, daß diese Personen durch ein Gerichtsverfahren schuldig befunden werden, schränkt sie ihre Zusage auf jene Fälle ein, in denen diesen Personen ein strafgesetzlich zu ahndendes Delikt zur Last liegt. Da wir aber die Entfernung jener Offiziere und Beamten verlangen, die monarchiefeindliche Propaganda betreiben, was ja im allgemeinen in Serbien kein gerichtlich strafbarer Tatbestand ist, erscheint unsere Forderung auch in diesem Punkte nicht erfüllt.

Mit dieser Frage hat das allgemeine Völkerrecht ebensowenig etwas zu tun, wie das Strafprozeßrecht; es handelt sich um eine Angelegenheit

schaft geben kann, welches dahin geht, daß die königlich serbische Regierung sich verpflichten soll, auf ihrem Gebiete die Mitwirkung von Organen der k. und k. Regierung zuzulassen, doch erklärt sie, daß sie jene Mitwirkung anzunehmen bereit wäre, welche den Grundsätzen des Völkerrechtes und des Strafprozesses sowie den freundschaftlichen Beziehungen entsprechen würde.

6. Die königliche Regierung hält es selbstverständlich für ihre Pflicht gegen alle jene Personen eine Untersuchung einzuleiten, die an dem Komplote vom 15./28. Juni beteiligt waren oder beteiligt gewesen sein sollen und die sich auf ihrem Gebiete befinden. Was die Mitwirkung von hiezu speziell delegierten Organen der k. und k. Regierung an dieser Untersuchung anbelangt, so kann sie eine solche nicht annehmen, da dies eine Verletzung der Verfassung und des Strafprozeßgesetzes wäre. Doch könnten den österreichisch-ungarischen Organen in einzelnen Fällen Mitteilung von dem Ergebnisse der Untersuchung gemacht werden.

rein staatspolizeilicher Natur, die im Wege einer besonderen Vereinbarung zu lösen ist. Die Reserve Serbiens ist daher unverständlich und wäre bei ihrer vagen, allgemeinen Form geeignet, zu unüberbrückbaren Schwierigkeiten bei Abschluß des zu treffenden Abkommens zu führen.

Unser Verlangen war ganz klar und nicht mißzuverstehen. Wir begeherten:

1. Einleitung einer gerichtlichen Untersuchung gegen die Theilnehmer am Komplote.

2. Die Mitwirkung von k. und k. Organen an den hierauf bezüglichen Erhebungen („recherches“ im Gegensatz zu „enquête judiciaire“).

Es ist uns nicht beigefallen, k. und k. Organe an dem serbischen Gerichtsverfahren teilnehmen zu lassen; sie sollten nur an den polizeilichen Vorhebungen mitwirken, welche das Materiale für die Untersuchung herbeizuschaffen und sicherzustellen hatten.

Wenn die serbische Regierung uns hier mißversteht, so tut sie dies bewußt, denn der Unterschied zwischen „enquête judiciaire“ und den einfachen „recherches“ muß ihr geläufig sein.

Da sie sich jeder Kontrolle des einzuleitenden Verfahrens zu entziehen wünscht, das bei korrekter Durchführung höchst unerwünschte Ergebnisse für sie liefern würde und da sie keine Handhabe besitzt, in plausibler Weise die Mitwirkung unserer Organe am polizeilichen Verfahren abzulehnen (Analogien für solche polizeiliche Inter-

7. Die königliche Regierung hat noch am Abend des Tages, an dem ihr die Note zukam, die Verhaftung des Majors Voislav Tankosić verfügt.

Was aber den Milan Ciganović anbelangt, der ein Angehöriger der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie ist und der bis zum 15. Juni (als Aspirant) bei der Eisenbahndirektion bedienstet war, so konnte dieser bisher nicht ausgeforscht werden, weshalb ein Steckbrief gegen ihn erlassen wurde.

Die k. und k. Regierung wird gebeten, zwecks Durchführung der Untersuchung so bald als möglich die bestehenden Verdachtsgründe und die bei der Untersuchung in Sarajevo gesammelten Schuldbeweise in der üblichen Form bekanntzugeben

8. Die serbische Regierung wird die bestehenden Maßnahmen wegen Unterdrückung des Schmuggelns von Waffen und Explosivstoffen verschärfen und erweitern.

Es ist selbstverständlich, daß sie sofort eine Untersuchung einleiten und jene Beamten des Grenzdienstes in der Linie Šabac—Ložnica streng bestrafen wird, die ihre Pflicht verletzt und die Urheber des Verbrechens die Grenze haben überschreiten lassen.

9. Die königliche Regierung ist gerne bereit, Aufklärung über die

ventionen bestehen in großer Menge), hat sie sich auf einen Standpunkt begeben, der ihrer Ablehnung den Schein der Berechtigung geben und unserem Verlangen den Stempel der Unerfüllbarkeit aufdrücken soll.

Diese Antwort ist hinterhältig.

Ciganović ging laut der von uns veranlaßten Nachforschungen drei Tage nach dem Attentate, als bekannt wurde, daß Ciganović an dem Komplote beteiligt sei, auf Urlaub und begab sich über Auftrag der Polizeipräfektur in Belgrad nach Ribari. Es ist also zunächst unrichtig, daß Ciganović schon am 15./28. Juni aus dem serbischen Staatsdienste schied. Hiezu kommt, daß der Polizeipräfekt von Belgrad, der die Abreise des Ciganović selbst veranlaßt hat und der wußte, wo dieser sich aufhalte, in einem Interview erklärte, ein Mann namens Milan Ciganović existiere in Belgrad nicht.

Der königlich serbischen Regierung müssen die bezüglichen Interviews ganz

Äußerungen zu geben, welche ihre Beamten in Serbien und im Auslande nach dem Attentate in Interviews gemacht haben und die nach der Behauptung der k. und k. Regierung der Monarchie feindselig waren, sobald die k. und k. Regierung die Stellen dieser Ausführungen bezeichnet und bewiesen haben wird, daß diese Äußerungen von den betreffenden Funktionären tatsächlich gemacht worden sind. Die königliche Regierung wird selbst Sorge tragen, die nötigen Beweise und Überführungsmittel hiefür zu sammeln.

10. Die königliche Regierung wird, insofern dies nicht schon in dieser Note geschehen ist, die k. und k. Regierung von der Durchführung der in den vorstehenden Punkten enthaltenen Maßnahmen in Kenntnis setzen, sobald eine dieser Maßregeln angeordnet und durchgeführt wird.

Die königl. serbische Regierung glaubt, daß es im gemeinsamen Interesse liegt, die Lösung dieser Angelegenheit nicht zu überstürzen und ist daher, falls sich die k. und k. Regierung durch diese Antwort nicht für befriedigt erachten sollte, wie immer bereit, eine friedliche Lösung anzunehmen, sei es durch Übertragung der Entscheidung dieser Frage an das internationale Gericht im Haag, sei es durch Überlassung der Entscheidung an die Großmächte, welche an der Ausarbeitung der von der serbischen Regierung am 18./31. März 1909 abgegebenen Erklärung mitgewirkt haben.

genau bekannt sein. Wenn sie von der k. und k. Regierung verlangt, daß diese ihr allerlei Details über diese Interviews liefere und sich eine förmliche Untersuchung hierüber vorbehält, zeigt sie, daß sie auch diese Forderung nicht ernstlich erfüllen will.

35.

**Graf Szögyény an Graf Berchtold.**

Telegramm.

*Berlin, 28. Juli 1914.*

Der von England gemachte Vermittlungsvorschlag, es sollten Deutschland, Italien, England und Frankreich zu einer Konferenz in London zusammentreten, ist deutscherseits mit der Begründung abgelehnt worden, daß es für Deutschland unmöglich sei, seinen Bundesgenossen in seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Serbien vor ein europäisches Gericht zu ziehen.

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36.

**Freiherr von Müller an Graf Berchtold.**

Telegramm.

*Tokio, 28. Juli 1914.*

Die heutige offiziöse japanische Times enthält einen Leitartikel, der am Schlusse besagt, daß Japan mit den drei in Betracht kommenden Großmächten Österreich-Ungarn, Deutschland und Rußland auf bestem Fuß stehe, während es an Serbien in keiner Weise interessiert sei. Im Kriegsfall würde die kaiserliche Regierung selbstverständlich strengste Neutralität bewahren.

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37.

**Graf Berchtold an das königlich serbische Ministerium des Äußern in Belgrad.**

Telegramm.

*Wien, 28. Juli 1914.*

Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'ayant pas répondu d'une manière satisfaisante à la Note qui lui avait été remise par le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade à la date du 23 juillet 1914, le Gouvernement I. et R. se trouve dans la nécessité de pourvoir lui-même à la sauvegarde de ses droits et intérêts et de recourir à cet effet à la force des armes.

L'Autriche-Hongrie se considère donc dès ce moment en état de guerre avec la Serbie.

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**Graf Berchtold an Graf Szögyény in Berlin.****Telegramm.***Wien, 28. Juli 1914.*

Zu Euer Exzellenz Information und zur Mitteilung an den Herrn Staatssekretär:

Ich habe nachstehendes Telegramm des Grafen Mensdorff unterm 27. l. M. erhalten:

„Ich hatte heute Gelegenheit, Sir E. Grey ausführlich darzulegen, daß unsere Aktion nicht Aggression sondern Selbstverteidigung und Selbsterhaltung sei und wir keine territorialen Eroberungen noch Vernichtung serbischer Unabhängigkeit beabsichtigen. Wir wollen gewisse Genugtuung für Vergangenheit und Garantien für die Zukunft.

Hiebei verwertete ich einige Anhaltspunkte aus dem Erlasse Euer Exzellenz an Graf Szápáry.

Sir E. Grey sagte mir, er sei sehr enttäuscht darüber, daß wir die serbische Antwort so behandeln, als wenn sie ganz ablehnend wäre.

Er hätte geglaubt, diese Antwort würde eine Basis liefern, auf welcher die vier anderen Regierungen ein befriedigendes Arrangement ausarbeiten könnten.

Das war seine Idee beim Vorschlag einer Konferenz.

Die Konferenz würde sich versammeln unter der Voraussetzung, daß sowohl Österreich-Ungarn wie Rußland während des Versuches der anderen Mächte, einen befriedigenden Ausweg zu finden, sich jeder militärischen Operation enthalten würden.

(Heutige Erklärung Sir E. Greys im Unterhaus führte Konferenzprojekt aus.) Als er vom Enthalt militärischer Operationen unsrerseits gegen Serbien sprach, machte ich die Bemerkung, ich fürchte, es sei vielleicht schon zu spät. Der Herr Staatssekretär meinte, wenn wir entschlossen sind, unter allen Umständen mit Serbien Krieg zu führen und voraussetzen, daß Rußland ruhig bleiben wird, so nehmen wir ein großes Risiko auf uns. Können wir Rußland dazu bewegen, ruhig zu bleiben, habe er nichts mehr zu sagen. Wenn nicht, sind die Möglichkeiten und Gefahren unberechenbar.

Als Symptom der Beunruhigung sagte er mir, die große englische Flotte, die nach den Manövern in Portsmouth konzentriert wurde und heute auseinander gehen sollte, würde vorläufig dort bleiben. „Wir hätten keine Reserven einberufen, aber nachdem sie versammelt sind, können wir sie in diesem Augenblick nicht nach Hause schicken.“

Seine Idee von Konferenz hat den Zweck, wenn möglich Kollision zwischen den Großmächten hintanzuhalten und er dürfte also auf Isolierung des Konfliktes hinzielen. Falls aber Rußland mobilisiert und Deutschland in Aktion tritt, so fällt die Konferenz von selbst in Bruch.“

Ich glaube Euer Exzellenz gegenüber nicht besonders hervorheben zu sollen, daß der Greysche Konferenzvorschlag, insoweit er sich auf unseren Konflikt mit Serbien bezieht, angesichts des eingetretenen Kriegszustandes durch die Ereignisse überholt erscheint.

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## 39.

**Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London.**

Telegramm.

*Wien, 28. Juli 1914.*

Wir legen das größte Gewicht darauf, daß Sir E. Grey unser Vorgehen gegen Serbien im allgemeinen und speziell unsere Ablehnung der serbischen Antwort in unparteiischer Weise würdige, und ersuche ich Euer Exzellenz daher, Gelegenheit zu nehmen, dem Herrn Staatssekretär das Ihnen auf dem Postwege übermittelte Dossier im Detail und unter Hervorhebung der besonders markanten Stellen auseinanderzusetzen; in demselben Sinne wollen Euer Exzellenz die kritischen Bemerkungen zu der serbischen Note (Text der Note mit unseren Bemerkungen versehen ist gestern an Euer Exzellenz per Post abgegangen) mit Sir E. Grey durchsprechen und ihm klarlegen, daß das serbische Entgegenkommen nur ein scheinbares war, bestimmt, Europa zu täuschen, ohne für die Zukunft irgendeine Garantie zu bieten.

Da die serbische Regierung wußte, daß uns nur eine vorbehaltlose Annahme unserer Forderungen befriedigen könne, ist die serbische Taktik klar zu durchschauen: Serbien akzeptierte, um Eindruck auf die europäische Öffentlichkeit zu machen, mit allerlei Vorbehalten eine Anzahl unserer Forderungen, darauf bauend, daß es nicht in die Lage kommen werde, seine Zusagen zu erfüllen. Ein Hauptgewicht bei der Konversation Euer Exzellenz mit Sir E. Grey wäre auf den Umstand zu legen, daß die allgemeine Mobilisierung der serbischen Armee für den 25. Juli nachmittags 3 Uhr angeordnet wurde, während die Antwort auf unsere Note erst knapp vor Ablauf der Frist, das heißt wenige Minuten vor 6 Uhr, überreicht wurde. Wir hatten vorher keine militärischen Vorbereitungen getroffen, durch die serbische Mobilisierung wurden wir aber zu solchen gezwungen.

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**Graf Berchtold an Graf Szápáry in St. Petersburg.**

Telegramm.

Wien, 28. Juli 1914.

Zu Euer Exzellenz Orientierung und Regelung Ihrer Sprache:

Der kaiserlich russische Botschafter sprach heute bei mir vor, um mir seine Rückkehr aus Rußland von kurzem Urlaube mitzuteilen und gleichzeitig einem telegraphischen Auftrage Herrn Sazonows nachzukommen. Letzterer hätte ihm mitgeteilt, daß er eine längere, freundschaftliche Aussprache mit Euer Exzellenz gehabt hätte (Euer Exzellenz Telegramm vom 27. d. M.), in deren Verlaufe Hochdieselben mit großer Bereitwilligkeit die einzelnen Punkte der serbischen Antwortnote durchgesprochen hätten. Herr Sazonow sei der Ansicht, daß Serbien in weitgehendem Maße unseren Wünschen entgegengekommen sei, daß aber einige Forderungen ihm ganz unannehmbar schienen, was er auch Euer Exzellenz nicht verhehlt habe. Es schiene ihm unter diesen Umständen, daß die serbische Antwortnote geeignet sei, den Ausgangspunkt zu einer Verständigung abzugeben, wozu die russische Regierung gerne die Hand bieten möchte. Herr Sazonow wolle mir daher vorschlagen, daß der Gedankenaustausch mit Euer Exzellenz Fortsetzung finde und Euer Exzellenz diesbezüglich mit Instruktionen versehen werden.

In meiner Entgegnung betonte ich, daß ich auf einen derartigen Vorschlag nicht eingehen könne. Eine Verhandlung über den Wortlaut der von uns als unbefriedigend bezeichneten Antwortnote könnte bei uns niemand verstehen und niemand billigen. Es wäre dies umsoweniger möglich, als sich, wie der Botschafter wisse, bereits eine tiefgehende allgemeine Erregung der öffentlichen Meinung bemächtigt hätte, überdies unsererseits heute der Krieg an Serbien erklärt worden sei.

Auf die Auseinandersetzungen des Botschafters, welche hauptsächlich darin gipfelten, daß wir die durchaus nicht abgeleugnete feindselige Stimmung in Serbien durch eine kriegerische Aktion nicht niederringen, im Gegenteile nur steigern würden, gab ich ihm einige Streiflichter hinsichtlich unseres derzeitigen Verhältnisses zu Serbien, welches es unvermeidlich mache, ganz gegen unseren Willen und ohne jede egoistische Nebenabsicht unserem unruhigen Nachbar mit dem nötigen Nachdrucke unsere ernste Absicht zu zeigen, nicht länger eine von der Regierung geduldete, gegen den Bestand der Monarchie gerichtete Bewegung zuzulassen. Die Haltung Serbiens nach Empfang unserer Note sei übrigens nicht darnach gewesen, eine friedliche Beilegung zu ermöglichen, indem Serbien, noch bevor es uns seine ungenügende Antwort übergeben ließ, die allgemeine Mobilisierung angeordnet und schon dadurch uns gegenüber einen feindseligen Akt vorgenommen habe. Trotzdem hätten wir noch drei Tage zugewartet.

Gestern seien nun serbischerseits gegen uns die Feindseligkeiten an der ungarischen Grenze eröffnet worden. Dadurch sei uns die Möglichkeit benommen, bei unserer Serbien gegenüber bewiesenen Langmut weiter zu beharren. Die Herbeiführung einer gründlichen aber friedlichen Sanierung unseres Verhältnisses zu Serbien sei uns nunmehr unmöglich gemacht worden und wir seien gezwungen, den serbischen Provokationen in der Form entgegenzutreten, die unter den gegebenen Umständen der Würde der Monarchie allein entspreche.

## 41.

**Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London.**

Telegramm.

Wien, 28. Juli 1914.

Der englische Botschafter, welcher heute bei mir vorsprach, hat mir auftraggemäß den Standpunkt Sir E. Greys zu unserem Konflikte mit Serbien in folgender Weise auseinandergesetzt:

Die englische Regierung habe mit lebhaftem Interesse den bisherigen Verlauf der Krise verfolgt und lege Wert darauf, uns zu versichern, daß sie Sympathien für unseren Standpunkt hege und unsere Griefs gegen Serbien vollkommen verstehe.

Wenn somit England keinen Grund habe, unseren Streitfall mit Serbien an sich zum Gegenstande besonderer Präokkupation zu machen, so könne derselbe doch nicht der Aufmerksamkeit des Londoner Kabinetts entgehen, weil dieser Konflikt weitere Kreise ziehen und dadurch den europäischen Frieden in Frage stellen könne.

Nur aus diesem für England in Betracht kommenden Grunde habe sich Sir E. Grey veranlaßt gesehen, eine Einladung an die Regierungen jener Staaten zu richten, die an diesem Konflikte nicht näher interessiert seien (Deutschland, Italien und Frankreich), um gemeinschaftlich mit ihnen im Wege fortlaufenden Gedankenaustausches die Möglichkeiten zu prüfen und zu erörtern, wie die Differenz möglichst rasch ausgeglichen werden könnte. Nach dem Muster der Londoner Konferenz während der letzten Balkankrise sollten, nach Anschauung des englischen Staatssekretärs, die Londoner Botschafter der genannten Staaten sich zu dem angegebenen Zwecke in fortlaufendem Kontakte mit ihm halten. Sir E. Grey habe bereits von den betreffenden Regierungen sehr freundschaftlich gehaltene Antworten erhalten, worin dieselben dem angeregten Gedanken zustimmen. Gegenwärtig wäre es der Wunsch des Herrn Staatssekretärs, wenn möglich, den Ausbruch der Feindseligkeiten zwischen Österreich-Ungarn

und Serbien in elfter Stunde zu verhindern, wenn dies aber nicht tunlich wäre, doch vorzubeugen, daß es zu einem blutigen Zusammenstoße komme, eventuell dadurch, daß die Serben sich zurückziehen könnten, ohne den Kampf aufzunehmen. Die von Serbien an uns eingelangte Antwort scheine die Möglichkeit zu bieten, eine Basis für eine Verständigung abzugeben. England sei gerne bereit, hiebei in unserem Sinne und nach unseren Wünschen seinen Einfluß zur Geltung zu bringen.

Ich dankte dem Herrn Botschafter für die Mitteilung Sir E. Greys und erwiderte ihm, daß ich der Auffassung des Herrn Staatssekretärs volle Würdigung zu zollen wisse. Sein Standpunkt sei aber von dem meinigen naturgemäß verschieden, da England an dem Streitfalle zwischen uns und Serbien nicht direkt interessiert sei und der Herr Staatssekretär wohl kaum gründlich orientiert sein könne über die schwerwiegende Bedeutung der zu lösenden Fragen für die Monarchie. Wenn Sir E. Grey von der Möglichkeit rede, den Ausbruch der Feindseligkeiten zu verhindern, so komme dieser Gedanke zu spät, da gestern bereits serbischerseits auf unsere Grenzsoldaten geschossen und heute von uns der Krieg an Serbien erklärt wurde. Was die Idee eines Transigierens auf Grund der serbischen Antwortnote anbelangt, müsse ich eine solche ablehnen. Wir hätten die integrale Annahme gefordert, Serbien habe sich durch Winkelzüge aus der Verlegenheit zu ziehen gesucht. Uns seien diese serbischen Methoden nur zu gut bekannt.

Sir Maurice Bunsen könne unseren Standpunkt durch seine hier erworbenen Lokalkenntnisse gewiß richtig einschätzen und werde in der Lage sein, Sir E. Grey hierüber ein genaues Bild zu geben.

Insoferne Sir E. Grey dem europäischen Frieden dienen wolle, würde er gewiß nicht auf Widerstand bei uns stoßen. Er müsse jedoch bedenken, daß der europäische Friede nicht dadurch gerettet würde, daß sich Großmächte hinter Serbien stellen und für dessen Straffreiheit eintreten. Denn selbst wenn wir auf einen solchen Ausgleichsversuch eingehen wollten, würde dadurch Serbien nur umso mehr ermutigt, auf dem bisherigen Pfade weiterzugehen, was den Frieden binnen der aller kürzesten Zeit abermals in Frage stellen möchte.

Der englische Botschafter versicherte mich zum Schlusse, daß er unseren Standpunkt vollkommen verstehe, andererseits aber bedauere, daß unter diesen Umständen der Wunsch der englischen Regierung, einen Ausgleich zu erzielen, derzeit keine Aussicht auf Verwirklichung habe. Er hoffe, mit mir weiterhin in Kontakt bleiben zu dürfen, was ihm wegen der großen Gefahr einer europäischen Konflagration von besonderem Werte wäre.

Ich erwiderte, ich stünde dem Herrn Botschafter jederzeit zur Verfügung, womit unsere Konversation schloß.

**Graf Berchtold an Graf Szűgyény in Berlin.**

Telegramm.

*Wien, am 28. Juli 1914.*

Ich ersuche Euer Exzellenz sich sofort zum Herrn Reichkanzler oder Staatssekretär zu begeben und ihm folgendes in meinem Namen mitzuteilen:

Nach übereinstimmenden Nachrichten aus St. Petersburg, Kiew, Warschau, Moskau und Odessa trifft Rußland umfangreiche militärische Vorbereitungen. Herr Sazonow hat zwar ebenso wie der russische Kriegsminister unter Ehrenwort versichert, daß eine Mobilisierung bisher nicht angeordnet wurde, der letztere hat jedoch dem deutschen Militär-Attaché mitgeteilt, daß die gegen Österreich-Ungarn gelegenen Militärbezirke Kiew, Odessa, Moskau und Kasan mobilisiert werden würden, wenn unsere Truppen die serbische Grenze überschritten.

Unter diesen Umständen möchte ich das Berliner Kabinett dringend ersuchen, der Erwägung näher zu treten, ob nicht Rußland in freundschaftlicher Weise darauf aufmerksam gemacht werden sollte, daß die Mobilisierung obiger Bezirke einer Bedrohung Österreich-Ungarns gleichkäme und daher, falls sie tatsächlich erfolgt, sowohl von der Monarchie als vom verbündeten Deutschen Reiche mit den weitestgehenden militärischen Gegenmaßnahmen beantwortet werden müßte.

Um Rußland ein eventuelles Einlenken zu erleichtern, schiene es uns angezeigt, daß ein solcher Schritt vorerst von Deutschland allein unternommen werden sollte; doch wären wir natürlich bereit, den Schritt auch zu zweien zu machen.

Eine deutliche Sprache schiene mir in diesem Augenblick das wirksamste Mittel, um Rußland die ganze Tragweite eines drohenden Verhaltens zum Bewußtsein zu bringen.

**Graf Berchtold an Graf Szűgyény in Berlin.**

Telegramm.

*Wien, 28. Juli 1914.*

Der kaiserlich deutsche Botschafter hat hier mitgeteilt, daß Sir E. Grey sich mit der Bitte an die deutsche Regierung gewendet habe, sie möge ihren Einfluß bei der k. u. k. Regierung geltend machen, daß diese die Antwort aus

Belgrad entweder als genügend betrachte oder als Grundlage für Besprechungen unter den Kabinetten akzeptiere.

Herr von Tschirschky war beauftragt, den englischen Vorschlag dem Wiener Kabinette zur Erwägung zu unterbreiten.

## 44.

**Graf Berchtold an die k. u. k. Botschafter in St. Petersburg, London, Paris und Rom.**

Telegramm.

Wien, 29. Juli 1914.

Zu Euer Exzellenz Information:

Ich habe heute dem kaiserlich deutschen Botschafter das nachfolgende Memoire in Beantwortung eines von demselben bei mir unternommenen Schrittes zukommen lassen:

**Memoire.**

Die k. u. k. Regierung hat mit dem ergebensten Danke von der Mitteilung Kenntnis genommen, welche ihr der Herr kaiserliche deutsche Botschafter am 28. I. M. über das Ersuchen des englischen Kabinettes gemacht hat, es möge die kaiserlich deutsche Regierung ihren Einfluß beim Wiener Kabinette geltend machen, damit dieses die Antwort aus Belgrad entweder als genügend betrachte oder aber als Grundlage für Besprechungen annehme. Was die Aussprache des Herrn englischen Staatssekretärs zu Fürst Lichnowsky betrifft, möchte die k. u. k. Regierung zunächst darauf aufmerksam machen, daß die serbische Antwortnote keineswegs, wie dies Sir E. Grey anzunehmen scheint, eine Zustimmung zu allen unseren Forderungen mit einer einzigen Ausnahme enthalte, daß vielmehr in den meisten Punkten Vorbehalte formuliert sind, welche den Wert der gemachten Zugeständnisse wesentlich herabdrücken. Die Ablehnung betreffe aber gerade jene Punkte, welche einige Garantie für die faktische Erreichung des angestrebten Zweckes enthalten.

Die k. u. k. Regierung kann ihre Überraschung über die Annahme nicht unterdrücken, als ob ihre Aktion gegen Serbien Rußland und den russischen Einfluß am Balkan treffen wolle, denn dies hätte zur Voraussetzung, daß die gegen die Monarchie gerichtete Propaganda nicht allein serbisch, sondern russischen Ursprungs sei. Wir sind bisher vielmehr von der Auffassung aus-

gegangen, daß das offizielle Rußland diesen der Monarchie feindlichen Tendenzen fernstehe und richtet sich unsere gegenwärtige Aktion ausschließlich gegen Serbien, während unsere Gefühle für Rußland, wie wir Sir E. Grey versichern können, durchaus freundschaftliche sind.

Im übrigen muß die k. u. k. Regierung darauf hinweisen, daß sie zu ihrem lebhaften Bedauern nicht mehr in der Lage ist, zu der serbischen Antwortnote im Sinne der englischen Anregung Stellung zu nehmen, da im Zeitpunkte des hier gemachten deutschen Schrittes der Kriegszustand zwischen der Monarchie und Serbien bereits eingetreten war und die serbische Antwortnote demnach durch die Ereignisse bereits überholt ist.

Die k. u. k. Regierung erlaubt sich bei diesem Anlasse darauf aufmerksam zu machen, daß die königlich serbische Regierung noch vor Erteilung ihrer Antwort mit der Mobilisierung der serbischen Streitkräfte vorgegangen ist und daß sie auch nachher drei Tage verstreichen ließ, ohne die Geneigtheit kundzugeben, den Standpunkt ihrer Antwortnote zu verlassen, worauf unsererseits die Kriegserklärung erfolgte.

Wenn im übrigen das englische Kabinett sich bereit findet, seinen Einfluß auf die russische Regierung im Sinne der Erhaltung des Friedens zwischen den Großmächten und der Lokalisierung des uns durch die jahrelangen serbischen Umtriebe aufgezwungenen Krieges geltend zu machen, so kann dies seitens der k. u. k. Regierung nur begrüßt werden.

## 45.

**Graf Szécsen an Graf Berchtold. .**

Telegramm.

*Paris, 29. Juli 1914.*

Frankreich trifft unzweifelhaft gewisse militärische Vorbereitungen, wie dies von den Zeitungen vielleicht mit gewisser Übertreibung verkündet wird.

Wie ich streng vertraulich erfahre, ist Baron Schoen beauftragt, diese Vorbereitungen heute bei Herrn Viviani zur Sprache zu bringen und darauf hinzuweisen, daß Deutschland unter diesen Umständen gezwungen werden könnte, ähnliche Maßnahmen zu treffen, die natürlich nicht geheim bleiben könnten und deren Bekanntwerden in der Öffentlichkeit große Aufregung verursachen würde. So könnten beide Länder, trotzdem sie nur den Frieden anstreben, zu einer wenigstens teilweisen Mobilisierung gedrängt werden, was gefährlich wäre.

Ferner wird Baron Schoen auftragsgemäß erklären, Deutschland wünsche lebhaft, daß der Konflikt zwischen uns und Serbien lokalisiert bleibe, wobei Deutschland auf die Unterstützung seitens Frankreichs zähle.



## 46.

**Graf Szögyény an Graf Berchtold.****Telegramm.***Berlin, 29. Juli 1914.*

Bereits Sonntag hat die deutsche Regierung in St. Petersburg erklärt, daß die russische Mobilisierung die deutsche Mobilisierung zur Folge hätte.

Darauf erfolgte russischerseits die mit meinem Telegramme vom 27. d. Mts. gemeldete Antwort. Hierauf wurde heute neuerdings nach St. Petersburg telegraphiert, daß durch das weitere Fortschreiten der russischen Mobilisierungsmaßnahmen Deutschland veranlaßt werden könnte, zu mobilisieren.

## 47.

**Graf Szápáry an Graf Berchtold.****Telegramm.***St. Petersburg, 29. Juli 1914.*

Da ich vom deutschen Botschafter erfahren habe, Herr Sazonow zeige sich über Euer Exzellenz angebliche Abgeneigtheit, Gedankenaustausch mit Rußland fortzusetzen und über vermeintlich weit über das notwendige Maß ausgedehnte und daher gegen Rußland gerichtete Mobilisierung Österreich-Ungarns sehr aufgeregt, suchte ich den Herrn Minister auf, um einige mir vorhanden scheinende Unklarheiten zu beheben.

Der Herr Minister begann damit zu konstatieren, daß Österreich-Ungarn kategorisch weiteren Gedankenaustausch ablehne. Ich stellte auf Grund Euer Exzellenz Telegrammes vom 28. d. M. richtig, daß Euer Exzellenz es zwar abgelehnt hätten, nach allem, was vorgefallen, über die Notentexte und den österreichisch-ungarisch-serbischen Konflikt überhaupt zu diskutieren, daß ich aber feststellen müsse, in der Lage gewesen zu sein, eine viel breitere Basis des Gedankenaustausches dadurch anzuregen, daß ich erklärte, wir wünschten keine russischen Interessen zu verletzen, hätten nicht die Absicht, natürlich unter der Voraussetzung, daß der Konflikt zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und Serbien lokalisiert bleibe, serbisches Territorium an uns zu bringen und gedächten auch die Souveränität Serbiens nicht anzutasten. Ich sei überzeugt, daß Euer Exzellenz über österreichisch-ungarische und russische Interessen immer bereit sein würden, mit St. Petersburg Fühlung zu nehmen.

Herr Sazonow meinte, in territorialer Hinsicht habe er sich überzeugen lassen, aber was die Souveränität anbelangt, müsse er den Standpunkt festhalten, die Aufzwingung unserer Bedingungen sei ein Vasallentum. Dieses aber verstoße gegen das Gleichgewicht am Balkan und letzteres sei das in Frage kommende russische Interesse. Nun kam er wieder auf die Diskussion über die Note, die Aktion Sir E. Greys etc. zurück und wollte mir neuerlich nahelegen, daß man unser legitimes Interesse zwar anerkenne und voll befriedigen wolle, daß dies aber in eine für Serbien annehmbare Form gekleidet werden sollte. Ich meinte, dies sei kein russisches, sondern ein serbisches Interesse, worauf Herr Sazonow geltend machte, russische Interessen seien in diesem Falle eben serbische, so daß ich dem Circulus vitiosus durch Übergang auf ein anderes Thema ein Ende machte.

Ich erwähnte, ich hätte gehört, man sei in Rußland beunruhigt, weil wir für die Aktion gegen Serbien acht Korps mobilisiert haben. Herr Sazonow bestätigte mir, daß nicht er, der hievon gar nichts gewußt, sondern der Generalstabschef diese Bedenken geäußert habe. Ich suchte dem Herrn Minister darzulegen, daß jeder Unbefangene sich leicht überzeugen könne, unsere südlichen Korps könnten keine Bedrohung für Rußland bilden.

Ich bedeutete dem Herrn Minister, daß es gut wäre, wenn sein kaiserlicher Herr über die wahre Situation informiert würde, umso mehr als es dringend geboten sei, wenn man den Frieden wolle, dem militärischen Lizitieren, welches sich jetzt auf Grund falscher Nachrichten einzustellen drohe, ein rasches Ende zu bereiten. Herr Sazonow meinte sehr charakteristischerweise, er könne dies dem Generalstabschef mitteilen, denn dieser sehe Seine Majestät alle Tage.

Der Herr Minister sagte mir weiter, es werde heute ein Ukas unterzeichnet, welcher eine Mobilisierung in ziemlich weitem Umfang anordne. Er könne mir aber auf das alleroffiziellste erklären, daß diese Truppen nicht dazu bestimmt seien, über uns herzufallen; sie würden nur Gewehr bei Fuß bereit stehen für den Fall, als Rußlands Balkaninteressen gefährdet würden. Eine note explicative werde dies feststellen, denn es handle sich nur um eine Vorsichtsmaßregel, die Kaiser Nikolaus gerechtfertigt gefunden habe, da wir, die wir ohnedies den Vorteil rascherer Mobilisierung hätten, nunmehr auch den so großen Vorsprung hätten. Ich machte Herrn Sazonow in ernsten Worten auf den Eindruck aufmerksam, den eine solche Maßregel bei uns erwecken werde. Ich müsse bezweifeln, daß die note explicative diesen Eindruck zu mildern geeignet sein werde, worauf der Herr Minister sich nochmals in Versicherungen über die Harmlosigkeit (!) dieser Verfügung erging.

48.

**Graf Berchtold an Graf Szögyény in Berlin.**

**Telegramm.**

*Wien, 29. Juli 1914.*

Soeben wurde mir von Herrn von Tschirschky mitgeteilt, der russische Botschafter habe ihm gesagt, daß er von seiner Regierung verständigt worden sei, daß die Militärbezirke von Kiew, Odessa, Moskau und Kasan mobilisiert würden. Rußland sei in seiner Ehre als Großmacht gekränkt und genötigt, entsprechende Maßnahmen zu ergreifen. Die russische Mobilisierung wird von unseren galizischen Korpskommanden bestätigt und wurde, einer Meldung des k. u. k. Militärattachés zufolge, heute auch von Herrn Sazonow dem deutschen Botschafter gegenüber nicht mehr geleugnet.

Ich ersuche Euer Exzellenz, vorstehendes unverzüglich zur Kenntnis der deutschen Regierung zu bringen und hiebei zu betonen, daß, wenn die russischen Mobilisierungsmaßnahmen nicht ohne Säumen eingestellt werden, unsere allgemeine Mobilisierung aus militärischen Gründen unverzüglich veranlaßt werden müßte.

Als letzter Versuch, den europäischen Krieg hintanzuhalten, hielte ich es für wünschenswert, daß unser und der deutsche Vertreter in St. Petersburg eventuell auch in Paris sogleich angewiesen werden, den dortigen Regierungen in freundschaftlicher Weise zu erklären, daß die Fortsetzung der russischen Mobilisierung Gegenmaßregeln in Deutschland und Österreich-Ungarn zur Folge haben würde, die zu ernststen Konsequenzen führen müßten.

Euer Exzellenz wollen hinzufügen, daß wir uns selbstverständlich in unserer kriegesischen Aktion in Serbien nicht beirren lassen werden.

Die k. u. k. Botschafter in St. Petersburg und Paris erhalten unter einem die Weisung, die vorerwähnte Erklärung abzugeben, sobald ihr deutscher Kollege analoge Instruktionen erhält.

49.

**Graf Berchtold an Graf Szápáry in St. Petersburg.**

**Telegramm.**

*Wien, 30. Juli 1914.*

Antwort auf Euer Exzellenz Telegramm vom 29. Juli.

Ich bin selbstverständlich nach wie vor bereit, die einzelnen Punkte unserer durch die Ereignisse übrigens bereits überholten an Serbien gerichteten Note

durch Euer Exzellenz Herrn Sazonow erläutern zu lassen. Auch würde ich besonderen Wert darauf legen, bei dieser Gelegenheit der mir durch Herrn Schebeko verdolmetschten Anregung entsprechend auch die unsere Beziehungen zu Rußland direkt betreffenden Fragen einer vertrauensvollen und freundschaftlichen Aussprache zu unterziehen, wovon sich eine Behebung der in diesem Belange bedauerlicherweise bestehenden Unklarheiten und Sicherstellung der so wünschenswerten friedlichen Entwicklung unserer Nachbarverhältnisse erhoffen ließe.

## 50.

**Graf Berchtold an Graf Szápáry in St. Petersburg.**

Telegramm.

Wien, 30. Juli 1914.

Zu Eurer Exzellenz Orientierung und Regelung Ihrer Sprache:

Ich habe heute Herrn Schebeko auseinandergesetzt, es sei mir gemeldet worden, daß Herr Sazonow über meine glatte Ablehnung seiner Proposition bezüglich Aussprache mit Euer Exzellenz peinlich berührt sei, wie nicht minder darüber, daß kein Gedankenaustausch zwischen mir und Herrn Schebeko stattgefunden habe.

Bezüglich des ersteren Punktes hatte ich Euer Exzellenz bereits telegraphisch freigestellt, auch weiterhin seitens Herrn Sazonows etwa gewünschte Erläuterungen bezüglich der Note — welche übrigens durch den Kriegsausbruch überholt erscheint — zu geben. Es könne sich dies allerdings nur im Rahmen nachträglicher Aufklärungen bewegen, da es niemals in unserer Absicht gelegen war, von den Punkten der Note etwas abhandeln zu lassen. Auch hätte ich Euer Exzellenz ermächtigt, unsere speziellen Beziehungen zu Rußland mit Herrn Sazonow freundschaftlich zu besprechen.

Daß Herr Sazonow sich darüber beklagen konnte, es hätte kein Gedankenaustausch zwischen Herrn Schebeko und mir stattgefunden, muß auf einen Irrtum beruhen, da wir — Herr Schebeko und ich — vor zwei Tagen die aktuellen Fragen durchgesprochen hatten, was mir der Herr Botschafter mit dem Bemerken bestätigte, er habe Herrn Sazonow in ausführlicher Weise über diese Unterredung referiert.

Herr Schebeko führte dann aus, warum man in St. Petersburg unser Vorgehen gegen Serbien mit solcher Besorgnis betrachte. Wir seien eine Großmacht, die gegen den kleinen serbischen Staat vorgehe, ohne daß man in St. Petersburg etwas darüber wisse, was wir mit demselben beabsichtigten, ob wir dessen Souveränität tangieren, ihn ganz niederwerfen oder gar zertreten wollten.

**D**urch historische und andere Bande mit Rußland verbunden, könne letzterem das weitere Schicksal Serbiens nicht gleichgültig sein. Man habe sich in St. Petersburg angelegen sein lassen, mit allem Nachdruck auf Belgrad einzuwirken, daß es alle unsere Forderungen erfülle, allerdings zu einer Zeit, wo man noch nicht wissen konnte, was für Forderungen wir nachmals gestellt. Aber selbst bezüglich dieser Forderungen würde man alles einsetzen, um wenigstens das Mögliche durchzubringen.

Ich erinnerte den Herrn Botschafter daran, daß wir wiederholt betont hätten, wir wollten keine Eroberungspolitik in Serbien treiben, auch dessen Souveränität nicht antasten, bloß einen Zustand herstellen, der uns Sicherheit biete gegen Beunruhigung seitens Serbiens. Hieran knüpfte ich eine längere Erörterung unseres unleidlichen Verhältnisses zu Serbien. Auch gab ich Herrn Schebeko deutlich zu verstehen, in welch hohem Maße die russische Diplomatie, wenn auch gewiß gegen den Willen der leitenden Faktoren, an diesen Zuständen schuld sei.

Im weiteren Verlaufe unserer Unterredung erwähnte ich die nunmehr zu meiner Kenntnis gelangte russische Mobilisierung. Nachdem sich dieselbe auf die Militärbezirke Odessa, Kiew, Moskau und Kasan beschränke, trage dieselbe einen hostilen Charakter gegen die Monarchie. Was der Grund hievon sei, wisse ich nicht, da ja gar kein Streitfall zwischen uns und Rußland existiere. Österreich-Ungarn habe ausschließlich gegen Serbien mobilisiert, gegen Rußland nicht einen Mann, was allein aus dem Umstande zu ersehen sei, daß das I., X. und XI. Korps nicht mobilisiert worden seien. Bei dem Umstande jedoch, daß Rußland offensichtlich gegen uns mobilisiere, müßten auch wir unsere Mobilisierung erweitern, wobei ich jedoch ausdrücklich erwähnen wolle, daß diese Maßnahme selbstverständlich keinen feindseligen Charakter gegen Rußland trage und sich lediglich als notwendige Gegenmaßnahme gegen die russische Mobilisierung darstelle.

Ich bat Herrn Schebeko, dies seiner Regierung zu melden, was er mir zusagte.

## 51.

### Graf Berchtold an die k. u. k. Botschafter in London und St. Petersburg.

Telegramm.

Wien, 31. Juli 1914.

Ich telegraphiere wie folgt nach Berlin:

Herr von Tschirschky hat auftragsgemäß gestern hier Mitteilung über eine Unterredung zwischen Sir E. Grey und Fürst Lichnowsky gemacht, in welcher der englische Staatssekretär dem deutschen Botschafter das Nachfolgende eröffnete:

„Sazonow habe die englische Regierung wissen lassen, daß er nach der Kriegserklärung Österreich-Ungarns an Serbien nicht mehr in der Lage sei, mit Österreich-Ungarn direkt zu verhandeln und daher die Bitte ausspreche, England möge seine Vermittlung wieder aufnehmen. Als Voraussetzung betrachte die russische Regierung die vorläufige Einstellung der Feindseligkeiten.

Zu dieser russischen Eröffnung bemerkte Sir E. Grey zu Fürst Lichnowsky, England denke an eine Vermittlung à quatre und halte dieselbe für dringend geboten, wenn nicht ein Weltkrieg entstehen solle.

Ich ersuche Euer Exzellenz, dem Herrn Staatssekretär, für die uns durch Herrn von Tschirschky gemachten Mitteilungen verbindlichst zu danken und ihm zu erklären, daß wir trotz der Änderung, die in der Situation seither durch die Mobilisierung Rußlands eingetreten sei, gerne bereit seien, dem Vorschlag Sir E. Greys, zwischen uns und Serbien zu vermitteln, näher zu treten.

Die Voraussetzungen unserer Annahme seien jedoch natürlich, daß unsere militärische Aktion gegen Serbien einstweilen ihren Fortgang nehme und daß das englische Kabinett die russische Regierung bewege, die gegen uns gerichtete russische Mobilisierung zum Stillstand zu bringen, in welchem Falle selbstverständlich auch wir die uns durch dieselbe aufgezwungenen defensiven militärischen Gegenmaßnahmen in Galizien sofort wieder rückgängig machen würden.

## 52.

**Graf Szápáry an Graf Berchtold.**

Telegramm.

*St. Petersburg, 31. Juli 1914.*

Heute früh Ordre zur allgemeinen Mobilisierung der gesamten Armee und Flotte erfolgt.

## 53.

**Graf Berchtold an die k. und k. Missionen.**

Telegramm.

*Wien, 31. Juli 1914.*

Zu Euer etc. Information und Verwertung bei dortiger Regierung:

Da von der russischen Regierung Mobilisierungen an unserer Grenze angeordnet worden sind, sehen wir uns zu militärischen Maßnahmen in Galizien gezwungen.

Diese Maßnahmen sind rein defensiven Charakters und lediglich unter dem Drucke der russischen Vorkehrungen erfolgt, die wir sehr bedauern, da wir selbst keinerlei aggressive Absichten gegen Rußland haben und die Fortdauer der bisherigen guten nachbarlichen Beziehungen wünschen.

Die der Situation entsprechenden Pourparlers zwischen dem Wiener und St. Petersburger Kabinett, von denen wir uns eine allseitige Beruhigung erhoffen, nehmen inzwischen ihren Fortgang.

## 54.

## Graf Szécsen an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm.

Paris, 31. Juli 1914.

Deutscher Botschafter hat im Auftrage seiner Regierung hier erklärt, daß, wenn angeordnete russische allgemeine Mobilisierung nicht binnen 12 Stunden eingestellt wird, Deutschland gleichfalls mobilisieren werde. Gleichzeitig fragte Baron Schoen, ob Frankreich im Falle deutsch-russischen Krieges neutral bleibe. Diesbezügliche Antwort binnen 18 Stunden erbeten. Termin läuft morgen, Samstag, 1 Uhr nachmittags ab.

## 55.

## Graf Szápáry an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm.

St. Petersburg, 31. Juli 1914.

Euer Exzellenz Telegramm vom 30. d. M. erhalten.

Hochdieselben werden meinem Telegramm vom 29. d. M. entnommen haben, daß ich, ohne einen Auftrag abzuwarten, Konversation mit Sazonow nahezu auf der mir nunmehr aufgetragenen Grundlage wieder aufgenommen habe, ohne daß sich die beiderseitigen Standpunkte wesentlich genähert hätten.

Inzwischen hat sich allerdings aus den vom deutschen Botschafter mit russischem Minister des Äußern geführten Konversationen ergeben, daß Rußland sich selbst mit einer formellen Erklärung, Österreich-Ungarn werde

weder das serbische Territorium schmälern noch die serbische Souveränität antasten, noch russische Balkan- oder sonstige Interessen verletzen, nicht zufriedengeben würde, und ist auch seither russischerseits die allgemeine Mobilisierung angeordnet worden.

## 56.

**Graf Szápáry an Graf Berchtold.**

Telegramm.

*St. Petersburg, 1. August 1914.*

Bei einem heutigen Besuche legte ich Herrn Sazonow dar, daß ich Instruktionen erhalten hätte, ich müsse aber vorausschicken, die augenblickliche, durch die russische allgemeine Mobilisierung in Wien geschaffene Lage sei mir gänzlich unbekannt, so daß ich von dieser bei Verdolmetschung meiner noch vorher abgegangenen Weisungen vollkommen absehen müsse. Ich sagte, daß die beiden Weisungen Euer Exzellenz von dem Mißverständnis handeln, als ob wir weitere Verhandlungen mit Rußland abgelehnt hätten. Dies sei, wie ich ihm schon ohne Auftrag versichert hätte, ein Irrtum. Euer Exzellenz seien nicht nur gerne bereit, mit Rußland auf breitester Basis zu verhandeln, sondern auch speziell geneigt, unseren Notentext einer Besprechung zu unterziehen, sofern es sich um dessen Interpretation handle.

Ich betonte, wie sehr die Instruktionen Euer Exzellenz an mich einen weiteren Beweis guten Willens böten, wenn ich ihm auch noch einmal in Erinnerung rufen müsse, daß mir die durch die seitherige allgemeine Mobilisierung geschaffene Situation unbekannt sei, ich könne nur hoffen, daß uns der Gang der Ereignisse nicht schon zu weit geführt habe; jedenfalls hätte ich es für meine Pflicht gehalten, im gegenwärtigen hochernsten Augenblicke den guten Willen der k. u. k. Regierung nochmals zu dokumentieren. Herr Sazonow erwiderte, er nehme von diesem Beweise guten Willens mit Befriedigung Akt; doch möchte er mich aufmerksam machen, daß ihm Unterhandlungen in St. Petersburg aus naheliegenden Gründen weniger Erfolg versprechend erschienen als solche auf dem neutralen Londoner Terrain. Ich erwiderte, Euer Exzellenz gingen, wie ich schon dargelegt hätte, vom Gesichtspunkte einer direkten Fühlungnahme in St. Petersburg aus, so daß ich nicht in der Lage sei, zu seiner Anregung bezüglich Londons Stellung zu nehmen, doch würde ich Euer Exzellenz hievon Meldung erstatten.



57.

**Graf Szögyény an Graf Berchtold.**

Telegramm.

*Berlin, 2. August 1914.*

Der Herr Staatssekretär sagte mir soeben, daß von Rußland keine Antwort auf deutsche Anfrage eingelangt sei.

Russische Truppen haben die deutsche Grenze bei Schwidden (südöstlich Bialla) überschritten.

Rußland hat daher Deutschland angegriffen.

Deutschland betrachtet sich daher im Kriegszustande mit Rußland.

Russischer Botschafter hat heute vormittags Pässe zugestellt erhalten; er wird voraussichtlich noch heute abreisen.

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58.

**Graf Mensdorff an Graf Berchtold.**

Telegramm.

*London, 4. August 1914.*

Ich habe eben Sir E. Grey gesehen. Englische Regierung hat an Deutschland Ultimatum wegen Belgiens gerichtet, erwartet Antwort heute um Mitternacht.

Sir E. Grey, sagte mir, er sehe vorläufig keine Veranlassung zu einer Mitteilung an die k. u. k. Regierung und keine Ursache, mit uns in Konflikt zu geraten, solange wir nicht im Kriegszustande mit Frankreich sind. Jedenfalls hoffe er, daß wir keine Feindseligkeiten eröffnen würden ohne vorherige Formalität der Kriegserklärung. Er wird Sir M. de Bunsen nicht abberufen.

Falls wir mit Frankreich im Kriegszustande wären, würde es für England als Bundesgenosse Frankreichs wohl schwer sein, mit demselben im Atlantischen Meere zu kooperieren und nicht im Mittelländischen Meer.

59.

**Graf Berchtold an Graf Szápáry in St. Petersburg.**

Telegramm.

*Wien, 5. August 1914.*

Ich ersuche Euer Exzellenz, dem dortigen Minister des Äußern folgende Note zu übergeben:

„D'ordre de son Gouvernement, le soussigné Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a l'honneur de notifier à Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Russie ce qui suit:

Vu l'attitude menaçante prise par la Russie dans le conflit entre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et la Serbie, et en présence du fait qu'en suite de ce conflit la Russie, d'après une communication du Cabinet de Berlin, a cru devoir ouvrir les hostilités contre l'Allemagne et que celle-ci se trouve, par conséquent, en état de guerre avec la dite Puissance, l'Autriche-Hongrie se considère également en état de guerre avec la Russie.“

Nach Überreichung dieser Note wollen Euer Exzellenz sich die Ausfertigung der Pässe erbitten und ungesäumt mit dem gesamten Botschaftspersonal, ausgenommen etwa zurückzulassende Organe, abreisen. Herrn von Schebeko werden gleichzeitig unsererseits die Pässe zugestellt.

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60.

**Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London.**

Telegramm.

*Wien, 6. August 1914.*

Erhalten Euer Exzellenz Telegramm vom 4. l. M.

Ich ersuche Hochdieselben Sir E. Grey zu versichern, daß wir keinesfalls ohne vorhergehende formelle Kriegserklärung Feindseligkeiten gegen England eröffnen würden, aber auch erwarteten, daß England uns gegenüber ein analoges Verhalten beobachten und vor Eintritt des formellen Kriegszustandes keine hostilen Akte gegen uns unternehmen werde.

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**Graf Szécsen an Graf Berchtold.**

**Telegramm.**

*Paris, 8. August 1914.*

Ministre des Affaires Etrangères m'a fait appeler pour me dire que, selon des renseignements positifs qui lui seraient parvenus, le corps d'armée d'Innsbruck serait transporté à la frontière française. Monsieur Doumergue désire savoir d'urgence si cette nouvelle est exacte et au cas affirmatif quelles sont les intentions du Gouvernement I. et R. La France se trouvant en guerre avec l'Allemagne envoi de nos troupes à la frontière française n'est pas compatible selon l'avis du Ministre avec état de paix existant entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et France. Monsieur Dumaine est chargé d'une démarche semblable auprès de Votre Excellence.

**Graf Berchtold an Graf Szécsen in Paris.**

**Telegramm.**

*Wien, 9. August 1914.*

Mit Bezug auf Euer Exzellenz Telegramm vom 8. d. M.

Nach mit Generalstab genommener Rücksprache ermächtige ich Euer Exzellenz, französischer Regierung zu erklären, daß Nachrichten über Teilnahme unserer Truppen an deutsch-französischem Krieg vollständig erfunden. Analog habe ich mich Herrn Dumaine gegenüber ausgesprochen.

**Graf Szécsen an Graf Berchtold.**

**Telegramm.**

*Paris, 10. August 1914.*

Reçu télégramme du 9 août. Ai immédiatement communiqué contenu à Monsieur Doumergue. Ministre qui avait reçu rapport télégraphique analogue de Monsieur Dumaine sur sa conversation avec Votre Excellence a reconnu que nos troupes ne se trouvaient pas à la frontière française, mais il dit avoir renseignements positifs qu'un corps d'armée austro-hongrois a été transporté en

Allemagne, ce qui permet à celle-ci de retirer ses troupes des territoires allemands occupés par nos soldats et constitue, selon avis du Ministre, facilitation des opérations de guerre allemandes. J'ai à différentes reprises attiré attention du Ministre sur le texte de la réponse de Votre Excellence, il a reconnu qu'on ne pouvait pas parler de participation effective de nos troupes à la guerre franco-allemande, mais il insista sur ce que présence de nos troupes sur territoire allemand était incontestable et que ceci constituait aide militaire prêté à l'Allemagne. Dans ces conditions il a chargé Ambassadeur de France à Vienne de demander immédiatement ses passeports et de quitter Vienne aujourd'hui avec tout le personnel de l'Ambassade. Le Ministre m'a dit que dans ces circonstances ma présence ici ne saurait être d'aucune utilité, mais que, vu excitation populaire, elle pourrait donner lieu à des incidents regrettables qu'il désirerait éviter. Il m'a offert de mettre dès ce soir un train à ma disposition pour quitter la France. J'ai répondu qu'il me serait impossible d'avoir instruction de Votre Excellence jusqu'au soir mais que, vu le rappel de Monsieur Dumaine, je le priai de me faire délivrer mes passeports.

64.

**Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London.**

*Wien, 11. August 1914.*

Französische Regierung hat ihren hiesigen Botschafter beauftragt, seine Pässe mit der Motivierung zu verlangen, daß ein österreichisch-ungarisches Armeekorps nach Deutschland entsendet worden sei, wodurch es der deutschen Heeresleitung ermöglicht würde, ihre Truppen aus den deutschen Gebieten zurückzuziehen, welche von unseren Abteilungen besetzt seien. Diese Maßnahme unseres Generalstabes bedeute eine militärische Hilfeleistung an Deutschland.

Euer Exzellenz wollen zur Kenntnis der englischen Regierung bringen, daß den an zuständiger Stelle eingeholten Informationen zufolge die französischerseits aufgestellte Behauptung unbegründet ist.

**Graf Mensdorff an Graf Berchtold.****Telegramm.***London, 12. August 1914.*

Je viens de recevoir de la part de Sir E. Grey la communication suivante:

„Sur la demande du Gouvernement français qui n'est pas à même de communiquer directement avec Votre Gouvernement, j'ai à Vous faire la communication suivante:

„Après avoir déclaré la guerre à la Serbie et pris ainsi la première initiative des hostilités en Europe, le Gouvernement austro-hongrois s'est mis sans aucune provocation du Gouvernement de la République française en état de guerre avec la France:

1. Après que l'Allemagne avait successivement déclaré la guerre à la Russie et à la France, il est intervenu dans ce conflit en déclarant la guerre à la Russie qui combattait déjà aux côtés de la France.

2. D'après de nombreuses informations dignes de foi l'Autriche a envoyé des troupes sur la frontière allemande dans des conditions qui constituent une menace directe à l'égard de la France.

En présence de cet ensemble de faits le Gouvernement français se voit obligé de déclarer au Gouvernement austro-hongrois qu'il va prendre toutes les mesures qui lui permettront de répondre à ces actes et à ces menaces.“

Sir E. Grey ajoute: Rupture avec la France ayant été amenée de cette manière, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique se voit obligé d'annoncer que l'état de guerre existe entre la Grande-Bretagne et l'Autriche-Hongrie à partir de minuit.

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66.

**Der japanische Botschafter an Graf Berchtold.**

*Wien, 20. August 1914.*

**Monsieur le Comte,**

No doubt Your Excellency have already been informed by His Excellency Baron Müller of the nature of the communication made to the German Government by my Government on the 15<sup>th</sup> inst.; but, for Your Excellency's personal information, I beg to enclose therewith a copy of a telegram received from Tokio on the subject although I have no instruction to do so.

Belligerence.

The Japanese Government, taking into serious consideration the present situation, and as the result of full communication with the British Government for the purpose of consolidating and maintaining the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia which forms one of the objects of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, have come to the decision of taking the necessary measures therefore in common with Great Britain; but before taking such measures, the Japanese Government thought it proper to once approach the German Government with a friendly advice which was communicated to them to the following effect on the 15<sup>th</sup> of August 1914.

1. All German vessels of war to be immediately withdrawn from the waters in the neighbourhood of Japan and China. The vessels, which cannot be so withdrawn, to be disarmed.

2. The German Government to deliver, unconditionally and without compensation, to the Japanese authorities, the entire leased territory of Kiao-Chau before the 16<sup>th</sup> of September 1914, for the purpose of returning it to China.

The Japanese Government have declared to the German Government that unless their reply of unconditional acceptance of the above advice should be received before noon of Sunday the 23<sup>rd</sup> instant, the Japanese Government shall take such action as they deem necessary.

It is sincerely hoped that the above advice, with such ample allowance of time for reply, may be accepted by the German Government; but should, unfortunately, the German Government not accept the advice of the Japanese Government the latter will be obliged to take the necessary measures in order to accomplish their object.

The reason that led the Imperial Government to assume the present attitude is, as already mentioned, none other than to safeguard the common interests of Japan and Great Britain mentioned in the Anglo-Japanese alliance by consolidating the foundation of permanent peace in the regions of Eastern Asia, and the Japanese Government have no intention whatever of embarking on a policy of territorial expansion or any other design of self-interest. Consequently, the Imperial Japanese Government are resolved to respect, with the utmost care, the interests of third powers in Eastern Asia and not in the least to injure them.

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67.

**Graf Berchtold an Graf Clary in Brüssel.**

Telegramm.

*Wien, 22. August 1914.*

Ich ersuche Euer Exzellenz, dem königlich belgischen Minister des Äußern sofort folgendes mitzuteilen:

„D'ordre de mon Gouvernement j'ai l'honneur de notifier à Votre Excellence ce qui suit:

Vu que la Belgique, après avoir refusé d'accepter les propositions qui lui avaient été adressées à plusieurs reprises par l'Allemagne, prête sa coopération militaire à la France et à la Grande-Bretagne qui, toutes deux, ont déclaré la guerre à l'Autriche-Hongrie, et en présence du fait que, comme il vient d'être constaté, les ressortissants autrichiens et hongrois se trouvant en Belgique ont, sous les yeux des autorités Royales, dû subir un traitement contraire aux exigences les plus primitives de l'humanité et inadmissible même vis-à-vis des sujets d'un Etat ennemi, l'Autriche-Hongrie se voit dans la nécessité de rompre les relations diplomatiques et se considère dès ce moment en état de guerre avec la Belgique.

Je quitte le pays avec le personnel de la Légation et confie la protection de mes administrés au Ministre des Etats-Unis d'Amérique en Belgique.

De la part du Gouvernement L. et R. les passeports sont remis au Comte Errembault de Dudzeele.

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68.

**Prinz Hohenlohe an Graf Berchtold.**

Telegramm.

*Berlin, 23. August 1914.*

Dem hiesigen japanischen Geschäftsträger wurde heute durch das Auswärtige Amt mitgeteilt, daß die kaiserlich deutsche Regierung nicht die Absicht habe, eine Antwort auf das japanische Ultimatum zu erteilen. Die deutsche Regierung habe ihrem Botschafter in Tokio den Auftrag erteilt, nach Ablauf der von Japan für heute 12 Uhr gestellten Frist Japan zu verlassen und sie werde zu gleicher Zeit dem hiesigen japanischen Geschäftsträger seine Pässe zustellen.

Zu Mittag wurden dann dem Herrn Geschäftsträger die Pässe zugestellt und wird derselbe mit dem Botschaftspersonal Berlin morgen früh verlassen.

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**Graf Berchtold an Freiherrn von Müller in Tokio.**

Telegramm.

*Wien, 24. August 1914.*

Der Kommandant S. M. S. „Elisabeth“ erhielt den Auftrag, in Tsingtau mitzukämpfen. Ersuche Euer Exzellenz, mit Rücksicht auf das Vorgehen Japans gegen das uns verbündete Deutsche Reich Ihre Pässe zu verlangen. Konsulate zu verständigen und mit Kolonie und Botschafts- und Konsulatspersonal nach Amerika abzureisen. Schutz unserer Staatsangehörigen und Interessen wollen Euer Exzellenz amerikanischem Botschafter anvertrauen. Hiesigem japanischen Botschafter werden Pässe zugestellt.

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ROYAUME DE BELGIQUE.  

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MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES.



# Correspondance diplomatique

RELATIVE A LA

## Guerre de 1914.

(24 JUILLET-29 AOUT.)

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ANVERS.  
IMPRIMERIE ET PUBLICITÉ FLORE BURTON, SOCIÉTÉ ANONYME.  
COURTE RUE NEUVE, 28.



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# CORRESPONDANCE DIPLOMATIQUE

RELATIVE

## A LA GUERRE DE 1914.

(24 juillet — 29 août.)

### N° 1.

*Lettre adressée par le Ministre du Roi à Vienne à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Vienne, le 24 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir, sous ce pli, le texte de l'ultimatum de l'Autriche-Hongrie à la Serbie.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

(s) Comte Errembault de Dudzele.

### ANNEXE AU N° 1.

Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal s'est vu obligé d'adresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois, par l'entremise du Ministre Impérial et Royal à Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie :

« Le 31 mars 1909 le Ministre de Serbie à Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal la déclaration suivante :

« La Serbie reconnaît qu'elle n'a pas été atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli créé en Bosnie-Herzégovine et qu'elle se conformera par conséquent à telle décision que les Puissances prendront par rapport à l'article 25 du Traité de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des Grandes Puissances, la Serbie s'engage dès à présent à abandonner l'attitude de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a observée à l'égard de l'annexion depuis l'automne dernier, et elle s'engage, en outre, à changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers l'Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre désormais avec cette dernière sur le pied d'un bon voisinage. »

Or, l'histoire des dernières années, et notamment les événements douloureux du 28 juin, ont démontré l'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement subversif dont le but est de détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe, est arrivé à se manifester au delà du territoire du royaume par des actes de terrorisme, par une série d'attentats et par des meurtres.

Le Gouvernement Royal serbe, loin de satisfaire aux engagements formels contenus dans la déclaration du 31 mars 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement : il a toléré l'activité criminelle des différentes sociétés et affiliations dirigées contre la Monarchie, le langage effréné de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'attentats, la participation d'offi-

ciers et de fonctionnaires dans les agissements subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans l'instruction publique, toléré enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe à la haine de la Monarchie et au mépris de ses institutions.

Cette tolérance coupable du Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'avait pas cessé au moment où les événements du 28 juin dernier en ont démontré au monde entier les conséquences funestes.

Il résulte des dépositions et aveux des auteurs criminels de l'attentat du 28 juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a été tramé à Belgrade, que les armes et explosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient être munis leur ont été donnés par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes faisant partie de la « Narodna Odbrana », et enfin que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a été organisé et effectué par des chefs du service-frontière serbe.

Les résultats mentionnés de l'instruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de poursuivre plus longtemps l'attitude de longanimité expectative qu'il avait observée pendant des années vis-à-vis des agissements concentrés à Belgrade et propagés de là sur les territoires de la Monarchie; ces résultats lui imposent au contraire le devoir de mettre fin à des menées qui forment une menace perpétuelle pour la tranquillité de la Monarchie.

C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se voit obligé de demander au Gouvernement serbe l'émonciation officielle qu'il condamne la propagande dirigée contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage à supprimer, par tous les moyens, cette propagande criminelle et terroriste.

Afin de donner un caractère solennel à cet engagement, le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie fera publier à la première page du « Journal officiel » en date du 26 juin (13 juillet) l'émonciation suivante :

« Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels.

« Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé à la propagande susmentionnée et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage

auquel le Gouvernement Royal s'était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 mars 1909.

« Le Gouvernement Royal, qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer. »

Cette énonciation sera portée simultanément à la connaissance de l'Armée Royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majesté le Roi et sera publiée dans le « Bulletin officiel » de l'armée.

Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage en outre :

1° à supprimer toute publication qui excite à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie et dont la tendance générale est dirigée contre son intégrité territoriale,

2° à dissoudre immédiatement la société dite « Narodna Odbrana », à confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, et à procéder de la même manière contre les autres sociétés et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent à la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise; le Gouvernement Royal prendra les mesures nécessaires pour que les sociétés dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activité sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme,

3° à éliminer sans délai de l'instruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie,

4° à éloigner du service militaire et de l'administration en général tous les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et dont le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se réserve de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gouvernement Royal,

5° à accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirigé contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie,

6° à ouvrir une enquête judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe;

des organes, délégués par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, prendront part aux recherches y relatives,

7° à procéder d'urgence à l'arrestation du Commandant Voija Tankosic et du nommé Milan Ciganovic, employé de l'Etat serbe, compromis par les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo,

8° à empêcher, par des mesures efficaces, le concours des autorités serbes dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière;

à licencier et punir sévèrement les fonctionnaires du service-frontière de Schabatz et de Loznica coupables d'avoir aidé les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontière,

9° à donner au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal des explications sur les propos injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, qui, malgré leur

position officielle, n'ont pas hésité après l'attentat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une manière hostile envers la Monarchie austro-hongroise, enfin

10° d'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents.

Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal attend la réponse du Gouvernement Royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi, 25 de ce mois, à 6 heures du soir.

Un mémoire concernant les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo à l'égard des fonctionnaires mentionnés aux points 7 et 8 est annexé à cette note.

J'ai l'honneur d'inviter votre Excellence à vouloir porter le contenu de cette note à la connaissance du Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité, en accompagnant cette communication du commentaire que voici :

Le 31 mars 1909, le Gouvernement Royal serbe a adressé à l'Autriche-Hongrie la déclaration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus.

Le lendemain même de cette déclaration la Serbie s'est engagée dans une politique tendant à inspirer des idées subversives aux ressortissants serbes de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et à préparer ainsi la séparation des territoires austro-hongrois, limitrophes à la Serbie.

La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle.

Des sociétés et affiliations ne tardèrent pas à se former qui, soit ouvertement, soit clandestinement, étaient destinées à créer des désordres sur le territoire austro-hongrois. Ces sociétés et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des généraux et des diplomates, des fonctionnaires d'Etat et des juges, bref les sommités du monde officiel et inofficiel du royaume.

Le journalisme serbe est presque entièrement au service de cette propagande, dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent leurs lecteurs à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie voisine ou à des attentats dirigés plus ou moins ouvertement contre sa sûreté et son intégrité.

Un grand nombre d'agents est appelé à soutenir par tous les moyens l'agitation contre l'Autriche-Hongrie et à corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays.

L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens serbes, esprit dont les annales du royaume portent les sanglantes empreintes, a subi une recrudescence depuis la dernière crise balkanique; des individus ayant fait partie des bandes jusque-là occupées en Macédoine sont venus se mettre à la disposition de la propagande terroriste contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

En présence de ces agissements, auxquels l'Autriche-Hongrie est exposée depuis des années, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gouvernement serbe a manqué au devoir que lui imposait la déclaration solennelle du 31 mars 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contradiction avec la volonté de l'Europe et avec l'engagement qu'il avait pris vis-à-vis de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

La longanimité du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal à l'égard de l'attitude provocatrice de la Serbie était inspirée du désintéressement territorial de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de l'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe fini-

rait tout de même par apprécier à sa juste valeur l'amitié de l'Autriche-Hongrie. En observant une attitude bienveillante pour les intérêts politiques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal espérait que le royaume se déciderait finalement à suivre de son côté une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait surtout à une pareille évolution dans les idées politiques en Serbie, lorsque, après les événements de l'année 1912, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal rendit possible, par une attitude désintéressée et sans rancune, l'agrandissement si considérable de la Serbie.

Cette bienveillance manifestée par l'Autriche-Hongrie à l'égard de l'Etat voisin n'a cependant aucunement modifié les procédés du royaume, qui a continué à tolérer sur son territoire une propagande, dont les funestes conséquences se sont manifestées au monde entier le 28 juin dernier, jour où l'héritier présomptif de la Monarchie et son illustre épouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot tramé à Belgrade.

En présence de cet état de choses le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a dû se décider à entreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes démarches à Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouvernement serbe à arrêter le mouvement incendiaire menaçant la sûreté et l'intégrité de la Monarchie austro-hongroise.

Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal est persuadé qu'en entreprenant cette démarche, il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisées, qui ne sauraient admettre que le régime devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impunément dans la lutte politique, et que la paix européenne fût continuellement troublée par les agissements partant de Belgrade.

C'est à l'appui de ce qui précède que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal tient à la disposition du Gouvernement Royal de Grande-Bretagne un dossier élucidant les menées serbes et les rapports existant entre ces menées et le meurtre du 28 juin.

Une communication identique est adressée aux représentants Impériaux et Royaux auprès des autres Puissances signataires.

Vous êtes autorisé de laisser une copie de cette dépêche entre les mains de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Vienne, le 24 juillet 1914.

#### ANNEXE.

L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le Tribunal de Sarajevo contre Gavril Princip et consort du chef d'assassinat et de complicité y relative — crime commis par eux le 28 juin dernier — a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations suivantes :

1° Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son séjour à Sarajevo, l'Archiduc François-Ferdinand fut formé à Belgrade par Gavril Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, le nommé Milan Ciganovic et Trifko Grabez avec le concours du commandant Voja Tankosic.

2° Les 6 bombes et les 4 pistolets Browning avec munition, moyennant lesquels les malfaiteurs ont commis l'attentat, furent livrés à Belgrade à Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez par le nommé Milan Ciganovic et le commandant Voja Tankosic

3° Les bombes sont des grenades à la main provenant du dépôt d'armes de l'armée serbe à Kragujevac.

4° Pour assurer la réussite de l'attentat, Ciganovic enseigna à Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez la manière de se servir des grenades et donna, dans une forêt près du champ de tir à Topschider, des leçons de tir avec pistolets Browning à Princip et Grabez.

5° Pour rendre possible à Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez de passer la frontière de Bosnie-Herzégovine et d'y introduire clandestinement leur contrebande d'armes, un système de transport secret fut organisé par Ciganovic.

D'après cette organisation l'introduction en Bosnie-Herzégovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut opérée par les capitaines-frontières de Chabac (Rade Popovic) et de Loznica ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbic de Loznica avec le concours de divers particuliers.

#### N° 2.

*Lettre adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Paris, Berlin, Londres, Vienne et Saint-Petersbourg.*

Bruxelles, le 24 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Le Gouvernement du Roi s'est demandé si, dans les circonstances actuelles, il n'y aurait pas lieu d'adresser aux Puissances qui ont garanti son indépendance et sa neutralité, une communication destinée à leur confirmer sa résolution de remplir les devoirs internationaux que lui imposent les traités au cas où une guerre viendrait à éclater aux frontières de la Belgique.

Il a été amené à la conclusion qu'une telle communication serait prématurée à l'heure présente mais que les événements pourraient se précipiter et ne point lui laisser le temps de faire parvenir, au moment voulu, les instructions opportunes à ses représentants à l'étranger.

Dans cette situation, j'ai proposé au Roi et à mes collègues du Cabinet, qui se sont ralliés à ma manière de voir, de vous donner, dès à présent, des indications précises sur la démarche que vous auriez à faire si l'éventualité d'une guerre franco-allemande devenait plus menaçante.

Vous trouverez, sous ce pli, une lettre signée, mais non datée dont vous aurez à donner lecture et à laisser copie au Ministre des Affaires étrangères si les circonstances exigent cette communication.

Je vous indiquerai par télégramme le moment d'agir.

Le télégramme vous sera adressé à l'heure où la mobilisation de l'armée belge sera décrétée, si, contrairement à notre sincère espoir, et aux apparences de solution pacifique, nos renseignements nous amenaient à prendre cette mesure extrême de précaution.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

(s) Davignon.

#### ANNEXE AU N° 2.

Monsieur le Ministre,

La situation internationale est grave; l'éventualité d'un conflit entre plusieurs puissances

ne peut être écartée des préoccupations du gouvernement du Roi.

La Belgique a observé avec la plus scrupuleuse exactitude les devoirs d'Etat neutre que lui imposent les traités du 19 avril 1839. Ces devoirs, elle s'attachera inébranlablement à les remplir, quelles que soient les circonstances.

Les dispositions amicales des puissances à son égard ont été affirmées si souvent que la Belgique a la confiance de voir son territoire demeurer hors de toute atteinte si des hostilités venaient à se produire à ses frontières.

Toutes les mesures nécessaires pour assurer l'observation de sa neutralité n'en ont pas moins été prises par le Gouvernement du Roi. L'armée belge est mobilisée et se porte sur les positions stratégiques choisies pour assurer la défense du pays et le respect de sa neutralité. Les forts d'Anvers et de la Meuse sont en état de défense.

Il est à peine nécessaire, Monsieur le Ministre, d'insister sur le caractère de ces mesures. Elles n'ont d'autre but que de mettre la Belgique en situation de remplir ses obligations internationales; elles ne sont et n'ont pu être inspirées, cela va de soi, ni par le dessein de prendre part à une lutte armée des puissances, ni par un sentiment de défiance envers aucune d'elles.

Me conformant aux ordres reçus, j'ai l'honneur de remettre à Votre Excellence une copie de la déclaration du gouvernement du Roi et de La prier de bien vouloir en prendre acte.

Une communication identique a été faite aux autres Puissances garantes de la neutralité belge.

Je saisis, etc.

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N° 3.

*Lettre adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Rome, La Haye et Luxembourg.*

Bruxelles, le 25 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai adressé à vos Collègues accrédités auprès des Puissances garantes de l'indépendance et de la neutralité de la Belgique une circulaire, sans date, dont vous trouverez le texte sous ce pli.

Si la menace d'une guerre franco-allemande devenait imminente, cette circulaire serait communiquée aux Gouvernements des Puissances garantes, pour leur faire connaître notre résolution bien arrêtée de remplir les devoirs internationaux que nous imposent les traités de 1839.

La communication dont il s'agit ne serait effectuée que sur un ordre télégraphique de ma part.

Si les circonstances m'amènent à donner cet ordre, je vous prierai, également par la voie télégraphique, de donner connaissance de notre démarche au gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité, en lui communiquant une copie de la circulaire ci-jointe, à titre de renseignement, et sans demander qu'il vous soit donné acte de cette communication.

Mon télégramme vous indiquerait, éventuellement, la date qui devrait être attribuée à la circulaire, date que vous auriez soin d'inscrire sur la copie que vous remettiez au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Il va de soi que la présente dépêche et son annexe doivent conserver un caractère strictement confidentiel, jusqu'au reçu de nouvelles instructions de ma part.

(s) Davignon,

ANNEXE AU N° 3.

(Voir l'annexe au N° 2.)

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N° 4.

*Lettre adressée par le Ministre du Roi à Belgrade à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Belgrade, le 25 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir, sous ce pli, le texte de la réponse faite par le gouvernement serbe à la communication austro-hongroise du 10/23 juillet.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

(s) Michotte de Welle.

ANNEXE AU N° 4.

Le Gouvernement Royal serbe a reçu la communication du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal du 10 de ce mois et il est persuadé que sa réponse éloignera tout malentendu qui menace de gâter les bons rapports de voisinage entre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et le Royaume de Serbie.

Le Gouvernement Royal conscient que les protestations qui ont apparu tant de la tribune de la Skoupchtina nationale que dans les déclarations et les actes des représentants responsables de l'Etat, protestations qui furent coupées court par les déclarations du Gouvernement serbe, faites le 18 mars 1909, ne se sont plus renouvelées vis-à-vis de la grande Monarchie voisine en aucune occasion et que, depuis ce temps, autant de la part des Gouvernements Royaux qui se sont succédé que de la part de leurs organes, aucune tentative n'a été faite dans le but de changer l'état de choses politique et juridique créé en Bosnie et Herzégovine, le Gouvernement Royal constate que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal n'a fait aucune représentation, sauf en ce qui concerne un livre scolaire, et au sujet de laquelle le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a reçu une explication entièrement satisfaisante. La Serbie a de nombreuses fois donné des preuves de sa politique pacifique et modérée pendant la durée de la crise balkanique, et c'est grâce à la Serbie et au sacrifice qu'elle a fait dans l'intérêt exclusif de la paix européenne que cette paix a été préservée. Le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas être rendu responsable pour les manifestations d'un caractère privé, telles que les articles des journaux et le travail paisible des sociétés, manifestations qui se produisent dans presque tous les pays comme une chose ordinaire et qui échappe, en règle générale, au contrôle officiel, d'autant moins que le Gouvernement Royal, lors de la solution de toute une série de questions qui se sont présentées entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, a montré une grande prévenance et a réussi, de cette façon, à en régler le plus grand nombre au profit du progrès des deux pays voisins.

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Royal a été péniblement surpris par les affirmations, d'après lesquelles des personnes du Royaume de Serbie auraient participé à la préparation de l'attentat commis à Sarajevo; il s'attendait à ce qu'il soit invité à collaborer à la recherche de tout ce qui se rapporte à ce crime, et il était prêt, pour prouver son entière correction, à agir contre toutes les personnes à l'égard desquelles des communications lui seraient faites, se rendant donc au désir du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, est disposé à remettre au Tribunal tout sujet serbe, sans égard à sa situation et à son rang, pour la complicité duquel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, des preuves lui seraient fournies, et spécialement, il s'engage à faire publier à la première page du «Journal officiel» en date du 13 (26) juillet, l'énonciation suivante :

«Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne toute propagande qui serait dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels. Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que certains officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé, d'après la communication du Gouvernement Royal et Impérial, à la propagande susmentionnée, et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvernement Royal serbe était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 mars 1909, qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'une immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers et fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que, dorénavant, il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer.»

Cette énonciation sera portée à la connaissance de l'armée Royale par un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majesté le Roi, par Son Altesse Royale le Prince héritier Alexandre, et sera publié dans le prochain bulletin officiel de l'armée.

Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en outre :

1. D'introduire dans la première convocation régulière de la Skoupchtina une disposition dans la loi de la presse, par laquelle sera punie de la manière la plus sévère la provocation à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance générale serait dirigée contre l'intégrité territoriale de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Il se charge, lors de la révision de la Constitution, qui est prochaine, à faire introduire dans l'article 22 de la Constitution un amendement de telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus puissent être confisquées, ce qui actuellement aux termes catégoriques de l'article 22 de la Constitution est impossible.

2. Le Gouvernement ne possède aucune preuve et la note du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne lui en fournit non plus aucune que la société «Narodna Odbrana» et autres sociétés similaires aient commis, jusqu'à ce jour quelques actes criminels de ce genre, par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Néanmoins, le Gouvernement Royal acceptera la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal et dissoudra la société «Narodna Odbrana» et toute autre société qui agirait contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

3. Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage à éliminer sans délais de l'instruction publique en Serbie dans ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, quand le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui fournira des faits et des preuves de cette propagande.

4. Le Gouvernement Royal accepte de même à éloigner du service militaire ceux pour qui l'enquête judiciaire aura prouvé qu'ils sont coupables d'actes dirigés contre l'intégrité du territoire de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, et il attend que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui communique ultérieurement les noms et les faits de ces officiers et fonctionnaires aux fins de la procédure qui doit s'ensuivre.

5. Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la portée de la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal que la Serbie s'engage à accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, mais il déclare qu'il admettra la collaboration qui répondrait aux principes du droit international et à la procédure criminelle ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage.

6. Le Gouvernement Royal, cela va de soi, considère de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquête contre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, éventuellement, auraient été mêlés au complot du 15 juin, et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du royaume. Quant à la participation à cette enquête des agents ou autorités austro-hongrois qui seraient délégués à cet effet par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas l'accepter, car ce serait une violation de la Constitution et de la loi sur la procédure criminelle; cependant dans des cas concrets des communications sur les résultats de l'instruction en question pourraient être données aux agents austro-hongrois.

7. Le Gouvernement Royal a fait procéder, dès le soir même de la remise de la note, à l'arrestation du Commandant Volslav Tankositch. Quant à Milan Ziganovitch, qui est sujet de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et qui jusqu'au 15 juin était employé (comme aspirant) à la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore être arrêté.

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est prié de vouloir bien, dans la forme accoutumée, faire connaître le plus tôt possible, les présomptions de culpabilité ainsi que les preuves éventuelles de leur culpabilité qui ont été recueillies jusqu'à ce jour par l'enquête à Sarajevo, aux fins d'enquête ultérieure.

8. Le Gouvernement serbe renforcera et étendra les mesures prises pour empêcher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière. Il va de soi qu'il ordonnera de suite une enquête et punira sévèrement les fonctionnaires des frontières sur la ligne Schabatz-Loznitza qui ont manqué à leurs devoirs et laissé passer les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo.

9. Le Gouvernement Royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les propos que ses fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, ont eu après l'attentat dans des entrevues et qui, d'après l'affirmation du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, ont été hostiles envers la Monarchie, dès que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui aura communiqué les passages en question de ces propos, et dès qu'il aura démontré que les propos employés ont, en effet, été tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires,

quoique le Gouvernement Royal lui-même aura soin de recueillir des preuves et convictions.

10. Le Gouvernement Royal informera le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents en tant que cela n'a pas été déjà fait par la présente note, aussitôt que chaque mesure aura été ordonnée et exécutée.

Dans le cas où le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne serait pas satisfait de cette réponse, le Gouvernement serbe, considérant qu'il est de l'intérêt commun de ne pas précipiter la solution de cette question, est prêt comme toujours d'accepter une entente pacifique, soit en remettant cette question à la décision du Tribunal international de La Haye, soit aux Grandes Puissances qui ont pris part à l'élaboration de la déclaration que le Gouvernement serbe a faite le 18 (31) mars 1909.

Belgrade, le 12 (25) juillet 1914.

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N° 5.

*Communication faite le 26 juillet 1914 par la Légation d'Autriche-Hongrie à Bruxelles à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

M. Pachitch a donné hier avant 6 heures la réponse du Gouvernement serbe à la note austro-hongroise. Cette réponse n'ayant pas été jugée satisfaisante, les relations diplomatiques ont été rompues et le Ministre et le personnel de la Légation d'Autriche ont quitté Belgrade. La mobilisation serbe avait été déclarée déjà avant 3 heures.

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N° 6.

*Télégramme adressé par le Baron Beyens, Ministre du Roi à Berlin, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Berlin, 27 juillet 1914.

D'après un télégramme du Chargé d'Affaires Britannique à Belgrade, le Gouvernement serbe a cédé sur tous les points de la note autrichienne. Il admet même l'immixtion de fonctionnaires autrichiens si celle-ci peut s'accorder avec les usages du droit des gens. Le Chargé d'Affaires Britannique estime que cette réponse devrait satisfaire l'Autriche dans le cas où celle-ci ne voudrait pas la guerre. Néanmoins l'impression est plus favorable ici aujourd'hui, surtout parce que les hostilités contre la Serbie n'ont pas commencé. Le Gouvernement Britannique propose l'intervention de l'Angleterre, de l'Allemagne, de la France et de l'Italie à Saint-Petersbourg et à Vienne pour trouver un terrain de conciliation. L'Allemagne seule n'a pas encore répondu. L'Empereur décidera.

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N° 7.

*Télégramme adressé par le Comte Errembauld de Dudszele, Ministre du Roi à Vienne, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Vienne, 28 juillet 1914.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères me notifie la déclaration de guerre de l'Autriche-Hongrie à la Serbie.

N° 8.

*Lettre adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Berlin, Paris, Londres, Vienne, Saint-Petersbourg, Rome, La Haye, Luxembourg.*

Bruxelles, le 29 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Le Gouvernement du Roi a décidé de mettre l'armée sur le pied de paix renforcé.

Cette mesure ne doit être en aucune façon confondue avec la mobilisation.

A cause du peu d'étendue de son territoire, la Belgique toute entière constitue en quelque sorte une zone frontalière. Son armée, sur le pied de paix ordinaire, ne comporte qu'une classe de milice sous les armes. Sur le pied de paix renforcé ses divisions d'armée et sa division de cavalerie, grâce au rappel de 3 classes ont des effectifs analogues à ceux des corps entretenus en permanence dans les zones frontalières des Puissances voisines.

Ces renseignements vous permettraient de répondre aux questions qui pourraient vous être posées.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

(s) Davignon.

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N° 9.

*Lettre adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Berlin, Paris et Londres.*

Bruxelles, le 31 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

M. le Ministre de France étant venu me montrer un télégramme de l'Agence Havas, décrétant l'état de guerre en Allemagne, m'a dit : Je profite de cette occasion pour vous déclarer qu'aucune incursion des troupes françaises n'aura lieu en Belgique, même si des forces importantes étaient massées sur les frontières de votre pays. La France ne veut pas avoir la responsabilité d'accomplir vis-à-vis de la Belgique, le premier acte d'hostilité. Des instructions dans ce sens seront données aux autorités françaises.

J'ai remercié M. Klobukowski de sa communication et j'ai cru devoir lui faire remarquer que nous avions toujours eu la plus grande confiance dans la loyauté que nos deux Etats voisins mettraient à tenir leurs engagements à notre égard. Nous avons aussi tout lieu de croire que l'attitude du Gouvernement allemand sera identique à celle du Gouvernement de la République française.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

(s) Davignon.

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N° 10.

*Télégramme adressé par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, à tous les Chefs de mission à l'étranger.*

Bruxelles, 31 juillet 1914.

Le Ministre de la Guerre me fait savoir que la mobilisation est décrétée et que le samedi 1<sup>er</sup> août est le premier jour de la mobilisation.

(s) Davignon.



**N° 11.**

*Lettre adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Berlin, Londres et Paris.*

Bruxelles, le 31 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Le Ministre d'Angleterre a demandé à me voir d'urgence et m'a fait la communication suivante, qu'il souhaitait être à même de m'exposer depuis plusieurs jours. En raison de la possibilité d'une guerre européenne, Sir Edward Grey a demandé aux Gouvernements français et allemand, séparément, si chacun d'eux était prêt à respecter la neutralité de la Belgique pourvu qu'aucune puissance ne la viole.

«Vu les traités qui existent, je suis chargé d'informer le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Belgique de ce qui précède et de dire que Sir Edward Grey présume que la Belgique fera tout son possible pour maintenir sa neutralité et qu'elle désire et s'attend à ce que les autres puissances l'observent et la maintiennent».

Je me suis empressé de remercier Sir Francis Villiers de cette communication que le Gouvernement belge apprécie particulièrement et j'ai ajouté que la Grande-Bretagne et les autres nations garantes de notre indépendance pouvaient être assurées que nous ne négligerions aucun effort pour maintenir notre neutralité, et que nous étions convaincus que les autres puissances, vu les excellents rapports d'amitié et de confiance, que nous avions toujours entretenus avec elles, observeraient et maintiendraient cette neutralité.

Je n'ai pas manqué d'affirmer que nos forces militaires, considérablement développées à la suite de notre réorganisation récente, étaient à même de nous permettre de nous défendre énergiquement en cas de violation de notre territoire.

Au cours de la conversation qui a suivi, Sir Francis m'a paru un peu surpris de la rapidité avec laquelle nous avons décidé la mobilisation de notre armée. J'ai fait remarquer que les Pays-Bas avaient pris une résolution identique avant nous et que d'autre part la date récente de notre nouveau régime militaire et les mesures transitoires que nous avons dû décider à cette occasion, nous imposaient des mesures urgentes et complètes. Nos voisins et garants devaient voir dans cette résolution le désir de manifester notre profonde volonté de maintenir nous-mêmes notre neutralité.

Sir Francis m'a paru satisfait de ma réponse et m'a annoncé que son Gouvernement attendait cette réponse pour continuer les négociations avec la France et l'Allemagne, négociations dont la conclusion me serait communiquée.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

(s) Davignon.

**N° 12.**

*Lettre adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Berlin, Londres et Paris.*

Bruxelles, le 31 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Ce matin, au cours d'une conversation que le Secrétaire Général de mon Département a

eue avec M. de Below, il a expliqué au Ministre d'Allemagne la portée des mesures militaires que nous avons prises et lui a dit qu'elles étaient une conséquence de notre volonté d'accomplir nos obligations internationales, qu'elles n'impliquaient en aucune façon une attitude de défiance envers nos voisins.

Le Secrétaire Général a demandé ensuite au Ministre d'Allemagne s'il avait connaissance de la conversation qu'il avait eue avec son prédécesseur M. de Flotow, et de la réponse que le Chancelier de l'Empire avait chargé celui-ci de lui faire.

Au cours de la polémique soulevée en 1911 par le dépôt du projet hollandais concernant les fortifications de Flessingue, certains journaux avaient affirmé qu'en cas de guerre franco-allemande, notre neutralité serait violée par l'Allemagne.

Le Département des Affaires Etrangères avait suggéré l'idée qu'une déclaration faite au Parlement allemand à l'occasion d'un débat sur la politique étrangère serait de nature à apaiser l'opinion publique et à calmer ses défiances, si regrettables au point de vue des relations des deux pays.

M. de Bethman-Holweg fit répondre qu'il avait été très sensible aux sentiments qui avaient inspiré notre démarche. Il déclarait que l'Allemagne n'avait pas l'intention de violer notre neutralité, mais il estimait qu'en faisant publiquement une déclaration, l'Allemagne affaiblirait sa situation militaire vis-à-vis de la France qui, rassurée du côté du Nord, porterait toutes ses forces du côté de l'Est.

Le Baron van der Elst poursuivant, dit qu'il comprenait parfaitement les objections qu'avaient faites M. de Bethman-Holweg à la déclaration publique suggérée et il rappela que depuis lors en 1913, M. de Jagow avait fait à la Commission du budget du Reichstag, des déclarations rassurantes quant au respect de la neutralité de la Belgique.

M. de Below répondit qu'il était au courant de la conversation avec M. de Flotow et qu'il était certain que les sentiments exprimés à cette époque n'avaient pas changé.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

(s) Davignon.

**ANNEXE AU N° 12.**

*Lettre adressée par le Ministre du Roi à Berlin, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Berlin, le 2 mai 1913.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître, d'après l'officieuse «Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung», les déclarations faites, au cours de la séance du 29 avril de la commission du budget du Reichstag, par le secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangères et le Ministre de la Guerre, relativement à la neutralité de la Belgique.

«Un membre du parti social-démocrate dit : En Belgique on voit avec appréhension s'approcher une guerre franco-allemande, car on craint que l'Allemagne ne respectera pas la neutralité de la Belgique.

«M. de Jagow, Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangères répondit: la neutralité de la Belgique est déterminée par des conventions internationales et l'Allemagne est décidée à respecter ces conventions.

» Cette déclaration ne satisfait pas un autre membre du parti social-démocrate. M. de Jagow observa qu'il n'avait rien à ajouter aux paroles claires qu'il avait prononcées relativement aux relations de l'Allemagne avec la Belgique.

» A de nouvelles interrogations d'un membre du parti social-démocrate M. de Heeringen, Ministre de la Guerre, répondit : la Belgique ne joue aucun rôle dans la justification du projet de réorganisation militaire allemand; celui-ci se trouve justifié par la situation en Orient. L'Allemagne ne perdra pas de vue que la neutralité belge est garantie par les traités internationaux.

» Un membre du parti progressiste ayant encore parlé de la Belgique, M. de Jagow fit remarquer à nouveau que sa déclaration concernant la Belgique était suffisamment claire.»  
Veuillez agréer, etc.

(s) Baron Beyens.

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N° 13.

*Télégramme adressé par le Comte de Laing, Ministre du Roi à Londres, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Londres, 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

L'Angleterre a demandé séparément à la France et à l'Allemagne si elles respecteraient le territoire de la Belgique dans le cas où leur adversaire ne la violerait pas. On attend la réponse allemande. La France a accepté.

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N° 14.

*Télégramme adressé par le Baron Beyens, Ministre du Roi à Berlin, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Berlin, 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a été chargé de demander au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères si en cas de guerre, l'Allemagne respecterait la neutralité de la Belgique et le Ministre aurait dit qu'il ne peut pas répondre à cette question.

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N° 15.

*Lettre adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Berlin, Paris et Londres.*

Bruxelles, 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que le Ministre de France m'a fait verbalement la communication suivante :

« Je suis autorisé à déclarer qu'en cas de conflit international, le Gouvernement de la République, ainsi qu'il l'a toujours déclaré, respectera la neutralité de la Belgique. Dans l'hypothèse où cette neutralité ne serait pas respectée par une autre puissance, le Gouvernement français, pour assurer sa propre défense, pourrait être amené à modifier son attitude. »

J'ai remercié Son Excellence et ai ajouté que de notre côté nous avions pris sans aucun retard toutes les mesures voulues pour faire respecter notre indépendance et nos frontières.  
Veuillez agréer, etc.

(s) Davignon.

N° 16.

*Télégramme adressé par le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Légations du Roi à Paris, Berlin, Londres, Vienne, Saint-Petersbourg.*

Bruxelles, 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

Exécutez instructions données par lettre du 24 juillet.

(s) Davignon.

(Voir pièce N° 2.)

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N° 17.

*Télégramme adressé par le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Légations à Rome, La Haye, Luxembourg.*

Bruxelles, le 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

Exécutez instructions données par lettre du 25 juillet.

(s) Davignon.

(Voir pièce n° 3.)

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N° 18.

*Télégramme adressé par M. Eyschen, Président du Gouvernement luxembourgeois, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Luxembourg, 2 août 1914.

J'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence les faits suivants: Dimanche 2 août, de grand matin, les troupes allemandes, d'après les informations qui sont parvenues au Gouvernement Grand-Ducal à l'heure actuelle, ont pénétré sur le territoire luxembourgeois par les ponts de Wasserbillig et de Remich, se dirigeant spécialement vers le Sud du pays et vers la ville de Luxembourg, capitale du Grand Duché. Un certain nombre de trains blindés avec des troupes et des munitions ont été acheminés par la voie de chemin de fer de Wasserbillig à Luxembourg, où l'on s'attend à les voir arriver d'un instant à l'autre. Ces faits impliquent des actes manifestement contraires à la neutralité du Grand Duché, garantie par le traité de Londres de 1867. Le Gouvernement Luxembourgeois n'a pas manqué de protester énergiquement contre cette agression auprès du Représentant de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne à Luxembourg. Une protestation identique va être transmise télégraphiquement au Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangères à Berlin.

Le Ministre d'Etat,  
Président du Gouvernement:  
(s) Eyschen.

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N° 19.

*Lettre adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Paris, Berlin, Londres, Vienne et Saint-Petersbourg.*

Bruxelles, le 2 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'avais eu soin de faire avertir par M. de Basompierre le Ministre d'Allemagne qu'un communiqué de M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France, à la presse bruxelloise, annoncerait

la déclaration formelle que ce dernier m'avait faite le 1<sup>er</sup> août. Rencontrant M. de Below, ce dernier m'a remercié de cette attention et a ajouté que jusqu'à présent il n'avait pas été chargé de nous faire une communication officielle, mais que nous connaissions son opinion personnelle sur la sécurité avec laquelle nous avions le droit de considérer nos voisins de l'Est. J'ai immédiatement répondu que tout ce que nous connaissions des intentions de ceux-ci, intentions indiquées dans les multiples entretiens antérieurs, ne nous permettait pas de douter de leur parfaite correction vis-à-vis de la Belgique; je tenais cependant à ajouter que nous attacherions le plus grand prix à être en possession d'une déclaration formelle dont la nation prendrait connaissance avec joie et reconnaissance.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

(s) Davignon.

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## N° 20.

*Note remise le 2 août, à 19 heures, par M. Below Saleske, Ministre d'Allemagne, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Brüssel, den 2 August 1914.

Kaiserlich  
Deutsche Gesandtschaft  
In Belgien.

### TRES CONFIDENTIEL.

Der Kaiserlichen Regierung liegen zuverlässige Nachrichten vor ueber den beabsichtigten Aufmarsch französischer Streitkräfte an der Maas-Strecke Givet-Namur. Sie lassen keinen Zweifel ueber die Absicht Frankreichs, durch belgisches Gebiet gegen Deutschland vorzugehen.

Die Kaiserliche Regierung kann sich der Besorgniss nicht erwehren, dass Belgien, trotz besten Willens, nicht im Stande sein wird, ohne Hilfe einen französischen Vormarsch mit so grosser Aussicht auf Erfolg abzuwehren, dass darin eine ausreichende Sicherheit gegen die Bedrohung Deutschlands gefunden werden kann. Es ist ein Gebot der Selbsterhaltung für Deutschland, dem feindlichen Angriff zuvorzukommen. Mit dem grössten Bedauern würde es daher die deutsche Regierung erfüllen, wenn Belgien einen Akt der Feindseligkeit gegen sich darin erblicken würde, dass die Massnahmen seiner Gegner Deutschland zwingen, zur Gegenwehr auch seinerseits belgisches Gebiet zu betreten.

Um jede Missdeutung auszuschliessen, erklärt die Kaiserliche Regierung das Folgende:

1. Deutschland beabsichtigt keinerlei Feindseligkeiten gegen Belgien. Ist Belgien gewillt, in dem bevorstehenden Kriege, Deutschland gegenüber eine wohlwollende Neutralität einzunehmen, so verpflichtet sich die deutsche Regierung, beim Friedensschluss Besitzstand und Unabhängigkeit des Königreichs in vollem Umfang zu garantieren.

2. Deutschland verpflichtet sich unter obiger Voraussetzung, das Gebiet des Königreichs wieder zu räumen, sobald der Friede geschlossen ist.

3. Bei einer freundschaftlicher Haltung Belgiens ist Deutschland bereit, im Einvernehmen mit den Königlich Belgischen Behörden alle Bedürfnisse seiner Truppen gegen Barzahlung anzukaufen und jeden Schaden zu ersetzen,

der etwa durch deutsche Truppen verursacht werden könnte.

4. Sollte Belgien den deutschen Truppen feindlich entgegen treten, insbesondere ihrem vorgehen durch Widerstand der Maas-Befestigungen oder durch Zerstörungen von Eisenbahnen, Strassen, Tunneln oder sonstigen Kunstbauten Schwierigkeiten bereiten, so wird Deutschland zu seinem Bedauern gezwungen sein, das Königreich als Feind zu betrachten. In diesem Falle würde Deutschland dem Königreich gegenüber keine Verpflichtungen übernehmen können, sondern müsste die spätere Regelung des Verhältnisses beider Staaten zu einander der Entscheidung der Waffen überlassen.

Die Kaiserliche Regierung giebt sich der bestimmten Hoffnung hin, dass diese Eventualität nicht eintreten, und dass die Königliche Belgische Regierung die geeigneten Massnahmen zu treffen wissen wird, um zu verhindern, dass Vorkommnisse, wie die vorstehend erwähnten, sich ereignen. In diesem Falle würden die freundschaftlichen Bande, die beide Nachbarstaaten verbinden, eine weitere und dauernde Festigung erfahren.

## ANNEXE AU N° 20.

### *Traduction de l'ultimatum de l'Allemagne.*

Le Gouvernement allemand a reçu des nouvelles sûres d'après lesquelles les forces françaises auraient l'intention de marcher sur la Meuse par Givet et Namur. Ces nouvelles ne laissent aucun doute sur l'intention de la France de marcher sur l'Allemagne par le territoire belge. Le Gouvernement Impérial allemand ne peut s'empêcher de craindre que la Belgique, malgré sa meilleure volonté, ne sera pas en mesure de repousser sans secours une marche française d'un si grand développement. Dans ce fait on trouve une certitude suffisante d'une menace dirigée contre l'Allemagne.

C'est un devoir impérieux de conservation pour l'Allemagne de prévenir cette attaque de l'ennemi.

Le Gouvernement allemand regretterait très vivement que la Belgique regardât comme un acte d'hostilité contre elle le fait que les mesures des ennemis de l'Allemagne l'obligent de violer de son côté le territoire belge.

Afin de dissiper tout malentendu le Gouvernement allemand déclare ce qui suit:

1. L'Allemagne n'a en vue aucun acte d'hostilité contre la Belgique. Si la Belgique consent dans la guerre qui va commencer à prendre une attitude de neutralité amicale vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne, le Gouvernement allemand de son côté s'engage, au moment de la paix, à garantir le royaume et ses possessions dans toute leur étendue.

2. L'Allemagne s'engage sous la condition énoncée à évacuer le territoire belge aussitôt la paix conclue.

3. Si la Belgique observe une attitude amicale, l'Allemagne est prête, d'accord avec les autorités du Gouvernement belge, à acheter contre argent comptant tout ce qui est nécessaire à ses troupes et à indemniser pour les dommages causés en Belgique.

4. Si la Belgique se comporte d'une façon hostile contre les troupes allemandes et particulièrement fait des difficultés à leur marche en avant par une opposition des fortifications de la Meuse ou par des destructions de routes, chemins de fer, tunnels ou autres ouvrages

d'art, l'Allemagne sera obligée de considérer la Belgique en ennemie.

Dans ce cas l'Allemagne ne prendra aucun engagement vis-à-vis du royaume, mais elle laissera le règlement ultérieur des rapports des deux Etats l'un vis-à-vis de l'autre à la décision des armes. Le Gouvernement allemand a l'espoir justifié que cette éventualité ne se produira pas et que le Gouvernement belge saura prendre les mesures appropriées pour l'empêcher de se produire. Dans ce cas les relations d'amitié qui unissent les deux Etats voisins deviendront plus étroites et durables.

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N° 21.

*Note sur l'entrevue demandée le 3 août à une heure et demie, par M. de Below Saleske, Ministre d'Allemagne, à M. le Baron van der Elst, Secrétaire Général au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères.*

A une heure et demie de la nuit, le Ministre d'Allemagne a demandé à voir le Baron van der Elst. Il lui a dit qu'il était chargé par son Gouvernement de nous informer que des dirigeables français avaient jeté des bombes et qu'une patrouille de cavalerie française, violant le droit des gens, attendu que la guerre n'était pas déclarée, avait traversé la frontière.

Le Secrétaire Général a demandé à M. de Below où ces faits s'étaient passés; en Allemagne, lui fut-il répondu. Le Baron van der Elst fit remarquer que dans ce cas il ne pouvait s'expliquer le but de sa communication. M. de Below dit que ces actes, contraires au droit des gens, étaient de nature à faire supposer d'autres actes contre le droit des gens que poserait la France.

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N° 22.

*Note remise par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, à M. de Below Saleske, Ministre d'Allemagne.*

Bruxelles, le 3 août 1914.

(7 heures du matin).

Par sa note du 2 août 1914, le Gouvernement allemand a fait connaître que d'après des nouvelles sûres les forces françaises auraient l'intention de marcher sur la Meuse par Givet et Namur, et que la Belgique, malgré sa meilleure volonté ne serait pas en état de repousser sans secours une marche en avant des troupes françaises.

Le Gouvernement allemand s'estimerait dans l'obligation de prévenir cette attaque et de violer le territoire belge. Dans ces conditions, l'Allemagne propose au Gouvernement du Roi de prendre vis-à-vis d'elle une attitude amicale et s'engage au moment de la paix à garantir l'intégrité du Royaume et de ses possessions dans toute leur étendue. La note ajoute que si la Belgique fait des difficultés à la marche en avant des troupes allemandes, l'Allemagne sera obligée de la considérer comme ennemie et de laisser le règlement ultérieur des deux Etats l'un vis-à-vis de l'autre à la décision des armes.

Cette note a provoqué chez le Gouvernement du Roi un profond et douloureux étonnement.

Les intentions qu'elle attribue à la France sont en contradiction avec les déclarations formelles qui nous ont été faites le 7 août, au nom du Gouvernement de la République.

D'ailleurs si contrairement à notre attente une violation de la neutralité belge venait à être commise par la France, la Belgique remplirait tous ses devoirs internationaux et son armée opposerait à l'envahisseur la plus vigoureuse résistance.

Les traités de 1839 confirmés par les traités de 1870 consacrent l'indépendance et la neutralité de la Belgique sous la garantie des Puissances et notamment du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse.

La Belgique a toujours été fidèle à ses obligations internationales; elle a accompli ses devoirs dans un esprit de loyale impartialité; elle n'a négligé aucun effort pour maintenir ou faire respecter sa neutralité.

L'atteinte à son indépendance dont la menace le Gouvernement allemand constituerait une flagrante violation du droit des gens. Aucun intérêt stratégique ne justifie la violation du droit.

Le Gouvernement belge en acceptant les propositions qui lui sont notifiées sacrifierait l'honneur de la nation en même temps qu'il trahirait ses devoirs vis-à-vis de l'Europe.

Conscient du rôle que la Belgique joue depuis plus de 80 ans dans la civilisation du monde, il se refuse à croire que l'indépendance de la Belgique ne puisse être conservée qu'au prix de la violation de sa neutralité.

Si cet espoir était déçu le Gouvernement belge est fermement décidé à repousser par tous les moyens en son pouvoir toute atteinte à son droit.

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N° 23.

*Télégramme adressé par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, aux Ministres du Roi, à Saint-Petersbourg, Berlin, Londres, Paris, Vienne, La Haye.*

Bruxelles, le 3 août 1914.

L'Allemagne a remis hier soir 7 heures une note proposant la neutralité amicale comportant le passage libre par notre territoire, promettant le maintien de l'indépendance du Royaume et de ses possessions à conclusion de la paix, menaçant en cas de refus de traiter la Belgique comme ennemie, délai de la réponse fixé à douze heures. Nous avons répondu que l'atteinte à notre neutralité serait une violation flagrante du droit des gens. L'acceptation de la proposition allemande sacrifierait l'honneur de la nation. Consciente de son devoir, la Belgique est fermement décidée à repousser une agression par tous moyens.

(s) Davignon.

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N° 24.

*Lettre adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Paris, Berlin, Londres, Vienne et Saint-Petersbourg.*

Bruxelles, le 3 août 1914.

(à midi).

Monsieur le Ministre,

Comme vous le savez, l'Allemagne a remis à la Belgique un ultimatum expirant ce matin

8 août, à 7 heures. Aucun fait de guerre ne s'étant encore produit à l'heure actuelle, le Conseil des Ministres a décidé qu'il n'y avait pas lieu, pour le moment, de faire appel aux Puissances garantes.

Le Ministre de France m'a dit à ce sujet : « Sans être chargé d'une déclaration de mon Gouvernement, je crois cependant, m'inspirant de ses intentions connues, pouvoir dire que si le Gouvernement royal faisait appel au Gouvernement français, comme puissance garante de sa neutralité, nous répondrions immédiatement à son appel; si cet appel n'était pas formulé, il est probable, à moins bien entendu que le souci de sa propre défense ne détermine des mesures exceptionnelles, qu'il attendra pour intervenir que la Belgique ait fait un acte de résistance effective. »

J'ai remercié M. Klobukowski de l'appui que le Gouvernement français voulait bien nous offrir éventuellement et lui ai dit que le Gouvernement du Roi ne faisait pas appel, pour l'instant, à la garantie des Puissances et se réservait d'apprécier ultérieurement ce qu'il y aura lieu de faire.

(s) Davignon.

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N° 25.

*Télégramme adressé par S. M. le Roi à S. M. le Roi d'Angleterre.*

Bruxelles, le 3 août 1914.

Me souvenant des nombreuses marques d'amitié de Votre Majesté et de ses prédécesseurs, de l'attitude amicale de l'Angleterre en 1870, et de la preuve de sympathie qu'elle vient encore de nous donner, je fais un suprême appel à l'intervention diplomatique du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté pour la sauvegarde de la neutralité de la Belgique.

(s) Albert.

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N° 26.

*Télégramme adressé par le Ministre du Roi à Londres à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Londres, 3 août 1914.

J'ai montré votre télégramme au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères qui l'a communiqué au Conseil des Ministres. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères m'a dit que si notre neutralité était violée, c'était la guerre avec l'Allemagne.

(s) Comte de Lalaing.

(Voir pièce N° 23.)

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N° 27.

*Lettre adressée par M. de Below Saleske, Ministre d'Allemagne, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères (L'original est en français).*

Bruxelles, le 4 août 1914.  
(6 heures du matin).

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai été chargé et j'ai l'honneur d'informer Votre Excellence que par suite du refus opposé par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi aux propositions bien intentionnées que lui

avait soumises le Gouvernement Impérial, celui-ci se verra, à son plus vif regret, forcé d'exécuter — au besoin par la force des armes — les mesures de sécurité exposées comme indispensables vis-à-vis des menaces françaises.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma haute considération.

(s) von Below.

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N° 28.

*Note remise par Sir Francis H. Villiers, Ministre d'Angleterre, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Bruxelles, le 4 août 1914.

Je suis chargé d'informer le Gouvernement belge que si l'Allemagne exerce une pression dans le but d'obliger la Belgique à abandonner son rôle de pays neutre, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique s'attend à ce que la Belgique résiste par tous les moyens possibles.

Le Gouvernement de S. M. Britannique, dans ce cas, est prêt à se joindre à la Russie et à la France, si la Belgique le désire, pour offrir au Gouvernement belge sans délai une action commune, qui aurait comme but de résister aux mesures de force employées par l'Allemagne contre la Belgique et en même temps d'offrir une garantie pour maintenir l'indépendance et l'intégrité de la Belgique dans l'avenir.

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N° 29.

*Lettre adressée par le Ministre du Roi à La Haye à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

La Haye, le 4 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères m'a dit hier soir que le Gouvernement de la Reine serait peut-être obligé, dans les circonstances graves actuelles, d'instituer sur l'Escaut le balisage de guerre.

Le Jhr. Loudon m'a lu un projet de note qui allait m'annoncer cette décision.

J'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre, sous ce pli, une copie de la note en question qui m'a été remise dans la soirée d'hier.

Comme vous le verrez, l'Escaut ne sera fermé que pendant la nuit. Pendant le jour, la navigation sera possible mais seulement avec des pilotes néerlandais qui ont été munis des indications nautiques nécessaires à ce sujet. De cette façon les intérêts de la défense du territoire néerlandais et ceux de la navigation belge d'Anvers sont sauvegardés.

Vous remarquerez qu'ensuite le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas nous demande qu'en cas où le balisage de guerre serait institué, nous fassions retirer les bateaux-phare «Wielingen» et «Wandelaar» en vue de faciliter le maintien de la neutralité du territoire des Pays-Bas.

Je vous ferai remarquer que le terme employé dans cette note «remonter l'Escaut» n'est pas assez explicite; descendre le fleuve sera permis dans les mêmes conditions. Le Ministre vient de m'en donner l'assurance.

Aussitôt que le Gouvernement néerlandais aura décidé cette mesure d'exception j'en serai informé.

Il faut environ six heures pour effectuer ce balisage de guerre.

Je vous télégraphierai aussitôt.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

(s) Baron Fallon.

NOTE ANNEXÉE AU N° 29.

Le Gouvernement de la Reine pourrait se voir obligé dans l'intérêt du maintien de la neutralité du territoire des Pays-Bas d'instituer sur l'Escaut le balisage de guerre, c'est-à-dire d'enlever ou de modifier une partie du balisage actuel et des phares.

Toutefois, ce balisage de guerre a été conçu de manière à ce qu'après son institution il sera encore possible de remonter l'Escaut pour gagner Anvers pendant le jour, mais seulement avec des pilotes néerlandais, qui ont été munis des indications nautiques nécessaires à ce sujet. En agissant de la sorte, le Gouvernement de la Reine est convaincu de pouvoir tenir compte également des intérêts de la défense du territoire néerlandais et de ceux de la navigation belge d'Anvers.

Après l'institution du balisage de guerre sur l'Escaut, il n'y aurait plus de raison d'entrer dans la passe de mer de Flessingue pendant la nuit et comme la présence des bateaux-phare «Wielingen» et «Wandelaar» n'est pas indispensable pour la navigation pendant le jour, le Gouvernement néerlandais mettrait un haut prix à ce que le Gouvernement Royal Belge voulût bien, au cas où le balisage de guerre serait institué par lui, faire retirer lesdits bateaux en vue de faciliter le maintien de la neutralité du territoire des Pays-Bas.

N° 30.

*Télégramme adressé par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Londres et à Paris.*

Bruxelles, le 4 août 1914.

L'Etat Major fait savoir que le territoire national a été violé à Gemmenich.

(s) Davignon.

N° 31.

*Lettre adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, à M. de Below Saleske, Ministre d'Allemagne.*

Bruxelles, le 4 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à Votre Excellence que dès aujourd'hui le Gouvernement du Roi ne saurait plus Lui reconnaître de caractère diplomatique et cesse d'avoir des relations officielles avec Elle. Votre Excellence trouvera sous ce pli les passeports qui sont nécessaires à son départ et à celui du personnel de la Légation.

Je saisis, etc.

(s) Davignon.

N° 32.

*Lettre adressée par M. de Below Saleske, Ministre d'Allemagne, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Bruxelles, le 4 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception à Votre Excellence de sa lettre du 4 août et de Lui faire savoir que j'ai remis la garde de la Légation Impériale à Bruxelles aux soins de mon collègue des Etats-Unis.

Je saisis, etc.

(s) de Below.

N° 33.

*Télégramme adressé par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, à M. le Baron Grenier, Ministre du Roi à Madrid.*

Bruxelles, le 4 août 1914.

Veuillez demander au Gouvernement espagnol s'il veut bien se charger de la protection des intérêts belges en Allemagne et, dans ce cas, donner les instructions nécessaires à son Ambassadeur à Berlin.

(s) Davignon.

N° 34.

*Télégramme adressé par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, à M. le Baron Beyens, Ministre du Roi à Berlin.*

Bruxelles, le 4 août 1914.

Le Ministre d'Allemagne quitte le pays ce soir; demandez vos passeports. Nous prions le gouvernement de Madrid d'autoriser l'Ambassadeur d'Espagne de vouloir bien se charger de la protection des intérêts belges en Allemagne.

(s) Davignon.

N° 35.

*Lettre adressée par le Ministre de Belgique à Berlin à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Berlin, 4 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir, ci-après en traduction, la partie du discours prononcé aujourd'hui à la tribune du Reichstag par le Chancelier de l'Empire et relative à l'odieuse violation de notre neutralité :

« Nous nous trouvons en état de légitime défense et la nécessité ne connaît pas de lois.

« Nos troupes ont occupé Luxembourg et ont, peut-être, déjà pénétré en Belgique. Cela est en contradiction avec les prescriptions du droit des gens. La France a, il est vrai, déclaré à Bruxelles qu'elle était résolue à respecter la neutralité de la Belgique, aussi longtemps que l'adversaire la respecterait. Mais nous savions que la France se tenait prête pour envahir la Belgique. La France pouvait attendre. Nous pas. Une attaque française sur notre flanc dans la région du Rhin inférieur aurait pu devenir fatale. C'est ainsi que nous avons été forcés de passer outre aux protestations justifiées des Gouvernements lu-



xembourgeois et belge. L'injustice que nous commettons de cette façon, nous la réparerons dès que notre but militaire sera atteint.

« A celui qui est menacé au point où nous le sommes et qui lutte pour son bien suprême, il n'est permis que de songer au moyen de se dégager; nous nous trouvons côte à côte avec l'Autriche. »

Il est à remarquer que M. de Bethmann-Hollweg reconnaît, sans le moindre détour, que l'Allemagne viole le droit international en envahissant le territoire belge et qu'elle commet une injustice à notre égard.

Veillez agréer, etc.

(s) Baron Beyens.

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N° 36.

*Lettre adressée par le Ministre du Roi à Londres à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Londres, le 4 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que le Premier Ministre a fait cet après-midi à la Chambre des Communes une nouvelle déclaration relativement à la crise européenne.

Après avoir rappelé les principaux points exposés hier par Sir E. Grey, le Premier Ministre a donné lecture :

1° d'un télégramme de Sir F. Villiers, reçu ce matin, qui fait connaître la teneur du second ultimatum adressé par le Gouvernement allemand au Gouvernement belge et qui vous a été remis ce matin; (voir N° 27).

2° du télégramme par lequel vous m'annoncez la violation de la frontière à Gemmenich, dont j'ai remis copie à Sir A. Nicolson;

3° d'un télégramme adressé ce matin par le Gouvernement allemand à son Ambassadeur à Londres dans le but évident d'égarer l'opinion publique sur son attitude. En voici la traduction d'après un journal de ce soir : « Veillez dissiper toute méfiance que le Gouvernement Britannique pourrait avoir au sujet de nos intentions, en répétant, de la manière la plus positive, l'assurance formelle que même en cas de conflit armé avec la Belgique, l'Allemagne n'annexera sous aucun prétexte le territoire belge.

« La sincérité de cette déclaration est corroborée par le fait que l'Allemagne a solennellement donné sa parole à la Hollande de son intention de respecter sa neutralité.

« Il est évident que nous ne pourrions nous annexer le territoire belge d'une manière avantageuse sans faire, en même temps, une acquisition territoriale au détriment de la Hollande.

« Prière de faire bien comprendre à Sir E. Grey qu'il était impossible d'exposer l'armée allemande à une attaque française portée en traversant la Belgique, attaque qui, d'après des informations absolument incontestables, était projetée.

« En conséquence l'Allemagne n'a pas tenu compte de la neutralité belge afin d'éviter ce qui est pour elle une question de vie ou de mort, une attaque française par la Belgique. »

M. Asquith a ensuite exposé à la Chambre qu'en réponse à cette note du Gouvernement allemand le Gouvernement britannique lui avait renouvelé sa proposition de la semaine dernière, à savoir de donner au sujet de la

neutralité belge les mêmes assurances que la France en avait données la semaine dernière, tant à l'Angleterre qu'à la Belgique. Le Cabinet anglais accordait à celui de Berlin jusqu'à minuit pour lui faire connaître sa réponse. Veillez agréer, etc.

(s) Comte de Lalaing.

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N° 37.

*Télégramme adressé par le Ministre du Roi à Londres à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Londres, 4 août 1914.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères a fait savoir aux Ministres anglais en Norvège, Hollande, Belgique, que l'Angleterre s'attend à ce que ces trois Royaumes résistent à la pression de l'Allemagne et gardent la neutralité. Dans leur résistance ils seront soutenus par l'Angleterre qui, dans ce cas, est prête à coopérer avec la France et la Russie si tel est le désir de ces trois Gouvernements en offrant alliance aux dits Gouvernements, pour repousser l'emploi contre eux de la force par l'Allemagne, et garantie, pour le maintien futur de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité des trois Royaumes. J'ai fait remarquer que la Belgique est neutre à perpétuité. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères a répondu : c'est pour le cas de neutralité violée.

(s) Comte de Lalaing.

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N° 38.

*Lettre adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Paris, Londres et Saint-Petersbourg.*

Bruxelles, le 4 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance l'ordre des faits successifs qui ont marqué pendant les derniers jours les relations de la Belgique avec certaines des Puissances garantes de sa neutralité et de son indépendance.

Le 31 juillet le Ministre d'Angleterre me fit une communication verbale aux termes de laquelle, en prévision d'une guerre européenne, Sir E. Grey avait demandé aux Gouvernements allemand et français, séparément, si chacun d'eux était résolu à respecter la neutralité de la Belgique dans l'éventualité où cette neutralité ne serait pas violée par aucune autre puissance.

En raison des traités existants, Sir Francis Villiers était chargé de porter cette démarche à la connaissance du Gouvernement du Roi en ajoutant que Sir E. Grey présumait que la Belgique était résolue à maintenir sa neutralité et qu'elle s'attendait à ce que les autres puissances la respectent.

J'ai dit à M. le Ministre d'Angleterre que nous apprécions hautement cette communication qui répondait à notre attente et j'ai ajouté que la Grande-Bretagne ainsi que les autres Puissances garantes de notre indépendance pourraient être pleinement assurées de notre ferme volonté de maintenir notre neutralité; celle-ci ne nous paraissant d'ailleurs pas pouvoir être menacée par aucun de ces Etats avec lesquels nous entretenons les rapports les plus cordiaux et les plus confiants. Le Gouvernement, ai-je fait remarquer, avait donné une

preuve de cette résolution en prenant dès à présent toutes les mesures militaires que la situation lui paraissait comporter.

A son tour, M. le Ministre de France se déclara, le 1<sup>er</sup> août, dans une conversation verbale, autorisé à faire connaître au Gouvernement belge: qu'en cas de conflit international, le Gouvernement de la République, conformément à ses déclarations constantes, respecterait le territoire de la Belgique et qu'il ne serait amené à modifier son attitude que dans le cas de violation de la neutralité belge par une autre Puissance.

Je remerciai Son Excellence et ajoutai que nous avions déjà pris toutes les dispositions requises pour assurer le respect de notre indépendance et de nos frontières.

Le 2 août, dans la matinée, j'eus avec Sir Francis Villiers un nouvel entretien au cours duquel il me fit part de ce qu'il avait transmis télégraphiquement samedi, dès la première heure, à son Gouvernement notre conversation du 31 juillet en ayant soin de reproduire fidèlement la déclaration solennelle qu'il avait recueillie de la volonté de la Belgique de défendre ses frontières, de quelque côté qu'elles soient envahies. Il ajouta: « Nous savons que la France vous a donné des assurances formelles; mais l'Angleterre n'a reçu à ce sujet aucune réponse de Berlin. »

Ce dernier fait ne provoqua en moi aucune émotion particulière, parce que la déclaration du Gouvernement allemand pouvait paraître surabondante en présence des traités existants. D'ailleurs le Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangères avait affirmé à la séance de la commission du Reichstag du 29 avril 1913 « que la neutralité de la Belgique est établie conventionnellement et que l'Allemagne a l'intention de respecter ce traité. »

Le même jour, M. de Below Saleske, Ministre d'Allemagne, se présenta au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères à 19 heures et me remit la note ci-jointe (voir pièce N° 20). Le Gouvernement allemand accordait au Gouvernement belge un délai de douze heures pour lui faire connaître sa décision.

Aucune hésitation ne pouvait se manifester au sujet de la réponse qu'appelaient la proposition surprenante du Gouvernement allemand. Vous en trouverez une copie sous ce pli. (Voir pièce N° 22.)

L'ultimatum expirait le 3 août, à 7 heures du matin; comme à 10 heures aucun fait de guerre ne s'était produit, le Conseil des Ministres décida qu'il n'y avait pas lieu, pour le moment, de faire appel aux Puissances garantes.

Vers midi, le Ministre de France m'interrogea sur ce point et me dit:

« Bien qu'en raison de la soudaineté des événements je ne sois encore chargé d'aucune déclaration, je crois cependant, m'inspirant des intentions bien connues de mon Gouvernement, pouvoir dire que si le Gouvernement Royal faisait appel au Gouvernement français comme puissance garante de sa neutralité, il répondrait immédiatement à son appel. Si cet appel n'était pas formulé il est probable, à moins bien entendu que le souci de sa propre défense ne détermine des mesures exceptionnelles, qu'il attendrait, pour intervenir, que la Belgique ait fait un acte de résistance effective. »

J'ai remercié M. Klobukowski de l'appui que le Gouvernement français voulait bien

nous offrir éventuellement et lui ai dit que le Gouvernement du Roi ne faisait pas appel, pour l'instant, à la garantie des Puissances et se réservait d'apprécier ultérieurement ce qu'il y aura lieu de faire.

Enfin, le 4 août, à 6 heures du matin, le Ministre d'Allemagne me fit la communication suivante: (voir pièce N° 27).

Le Conseil des Ministres délibère en ce moment au sujet de l'appel aux Puissances garantes de notre neutralité.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

(s) Davignon.

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N° 39.

*Télégramme adressé par le Ministre du Roi à Londres à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Londres, 4 août 1914.

L'Angleterre a sommé ce matin l'Allemagne de respecter la neutralité belge. L'ultimatum dit que vu la note adressée par l'Allemagne à la Belgique menaçant cette dernière de la force des armes si elle s'oppose au passage de ses troupes, vu la violation du territoire belge à Gemmenich, vu le fait que l'Allemagne a refusé de donner à l'Angleterre la même assurance que celle donnée la semaine dernière par la France, l'Angleterre doit demander à nouveau une réponse satisfaisante au sujet du respect de la neutralité belge et d'un traité dont l'Allemagne est signataire aussi bien qu'elle-même. L'ultimatum expire à minuit.

En conséquence de l'ultimatum de l'Angleterre à l'Allemagne, la proposition anglaise que je vous ai transmise par télégramme est annulée pour le moment.

(s) Comte de Lalaing.

(Voir pièce N° 37.)

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N° 40.

*Lettre adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, aux Ministres de Grande-Bretagne, de France et de Russie.*

Bruxelles, le 4 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Le Gouvernement belge a le regret de devoir annoncer à Votre Excellence que ce matin les forces armées de l'Allemagne ont pénétré sur le territoire belge en violation des engagements qui ont été pris par traité.

Le Gouvernement du Roi est fermement décidé à résister par tous les moyens en son pouvoir.

La Belgique fait appel à l'Angleterre, à la France et à la Russie pour coopérer, comme garantes, à la défense de son territoire.

Il y aurait une action concertée et commune ayant pour but de résister aux mesures de forces employées par l'Allemagne contre la Belgique et en même temps de garantir le maintien de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité de la Belgique dans l'avenir.

La Belgique est heureuse de pouvoir déclarer qu'elle assumera la défense des places fortes.

Je saisis, etc.

(s) Davignon.



N° 41

*Télégramme adressé par le Ministre du Roi à Londres à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères*

Londres, 5 août 1914.

L'Allemagne ayant rejeté les propositions anglaises, l'Angleterre lui a déclaré que l'état de guerre existait entre les deux pays, à partir de onze heures.

(s) Comto de Lalaing

N° 42.

*Télégramme adressé par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Paris, Londres et Saint-Petersbourg.*

Bruxelles, le 5 août 1914.

Après la violation du territoire à Gemmenich, la Belgique a fait appel, par l'intermédiaire de leurs Représentants accrédités à Bruxelles, à l'Angleterre, à la France et à la Russie pour coopérer, comme garantes, à la défense de son territoire.

La Belgique assume la défense des places fortes.

(s) Davignon.

N° 43.

*Lettre adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Paris, Londres et Saint-Petersbourg.*

Bruxelles, le 5 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Par ma dépêche du 4 août (voir pièce N° 38), j'ai eu l'honneur de vous exposer la suite des événements qui ont marqué les relations internationales de la Belgique du 31 juillet au 4 août. J'ajoutais que le Conseil des Ministres examinait la question de savoir si la Belgique, dont le territoire avait été envahi depuis le matin, ferait appel à la garantie.

Le Conseil venait de se décider en faveur de l'affirmative, lorsque le Ministre d'Angleterre me fit savoir que la proposition dont il m'avait saisi et d'après laquelle le Gouvernement britannique était disposé à répondre à notre appel en garantie, était annulée pour le moment. (Voir pièce N° 37).

Un télégramme de Londres m'apprit que ce changement d'attitude était motivé par un ultimatum de l'Angleterre laissant à l'Allemagne un délai de dix heures pour évacuer le sol belge et respecter la neutralité de la Belgique. (Voir pièce N° 39). Dans la soirée, le Gouvernement du Roi a adressé, par l'intermédiaire de leurs représentants respectifs à Bruxelles, à la France, à la Grande-Bretagne et à la Russie, la note dont vous trouverez la copie ci-jointe. (Voir pièce N° 40)

Comme vous le remarquerez la Belgique fait appel à l'Angleterre, à la France et à la Russie pour coopérer comme garants à la défense de son territoire et au maintien dans l'avenir de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité du territoire. Elle assurera la défense des places fortes.

Jusqu'ici nous ne connaissons pas l'accueil qui a été réservé à notre appel.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

(s) Davignon.

N° 44.

*Lettre adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, aux Chefs de mission dans tous les pays entretenant avec la Belgique des rapports diplomatiques*

Bruxelles, le 5 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Par le traité du 18 avril 1839, la Prusse, la France, l'Angleterre, l'Autriche et la Russie se sont déclarées garantes du traité conclu le même jour entre S. M. le Roi des Belges et S. M. le Roi des Pays-Bas. Ce traité porte : « La Belgique formera un Etat indépendant et perpétuellement neutre. » La Belgique a rempli toutes ses obligations internationales, elle a accompli ses devoirs dans un esprit de loyale impartialité, elle n'a négligé aucun effort pour maintenir et faire respecter sa neutralité.

Aussi est-ce avec une pénible émotion que le Gouvernement du Roi a appris que les forces armées de l'Allemagne, puissance garante de notre neutralité, ont pénétré sur le territoire de la Belgique en violation des engagements qui ont été pris par traité.

Il est de notre devoir de protester avec indignation contre un attentat au droit des gens qu'aucun acte de notre part n'a pu provoquer.

Le Gouvernement du Roi est fermement décidé à repousser par tous les moyens en son pouvoir l'atteinte portée à sa neutralité et il rappelle qu'en vertu de l'article 10 de la convention de La Haye de 1907, concernant les droits et les devoirs des Puissances et des personnes neutres en cas de guerre sur terre, ne peut être considéré comme un acte hostile le fait, par une Puissance neutre, de repousser, même par la force, les atteintes à sa neutralité.

Vous voudrez bien demander d'urgence une audience au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères et donner lecture à Son Excellence de la présente lettre dont vous lui laisserez copie. Si l'audience ne pouvait vous être immédiatement accordée, vous ferez par écrit la communication dont il s'agit.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

(s) Davignon.

N° 45.

*Télégramme adressé par le Ministre du Roi à Berlin, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Berlin, le 5 août 1914.

J'ai reçu mes passeports. Je quitterai Berlin demain matin avec personnel pour la Hollande.

(s) Baron Beyens.

N° 46.

*Télégramme adressé par le Ministre du Roi à Madrid, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Saint-Sébastien, 5 août 1914.

Le Gouvernement espagnol se charge des intérêts belges en Allemagne. Il donne au-

jourd'hui télégraphiquement des instructions à son Ambassadeur à Berlin.

(s) Baron Grenier.

(Voir pièce N° 33.)

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N° 47.

*Lettre adressée par le Ministre du Roi à Paris à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Paris, le 5 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir, sous ce pli, une copie de la notification de l'état de guerre existant entre la France et l'Allemagne, qui m'a été remise aujourd'hui.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

(s) Baron Guillaume.

ANNEXE AU N° 47.

Le Gouvernement Impérial Allemand, après avoir laissé ses forces armées franchir la frontière et se livrer sur le territoire français à divers actes de meurtre et de violence; après avoir violé la neutralité du Grand Duché de Luxembourg au mépris des stipulations de la convention de Londres du 11 mai 1867 et de la convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907, sur les droits et devoirs des Puissances et des personnes neutres en cas de guerre sur terre (articles 1 à 11), conventions signées de lui; après avoir adressé un ultimatum au Gouvernement royal de Belgique, tendant à exiger le passage des forces allemandes par le territoire belge, en violation des Traités du 19 avril 1839 également signés par lui et de la susdite convention de La Haye;

A déclaré la guerre à la France le 3 août 1914, à 18 heures 45;

Le Gouvernement de la République se voit dans ces conditions obligé de son côté de recourir à la force des armes.

Il a en conséquence l'honneur de faire savoir par la présente au Gouvernement Royal que l'état de guerre existe entre la France et l'Allemagne à dater du 3 août, 18 heures 45.

Le Gouvernement de la République proteste auprès de toutes les nations civilisées et spécialement auprès des Gouvernements signataires des conventions et traités sus-rappelés, contre la violation par l'Empire allemand de ses engagements internationaux; il fait toutes réserves quant aux représailles qu'il pourrait se voir amené à exercer contre un ennemi aussi peu soucieux de la parole donnée.

Le Gouvernement de la République, qui entend observer les principes du droit des gens, se conformera durant les hostilités et sous réserve de réciprocité aux dispositions des conventions internationales signées par la France concernant le droit de la guerre sur terre et sur mer.

La présente notification faite en conformité de l'article 2 de ladite II<sup>e</sup> Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907 relative à l'ouverture des hostilités est remise à M. le Ministre de Belgique à Paris, le 5 août 1914, à 14 heures.

N° 48.

*Communication faite le 5 août par Sir Francis Villiers, Ministre d'Angleterre, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Je suis chargé d'informer le Gouvernement belge que le Gouvernement de S. M. Britannique considère l'action commune dans le but de résister à l'Allemagne comme étant en vigueur et justifiée par le traité de 1839.

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N° 49.

*Télégramme adressé par le Ministre du Roi à Londres à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Londres, 5 août 1914.

L'Angleterre accepte de coopérer comme garante à la défense de notre territoire. La flotte anglaise assurera le libre passage de l'Escaut pour le ravitaillement d'Anvers.

(s) Comte de Lalaing.

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N° 50.

*Télégramme adressé par le Ministre du Roi à La Haye à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

La Haye, 5 août 1914.

Le balisage de guerre va être établi.

(s) Baron Fallon.

(Voir pièce N° 29).

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N° 51.

*Télégramme adressé par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, à M. le Baron Grenier, Ministre du Roi à Madrid.*

Bruxelles, 5 août 1914.

Exprimez au Gouvernement espagnol les remerciements très sincères du Gouvernement du Roi.

(s) Davignon.

(Voir pièce N° 46.)

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N° 52.

*Lettre adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ministres du Roi à Paris, Londres et Saint-Petersbourg.*

Bruxelles, le 5 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que les Ministres de France et de Russie ont fait ce matin une démarche auprès de moi, pour me faire connaître la volonté de leurs gouvernements de répondre à notre appel et de coopérer avec l'Angleterre à la défense de notre territoire.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

(s) Davignon

**N° 53.**

*Lettre adressée par le Ministre des Pays-Bas à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Bruxelles, le 6 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de faire parvenir ci-joint à Votre Excellence un exemplaire du numéro extraordinaire du «Staatscourant», contenant la déclaration de neutralité des Pays-Bas dans la guerre entre la Belgique et l'Allemagne, et l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

(s) Jonkheer de Weede.

**ANNEXE AU N° 53.**

**LOIS, ARRÊTÉS, NOMINATIONS, ETC.**

*Ministère des Affaires étrangères, de la Justice, de la Marine, de la Guerre et des Colonies.*

Les Ministres des Affaires Etrangères, de la Justice, de la Marine, de la Guerre et des Colonies, autorisés à cette fin par Sa Majesté la Reine, portent à la connaissance de tous ceux que la chose concerne, que le Gouvernement néerlandais observera dans la guerre qui a éclaté entre les Puissances amies des Pays-Bas, Grande-Bretagne et Allemagne, et Belgique et Allemagne, une stricte neutralité et qu'en vue de l'observation de cette neutralité les dispositions suivantes ont été arrêtées :

**ARTICLE 1.**

Dans les limites du territoire de l'Etat, comprenant le territoire du Royaume en Europe, outre les colonies et possessions dans d'autres parties du monde, aucun genre d'hostilités n'est permis et ce territoire ne peut servir de base pour des opérations hostiles.

**ARTICLE 2.**

Ni l'occupation d'une partie quelconque du territoire de l'Etat par un belligérant, ni le passage à travers ce territoire par voie de terre par des troupes ou des convois de munitions appartenant à un des belligérants ne sont permis, non plus que le passage à travers le territoire situé à l'intérieur des eaux territoriales néerlandaises par des navires de guerre ou des bâtiments des belligérants assimilés à ceux-ci.

**ARTICLE 3.**

Les troupes ou les militaires, appartenant aux belligérants ou destinés à ceux-ci et arrivant sur le territoire de l'Etat par voie de terre seront immédiatement désarmés et internés jusqu'à la fin de la guerre.

Les navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés à ces derniers, appartenant à un belligérant, qui contreviendront aux prescriptions des articles 2, 4 ou 7, ne pourront quitter ce territoire avant la fin de la guerre.

Les navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés à ces derniers, appartenant à un belligérant, qui contreviendront aux prescriptions des articles 2, 4 ou 7, ne pourront quitter ce territoire avant la fin de la guerre.

**ARTICLE 4.**

Les navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés à ces derniers, qui appartiennent à un belligérant, n'auront pas accès au territoire de l'Etat.

**ARTICLE 5.**

La disposition de l'article 4 n'est pas applicable :

1° aux navires de guerre ou bâtiments d'un belligérant assimilés à ces derniers, et qui par suite d'avarie ou de l'état de la mer sont tenus d'entrer dans un des ports ou rades de l'Etat. Les navires pourront quitter les dits ports ou rades dès que les circonstances qui les ont contraints de s'y réfugier auront cessé d'exister;

2° aux navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés, appartenant à un belligérant, et qui font escale dans un port ou une rade situés dans le territoire des colonies et possessions d'outre-mer, exclusivement dans le but de compléter leur provision de denrées alimentaires ou de combustibles. Ces navires devront repartir dès que les circonstances qui les ont forcés à faire escale ont cessé d'exister, avec cette condition que le séjour en rade ou dans le port ne pourra durer plus de 24 heures.

3° aux navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés, appartenant à un belligérant, et qui sont utilisés exclusivement pour une mission religieuse, scientifique, ou humanitaire.

**ARTICLE 6.**

Les navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés, appartenant à un belligérant, ne peuvent réparer leurs avaries dans les ports ou rades de l'Etat qu'en tant que cette réparation est indispensable à la sécurité de la navigation, et ils ne pourront en aucune façon accroître leurs capacités de combat.

**ARTICLE 7.**

Les navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés, appartenant à un belligérant, et qui, au commencement de la guerre, se trouveraient sur le territoire de l'Etat, sont tenus de le quitter dans les 24 heures de la publication de la présente.

**ARTICLE 8.**

Si des navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés appartenant à divers belligérants se trouvent, en même temps, dans les conditions visées à l'article 5, dans une même partie du monde, et sur le territoire de l'Etat, un délai d'au moins 24 heures doit s'écouler entre le départ des navires de chacun des belligérants. A moins de circonstances spéciales, l'ordre de départ est déterminé par l'ordre d'arrivée. Un navire de guerre ou un bâtiment assimilé, appartenant à un belligérant, ne peut quitter le territoire de l'Etat que 24 heures après le départ d'un navire de commerce portant le pavillon de l'autre belligérant.

**ARTICLE 9.**

Les navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés, appartenant à un belligérant, visés à l'art. 5 et à l'art. 7, ne peuvent être ravitaillés

en denrées alimentaires dans les ports et les rades du pays que dans la mesure nécessaire pour parfaire leurs provisions jusqu'à la limite normale du temps de paix.

De même, ils ne peuvent charger de combustible que dans la mesure nécessaire pour pouvoir atteindre, avec la provision qu'ils ont encore à bord, le port le plus rapproché de leur propre pays.

Un même bâtiment ne peut être ravitaillé à nouveau en combustible qu'à l'expiration d'une période de trois mois au moins après son précédent ravitaillement dans le territoire de l'Etat.

#### ARTICLE 10.

Une prise ne peut être amenée dans le territoire que lorsqu'elle est incapable de naviguer, qu'elle tient mal la mer, qu'elle manque de combustible ou de denrées alimentaires.

Elle doit s'éloigner dès que la cause de son entrée dans le territoire cesse d'exister.

Si elle ne le fait pas, l'ordre lui sera donné de partir immédiatement, en cas de refus, il sera fait usage des moyens disponibles pour libérer la prise avec ses officiers et son équipage et pour interner l'équipage placé à bord par le belligérant qui a fait la prise.

#### ARTICLE 11.

Il est interdit, sur le territoire de l'Etat, de former des corps combattants ou d'ouvrir des bureaux de recrutement au profit des belligérants.

#### ARTICLE 12.

Il est interdit, sur le territoire de l'Etat, de prendre du service à bord de navires de guerre ou de bâtiments assimilés.

#### ARTICLE 13.

Il est interdit, sur le territoire de l'Etat, d'aménager, d'armer ou d'équiper des navires destinés à des fins militaires au profit d'un belligérant, ou de fournir ou conduire à un belligérant de tels navires.

#### ARTICLE 14.

Il est interdit, sur le territoire de l'Etat, de fournir des armes ou des munitions à des navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés appartenant à un belligérant, ou de leur venir en aide d'une manière quelconque en vue de l'augmentation de leur équipage ou de leur armement.

#### ARTICLE 15.

Il est interdit, sur le territoire de l'Etat, sauf autorisation préalable des autorités locales compétentes, de faire des réparations aux navires de guerre ou bâtiments assimilés appartenant à un belligérant, ou de leur fournir des provisions de bouche ou de combustible.

#### ARTICLE 16.

Il est interdit, sur le territoire de l'Etat, de coopérer au dégrèvement ou à la réparation de prises, sauf ce qui est nécessaire pour les rendre propres à tenir la mer, ainsi que d'acheter des prises ou des marchandises confisquées, et de les recevoir en échange, en don ou en dépôt.

#### ARTICLE 17.

Le territoire de l'Etat comprend la mer côtière sur une largeur de 3 milles marins à raison de 60 par degré de latitude, à partir de la laisse de la basse mer.

En ce qui concerne les baies, cette distance de 3 milles marins est mesurée à partir d'une ligne droite tirée à travers la baie aussi près que possible de l'entrée, au point où l'ouverture de la baie ne dépasse pas dix milles marins, à raison de 60 par degré de latitude.

#### ARTICLE 18.

En outre, l'attention est attirée sur les articles 100, 1<sup>er</sup>, et 205 du Code pénal; Indisch Staatsblad 1906, N° 62; Art. 7, 4<sup>e</sup>, de la loi sur la qualité de Néerlandais et sur le domicile (Nederlandsch Staatsblad 1892, N° 268; 1910, N° 216); art. 2, N° 3, de la loi sur la qualité de sujet néerlandais (Nederlandsch Staatsblad 1910, N° 55, Indisch Staatsblad 1910, N° 298, art. 54 et 55 du Code pénal de Suriname; art. 54 et 55 du Code pénal de Curaçao).

De même, l'attention des commandants de navires, armateurs et affréteurs, est attirée sur le danger et les inconvénients auxquels ils s'exposeraient en ne respectant pas le blocus effectif des belligérants, en transportant de la contrebande de guerre ou des dépêches militaires pour les belligérants (à moins qu'il ne s'agisse du service postal régulier) ou en exécutant pour eux d'autres services de transport.

Quiconque se rendrait coupable d'actes prévus ci-dessus, s'exposerait à toutes les conséquences de ces actes, et ne pourrait obtenir à cet égard aucune protection ni intervention du Gouvernement néerlandais.

#### N° 54.

*Télégramme adressé par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, à M. le Baron Fallon, Ministre du Roi à La Haye.*

Bruxelles, 6 août 1914.

Veuillez communiquer au Gouvernement néerlandais la note suivante :

Le Gouvernement belge a pris note de l'abaissement du balisage de guerre sur l'Escaut et de ce que le Gouvernement hollandais assure le maintien de la navigation.

Il conviendrait que la navigation pût se faire à partir de 30 minutes avant le lever du soleil jusqu'à 30 minutes après son coucher et que l'échange des pilotes se fit à Bath.

Si désireux qu'il soit de consentir aux demandes du gouvernement hollandais, le Gouvernement belge estime qu'il y a lieu, à raison des ports du littoral, de maintenir les bateaux-phares de Wielingen et de Wandelaar, ainsi que les bouées du chenal de Wielingen.

(s) Davignon.

(Voir pièce N° 50.)

#### N° 55.

*Télégramme adressé par le Ministre du Roi à La Haye, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

La Haye, 6 août 1914.

La navigation sur l'Escaut peut se faire dès l'aube et tant qu'il fait clair. Les bouées de

Wielingen seront rétablies. L'échange des pilotes à Hansweert est plus facile et mieux organisé. Insistez-vous pour Bath.

(s) Baron Fallon.

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N° 56.

*Télégramme adressé par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, à M. le Baron Fallon, Ministre du Roi à La Haye.*

Bruxelles, 7 août 1914.

Veillez exprimer au Gouvernement néerlandais les remerciements sincères du Gouvernement belge pour les mesures prises pour assurer la navigation sur l'Escaut. Le Gouvernement est d'accord avec le Gouvernement hollandais au sujet de la durée de la navigation. Il avait proposé Bath, mais accepte Hansweert, puisque ce port est mieux outillé pour l'échange des pilotes.

(s) Davignon.

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N° 57.

*Télégramme adressé par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Paris et à Londres.*

Bruxelles, 7 août 1914.

La Belgique souhaite que la guerre ne soit pas étendue en Afrique centrale. Le Gouverneur du Congo belge a reçu pour instructions d'observer une attitude strictement défensive. Priez le Gouvernement français (anglais) de faire savoir si son intention est de proclamer la neutralité au Congo français (colonies britanniques du bassin conventionnel du Congo), conformément à l'article onze de l'Acte général de Berlin. Un télégramme de Boma annonce que les hostilités sont probables entre Français et Allemands dans l'Ubangi.

(s) Davignon.

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N° 58.

*Lettre adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Paris et à Londres.*

Bruxelles, le 7 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Comme suite à mon télégramme de ce matin, j'ai l'honneur de vous prier de porter à la connaissance du Gouvernement français (anglais) l'information suivante:

Tout en prescrivant au Gouverneur Général du Congo de prendre des mesures de défense sur les frontières communes de la colonie belge et des colonies allemandes de l'Est africain et du Kameroun, le Gouvernement du Roi a invité ce haut fonctionnaire à s'abstenir de toute action offensive contre ces colonies.

Vu la mission civilisatrice commune aux nations colonisatrices, le Gouvernement belge désire, en effet, par un souci d'humanité, ne pas étendre le champ des hostilités à l'Afrique centrale. Il ne prendra donc point l'initiative d'infliger une pareille épreuve à la civilisation dans cette région et les forces militaires qu'il y possède n'entreront en action que dans le cas où elles devraient repousser une attaque directe contre ses possessions africaines.

J'attacherais du prix à savoir si le Gouvernement de la République (de S. M. britannique) partage cette manière de voir et, le cas échéant, s'il entre dans ses intentions, à l'occasion du conflit actuel, de se prévaloir de la disposition de l'article II de l'Acte général de Berlin pour placer sous le régime de la neutralité celles de ses colonies qui sont comprises dans le Bassin conventionnel du Congo.

J'adresse une communication identique à votre collègue à Londres (Paris).

Veillez agréer, etc.

(s) Davignon.

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N° 59.

*Lettre adressée par le Ministre du Roi à Paris à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Paris, le 8 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai eu l'honneur de parler au Président de la République de votre télégramme d'hier. Je l'avais reçu dans la soirée et l'avais immédiatement communiqué au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. On avait demandé à réfléchir avant de me répondre.

M. Poincaré m'a promis de parler de cette question aujourd'hui au Ministre des Colonies. A première vue, il ne verrait guère d'inconvénient à proclamer la neutralité du Congo français, mais il réserve cependant sa réponse. Il croit que des faits de guerre ont déjà éclaté dans l'Oubanghi. Il a profité de la circonstance pour me rappeler que la protection que nous accorde la France s'étend aussi à nos colonies et que nous n'avons rien à craindre.

Veillez agréer, etc.

(s) Baron Guillaume.

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N° 60.

*Télégramme adressé par le Ministre du Roi à La Haye à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

La Haye, 9 août 1914.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères m'a prié de vous transmettre les informations suivantes, parce que le Ministre d'Amérique à Bruxelles s'y refuse.

La forteresse de Liège a été prise d'assaut après une défense courageuse. Le Gouvernement Allemand regrette très profondément que par suite de l'attitude du Gouvernement belge contre l'Allemagne, on en est arrivé à des rencontres sanglantes. L'Allemagne ne vient pas en ennemie en Belgique, c'est seulement par la force des événements qu'elle a dû, à cause des mesures militaires de la France, prendre la grave détermination d'entrer en Belgique et d'occuper Liège comme point d'appui pour ses opérations militaires ultérieures. Après que l'armée belge a par sa résistance héroïque contre une grande supériorité, maintenu l'honneur de ses armes, le Gouvernement allemand prie le Roi des Belges et le Gouvernement belge d'éviter à la Belgique les horreurs ultérieures de la guerre. Le Gouvernement est prêt à tous accords avec la Belgique qui peuvent se concilier avec ses arrangements (voir pièce N° 70) avec la France. L'Allemagne assure encore solennellement qu'elle n'a pas l'intention de s'appropriier le ter-

ritoire belge et que cette intention est loin d'elle. L'Allemagne est toujours prête à évacuer la Belgique aussitôt que l'état de guerre le lui permettra.

L'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis avait prié son collègue de se charger de cette tentative de médiation. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères a accepté sans enthousiasme cette mission. Je m'en suis chargé pour lui faire plaisir.

(s) Baron Fallon.

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N° 61.

*Télégramme adressé par le Ministre du Roi à Paris à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Paris, 9 août 1914.

Le Gouvernement français est très disposé à proclamer la neutralité des possessions du Bassin conventionnel du Congo et prie l'Espagne de le proposer à Berlin.

(s.) Baron Guillaume.

(Voir pièce N° 59.)

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N° 62.

*Lettre adressée par le Ministre du Roi à La Haye, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

La Haye, le 10 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Répondant à un appel téléphonique, hier à 9 heures du soir, je me suis rendu au Département des Affaires Etrangères.

Le Jhr. Loudon m'a dit que mon collègue d'Allemagne sortait de son Cabinet et lui avait remis un document que le Représentant des Etats-Unis à Bruxelles avait refusé de vous transmettre.

Le diplomate américain, chargé de la Légation d'Allemagne à Bruxelles a prétendu qu'il n'a pas reçu d'ordres spéciaux de Washington pour intervenir officiellement auprès du Gouvernement belge dans l'intérêt de l'Allemagne.

Le Ministre d'Amérique a, en conséquence, télégraphié à son collègue à La Haye, lequel a informé le Représentant allemand du refus de Mr. Whitlock.

La première démarche a donc été faite par le Gouvernement allemand auprès de l'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à Berlin.

Dans ces conditions et vu l'urgence que présentent ces affaires, M. von Müller a prié le Jhr. Loudon de servir d'intermédiaire du Gouvernement allemand auprès de vous.

Son Excellence m'a lu le texte allemand du document. Je n'ai pas caché mon étonnement de cette tentative de médiation et sa faible chance de succès dans cette forme; mais uniquement pour être agréable au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères des Pays-Bas j'ai promis de vous télégraphier immédiatement; ce que j'ai fait hier.

Vous trouverez, sous ce pli, le document allemand dans son texte original et en traduction.

(s) Baron Fallon.

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1<sup>re</sup> ANNEXE AU N° 62.

Die Festung Lüttich ist nach tapferer Gegenwehr im Sturm genommen worden. Die Deutsche Regierung bedauert es auf das tiefste,

dass es infolge der Stellungnahme der Belgischen Regierung gegen Deutschland zu blütigen Zusammenstößen gekommen ist. Deutschland kommt nicht als Feind nach Belgien. Nur unter dem Zwang des Verhältnisses hat es angesichts der militärischen Massnahmen Frankreichs den schweren Entschluss fassen müssen, in Belgien einzurücken und Lüttich als Stützpunkt für seine weiteren militärischen Operationen besetzen zu müssen. Nachdem die Belgische Armee in heldenmütigem Widerstand gegen die grosse Ueberlegenheit ihre Waffenehre auf das glänzendste gewahrt hat, bittet die Deutsche Regierung seine Majestät den König und die Belgische Regierung, Belgien die weiteren Schrecken des Krieges zu ersparen. Die Deutsche Regierung ist zu jedem Abkommen mit Belgien bereit das sich irgendwie mit Rücksicht auf seine (voir pièce N° 70) Auseinandersetzung mit Frankreich vernügen lässt. Deutschland versichert nochmals feierlichst, dass es nicht von der Absicht geleitet gewesen ist sich Belgisches Gebiet anzueignen, und dass ihm diese Absicht durchaus fernliegt. Deutschland ist noch immer bereit das Belgische Königreich unverzüglich zu räumen, sobald die Kriegslage es ihm gestattet. «Der hiesige Amerikanische Botschafter ist mit diesem Vermittlungsversuch seines Brüsseler Kollegen einverstanden.»

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2<sup>me</sup> ANNEXE AU N° 62.

(Traduction.)

La forteresse de Liège a été prise d'assaut après une défense courageuse. Le Gouvernement allemand regrette le plus profondément que par suite de l'attitude du Gouvernement belge contre l'Allemagne on en soit arrivé à des rencontres sanglantes. L'Allemagne ne vient pas en ennemie en Belgique. C'est seulement par la force des événements qu'elle a dû, à cause des mesures militaires de la France, prendre la grave détermination d'entrer en Belgique et d'occuper Liège comme point d'appui pour ses opérations militaires ultérieures. Après que l'armée belge a, dans une résistance héroïque contre une grande supériorité, maintenu l'honneur de ses armes de la façon la plus brillante, le Gouvernement allemand prie Sa Majesté le Roi et le Gouvernement belge d'éviter à la Belgique les horreurs ultérieures de la guerre. Le Gouvernement allemand est prêt à tout accord avec la Belgique, qui peut se concilier de n'importe quelle manière avec ses arrangements avec la France. L'Allemagne assure encore une fois solennellement qu'elle n'a pas été dirigée par l'intention de s'approprier le territoire belge et que cette intention est loin d'elle. L'Allemagne est encore toujours prête à évacuer la Belgique aussitôt que l'état de la guerre le lui permettra.

L'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis ici est d'accord avec cette tentative de médiation de son collègue de Bruxelles.

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N° 63.

*Télégramme adressé par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, à M. le Baron Fallon, Ministre du Roi à La Haye.*

Bruxelles, le 10 août 1914.

Le Gouvernement du Roi a reçu les propositions que le Gouvernement allemand lui a



fait parvenir par l'entremise du gouvernement néerlandais. Il vous transmettra prochainement sa réponse.

(s) Davignon

(Voir pièce N° 62 et annexes.)

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N° 64.

*Télégramme adressé par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, au Ministre du Roi à La Haye.*

Bruxelles, 10 août 1914.

Un doute subsiste quant à la signification du mot «auseinandersetzung» que vous traduisez par «arrangement». Veuillez vous informer si dans la pensée du Gouvernement allemand il s'agit des arrangements que nous aurions pris avec la France ou du règlement du différend entre la France et l'Allemagne.

(s) Davignon.

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N° 65.

*Lettre adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, aux Ministres de Grande Bretagne, Russie et France, accrédités en Belgique.*

Bruxelles, le 10 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à Votre Excellence que le Ministre du Roi à La Haye, à la demande du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères des Pays-Bas, nous a transmis la proposition suivante du Gouvernement allemand (voir pièce N° 62, annexe 2).

Voici le texte de la réponse que le Gouvernement du Roi se propose de faire à cette communication :

«La proposition que nous fait le Gouvernement allemand reproduit la proposition qui avait été formulée dans l'ultimatum du 2 août. Fidèle à ses devoirs internationaux, la Belgique ne peut que réitérer sa réponse à cet ultimatum, d'autant plus que depuis le 3 août sa neutralité a été violée, qu'une guerre douloureuse a été portée sur son territoire et que les garants de sa neutralité ont loyalement et immédiatement répondu à son appel.»

Le Gouvernement du Roi tient à ce que les Puissances garantes de la neutralité de Belgique aient connaissance de ces documents. Je saisis, etc.

(s) Davignon.

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N° 66.

*Lettre adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Londres, Paris et Saint-Petersbourg.*

Bruxelles, le 10 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître les circonstances qui ont amené le départ de Luxembourg du Représentant du Roi.

Le général commandant des troupes allemandes dans le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg fit part, le 8 août, au Ministre d'Allemagne en cette ville, de la volonté des autorités militaires de provoquer le départ du Représentant du Roi près la Cour Grand Ducale.

M. von Buch adressa à M. Eyschen, Président du Gouvernement, une lettre dont la traduction suit:

«Luxembourg, le 8 août 1914.

Excellence,

En conséquence de l'attitude complètement hostile que la Belgique a prise vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne, les autorités militaires se voient contraintes d'insister pour le départ d'ici du Ministre de Belgique.

Son Excellence le général commandant fait prier le Comte van den Steen de Jehay, d'organiser son voyage de départ de telle façon qu'il puisse, endéans les 24 heures, entrer en relation personnellement à Coblenz avec le général de Ploetz, au sujet de son voyage ultérieur. Le départ n'est possible que par la voie Trèves-Coblenz.»

(s) de Buch.

M. Eyschen transmet cette lettre le même jour au Comte van den Steen de Jehay, dans les termes suivants :

«Luxembourg, le 8 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai le très vif regret de vous communiquer ci-joint copie d'une lettre du Ministre d'Allemagne m'informant que l'autorité militaire allemande demande votre départ.

Vous y trouverez les conditions y attachées.

M. von Buch me dit que les autorités militaires conseilleraient plutôt le voyage par chemin de fer, parce que le voyage par automobile vous exposerait à être arrêté trop souvent pour des motifs de contrôle. Mais le choix vous est abandonné.

Le Ministre d'Allemagne viendra chez moi prendre votre réponse.

Je ne saurais vous dire combien la tâche que je remplis en ce moment m'est pénible. Je n'oublierai jamais les relations si agréables que nous avons eues et je fais des vœux pour que votre voyage se fasse dans les meilleures conditions.

(s) Eyschen.»

Le Gouvernement belge estimant que le Gouvernement Grand Ducal n'avait pas eu le choix de son attitude et que celle qu'il avait été obligé d'adopter n'impliquait en aucune manière une intention discourtoise à l'égard du Roi et de la Belgique, décida qu'il n'y avait pas lieu, dans ces conditions, de prier le Chargé d'Affaires du Grand Duché de quitter la Belgique.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

(s) Davignon.

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N° 67.

*Lettre adressée à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, par le Ministre des Etats-Unis, accrédité à Bruxelles.*

Bruxelles, le 11 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

La Légation a reçu aujourd'hui de Washington une dépêche l'informant que le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis avait, à la demande du Gouvernement allemand, consenti à titre de courtoisie internationale, à accepter la protection des intérêts des sujets allemands en Belgique.

En vertu des instructions qui accompagnaient cette dépêche, nous nous occuperons donc, si vous n'y voyez pas d'inconvénient, d'exercer nos bons et amicaux offices auprès du Gouvernement du Roi, pour la protection des sujets allemands. Les agréables rapports que nous avons eus à ce sujet jusqu'à présent me donnent la conviction que c'est avec le même et mutuel sentiment que nous pourrions les poursuivre, dans le même but.

Je saisis cette occasion, Monsieur le Ministre, pour vous renouveler l'assurance de ma haute considération.

(s) Brand Whitlock.

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N° 68.

*Lettre adressée à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, par sir Francis H. Villiers, Ministre d'Angleterre.*

(Traduction.)

Bruxelles, le 11 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai télégraphié à Sir Edward Grey la communication allemande et la réponse projetée.

J'ai reçu l'ordre d'exprimer à Votre Excellence l'entière approbation du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique. Ce dernier ne peut que se déclarer d'accord sur les termes de la réponse que le Gouvernement belge se propose de faire à une tentative de semer la désunion, parmi les pays maintenant unis, pour la défense des Traités violés par l'Allemagne.

Je saisis, etc.

(s) F. H. Villiers.

(Voir pièce N° 65.)

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N° 69

*Lettre adressée à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, par le Ministre de France, accrédité à Bruxelles.*

Bruxelles, le 11 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement français donne son entière adhésion à la réponse que le gouvernement belge se propose de faire au nouvel ultimatum de l'Allemagne.

Cette réponse est bien celle qu'on pouvait attendre d'un Gouvernement et d'un peuple qui ont résisté aussi héroïquement à la violation odieuse de leur territoire.

La France continuera à remplir ses devoirs de garante de la neutralité belge et de fidèle amie de la Belgique.

Je saisis, etc.

(s) Klobukowski.

(Voir pièce N° 65.)

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N° 70.

*Télégramme adressé à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, par le Ministre du Roi à La Haye.*

La Haye, 12 août 1914.

Le texte allemand contenait une faute; au lieu de «seine auseinandersetzung» il faut lire

«ihre» et donc traduire «son conflit avec la France».

(s) Baron Fallon.

(Voir pièce N° 64.)

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N° 71.

*Télégramme adressé par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, à M. le Baron Fallon, Ministre du Roi à La Haye.*

Bruxelles, 12 août 1914.

Prière de remettre le télégramme suivant au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères : La proposition que nous fait le Gouvernement allemand reproduit la proposition qui avait été formulée dans l'ultimatum du 2 août. Fidèle à ses devoirs internationaux, la Belgique ne peut que réitérer sa réponse à cet ultimatum, d'autant plus que depuis le 3 août sa neutralité a été violée, qu'une guerre douloureuse a été portée sur son territoire et que les garants de sa neutralité ont loyalement et immédiatement répondu à son appel.

(s) Davignon.

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N° 72.

*Télégramme adressé à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, par S. E. M. Sazonoff, Président du Conseil des Ministres de Russie.*

Saint-Petersbourg, 13 août 1914

Veillez remercier le Gouvernement Royal pour sa communication et lui exprimer le plaisir que le Gouvernement Impérial éprouve à voir son attitude ferme et digne dont il le félicite très vivement.

(s) Sazonoff.

(Voir pièce N° 65.)

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N° 73.

*Lettre adressée à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, par le Ministre du Roi à La Haye.*

La Haye, le 13 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre télégramme d'hier et j'ai remis aussitôt à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères la réponse de la Belgique à la seconde proposition allemande.

Son Excellence m'a promis de faire parvenir immédiatement au Ministre d'Allemagne la communication du Gouvernement du Roi.

Veillez agréer, etc.

(s) Baron Fallon.

(Voir pièce N° 71.)

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N° 74.

*Lettre adressée par le Ministre du Roi à Paris à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Paris, le 16 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Au cours de l'entretien que j'ai eu ce matin avec M. de Margerie, j'ai amené la conversation sur les affaires coloniales et sur la dé-



marche que vous m'avez chargé de faire par votre télégramme et votre dépêche du 7 de ce mois.

Mon interlocuteur m'a rappelé que le Gouvernement de la République s'était adressé à l'Espagne qui n'avait pas donné réponse avant d'avoir l'avis de l'Angleterre. Il paraît que celle-ci continue à ne pas donner de réponse.

M. de Margerie estime qu'en présence de la situation actuelle, il importe de frapper l'Allemagne partout où on peut l'atteindre; il croit que telle est aussi l'opinion de l'Angleterre qui aura certes des prétentions à faire valoir; la France désire reprendre la partie du Congo, qu'elle a dû céder à la suite des incidents d'Agadir. Un succès, me dit mon interlocuteur, ne serait pas difficile à obtenir.

Veillez agréer, etc.

(s) Baron Guillaume.

(Voir pièces N<sup>os</sup> 57 et 58.)

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N<sup>o</sup> 75.

*Lettre adressée par le Ministre du Roi à Londres, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Londres, le 17 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

En réponse à votre dépêche du 7 août, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que le Gouvernement britannique ne peut se rallier à la proposition belge tendant à respecter la neutralité des possessions des Puissances belligérantes dans le bassin conventionnel du Congo.

Les troupes allemandes de l'Est Africain allemand ont déjà pris l'offensive contre le protectorat anglais de l'Afrique centrale. D'autre part, des troupes britanniques ont déjà attaqué le port allemand de Dar-Es-Salaam, où elles ont détruit la station de télégraphie sans fil.

Dans ces circonstances, même si le Gouvernement anglais était persuadé de l'utilité politique et stratégique de la proposition belge, il ne pourrait l'adopter.

Le Gouvernement de Londres croit que les forces qu'il envoie en Afrique seront suffisantes pour vaincre toute opposition. Il fera tous ses efforts pour empêcher des soulèvements dans la population indigène.

La France est du même avis que l'Angleterre, vu l'activité allemande que l'on remarque près de Bonar et Ekododo.

Veillez agréer, etc.

(s) Comte de Lalaing.

(Voir pièces N<sup>os</sup> 57 et 58.)

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N<sup>o</sup> 76.

*Télégramme adressé par le Vice-Gouverneur du Katanga à M. Renkin, Ministre des Colonies.*

Elisabethville, 26 août 1914.

Allemands continuant leurs escarmouches au Tanganika ont attaqué le 22 août le port de Lukuga. Ils ont eu deux noirs tués et deux blessés. De nouvelles attaques sont attendues.

(s) Tombeur.

N<sup>o</sup> 77.

*Télégramme adressé par le Comte Clary et Aldringen, Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, et transmis par l'intermédiaire du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères des Pays-Bas.*

La Haye, le 28 août 1914.

D'ordre de mon Gouvernement j'ai l'honneur de notifier à Votre Excellence ce qui suit : «Vu que la Belgique, après avoir refusé d'accepter les propositions qui lui avaient été adressées à plusieurs reprises par l'Allemagne, prête sa coopération militaire à la France et à la Grande-Bretagne qui, toutes deux ont déclaré la guerre à l'Autriche-Hongrie, et en présence du fait que, comme il vient d'être constaté, les ressortissants autrichiens et hongrois se trouvant en Belgique ont sous les yeux des autorités Royales, dû subir un traitement contraire aux exigences les plus primitives de l'humanité et inadmissible même vis-à-vis des sujets d'un Etat ennemi, l'Autriche-Hongrie se voit dans la nécessité de rompre les relations diplomatiques et se considère dès ce moment en état de guerre avec la Belgique. Je quitte le pays avec le personnel de la Légation et confie la protection de mes administrés au Ministre des Etats-Unis d'Amérique en Belgique. De la part du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal les passeports sont remis au Comte Errembault de Dudzeele.»

(s) Clary.

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N<sup>o</sup> 78.

*Télégramme adressé par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à M. le Baron Fallon, Ministre du Roi à La Haye.*

Anvers, le 29 août 1914.

Prière accuser réception à Légation Autriche par intermédiaire Ministre Affaires Etrangères déclaration de guerre Autriche-Hongrie à Belgique et ajouter ce qui suit:

«La Belgique a toujours entretenu des relations d'amitié avec tous ses voisins sans distinction. Elle a scrupuleusement rempli les devoirs que la neutralité lui impose. Si elle n'a pas cru pouvoir accepter les propositions de l'Allemagne, c'est que celles-ci avaient pour objet la violation des engagements qu'elle a pris à la face de l'Europe, engagements qui ont été les conditions de la création du Royaume de Belgique. Elle n'a pas cru qu'un peuple, quelque faible qu'il soit, puisse méconnaître ses devoirs et sacrifier son honneur en s'inclinant devant la force. Le Gouvernement a attendu, non seulement les délais de l'ultimatum, mais la violation de son territoire par les troupes allemandes avant de faire appel à la France et à l'Angleterre, garantes de sa neutralité au même titre que l'Allemagne et l'Autriche-Hongrie, pour coopérer au nom et en vertu des traités à la défense du territoire belge.

En repoussant par les armes les envahisseurs, elle n'a même pas accompli un acte d'hostilité aux termes de l'article 10 de la convention de La Haye, sur les droits et devoirs des Puissances neutres.

L'Allemagne a reconnu elle-même que son agression constitue une violation du droit des gens et ne pouvant la justifier elle a invoqué son intérêt stratégique.

La Belgique oppose un démenti formel à l'affirmation que les ressortissants autrichiens et hongrois auraient subi en Belgique un traitement contraire aux exigences les plus primitives de l'humanité.

Le Gouvernement Royal a donné, dès le début des hostilités, les ordres les plus stricts quant à la sauvegarde des personnes et des propriétés austro-hongroises.

(s) Davignon.

## N° 79

*Lettre adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, aux Légations du Roi à l'étranger.*

Anvers, le 29 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Sous la date du 17 août, j'ai adressé au Ministre du Roi à Londres une lettre dans laquelle j'ai cru devoir relever certaines allégations produites par le Gouvernement allemand, et dont faisait mention le *Blue Book* publié récemment par le Gouvernement anglais.

J'ai l'honneur de placer sous vos yeux une copie de cette lettre et de ses annexes. Veuillez, je vous prie, en donner connaissance au Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

(s) Davignon.

### 1<sup>re</sup> ANNEXE AU N° 79.

*Lettre adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, au Comte de Lalaing, Ministre du Roi à Londres.*

Bruxelles, le 17 août 1914.

Monsieur le Comte,

Le *Blue Book* publié récemment par le Gouvernement britannique reproduit, sous le n° 122 (page 65), le texte d'un télégramme adressé de Berlin, le 31 juillet, par Sir E. Groschen à Sir E. Grey, télégramme dont j'extrais le passage suivant :

« It appears from what he (His Excellency the Secretary of State) said that German Government consider that certain hostile acts have been already committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn of Germany had been placed under an embargo already ready. »

Le fait auquel le Secrétaire d'Etat allemand des Affaires Etrangères a fait allusion dans son entretien avec Sir E. Groschen, et qu'il considérait comme un acte hostile de la part de la Belgique, se rapporte sans doute à l'application des arrêtés royaux du 30 juillet, qui ont prohibé provisoirement l'exportation de Belgique de certains produits. Comme vous le constaterez par l'exposé que je tiens à vous faire ci-après, le fait qui nous est reproché n'a nullement le caractère qu'on a voulu lui donner en Allemagne.

Des arrêtés royaux datés du 30 juillet et publiés au *Moniteur belge* du lendemain ont prohibé à titre provisoire, par toutes les frontières de terre et de mer, l'exportation d'une série de produits, des céréales notamment. Sous la date du 31 juillet, M. le Ministre d'Allemagne à Bruxelles me signala que la douane d'Anvers retenait des chargements de grains à destination de l'Allemagne qui, simplement transbordés dans notre port, ne faisaient en réalité qu'y transiter. M. de Below Saleske demandait la libre sortie des bateaux portant ces chargements. Le jour même où il recut la réclamation du Ministre d'Allemagne, mon Département en saisit le Ministre des Finances, et dès le surlendemain 2 août, celui-ci nous annonça qu'il avait été transmis à la douane belge des instructions donnant pleine et entière satisfaction à l'Allemagne.

Je crois ne pouvoir mieux faire, Monsieur le Comte, que de placer sous vos yeux une copie de la correspondance échangée à ce sujet avec M. de Below Saleske. Vous y verrez que rien dans notre attitude ne pouvait être considéré comme témoignant de dispositions hostiles à l'égard de l'Allemagne ; les mesures prises par le Gouvernement belge à ce moment ne constituaient que les simples précautions que tout Etat a le droit et le devoir de prendre dans des circonstances aussi exceptionnelles.

Il serait bon que vous adressiez au Gouvernement de S. M. Britannique une communication afin de l'éclairer sur la réalité des faits.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

(s) Davignon.

### 2<sup>me</sup> ANNEXE AU N° 79.

*Lettre adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, à M. de Below Saleske, Ministre d'Allemagne.*

Bruxelles, 3 août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Comme suite à la lettre que Votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser le 31 juillet j'ai l'honneur de Lui faire savoir que mon collègue des Finances a porté à la connaissance du service des douanes que les prohibitions établies par les arrêtés royaux du 30 juillet écoulé ne visent que l'exportation proprement dite et ne s'étendent donc pas aux marchandises régulièrement déclarées en transit lors de l'importation. Au surplus, lorsque des marchandises libres de droits sont déclarées en consommation, bien qu'elles soient en réalité destinées à l'exportation, elles font communément l'objet de déclarations de libre entrée spéciales, qui sont considérées comme des documents de transit. Enfin, s'il arrivait que de telles marchandises aient été déclarées en consommation sans restrictions, comme si elles devaient rester effectivement dans le pays, la douane en permettrait encore la sortie du moment où il serait dûment établi, par les documents d'expédition-manifestes, connaissements, etc., qu'elles devaient être exportées immédiatement en transit.

Je puis ajouter que l'exportation des grains auxquels se rapportait la lettre précitée de la Légation Impériale a été autorisée le 1<sup>er</sup> août.

Je saisis, etc.

(s) Davignon.

3<sup>me</sup> ANNEXE AU N<sup>o</sup> 79.

*Lettre adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, à M. de Below Saleske, Ministre d'Allemagne.*

Bruxelles, le 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

En réponse à la lettre de Votre Excellence du 31 juillet, j'ai l'honneur de Lui faire savoir que l'arrêté belge du 30 juillet ne vise que l'exportation et non le transit des produits cités.

J'ai eu soin de faire part de votre communication à mon collègue des Finances, en le priant de vouloir bien donner aux bureaux de la douane des instructions précises de nature à prévenir toute erreur dans l'application de l'arrêté précité.

Je saisis, etc.

(s) Davignon.

4<sup>me</sup> ANNEXE AU N<sup>o</sup> 79.

*Lettre adressée par M. de Below Saleske, ministre d'Allemagne, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

Bruxelles, le 31 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

On m'a informé d'Anvers que la douane a défendu le départ des bateaux chargés de grains pour l'Allemagne.

Vu qu'il ne s'agit pas dans ces cas d'une *exportation* de grains, mais d'un *transit*, parce que la marchandise a été seulement transbordée à Anvers, j'ai l'honneur de recourir à votre bienveillante entremise afin qu'on laisse partir pour l'Allemagne les bateaux en question.

En même temps, je prie Votre Excellence de me faire savoir si le port d'Anvers est fermé pour le transit des marchandises énumérées au *Moniteur* d'aujourd'hui.

En attendant la réponse de Votre Excellence dans le plus bref délai possible, je profite de cette occasion, etc.

(s) de Below Saleske.

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MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES

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1914

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LA GUERRE EUROPÉENNE

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I

PIÈCES

RELATIVES AUX NÉGOCIATIONS  
QUI ONT PRÉCÉDÉ LES DÉCLARATIONS DE GUERRE  
DE L'ALLEMAGNE À LA RUSSIE (1<sup>er</sup> AOÛT 1914)  
ET À LA FRANCE (3 AOÛT 1914)  
DÉCLARATION DU 4 SEPTEMBRE 1914



PARIS  
IMPRIMERIE NATIONALE

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MDCCCXIV



**MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES**

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**GUERRE EUROPÉENNE**





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(Du vendredi 24 juillet au samedi 25 juillet.)

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## LA GUERRE EUROPÉENNE

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DÉCLARATION DU 4 SEPTEMBRE 1914



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**LA GUERRE EUROPÉENNE**



**1914**

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# **CHAPITRE PREMIER**

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## **AVERTISSEMENTS**

**(1913)**



N° 1.

**M. JULES CAMBON**, Ambassadeur de la République à Berlin,  
à **M. JONNART**, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

Berlin, le 17 mars 1913.

Nos attachés militaire et naval adressent à leurs Ministres respectifs des rapports sur la nouvelle loi militaire allemande. J'appelle l'attention de Votre Excellence sur ces importants documents.

L'étude des moyens financiers destinés à pourvoir aux mesures militaires que l'Allemagne a en vue retarde seule la publication des propositions définitives du Gouvernement. Malgré le patriotisme affecté avec lequel les classes riches acceptent le sacrifice qui leur sera demandé, elles n'en sont pas moins, particulièrement dans le monde des affaires, mécontentes des mesures financières annoncées, et elles sentent qu'une contribution forcée, imposée en pleine paix, crée pour l'avenir un précédent redoutable. D'autre part, les Gouvernements confédérés ont opposé une vive résistance à l'innovation qui attribuera à l'Empire des ressources tirées de l'impôt direct. Jusqu'ici les impôts de cette nature étaient réservés aux États confédérés, et ceux-ci voient dans l'abandon de cette règle une affirmation nouvelle de la personnalité de l'Empire, qui constitue une certaine diminution de leur propre souveraineté.

Quoi qu'il en soit, en augmentant la force de l'armée allemande, l'Empire veut ne rien laisser à l'imprévu, au cas où une crise éclaterait.

Les innovations de l'Allemagne ont fait surgir un fait inattendu pour elle : la proposition du Gouvernement de la République rétablissant le service de trois ans, et la résolution virile avec laquelle cette proposition a été accueillie en France. L'impression d'étonnement que ces projets ont produite a été mise à profit par le Gouvernement Impérial pour insister sur la nécessité absolue de l'augmentation des forces militaires de l'Allemagne; ses projets ont été présentés comme une réponse. C'est le contraire de la vérité, puisque l'immense effort militaire que la France accepte n'est que la conséquence des initiatives de l'Allemagne.

Les Autorités Impériales ne cessent d'exalter le sentiment patriotique. L'Empereur se complait à rappeler tous les jours les souvenirs de 1813. Hier soir, une retraite militaire a parcouru les rues de Berlin et des discours ont été prononcés dans lesquels

la situation présente était assimilée à celle d'il y a un siècle. L'entraînement de l'opinion aura sa répercussion dans les discussions qui s'ouvriront le mois prochain au Reichstag, et j'ai lieu de craindre que le Chancelier lui-même ne soit poussé à faire dans ses déclarations des allusions aux relations de la France et de l'Allemagne. Il fallait s'attendre à ce qu'on exaltât le patriotisme de la nation au moment où on demande de nouveaux sacrifices, mais c'est abuser du rapprochement historique que de comparer le temps présent à 1813. Si le mouvement qui, il y a un siècle, emportait le peuple allemand contre l'homme de génie qui aspirait à la domination universelle, pouvait trouver aujourd'hui quelque équivalent, c'est en France qu'il faudrait chercher, puisque le peuple français ne songe qu'à se défendre contre domination de la force.

Il n'en est pas moins vrai que cet état de l'opinion dans les deux pays rend situation grave.

JULES CAMBON.

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#### ANNEXE I.

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**RAPPORT du Lieutenant-Colonel SERRET, Attaché militaire près l'Ambassade  
de la République Française à Berlin,  
à M. ÉTIENNE, Ministre de la Guerre.**

Berlin, le 15 mars 1913.

Le mouvement patriotique qui s'est manifesté en France a causé dans certains milieux une véritable colère.

Je ne prétends certes pas que l'article virulent de la *Gazette de Cologne* soit l'expression d'un sentiment général. C'est l'explosion de rage d'un journaliste impulsif, aussitôt désavoué par le Gouvernement.

Mais, malgré son inconvenance, la manifestation de la *Gazette de Cologne* n'est pas négligeable; elle a été approuvée dans son esprit, sinon dans sa forme, par plusieurs journaux assez importants, et elle me paraît correspondre à un sentiment réel, à une colère latente.

Il est intéressant de le constater, parce que le sens des armements actuels s'en trouve éclairé d'une lumière plus vive.

Depuis quelque temps déjà, on rencontre des gens qui déclarent les projets militaires de la France extraordinaires et injustifiés. Dans un salon, un membre du Reichstag et non un énergumène, parlant du service de trois ans en France, allait jusqu'à dire : « C'est une provocation, nous ne le permettrons pas ». De plus modérés, militaires ou civils, soutiennent couramment la thèse que la France, avec ses quarante millions d'âmes, n'a pas le droit de rivaliser ainsi avec l'Allemagne.

En somme, on est furieux, et cette colère ne résulte pas des criaileries de certaines feuilles françaises auxquelles les gens sérieux ne s'arrêtent guère. C'est du dépit. On enrage de voir que, malgré l'effort énorme entrepris l'année dernière, continué et accru encore



cette année, on ne pourra probablement pas encore cette fois mettre la France hors de course.

Nous mettre définitivement hors de course, puisque nous ne voulons ni ne pouvons être avec elle, c'est cela en effet que poursuit l'Allemagne. On ne saurait trop le répéter et la prochaine loi, que l'opinion française regarde un peu trop comme une explosion spontanée, n'est que la suite fatale, attendue, de la loi de juin 1912.

Celle-ci, en effet, en créant deux corps d'armée nouveaux, avait laissé à dessein, suivant la manière allemande, de grandes unités et des régiments incomplets. Il était évident qu'on n'attendrait pas longtemps pour combler les lacunes<sup>(1)</sup>. La crise balkanique a fourni une merveilleuse occasion, éclatant juste à point voulu, pour permettre d'exploiter le centenaire des guerres de délivrance, d'obtenir plus facilement des sacrifices au souvenir de ceux consentis naguère, déjà contre nous.

Pour bien montrer la genèse de ce programme militaire, je me permets de rappeler ce qu'écrivait, il y a un an, lors de l'apparition de la loi de 1912, mon prédécesseur, le colonel Pellé :

« Nous découvrons tous les jours combien sont profonds et durables les sentiments d'orgueil froissé et de rancunes contre nous provoqués par les événements de l'an dernier.

• Le traité du 4 novembre 1911 est une profonde désillusion.

• Le ressentiment éprouvé dans toutes les parties du pays est le même. Tous les Allemands, jusqu'aux socialistes, nous en veulent de leur avoir pris leur part au Maroc.

• Il semblait, il y a un ou deux ans, que les Allemands fussent partis à la conquête du monde. Ils s'estimaient assez forts pour que personne n'osât entamer la lutte contre eux. Des possibilités indéfinies s'ouvraient à l'industrie allemande, au commerce allemand, à l'expansion allemande. »

• Naturellement, ces idées et ces ambitions n'ont pas disparu aujourd'hui. Les Allemands ont toujours besoin de débouchés, d'expansion économique et coloniale. Ils estiment qu'ils y ont droit parce qu'ils grandissent tous les jours, parce que l'avenir leur appartient. Ils nous regardent, avec nos 40 millions d'habitants, comme une nation secondaire.

• Dans la crise de 1911, cette nation secondaire leur a tenu tête, et l'Empereur et le Gouvernement ont cédé. L'opinion publique ne l'a pardonné ni à eux, ni à nous. *Elle ne veut pas qu'un pareil fait puisse se reproduire.* »

Et au moment où la seconde et formidable partie du programme va être réalisée, où la force militaire allemande est sur le point d'acquiescer cette supériorité définitive qui nous forcerait à subir, le cas échéant, l'humiliation ou l'écrasement, voici que soudain la France refuse d'abdiquer, et qu'elle montre, comme disait Renan, « son pouvoir éternel de renaissance et de résurrection ». On comprend à merveille le dépit allemand.

Sans doute le Gouvernement invoque la situation générale de l'Europe et parle du péril slave. Pour ma part, l'opinion me semble en réalité indifférente au péril slave et cependant elle a accepté avec une très belle tenue, sinon plus, les charges énormes de ces deux lois consécutives.

Le 10 mars dernier, centenaire de l'organisation de la levée en masse de l'Allemagne contre nous, une foule énorme s'est pressée, malgré une pluie battante, à la parade militaire devant le château, au milieu du Tiergarten devant les statues de la reine Louise et de Frédéric-Guillaume III, entourées de monceaux de fleurs.

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<sup>(1)</sup> Le problème qui nous est posé aujourd'hui se serait donc posé quelques années plus tard et d'une manière plus angoissante encore, puisque la diminution de nos contingents amoindrirait sans cesse le chiffre de notre effectif de paix.

Ces anniversaires, rappelant la lutte contre la France, vont se répéter toute l'année. En 1914 on célébrera le centenaire de la première campagne de France, de la première entrée des Prussiens à Paris.

En résumé, si l'opinion publique allemande ne montre pas la France du doigt, comme le fait la *Gazette de Cologne*, c'est cependant contre nous qu'elle est et restera longtemps braquée. Elle trouve que pour nos 40 millions d'habitants nous tenons au soleil une place vraiment trop grande.

Les Allemands désirent la paix, ne cesse-t-on de proclamer, et l'Empereur plus que tout autre, mais ils ne l'entendent pas dans le sens de concessions mutuelles ni d'équilibre des armements. Ils veulent qu'on les craigne et ils sont en train de faire les sacrifices nécessaires. Si, à quelque occasion, leur orgueil national se trouve blessé, la confiance que pourra avoir le pays dans l'énorme supériorité de son armée favorisera une explosion de colère nationale devant laquelle la modération du Gouvernement impérial sera peut-être impuissante.

Il faut constater d'ailleurs que le Gouvernement met tout en œuvre pour chauffer le sentiment national, en fêtant avec éclat tous les anniversaires de 1813.

Au reste, le tournure de l'opinion n'aurait pour effet que de donner à une guerre un caractère plus ou moins national. Par quelque prétexte que l'Allemagne justifie une conflagration européenne, nul ne peut faire que les premiers coups décisifs ne soient pas portés contre la France.

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## ANNEXE II.

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M. DE FARAMOND, attaché naval près l'Ambassade de France à Berlin,  
à M. BAUDIN, Ministre de la Marine.

Berlin, le 15 mars 1913.

En vous rendant compte de l'examen du budget de la marine par la Commission du Reichstag, j'ai dit qu'aucune loi navale ayant pour objet un accroissement de la flotte ne serait présentée cette année et que tout l'effort militaire serait dirigé contre nous.

Bien que le nouveau projet de loi destiné à augmenter les effectifs allemands ne soit pas encore déposé devant le Reichstag, nous savons qu'il s'agit d'un « renforcement militaire de grande envergure », suivant l'expression de la *Gazette de l'Allemagne du Nord*.

Les journaux officiels ont d'ailleurs commenté le projet militaire dans des termes qui permettent de tenir pour exact le communiqué du *Lokal Anzeiger*.

Les effectifs allemands s'élèvent actuellement à 720,000 hommes; nous sommes autorisés à conclure que, le 1<sup>er</sup> octobre 1914, l'armée impériale sera portée à un chiffre voisin de 860,000 hommes.

L'importance du chiffre serait moindre si les prévisions de la nouvelle loi (d'après ce que nous ont laissé entrevoir les feuilles officielles) n'avaient pas pour tendance, comme du reste les dispositions de la loi de 1912, de mettre les corps d'armée voisins de notre frontière

dans un état aussi rapproché que possible du pied de guerre, afin de pouvoir, le jour même de l'ouverture des hostilités, nous attaquer brusquement avec des forces très supérieures aux nôtres. C'est pour le Gouvernement impérial une nécessité impérieuse d'obtenir un succès dès le début des opérations.

Les conditions dans lesquelles l'Empereur allemand engagerait aujourd'hui une lutte contre la France ne sont plus les mêmes qu'il y a quarante ans. Au début de la guerre de 1870, l'État-Major prussien avait envisagé la possibilité d'une offensive victorieuse des Français et Moltke, prévoyant que nous pourrions à la rigueur parvenir jusqu'à Mayence, avait dit à son souverain : « Là ils se heurteront ». Guillaume II ne peut pas admettre une retraite dans ses calculs, quoique le soldat allemand ne soit plus aujourd'hui, comme il y a quarante ans, un homme simple, religieux et prêt à mourir sur un ordre de son roi. Tenant compte des quatre millions de suffrages socialistes exprimés aux dernières élections et du fait que le droit de vote n'est acquis en Allemagne qu'à 25 ans, on peut penser que l'armée active, composée de jeunes gens de 20 à 25 ans, doit comporter dans ses rangs une proportion sérieuse de socialistes.

Certes, ce serait folie de croire que les socialistes allemands lèveront la crosse en l'air le jour où la France et l'Allemagne en viendront aux mains; mais il sera extrêmement important, pour le Gouvernement impérial de leur persuader, d'une part que nous sommes les agresseurs, et d'autre part qu'ils peuvent avoir pleine confiance dans le commandement et le résultat.

Lors du dernier serment des recrues de la garde à Potsdam, j'ai été frappé d'entendre l'Empereur prendre pour thème de son discours aux jeunes soldats « le devoir d'être plus courageux et plus discipliné dans la mauvaise fortune que dans la bonne ».

Et c'est parce qu'une première défaite allemande aurait pour l'Empire une portée incalculable que l'on trouve dans tous les projets militaires élaborés par le grand État-Major l'objectif d'une offensive foudroyante contre la France.

En réalité, le Gouvernement impérial veut se mettre en état de faire face à toutes les éventualités possibles. C'est du côté de la France que le danger lui paraît le plus grand. La *Gazette de Cologne* l'a dit dans un article haineux et violent dont la Wilhelmstrasse a désavoué la forme plutôt que le fond.

Mais nous devons nous persuader que l'opinion exprimée par la *Gazette de Cologne* est à l'heure actuelle celle de l'immense majorité du peuple allemand.

A cet égard, je crois intéressant de citer une conversation qu'un membre de notre ambassade a eue l'autre soir avec le vieux prince Henckel de Donnersmark, parce qu'elle pourrait bien refléter la pensée qui domine dans les milieux de la Cour.

Faisant allusion au nouveau projet militaire allemand, le prince de Donnersmark a dit : « Les Français ont tout à fait tort de croire que nous nourrissons de sombres desseins et que nous désirons une guerre. Mais nous ne pouvons pas oublier qu'en 1870 l'opinion populaire a forcé le Gouvernement Français à nous attaquer follement, sans être prêt. Qui peut nous assurer que l'opinion publique, si prompt à s'enflammer en France, ne mettra pas quelque jour le Gouvernement de la République dans l'obligation de nous faire la guerre? C'est contre ce danger que nous voulons nous prémunir ».

Et le prince a ajouté : « On m'a souvent regardé en France comme un des artisans de la guerre de 1870. Cela est tout à fait faux. Si j'ai travaillé aux conséquences de la guerre, j'avais au contraire fait mon possible pour en empêcher l'explosion. Quelque temps avant la guerre, me trouvant à un dîner où étaient réunies les personnalités les plus considérables du régime impérial, je pris la parole pour déplorer les sentiments d'inimitié qui se manifestaient déjà entre la France et la Prusse. On me répondit que si je parlais ainsi, c'est que

j'avais peur d'une lutte dont l'issue serait certainement défavorable à la Prusse. Je répliquai : « Non, ce n'est pas parce que j'ai peur que je répudie l'idée d'une guerre entre la France et la Prusse, mais bien parce que je crois qu'il est de l'intérêt des deux pays de l'éviter. Et puisque vous avez fait allusion aux chances d'une telle lutte, je vais vous dire mon opinion. J'ai la conviction que vous serez battus pour la raison que voici : en dépit des brillantes qualités que je reconnais aux Français et que j'admire, vous n'êtes pas exacts. Par exactitude, je n'entends pas le fait d'arriver à l'heure à un rendez-vous, mais j'entends la ponctualité dans toute l'étendue du mot. Le Français, qui a une grande facilité de travail, n'est pas aussi ponctuel que l'Allemand dans l'accomplissement de ses devoirs. Dans la prochaine guerre, la nation victorieuse sera celle dont tous les serviteurs du haut en bas de l'échelle seront exacts à remplir leur devoir, si important ou si infime que soit ce devoir. » Et le prince de Donnersmark a ajouté : « La ponctualité, qui a joué un si grand rôle lorsqu'il s'est agi, il y a quarante ans, de mouvoir une armée de 500,000 hommes, aura une importance encore bien plus grande au cours de la prochaine guerre où l'on devra mettre en action des masses autrement nombreuses ».

Sous cette forme, le vieux prince a exprimé la confiance qu'ont tous les Allemands dans la supériorité de leur organisation militaire.

Lorsque j'ai parlé plus haut du nouveau projet allemand, je n'ai fait allusion qu'à un accroissement des effectifs. Mais le projet comportera aussi une augmentation du matériel et des ouvrages de défense dont le détail n'est pas connu, mais dont on peut se faire une idée par le chiffre des dépenses envisagées pour y faire face : 1,250,000,000 de francs.

L'exécution de la loi du quinquennat de 1911 n'avait pas nécessité de mesure financière spéciale.

La loi militaire et navale de 1912 avait été provisoirement couverte par les excédents budgétaires des années 1910 et 1911, par une réforme de la loi sur l'alcool et par l'ajournement de l'abaissement de l'impôt sur les sucres (ces deux dernières ressources ne représentent d'ailleurs ensemble qu'une somme d'une soixantaine de millions de francs).

Il faut en outre rappeler que de gros emprunts ont été fait récemment par l'Empire et la Prusse : cinq cents millions de marks le 29 janvier 1912 et trois cent cinquante millions de marks le 7 mars 1913. Une part assez importante de ces emprunts a dû être affectée aux dépenses militaires.

La loi militaire de 1913 exigera des mesures financières tout à fait exceptionnelles.

D'après les indications données par la presse officieuse, les dépenses dites « d'une fois » s'élèveraient à un milliard de marks et les dépenses « permanentes » annuelles résultant de l'augmentation des effectifs dépasseraient deux cents millions de marks.

Il paraît à peu près certain que les dépenses non renouvelables seront couvertes par une contribution de guerre prélevée sur le capital. On exempterait les petites fortunes et l'on frapperait d'une taxe progressive les fortunes supérieures à 20,000 marks. Présenté sous cette forme l'impôt de guerre ne saurait déplaire aux socialistes, qui pourront ainsi, suivant leur tactique habituelle, repousser le principe de la loi militaire et voter les crédits qui en assurent l'exécution.

Le Gouvernement craint que parmi les classes riches et bourgeoises, cette imposition extraordinaire d'un milliard portant exclusivement sur la fortune acquise ne crée un durable mécontentement; aussi fait-il tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour persuader ceux qu'il va rançonner si durement que la sécurité de l'Empire est menacée et pour établir une analogie entre les temps belliqueux de 1813 et la période actuelle.

En fêtant bruyamment le centenaire de la guerre de l'Indépendance, on veut convaincre

le peuple de la nécessité du sacrifice et lui rappeler que la France est, aujourd'hui, comme il y a cent ans, l'ennemi héréditaire.

Si nous constatons que le Gouvernement allemand s'efforce d'obtenir que cette énorme taxe ne soit pas acquittée en plusieurs échéances; et si comme le disent certains journaux, le paiement intégral devait être réalisé avant le 1<sup>er</sup> juillet 1914, il y aurait là pour nous une indication redoutable, car rien ne saurait expliquer une telle hâte des autorités militaires à posséder un trésor de guerre liquide d'un milliard dans leur caisse.

En ce qui concerne la couverture des dépenses permanentes qui résulteront de l'application des lois de 1912 et 1913, rien n'a encore été dit. Une nouvelle législation sera évidemment nécessaire pour procurer les ressources annuelles.

Je conclus : en Allemagne l'exécution d'une réforme militaire suit toujours de très près la décision prise de l'accomplir. Toutes les dispositions nouvelles prévues par la loi du quinquennat de 1911 et par la loi de 1912 sont déjà mises en vigueur. Il est fort possible qu'une partie du matériel dont la nouvelle loi va autoriser l'achat soit en cours de fabrication. Les secrets militaires sont si bien gardés ici qu'il est extrêmement difficile de suivre les mouvements du personnel et du matériel.

Avec 700,000 hommes sous les armes (sans compter les réservistes fort nombreux qui sont actuellement en instruction) une organisation militaire parfaite et une opinion publique qui se laisse dominer par les appels belliqueux de la Ligue militaire et de la Ligue navale, le peuple allemand est à cette heure un voisin bien dangereux.

Si le service de trois ans est adopté et immédiatement appliqué en France, les conditions seront moins inégales l'an prochain. Les effectifs allemands seront encore sensiblement plus considérables que les nôtres, mais l'appel de tout le contingent disponible ne permettra plus la sélection et amènera dans les rangs de l'armée allemande des éléments de second ordre et même des unités peu désirables. La valeur morale de l'armée active y perdra.

Les Allemands ont voulu rompre l'équilibre des deux camps qui divisent l'Europe, par un grand effort suprême, au delà duquel ils ne peuvent plus grand'chose.

Ils n'avaient pas cru la France capable d'un grand sacrifice. L'adoption du service de trois ans chez nous déjouera leurs calculs.

FARAMOND.

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## N° 2.

M. ÉTIENNE, Ministre de la Guerre,

à M. JONNART, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Paris, le 2 avril 1913.

Je viens de recevoir d'une source sûre communication d'un rapport officiel et secret sur le renforcement de l'armée allemande : il se divise en deux parties : une première de généralités, et une seconde, d'ordre technique, précisant dans le plus grand

détail, arme par arme, les mesures à prendre ; ce qui concerne l'emploi des automobiles et l'utilisation de l'aéronautique est particulièrement frappant.

J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser ci-joint une copie de la première partie de ce document, qui me paraît devoir retenir votre attention.

ÉTIENNE.

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ANNEXE.

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*NOTE sur le renforcement de l'armée allemande.*

Berlin, le 19 mars 1913.

I. — GÉNÉRALITÉS SUR LES NOUVELLES LOIS MILITAIRES.

L'augmentation a eu lieu en trois étapes :

1° La Conférence d'Algésiras a enlevé les derniers doutes sur l'existence d'une entente entre la France, l'Angleterre et la Russie. Nous avons vu, d'autre part, que l'Autriche-Hongrie était obligée d'immobiliser des forces contre la Serbie et l'Italie ; enfin, notre flotte n'était pas, à ce moment-là, assez forte. A la fin du conflit, on s'occupa donc en première ligne de renforcer la défense de nos côtes, d'augmenter notre force navale. Contre l'intention anglaise d'envoyer un corps d'expédition de 100,000 hommes sur le continent, on devait répondre par une meilleure formation des réserves qui devaient être employées, d'après les circonstances, au service sur les côtes, dans les forteresses et dans les sièges. Il était clair déjà à cette époque qu'il serait indispensable de faire un grand effort.

2° Les Français ayant violé les conventions marocaines, amenèrent l'incident d'Agadir. A cette époque, les progrès de l'armée française, le relèvement moral de la nation, l'avance technique prise dans le domaine de l'aviation et dans celui des mitrailleuses, rendait une attaque contre les Français moins facile que dans la période précédente. De plus, il fallait s'attendre à une attaque de la flotte anglaise. Cette situation difficile ouvrit les yeux sur la nécessité d'une augmentation de l'armée. Cette augmentation fut, dès cette époque, considérée comme un minimum.

3° La guerre des Balkans aurait pu nous entraîner à la guerre pour soutenir notre allié. La nouvelle situation au sud de l'Autriche-Hongrie diminuait la valeur de l'aide que cet allié pouvait nous apporter. D'autre part, la France s'était renforcée par une nouvelle loi des cadres ; il fallait donc avancer les dates d'exécution prévues pour la nouvelle loi militaire.

On prépare l'opinion à un renforcement nouveau de l'armée active, qui assurerait à l'Allemagne une paix honorable, et la possibilité de garantir comme il convient son influence dans les affaires du monde. La nouvelle loi militaire et le complément qui doit la suivre, permettront presque complètement de répondre à ce but.

Ni les ridicules criailleries de revanche des chauvinistes français, ni les grincements de dents des Anglais, ni les gestes désordonnés des Slaves ne nous détourneront de notre but qui est de fortifier et d'étendre le Deutschthum (puissance germanique) dans le monde entier.

Les Français peuvent armer tant qu'ils voudront ; ils ne peuvent, du jour au lendemain, augmenter leur population. L'emploi d'une armée noire sur les théâtres d'opérations européens restera pour longtemps un rêve, du reste dépourvu de beauté.

## II. — BUT ET DEVOIRS DE NOTRE POLITIQUE NATIONALE, DE NOTRE ARMÉE ET DE NOS ORGANES SPÉCIAUX AU SERVICE DE L'ARMÉE.

Notre nouvelle loi militaire n'est qu'une extension de l'œuvre d'éducation militaire du peuple allemand. Nos ancêtres de 1813 ont fait de plus gros sacrifices. C'est notre devoir sacré d'aiguiser l'épée que l'on nous a mise en main, et de la tenir prête pour nous défendre comme pour porter des coups à notre ennemi. *Il faut faire pénétrer dans le peuple l'idée que nos armements sont une réponse aux armements et à la politique française.* Il faut l'habituer à penser qu'une guerre offensive de notre part est une nécessité pour combattre les provocations de l'adversaire. Il faudra agir avec prudence pour n'éveiller aucun soupçon, et éviter les crises qui pourraient nuire à notre vie économique. Il faut mener les affaires de telle façon que sous la pesante impression d'armements puissants, de sacrifices considérables, et d'une situation politique tendue, un déchaînement (*Loschlagen*) soit considéré comme une délivrance, parce qu'après lui viendraient des décades de paix et de prospérité comme après 1870. Il faut préparer la guerre au point de vue financier; il y a beaucoup à faire de ce côté-là. Il ne faut pas éveiller la méfiance de nos financiers, mais bien des choses cependant ne pourront être cachées.

Il n'y aurait pas à s'inquiéter du sort de nos colonies. Le résultat final en Europe le règlera pour elles. Par contre, il faudra susciter des troubles dans le Nord de l'Afrique et en Russie. C'est un moyen d'absorber des forces de l'adversaire. Il est donc absolument nécessaire que nous nous mettions en relations, par des organes bien choisis, avec des gens influents en Égypte, à Tunis, à Alger et au Maroc, pour préparer les mesures nécessaires en cas de guerre européenne. Bien entendu, en cas de guerre, on reconnaîtrait ouvertement ces alliés secrets; et on leur assurerait, à la conclusion de la paix, la conservation des avantages conquis. On peut réaliser ces desiderata. Un premier essai, qui a été fait il y a quelques années, nous avait procuré le contact voulu. Malheureusement, on n'a pas consolidé suffisamment les relations obtenues. Bon gré mal gré, il faudra en venir à des préparatifs de ce genre, pour mener rapidement à sa fin une campagne.

Les soulèvements provoqués en temps de guerre par des agents politiques demandent à être soigneusement préparés, et par des moyens matériels. Ils doivent éclater simultanément avec la destruction des moyens de communication; ils doivent avoir une tête dirigeante que l'on peut trouver dans des chefs influents, religieux ou politiques. L'école égyptienne y est particulièrement apte, elle relie de plus en plus entre eux les intellectuels du monde musulman.

Quoi qu'il en soit, nous devons être forts pour pouvoir auéantir d'un puissant élan nos ennemis de l'Est et de l'Ouest. Mais dans la prochaine guerre européenne, il faudra aussi que les petits États soient contraints à nous suivre, ou soient domptés. Dans certaines conditions, leurs armées et leurs places fortes peuvent être rapidement vaincues ou neutralisées, ce qui pourrait être vraisemblablement le cas pour la Belgique et la Hollande, afin d'interdire à notre ennemi de l'Ouest un territoire qui pourrait lui servir de base d'opération dans notre flanc. Au Nord, nous n'avons à craindre aucune menace du Danemark ou des États scandinaves, d'autant plus que dans tous les cas, nous pourrions à la concentration d'une forte armée du Nord, capable de répondre à toute mauvaise intention de ce côté. Au cas le plus défavorable, le Danemark pourrait être forcé par l'Angleterre à abandonner sa neutralité; mais à ce moment, la décision serait déjà intervenue sur terre et sur mer. Notre armée du Nord, dont les forces pourraient être notablement augmentées par les formations

hollandaises, répondrait par une défensive extrêmement active à toute offensive de ce côté.

Au Sud, la Suisse forme un boulevard extrêmement solide, et nous pouvons compter qu'elle défendra énergiquement sa neutralité contre la France, protégeant ainsi notre flanc.

Comme on l'a dit plus haut, on ne peut considérer de même la situation vis-à-vis des petits États de notre frontière Nord-Ouest. Là, ce sera pour nous une question vitale, et le but vers lequel il faudra tendre, c'est de prendre l'offensive avec une grande supériorité dès les premiers jours. Pour cela, il faudra concentrer une grande armée, suivie de fortes formations de landwehr, qui détermineront les armées des petits États à nous suivre, ou tout au moins à rester inactives sur le théâtre de la guerre, et qui les écraseraient en cas de résistance armée. Si l'on pouvait décider ces États à organiser leur système fortifié de telle façon qu'il constitue une protection efficace de notre flanc, on pourrait renoncer à l'invasion projetée. Mais, pour cela, il faudrait aussi, particulièrement en Belgique, qu'on réformât l'armée, pour qu'elle offrît des garanties sérieuses de résistance efficace. Si, au contraire, son organisation défensive était établie contre nous, ce qui donnerait des avantages évidents à notre adversaire de l'Ouest, nous ne pourrions, en aucune façon, offrir à la Belgique une garantie de la sécurité de sa neutralité. Un vaste champ est donc ouvert à notre diplomatie pour travailler, dans ce pays, dans le sens de nos intérêts.

Les dispositions arrêtées dans ce sens permettent d'espérer que l'offensive peut être prise aussitôt après la concentration complète de l'armée du Bas-Rhin. Un ultimatum à brève échéance, que doit suivre immédiatement l'invasion, permettra de justifier suffisamment notre action au point de vue du droit des gens.

Tels sont les devoirs qui incombent à notre armée, et qui exigent un effectif élevé. Si l'ennemi nous attaque, ou si nous voulons le dompter, nous ferons comme nos frères d'il y a cent ans; l'aigle provoqué prendra son vol, saisira l'ennemi dans ses serres acérées, et le rendra inoffensif. Nous nous souviendrons alors que les provinces de l'ancien empire allemand : Comté de Bourgogne et une belle part de la Lorraine, sont encore aux mains des Francs; que des milliers de frères allemands des provinces baltiques gémissent sous le joug slave. C'est une question nationale de rendre à l'Allemagne ce qu'elle a autrefois possédé.

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### N° 3.

M. Jules CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Berlin,

à M. Stéphen PICHON, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Berlin, le 6 mai 1913.

Je parlais ce soir avec le Secrétaire d'État de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs et des résultats obtenus à la séance d'hier à Londres. La crise dont l'Europe était menacée est, à ses yeux, écartée, mais seulement pour quelque temps : « Il semble, me disait M. de Jagow, que nous marchons dans un pays de montagnes. Nous venons de passer un col difficile et nous voyons d'autres hauteurs se dresser devant nous. — « Celle que nous venons de surmonter, lui répondis-je, était peut-être la plus dure à Passer. »



La crise que nous venons de traverser a été très sérieuse. Ici, on a considéré le danger de guerre comme imminent. J'ai eu la preuve des préoccupations de l'Allemagne par un certain nombre de faits qu'il importe que Votre Excellence connaisse.

J'ai reçu hier la visite d'un de mes collègues avec qui j'entretiens des relations particulières et cordiales. Lors de la visite qu'il a faite à M. de Jagow, celui-ci lui a demandé, à titre confidentiel quelle était exactement la situation de la Russie en Extrême-Orient et si cette Puissance a, en ce moment, quelque chose à redouter de ce côté qui y puisse retenir ses forces. L'Ambassadeur lui répondit qu'il ne voyait rien, absolument rien, qui pût être une cause de préoccupation pour le Gouvernement russe et que celui-ci avait les mains libres en Europe.

Je disais plus haut que le danger d'une guerre avait été envisagé ici comme très proche. Aussi ne s'est-on pas contenté de tâter le terrain en Extrême-Orient, on s'est préparé ici-même.

La mobilisation de l'armée allemande ne se borne pas à l'appel des réservistes à la caserne. Il y a, en Allemagne, une mesure préparatoire qui n'existe pas chez nous et qui consiste à prévenir les officiers et les hommes de la réserve de se tenir prêts pour l'appel, afin qu'ils puissent prendre les arrangements qui leur sont nécessaires. C'est un « garde à vous » général, et il faut l'incroyable esprit de soumission, de discipline et de secret qui existe en ce pays, pour qu'une pareille disposition puisse exister. Si un pareil avertissement était donné en France, le pays frémirait tout entier et la presse le dirait le lendemain.

Cet avertissement a été lancé, en 1911, au cours des négociations que je poursuivais sur le Maroc.

Or, il a été lancé de nouveau, il y a une dizaine de jours, c'est-à-dire au moment de la tension austro-albanaise. Je le sais, et le tiens de plusieurs sources différentes, notamment d'officiers de réserve qui l'ont dit à des amis dans la plus stricte intimité. Ces messieurs ont pris les mesures nécessaires pour assurer à leur famille, en coffre-fort, les moyens de vivre pendant un an. On a même dit que c'était pour cette même raison que le Kronprinz, qui devait faire le voyage d'essai de l'*Imperator*, ne s'est pas embarqué.

La décision qui a fait prendre cette mesure préparatoire à la mobilisation répond aux idées du Grand État-Major général. Sur ce point, j'ai été mis au courant d'une conversation tenue dans un milieu allemand par le général de Moltke, qui est considéré ici comme l'officier le plus distingué de l'armée allemande.

La pensée de l'État-Major général est d'agir par surprise. « Il faut laisser de côté, a dit le général de Moltke, les lieux communs sur la responsabilité de l'agresseur. Lorsque la guerre est devenue nécessaire, il faut la faire en mettant toutes les chances de son côté. Le succès seul la justifie. L'Allemagne ne peut ni ne doit laisser à la Russie le temps de mobiliser; car elle serait obligée de maintenir sur sa frontière Est une force telle qu'elle se trouverait en situation d'égalité, sinon d'infériorité, avec la France. Donc, a ajouté le général, il faut prévenir notre principal adversaire dès qu'il y aura neuf chances sur dix d'avoir la guerre, et la commencer sans attendre pour écraser brutalement toute résistance. »

Voilà exactement l'état d'âme des milieux militaires, qui répond à l'état d'âme des milieux politiques, ceux-ci ne considérant pas la Russie, au contraire de nous, comme un ennemi nécessaire.

Voilà ce qu'on pensait et disait entre soi il y a quinze jours.

Il faut retenir de cette aventure la leçon que renferment les faits que j'ai présentés plus haut : ces gens-ci ne craignent pas la guerre, ils en acceptent pleinement la possibilité et ils ont pris leurs mesures en conséquence. *Ils veulent être toujours prêts.*

Comme je le disais, cela exige des conditions de secret et de discipline et une volonté persévérante : l'enthousiasme ne suffit pas à tout. Cette leçon peut être utile à méditer dans le moment où le Gouvernement de la République demande au Parlement les moyens de fortifier le pays.

Jules CAMBON.

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N° 4.

M. ALLIZÉ, Ministre de la République en Bavière,  
à M. Stéphane PICRON, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Munich, le 10 juillet 1913.

Au point de vue politique, on se demande à quoi serviront les nouveaux armements. Reconnaisant que personne ne menace l'Allemagne, on considère que la diplomatie allemande disposait déjà de forces assez considérables et d'alliances assez puissantes pour défendre avec succès les intérêts allemands. Comme je le relevais déjà au lendemain de l'accord marocain de 1911, on estime que la Chancellerie impériale sera aussi incapable dans l'avenir que dans le passé d'adopter une politique extérieure active et de remporter, tout au moins sur ce terrain, des succès qui justifieraient les sacrifices que la nation s'impose.

Cet état d'esprit est d'autant plus inquiétant que le Gouvernement impérial se trouverait actuellement soutenu par l'opinion publique dans toute entreprise où il s'engagerait vigoureusement, même aux risques d'un conflit. L'état de guerre, auquel tous les événements d'Orient habituent les esprits depuis deux ans, apparaît, non plus comme une catastrophe lointaine, mais comme une solution aux difficultés politiques et économiques qui n'iront qu'en s'aggravant.

Puisse l'exemple de la Bulgarie exercer en Allemagne une influence salutaire. Comme me le disait naguère le Prince-Régent : « Le sort des armes est toujours incertain ; toute guerre est une aventure, et bien fou est celui qui la court se croyant assuré de la victoire. »

ALLIZÉ.

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N° 5.

*NOTE à M. Stephen Pichon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères*

(Sur l'opinion publique en Allemagne, d'après les rapports des agents diplomatiques et consulaires).

Paris, le 30 juillet 1913.

Des observations que nos agents en Allemagne ont pu recueillir auprès de personnes en mesure de pénétrer dans les milieux les plus divers, l'on peut tirer cette conclusion que deux sentiments dominant et irritent les esprits :

- 1° Le traité du 4 novembre 1911 serait, pour l'Allemagne, un déboire;
- 2° La France — une France nouvelle — insoupçonnée jusqu'à l'été de 1911 — serait *belliqueuse*. Elle voudrait la guerre.

Députés de tous les partis du Reichstag, depuis les conservateurs jusqu'aux socialistes, et représentant les contrées les plus différentes de l'Allemagne, universitaires de Berlin, de Halle, d'Iéna et de Marbourg, étudiants, instituteurs, employés de commerce, commis de banque, banquiers, artisans, commerçants, industriels, médecins, avocats, rédacteurs de journaux démocrates et de journaux socialistes, publicistes juifs, membres des syndicats ouvriers, pasteurs et boutiquiers de la Marche de Brandebourg, hobereaux de Poméranie et cordonniers de Stettin fêtant le 505<sup>e</sup> anniversaire de leur association, châtelains, fonctionnaires, curés et gros cultivateurs de Westphalie sont unanimes sur ces deux points, sans nuances notables, selon les milieux et les partis. Voici la synthèse de toutes ces opinions :

Le traité du 4 novembre est une défaite diplomatique, une preuve de l'incapacité de la diplomatie allemande et de l'incurie du Gouvernement, si souvent dénoncées, la preuve que l'avenir de l'Empire n'est pas assuré sans un nouveau Bismarck, une humiliation nationale, une déconsidération européenne, une atteinte au prestige allemand, d'autant plus grave que, jusqu'en 1911, la suprématie militaire de l'Allemagne était incontestée et que l'anarchie française, l'impuissance de la République étaient une sorte de dogme allemand.

En juillet 1911, le « coup d'Agadir » posa vraiment, pour la première fois, la question marocaine comme une question nationale, important à la vie et à l'expansion de l'Empire. Les révélations et procès de presse qui suivirent ont suffisamment démontré comment la campagne avait été organisée, quelles convoitises pangermaniques elle avait allumées et quelles rancunes elle a laissées. Si l'Empereur est discuté, le Chancelier impopulaire, M. de Kiderlen, fut l'homme le plus haï de l'Allemagne, l'hiver dernier. Cependant il commence à n'être plus que déconsidéré, car il laisse entendre qu'il prendra sa revanche.

Donc, pendant l'été de 1911, l'opinion publique allemande se cabra en face de l'opinion française pour le Maroc. Et l'attitude de la France, son calme tranquille, son unité morale refaite, sa résolution de faire valoir son droit jusqu'au bout, le

fait qu'elle a l'insolence de n'avoir pas peur de la guerre, sont le plus constant, le plus grave sujet d'inquiétude et de mauvaise humeur de l'opinion publique allemande.

Pourquoi donc l'Allemagne n'a-t-elle pas fait la guerre pendant l'été de 1911, puisque l'opinion publique, encore que moins unanime et résolue que l'opinion française, y était cependant favorable? Outre la volonté pacifique de l'Empereur et du Chancelier, on fait valoir dans les milieux compétents des raisons militaires et financières.

Mais ces événements de 1911 ont causé une profonde désillusion en Allemagne. Une France nouvelle, unie, résolue, décidée à ne plus se laisser intimider, est sortie du suaire dans lequel on la contemplait s'ensevelissant depuis dix ans. Avec une surprise mêlée d'irritation, l'opinion publique allemande a découvert, de décembre à mai, à travers la presse de tous les partis qui reprochaient au Gouvernement impérial son incapacité, sa lâcheté : que la vaincue de 1870 n'avait cessé depuis de guerroyer, de promener en Asie et en Afrique son drapeau et le prestige de ses armes, de conquérir de vastes territoires; que l'Allemagne avait vécu d'héroïsme honoraire, que la Turquie est le seul pays où elle ait fait, sous le règne de Guillaume II, des conquêtes morales, bien compromises maintenant par la honte de la solution marocaine. Chaque fois que la France faisait une conquête coloniale, on consolait cette même opinion en disant : « Oui, mais cela n'empêche pas la décadence, l'anarchie, la décomposition de la France à l'intérieur. »

On se trompait, et on trompait l'opinion.

Étant donné ces sentiments de l'opinion publique allemande, qui tient la France pour belliqueuse, que peut-on augurer de l'avenir au point de vue d'une guerre possible et prochaine?

L'opinion publique allemande est divisée, sur la question de l'éventualité d'une guerre possible et prochaine, en deux courants.

Il y a dans le pays des forces de paix, mais inorganiques et sans chefs populaires. Elles considèrent que la guerre serait un malheur social pour l'Allemagne, que l'orgueil de caste, la domination prussienne et les fabricants de canons et de plaques de cuirassés en tireraient le meilleur bénéfice, que la guerre profiterait surtout à l'Angleterre.

Elles se décomposent ainsi qu'il suit :

La masse profonde des ouvriers, des artisans et des paysans qui sont pacifiques d'instinct.

La noblesse dégagée des intérêts de carrière militaire et engagée dans les affaires industrielles — tels les grands seigneurs de Silésie et quelques autres personnalités très influentes à la Cour — et assez éclairée pour se rendre compte des conséquences politiques et sociales désastreuses d'une guerre, même victorieuse.

Un grand nombre d'industriels, de commerçants et de financiers de moyenne importance, dont la guerre, même victorieuse, amènerait la banqueroute, parce que leurs entreprises vivent de crédit et sont surtout commanditées par des capitaux étrangers.

Les Polonais, les Alsaciens-Lorrains, les habitants du Schleswig-Holstein conquis,

mais non assimilés, et en hostilité sourde contre la politique prussienne, soit environ 7 millions d'Allemands annexés.

Enfin, les Gouvernements et les classes dirigeantes des grands États du Sud, la Saxe, la Bavière, le Wurtemberg et le Grand-Duché de Bade, sont partagés entre ce double sentiment : une guerre malheureuse compromettrait la Confédération, dont ils ont tiré de grands avantages économiques; une guerre victorieuse ne profiterait qu'à la Prusse et à la prussianisation, contre laquelle ils défendent avec peine leur indépendance politique et leur autonomie administrative.

Ces éléments préfèrent, par raison ou par instinct, la paix à la guerre; mais ce ne sont que des forces politiques de contrepoids, dont le crédit sur l'opinion est limité, ou des forces sociales de silence, passives et sans défense contre la contagion d'une poussée belliqueuse.

Un exemple éclairera cette idée : les 110 députés socialistes sont des partisans de la paix. Ils ne sauraient empêcher la guerre, car elle ne dépend pas d'un vote du Reichstag, et, en présence de cette éventualité, le gros de leurs troupes ferait chorus dans la colère ou dans l'enthousiasme avec le reste du pays.

Il faut noter enfin que ces partisans de la paix dans la masse croient à la guerre, parce qu'ils ne voient pas de solution à la situation actuelle. Dans certains contrats, notamment dans les contrats d'éditeurs, on a introduit la clause de résiliation en cas de guerre. Ils espèrent cependant que la volonté de l'Empereur, d'une part, et les difficultés de la France au Maroc, d'autre part, sont pour quelque temps des garanties de paix. Quoi qu'il en soit, leur pessimisme laisse libre jeu aux partisans de la guerre.

On parle quelquefois de parti militaire allemand. L'expression est inexacte, même pour dire que l'Allemagne est le pays de la suprématie du pouvoir militaire, comme on dit que la France est le pays de la suprématie du pouvoir civil. Il y a un état d'esprit plus digne d'attention que ce fait historique, parce qu'il constitue un danger plus évident et plus prochain. Il y a un parti de la guerre, avec des chefs, des troupes, une presse convaincue ou payée pour fabriquer l'opinion, des moyens variés et redoutables pour intimider le Gouvernement. Il agit sur le pays avec des idées claires, des sentiments ardents, une volonté frémissante et tendue.

Les partisans de la guerre se divisent en plusieurs catégories, chacun tire de sa caste, de sa classe, de sa formation intellectuelle et morale, de ses intérêts, de ses hancunes, des raisons particulières qui créent en un état d'esprit général et accroissent la force et la rapidité du courant belliqueux.

Les uns veulent la guerre parce qu'elle est *inévitabile* étant données les circonstances actuelles. Et pour l'Allemagne, il vaut mieux plus tôt que plus tard.

D'autres la considèrent comme nécessaire pour des raisons économiques tirées de la surpopulation, de la surproduction, du besoin de marchés et de débouchés; ou pour des raisons sociales : la diversion à l'extérieur peut seule empêcher ou retarder la montée vers le pouvoir des masses démocratiques et socialistes.

D'autres, insuffisamment rassurés sur l'avenir de l'Empire, et croyant que le temps travaille pour la France, pensent qu'il faut précipiter l'événement. Il n'est pas rare de rencontrer, à la traversée des conversations ou des brochures patriotiques, le senti-

ment obscur, mais profond, qu'une Allemagne libre, et une France ressuscitée sont deux faits historiques incompatibles.

D'autres sont belliqueux par « Bismarckisme », si l'on peut ainsi dire. Ils se sentent humiliés d'avoir à discuter avec des Français, à parler droit, raison, dans des négociations ou des conférences où ils n'ont pas facilement eu toujours raison, alors qu'ils ont la force plus décisive. Ils tirent d'un passé récent un orgueil sans cesse alimenté par des souvenirs vécus, par la tradition orale et par les livres, et blessé par les événements de ces dernières années. Le dépit irrité caractérise l'esprit d'association des « Wehrvereine » et autres groupements de la Jeune Allemagne.

D'autres veulent la guerre par haine mystique de la France révolutionnaire. D'autres enfin, par rancune. Ce sont ces derniers qui amassent les prétextes.

Dans la réalité, ces sentiments se concrétisent ainsi : les hobereaux, représentés au Reichstag par le parti conservateur, veulent éluder à tout prix l'impôt sur les successions, inévitable si la paix se prolonge. Le Reichstag, dans la dernière séance de la session qui vient de se clore, en a voté le principe. C'est une atteinte grave aux intérêts et aux privilèges de la noblesse terrienne. D'autre part, cette noblesse est une aristocratie militaire, et il est instructif de comparer l'annuaire de l'armée avec l'annuaire de la noblesse. La guerre seule peut faire durer son prestige et servir ses intérêts familiaux. Dans la discussion de la loi militaire, un orateur du parti a fait valoir en faveur du vote la nécessité de l'avancement des officiers. Enfin, cette classe sociale, qui forme une hiérarchie dont le roi de Prusse est le couronnement suprême, constate avec terreur la démocratisation de l'Allemagne et la force grandissante du parti socialiste et considère que ses jours sont comptés. Non seulement ses intérêts matériels sont menacés par un formidable mouvement hostile au protectionnisme agraire, mais encore sa représentation politique diminue à chaque législature. Dans le Reichstag de 1878, il y avait 162 membres (sur 397) appartenant à la noblesse; dans celui de 1898, 83; dans le Reichstag de 1912, 57. Sur ce dernier nombre, 27 seulement siègent à droite, 14 au centre, 7 à gauche, un sur les bancs socialistes.

La grande bourgeoisie, représentée par le parti national libéral, parti des satisfaits, n'a pas les mêmes raisons que les hobereaux de vouloir la guerre. Elle est belliqueuse cependant, sauf exceptions. Elle a ses raisons d'ordre social.

La grande bourgeoisie n'est pas moins affligée que la noblesse de la démocratisation de l'Allemagne. En 1871, elle avait 125 représentants au Reichstag; 155 en 1874; 99 en 1887; en 1912, 45. Elle n'oublie pas qu'ils jouèrent le grand rôle parlementaire au lendemain de la guerre en servant les desseins de Bismarck contre les hobereaux. Aujourd'hui, mal assise entre des instincts conservateurs et des idées libérales, elle demande à la guerre des solutions que ne trouvent pas ses représentants incapables et pitoyables. En outre, les industriels doctrinaires professent que les difficultés qu'ils ont avec leurs ouvriers ont leurs origines en France, foyer révolutionnaire des idées d'émancipation — sans la France, l'industrie serait tranquille.

Enfin, fabricants de canons et de plaques d'acier, grands marchands qui demandent de plus grands marchés, banquiers qui spéculent sur l'âge d'or et la prochaine indemnité de guerre, pensent que la guerre serait une bonne affaire.

Parmi les « Bismarckiens » il faut compter les fonctionnaires de toutes carrières, représentés assez exactement au Reichstag par les conservateurs libres ou parti d'Empire, parti des retraités dont les idées fougueuses se déversent dans la *Post*. Ils font école et souche dans les groupements de jeunes gens dont l'esprit a été préparé et tendu par l'école ou l'université.

L'université, exception faite pour quelques esprits distingués, développe une idéologie guerrière. Les économistes démontrent à coups de statistiques la nécessité pour l'Allemagne d'avoir un empire colonial et commercial qui réponde au rendement industriel de l'Empire. Il y a des sociologues fanatiques qui vont plus loin. La paix armée, disent-ils, est un écrasant fardeau pour les nations, elle empêche l'amélioration du sort des masses et favorise la poussée socialiste. La France, en s'obstinant à vouloir la revanche, s'oppose au désarmement. Il faut une fois pour toutes la réduire à l'impuissance pour un siècle, c'est la meilleure et la plus rapide façon de résoudre la question sociale.

Historiens, philosophes, publicistes politiques et autres apologistes de la « *deutsche Kultur* » veulent imposer au monde une manière de sentir et de penser qui soit spécifiquement allemande. Ils veulent conquérir la suprématie intellectuelle qui, de l'avis des esprits lucides, reste à la France. C'est à cette source que s'alimente la phraséologie des pangermanistes comme aussi les sentiments et les contingents des *Kriegesvereine*, des *Wehrvereine* et autres associations de ce genre, trop connues pour qu'il soit nécessaire d'insister sur ce point. Il convient de noter seulement que le mécontentement causé par le traité du 4 novembre a considérablement accru le nombre des membres des sociétés coloniales.

Il y a enfin les partisans de la guerre par rancune, par ressentiment. Ce sont les plus dangereux. Ils se recrutent surtout parmi les diplomates. Les diplomates allemands ont très mauvaise presse dans l'opinion publique. Les plus acharnés sont ceux qui, depuis 1905, ont été mêlés aux négociations entre la France et l'Allemagne; ils accumulent et additionnent les griefs contre nous, et un jour, ils présenteront des comptes dans la presse belliqueuse. On a l'impression que c'est surtout au Maroc qu'ils les chercheront, bien qu'un incident soit toujours possible sur tous les points du globe où la France et l'Allemagne sont en contact.

Il leur faut une revanche, car ils se plaignent d'avoir été dupés. Pendant la discussion de la loi militaire, un de ces diplomates belliqueux déclarait : « L'Allemagne ne pourra causer sérieusement avec la France que quand elle aura tous ses hommes valides sous les armes ».

Comment s'engagera cette conversation? C'est une opinion assez répandue, même dans les milieux pangermanistes, que l'Allemagne ne déclarerait pas la guerre, étant donné le système d'alliances défensives et les dispositions de l'Empereur. Mais quand le moment sera venu, il devra, par tous les moyens, contraindre la France à l'attaquer. On l'offensera, s'il le faut. C'est la tradition prussienne.

Faut-il donc tenir la guerre pour fatale?

Il est peu probable que l'Allemagne ose risquer l'aventure, si la France peut faire aux yeux de l'opinion la preuve décisive que l'entente cordiale et l'alliance russe ne sont pas seulement des fictions diplomatiques, mais des réalités qui existent et qui

joueront. La flotte anglaise inspire une salubre terreur. Mais on sait bien que la victoire sur mer laissera tout en suspens, que c'est sur terre que se régleront les comptes décisifs.

Quant à la Russie, si elle a dans l'opinion un poids plus considérable qu'il y a trois ou quatre ans, dans les milieux politiques et militaires, on ne croit pas que son concours soit assez rapide et énergique pour être efficace.

Les esprits s'habituent ainsi à considérer la prochaine guerre comme un duel en la France et l'Allemagne.

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N° 6.

M. Jules CAMBON, Ambassadeur de la République française à Berlin,  
à M. Stephen PICHON, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Berlin, le 22 novembre 1913.

Je tiens d'une source absolument sûre la relation d'une conversation que l'Empereur aurait eue avec le Roi des Belges, en présence du Chef d'État-Major Général de Moltke, il y a une quinzaine de jours, conversation qui aurait, paraît-il, vivement frappé le Roi Albert; je ne suis nullement surpris de son impression, qui répond à celle que moi-même je ressens depuis quelque temps : l'hostilité contre nous s'accroît et l'Empereur a cessé d'être partisan de la paix.

L'interlocuteur de l'Empereur d'Allemagne pensait jusqu'ici, comme tout le monde, que Guillaume II, dont l'influence personnelle s'était exercée dans bien des circonstances critiques au profit du maintien de la paix, était toujours dans les mêmes dispositions d'esprit. Cette fois, il l'aurait trouvé complètement changé : l'Empereur d'Allemagne n'est plus à ses yeux le champion de la paix contre les tendances belliqueuses de certains partis allemands. Guillaume II en est venu à penser que la guerre avec la France est inévitable et qu'il faudra en venir là un jour ou l'autre. Il croit naturellement à la supériorité écrasante de l'armée allemande et à son succès certain.

Le Général de Moltke parla exactement comme son souverain. Lui aussi, il déclara la guerre nécessaire et inévitable, mais il se montra plus assuré encore du succès, « car, dit-il au Roi, cette fois, il faut en finir, et Votre Majesté ne peut se douter de l'enthousiasme irrésistible qui, ce jour-là, entraînera le peuple allemand tout entier ».

Le Roi des Belges protesta que c'était travestir les intentions du Gouvernement français que les traduire de la sorte et se laisser abuser sur les sentiments de la nation française par les manifestations de quelques esprits exaltés ou d'intrigants sans conscience.

L'Empereur et son Chef d'État-Major n'en persistèrent pas moins dans leur manière de voir.

Au cours de cette conversation l'Empereur était, du reste, apparu surmené et irritable. A mesure que les années s'appesantissent sur Guillaume II, les traditions



familiales, les sentiments rétrogrades de la Cour, et surtout l'impatience des militaires prennent plus d'empire sur son esprit. Peut-être éprouve-t-il on ne sait quelle jalousie de la popularité acquise par son fils, qui flatte les passions des pangermanistes et ne trouve pas la situation de l'Empire dans le monde égale à sa puissance. Peut-être aussi la réplique de la France à la dernière augmentation de l'armée allemande, dont l'objet était d'établir sans conteste la supériorité germanique, est-elle pour quelque chose dans ces amertumes, car, quoi qu'on dise, on sent qu'on ne peut guère aller plus loin.

On peut se demander ce qu'il y a au fond de cette conversation. L'Empereur et son Chef d'État-Major Général ont pu avoir pour objectif d'impressionner le Roi des Belges et de le disposer à ne point opposer de résistance au cas où un conflit avec nous se produirait. Peut-être aussi voudrait-on la Belgique moins hostile à certaines ambitions qui se manifestent ici à propos du Congo belge, mais cette dernière hypothèse ne me paraît pas concorder avec l'intervention du Général de Moltke.

Au reste, l'Empereur Guillaume est moins maître de ces impatiences qu'on ne le croit communément. Je l'ai vu plus d'une fois laisser échapper le fond de sa pensée. Quel qu'ait été son objectif dans la conversation qui m'a été rapportée, la confiance n'en a pas moins le caractère le plus grave. Elle correspond à la précarité de la situation générale et à l'état d'une certaine partie de l'opinion en France et en Allemagne.

S'il m'était permis de conclure, je dirais qu'il est bon de tenir compte de ce fait nouveau que l'Empereur se familiarise avec un ordre d'idées qui lui répugnait autrefois, et que, pour lui emprunter une locution qu'il aime à employer, nous devons tenir notre poudre sèche.

Jules CAMBON.

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## **CHAPITRE II**

### **PRÉLIMINAIRES**

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**DE LA MORT DE L'ARCHIDUC HÉRITIER**

**(28 JUIN 1914)**

**A LA REMISE DE LA NOTE AUTRICHIENNE A LA SERBIE**

**(23 JUILLET 1914)**



N° 7.

M. DUMAINE, Ambassadeur de France à Vienne,

à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Vienne, le 28 juin 1914.

La nouvelle vient de parvenir à Vienne que l'Archiduc héritier d'Autriche et sa femme ont été assassinés aujourd'hui à Serajevo par un étudiant originaire de Grahovo. Quelques instants avant l'attentat auquel ils ont succombé, ils avaient échappé à l'explosion d'une bombe qui a blessé plusieurs officiers de leur suite.

L'Empereur, en ce moment à Ischl, en a été aussitôt avisé télégraphiquement.

DUMAINE.

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N° 8.

M. DUMAINE, Ambassadeur de France à Vienne,

à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Vienne, le 2 juillet 1914.

Le crime de Serajevo suscite les plus vives rancunes dans les milieux militaires autrichiens et chez tous ceux qui ne se résignent pas à laisser la Serbie garder dans les Balkans le rang qu'elle a conquis.

L'enquête sur les origines de l'attentat qu'on voudrait exiger du Gouvernement de Belgrade dans des conditions intolérables pour sa dignité, fournirait, à la suite d'un refus, le grief permettant de procéder à une exécution militaire.

DUMAINE.

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N° 9.

M. DE MANNEVILLE, Chargé d'affaires de France à Berlin,

à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Berlin, le 4 juillet 1914.

Le Sous-Secrétaire d'État des Affaires étrangères m'a dit hier, et a répété aujourd'hui à l'Ambassadeur de Russie, qu'il espérait que la Serbie donnerait satisfaction aux demandes que l'Autriche pouvait avoir à lui adresser en vue de la recherche et de la poursuite des complices du crime de Serajevo. Il a ajouté qu'il avait confiance qu'il en serait ainsi parce que la Serbie, si elle agissait autrement, aurait contre elle l'opinion de tout le monde civilisé.

Le Gouvernement allemand ne paraît donc pas partager les inquiétudes qui se manifestent dans une partie de la presse allemande au sujet d'une tension possible des rapports entre les Gouvernements de Vienne et de Belgrade, ou du moins il ne veut pas en avoir l'apparence.

DE MANNEVILLE.

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N° 10.

M. PALÉOLOGUE, Ambassadeur de France à Saint-Petersbourg,

à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Saint-Petersbourg, 6 juillet 1914.

Au cours d'un entretien qu'il avait tenu à avoir avec le Chargé d'affaires d'Autriche-Hongrie, M. Sazonoff a signalé amicalement à ce diplomate l'irritation inquiétante que les attaques de la presse autrichienne contre la Serbie risquent de produire dans son pays.

Le Comte Czernin ayant laissé entendre que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois

serait peut-être obligé de rechercher sur le territoire serbe les instigateurs de l'attentat de Serajevo, M. Sazonoff l'interrompt : « Aucun pays plus que la Russie, a-t-il dit, n'a eu à souffrir des attentats préparés sur territoire étranger. Avons-nous jamais prétendu employer contre un pays quelconque les procédés dont vos journaux menacent la Serbie ? Ne vous engagez pas dans cette voie ».

Puisse cet avertissement n'être pas perdu.

PALÉOLOGUE.

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N° 11.

M. D'APCHIER LE MAUGIN, Consul général de France à Budapest,

à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Budapest, le 11 juillet 1914.

Interpellé à la Chambre sur l'état de la question austro-serbe, M. Tisza a déclaré qu'il fallait avant toute chose attendre le résultat de l'enquête judiciaire, dont il s'est refusé pour l'instant à révéler quoi que ce soit. Et la Chambre l'a approuvé hautement. Il s'est montré tout aussi discret sur les décisions prises dans la réunion des ministres à Vienne, et n'a pas laissé deviner si on donnerait suite au projet de démarche à Belgrade dont les journaux des deux mondes ont retenti. La Chambre s'est inclinée derechef.

En ce qui concerne cette démarche, il semble qu'il y ait un mot d'ordre pour en atténuer la portée : la colère hongroise s'est comme évaporée à travers les articles virulents de la presse, unanime maintenant à déconseiller ce pas qui pourrait être dangereux. Les journaux officiels notamment voudraient que l'on substituât à ce mot de « démarche », aux apparences comminatoires, le terme qui leur paraît plus amical et plus poli de « pourparlers ». Ainsi, officiellement, pour le quart d'heure, tout est à la paix.

Tout est à la paix, dans les journaux. Mais le gros public ici croit à la guerre et la craint. Et par ailleurs, des personnes en qui j'ai toute raison d'avoir confiance m'ont affirmé savoir que chaque jour des canons et des munitions étaient dirigés en masse vers la frontière. Vrai ou non, ce bruit m'a été rapporté de divers côtés avec des détails concordants ; il indique au moins quelles sont les préoccupations générales. Le Gouvernement, soit qu'il veuille sincèrement la paix, soit qu'il *prépare un coup*,

fait maintenant tout son possible pour calmer ces inquiétudes. Et c'est pourquoi la ton des journaux gouvernementaux a baissé d'une note, puis de deux, pour être à l'heure actuelle presque optimiste. Mais ils avaient eux-mêmes propagé l'alarme à plaisir. Leur optimisme de commande est actuellement sans écho, la nervosité de la Bourse, baromètre que l'on ne saurait négliger, en est une preuve certaine; les valeurs sans exception sont tombées à des cours invraisemblablement bas; la rente hongroise 4 o/o était cotée hier 79,95, cours qui n'a jamais été coté depuis la première émission.

D'APCHIER LE MAUGIN.

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N° 12.

M. DUMAINE, Ambassadeur de France à Vienne,

à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Vienne, le 15 juillet 1914.

Certains organes de la presse viennoise, discutant l'organisation militaire de la France et de la Russie, présentent ces deux pays comme hors d'état de dire leur mot dans les affaires européennes, ce qui assurerait à la monarchie dualiste, soutenue par l'Allemagne, d'appréciables facilités pour soumettre la Serbie au régime qu'il plairait de lui imposer. La *Militärische Rundschau* l'avoue sans ambage. « L'instant nous est encore favorable. Si nous ne nous décidons pas à la guerre, celle que nous devons faire dans deux ou trois ans au plus tard s'engagera dans des circonstances beaucoup moins propices. Actuellement, c'est à nous qu'appartient l'initiative : la Russie n'est pas prête, les facteurs moraux et le bon droit sont pour nous, de même que la force. Puisqu'un jour nous devons accepter la lutte, provoquons-la tout de suite. Notre prestige, notre situation de grande Puissance, notre honneur sont en question : plus encore, car vraisemblablement il s'agirait de notre existence, d'être ou ne pas être, ce qui réellement est aujourd'hui la grande affaire. »

En renchérissant sur elle-même, la *Neue Freie Presse* de ce jour s'en prend au Comte Tisza de la modération de son second discours, où il a dit : « nos relations avec la Serbie auraient toutefois besoin d'être clarifiées ». Ces mots provoquent son indignation. Pour elle, l'apaisement, la sécurité ne peuvent résulter que d'une guerre au couteau contre le panserbisme, et c'est au nom de l'humanité qu'elle réclame l'extermination de la maudite race serbe.

DUMAINE.

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N° 13.

M. DUMAINE, Ambassadeur de France à Vienne,

à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Vienne, 19 juillet 1914.

Le Chancelier du Consulat qui m'a remis son rapport semestriel résumant les faits divers d'ordre économique qui ont fait l'objet de ses études depuis le début de l'année, y a joint une partie d'information politique provenant d'une source sérieuse.

Je l'ai prié de rédiger brièvement les renseignements qu'il a recueillis sur la remise prochaine de la Note autrichienne à la Serbie, que les journaux annoncent depuis quelques jours avec insistance.

Vous trouverez ci-joint le texte de cette note d'information, intéressante en raison de sa précision.

DUMAINE.

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N° 14.

NOTE.

(Extrait d'un rapport consulaire sur la situation économique et politique en Autriche.)

Vienne, le 20 juillet 1914.

Il résulte de renseignements fournis par une personnalité particulièrement au courant des nouvelles officielles que le Gouvernement français aurait tort de s'en rapporter aux semeurs d'optimisme : on exigera beaucoup de la Serbie, on lui imposera la dissolution de plusieurs sociétés de propagande, on la sommerá de réprimer le nationalisme, de surveiller la frontière en collaboration avec des commissaires autrichiens, de faire la police des écoles au point de vue de l'esprit anti-autrichien, et il est bien difficile qu'un Gouvernement accepte de se faire ainsi le sergent de ville d'un Gouvernement étranger. On compte avec les échappatoires par lesquelles la Serbie voudra sans doute esquiver une réponse claire et directe ; c'est

pourquoi on lui fixera peut-être un délai bref pour déclarer si elle accepte oui ou non. La teneur de la Note et son allure impérative garantissent presque sûrement que Belgrade refusera. Alors, on opérera militairement.

Il y a ici, et pareillement à Berlin, un clan qui accepte l'idée du conflit à dimensions généralisées, en d'autres termes, la conflagration. L'idée directrice est probablement qu'il faudrait marcher avant que la Russie ait terminé ses grands perfectionnements de l'armée et des voies ferrées, et avant que la France ait mis au point son organisation militaire. Mais ici, il n'y a pas accord dans les hautes sphères : du côté du comte Berchtold et des diplomates, on voudrait tout au plus une opération localisée contre la Serbie. Mais tout doit être envisagé comme possible. On signale un fait singulier : généralement l'agence télégraphique officielle, dans ses résumés et revues de presse étrangère, ne tient compte que des journaux officieux et des organes les plus importants; elle omet toute citation, toute mention des autres. C'est une règle et une tradition. Or, depuis une dizaine de jours, l'agence officielle fournit quotidiennement à la presse d'Autriche-Hongrie une revue complète de toute la presse serbe, en donnant une large place aux journaux les plus ignorés, les plus petits et insignifiants, qui par cela même ont un langage plus libre, plus hardi, plus agressif et souvent injurieux. Ce travail de l'Agence officielle a visiblement pour but d'exciter le sentiment public et de créer une opinion favorable à la guerre. Le fait est significatif.

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N° 15.

M. Jules CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Berlin,

à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Berlin, le 21 juillet 1914.

Il me revient que le représentant de la Serbie à Berlin aurait fait hier une démarche à la Wilhelmstrasse pour dire que son Gouvernement était prêt à accueillir la requête de l'Autriche motivée par l'attentat de Serajevo, pourvu qu'elle ne demandât que des concours judiciaires en vue de la répression et de la prévention des attentats politiques, mais il aurait été chargé de prévenir le Gouvernement allemand qu'il serait dangereux de chercher par cette enquête à porter atteinte au prestige de la Serbie.

Confidentiellement, je puis dire également à Votre Excellence que le Chargé d'affaires de Russie, à l'audience diplomatique d'aujourd'hui, a parlé de cette ques-

tion à M. de Jagow. Il lui a dit qu'il supposait que le Gouvernement allemand connaissait actuellement très bien la Note préparée par l'Autriche et était par suite à même de donner l'assurance que les difficultés austro-serbes seraient localisées. Le Secrétaire d'État a protesté qu'il ignorait absolument le contenu de cette Note et s'est exprimé de même avec moi. Je n'ai pu que m'étonner d'une déclaration aussi peu conforme à ce que les circonstances conduisent à penser.

Il m'a été assuré d'ailleurs que, dès maintenant, les avis préliminaires de mobilisation qui doivent mettre l'Allemagne dans une sorte de « garde à vous » pendant les époques de tension, ont été adressés ici aux classes qui doivent les recevoir en pareil cas. C'est là une mesure à laquelle les Allemands, étant donné leurs habitudes, peuvent recourir sans s'exposer à des indiscretions et sans émouvoir la population. Elle ne revêt pas un caractère sensationnel, et n'est pas forcément suivie de mobilisation effective ainsi que nous l'avons déjà vu, mais elle n'en est pas moins significative.

Jules CAMBON.

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N° 16.

M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.,  
à Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Vienne, Rome.

Paris, le 21 juillet 1914.

J'attire spécialement votre attention sur des informations que je reçois de Berlin : l'Ambassadeur de France signale l'extrême faiblesse de la Bourse de Berlin d'hier, et l'attribue aux inquiétudes que la question serbe commence à provoquer.

M. Jules Cambon a des raisons très sérieuses de croire que lorsque l'Autriche fera à Belgrade la démarche qu'elle juge nécessaire à la suite de l'attentat de Serajevo, l'Allemagne l'appuiera de son autorité, sans chercher à jouer un rôle de médiation.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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N° 17.

**M. BIENVENU-MARTIN**, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.,  
à MM. les **AMBASSADEURS** de France à Londres, Saint-Pétersbourg,  
Vienne, Rome.

Paris, le 22 juillet 1914.

M. Jules Cambon ayant interrogé M. de Jagow sur la teneur de la Note autrichienne à Belgrade, ce dernier lui a répondu qu'il n'en connaissait nullement le libellé ; notre Ambassadeur en a marqué toute sa surprise. Il constate que la baisse de la Bourse de Berlin continue et que des nouvelles pessimistes circulent.

M. Barrère a également entretenu de la même question le Marquis de San Giuliano, qui s'en montre inquiet et assure qu'il agit à Vienne pour qu'il ne soit demandé à la Serbie que des choses réalisables, par exemple la dissolution du Club bosniaque et non une enquête judiciaire sur les causes de l'attentat de Serajevo.

Dans les circonstances présentes, la supposition la plus favorable qu'on puisse faire est que le Cabinet de Vienne, se sentant débordé par sa presse et par le parti militaire, cherche à obtenir le maximum de la Serbie par une intimidation préalable, directe et indirecte, et s'appuie sur l'Allemagne à cet effet.

J'ai prié l'Ambassadeur de France à Vienne d'user de toute son influence sur le Comte Berchtold pour lui représenter, dans une conversation amicale, combien la modération du Gouvernement autrichien serait appréciée en Europe, et quelle répercussion risquerait d'avoir une pression brutale sur la Serbie.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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N° 18.

**M. DUMAINE**, Ambassadeur de France à Vienne,  
à M. **BIENVENU-MARTIN**, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Vienne, le 22 juillet 1914.

On ne sait rien encore des décisions que le Comte Berchtold, prolongeant son séjour à Ischl, tente d'obtenir de l'Empereur. On attribuait au Gouvernement l'inten-

tion d'agir avec la plus grande rigueur envers la Serbie, d'en finir avec elle, « de la traiter comme une autre Pologne ». Huit corps d'armée seraient prêts à entrer en campagne, mais M. Tisza, très inquiet de l'agitation en Croatie, serait intervenu activement dans un sens modérateur.

En tous cas, on croit que la démarche à Belgrade aura lieu cette semaine. Les demandes du Gouvernement austro-hongrois relativement à la répression de l'attentat et à certaines garanties de surveillance et de police paraissent acceptables pour la dignité des Serbes; M. Jovanovich croit qu'elles seront accueillies. M. Pachitch désire un arrangement pacifique, mais se déclare prêt à toute résistance. Il a confiance dans la force de l'armée serbe; il compte, en outre, sur l'union de tous les Slaves de la Monarchie pour paralyser l'effort dirigé contre son pays.

A moins d'un aveuglement absolu, on devrait reconnaître ici qu'un coup de force a les plus grandes chances d'être funeste, aussi bien aux troupes austro-hongroises qu'à la cohésion déjà si compromise des nationalités gouvernées par l'Empereur.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, M. de Tchirsky, se montre partisan des résolutions violentes, tout en laissant volontiers entendre que la Chancellerie impériale ne serait pas entièrement d'accord avec lui sur ce point. L'Ambassadeur de Russie, parti hier pour la campagne, en raison des déclarations rassurantes qui lui ont été faites au Ministère des Affaires étrangères, m'a confié que son Gouvernement n'aura pas d'objection contre des démarches visant la punition des coupables et la dissolution des associations notoirement révolutionnaires, mais ne pouvait admettre des exigences humiliantes pour le sentiment national serbe.

DUMAINE.

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## N° 19.

M. Paul CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Londres,  
à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Londres, le 22 juillet 1914.

Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire part des impressions recueillies par notre Ambassadeur à Berlin, relativement aux conséquences de la démarche que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois se propose de faire à Belgrade.

Ces impressions m'ont été confirmées par une conversation que j'ai eue hier avec le Principal Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires étrangères. Sir E. Grey m'a dit avoir reçu la visite de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, qui lui a déclaré qu'à Berlin on s'attendait à une démarche du Gouvernement austro-hongrois auprès du Gouvernement serbe. Le Prince Lichnowski a assuré que le Gouvernement allemand s'employait à retenir et à modérer le Cabinet de Vienne, mais que jusqu'à présent il n'y réussissait pas et qu'il n'était pas sans inquiétude sur les suites d'une telle démarche. Sir E. Grey a ré-

pondu au Prince Lichnowski qu'il voulait croire qu'avant d'intervenir à Belgrade, le Gouvernement austro-hongrois se serait bien renseigné sur les circonstances du complot dont l'archiduc héritier et la duchesse de Hohenberg ont été victimes, se serait assuré que le Gouvernement serbe en avait eu connaissance et n'avait pas fait tout ce qui dépendait de lui pour en prévenir les effets. Car s'il ne pouvait pas être prouvé que la responsabilité du Gouvernement serbe fût impliquée dans une certaine mesure, l'intervention du Gouvernement austro-hongrois ne se justifierait pas et soulèverait contre lui l'opinion européenne.

La communication du Prince Lichnowski avait laissé Sir E. Grey sous une impression d'inquiétude qu'il ne m'a pas dissimulée. La même impression m'a été donnée par l'Ambassadeur d'Italie qui redoute, lui aussi, l'éventualité d'une nouvelle tension des rapports austro-serbes.

Ce matin, j'ai reçu la visite du Ministre de Serbie, qui partage également les appréhensions de Sir E. Grey. Il craint que l'Autriche ne mette le Gouvernement serbe en présence d'une demande que la dignité de celui-ci et surtout la susceptibilité de l'opinion publique ne lui permettent pas d'accueillir sans protestation. Comme je lui objectais le calme qui paraît régner à Vienne et dont témoignent tous les Ambassadeurs accrédités dans cette capitale, il m'a répondu que ce calme officiel n'était qu'apparent et recouvrait les dispositions les plus foncièrement hostiles contre la Serbie. Or, a-t-il ajouté, si ces dispositions viennent à se manifester par une démarche dépourvue de la mesure désirable, il y aura lieu de tenir compte de l'opinion publique serbe, surexcitée par les mauvais procédés dont l'Autriche a abreuvé ce pays et rendue moins patiente par le souvenir encore tout frais de deux guerres victorieuses. Malgré les sacrifices dont la Serbie a payé ses récentes victoires, elle peut mettre encore sur pied 400,000 hommes et l'opinion publique, qui le sait, n'est pas disposée à tolérer une humiliation.

Sir E. Grey dans un entretien avec l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie l'a prié de recommander à son Gouvernement de ne pas s'écarter de la prudence et de la modération nécessaires pour éviter de nouvelles complications, de ne demander à la Serbie que des mesures auxquelles celle-ci puisse raisonnablement se prêter et de ne pas se laisser entraîner au delà.

Paul CAMBON.

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N° 20.

**M. BIENVENU-MARTIN**, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.,  
à Londres, Berlin, Saint-Pétersbourg et Rome.

Paris, le 23 juillet 1914.

Les premières intentions du Gouvernement austro-hongrois avaient été, selon les informations recueillies par l'Ambassadeur de France à Vienne, d'agir avec la plus grande rigueur contre la Serbie, en tenant huit corps d'armée prêts à entrer en campagne.

Ses dispositions actuelles seraient plus conciliantes : en réponse à une question que lui posait M. Dumaine, à qui j'avais prescrit d'appeler l'attention du Gouvernement autrichien sur les inquiétudes éveillées en Europe, le baron Macchio a affirmé à notre Ambassadeur que le ton et les demandes qui seront formulées dans la note autrichienne permettent de compter sur un dénouement pacifique. Je ne sais quelle foi il faut accorder à ces assurances, en raison des habitudes de la chancellerie impériale.

Dans tous les cas, la note autrichienne sera remise dans un très bref délai. Le Ministre de Serbie estime que M. Pachitch acceptera, par désir d'un arrangement, les demandes relatives à la répression de l'attentat et à des garanties de surveillance et de police, mais qu'il résistera à ce qui attenterait à la souveraineté et à la dignité de son pays.

Dans les cercles diplomatiques de Vienne, l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne préconise des résolutions violentes, tout en convenant que peut-être la Chancellerie impériale n'est pas entièrement d'accord avec lui sur ce point; l'Ambassadeur de Russie, se fiant aux assurances qui lui ont été données, s'est absenté de Vienne et a confié, avant son départ, à M. Dumaine, que son Gouvernement n'élèvera pas d'objections contre la punition des coupables et la dissolution des associations révolutionnaires, mais qu'il ne pourrait tolérer des exigences humiliantes pour le sentiment national de la Serbie.

BIENVENU-MARTIN,

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N° 21.

**M. ALLIZÉ**, Ministre de France à Munich,  
à **M. BIENVENU-MARTIN**, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Munich, le 23 juillet 1914.

La presse bavaroise paraît croire qu'une solution pacifique de l'incident austro-serbe est non seulement possible, mais même vraisemblable; dans les sphères offi-

cielles, au contraire, on affecte, depuis quelque temps, avec plus ou moins de sincérité, un réel pessimisme.

Le Président du Conseil notamment m'a dit aujourd'hui que la note autrichienne, dont il avait connaissance, était, à son avis, rédigée dans des termes acceptables pour la Serbie, mais que la situation actuelle ne lui en paraissait pas moins très sérieuse.

ALLIZÉ.

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### **CHAPITRE III**

**LA NOTE AUTRICHIENNE ET LA RÉPONSE SERBE**

**DU VENDREDI 24 JUILLET AU SAMEDI 25 JUILLET**



N° 22.

**M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil,**

**à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.**

Je vous serais obligé de transmettre d'urgence à M. Dumaine les informations et instructions suivantes :

Reval, le 24 juillet 1914, à 1 heure du matin.

Au cours de mes entretiens avec le Ministre des Affaires étrangères russe, nous avons été amenés à envisager les dangers qui pourraient résulter d'une démarche éventuelle de l'Autriche-Hongrie à l'égard de la Serbie, relativement à l'attentat dont a été victime l'archiduc héritier. Nous sommes tombés d'accord pour penser qu'il convenait de ne rien négliger pour prévenir une demande d'explications ou quelque mise en demeure qui équivaldraient à une intervention dans les affaires intérieures de la Serbie, et que celle-ci pourrait considérer comme une atteinte à sa souveraineté et à son indépendance.

En conséquence, nous avons estimé qu'il y avait lieu, dans une conversation amicale avec le Comte Berchtold, de lui donner des conseils de modération, propres à lui faire comprendre combien serait mal inspirée une intervention à Belgrade, où l'on pourrait voir une menace de la part du Cabinet de Vienne.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, mis au courant par M. Sazonow, a exprimé l'idée que son Gouvernement se joindrait sans doute à une démarche tendant à écarter un danger qui peut menacer la paix générale, et a télégraphié dans ce sens à son Gouvernement.

M. Sazonow a adressé des instructions à cet effet à M. Schebeko. Sans qu'il s'agisse ici d'une action collective ou concertée des représentants de la Triple Entente à Vienne, je vous prie de vous entretenir de la question avec les Ambassadeurs de Russie et d'Angleterre, et de vous entendre avec eux sur le meilleur moyen, pour chacun de vous, de faire entendre sans retard au Comte Berchtold les conseils de modération que nous paraît réclamer la situation présente.

J'ajoute qu'il y aurait lieu de prier M. Paul Cambon de faire valoir auprès de Sir E. Grey l'utilité de cette démarche, et d'appuyer la suggestion que l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre en Russie a dû présenter à cet effet au Foreign Office. Le Comte Benc-kendorff est chargé de faire une recommandation analogue.

René VIVIANI.

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N° 23.

M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.  
à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, à bord de la *France*.

Paris, le 24 juillet 1914.

J'ai transmis d'urgence à Vienne vos instructions, mais il résulte des informations de presse de ce matin que la Note autrichienne a été remise hier soir à six heures à Belgrade.

Cette note, dont l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie ne nous a pas encore remis le texte officiel, paraît très accentuée; elle tendrait non seulement à obtenir la poursuite des Serbes mêlés directement à l'attentat de Serajevo, mais demanderait la répression immédiate dans la presse et dans l'armée serbe de toute propagande anti-autrichienne. Elle donnerait jusqu'à samedi soir, à six heures, à la Serbie pour s'exécuter.

En transmettant vos instructions à M. Dumaine, je l'ai prié de se concerter avec ses collègues anglais et russe.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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N° 24.

*TEXTE de la Note autrichienne.*

(Note communiquée par le Comte Szecsen, Ambassadeur d'Autriche Hongrie, à M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i., le vendredi 24 juillet 1914, à 10 h. 1/2 du matin.)

Vienne, le 24 juillet 1914.

Le Gouvernement impérial et royal s'est vu obligé d'adresser jeudi 23 juillet courant, par l'entremise du Ministre impérial et royal à Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouvernement royal de Serbie :

• Le 31 mars 1909 le Ministre de Serbie à Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouvernement au Gouvernement impérial et royal la déclaration suivante :

• La Serbie reconnaît qu'elle n'a pas été atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli créé en Bosnie-Herzégovine et qu'elle se conformera par conséquent à telle décision que les Puissances prendront par rapport à l'article XXV du Traité de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des grandes puissances, la Serbie s'engage dès à présent à abandonner l'attitude de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a observée à l'égard de l'annexion depuis l'automne dernier et elle s'engage, en outre, à changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers l'Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre désormais avec cette dernière sur le pied d'un bon voisinage. •

Or, l'histoire des dernières années, et notamment les événements douloureux du 28 juin ont démontré l'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement subversif dont le but est de détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe est arrivé à se manifester au delà du territoire du royaume par des actes de terrorisme, par une série d'attentats et par des meurtres.

Le Gouvernement royal serbe, loin de satisfaire aux engagements formels contenus dans la déclaration du 31 mars 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement. Il a toléré l'activité criminelle des différentes sociétés et affiliations dirigées contre la Monarchie, le langage effréné de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'attentats, la participation d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans des agissements subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans l'instruction publique, toléré enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe à la haine de la Monarchie et au mépris de ses institutions.

Cette tolérance coupable du Gouvernement royal de Serbie n'avait pas cessé au moment où les événements du 28 juin dernier en ont démontré au monde entier les conséquences funestes.

Il résulte des dépositions et aveux des auteurs criminels de l'attentat du 28 juin que le meurtre de Serajevo a été tramé à Belgrade, que les armes et explosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient être munis, leur ont été donnés par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes faisant partie de la « Narodna Odbrana » et enfin que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a été organisé et effectué par des chefs du service-frontière serbe.

Les résultats mentionnés de l'instruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement impérial et royal de poursuivre plus longtemps l'attitude de longanimité expectative qu'il avait observée pendant des années vis-à-vis des agissements concentrés à Belgrade et propagés de là sur les territoires de la Monarchie : ces résultats lui imposent au contraire le devoir de mettre fin à des menées qui forment une menace perpétuelle pour la tranquillité de la Monarchie.

C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement impérial et royal se voit obligé de demander au Gouvernement serbe l'énonciation officielle qu'il condamne la propagande dirigée contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage à supprimer, par tous les moyens, cette propagande criminelle et terroriste.

Afin de donner un caractère solennel à cet engagement le Gouvernement royal de Serbie fera publier à la première page du *Journal officiel* en date du 13/26 juillet l'énonciation suivante :

« Le Gouvernement royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tolérances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels.

Le Gouvernement royal regrette que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé à la propagande sus mentionnée et compromis par là les relations de bon

voisinage auquel le Gouvernement royal s'était solennellement engagé par ses déclarations du 31 mars 1909.

Le Gouvernement royal qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer. »

Cette énonciation sera portée simultanément à la connaissance de l'armée royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majesté le Roi et sera publiée dans le *Bulletin officiel de l'armée*.

Le Gouvernement royal serbe s'engage en outre :

1° A supprimer toute publication qui excite à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie, et dont la tendance générale est dirigée contre son intégrité territoriale.

2° A dissoudre immédiatement la société dite « Narodna Odbrana », à confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, et à procéder de la même manière contre les autres sociétés et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent à la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise, le Gouvernement royal prendra les mesures nécessaires pour que les sociétés dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activité sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme.

3° A éliminer sans délai de l'instruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

4° A éloigner du service militaire et de l'administration en général tous les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et dont le Gouvernement impérial et royal se réserve de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gouvernement royal.

5° A accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement impérial et royal dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirigé contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie.

6° A ouvrir une enquête judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe; des organes délégués par le Gouvernement impérial et royal prendront part aux recherches y relatives.

7° A procéder d'urgence à l'arrestation du commandant Voija Tankosic et du nommé Milan Ciganovic, employé de l'Etat serbe, compromis par les résultats de l'instruction de Serajevo.

8° A empêcher, par des mesures efficaces, le concours des autorités serbes dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière;

A licencier et punir sévèrement les fonctionnaires du service-frontière de Schabatz et de Loznica coupables d'avoir aidé les auteurs du crime de Serajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontière.

9° A donner au Gouvernement impérial et royal des explications sur les propos

injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger qui, malgré leur position officielle, n'ont pas hésité après l'attentat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une manière hostile envers la Monarchie austro-hongroise. Enfin,

10° D'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement impérial et royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents.

Le Gouvernement impérial et royal attend la réponse du Gouvernement royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi 25 de ce mois à cinq heures du soir (1).

Un mémoire concernant les résultats de l'instruction de Serajevo à l'égard des fonctionnaires mentionnés aux points 7 et 8 est annexé à cette note.

J'ai l'honneur d'inviter votre Excellence de vouloir bien porter le contenu de cette Note à la connaissance du Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité, en accompagnant cette communication du commentaire que voici :

Le 31 mars 1909 le Gouvernement royal serbe a adressé à l'Autriche-Hongrie la déclaration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus.

Le lendemain même de cette déclaration, la Serbie s'est engagée dans une politique tendant à inspirer des idées subversives aux ressortissants serbes de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et à préparer ainsi la séparation des territoires austro-hongrois, limitrophes à la Serbie.

La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle :

Des sociétés et affiliations ne tardèrent pas à se former qui, soit ouvertement, soit clandestinement, étaient destinées à créer des désordres sur le territoire austro-hongrois. Ces sociétés et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des généraux et des diplomates, des fonctionnaires d'État et des juges, bref, les sommités du monde officiel et inofficiel du royaume.

Le journalisme serbe est presque entièrement au service de cette propagande, dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent leurs lecteurs à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie voisine ou à des attentats dirigés plus ou moins ouvertement contre sa sûreté et son intégrité.

Un grand nombre d'agents est appelé à soutenir par tous les moyens l'agitation contre l'Autriche-Hongrie et à corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays.

L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens serbes, esprit dont les annales du royaume portent les sanglantes empreintes, a subi une recrudescence depuis la dernière crise balkanique; des individus ayant fait partie des bandes jusque-là occupées en Macédoine, sont venus se mettre à la disposition de la propagande terroriste contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

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(1) L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a adressé au Ministre des Affaires étrangères, par lettre particulière, la rectification suivante, dans la journée du 24 juillet : « Dans la copie de la dépêche que j'ai eu l'honneur de remettre ce matin à Votre Excellence, il était dit que mon Gouvernement attendait la réponse du Cabinet de Belgrade au plus tard jusqu'au samedi 25 de ce mois à cinq heures du soir. Notre Ministre à Belgrade n'ayant remis sa note hier qu'à six heures du soir, le délai pour la réponse se trouve prorogé de ce fait jusqu'à demain samedi six heures du soir.

« J'ai cru de mon devoir d'informer Votre Excellence de cette légère modification dans l'expiration du délai fixé pour la réponse du Gouvernement serbe. »

En présence de ces agissements auxquels l'Autriche-Hongrie est exposée depuis des années, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gouvernement serbe a manqué au devoir que lui imposait la déclaration solennelle du 31 mars 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contradiction avec la volonté de l'Europe et avec l'engagement qu'il avait pris vis-à-vis de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

La longanimité du Gouvernement impérial et royal à l'égard de l'attitude provocatrice de la Serbie était inspirée du désintéressement territorial de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de l'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe finirait tout de même par apprécier à sa juste valeur l'amitié de l'Autriche-Hongrie. En observant une attitude bienveillante pour les intérêts politiques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement impérial et royal espérait que le royaume se déciderait finalement à suivre de son côté une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait surtout à une pareille évolution dans les idées politiques en Serbie, lorsque, après les événements de l'année 1912, le Gouvernement impérial et royal rendit possible, par une attitude désintéressée et sans rancune, l'agrandissement si considérable de la Serbie.

Cette bienveillance manifestée par l'Autriche-Hongrie à l'égard de l'État voisin n'a cependant aucunement modifié les procédés du royaume, qui a continué à tolérer sur son territoire une propagande dont les funestes conséquences se sont manifestées au monde entier le 28 juin dernier, jour où l'héritier présomptif de la Monarchie et son illustre épouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot tramé à Belgrade.

En présence de cet état de choses, le Gouvernement impérial et royal a dû se décider à entreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes démarches à Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouvernement serbe à arrêter le mouvement incendiaire menaçant la sûreté et l'intégrité de la Monarchie austro-hongroise.

Le Gouvernement impérial et royal est persuadé qu'en entreprenant cette démarche, il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisées qui ne sauraient admettre que le régicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impunément dans la lutte politique, et que la paix européenne fût continuellement troublée par les agissements partant de Belgrade.

C'est à l'appui de ce qui précède que le Gouvernement impérial et royal tient à la disposition du Gouvernement de la République française un dossier elucidant les menées serbes et les rapports existant entre ces menées et le meurtre du 28 juin.

Une communication identique est adressée aux représentants impériaux et royaux auprès des autres Puissances signataires.

Vous êtes autorisé de laisser une copie de cette dépêche entre les mains de M. le Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

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#### ANNEXE.

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L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le tribunal de Serajevo contre Gravillo Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicité y relative, crime commis par eux le 28 juin dernier, a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations suivantes :



1° Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son séjour à Serajevo, l'archiduc François-Ferdinand fut formé à Belgrade par Gravillo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, le nommé Milan Ciganovic et Trifko Grabez avec le concours du commandant Voija Tankosic.

2° Les six bombes et les quatre pistolets Browning avec munitions, moyennant lesquels les malfaiteurs ont commis l'attentat, furent livrés à Belgrade à Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez par le nommé Milan Ciganovic et le commandant Voija Tankosic.

3° Les bombes sont des grenades à main provenant du dépôt d'armes de l'armée serbe à Kragujevaks.

4° Pour assurer la réussite de l'attentat, Ciganovic enseigna à Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez la manière de se servir des grenades et donna, dans une forêt près du champ de tir à Topschider, des leçons de tir avec pistolets Browning à Princip et à Grabez.

5° Pour rendre possible à Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez de passer la frontière de Bosnie-Herzégovine et d'y introduire clandestinement leur contrebande d'armes, un système de transport secret fut organisé par Ciganovic.

D'après cette organisation, l'introduction en Bosnie-Herzégovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut opérée par les capitaines-frontières de Sabac (Popovic) et de Loznica, ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbic de Loznica, avec le concours de divers particuliers.

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## N° 25

**M. BIENVENU-MARTIN**, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.,

à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, à bord de la *France*, et à  
Londres, Berlin, Vienne, Saint-Petersbourg, Rome, Belgrade.

Paris, le 24 juillet 1914.

J'ai l'honneur de vous informer que la Note autrichienne, remise à Belgrade jeudi soir, m'a été laissée en copie, ce matin, par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie. Le comte Szecsen m'a fait connaître que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois attend la réponse du Gouvernement serbe jusqu'à samedi 25, à cinq heures du soir (1).

La Note s'appuie sur l'engagement pris par la Serbie, le 31 mars 1909, de reconnaître l'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzégovine et reproche au Gouvernement serbe d'avoir toléré une propagande anti-autrichienne, à laquelle ont pris part les fonctionnaires, l'armée et la presse, propagande menaçante pour la sécurité et l'intégrité de l'Autriche, et dont le crime du 28 juin, tramé à Belgrade, selon les constatations de l'instruction, a démontré les dangers.

Le Gouvernement autrichien se déclare obligé de mettre fin à une propagande qui constitue un danger permanent pour sa tranquillité, et d'exiger du Gouvernement serbe une énonciation officielle de sa volonté de la condamner et réprimer, par la publication, au *Journal officiel* du 26, d'une déclaration dont les termes sont indiqués, reprouvant, regrettant et menaçant de sévir. Un ordre du jour du Roi à l'armée serbe porterait également cette déclaration à sa connaissance. En outre, le Gouver-

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(1) Voir note page 43.

nement serbe s'engagerait à supprimer les publications, à dissoudre les Sociétés, à révoquer les officiers et fonctionnaires dont les noms seraient communiqués par le Gouvernement autrichien, à accepter la collaboration de fonctionnaires autrichiens pour la suppression de l'action subversive signalée, ainsi que pour l'enquête sur l'attentat de Serajevo, enfin à procéder à l'arrestation immédiate d'un officier et d'un employé serbes qui y sont compromis.

Au memorandum autrichien est annexée une Note, résumant les constatations de l'instruction du crime de Serajevo et affirmant qu'il a été tramé à Belgrade, que les bombes ont été fournies aux assassins et émanent d'un dépôt de l'armée serbe, enfin que les assassins ont été exercés et aidés par des officiers et employés serbes.

En rendant visite, aussitôt après cette communication au Directeur politique p. i. le Comte Szecsen l'a informé, sans aucun commentaire, de la remise de la Note. M. Berthelot n'a pu que signaler, sur mes indications, à l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie, l'impression d'inquiétude éveillée par les informations parues dans la matinée sur le contenu de la Note autrichienne, et le sentiment pénible que ne manquerait pas d'éveiller, dans l'opinion française, le moment choisi pour une démarche si impérative et de si court délai; c'est-à-dire l'heure où le Président de la République et le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République avaient quitté Pétersbourg et se trouvaient en mer, par conséquent hors d'état d'exercer, d'accord avec les Puissances qui n'étaient pas directement intéressées, l'action apaisante si désirable entre la Serbie et l'Autriche, dans l'intérêt de la paix générale.

Le Ministre de Serbie n'a encore aucune donnée sur les intentions de son Gouvernement.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a demandé à être reçu par moi, cet après-midi, à cinq heures.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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## N° 26

M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

à M. THIEBAUT, Ministre de France à Stockholm (pour le Président du Conseil) et à Belgrade, Vienne, Londres, Berlin, Rome, Pétersbourg.

Paris, le 24 juillet 1914.

M. Vesnitch n'avait, ce matin encore, reçu de son Gouvernement aucun télégramme de nature à le renseigner sur ses intentions et ne connaissait pas le contenu de la Note autrichienne.

A la demande de conseil qu'il formulait à la Direction politique, M. Berthelot lui a dit, à titre tout personnel, que la Serbie devait chercher à gagner du temps, le

terme de 48 heures constituant peut-être plutôt une « mise en demeure » qu'un ultimatum proprement dit; qu'il pouvait y avoir lieu, par exemple, d'offrir immédiatement satisfaction sur tous les points qui n'étaient pas inconciliables avec la dignité et la souveraineté de la Serbie; il lui a été conseillé de faire remarquer que les constatations de l'instruction autrichienne de Serajevo étaient unilatérales, et que la Serbie, tout en étant prête à sévir contre tous les complices d'un crime qu'elle réprouvait hautement, demandait à être mise au courant des preuves, pour pouvoir les vérifier rapidement; de chercher surtout à échapper à la prise directe de l'Autriche, en se déclarant prête à se soumettre à l'arbitrage de l'Europe.

J'ai demandé à Londres et à Pétersbourg les vues et les intentions des Gouvernements anglais et russe. Il résulte, d'autre part, de nos informations, que l'Italie n'a reçu qu'aujourd'hui communication de la Note autrichienne, au sujet de laquelle elle n'avait été ni pressentie ni même avertie.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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N° 27

M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères  
à Stockholm (pour le Président du Conseil), Belgrade, Londres,  
Saint-Pétersbourg, Berlin, Rome.

Paris, le 25 juillet 1914.

L'Ambassadeur de France à Vienne me fait savoir que l'opinion a été surprise par la soudaineté et l'exagération des demandes autrichiennes, mais que le parti militaire paraît craindre surtout que la Serbie ne cède.

Le Ministre de Serbie en Autriche pense que son Gouvernement se montrera très conciliant en ce qui concerne la punition des complices de l'attentat et les garanties à donner en vue de la suppression de la propagande anti-autrichienne, mais qu'il ne saurait accepter un ordre du jour à l'armée dicté au Roi, ni le licenciement d'officiers suspects à l'Autriche, ni l'intervention de fonctionnaires étrangers en Serbie. M. Jovanovitch estime que s'il était possible d'engager une discussion, le conflit pourrait encore s'arranger, avec le concours des Puissances.

Notre Ambassadeur à Berlin rend compte de l'émotion provoquée par la Note autrichienne et de l'état d'esprit du Chargé d'affaires de Russie, qui pense qu'une grande partie de l'opinion en Allemagne souhaiterait la guerre. Le ton de la presse est menaçant et paraît avoir pour but d'intimider la Russie. Notre Ambassadeur doit voir ce soir M. de Jagow.

M. Barrère informe que l'Italie agit à Vienne dans un sens modérateur et cherche à éviter des complications.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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**M. BIENVENU-MARTIN**, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

à Stockholm (pour le Président du Conseil), et à Belgrade, Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Berlin, Vienne, Rome.

Paris, le 24 juillet 1914.

M. de Schoen est venu me communiquer, sans vouloir m'en laisser une copie, mais en m'en donnant lecture à deux reprises, sur ma demande, une Note de son Gouvernement.

Cette Note s'exprime presque textuellement de la manière suivante :

« Les déclarations des journaux austro-hongrois relatives aux circonstances dans lesquelles l'attentat sur la personne de l'héritier du trône d'Autriche et de son épouse a eu lieu, dévoilent nettement le but que la propagande panserbe s'était proposé et les moyens dont elle s'est servie pour l'atteindre. D'après les faits connus, il ne peut non plus y avoir aucun doute, que c'est à Belgrade qu'il faut chercher le centre d'action des agitations qui tendaient à détacher de l'Autriche-Hongrie les provinces slaves du Sud pour les réunir au royaume de Serbie et que c'est là tout au moins que s'est développée son activité, avec la connivence de membres du Gouvernement et de l'armée.

« Les menées serbes remontent à un grand nombre d'années. Le chauvinisme panserbe s'est particulièrement manifesté pendant la crise bosniaque. C'est à la modération du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, à son grand empire sur lui-même, à l'intervention énergique des Puissances que l'on est redevable si les provocations auxquelles l'Autriche-Hongrie a été, à cette époque, en butte de la part de la Serbie, n'ont pas suscité un conflit. La promesse faite alors par le Gouvernement serbe d'adopter une attitude irréprochable n'a pas été tenue. Sous les yeux, tout au moins avec la tolérance tacite de la Serbie officielle, la propagande panserbe a continué, dans l'entretemps, à croître en étendue et intensité. C'est sur son compte qu'il faut mettre ce dernier forfait, dont on doit rechercher la trame à Belgrade. Il est indubitable qu'il ne serait conciliable ni avec la dignité ni avec l'esprit de conservation de la Monarchie austro-hongroise de rester plus longtemps inactive en présence de l'agitation qui se poursuit de ce côté-là de sa frontière et qui constitue une menace perpétuelle pour la sûreté et l'intégrité de ses territoires. En raison de cet état de choses, la conduite de même que les revendications du Gouvernement austro-hongrois doivent être considérées comme justifiées. Cependant l'attitude que l'opinion publique aussi bien que le Gouvernement ont adoptée dans ces derniers temps en Serbie, n'exclut pas la crainte que le Gouvernement serbe se refusera à accéder à ces réclamations et même qu'il se laissera entraîner à une attitude provocatrice à l'égard de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Si celle-ci ne veut pas renoncer définitivement à son rang de Grande Puissance, il ne restera au Gouvernement austro-hongrois plus rien d'autre à faire qu'à poursuivre ses revendications auprès du Gouvernement serbe en exerçant une forte pression et au besoin en prenant des mesures militaires dont le choix des moyens doit lui être laissé. »

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a appelé particulièrement mon attention sur les deux derniers paragraphes de sa Note, indiquant avec insistance, avant de les lire, que c'était là le point capital. J'en ai noté littéralement le texte, que voici : « Le Gouvernement allemand estime que la question actuelle est une affaire à régler exclusivement entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie et que les Puissances ont le plus sérieux intérêt à la restreindre aux deux Parties intéressées.

« Le Gouvernement allemand désire ardemment que le conflit soit localisé, toute intervention d'une autre Puissance devant, par le jeu naturel des alliances, provoquer des conséquences incalculables. »

J'ai fait remarquer à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qu'autant il paraîtrait légitime qu'on demandât la punition de tous les complices de l'attentat de Serajevo, autant, au contraire, il semblait difficile d'exiger des mesures inacceptables pour la dignité et la souveraineté de la Serbie : le Gouvernement serbe, même s'il voulait s'y soumettre, risquerait d'être emporté par une révolution.

J'ai également fait observer à M. de Schoen que sa Note n'envisageait que deux hypothèses : celle d'un refus pur et simple, ou celle d'une attitude de provocation de la Serbie. Une troisième hypothèse (qui laisserait la porte ouverte à un accommodement) devrait en tous cas être envisagée : celle d'une acceptation de la Serbie, qui consentirait à donner immédiatement toutes les satisfactions pour la punition des complices et toutes les garanties pour la répression de la propagande anti-autrichienne, compatibles avec sa souveraineté et sa dignité.

J'ai ajouté que si, dans cette limite, les satisfactions poursuivies par l'Autriche étaient admissibles, les modalités de leur application pourraient être examinées ; si la Serbie donnait des preuves évidentes de bonne volonté, on ne pourrait comprendre que l'Autriche refusât de se prêter à la conversation.

Peut-être ne fallait-il pas rendre trop difficile à de tierces Puissances, qui ne sauraient ni moralement ni sentimentalement se désintéresser de la Serbie, une attitude conforme au désir exprimé par l'Allemagne de localiser le conflit.

M. de Schoen a reconnu la valeur de ces considérations et a déclaré vaguement que l'espoir restait toujours possible. Comme je lui demandais s'il fallait attribuer à la Note autrichienne le caractère d'une simple mise en demeure, permettant une discussion, ou d'un ultimatum, il a répondu qu'il n'avait pas de sentiment personnel.

BIENVENU-MARTIN,

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N° 29.

M. Jules CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Berlin,

à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Berlin, le 24 juillet 1914.

La remise de la Note autrichienne à la Serbie a causé une profonde émotion.

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche déclare que son Gouvernement ne saurait rien retrans-

cher de ses exigences. A la Wilhelmstrasse, ainsi que dans la presse, on tient le même langage.

La plupart des Chargés d'affaires présents à Berlin sont venus me voir ce matin. Ils manifestent peu d'espoir dans une issue pacifique. Le Chargé d'affaires de Russie a remarqué avec amertume que l'Autriche avait remis sa Note au moment même où le Président de la République et le Président du Conseil avaient quitté Pétersbourg. Il incline à penser qu'une grande partie de l'opinion en Allemagne souhaite la guerre et voudrait saisir cette occasion dans laquelle l'Autriche se montrera sans doute plus unie que par le passé et où l'Empereur d'Allemagne, par un sentiment de solidarité monarchique et par horreur de l'attentat, est moins porté à se montrer conciliant.

M. de Jagow doit me recevoir à la fin de l'après-midi.

Jules CAMBON.

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N° 30.

M. Jules CAMBON, Ambassadeur de la République française à Berlin,  
à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Berlin, le 24 juillet 1914.

J'ai demandé au Secrétaire d'État, dans l'entrevue que j'ai eue avec lui, aujourd'hui, s'il était exact, comme l'annonçaient les journaux, que l'Autriche eût remis une Note aux Puissances sur son différend avec la Serbie, s'il l'avait reçue, et comment il l'appréciait.

M. de Jagow m'a répondu affirmativement, ajoutant que la note était énergique, et qu'il l'approuvait, le Gouvernement Serbe ayant depuis longtemps lassé la patience autrichienne. Il considère d'ailleurs cette question comme d'ordre intérieur pour l'Autriche et il espère qu'elle sera localisée.

J'ai continué en lui disant que n'ayant reçu encore aucune instruction, je ne voulais échanger avec lui que des vues toutes personnelles. Je lui ai demandé alors si vraiment le Cabinet de Berlin avait totalement ignoré les exigences autrichiennes avant qu'elles fussent communiquées à Belgrade et, comme il me l'affirmait, je lui ai manifesté ma surprise de le voir ainsi s'engager à soutenir des prétentions dont il ignorait la limite et la portée.

« C'est bien, m'a dit M. de Jagow en m'interrompant, parce que nous causons entre nous personnellement que je vous laisse me dire cela. »

« Certainement, ai-je dit; mais si Pierre I<sup>er</sup> s'humilie, la Serbie sera probablement livrée à des troubles intérieurs, cela ouvrira la porte à de nouvelles éventualités, et savez-vous où vous serez conduit par Vienne? » J'ai ajouté que le langage des journaux allemands n'était pas le langage de gens indifférents et étrangers à l'affaire, mais annonçait un appui actif. Enfin, j'ai remarqué que la brièveté du délai imparti à la Serbie pour se soumettre, impressionnerait fâcheusement l'Europe.

M. de Jagow me répondit qu'il s'attendait bien à « un peu d'émotion » de la part des amis de la Serbie, mais qu'il comptait qu'ils lui donneraient de bons conseils.

« Je ne doute pas, lui dis-je alors, que la Russie fasse effort auprès du Cabinet de Belgrade pour l'amener aux concessions acceptables; mais ce qu'on demande à l'un pourquoi ne pas le demander à l'autre; et si l'on compte que des conseils seront donnés à Belgrade, n'est-il pas légitime de compter que, d'un autre côté, des conseils seront aussi donnés à Vienne? »

Le Secrétaire d'État se laissa aller à dire que cela dépendait des circonstances, mais se reprenant aussitôt, il répéta que l'affaire devait être localisée. Il me demanda si vraiment je trouvais la situation grave. "Assurément, lui répondis-je, car, si ce qui se passe a été réfléchi, je ne comprends pas qu'on ait coupé les ponts derrière soi."

Tout indique que l'Allemagne se dispose à appuyer d'une façon singulièrement énergique l'attitude de l'Autriche. La faiblesse, manifestée depuis quelques années par l'alliée austro-hongroise, affaiblissait la confiance que l'on avait ici en elle. On la trouvait lourde à trainer. Les mauvais procès, comme l'affaire d'Agram et l'affaire Friedjung, rendaient sa police odieuse en la couvrant de ridicule. On ne lui demandait que d'être forte, mais l'on est satisfait qu'elle soit brutale.

Un article paru dans le *Lokal Anzeiger* de ce soir indique aussi dans la Chancellerie allemande un état d'esprit dont, à Paris, nous sommes naturellement portés à ne pas tenir assez de compte, je veux parler du sentiment de la solidarité monarchique. Je suis convaincu que ce point de vue doit être grandement considéré pour apprécier l'attitude de l'Empereur Guillaume, dont la nature impressionnable a dû être sensible à l'assassinat d'un Prince qui l'avait reçu quelques jours auparavant.

Il n'en est pas moins frappant de voir le soin avec lequel M. de Jagow, et tous les fonctionnaires placés sous ses ordres, affectent de dire à tout le monde qu'ils ignorent la portée de la Note autrichienne remise à la Serbie.

Jules CARRON.

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## N° 31.

M. PALÉOLOGUE, Ambassadeur de France à Saint-Petersbourg,

à M. BIENVENI-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Petersbourg, le 24 juillet 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a donné communication à M. Sazonoff d'une note comminatoire à la Serbie.

Les dispositions de l'Empereur de Russie et de ses Ministres sont des plus paci-

fiques, ainsi que le Président de la République et le Président du Conseil ont pu s'en assurer directement; mais l'ultimatum que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois vient de remettre au Cabinet de Belgrade apporte dans la situation un élément nouveau et inquiétant.

L'opinion publique russe ne tolérerait pas que l'Autriche fît violence à la Serbie. La brièveté du délai assigné pour l'ultimatum rend plus difficile encore l'action modératrice que les Puissances de la Triple Entente pourraient exercer à Vienne.

D'autre part, M. Sazonoff présume que l'Allemagne voudra soutenir son alliée, et je crains que cette impression ne soit exacte. La solidarité de la Triple Entente, en s'affirmant, peut seule empêcher les Puissances germaniques d'accentuer leur attitude provocante.

PALÉOLOGUE.

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N° 32.

M. Paul CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Londres,

à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Londres, le 24 juillet 1914.

Sir Ed. Grey m'ayant entretenu de son désir de ne rien négliger pour conjurer la crise, nous avons été d'accord pour penser que le Cabinet anglais pourrait demander au Gouvernement allemand de prendre l'initiative d'une démarche à Vienne pour offrir une médiation, entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, des quatre Puissances non directement intéressées. Si l'Allemagne s'y prête, on gagnera du temps et c'est l'essentiel.

Sir Ed. Grey m'a dit qu'il entretiendrait le Prince Lichnowsky du projet que je viens d'exposer. J'en ai fait part à mon Collègue de Russie, qui appréhende une surprise de l'Allemagne et suppose que l'Autriche n'aurait pas envoyé son ultimatum sans accord préalable avec Berlin.

Le Comte Benckendorff m'a dit que le Prince Lichnowsky, à son retour de congé, il y a un mois environ, lui avait témoigné des vues pessimistes au sujet des rapports entre Pétersbourg et Berlin. Il avait noté l'inquiétude causée dans cette dernière capitale par les bruits d'entente navale entre la Russie et l'Angleterre, par la visite du Tzar à Bucarest et par le renforcement de l'armée russe. Le Comte Benckendorff en avait conclu qu'on envisagerait volontiers en Allemagne une guerre avec la Russie.

Le Sous-Secrétaire d'État a été frappé, comme nous tous de l'air soucieux du Prince Lichnowsky depuis son retour de Berlin et il pense que si l'Allemagne l'avait voulu, elle aurait pu empêcher la remise de l'ultimatum.



La situation est donc des plus graves, et nous ne voyons aucun moyen d'enrayer la marche des événements.

Cependant le Comte Benckendorff croit bon de tenter la démarche sur laquelle je me suis mis d'accord avec Sir Ed. Grey.

Paul CAMBON.

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N° 33.

M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France à Londres,  
à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Londres, le 24 juillet 1914.

Le Ministre serbe a reçu cette nuit de M. Pachitch un télégramme disant que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois lui avait adressé son ultimatum dont le délai expire demain, soit samedi à 6 heures. M. Pachitch ne donne pas les termes de la communication autrichienne, mais, si elle est telle que le *Times* de ce jour le rapporte, il semble impossible que le Gouvernement serbe puisse l'accepter.

Nous nous sommes demandé avec mon Collègue russe, qui considère comme extrêmement difficile pour son Gouvernement de ne pas soutenir la Serbie, quelle intervention pourrait arrêter le conflit.

Sir Ed. Grey m'ayant convoqué pour cet après-midi, je me propose de lui suggérer de réclamer l'intervention officieuse du Gouvernement allemand à Vienne pour empêcher une attaque subite.

Paul CAMBON.

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N° 34.

M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.,  
à Stockholm (pour le Président du Conseil), Belgrade, Saint-Petersbourg, Berlin, Vienne, Rome.

Paris, le 24 juillet 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche ayant communiqué la Note de son Gouvernement à Sir Ed. Grey, celui-ci a fait observer que jamais déclaration aussi formidable n'avait été adressée par un Gouvernement à un autre; il a attiré l'attention du Comte Mensdorff sur les responsabilités assumées par l'Autriche.

Envisageant une possibilité de conflit entre l'Autriche et la Russie, Sir Ed. Grey se propose de réclamer le concours du Gouvernement allemand en vue d'une médiation des quatre Puissances non intéressées directement dans l'affaire Serbe : Angleterre, France, Italie et Allemagne; cette médiation s'exercerait à la fois à Vienne et à Pétersbourg.

J'ai donné au Ministre de Serbie des conseils de prudence et suis disposé à m'associer à toute action conciliante à Vienne, dans l'espoir que l'Autriche ne maintiendra pas l'intégralité de ses exigences vis-à-vis d'un petit Etat, si celui-ci se montre disposé à donner toutes les satisfactions jugées compatibles avec son indépendance et sa souveraineté.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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N° 35.

M. Jules CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Berlin,

à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Berlin, le 25 juillet 1914.

Le Ministre de Belgique se montre très préoccupé des événements.

Il considère que l'Autriche et l'Allemagne ont voulu profiter du concours de circonstances qui fait qu'en ce moment la Russie et l'Angleterre leur paraissent menacées de troubles intérieurs, et qu'en France le régime militaire est discuté; aussi ne croit-il pas à l'ignorance que le Gouvernement de Berlin affecte au sujet de la démarche de l'Autriche.

Il pense que si la forme n'en a pas été soumise au cabinet de Berlin, le moment en a été habilement choisi avec lui pour surprendre la Triple Entente dans un moment de désorganisation.

Il a vu l'Ambassadeur d'Italie qui vient d'interrompre son congé pour rentrer. Il paraîtrait que l'Italie serait surprise, pour ne pas dire plus, d'avoir été tenue à l'écart de toute l'affaire par ses deux alliées.

Jules CAMBON.

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N° 36.

M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.,  
à Stockholm (pour le Président du Conseil), et à Londres, Berlin,  
Petersbourg, Vienne.

Paris, le 25 juillet 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne est venu protester à midi contre un article de *L'Echo de Paris*, qui qualifiait de « menace allemande » sa démarche d'hier. M. de Schoen a dit à un certain nombre de journalistes, et est venu affirmer à la Direction politique, qu'il n'y a pas eu « concert » entre l'Autriche et l'Allemagne pour la Note autrichienne et que le Gouvernement allemand ignorait celle-ci, bien qu'il l'eût approuvée ultérieurement, quand elle lui a été communiquée, en même temps qu'aux autres Puissances.

Le Baron de Schoen a ajouté qu'il n'y avait pas davantage « menace » : le Gouvernement allemand s'était contenté d'indiquer qu'il estimait désirable de localiser le conflit et que l'intervention d'autres Puissances risquerait de l'aggraver.

Le Directeur politique p. i. a pris acte de la démarche du Baron de Schoen. L'ayant prié de répéter les termes mêmes des deux derniers paragraphes de sa Note, il lui a fait remarquer que les termes indiquaient la volonté de l'Allemagne de s'interposer entre les Puissances et l'Autriche. M. Berthelot a ajouté qu'aucune confidence n'ayant d'ailleurs été faite à aucun journaliste, l'information de *L'Echo de Paris* n'engageait que ce journal, et marquait seulement que la démarche allemande paraissait avoir été connue autre part qu'au Ouai d'Orsay, et en dehors de lui. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne n'a pas relevé l'allusion.

D'autre part, l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche à Londres est venu également rassurer Sir Edward Grey, en lui disant que la Note autrichienne ne constituait pas un « ultimatum », mais une « demande de réponse avec limitation de temps » ; ce qui signifiait que, si les demandes autrichiennes ne sont pas acceptées ce soir à six heures, le Ministre d'Autriche quittera Belgrade, et le Gouvernement austro-hongrois commencera les actes de « préparation » militaire, mais non les « opérations » militaires.

Le Cabinet de Londres, comme ceux de Paris et de Petersbourg, a fait donner à Belgrade le conseil d'exprimer des regrets pour les complicités qui pourraient être prouvées dans l'attentat de Serajevo et de promettre à cet égard les plus larges satisfactions. Il a ajouté que, pour le reste, c'est à la Serbie qu'il appartient de répondre, dans les termes que l'intérêt du pays lui paraîtra conseiller. Le Ministre d'Angleterre à Belgrade doit consulter ses Collègues français et russe et conseiller au Gouvernement serbe, si ceux-ci en ont également l'instruction, de donner satisfaction sur tous les points où il jugera pouvoir le faire.

Sir E. Grey a dit au Prince Lichnowsky (qui ne lui a fait jusqu'ici aucune communication analogue à celle de M. de Schoen à Paris) que, si la Note autrichienne n'amenait aucune difficulté entre l'Autriche et la Russie, le Gouvernement anglais n'aurait,

pas à s'en occuper, mais qu'il était à craindre que la raideur de la Note et la brièveté du délai indiqué n'amenassent une tension. Dans ces conditions, la seule chance qu'on aperçoive d'éviter un conflit consisterait dans une médiation de la France, de l'Allemagne, de l'Italie et de l'Angleterre, l'Allemagne seule pouvant exercer dans ce sens une action sur le Gouvernement de Vienne.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a répondu qu'il transmettrait cette suggestion à Berlin, mais a laissé entendre à l'Ambassadeur de Russie, qui est son parent, que l'Allemagne ne se prêterait à aucune démarche à Vienne.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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N° 37.

M. DE FLEURIAU, Chargé d'Affaires de France à Londres,  
à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Londres, le 25 juillet 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne est venu au Foreign Office affirmer que son Gouvernement refuserait de s'immiscer dans le conflit qui divise l'Autriche et la Serbie.

Sir E. Grey a répondu que, sans le concours de l'Allemagne à Vienne, l'Angleterre ne saurait agir à Pétersbourg. Si cependant l'Autriche et la Russie mobilisaient toutes deux, ce serait bien l'occasion d'une intervention des quatre autres Puissances. Le Gouvernement allemand maintiendrait-il alors son attitude passive et refuserait-il de se joindre à l'Angleterre, à la France et à l'Italie?

Le Prince Lichnowsky ne le pense pas, puisqu'il ne s'agirait plus de difficultés entre Vienne et Belgrade, mais d'un conflit entre Vienne et Pétersbourg.

Sir E. Grey a ajouté cette observation que, si la guerre venait à éclater, aucune Puissance en Europe ne pourrait s'en désintéresser.

DE FLEURIAU.

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N° 38.

M. PALÉOLOGUE, Ambassadeur de France à Saint-Petersbourg,  
à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Petersbourg, le 25 juillet 1914.

Le Gouvernement Russe va s'efforcer d'obtenir du Gouvernement austro-hongrois une prolongation du délai assigné par l'ultimatum, afin que les Puissances puissent

se former une opinion sur le dossier judiciaire dont la communication leur est offerte.

M. Sazonoff a prié l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne de signaler à son Gouvernement le danger de la situation; il s'est abstenu toutefois de faire allusion aux mesures que la Russie serait sans doute amenée à prendre, si la Serbie était menacée dans son indépendance nationale ou dans l'intégrité de son territoire; les réponses évasives et les récriminations du Comte de Pourtalès ont laissé à M. Sazonoff une impression défavorable.

Un Conseil des ministres sera tenu demain sous la présidence de l'Empereur. M. Sazonoff garde toute sa modération : « Il faut éviter, m'a-t-il dit, tout ce qui pourrait précipiter la crise. J'estime que, même si le Gouvernement austro-hongrois passait à l'action contre la Serbie, nous ne devrions pas rompre les négociations. »

PALÉOLOGUE.

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N° 39.

M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.,  
à M. DUMAINE, Ambassadeur de France à Vienne.

Paris, le 25 juillet 1914.

Le Gouvernement russe a donné comme instructions à son représentant à Vienne de demander au Gouvernement autrichien une prolongation du délai fixé à la Serbie, pour permettre aux Puissances de se faire une opinion sur le dossier que l'Autriche a offert de leur communiquer, et en vue d'éviter des conséquences regrettables pour tous.

Un refus opposé par l'Autriche-Hongrie à cette demande ôterait toute signification à la démarche qu'elle a faite auprès des Puissances, en leur communiquant sa Note, et la mettrait en contradiction avec la morale internationale.

Le Gouvernement russe a demandé que vous fassiez d'urgence une démarche analogue auprès du Comte Berchtold; je vous prie d'appuyer la demande de votre Collègue. Le Gouvernement russe a adressé la même demande à Londres, Rome, Berlin et Bucarest.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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N° 40.

**M. DE FLEURIAU, Chargé d'affaires de France à Londres,**  
**à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.**

Londres, le 25 juillet 1914.

Sir Ed. Grey a reçu communication ce matin des instructions qui prescrivent à l'Ambassadeur de Russie à Vienne, de demander la prolongation du délai donné à la Serbie par la Note autrichienne d'avant-hier. M. Sazonoff demandait que la démarche russe fût appuyée par l'Ambassade d'Angleterre.

Sir Ed. Grey a télégraphié à Sir M. de Bunsen de s'exprimer dans le même sens que son collègue russe et de rappeler la communication autrichienne qui lui a été faite hier soir tard par le Comte Mensdorf, communication aux termes de laquelle le défaut d'adhésion de la Serbie aux conditions de l'ultimatum n'entraînerait, dès aujourd'hui, qu'une rupture diplomatique et non des opérations militaires immédiates.

Sir Ed. Grey en concluait que le temps serait laissé aux Puissances pour intervenir, et chercher les moyens de dénouer la crise.

DE FLEURIAU.

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N° 41.

**M. Jules CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Berlin,**  
**à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.**

Berlin, le 25 juillet 1914.

Ce matin, le Chargé d'affaires d'Angleterre a demandé à M. de Jagow, d'après les ordres de son Gouvernement, si l'Allemagne voudrait se joindre à l'Angleterre, à la France et à l'Italie, pour intervenir auprès de l'Autriche et de la Russie afin d'empêcher un conflit et, en premier lieu, pour demander à Vienne une prolongation du délai imparti à la Serbie par l'ultimatum.

Le Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères a répondu qu'il avait déjà, dès la réception de la dépêche du Prince Lichnowsky lui faisant part des intentions de Sir E. Grey, télégraphié ce matin même à l'Ambassadeur de la Grande-Bretagne à Vienne pour qu'il demandât cette prolongation au Comte Berchtold. Malheureusement le Comte Berchtold est à Ischl. Au reste, M. de Jagow ne croit pas que cette demande soit accueillie.

Le Chargé d'affaires d'Angleterre s'est également enquis auprès de M. de Jagow,

comme je l'avais fait hier, si l'Allemagne n'avait eu aucune connaissance de la Note autrichienne avant qu'elle fût lancée, et a reçu une réponse si nettement négative qu'il ne pourrait insister; mais il n'a pu s'empêcher de s'étonner du blanc-seing donné par l'Allemagne à l'Autriche.

M. de Jagow lui ayant répondu que la question était pour l'Autriche une question intérieure, il a remarqué qu'elle était devenue au premier chef internationale.

Jules CAMBON.

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N° 42.

M. Jules CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Berlin,  
à M. le Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Berlin, le 25 juillet 1914.

Le Chargé d'affaires de Russie a reçu pour instruction de demander au Gouvernement allemand d'insister auprès du Cabinet de Vienne, en vue de faire prolonger le délai de l'ultimatum.

M. de Jagow ne lui ayant donné rendez-vous qu'à la fin de l'après-midi, c'est-à-dire au moment où l'ultimatum viendra à échéance, M. Broniewski a envoyé d'urgence une note écrite au Secrétaire d'État, dans laquelle il marque que le retard de la communication faite par l'Autriche aux Puissances rend l'effet de cette communication illusoire, puisqu'elle ne leur laisse pas le temps de prendre connaissance des faits allégués, avant l'expiration du délai fixé. Il insiste très vivement sur la nécessité de le prolonger, si l'on n'a pas en vue de créer une grande crise.

Jules CAMBON.

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N° 43.

M. Jules CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Berlin,  
à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Berlin, le 25 juillet 1914.

Le Chargé d'affaires de Russie a fait auprès du Secrétaire d'État la démarche qui lui était prescrite, en vue d'une prolongation du délai de l'ultimatum; M. de Jagow lui a répondu qu'il avait déjà transmis une indication de ce genre à Vienne, mais qu'il estimait que toutes ces démarches étaient trop tardives.

M. Broniewski a insisté, en disant que si le délai ne pouvait être prolongé, les

mesures d'exécution pouvaient au moins être retardées, de manière à permettre aux Puissances de s'employer à éviter un conflit. Il a ajouté que la Note autrichienne était conçue dans des termes calculés pour blesser la Serbie et la forcer à la guerre.

M. de Jagow lui a répondu qu'il ne s'agissait pas d'une guerre, mais d'une « exécution » dans une affaire locale.

Le Chargé d'affaires a repris, en exprimant le regret que le Gouvernement allemand ne mesurât pas ses responsabilités dans le cas où des hostilités se produiraient, qui pourraient s'étendre au reste de l'Europe : à quoi, M. de Jagow a répondu qu'il se refusait à croire à de pareilles conséquences.

Le Chargé d'affaires de Russie a recueilli comme moi le bruit que l'Autriche, tout en déclarant ne vouloir aucune annexion de territoire, occuperait des parties de la Serbie jusqu'à ce qu'elle ait complète satisfaction. « On sait, m'a-t-il dit, ce que signifie ce mot satisfaction. » Les impressions de M. Broniewski sur les arrières-pensées de l'Allemagne sont très pessimistes.

Jules CAMBON.

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N° 44.

M BARRÈRE, Ambassadeur de France à Rome,  
à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Rome, le 25 juillet 1914.

L'Ambassadeur de Russie a fait à la Consulta la démarche prescrite par M. Sazonoff aux représentants de la Russie à Paris, Berlin, Rome, Bucarest, et qui tendait à obtenir de ces différents Cabinets qu'ils associent leur action à celle de la Russie à Vienne en vue d'obtenir une prolongation du délai imparti à la Serbie.

En l'absence du Marquis de San Giuliano, M. Salandra et M. de Martino ont répondu qu'ils se mettraient en rapport avec le Ministre des Affaires étrangères, mais que sa réponse ne pourrait leur parvenir que vers six heures, c'est-à-dire trop tard pour entreprendre une démarche à Vienne.

BARRÈRE.

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N° 45.

M. DUMAINE, Ambassadeur de France à Vienne,  
à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Vienne, le 25 juillet 1914.

Le Chargé d'affaires de Russie a reçu de son Gouvernement l'ordre de demander un délai pour l'ultimatum à la Serbie, au moment même où le Comte Berchtold



partait pour Ischl avec l'intention, au dire des journaux, d'y rester près de l'Empereur jusqu'à la fin de la crise.

Le Prince Koudacheff l'a néanmoins informé de la démarche qu'il avait à remplir par deux télégrammes en clair, l'un en cours de route, l'autre à destination. Il n'en attend aucun effet.

Le Baron Macchio, Secrétaire général du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, à qui le Prince a communiqué le sens de ses instructions et de sa démarche télégraphique, a témoigné une froideur glaciale quand son interlocuteur lui a représenté que donner à juger des griefs avec pièces justificatives, sans laisser le temps d'étudier le dossier, est contraire à la courtoisie internationale; le Baron Macchio a répliqué que parfois l'intérêt dispense d'être courtois.

Le Gouvernement autrichien est résolu à infliger à la Serbie une humiliation : il n'acceptera l'intervention d'aucune puissance, jusqu'à ce que le coup ait été porté et reçu en pleine face par la Serbie.

DUMAINE.

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N° 46.

M. BOPPE, Ministre de France à Belgrade,  
à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Belgrade, 25 juillet 1914.

M. Pachitch vient de me donner connaissance de la réponse qui sera remise ce soir au Ministre d'Autriche.

Le Gouvernement serbe accepte de publier demain au *Journal officiel* la déclaration qui lui est demandée; il la communiquera également à l'armée, par un ordre du jour; il dissoudra les sociétés de défense nationale et toutes autres associations susceptibles d'agir contre l'Autriche-Hongrie; il s'engage à modifier la loi sur la presse, à renvoyer du service de l'armée, de l'instruction publique et des autres administrations, tous fonctionnaires dont la participation dans la propagande sera prouvée; il demande seulement que le nom de ces fonctionnaires lui soit communiqué.

Quant à la participation dans l'enquête de fonctionnaires autrichiens, il demande qu'on lui explique comment elle s'exercerait; il ne pourrait accepter que celle qui correspondrait au droit international ou aux relations de bon voisinage.

Il accepte toutes les autres exigences de l'ultimatum et déclare que si le Gouvernement austro-hongrois ne s'en contente pas, il est prêt à s'en remettre à la décision du tribunal de La Haye, ou à celle des grandes Puissances qui ont pris part à l'élaboration de la déclaration du 31 mars 1909.

BOPPE.

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N° 47.

**M. Jules CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Berlin,**

**à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.**

**Berlin, le 25 juillet 1914.**

Pendant tout l'après-midi le bruit a couru avec persistance que la Serbie se soumettait aux exigences autrichiennes; ce soir les journaux publient des suppléments annonçant la rupture à Belgrade et le départ du Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie.

Ce bruit vient d'être confirmé au correspondant de l'Agence Hayas à la Wilhelmstrasse. Des groupes considérables de plusieurs centaines de personnes stationnent ici devant les bureaux des journaux, et une nombreuse manifestation de jeunes gens vient de passer sur Pariser-platz en poussant des cris de « hurrah ! » pour l'Allemagne, et en chantant des chants patriotiques; elle se rend à la Colonne de la Victoire, à l'Ambassade d'Autriche, puis à celle d'Italie. C'est une explosion significative de chauvinisme.

Une personnalité allemande, que j'ai vue ce soir, m'a avoué qu'on avait craint ici que la Serbie n'acceptât en bloc la note autrichienne, en se réservant d'en discuter l'application, pour gagner du temps et permettre aux efforts des Puissances de se produire utilement avant la rupture.

Dans les milieux financiers, on prend déjà des mesures pour parer à toute éventualité, car on n'y aperçoit pas le moyen d'enrayer la crise, en présence de l'appui déterminé que donne l'Allemagne à l'Autriche.

Je ne vois, pour moi, que l'Angleterre qui puisse, en Europe, être écoutée à Berlin.

Quoi qu'il arrive, Paris, Pétersbourg et Londres ne parviendront à maintenir dignement la paix qu'en se montrant fermement et absolument unis.

**Jules CAMBON.**

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N° 48.

**M. DUMAINE, Ambassadeur de France à Vienne,**

**à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.**

**Vienne, le 25 juillet 1914.**

On me remet votre télégramme précisément à l'heure où expire le délai imparti à la Serbie. D'autre part, je viens de vous faire savoir dans quelles conditions le Chargé d'affaires de Russie a dû exécuter sa démarche. Il semble inutile de l'appuyer quand il n'en est plus temps.

Dans l'après-midi, le bruit s'était répandu que la Serbie avait cédé à l'ultimatum tout en ajoutant qu'elle en appelait aux Puissances. Mais on assure, au dernier

moment, que le Ministre d'Autriche vient de quitter précipitamment Belgrade; il aurait jugé insuffisante l'adhésion du Gouvernement serbe aux conditions posées par son Gouvernement.

DUMAINE.

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N° 49.

*Réponse du Gouvernement serbe à la Note austro-hongroise.*

(Communiqué par M. Vesnitch, Ministre de Serbie, le 27 juillet.)

Belgrade, le 25 juillet 1914.

Le Gouvernement royal serbe a reçu la communication du Gouvernement impérial et royal du 10/23 de ce mois et il est persuadé que sa réponse éloignera tout malentendu qui menace de compromettre les bons rapports de voisinage entre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et le Royaume de Serbie.

Le Gouvernement royal a conscience que les protestations qui ont apparu tant à la tribune de la Skoupchtina nationale que dans les déclarations et les actes des représentants responsables de l'État, protestations auxquelles coupa court la déclaration du Gouvernement serbe faite le 18/31 mars 1909, ne se sont plus renouvelées vis-à-vis de la grande Monarchie voisine en aucune occasion, et que depuis ce temps, autant de la part des Gouvernements royaux qui se sont succédé que de la part de leurs organes, aucune tentative n'a été faite dans le but de changer l'état de choses politique et juridique créé en Bosnie-Herzégovine.

Le Gouvernement royal constate que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement impérial et royal n'a fait aucune représentation, sauf en ce qui concerne un livre scolaire, représentation au sujet de laquelle le Gouvernement impérial et royal a reçu une explication entièrement satisfaisante.

La Serbie a, à de nombreuses reprises, donné des preuves de sa politique pacifique et modérée pendant la durée de la crise balkanique, et c'est grâce à la Serbie et aux sacrifices qu'elle a faits dans l'intérêt exclusif de la paix européenne, que cette paix a été préservée.

Le Gouvernement royal ne peut pas être rendu responsable des manifestations d'un caractère privé telles que les articles des journaux et les agissements des sociétés, manifestations qui se produisent dans presque tous les pays comme une chose ordinaire et qui échappent en règle générale au contrôle officiel, d'autant moins que le Gouvernement royal, lors de la solution de toute une série de questions qui se sont présentées entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, a montré une grande prévenance et a réussi, de cette façon, à en régler le plus grand nombre au profit du progrès des deux pays voisins.

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement royal a été péniblement surpris par les affirmations d'après lesquelles des personnes du royaume de Serbie auraient participé à la préparation de l'attentat commis à Sarajevo. Il s'attendait à être invité à collaborer à la recherche de tout ce qui se rapporte à ce crime et il était prêt, pour prouver par

des actes son entière correction, à agir contre toutes les personnes à l'égard desquelles des communications lui seraient faites.

Se rendant donc au désir du Gouvernement impérial et royal, le Gouvernement royal est disposé à remettre aux tribunaux tout sujet serbe, sans égard à sa situation et à son rang, pour la complicité duquel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, des preuves lui seraient fournies.

Il s'engage spécialement à faire publier à la première page du *Journal officiel* en date du 13/26 juillet l'énonciation suivante :

« Le Gouvernement royal de Serbie condamne toute propagande qui serait dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels.

« Le Gouvernement royal regrette que certains officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé, d'après la communication du Gouvernement impérial et royal, à la propagande susmentionnée et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvernement royal s'était solennellement engagé par la déclaration du 18/31 mars 1909.

Le Gouvernement, qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'une immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie, que ce soit, considère qu'il est de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer. »

Cette énonciation sera portée à la connaissance de l'armée royale par un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majesté le roi par S. A. R. le prince héritier Alexandre, et sera publiée dans le prochain Bulletin officiel de l'armée.

Le Gouvernement royal s'engage en outre :

1.° A introduire dans la première convocation régulière de la Skoupchtina une disposition dans la loi de la presse par laquelle sera puni de la manière la plus sévère la provocation à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance générale serait dirigée contre l'intégrité territoriale de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

Il se charge, lors de la revision de la Constitution, qui est prochaine, de faire introduire dans l'article 22 de la Constitution un amendement de telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus puissent être confisquées, ce qui, actuellement, aux termes catégoriques de l'article 22 de la Constitution, est impossible.

2.° Le gouvernement ne possède aucune preuve et la Note du gouvernement impérial et royal ne lui en fournit non plus aucune que la Société Norodna Obrana et les autres sociétés similaires aient commis jusqu'à ce jour quelque acte criminel de ce genre par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Néanmoins le gouvernement royal acceptera la demande du gouvernement impérial et royal et dissoudra la Société Norodna Obrana et toute autre société qui agirait contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

3.° Le gouvernement royal serbe s'engage à éliminer sans délai de l'instruction

publique en Serbie tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, quand le gouvernement impérial et royal lui fournira des faits et des preuves de cette propagande.

4° Le gouvernement royal accepte du moins d'éloigner du service militaire ceux dont l'enquête judiciaire aura prouvé qu'ils sont coupables d'actes dirigés contre l'intégrité du territoire de la monarchie austro-hongroise; il attend que le gouvernement impérial et royal lui communique ultérieurement les noms et les faits de ces officiers et fonctionnaires aux fins de la procédure qui doit s'ensuivre.

5° Le gouvernement royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la portée de la demande du gouvernement impérial et royal tendant à ce que la Serbie s'engage à accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du gouvernement impérial et royal.

Mais il déclare qu'il admettra toute collaboration qui répondrait aux principes du droit international et à la procédure criminelle, ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage.

6° Le gouvernement royal, cela va de soi, considère de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquête contre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, éventuellement, auraient été mêlés au complot du 15/28 juin et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du royaume. Quant à la participation à cette enquête des agents des autorités austro-hongroises qui seraient délégués à cet effet par le gouvernement impérial et royal, le gouvernement royal ne peut pas l'accepter, car ce serait une violation de la Constitution et de la loi sur la procédure criminelle. Cependant, dans des cas concrets, des communications sur les résultats de l'instruction en question pourraient être données aux organes austro-hongrois.

7° Le gouvernement royal a fait procéder dès le soir même de la remise de la note à l'arrestation du commandant Voïja-Tankositch. Quant à Milan Ciganovitch, qui est sujet de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et qui jusqu'au 15/28 juin était employé (comme aspirant) à la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore être joint. Le gouvernement impérial et royal est prié de vouloir bien, dans la forme accoutumée, faire connaître le plus tôt possible les présomptions de culpabilité, ainsi que les preuves éventuelles de culpabilité qui ont été recueillies jusqu'à ce jour par l'enquête à Sarajevo, aux fins d'enquêtes ultérieures.

8° Le gouvernement serbe renforcera et étendra les mesures prises pour empêcher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière. Il va de soi qu'il ordonnera tout de suite une enquête et punira sévèrement les fonctionnaires des frontières sur la ligne Schabac-Loznica, qui ont manqué à leur devoir et laissé passer les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo.

9° Le gouvernement royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les propos que ces fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, ont tenus après l'attentat dans des interviews et qui, d'après l'affirmation du gouvernement impérial et royal, ont été hostiles à la Monarchie, dès que le gouvernement impérial et royal lui aura communiqué les passages en question de ces propos, et dès qu'il aura démontré que les propos employés ont en effet été tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, propos au sujet

desquels le gouvernement royal lui-même aura soin de recueillir des preuves et convictions.

10° Le gouvernement royal informe le gouvernement impérial et royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents en tant que cela n'a pas été déjà fait par la présente note. Aussitôt que chaque mesure aura été ordonnée et exécutée, dans le cas où le gouvernement impérial et royal ne serait pas satisfait de cette réponse, le gouvernement royal serbe, considérant qu'il est de l'intérêt commun de ne pas précipiter la solution de cette question, est prêt, comme toujours, accepter une entente pacifique, en remettant cette question soit à la décision du Tribunal international de La Haye, soit aux grandes Puissances qui ont pris part à l'élaboration de la déclaration que le gouvernement serbe a faite le 18/31 mars 1909.

## **CHAPITRE IV**

**DE LA RUPTURE DES RELATIONS DIPLOMATIQUES**

**(25 JUILLET 1914),**

**À LA DÉCLARATION DE GUERRE DE L'AUTRICHE À LA SERBIE**

**(28 JUILLET 1914)**





N° 50.

**M. BIENVENU-MARTIN**, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.,

à bord de *la France* (pour le Président du Conseil), et à MM. les Ambassadeurs de France à Londres, Pétersbourg, Berlin, Vienne, Rome.

Paris, le 26 juillet 1914.

On peut résumer ainsi les événements de samedi : refus de l'Autriche d'accéder à la prolongation de délai demandée par la Russie, — départ du Ministre d'Autriche de Belgrade après remise d'une réponse à la Serbie, estimée insuffisante, bien qu'elle eût atteint la limite des concessions jugées possibles, — ordre de mobilisation donné en Serbie, dont le Gouvernement s'est retiré à Kragoujewatz, où il est suivi par les Ministres de France et de Russie.

Le Gouvernement italien, à qui la note autrichienne a été communiquée vendredi, sans demande d'appui ni même d'avis, n'a pas, en l'absence du Marquis de San Giuliano qui ne rentre que mardi, pu répondre à la suggestion du Gouvernement russe qui proposait d'insister à Vienne pour une prolongation de délai. Il résulte d'une confidence de l'Ambassadeur d'Italie à M. Paléologue qu'à Vienne on continue à se bercer de l'illusion que la Russie « ne tiendra pas le coup ». Il ne faut pas oublier que l'Italie n'est tenue par les engagements de la Triple Alliance que si elle a été préalablement consultée.

De Pétersbourg, nous apprenons que M. Sazonoff a conseillé à la Serbie de demander la médiation anglaise. Dans le Conseil des Ministres du 25, tenu en présence de l'Empereur, la mobilisation des treize corps d'armée éventuellement destinés à opérer contre l'Autriche a été envisagée; cette mobilisation ne serait toutefois rendue effective que si l'Autriche contraignait la Serbie par la force des armes, et seulement après avis du Ministre des Affaires étrangères, à qui le soin incombe de fixer la date, liberté lui étant laissée de continuer les négociations même dans le cas où Belgrade serait occupée. L'opinion russe manifeste l'impossibilité politique et morale pour la Russie de laisser écraser la Serbie.

A Londres, la démarche allemande a été faite le 25, dans les mêmes termes que par le Baron de Schoen à Paris. Sir E. Grey a répondu au Prince Lichnowski que, si la guerre venait à éclater, aucune puissance en Europe ne pourrait s'en désintéresser. Il n'a pas précisé davantage et a tenu un langage très réservé au Ministre de Serbie. La communication faite le 25 au soir par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche rend Sir E. Grey plus optimiste; puisque la rupture diplomatique ne doit pas entraîner des opérations militaires immédiates, le Secrétaire d'État veut encore espérer que les Puissances auront le temps d'intervenir.

A Berlin, le langage tenu par le Secrétaire d'État au Chargé d'Affaires de Russie est peu satisfaisant et dilatoire; comme celui-ci lui demandait de s'associer à une démarche à Vienne pour une prolongation de délai, il a répondu qu'il avait déjà agi dans ce sens, mais que c'était trop tard; à la demande d'obtenir un délai pour prolonger

les mesures d'exécution, il a répliqué qu'il s'agissait d'une question intérieure et non pas d'une guerre mais d'une exécution locale. M. de Jagow feint de ne pas croire que l'action autrichienne puisse entraîner des conséquences générales.

Il se produit une véritable explosion de chauvinisme à Berlin. L'Empereur d'Allemagne revient directement à Kiel. M. Jules Cambon estime que, aux premières mesures militaires de la Russie, l'Allemagne répondrait immédiatement et n'attendrait vraisemblablement pas un prétexte pour nous attaquer.

A Vienne, l'Ambassadeur de France n'a pas eu le temps de se joindre à la démarche de son collègue russe pour obtenir une prolongation du délai fixé à la Serbie; il ne le regrette pas, cette démarche ayant été repoussée catégoriquement, et l'Angleterre n'ayant pas non plus eu le temps de donner des instructions à cet égard à son agent.

Une note de l'Ambassade d'Angleterre m'a été remise: elle rend compte de la conférence de l'Ambassadeur britannique à Pétersbourg avec M. Sazonoff et M. Paléologue. Sir Edward Grey estime que les quatre Puissances non intéressées devraient insister auprès de la Russie et de l'Autriche pour que leurs armées ne franchissent pas la frontière et donnent le temps à l'Angleterre, à la France, à l'Allemagne et à l'Italie d'exercer leur médiation. Si l'Allemagne accepte, le Gouvernement anglais a des raisons de penser que l'Italie serait heureuse de s'associer également à l'action jointe de l'Angleterre et de la France: l'adhésion de l'Allemagne est essentielle, car pas plus l'Autriche que la Russie ne tolérerait d'autre intervention que d'amis impartiaux ou d'alliés.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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## N° 51.

M. BABRÈRE, Ambassadeur de France à Rome,

à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Rome, le 26 juillet 1914.

Un télégramme de Vienne reçu à l'instant à la Consulta lui fait connaître que la rupture diplomatique est effective entre l'Autriche et la Serbie. et que l'Autriche procède à des mesures militaires.

Le Marquis di San Giuliano, qui est à Fiuggi, ne reviendra à Rome qu'après-demain.

J'ai eu aujourd'hui avec le Président du Conseil un intéressant entretien sur la situation, dont il reconnaît toute la gravité. De l'ensemble de ses propos, j'ai emporté le sentiment que le Gouvernement italien voudrait, en cas de conflit, se tenir en dehors et rester dans une attitude d'observation.

M. Salandra m'a dit, à ce propos: « Nous ferons les plus grands efforts pour em-

pêcher la paix d'être rompue : notre situation est un peu analogue à celle de l'Angleterre. Peut-être pourrions-nous faire quelque chose dans un sens pacifique avec les Anglais ». M. Salandra m'a confirmé que la note autrichienne avait été communiquée à Rome à la dernière heure.

BARRÈRE.

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N° 52.

M. BARRÈRE, Ambassadeur de France à Rome,  
à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Rome, le 26 juillet 1914.

M. Sazonoff a dit hier à l'Ambassadeur d'Italie à Pétersbourg que la Russie se servirait de tous les moyens diplomatiques pour éviter le conflit et qu'elle ne renonçait pas à l'espoir qu'une médiation pourrait amener l'Autriche à une attitude moins intransigeante ; mais qu'on ne pouvait cependant lui demander de laisser écraser la Serbie.

Je remarque que la majeure partie de l'opinion publique italienne est hostile à l'Autriche dans cette grave affaire.

BARRÈRE.

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N° 53.

M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.,  
à M. DE FLEURIAU, Chargé d'affaires à Londres.

Paris, le 26 juillet 1914.

M. Paléologue m'adresse le télégramme suivant : « M. Sazonoff conseille au Gouvernement serbe de solliciter la médiation du Gouvernement britannique. »

D'accord avec M. Paul Cambon, je pense que le Gouvernement français ne peut qu'exprimer l'espoir de voir le Gouvernement anglais accepter, si une offre de cette nature lui était faite.

Veillez vous exprimer dans ce sens auprès du Foreign Office.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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N° 54.

M. PALÉOLOGUE, Ambassadeur de France à Saint-Petersbourg,  
à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 26 juillet 1914.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères continue avec une louable persévérance à rechercher les moyens de faire prévaloir une solution pacifique. « Jusqu'au dernier instant, m'a-t-il déclaré, je me montrerai prêt à négocier. »

C'est dans cet esprit qu'il vient de mander le Comte Szapary pour le convier à une « franche et loyale explication ». Article par article, M. Sazonoff a commenté devant lui l'ultimatum austro-hongrois, en faisant ressortir le caractère injurieux des principales clauses. « L'intention qui a inspiré ce document, a-t-il dit, est légitime si vous n'avez poursuivi d'autre but que de protéger votre territoire contre les menées des anarchistes serbes; mais le procédé auquel vous avez eu recours n'est pas défendable. » Il a conclu : « Reprenez votre ultimatum, modifiez-en la forme, et je vous garantis le résultat ».

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie s'est montré touché de ce langage; toutefois, en attendant des instructions, il réserve l'opinion de son Gouvernement. Sans se décourager, M. Sazonoff a décidé de proposer, dès ce soir, au Comte Berchtold l'ouverture d'une conversation directe entre Vienne et Pétersbourg sur les changements à introduire dans l'ultimatum.

Cette entremise amicale et officieuse de la Russie entre l'Autriche et la Serbie a l'avantage d'être expéditive. Je la crois donc préférable à toute autre procédure, et de nature à aboutir.

PALÉOLOGUE.

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N° 55.

M. DUMAINE, Ambassadeur de France à Vienne,  
à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Vienne, le 26 juillet 1914.

M. Schebeko est revenu précipitamment d'un voyage en Russie; il ne l'avait entrepris qu'après l'assurance donnée par le Comte Berchtold que les réclamations contre la Serbie seraient des plus acceptables.

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie à Pétersbourg avait parlé dans le même sens à M. Sazonoff la veille de la remise de la note. Ce procédé, très habituel dans la diplomatie de la Monarchie, et qui a servi également au Baron Macchio envers moi, paraît avoir beaucoup ajouté à l'irritation du Gouvernement russe.

M. Schebeko va s'efforcer, cependant, de profiter du délai indispensable à la mobilisation pour introduire une proposition d'arrangement, qui aura au moins l'avantage de permettre de mesurer la valeur des déclarations pacifiques de l'Allemagne.

Pendant que nous en délibérons ce soir, en compagnie de Sir M. de Bunsen, celui-ci a reçu des instructions du Foreign Office concernant la démarche à tenter par les représentants des quatre Puissances moins directement intéressées. Je m'attends donc à ce que nous ayons à nous concerter demain avec le duc d'Avarna et M. de Tschirsky, lequel se retranchera presque sûrement derrière le principe de la localisation du conflit pour refuser son concours.

Mon impression est, d'ailleurs, que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, quoique surpris et peut-être au regret de l'énergie qu'on lui a inspirée, se croira obligé à un commencement d'action militaire.

DUMAINE.

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N° 56.

M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

à bord de la *France* (pour le Président du Conseil) et à MM. les Ambassadeurs de France à Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Berlin, Vienne, Rome.

Paris, le 26 juillet 1914.

Le résumé de la réponse serbe à la note autrichienne ne nous est parvenu qu'avec vingt heures de retard. Bien que le Gouvernement serbe eût cédé sur tous les points, sauf deux petites réserves, le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a rompu les relations, prouvant ainsi la volonté arrêtée de son gouvernement de procéder à l'exécution de la Serbie.

D'après un télégramme de M. Jules Cambon, l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a le sentiment d'un peu de fléchissement; comme il faisait observer à M. de Jagow que Sir Ed. Grey ne lui demandait pas d'intervenir entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, mais, cette question cessant d'être localisée, d'intervenir avec l'Angleterre, la France et l'Italie à Vienne et Pétersbourg, le Secrétaire d'État a déclaré qu'il ferait son possible pour maintenir la paix.

Au cours d'un entretien de M. Barrère avec le Secrétaire général du Ministère des Affaires étrangères italien, celui-ci a indiqué que le Gouvernement italien n'aurait vraisemblablement pas approuvé la note autrichienne; mais comme elle ne lui a pas été préalablement communiquée, il se trouve, de ce fait, libéré de toute responsabilité dans la grave initiative prise par l'Autriche.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne est venu cet après-midi me faire une communication, tendant à une intervention de la France auprès de la Russie dans un sens pacifique. L'Autriche, m'a-t-il dit, a fait déclarer à la Russie qu'elle ne poursuivait ni agrandissement territorial, ni atteinte à l'intégrité du Royaume de Serbie; sa seule intention est d'assurer sa propre tranquillité et de faire la police. C'est des décisions de la Russie qu'il dépend qu'une guerre soit évitée; l'Allemagne se sent solidaire de la France dans l'ardent désir que la paix puisse être maintenue, et a le ferme espoir que la France usera de son influence dans un sens apaisant à Pétersbourg.

J'ai répondu à cette suggestion que la Russie était modérée, qu'elle n'avait accompli aucun acte qui pût faire douter de sa modération et que nous étions d'accord avec elle pour rechercher la solution pacifique de ce conflit. Il nous paraissait donc qu'à titre de contre-partie, l'Allemagne devait agir à Vienne, où l'efficacité de son action était certaine en vue d'éviter des opérations militaires tendant à l'occupation de la Serbie.

L'Ambassadeur m'ayant fait remarquer que cela était inconciliable avec la position prise par l'Allemagne « que la question ne regardait que l'Autriche et la Serbie », je lui ai dit que la médiation à Vienne et à Pétersbourg pourrait être le fait des quatre autres Puissances moins intéressées dans la question.

M. de Schoen se retrancha alors derrière le manque d'instructions à cet égard, et je lui dis que, dans ces conditions, je ne me sentais pas en mesure d'exercer une action seulement à Pétersbourg.

La conversation se termina sur l'assurance, renouvelée par l'Ambassadeur, des intentions pacifiques de l'Allemagne, qu'il déclarait solidaire, sur ce point, de la France.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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N° 57.

*Note pour le Ministre.*

Dimanche soir, 26 juillet 1914.

Après la visite qu'il avait faite au Ministre à 5 heures de l'après-midi, le Baron de Schoen s'est rendu, ce soir à 7 heures, à la Direction politique, pour demander qu'en vue d'éviter des commentaires tendancieux des journaux, comme celui de l'*Écho de Paris* la veille, et afin de bien préciser le sens des démarches du Gouvernement allemand, un bref communiqué fût donné à la presse sur l'entrevue de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne et du Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

M. de Schoen suggéra, pour préciser sa pensée, les termes suivants, dont le Directeur politique p. i. prit note sous sa dictée : « L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne et le Ministre des Affaires étrangères ont eu, pendant l'après-midi, un nouvel entretien, au cours duquel ils ont examiné, dans l'esprit le plus amical et dans un sentiment de solidarité pacifique, les moyens qui pourraient être employés pour maintenir la paix générale. »

Le Directeur politique p. i. répondit aussitôt : « Alors, tout est réglé dans votre esprit, et vous nous apportez l'assurance que l'Autriche accepte la note serbe, ou se prêtera aux conversations avec les Puissances à cet égard ? » L'Ambassadeur ayant paru surpris et fait une vive dénégation, il lui fut exposé que si rien n'était modifié dans l'attitude négative de l'Allemagne, les termes de la « Note à la presse » suggérée étaient excessifs et de nature à donner à l'opinion française une fausse sécurité, en créant des illusions sur la situation réelle, dont les dangers n'étaient que trop évidents.

Aux assurances que prodiguait l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne sur l'impression opti-

miste qu'il éprouvait, le Directeur politique p. i. répondit en lui demandant s'il lui permettait de lui parler à titre tout personnel et privé, d'homme à homme, en toute liberté, et sans tenir compte de leurs fonctions respectives. Le Baron de Schoen le pria de le faire.

M. Berthelot dit alors que pour tout esprit simple, l'attitude de l'Allemagne ne pouvait s'expliquer, si elle ne tendait pas à la guerre : une analyse purement objective des faits et la psychologie des rapports austro-allemands conduisaient logiquement à cette conclusion. Devant l'affirmation répétée que l'Allemagne ignorait le contenu de la note autrichienne, il n'était plus permis d'élever de doutes sur ce point ; était-il vraisemblable, cependant, que l'Allemagne se fût rangée, les yeux fermés, à côté de l'Autriche, dans une pareille aventure ? La psychologie de toutes les relations passées de Vienne et de Berlin permettait-elle d'admettre que l'Autriche eût pris une position sans recul possible, avant d'avoir pesé, avec son alliée, toutes les conséquences de son intransigeance ? Combien le refus de l'Allemagne de donner un conseil de médiation à Vienne paraissait surprenant, maintenant qu'elle connaissait le texte extraordinaire de la note autrichienne ! Quelle responsabilité le Gouvernement allemand prendrait, et quelles suspicions pèseraient sur lui, s'il persistait à s'interposer entre l'Autriche et les Puissances, après la soumission pour ainsi dire absolue de la Serbie, et quand le moindre conseil donné par lui à Vienne mettrait fin au cauchemar qui pesait sur l'Europe !

La rupture des relations diplomatiques par l'Autriche, ses menaces de guerre et la mobilisation qu'elle poursuit, donnent une particulière urgence à l'action pacificatrice de l'Allemagne, car du jour où les troupes autrichiennes auraient franchi la frontière serbe, on se trouverait en présence d'un fait qui obligerait sans doute le Cabinet de Pétersbourg à intervenir et risquerait de déclencher une guerre que l'Allemagne déclare vouloir éviter.

M. de Schoen, qui écoutait en souriant, affirma de nouveau que l'Allemagne avait ignoré le texte de la note autrichienne (1) et ne l'avait approuvée qu'après sa remise ; elle estimait toujours que la Serbie avait besoin d'une leçon assez sévère pour qu'elle ne pût l'oublier, et que l'Autriche se devait à elle-même de mettre fin à une situation dangereuse et intolérable pour une grande puissance. Il déclara, d'ailleurs, ne pas connaître le texte de la réponse serbe, et se montra personnellement surpris qu'elle n'eût pas satisfait l'Autriche, si toutefois elle était telle que les journaux, souvent mal informés, la représentaient.

Il insista encore sur les intentions pacifiques de l'Allemagne et donna son impression sur l'effet que pourraient avoir de bons conseils adressés, par exemple à Vienne, par l'Angleterre, sur un ton amical. Selon lui, l'Autriche n'était pas intransigeante ; ce qu'elle repousse, c'est l'idée d'une médiation formelle, le « spectre » d'une conférence : un mot pacifique venu de Pétersbourg, de bonnes paroles dites d'un ton con-

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(1) Voir pièce n° 21. Lettre du Ministre de France à Munich relatant que le Président du Conseil bavarois a dit, le 23 juillet, avoir connaissance du texte de la note autrichienne à la Serbie.

V. aussi *Livre Bleu*, la pièce n° 95 où Sir M. de Bunsen, ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Vienne, déclare : « Quoique je ne puisse pas le vérifier, je tiens d'une source privée que l'Ambassadeur allemand connaissait le texte de l'ultimatum autrichien à la Serbie avant qu'il ne fût expédié et qu'il l'a télégraphié à l'Empereur d'Allemagne ; je sais par l'Ambassadeur allemand lui-même qu'il en approuve chaque ligne. »

ciliant par les Puissances de la Triple Entente, auraient chance d'être bien accueillies. Il ajouta enfin qu'il ne disait pas que l'Allemagne, de son côté, ne donnerait pas quelques conseils à Vienne.

Dans ces conditions, le Directeur politique déclara qu'il demanderait au Ministre s'il lui paraissait opportun de communiquer à la presse une courte note de ton modéré.

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N° 58.

M. CHEVALLEY, Ministre de France à Christiania,

à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Christiania, le 26 juillet 1914.

Toute la flotte allemande en Norvège a reçu l'ordre de prendre la mer. Les autorités allemandes à Bergen déclarent que c'est pour rallier directement l'Allemagne.

Les navires allemands dispersés dans les fiords au nord de Bergen rejoindraient ceux qui sont aux environs de Stavanger.

CHEVALLEY.

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N° 59.

M. D'ANNOVILLE, Chargé d'affaires de France à Luxembourg,

à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Luxembourg, le 26 juillet 1914.

D'après des renseignements que je viens de recevoir de Thionville, les quatre dernières classes libérées ont ordre de se tenir à la disposition de la Kommandatur à toute heure.

Sans être complètement mobilisés, les réservistes ont interdiction de s'absenter du lieu de leur domicile.

D'ANNOVILLE.

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N° 60.

M. FARGES, Consul général de France à Bâle,  
à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Bâle, le 27 juillet 1914.

Les officiers allemands en vacances dans cette région ont reçu, il y a quatre jours, l'ordre de les interrompre pour regagner l'Allemagne.

D'autre part, j'apprends de deux sources sérieuses qu'un avis a été donné aux propriétaires de voitures automobiles du Grand-Duché de Bade de se préparer à les mettre à la disposition des autorités militaires, deux jours après un nouvel ordre. Le secret, sous peine d'amende, a été recommandé sur cet avis.

La population bâloise est très inquiète et les facilités bancaires se resserrent.

FARGES.

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N° 61.

M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.,  
à M. Jules CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Berlin, communiqué  
à bord de la *France* (pour le Président du Conseil) et à MM. les  
Ambassadeurs de France à Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Vienne,  
Rome.

Paris, le 27 juillet 1914.

Les trois démarches de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Paris semblent caractéristiques : — le vendredi, il lit une note où le Gouvernement allemand se pose catégoriquement entre l'Autriche et les Puissances, approuvant l'ultimatum autrichien à la Serbie et ajoutant que « l'Allemagne désire ardemment que le conflit reste localisé, toute intervention d'une autre Puissance devant, par le jeu de ses alliances, provoquer d'incalculables conséquences » ; — le second jour, le samedi, l'effet ayant été produit et les Puissances ayant, en raison de la surprise, de la brièveté du délai et des risques de guerre générale, conseillé à la Serbie de céder, M. de Schoen revient atténuer sa démarche, feignant de s'étonner de l'impression produite et proteste qu'on prête à l'Allemagne des intentions qu'elle n'a pas, puisque, dit-il, il n'y a eu ni concert avant, ni menace après ; — le troisième jour, le dimanche, le résultat ayant été obtenu, puisque la Serbie a cédé en fait pour ainsi dire à toutes les exigences de l'Autriche, l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne reparait à deux reprises, pour insister sur les intentions pacifiques

de l'Allemagne et sur son désir ardent de collaborer au maintien de la paix, après avoir enregistré le succès autrichien, qui clot la première phase de la crise.

La situation à l'heure actuelle reste inquiétante, en raison du refus incompréhensible de l'Autriche d'accepter la soumission serbe, de ses opérations de mobilisation et de ses menaces d'envahir la Serbie. L'attitude prise depuis le début, avec l'appui allemand, par le Gouvernement autrichien, son refus d'accepter aucune conversation des Puissances ne permettant pas, en pratique, à celles-ci d'intervenir utilement auprès de lui sans l'intermédiaire de l'Allemagne. Cependant le temps presse, car si l'armée autrichienne franchit la frontière, il sera très difficile d'enrayer la crise, la Russie ne paraissant pas pouvoir tolérer l'occupation de la Serbie, après que celle-ci s'est en réalité soumise à la Note autrichienne en lui donnant toutes satisfactions et garanties. L'Allemagne, du fait même de la position prise par elle, est qualifiée pour intervenir utilement et être écoutée à Vienne; si elle ne le fait pas, elle justifie tous les soupçons et assume la responsabilité de la guerre.

Les Puissances, et en particulier la Russie, la France et l'Angleterre ont déterminé par leurs pressants conseils Belgrade à céder; elles ont donc rempli leur rôle; maintenant c'est à l'Allemagne, seule en situation d'être entendue rapidement à Vienne, à donner des conseils à l'Autriche qui a obtenu satisfaction et ne peut, pour un détail facile à régler, déclencher la guerre générale.

C'est dans ces conditions que se présente la proposition faite par le cabinet de Londres; M. Sazonoff ayant dit à l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre qu'à la suite de l'appel de la Serbie aux Puissances, la Russie accepterait de se tenir à l'écart, Sir E. Grey a formulé auprès des Cabinets de Paris, Berlin et Rome, la suggestion suivante : les Ambassadeurs de France, d'Allemagne et d'Italie à Londres seraient chargés de chercher avec Sir E. Grey un moyen de résoudre les difficultés actuelles, étant entendu que pendant cette conversation, la Russie, l'Autriche et la Serbie s'abstiendraient de toute opération militaire active. Sir A. Nicolson a parlé de cette suggestion à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, qui s'y est montré favorable; elle sera également bien accueillie à Paris et aussi à Rome, selon toute vraisemblance. Ici encore, la parole est à l'Allemagne, qui a l'occasion de témoigner autrement qu'en paroles sa bonne volonté.

Je vous prie de vous concerter avec votre collègue anglais et d'appuyer auprès du Gouvernement allemand sa démarche dans la forme qui vous paraîtra opportune.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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N° 62.

M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.,

à bord de la *France* (pour le Président du Conseil) et à MM. les Ambassadeurs de France à Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Berlin, Vienne.

Paris, le 27 juillet 1914.

Après sa démarche d'hier tendant à une intervention apaisante de la France à Pétersbourg, l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne était revenu, ainsi que je vous en ai informé, à la Direction politique, sous le prétexte qu'il pourrait y avoir intérêt à com-

muniquer à la presse une courte note indiquant le sens pacifique et amical de la conversation; il avait même suggéré les termes suivants : « L'Ambassadeur et le Ministre des Affaires étrangères ont eu, pendant l'après-midi, un nouvel entretien au cours duquel on a examiné, dans l'esprit le plus amical et dans un sentiment de solidarité pacifique, les moyens qui pourraient être employés pour maintenir la paix générale. » Il fut répondu de suite que les termes paraissaient excessifs et de nature à donner à l'opinion des illusions sur la situation réelle, que cependant une brève note dans le sens indiqué, c'est-à-dire rendant compte d'une conversation où avaient été examinés les moyens employés pour sauvegarder la paix, pourrait être donnée si je l'approuvais.

La note communiquée a été la suivante : « L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne et le Ministre des Affaires étrangères ont eu un nouvel entretien, au cours duquel ils ont recherché les moyens d'action des Puissances pour le maintien de la paix. » Cette rédaction, volontairement terne, évitait une solidarité avec l'Allemagne qui pourrait être mal interprétée.

Ce matin, M. de Schoen a adressé une lettre particulière au Directeur politique, sous le prétexte de résumer son entretien avec le Ministre, et a ajouté : « Notez bien la phrase sur la solidarité des sentiments pacifiques. Ce n'est pas une phrase banale, mais la sincère expression de la réalité. » Le résumé joint à la lettre était ainsi conçu : « Le Cabinet de Vienne a fait formellement et officiellement déclarer à celui de Pétersbourg qu'il ne poursuit aucune acquisition territoriale en Serbie et qu'il ne veut point porter atteinte à l'intégrité du royaume; sa seule intention est celle d'assurer sa tranquillité. En ce moment, la décision, si une guerre européenne doit éclater, dépend uniquement de la Russie. Le Gouvernement Allemand a la ferme confiance que le Gouvernement Français, avec lequel il se sait solidaire dans l'ardent désir que la paix européenne puisse être maintenue, usera de toute son influence dans un esprit apaisant auprès du Cabinet de Pétersbourg. »

Je vous ai fait connaître la réponse qui avait été faite (une démarche française à Pétersbourg s'expliquait mal et devait avoir pour corollaire une démarche allemande à Vienne, ou, à défaut, une médiation, dans les deux capitales, des quatre Puissances moins intéressées).

La lettre de M. de Schoen est susceptible de diverses interprétations : la plus vraisemblable est qu'elle tend, comme sa démarche même, à chercher à compromettre la France au regard de la Russie, quitte, en cas d'échec, à rejeter sur la Russie et sur la France la responsabilité d'une guerre éventuelle, enfin à masquer, par des assurances pacifiques non écoutées, une action militaire de l'Autriche en Serbie, destinée à compléter le succès autrichien.

Je vous communique ces renseignements à titre d'information et à toutes fins utiles.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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N° 63.

**M. DE FLEURIAU, Chargé d'Affaires de France à Londres,**  
à **M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.**

Londres, le 27 juillet 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne et l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie laissent entendre qu'ils sont sûrs que l'Angleterre garderait la neutralité si un conflit venait à éclater. Sir Arthur Nicolson m'a dit que, cependant, le Prince Lichnowski ne pouvait, après la conversation qu'il a eue avec lui aujourd'hui, conserver aucun doute sur la liberté qu'entendait garder le Gouvernement britannique d'intervenir, au cas où il le jugerait utile.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne n'aura pas manqué d'être frappé de cette déclaration, mais pour peser sur l'Allemagne et pour éviter un conflit, il semble indispensable que celle-ci soit amenée à tenir pour certain qu'elle trouverait l'Angleterre et la Russie aux côtés de la France.

DE FLEURIAU.

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N° 64.

**M. PALÉOLOGUE, Ambassadeur de France à Saint-Petersbourg,**  
à **M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.**

Saint-Petersbourg, 27 juillet 1914.

M. Sazonoff a tenu à tous mes collègues un langage conciliant.

Malgré l'émotion publique, le Gouvernement Russe s'applique et réussit à contenir la presse; on a notamment recommandé une grande modération envers l'Allemagne.

Depuis hier, M. Sazonoff n'a reçu de Vienne ni de Berlin aucune information.

PALÉOLOGUE.

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N° 65.

**M. BOMPARD, Ambassadeur de France à Constantinople,**  
à **M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.**

Thérapia, le 27 juillet 1914.

Le conflit austro-serbe retient l'attention du Gouvernement Ottoman et les Turcs se réjouissent des épreuves de la Serbie, mais on est porté à croire ici en général que

ce conflit restera localisé. L'on estime généralement que, cette fois encore, la Russie n'interviendra pas en faveur de la Serbie dans des conditions qui étendraient le conflit armé.

Le sentiment unanime, dans les milieux politiques ottomans, est que l'Autriche, avec l'appui de l'Allemagne, arrivera à ses fins et qu'elle fera entrer la Serbie, après la Bulgarie, dans l'orbite de la Triple Alliance.

BOMPARD.

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N° 66.

M. DE FLEURIAU, Chargé d'affaires à Londres,  
à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Londres, le 27 juillet 1914.

Sir Ed. Grey a dit ce matin à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que si l'Autriche envahissait la Serbie après la réponse serbe, elle démontrerait qu'elle ne poursuivait pas seulement le règlement des questions mentionnées dans sa note du 23 juillet, mais qu'elle voulait écraser un petit État. « Alors, a-t-il ajouté, se poserait une question européenne, et il s'ensuivrait une guerre, à laquelle d'autres Puissances seraient amenées à prendre part ».

L'attitude de la Grande-Bretagne s'affirme par l'arrêt de la démobilisation de sa flotte. Le Premier Lord de l'Amirauté avait pris discrètement cette mesure dès vendredi, de sa propre initiative; cette nuit, sir Edward Grey et ses collègues ont décidé de la publier. Ce résultat est dû à l'attitude conciliante de la Serbie et de la Russie.

DE FLEURIAU.

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N° 67.

M. Jules CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Berlin,  
à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Berlin, le 27 juillet 1914.

J'ai entretenu aujourd'hui le Secrétaire d'État de la démarche de l'Angleterre tendant à ce que l'Allemagne se joigne aux Cabinets de Londres, Paris et Rome pour empêcher les hostilités entre Pétersbourg et Vienne.

Je lui ai fait remarquer que la proposition de sir Edward Grey ouvrait la voie à une issue pacifique. M. de Jagow m'a répondu qu'il était disposé à y entrer, mais il m'a fait remarquer que si la Russie mobilisait, l'Allemagne serait obligée de mobiliser aussitôt, que nous y serions forcés également et qu'alors le conflit serait presque inévitable. Je lui ai demandé si l'Allemagne se croirait engagée à mobiliser dans le cas où la Russie ne mobiliserait que sur la frontière autrichienne ; il m'a dit que non et m'a autorisé formellement à vous faire connaître cette restriction. Aussi attacherait-il la plus grande importance à ce que les puissances amies et alliées de la Russie intervinssent auprès d'elle.

Enfin il a remarqué que si la Russie attaquait l'Autriche, l'Allemagne devrait attaquer aussitôt de son côté. L'intervention proposée par l'Angleterre à Pétersbourg et à Vienne ne pourrait donc s'exercer à ses yeux que si les événements ne se précipitaient pas. Il ne désespère pas dans ce cas qu'elle puisse réussir. J'ai exprimé le regret que l'Autriche, par son intransigeance, eût conduit l'Europe au pas difficile que nous traversons, mais j'ai témoigné l'espoir que l'intervention aboutirait.

Jules CAMBON.

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N° 68.

M. DE FLEURIAU, Chargé d'affaires à Londres,

à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i..

Londres, le 27 juillet 1914.

Hier, au cours d'une conversation entre M. Sazonoff, M. Paléologue et Sir G. Buchanan, le Ministre russe aurait dit que la Serbie était disposée à en appeler aux Puissances, et, qu'en ce cas, son Gouvernement accepterait de se tenir à l'écart.

Sir Ed. Grey a pris texte de ces paroles pour formuler auprès des Cabinets de Paris, de Berlin et de Rome une proposition dont Sir Francis Bertie saisira Votre Excellence. Les quatre puissances interviendraient dans le conflit, et les Ambassadeurs de France, d'Allemagne et d'Italie à Londres seraient chargés de chercher, avec Sir Ed. Grey, un moyen de résoudre les difficultés actuelles.

Il serait entendu que, pendant les débats de cette petite conférence, la Russie, l'Autriche et la Serbie s'abstiendraient de toute opération militaire active. Sir A. Nicolson a parlé de cette suggestion à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qui s'y est montré favorable.

DE FLEURIAU.

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N° 69.

**M. DE FLEURIAU, Chargé d'affaires à Londres,**

**à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.**

Londres, le 27 juillet 1914.

Le Ministre de Serbie n'a pas reçu d'instructions de son Gouvernement en vue de demander la médiation de l'Angleterre; il est d'ailleurs possible que les télégrammes de son Gouvernement soient arrêtés en route.

La proposition anglaise d'intervenir à quatre, indiquée dans mon télégramme précédent, est d'ailleurs lancée, et me paraît devoir être soutenue en premier lieu.

DE FLEURIAU.

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N° 70.

**M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.**

**à M. DE FLEURIAU, Chargé d'affaires de France à Londres.**

Paris, le 27 juillet 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre m'a communiqué la proposition de Sir Ed. Grey tendant à une action commune de l'Angleterre, de l'Allemagne, de la France et de l'Italie à Vienne, Belgrade et Pétersbourg pour arrêter les opérations militaires actives, pendant que les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne, d'Italie et de France à Londres examineraient, avec Sir E. Grey, les moyens de trouver une solution aux complications présentes.

J'ai prescrit ce matin à M. Jules Cambon de se concerter avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Berlin, et d'appuyer sa démarche, dans la forme où il le jugerait opportun.

Je vous autorise à prendre part à la réunion projetée par Sir E. Grey. Je suis prêt également à donner à nos agents à Vienne, Pétersbourg et Belgrade des instructions dans le sens demandé par le Gouvernement anglais.

Toutefois, j'estime que les chances de succès de la proposition de Sir E. Grey reposent essentiellement sur l'action que Berlin serait disposé à exercer à Vienne; une démarche de ce côté pour amener la suspension des opérations militaires me paraîtrait vouée à l'échec, si l'influence de l'Allemagne ne s'était pas exercée au préalable.

J'ai également noté parmi les observations de M. de Schoen, que le Gouvernement

austro-hongrois était spécialement susceptible quand on prononçait les termes de « médiation », « intervention », « conférence », et plus capable d'admettre des « conseils amicaux » et des « conversations ».

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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N° 71.

M. DE FLEURIAU, Chargé d'affaires de France. à Londres,  
à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Londres, le 27 juillet 1914.

J'ai fait connaître à Sir E. Grey votre adhésion à sa proposition de médiation à quatre et de conférence à Londres. L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Vienne a reçu les instructions nécessaires pour saisir le Gouvernement austro-hongrois dès que ses collègues français, allemand ou italien auront été autorisés à faire la même démarche.

Le Gouvernement italien a accepté l'intervention à quatre en vue de prévenir les opérations militaires; il consulte le Gouvernement allemand sur la proposition de conférence et la procédure à suivre à l'égard du Gouvernement austro-hongrois. Le Gouvernement allemand n'a pas encore répondu.

DE FLEURIAU.

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N° 72.

M. BARRÈRE, Ambassadeur de France à Rome.  
à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Rome, le 27 juillet 1914.

Le Marquis de San Giuliano, est rentré à Rome ce soir et je l'ai vu aussitôt après son arrivée. Il m'a parlé du contenu de la Note autrichienne et m'a assuré formellement qu'il n'en a eu aucune connaissance préalable.

Il savait bien que cette Note devait avoir un caractère rigoureux et énergique; mais il ne s'était pas douté qu'elle pût prendre une telle forme. Je lui ai demandé s'il était vrai qu'il eût fait exprimer à Vienne à ce propos, comme le prétendent certains journaux, une approbation de l'action autrichienne et l'assurance que l'Italie remplirait à l'égard de l'Autriche ses devoirs d'alliée. « En aucune façon, m'a répondu le Ministre: nous n'avons pas été consultés, on ne nous a rien dit; nous n'avons donc eu à faire aucune communication de cette nature à Vienne ».



Le Marquis de San Giuliano estime que la Serbie aurait agi plus sagement en acceptant la note dans son intégralité; aujourd'hui encore il estime que ce serait la seule chose à faire, étant convaincu que l'Autriche ne retirera aucune de ses prétentions, et les maintiendra, même au risque d'amener une conflagration générale; il doute que l'Allemagne soit disposée à se prêter à une action auprès de son alliée. Il constate toutefois que l'Allemagne tient en ce moment un grand compte de ses rapports avec Londres, et il croit que si une Puissance peut déterminer Berlin à une action pacifique, c'est l'Angleterre.

Quant à l'Italie, elle continuera à faire tous ses efforts en faveur de la paix. C'est à cet effet qu'il a adhéré sans hésiter à la proposition de Sir Ed. Grey de réunir à Londres les Ambassadeurs des Puissances, qui ne sont pas directement intéressées dans le conflit austro-serbe.

BARRÈRE.

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N° 73.

M. Jule. CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Berlin,

à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Berlin, le 27 juillet 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, qui est rentré aujourd'hui, a vu le Secrétaire d'État et l'a entretenu de la suggestion de Sir Ed. Grey. M. de Jagow lui a répondu en manifestant toujours son désir de la paix, mais en ajoutant qu'il ne pourrait consentir à ce qui ressemblerait à une conférence des Puissances; ce serait instituer une espèce de cour d'arbitrage, dont l'idée ne serait acceptable que si elle était demandée par Vienne et Pétersbourg. Le langage de M. de Jagow confirme celui de M. de Schoen à Votre Excellence.

A la vérité une démarche des quatre Puissances à Vienne et Pétersbourg peut se produire par la voie diplomatique, sans prendre la forme d'une conférence et est susceptible de bien des modalités; ce qui importerait c'est de manifester à Vienne et à Pétersbourg le désir commun des quatre Puissances qu'un conflit soit évité. La temporisation permettrait seule d'arriver à une issue pacifique des difficultés présentes.

Jules CAMBON.

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N° 74.

**M. Jules CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Berlin,**

**à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.**

Berlin, le 27 juillet 1914.

Je me suis entretenu aujourd'hui avec le Secrétaire d'État et j'ai appuyé auprès de lui la démarche que venait de faire Sir E. Goschen.

M. de Jagow m'a répondu, comme il l'avait fait à l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, qu'il ne pouvait accepter la proposition de charger les Ambassadeurs d'Italie, de France et d'Allemagne de chercher avec Sir Ed. Grey les moyens de résoudre les difficultés actuelles, parce que ce serait instituer une véritable conférence pour traiter des affaires de l'Autriche et de la Russie.

J'ai répliqué à M. de Jagow que je regrettais sa réponse, mais que le grand objet que Sir Edw. Grey avait en vue dépassait une question de forme; que ce qui importait c'était l'association de l'Angleterre et de la France avec l'Allemagne et l'Italie pour travailler à une œuvre de paix; que cette association pouvait se manifester par des démarches communes à Pétersbourg et à Vienne; qu'il m'avait souvent exprimé son regret de voir les deux groupes d'alliance opposés toujours l'un à l'autre en Europe; qu'il avait là l'occasion de prouver qu'il y avait un esprit européen, en montrant quatre Puissances appartenant aux deux groupes agissant d'un commun accord, pour empêcher un conflit.

M. de Jagow s'est dérobé en disant que l'Allemagne avait des engagements avec l'Autriche. Je lui ai fait remarquer que les rapports de l'Allemagne avec Vienne n'étaient pas plus étroits que ceux de la France avec la Russie et que c'était lui-même qui mettait dans l'espèce les deux groupes d'alliance en opposition.

Le Secrétaire d'État m'a dit alors qu'il ne se refusait pas à agir pour écarter le conflit austro-russe, mais qu'il ne pouvait pas intervenir dans le conflit austro-serbe. « L'un est la conséquence de l'autre, ai-je dit, et il importe d'empêcher qu'il ne survienne un état de fait nouveau, de nature à amener une intervention de la Russie. »

Comme le Secrétaire d'État persistait à dire qu'il était obligé de tenir ses engagements à l'égard de l'Autriche, je lui ai demandé s'il s'était engagé à la suivre partout, les yeux bandés, et s'il avait pris connaissance de la réponse de la Serbie à l'Autriche, que le Chargé d'affaires de Serbie lui avait remise ce matin. « Je n'en ai pas encore eu le temps, » me dit-il. « Je le regrette. Vous verriez que, sauf sur des points de détail, la Serbie se soumet entièrement. Il semble donc que, puisque l'Autriche a obtenu les satisfactions que votre appui lui a procurées, vous pouvez aujourd'hui lui conseiller de s'en contenter ou d'examiner avec la Serbie les termes de la réponse de celle-ci. »

Comme M. Jagow ne me répondait pas clairement, je lui ai demandé si l'Allemagne voulait la guerre. Il a protesté vivement, disant qu'il savait que c'était ma pensée, mais que c'était tout à fait inexact. « Il faut donc, ai-je repris, agir en

« conséquence. Quand vous lirez la réponse serbe, pesez-en les termes avec votre  
« conscience, je vous en prie, au nom de l'humanité, et n'assumez pas personnelle-  
« ment une part de responsabilité dans les catastrophes que vous laissez préparer. »  
M. de Jagow a protesté de nouveau, ajoutant qu'il était prêt à s'unir à l'Angleterre  
et à la France dans un effort commun, mais qu'il fallait trouver à cette intervention  
une forme qu'il pût accepter et que les Cabinets devaient s'entendre à ce sujet.

« Au reste, a-t-il ajouté, les conversations directes entre Vienne et Pétersbourg  
« sont entamées et se poursuivent : j'en augure beaucoup de bien et j'espère. »

Au moment de le quitter, je lui dis que j'avais eu ce matin l'impression que l'heure  
de la détente avait sonné, mais que je voyais bien qu'il n'en était rien. Il m'a répondu  
que je me trompais; qu'il espérait que les choses étaient en bonne voie et abouti-  
raient peut-être rapidement. Je lui ai demandé d'agir à Vienne pour qu'elles marchent  
vite, parce qu'il importait de ne pas laisser se créer en Russie un de ces courants  
d'opinion qui emportent tout.

A mon sentiment, il y aurait lieu de demander à Sir E. Grey, qui a dû être avisé  
par Sir E. Goschen du refus opposé à sa proposition dans la forme qui lui était  
donnée, de la renouveler sous une autre forme, de telle façon que l'Allemagne n'ait  
pas de prétexte pour refuser de s'y associer et prenne ses responsabilités aux yeux de  
l'Angleterre.

Jules CAMBON.

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## N° 75.

M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

à MM. les Ambassadeurs de France à Londres, Saint-Pétersbourg,  
Berlin, Vienne, Rome.

Paris, le 27 juillet 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie est venu me voir pour me remettre un mé-  
moire, véritable acte d'accusation contre la Serbie; il m'a déclaré, d'ordre de son  
Gouvernement, que la Serbie n'ayant pas répondu d'une manière satisfaisante aux  
demandes du Gouvernement impérial, celui-ci se voit contraint d'employer des  
moyens énergiques pour amener la Serbie à donner les satisfactions et garanties qui  
sont réclamées d'elle. C'est demain que le Gouvernement autrichien prendra les  
mesures à cet effet.

J'ai prié l'Ambassadeur de me faire connaître les mesures envisagées par l'Autriche,  
et le Comte Szecsen m'a répondu que cela pourrait être soit un ultimatum, soit une  
déclaration de guerre, soit le passage de la frontière, mais qu'il n'avait aucune indi-  
cation précise sur ce point.

J'ai alors fait remarquer à l'Ambassadeur que la Serbie avait accepté sur presque  
tous les points les exigences de l'Autriche, que la divergence qui subsistait sur

quelques points pourrait disparaître avec un peu de bonne volonté réciproque, et par l'aide des Puissances amies de la paix; en fixant à demain l'exécution de ses résolutions, l'Autriche rendait, pour la seconde fois, leur concours presque impossible et assumait une lourde responsabilité en risquant de déclencher une guerre, dont on ne pourrait mesurer l'extension.

Je vous communique, à titre d'information, le mémoire que m'a remis le Comte Szecsen.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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ANNEXE.

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*MÉMOIRE du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, remis par le Comte Szecsen  
à M. Bienvenu-Martin le 27 juillet 1914.*

L'agitation serbe, qui s'est donné pour but d'arriver à la séparation de la Monarchie autrichienne des partis slaves du Sud pour les rattacher à un grand État serbe, remonte très loin en arrière. Cette propagande sur le sol serbe, toujours la même quant à son but final, quoique diverse dans ses moyens et intensités, avait atteint son plus haut point lors de la crise de l'annexion. Rejetant le manteau protecteur du secret, elle s'était montrée alors avec toute la franchise de ses tendances et avait montré sous le patronage du Gouvernement serbe son intention de réaliser ses desseins avec tous les moyens disponibles.

Tandis que la Presse serbe tout entière appelait au combat contre la Monarchie par des cris haineux et en dénaturant les faits, il se créait des associations pour encourager à cette lutte — même abstraction faite d'autres moyens de propagande.

L'association qui est devenue la plus importante est la « Narodna Odbrana ». Issue d'un comité révolutionnaire qui existait alors, elle fut constituée en Société privée, cependant, sous forme d'organisation dépendant du Département des Affaires étrangères de Belgrade par des fonctionnaires serbes militaires et civils. Parmi ces fondateurs, on doit citer notamment : le général Buzo Jankovic, les anciens ministres Ljuba Jovanovic, Ljuba Davidovic et Valislav Valovic, le directeur de l'Imprimerie nationale Zivojin Dacic, et les anciens capitaines, maintenant commandants, Voja Tankovic et Milan Pribicevic. Cette association s'était imposé comme but la création et l'organisation de bandes en vue de la guerre espérée contre la Monarchie. On trouvera une description saisissante de l'activité d'alors de la « Narodna Odbrana », notamment dans les déclarations du sujet bosnéo-herzégovinien Trifko Krstanovic, entendu comme témoin par le conseil de guerre de Sarajevo, qui se trouvait alors à Belgrade et qui, avec d'autres sujets de la Monarchie, a été accepté comme comitadji par la « Narodna Odbrana ». Avec environ cent quarante autres, Krstanovic avait été amené à une école créée pour la formation de nouvelles bandes à Cuprija, district de Jagodina, et dirigée par les capitaines Voja Tankosic et Dusan Putnick. Il n'y avait comme maîtres dans cette école que des officiers serbes; le général Bozo Jankovic et le capitaine Milan Pribicevic donnèrent une grande régularité à ces cours d'organisation de bandes, qui duraient trois mois.

Les comitadji y recevaient un enseignement complet du tir, du jet des bombes, des mines, de la destruction des chemins de fer, tunnels, ponts et télégraphes. Leur devoir était, d'après

leurs chefs, de mettre en pratique les connaissances nouvellement acquises en Bosnie-Herzégovine.

Par cette action de la « Narodna Odbrana » exercée de la manière la plus publique et favorisée par le Gouvernement Serbe, a été répandue la guerilla des bandes contre la Monarchie. Par là, les sujets de la Monarchie étaient conduits à la trahison contre leur patrie, et amenés systématiquement à pratiquer comme émissaires serbes des attaques secrètes contre les moyens de défense de leur patrie.

Cette période des aspirations agressives s'est terminée avec la déclaration faite par le Gouvernement serbe le 31 mars 1909, dans laquelle celui-ci se déclarait prêt à accepter le nouvel état de choses créé par l'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzégovine au point de vue du droit public, et a promis solennellement vouloir vivre en relations amicales de bon voisinage, dans l'avenir, avec la Monarchie.

Avec cette déclaration, il semblait que dut prendre fin l'agitation constituant une source permanente de troubles contre l'Autriche-Hongrie et qu'on eût trouvé un moyen de rapprochement amical entre la Serbie et la Monarchie. Privée de l'appui du Gouvernement serbe, et combattue par lui conformément à ces engagements, la propagande hostile n'aurait pu durer que d'une manière occulte, vouée à une prompte destruction. Par contre, les points de contact existant entre les partis slaves du Sud de la Monarchie et la Serbie dans le domaine de la langue, des races et de la culture auraient dû conduire à la réalisation d'un travail de développement commun inspiré d'amitiés réciproques et d'intérêts parallèles.

Cependant ces espoirs ne se sont pas réalisés. Les aspirations hostiles à la Monarchie ont subsisté, et, sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe qui n'a rien fait pour étouffer cette agitation, la propagande instituée contre l'Autriche n'a fait que gagner en étendue et profondeur. La haine contre la Monarchie a été tenue en haleine et s'est transformée en un sentiment irréconciliable. Le peuple serbe, tant par les moyens anciens, mieux adaptés à la situation, que par des méthodes plus complètes, a été appelé « au combat d'anéantissement inéluctable » contre l'Autriche. Systématiquement, des fils secrets ont été tissés vers les domaines slaves du sud de la Monarchie, dont les sujets ont été incités à la trahison.

Par-dessus tout, c'est la presse serbe qui n'a cessé d'agir dans cet esprit.

Pas moins de quatre-vingt un journaux paraissant en Serbie ont dû être retirés de la circulation postale jusqu'aujourd'hui, en raison de leur contenu qui tomba sous le coup de la loi pénale. Il n'est guère une loi pénale protégeant la personne sacrée du Monarque et des membres de la famille impériale ou l'intégrité de l'État qui n'ait été violée par les feuilles serbes. On trouvera à l'annexe I quelques-unes des nombreuses preuves données par la presse dans l'ordre d'idées ci-dessus.

Sans entrer dans un examen détaillé des manières de voir de l'opinion publique serbe, il y a lieu d'observer que la presse n'a cessé de considérer l'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, malgré la reconnaissance formelle serbe, après comme avant, comme un rapt exercé contre la Serbie ayant besoin d'être réparé. Cette pensée ne revient pas seulement dans les feuilles d'opinion avancée, mais aussi dans la « Samoprava » qui tient de si près à l'Office des Affaires étrangères de Belgrade, où elle est exprimée sous une forme à peine enveloppée (voir annexe II<sup>B</sup>).

On ne peut pas non plus négliger de considérer comment l'attentat commis le 15 juin 1910 à Sarajevo par Bogdan Zerajie contre le Gouverneur de Bosnie-Herzégovine, maître de camp von Varesanin, a été loué par la presse.

On se souvient que Zerajie s'était tué immédiatement après son acte et avait brûlé, avant de le commettre, tous ses papiers. Pour ces raisons, il n'avait pas été possible de mettre en lumière pleinement les motifs de cet attentat, on a cependant pu conclure d'une pièce trouvée

près de lui qu'il était partisan des idées de Kropotkine. Les indices relevés ont également conduit à penser qu'il s'agissait d'un attentat d'un caractère anarchiste.

Ceci n'empêcha pas cependant la presse serbe de célébrer le criminel comme un héros national serbe et de louer son acte. Même, le « Politika » s'est élevé contre l'idée que Zerajic fut un anarchiste et l'a réclaté comme un « héros serbe dont le nom sera répété par tous les Serbes avec respect et douleur ».

Le « Politika » considère la date du 18 août de la même année « jour de naissance de S. M. Impériale et Royale » comme une occasion favorable pour parler à nouveau de Zerajic « dont le nom sera dans le peuple quelque chose comme celui d'un saint » et pour louer solennellement l'attentat en une poésie (annexe n° I).

C'est ainsi qu'a été exploité ce crime n'ayant rien de commun avec les aspirations sur des territoires de la Monarchie, pour le progrès de cette idée et que le meurtre a été reconnu de la manière la plus explicite comme un moyen glorieux et digne d'imitation dans la lutte pour la réalisation de cette pensée. Cette sanctification du meurtre comme une méthode pleinement admissible dans la lutte contre la Monarchie revient plus tard dans les feuilles parlant de l'attentat commis par Jukic contre le Commissaire royal de Cuvaj (annexe I<sup>b</sup>).

Ces journaux répandus, non pas seulement en Serbie, mais comme on l'a vu plus tard par des voies secrètes bien organisées et par fraudes dans la Monarchie qui ont amené et maintenu éveillée dans les grandes masses cette disposition, laquelle a fourni un terrain nourricier, favorable pour les méfaits des associations hostiles à la Monarchie.

C'est la « Narodna Odbrana » qui est devenue le centre de l'agitation menée par les associations. Les mêmes personnes qui, au temps de l'annexion, étaient à sa tête, sont encore celles qui la dirigent. On retrouve parmi elles comme organisateurs énergiques et pleins d'action les plus violents opposants de la Monarchie cités plus haut. Organisée sur une base large et profonde et possédant une hiérarchie (voir annexe II « organisation »), la « Narodna Odbrana » posséda bientôt environ quatre cents adhérents, qui répandirent une agitation très active.

En outre, la Narodna s'est mise en association étroite avec la « Fédération des Tireurs » (762 sociétés), l'association des Sokol « Dusan Silni » (2,500 membres), le Club olympique, l'Association des cavaliers « Knez Mihajlo », la Société des chasseurs et la Ligue de développement, ainsi que de nombreuses autres associations, qui toutes, conduites et protégées par la Narodna, agissaient dans le même esprit. Se pénétrant de plus en plus les unes les autres, ces associations parvinrent à une fusion complète, de telle manière qu'elles ne sont plus aujourd'hui que des membres du Corps unique de la Narodna. Ainsi cette dernière a constitué sur toute la Serbie un réseau très serré d'agitation et a attiré à toutes ses idées tous ceux capables de les recevoir.

Quel est l'esprit de l'action de la Narodna, c'est ce que démontre avec une suffisante clarté les publications officielles de cette Société.

Dans ses statuts, revêtus de l'apparence d'une société de développement ne se préoccupant que du perfectionnement spirituel et corporel de la population serbe et de son renforcement matériel, la Narodna dévoile dans son organe corporatif (voir annexe II) le vrai et unique mobile de son existence, en ce qu'elle appelle son « programme réorganisé ».

Prêcher au peuple serbe notamment « la vérité sainte par un travail fanatique et infatigable » sous l'allégation que la Monarchie veut « lui prendre sa liberté et sa langue et même détruire la Serbie »; qu'il est une nécessité inéluctable de conduire contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, son premier et plus grand ennemi, le « combat de destruction avec fusils et canons » et de préparer le peuple à ce combat « par tous les moyens », pour la libération des territoires soumis, dans lesquels sont sous l'opprobre et le joug sept millions de frères. Tous les « efforts

pour le développement » de la Narodna sont au service exclusif de cette idée comme simple moyen pour l'organisation et l'éducation du peuple en vue de la lutte pour l'anéantissement prévu.

C'est dans le même esprit que travaillent toutes les associations affiliées à la Narodna à l'égard desquelles l'association des « Sokol » de Kragujevac peut servir comme exemple (voir annexe III).

Comme pour la Narodna, ce sont des officiers, professeurs et agents de l'État qui sont à sa tête.

Le discours par lequel son Président, major Kovacevic, a ouvert l'assemblée annuelle de 1914 renonce totalement à mentionner la gymnastique, ce qui est cependant le but véritable des « Sokol » et ne parle que de la « préparation à la guerre » contre « l'Ennemi dangereux, sans cœur, odieux et envahissant du Nord » qui enlève à des millions de frères serbes leurs libertés et leurs droits et les maintient dans l'esclavage et les fers.

Dans les rapports administratifs de cette association, les développements techniques passent totalement à l'arrière-plan et ne servent que de rubriques pour la connaissance du véritable « but de l'activité de l'administration »; notamment « la préparation du développement national et la nécessité de fortifier la « nation écrasée » dans l'objectif qu'elle puisse ainsi mener à bien son « programme non encore rempli, sa tâche non encore accomplie », et accomplir cette « grande action qui doit s'accomplir dans l'avenir prochain : la libération des frères vivant au delà de la Drina qui endurent le martyre des crucifiés ».

Il n'est pas jusqu'au trésorier qui ne fasse servir son rapport financier pour lancer cet appel que l'on doit « élever des faucons » qui sont en mesure « d'apporter la liberté aux frères non encore libérés. »

De même que les aspirations au développement dans la Narodna, l'activité en gymnastique des « Sokol » n'est pas le but lui-même, mais un simple moyen au service de la même propagande menée avec les mêmes intentions pour ne pas dire avec les mêmes mots exactement.

Lorsque la Narodna appelle au combat d'anéantissement contre la Monarchie, elle ne s'adresse pas seulement au peuple de la Monarchie, mais à tous les peuples slaves du sud. Pour la Narodna, les territoires slaves du sud de la Monarchie font partie de « nos territoires serbes soumis » (voir aussi annexe IV). De même les sujets slaves du sud de la monarchie doivent prendre part à cette « œuvre nationale », de même cette activité « saine et nécessaire » doit s'exercer de l'autre côté de la frontière serbe et même sur le sol de la monarchie, la Narodna recherche ses « héros pour la guerre sainte », dont Obilic, l'assassin de Mourad, est cité comme exemple digne d'imitation du sacrifice à la patrie.

Mais, pour amener les frères « hors de Serbie » à participer au « travail d'initiative privée » la Narodna entretient une association intime avec les « Frères de ce côté-ci de la frontière ». Comment cette intimité est exercée, c'est ce qui n'est pas dit, sans doute parce que *cela appartient à cette partie du « travail d'ensemble »* qui « pour des raisons nombreuses ne peut ni ne doit être expliqué ».

Combien cette branche de son activité est étendue, c'est ce que montre le fait que non seulement le Comité central de la Narodna, mais encore certains de ses comités régionaux, possède des sections spéciales pour « les affaires extérieures ».

L'activité extérieure de la Narodna et de ses affiliés est particulièrement variée.

Celle qui est relativement la moins dangereuse parce que contrôlable officiellement, consiste en tournées de conférences qu'entreprennent les membres influents de la Narodna vers les parties sud-ouest de la Monarchie où ils parlent dans diverses sociétés sur des sujets nationaux ou de culture. Ces occasions permettent aux orateurs d'exposer aux cercles les plus

relevés de leurs adhérents, en paroles plus ou moins gâzées, compréhensibles pour ceux qui sont déjà au courant, les véritables tendances de l'association.

Parmi ces émissaires, un des plus connus est le Directeur de l'Imprimerie d'État Zivojin Dacic déjà nommé; c'est lui qui, le 8 août 1909, a lancé un appel au peuple serbe, dans lequel il a désigné l'Autriche comme « l'ennemi de la Serbie » et l'a invité à se préparer au combat contre la Monarchie. A plusieurs reprises, il a entrepris des voyages d'agitation de ce genre. A Karlova (en 1912) il a même abandonné toute prudence et a parlé dans le sens de « l'union de tous les Serbes contre l'ennemi commun ».

Plus dangereuses sont les relations entretenues par les associations imbues de l'esprit de la Narodna, sous le manteau de la communauté des intérêts et de la culture, avec les associations dans la Monarchie; car les envoyés respectifs et les visites corporatives de ces associations, qui échappent à tout contrôle, sont utilisées par les Serbes à toutes espèces de machinations contre la Monarchie.

C'est ainsi, par exemple, qu'un envoyé de la Narodna à la fête de Sarajevo en septembre 1912 (annexe VI) ne s'est pas gêné pour recruter en secret des adhérents bosniaques à sa société. L'envoi d'un représentant de l'association des Sokol de Kragujevac à cette fête devait signifier pour les frères de Bosnie : « Nous ne vous avons pas oubliés, les ailes de faucon de sumadija sont encore puissantes. » Une pensée qui, dans la circulation intime, aura trouvé sans doute une toute autre expression conforme aux tendances ci-dessus exposées de la Narodna (annexe III). Quant aux événements qui se passent lors des réunions du même genre en Serbie, il est évident qu'ils échappent à un contrôle quelconque des autorités Impériales et Royales qui ne possèdent à cet égard que des informations confidentielles difficilement contrôlables. En relation avec ces faits il y aurait lieu d'élever des doutes sur la visite des étudiants d'Agram en Serbie (avril 1912) qui ont reçu du côté serbe un accueil officiel presque militaire accompagné même d'une parade, d'une revue de troupes en leur honneur et cela d'une manière assez suggestive pour que l'association des Sokol de Kragujevac puisse dire : « Cet événement signifie le commencement et la clef d'un grand acte qui doit s'accomplir dans un événement rapproché, c'est un germe qui mûrira lorsque l'âme du peuple s'évanouira jusqu'à ce qu'il n'y ait plus aucune barrière qui ne soit détruite. »

Ce n'est que récemment qu'il est parvenu à la connaissance des autorités austro-hongroises que les associations de Sokol serbes ont réussi à déterminer quelques corporations analogues de la Monarchie à se mettre avec elles dans un lieu jusqu'à présent secret dont le caractère n'est pas encore complètement éclairci; car les constatations à cet égard continuent à être relevées. Jusqu'à présent cependant les renseignements obtenus permettent d'estimer que l'on a découvert les traces d'un des moyens par lesquels les tendances subversives des Sokol serbes ont détourné et conduit à l'erreur certains groupes de personnes dans la Monarchie.

Cette propagande dans les cercles de plus en plus différents paraît cependant reléguée au second plan si on lui compare celle du « travail extérieur » qui est conduite par la Narodna et ses amis vers une agitation d'homme à homme. C'est dans ce domaine que se constatent les résultats les plus tristes.

Par ses hommes de confiance et émissaires secrets, elle apporte le poison de la mutinerie dans les cercles des gens d'âge comme dans ceux de la jeunesse irresponsable.

C'est ainsi par exemple que, détournés par Milan Pribicevitch les anciens officiers de Honved V. B. D. K. V. N. et le lieutenant de gendarmerie de Croatie Esclavone V. K. ont abandonné le service de l'armée de la Monarchie dans les conditions les plus suspectes et se sont tournés vers la Serbie; ils vivent entre temps la plupart de leurs espérances déçues ou du moins en partie, et pensent à retourner dans la patrie qu'ils ont trahie. L'agitation introduite de Serbie dans les écoles moyennes de Croatie et de Bosnie est malheureusement si connue qu'elle a à



peine besoin d'exemples. Ce qui est moins connu, c'est que ceux qui ont été éliminés pour infraction disciplinaire grave des écoles croates et bosniaques sont accueillis en Serbie les bras ouverts et souvent même protégés par l'État et entretenus comme des adversaires de la Monarchie. Les écoles serbes avec leurs maîtres hostiles à l'Autriche, qui sont en grande partie adhérents de la Narodna, sont évidemment des établissements tout à fait appropriés pour l'éducation d'adeptes de ce genre. Un cas particulièrement notable doit être cité ici. En mars dernier, plusieurs écoliers des écoles normales de maîtres de Pakrac (Croatie) ont été expulsés pour raison de grève. Ils se sont retournés vers la Serbie où ils ont obtenu illico des positions de maîtres d'école ou ont été admis dans des écoles normales de maîtres. Un de ces relégués, en relations avec des cercles hostiles à la Monarchie a déclaré publiquement que lui et ses gens donneraient le conseil, émettraient l'opinion pendant la durée du séjour de l'archiduc héritier en Bosnie, que cette province est une terre serbe. Il est particulièrement à remarquer que le Préfet du cercle serbe de Krajna a accordé à trois de ces étudiants si compromis, pendant la durée du séjour de l'Archiduc François-Ferdinand en Bosnie, des passeports serbes dans lesquels il les désigne faussement comme des sujets serbes, quoiqu'il eût dû connaître leur qualité de Croates. Munis de ces passeports, les trois agitateurs ont pu gagner la Monarchie sans être remarqués, où cependant ils ont fini par être reconnus et arrêtés.

Mais ce qui précède ne suffit pas à caractériser intégralement l'activité « extérieure » de la Narodna.

Depuis longtemps déjà le Gouvernement impérial et royal a été informé par des informations confidentielles que la Narodna a préparé la guerre qu'elle a désiré à l'encontre de la Monarchie par des moyens militaires en ce sens qu'elle y envoie des émissaires chargés à la manière des bandes de tenter, dès l'ouverture des hostilités, la destruction des moyens de transport et d'amener des révoltes ou des paniques (voir annexe VII).

La procédure criminelle intentée en 1913 par le Conseil de guerre de Sarajevo contre Jovo Jajilic et consorts pour crimes d'espionnage a amené la confirmation de ces informations confidentielles. Comme au temps de sa fondation, aujourd'hui encore, la préparation de la guerre par bandes armées, figure encore au programme de la Narodna, auquel est venu se joindre en plus toute une activité dans l'ordre de l'espionnage. C'est pour cela que le programme dit « réorganisé » de la Narodna est en réalité un programme *étendu*. D'une atmosphère de haine ainsi exaspérée publiquement et secrètement, d'une agitation échappant à toute responsabilité pour lesquelles dans la lutte contre l'Autriche tous les moyens sont bons jusques et y compris, sans en avoir honte, le meurtre vulgaire, devait finalement résulter des actes de terrorisme.

Le 8 juin 1912, le nommé Jukic a tiré sur le Commissaire royal à Agram, von Cuvaj, ce qui a amené la blessure mortelle du conseiller von Herwic assis dans la même voiture; dans sa fuite, a tué un policier qui le poursuivait et en a blessé deux autres.

Il est connu par les poursuites que Jukic était imbu des idées et des plans de la Narodna, même si Jukic se livrait déjà depuis quelque temps à des projets d'attentat, ceux-ci n'arrivèrent cependant à maturité qu'après qu'il eut fait le 18 avril 1912 avec les étudiants d'Agram l'excursion de Belgrade aux fêtes préparées pour honorer ces visiteurs, ce Jukic est entré en rapports avec diverses personnes appartenant aux cercles de la Narodna et avec lesquelles il a discuté de politique. Peu de jours après, il est revenu à Belgrade et là il a reçu d'un major serbe une bombe et d'un camarade un *browning*, avec lesquels il a exécuté l'attentat. La bombe trouvée à Agram provenait, d'après les experts, d'un arsenal militaire.

Le coup de Jukic n'était pas encore oublié lorsque, le 18 août 1913, Stephan Dojcic, revenu d'Amérique à Agram, a commis un attentat contre le Commissaire royal baron

Skerlec, attentat résultant des actions organisées par les Serbes parmi les cercles des Slaves du Sud vivant en Amérique, et qui était l'œuvre de la propagande extérieure de la Narodna.

Une brochure du serbe T. Dimitrijevitich imprimée à Chicago, avec ses attaques sans mesures contre S. M. Impériale et Royale et ses appels aux Serbes de la Monarchie touchant leur prochaine « délivrance » les poussant à rentrer en Serbie montre le parallélisme de la propagande menée par les Serbes en toute liberté en Amérique, et de celle menée de Serbie dans les domaines de la Monarchie.

Et de nouveau, à peine un an après, Agram était le théâtre d'un nouvel attentat, manqué cette fois.

Le 20 mai 1913, Jacob Schäfer a tenté, au théâtre d'Agram, sur le ban Freiherr von Skerlec, un attentat qui a été arrêté au dernier moment par un policier. L'enquête a mis au jour l'existence d'un complot dont l'âme était Rudolf Hercigonja. Des déclarations de ce dernier et de ses cinq co-inculpés, il résulte que cet attentat aussi avait son origine en Serbie.

Ayant pris part à une tentative manquée pour mettre en liberté Jukic, Hercigonja s'était sauvé en Serbie (octobre 1912) où il fréquentait avec son complice Marojan Jakcic, des comitadji et des membres de la Narodna. Comme cela est arrivé fréquemment avec des esprits juvéniles s'occupant trop tôt de questions politiques, ces fréquentations ont amené les plus mauvais résultats. Hercigonja rentra chez lui avec le dogme prêché à Belgrade que les pays slaves du sud de la Monarchie doivent en être séparés pour être réunis au royaume serbe. Il avait en outre été persuadé par l'enseignement reçu de ses amis que ce but devait être poursuivi par l'exécution d'attentat sur de hauts personnages ayant part à la politique de la Monarchie.

C'est dans cet esprit qu'Hercigonja à Agram a exercé son action sur ses amis et les a amenés à ses idées. Au premier plan de ses projets, était l'exécution d'un attentat sur l'héritier du trône.

Peu de mois auparavant, des poursuites en haute trahison avaient été intentées contre Suka Alginovic. Au cours de ce procès, trois témoins ont déclaré qu'Alginovic avait dit devant eux avoir reçu cent dina de la Narodna et autant d'une association secrète d'étudiants pour début de propagande, mais principalement pour l'exécution d'un attentat sur l'archiduc François-Ferdinand.

*On voit à quel point l'agitation criminelle de la Narodna et, de ceux qui partagent ses opinions, s'est concentrée ces derniers temps sur la personne de l'archiduc héritier.*

De toutes ces constatations, on arrive à la conclusion que la Narodna ainsi que les cercles hostiles à la Monarchie groupés autour d'elle considéraient depuis peu le moment venu de faire réaliser leur enseignement par des actes.

Il est remarquable qu'elle se contente pour ces actes de donner l'incitation et là où cette incitation était tombée sur un sol fertile de placer les moyens de secours matériels à leur disposition, mais qu'elle a fait reposer tout le rôle dangereux de cette propagande par le fait, uniquement sur la jeunesse de la Monarchie excitée et détournée par elle qui doit supporter seule le fardeau de ce triste « héroïsme ».

Tous les traits de cette façon de faire se retrouvent dans l'histoire et l'origine de l'attentat profondément regrettable du 28 juin.

Princip et Grabez sont des exemples de cette jeunesse empoisonnée dès l'école par les pensées de la Narodna. A Belgrade, fréquentant les cercles d'étudiants imbus de ces idées, Princip s'est occupé de plans d'attentat contre l'Archiduc héritier contre lequel s'exerçait la

haine particulièrement aiguë des éléments hostiles à la monarchie, à l'occasion de son voyage dans les pays annexés.

Il se lia d'amitié avec Kabrinovitch qui fréquentait les mêmes cercles et dont les opinions radicalement révolutionnaires, d'après ses propres aveux, l'amenaient au même sentiment hostile à la Monarchie et à la propagande par le fait. Mais, si soigneusement qu'ait été préparé ce complot, et si décidés qu'aient été les conjurés, cependant l'attentat n'aurait jamais été accompli s'il ne s'était pas trouvé, comme dans le cas Jukic, des gens pour donner aux complices les moyens d'exécuter leur agression, car Princip et Kabrinovitch l'ont expressément reconnu, ils manquaient autant des armes nécessaires que d'argent pour les acheter. Il est intéressant de voir où les complices se sont procuré leurs armes. Milan Pribicevic et Zivojin Dacic, ces deux hommes principaux de la Narodna sont les premiers auxquels les complices se sont adressés dans leur besoin comme à une aide sûre sans doute parce qu'il était déjà devenu une tradition dans le cercle de ceux qui sont prêts à commettre des attentats qu'il était possible d'obtenir des représentants de la Narodna des instruments de meurtre. Le fait accidentel que ces deux hommes, au moment critique, ne se trouvaient pas à Belgrade, déjoua sans doute ce projet, cependant Princip et Kabrinovic ne furent pas embarrassés pour trouver une autre assistance, celle de Milan Ciganovic, un ancien comitadji, maintenant fonctionnaire des chemins de fer à Belgradé et membre de la Narodna. Ce dernier et son ami, le major Voja Tankosic déjà nommé, également, un des chefs de la Narodna qui a été en 1908 le chef de l'école des bandes armées de Kuprija (annexe V) apparaissent maintenant comme les chefs spirituels du complot. Ils n'eurent qu'une hésitation, légère au début, à savoir si les trois conjurés étaient réellement décidés à commettre cet acte, hésitation qui disparut bientôt grâce à leurs suggestions. Dès lors, ils furent prêts à fournir toute assistance, Tankosic a procuré quatre brownings et des munitions et de l'argent pour le voyage. Six grenades à main provenant de l'armée serbe constituaient le complément d'armement, ce qui nous rappelle le cas Jukic. Préoccupé du succès, Tankosic procura l'enseignement du tir, mais Tankosic et Ciganovic se sont préoccupés en outre d'assurer un moyen spécial *non désiré* d'assurer le secret du complot. Ils apostèrent Zian Kali avec l'indication que les deux auteurs, après l'attentat, devaient se tuer, acte de précaution qui devait leur profiter en première ligne, car le secret leur enlevait le faible danger qu'ils avaient assumé dans cette entreprise. *La mort sûre pour les victimes de leur détournement, la pleine sécurité pour elle-même, telle est la devise, connue maintenant, de la Narodna.*

Pour rendre possible l'exécution de l'attentat, il fallait que les armes et bombes parvinssent en fraude et sans être aperçues en Bosnie. Là encore, Ciganovic a donné toute son assistance, il prescrit aux conjurés une route déterminée et leur assure la protection des autorités frontières serbes. La manière dans laquelle ce voyage décrit par Princip comme « mystérieux » a été organisé et exécuté ne laisse subsister aucun doute qu'il s'agit d'une voie secrète bien préparée, et déjà parcourue souvent en vue de desseins secrets de la Narodna. Avec une simplicité et une sûreté résultant de la seule habitude, les capitaines de la frontière à Sabak et Losnika ont prêté dans ce but leur organisation administrative; sans difficulté s'est effectué ce transport secret, avec son système compliqué de guides toujours changeants qui, appelés comme par miracle, se trouvaient toujours sur place quand on avait besoin d'eux. Sans s'enquérir du but de ce voyage curieux de quelques étudiants trop jeunes, les autorités serbes ont laissé sur l'indication de l'ancien comitadji et du fonctionnaire subalterne des chemins de fer Ciganovic, jouer cet appareil fonctionnant si facilement. Ils n'avaient d'ailleurs pas besoin de demander, car d'après les indications reçues, il était clair pour eux qu'il s'agissait de remplir de nouveau une mission de la « Narodna ». La vue de l'arsenal de bombes et de revolvers arrachait seulement au surveillant Grbic un sourire bien-

veillant d'approbation donnant la preuve complète combien l'on était habitué sur cette route à rencontrer une contrebande de ce genre.

Le Gouvernement royal serbe s'est chargé d'une faute lourde en laissant s'accomplir tout cela.

Tenu à cultiver des relations de bon voisinage avec l'Autriche-Hongrie, il a permis à la presse de répandre la haine contre la Monarchie, toléré que des associations établies sur son sol sous la conduite d'officiers élevés, de fonctionnaires, de maîtres et de juges, se livrent contre la Monarchie à une campagne publique menant ses citoyens aux idées révolutionnaires, il n'a pas empêché que des hommes ayant une part à la direction de son administration militaire et civile empoisonnent la conscience publique contre tous les sentiments moraux au point que, dans cette lutte, l'assassinat vulgaire par guet-apens apparaisse comme l'arme la plus recommandable.

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N° 75 BIS.

*COMMUNIQUÉ officieux du bureau de la Presse :*

Vienne, 28 juillet 1914.

Le Ministre autrichien à Belgrade a présenté dès son retour à Vienne le texte de la réponse serbe.

Cette réponse est remplie d'un esprit de manque de sincérité : elle laisse apparaître que le Gouvernement serbe est sans intention sérieuse de mettre fin à la tolérance coupable grâce à laquelle ont été permises les menées anti-autrichiennes. La réponse serbe contient de telles restrictions et limitations, non seulement sur le principe même de la démarche austro-hongroise, mais encore en ce qui concerne les revendications exposées par l'Autriche, que les concessions faites sont sans importance.

En particulier, refus sous prétexte vain, d'accepter la participation des organes austro-hongrois pour la poursuite des auteurs des attentats résidant en territoire serbe.

De même la réponse serbe à la demande autrichienne pour mettre fin aux menées hostiles de la presse équivaut à un refus.

La demande relative aux mesures qui devraient être prises pour que les associations hostiles à l'Autriche-Hongrie ne puissent, après leur dissolution, continuer leur action sous un autre nom et forme, n'a pas même été envisagée.

Ces revendications constituant le minimum nécessaire au rétablissement du calme permanent dans le Sud-Est de la Monarchie, la réponse serbe est considérée comme insuffisante.

Le Gouvernement serbe en a conscience d'ailleurs, puisqu'il envisage le règlement du conflit par voie d'arbitrage, et que le jour où sa réponse devait être remise et avant cette remise, il avait ordonné la mobilisation.

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N° 76.

M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil,

à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères p. i.

A bord de la *France*, le 28 juillet 1914.

J'ai reçu par Copenhague votre télégramme résumant les faits de samedi, le télégramme relatant la dernière visite de l'ambassadeur d'Allemagne, celui relatif à la médiation que la Russie conseille à la Serbie de demander et aux démarches anglaises à Berlin, ainsi que votre télégramme venu ce matin directement par la tour Eiffel.

J'approuve pleinement la réponse que vous avez faite au baron de Schoen; la thèse que vous avez soutenue est l'évidence même : dans la recherche d'une solution pacifique du conflit, nous sommes pleinement d'accord avec la Russie, qui n'est pas responsable de la situation actuelle, et n'a encore procédé à aucune mesure quelconque pouvant éveiller le moindre soupçon; mais il est évident qu'à titre de contrepartie l'Allemagne ne saurait se refuser à donner des conseils au Gouvernement austro-hongrois, dont l'action a ouvert la crise.

Il y a donc lieu de continuer à tenir à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne le même langage. Ce conseil est d'ailleurs en harmonie avec la double proposition anglaise mentionnée dans votre télégramme. J'approuve entièrement la combinaison suggérée par sir Edward Grey et j'invite directement M. Paul Cambon à le lui faire savoir. Il est essentiel que l'on sache à Berlin et à Vienne que notre plein concours est acquis aux efforts que poursuit le Gouvernement britannique en vue de chercher une solution au conflit austro-serbe. L'action des quatre puissances moins intéressées ne peut, pour les raisons exposées ci-dessus, s'exercer uniquement à Vienne et à Pétersbourg. En proposant de l'exercer aussi à Belgrade, ce qui veut dire surtout, en fait, entre Vienne et Belgrade, sir Edward Grey rentre dans la logique de la situation; et, en n'excluant pas Pétersbourg, il offre, d'autre part, à l'Allemagne, un moyen de se départir, en toute dignité, de la démarche par laquelle le Gouvernement allemand a fait savoir à Paris et à Londres que l'affaire était envisagée par lui comme purement austro-serbe et dépourvue de caractère général.

Je vous prie de communiquer le présent télégramme à nos représentants auprès des grandes puissances et à notre Ministre à Belgrade.

René VIVIANI.

N° 77.

M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères p. i.

à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, à bord de la *France*.

Paris, 28 juillet 1914.

Malgré les assurances données, tant à Berlin qu'à Paris, par les agents allemands, du désir de leur gouvernement de concourir aux efforts pour le maintien de la paix, aucune action sincère n'est exercée par eux pour retenir l'Autriche; la proposition anglaise, qui consiste dans une action des quatre puissances moins intéressées pour obtenir un arrêt des opérations militaires à Vienne, Belgrade et Pétersbourg, et dans une réunion à Londres des Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne, de France et d'Italie, sous la présidence de Sir E. Grey en vue de chercher une solution aux difficultés austro-serbes, rencontre à Berlin des objections de nature à la faire échouer.

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a fait une démarche pour annoncer que son gouvernement prendrait demain des mesures énergiques pour contraindre la Serbie à lui donner les satisfactions et les garanties qu'il exige de cette puissance; le Comte Szecseny s'est pas expliqué sur ces mesures; la mobilisation, à partir du 28 juillet, paraît certaine d'après notre attaché militaire à Vienne.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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N° 78.

M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères p. i.

à Londres, Berlin, Pétersbourg, Vienne, Rome.

Paris, le 28 juillet 1914.

J'ai eu de nouveau la visite de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne ce matin; il m'a dit qu'il n'avait pas de communication, pas de proposition officielle à me faire, mais qu'il venait, comme la veille, causer de la situation et des moyens à employer pour éviter des actes irréparables. Interrogé sur les intentions de l'Autriche, il a déclaré ne pas les connaître, et ignorer la nature des moyens de coercition qu'elle prépare.

L'Allemagne, selon le Baron de Schoen, ne demande qu'à agir avec la France pour le maintien de la paix. Sur l'observation qui lui était faite qu'un projet de médiation des quatre puissances, auquel nous avons adhéré, et qui a obtenu l'assentiment de principe de l'Italie et de l'Allemagne, a été mis en avant par l'Angleterre, l'ambassadeur a dit que le Gouvernement allemand ne demandait en effet qu'à s'associer à l'action des

puissances, pourvu que cette action n'affecte pas la forme d'un arbitrage ou d'une conférence, repoussés par l'Autriche.

J'ai répondu que si le mot seul arrête le Gouvernement autrichien, le but peut être atteint par d'autres moyens; le Gouvernement allemand est bien placé pour demander à l'Autriche de laisser aux puissances le temps d'intervenir, de trouver une conciliation.

M. de Schoen m'a fait alors observer qu'il n'a pas d'instructions et sait seulement que l'Allemagne se refuse à exercer une pression sur l'Autriche, qui ne veut pas de conférence. Il reproche aux journaux français de prêter à l'Allemagne une attitude qu'elle n'a pas, en prétendant qu'elle pousse l'Autriche : sans doute elle approuve son attitude, mais elle n'a pas connu sa note; elle ne saurait l'arrêter trop brusquement, car l'Autriche a besoin de garanties contre les procédés serbes.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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N° 79.

M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

à M. DUMAINE, Ambassadeur de France à Vienne,

Paris, le 28 juillet 1914.

Vous connaissez, par les télégrammes de nos Ambassades, que je vous ai transmis, la proposition anglaise de médiation à quatre et de conférence à Londres, ainsi que notre adhésion à cette suggestion, l'acceptation conditionnelle de l'Italie et les réserves de Berlin.

Je vous prie de vous tenir en contact à ce sujet avec votre Collègue d'Angleterre, qui a reçu les instructions nécessaires pour saisir le Gouvernement austro-hongrois de la suggestion anglaise, dès que ses trois Collègues auront été autorisés à faire la même démarche; vous vous conformerez à son attitude.

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N° 80.

M. Paul CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Londres,

à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Londres, le 28 juillet 1914.

Sir Ed. Grey a reçu hier mes Collègues d'Autriche Hongrie et d'Allemagne. Le premier a continué à soutenir que la réponse serbe était inacceptable. Le second a tenu

un langage analogue à celui de M. de Schoen à Paris. Il a insisté sur l'utilité d'une action modératrice de l'Angleterre à Pétersbourg. Sir Ed. Grey lui a répondu que la Russie s'était montrée très modérée depuis l'ouverture de la crise, notamment dans ses conseils au Gouvernement serbe, et qu'il serait très embarrassé de lui faire des recommandations pacifiques. Il a ajouté que c'était à Vienne qu'il convenait d'agir et que le concours de l'Allemagne était indispensable.

D'autre part l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Pétersbourg a télégraphié que M. Sazonoff avait proposé à l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche une conversation sur l'affaire serbe. Cette information a été confirmée par l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Vienne qui a fait savoir qu'un premier entretien entre le Ministre russe des Affaires étrangères et le Comte Szapary avait produit un bon effet au Ballplatz.

Sir Ed. Grey et Sir A. Nicolson m'ont dit que, si un accord pouvait s'établir directement entre Pétersbourg et Vienne, il faudrait s'en féliciter, mais ils ont élevé quelques doutes sur le succès de l'initiative de M. Sazonoff.

Interrogé par Sir G. Buchanan sur la convocation éventuelle à Londres d'une Conférence des Représentants de l'Angleterre, de la France, de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie pour chercher une issue à la situation actuelle, M. Sazonoff a répondu : « qu'il avait entamé des pourparlers avec l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche dans des conditions qu'il espérait favorables; que cependant il n'avait pas encore reçu de réponse à sa proposition d'une révision de la Note serbe par les deux Cabinets. » Si des explications directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne sont irréalisables, M. Sazonoff se déclare prêt à accepter la proposition anglaise ou toute autre de nature à résoudre favorablement le conflit.

Il serait, en tous cas, très désirable que cette négociation directe, à un moment où le moindre retard peut avoir de si sérieuses conséquences, fût menée de manière à ne pas entraver l'action de Sir Ed. Grey et à ne pas fournir à l'Autriche un prétexte pour se dérober à l'intervention amicale des quatre puissances.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Berlin ayant insisté auprès de M. de Jagow pour obtenir une adhésion à la suggestion de Sir Ed. Grey, le Ministre allemand des Affaires étrangères a répondu qu'il convenait d'attendre le résultat de la conversation engagée entre Pétersbourg et Vienne. Sir Ed. Grey a, en conséquence, prescrit à Sir Ed. Goschen de suspendre pour le moment ses démarches. Au surplus l'annonce que l'Autriche vient de notifier officiellement sa déclaration de guerre à la Serbie fait entrer la question dans une nouvelle phase.

Paul CAMBON.

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## N° 81.

M. Jules CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Berlin.

à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Berlin, le 28 juillet 1914.

La conversation que M. Sazonoff a eue avec le Comte Szapary a été portée à la connaissance de M. de Jagow par le Chargé d'Affaires de Russie. Le Secrétaire d'État



lui a dit que, conformément aux remarques de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne en Russie, puisque après l'expiration de l'ultimatum de l'Autriche le Gouvernement de Vienne ne se refusait pas à causer avec le Gouvernement de Pétersbourg, il y avait lieu d'espérer que de son côté le Comte Berchtold pourrait causer avec M. Schebeko et qu'une issue pourrait être trouvée aux difficultés actuelles. Le Chargé d'affaires russe voit avec faveur cette disposition des esprits, qui correspond aux désirs de M. de Jagow de voir Vienne et Pétersbourg s'entendre directement et dégager l'Allemagne. Il y a lieu de se demander seulement si l'Autriche ne cherche pas à gagner du temps pour se préparer.

J'ai aujourd'hui appuyé la démarche de mon Collègue d'Angleterre auprès du Secrétaire d'Etat. Celui-ci m'a répondu comme à Sir Ed. Goschen, qu'il lui était impossible d'accepter l'idée d'une sorte de conférence à Londres entre les Ambassadeurs des quatre Puissances, et qu'il faudrait donner à la suggestion anglaise une autre forme, pour qu'elle pût être réalisée. Je lui ai fait valoir le danger d'un retard, qui pouvait amener la guerre, et lui ai demandé s'il la souhaitait. Il a protesté et a ajouté que les conversations directes entre Vienne et Pétersbourg étaient entamées, et que, dès maintenant, il en attendait une suite favorable.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre et l'Ambassadeur d'Italie sont venus me voir ce matin ensemble, pour m'entretenir des conversations qu'ils avaient eues avec M. de Jagow hier au sujet de la proposition de Sir Ed. Grey. Le Secrétaire d'Etat leur a, somme toute, tenu le même langage qu'à moi : acceptant en principe de s'unir dans une démarche commune à l'Angleterre, à l'Italie et à nous-mêmes, mais repoussant toute idée de conférence.

Nous avons pensé, mes collègues et moi, qu'il n'y avait là qu'une question de forme et l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre va suggérer à son Gouvernement de libeller autrement sa proposition, qui pourrait prendre le caractère d'une démarche diplomatique à Vienne et à Pétersbourg.

En raison de la répugnance manifestée par M. de Jagow contre toute démarche à Vienne, Sir Ed. Grey pourrait le mettre au pied du mur, en lui demandant de formuler lui-même comment pourrait se produire l'action diplomatique des puissances pour éviter la guerre.

Nous devons nous associer à tous les efforts en faveur de la paix compatibles avec nos engagements vis-à-vis de notre alliée; mais, pour laisser les responsabilités où elles sont, il importe d'avoir soin de demander à l'Allemagne de préciser ce qu'elle veut.

Jules CAMBON.

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N° 82.

**M. PALÉOLOGUE, Ambassadeur de France à Pétersbourg,  
à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.**

Pétersbourg, le 28 juillet 1914.

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois n'a pas encore répondu à la proposition du Gouvernement russe, tendant à l'ouverture d'une conversation directe entre Pétersbourg et Vienne.

M. Sazonoff a reçu cet après-midi les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne et d'Autriche-Hongrie; l'impression qu'il a gardée de son double entretien est mauvaise : « Décidément, m'a-t-il dit, l'Autriche ne veut pas causer ».

A la suite d'une conversation que je viens d'avoir avec mes deux collègues, j'éprouve la même impression de pessimisme.

PALÉOLOGUE.

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N° 83.

**M. DUMAINE, Ambassadeur de France à Vienne,  
à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.**

Vienne, le 28 juillet 1914.

Le Comte Berchtold vient de déclarer à Sir M. de Bunsen que toute intervention tendant à la reprise de la discussion entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, sur la base de la réponse serbe, serait inutile, et d'ailleurs trop tardive, la guerre ayant été officiellement déclarée à midi.

L'attitude de mon collègue russe n'a jusqu'à présent pas varié : il ne s'agissait pas à son avis de localiser le conflit, mais bien de l'empêcher. La déclaration de guerre rendra bien difficile l'engagement des pourparlers à quatre, ainsi que la continuation des entretiens directs entre M. Sazonoff et le Comte Szapary.

On prétexte ici que la formule qui paraissait pouvoir obtenir l'adhésion de l'Allemagne, « médiation entre l'Autriche et la Russie », a l'inconvénient d'accuser entre ces deux empires un conflit qui n'existe pas, jusqu'à présent.

Parmi les soupçons qu'inspire la soudaine et violente résolution de l'Autriche, le plus inquiétant est que l'Allemagne l'aurait poussée à l'agression contre la Serbie afin de pouvoir elle-même entrer en lutte avec la Russie et la France, dans les circonstances qu'elle suppose devoir lui être le plus favorables, et dans des conditions délibérées.

DUMAINE.

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## **CHAPITRE V**

**DE LA DÉCLARATION DE GUERRE DE L'AUTRICHE À LA SERBIE**

**(28 JUILLET 1914)**

**À L'ULTIMATUM DE L'ALLEMAGNE À LA RUSSIE**

**(31 JUILLET 1914)**



N° 84.

**M. BARRÈRE**, Ambassadeur de France à Rome,

à **M. BIENVENU-MARTIN**, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Rome, le 29 juillet 1914.

La Consulta estime que, malgré la déclaration de guerre de l'Autriche à la Serbie, il n'y a pas lieu d'interrompre les efforts diplomatiques tendant à la réunion d'une Conférence à Londres en vue d'une médiation.

**BARRÈRE.**

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N° 85.

**M. BIENVENU-MARTIN**, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.,

à Saint-Petersbourg, Londres, Berlin, Rome, Vienne, Constantinople, Belgrade.

Paris, le 29 juillet 1914.

L'attitude austro-allemande se précise. L'Autriche, inquiète de la propagande slave, a saisi l'occasion de l'attentat de Serajevo pour châtier les menées serbes, et prendre de ce côté, des garanties qui peuvent, selon que l'on laissera ou non se développer les événements, ne porter que sur le Gouvernement et l'armée serbes, ou devenir territoriales. L'Allemagne s'interpose entre son alliée et les autres puissances, en déclarant qu'il s'agit d'une question locale, châtiment d'un crime politique dans le passé, garanties certaines pour l'avenir que les menées anti-autrichiennes prendront fin. Le Gouvernement allemand estime que la Russie doit se contenter des assurances officielles et formelles données par l'Autriche qu'elle ne poursuit pas d'agrandissement territorial et respectera l'intégrité de la Serbie; dans ces conditions, c'est de la Russie seule, si elle voulait intervenir dans une question bien délimitée, que peut venir un danger de guerre. Dans ces conditions c'est à Pétersbourg seulement qu'il faut agir pour le maintien de la paix.

Ce sophisme, qui dispenserait l'Allemagne d'intervenir à Vienne, a été soutenu sans succès à Paris par M. de Schöen, qui a vainement tenté de nous entraîner dans une action solidaire franco-allemande à Pétersbourg; il a été également développé à Londres auprès de Sir E. Grey : en France comme en Angleterre, on a répondu que le cabinet de Pétersbourg a donné, depuis le début, les plus grandes preuves de sa modération, en particulier en s'associant aux puissances pour donner à la

Serbie le conseil de céder aux exigences de la note autrichienne. La Russie ne menace donc nullement la paix; c'est à Vienne qu'il faut agir, c'est de là que vient le danger, du moment qu'on y refuse de se contenter de la soumission presque totale de la Serbie à des exigences exorbitantes et qu'on ne veut pas accepter la collaboration des puissances pour la discussion des points restant à régler entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, et enfin qu'on n'hésite pas devant une déclaration de guerre aussi précipitée que la note primitive de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

L'attitude à Berlin, comme à Vienne, reste dilatoire. Dans la première capitale, tout en protestant du désir allemand de sauvegarder la paix générale par une action commune des quatre puissances, on repousse l'idée d'une Conférence, sans suggérer aucun autre moyen et en refusant d'agir positivement à Vienne. Dans la capitale autrichienne, on voudrait amuser Pétersbourg par l'illusion d'une entente pouvant résulter de conversations directes, et l'on agit contre la Serbie.

Dans ces conditions, il paraît essentiel que le cabinet de Pétersbourg, dont le désir de dénouer pacifiquement la crise est manifeste, adhère immédiatement à la proposition anglaise. Celle-ci a besoin d'être très appuyée à Berlin pour décider M. de Jagow à une action réelle sur Vienne, susceptible d'arrêter l'Autriche et d'empêcher que son avantage diplomatique se double d'un succès militaire. Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois ne manquerait pas en effet d'en profiter pour imposer à la Serbie, sous le nom élastique de garanties, des conditions qui modifieraient en fait, malgré toutes les assurances de désintéressement territorial, le statut de l'Europe orientale, et risqueraient de compromettre gravement, soit dès maintenant, soit dans un avenir prochain, la paix générale.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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N° 86.

M. PALÉOLOGUE, Ambassadeur de France à Saint-Pétersbourg ,

à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 29 juillet 1914.

Dès maintenant, je suis en mesure d'assurer à Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement russe acquiesce à toutes les procédures que la France et l'Angleterre lui proposeront pour sauvegarder la paix. Mon collègue d'Angleterre télégraphie dans le même sens à Londres.

PALÉOLOGUE.

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N° 87.

**M. KLOBUKOWSKI, Ministre de France à Bruxelles,**

**à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.**

Bruxelles, le 29 juillet 1914.

De mon entretien avec M. Davignon et diverses personnes en mesure d'être exactement informées, je rapporte l'impression suivante : l'attitude de l'Allemagne est énigmatique et autorise toutes les appréhensions. Il paraît invraisemblable que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois ait pris une initiative le conduisant, suivant un plan préconçu, à une déclaration de guerre sans accord préalable avec l'empereur Guillaume.

Le Gouvernement allemand reste l'arme au pied, réservant, selon les circonstances, son action pacifique ou guerrière, mais l'inquiétude est telle dans tous les milieux qu'une intervention brusque contre nous ne surprendrait ici personne. Mes Collègues de Russie et d'Angleterre partagent ce sentiment.

Le Gouvernement belge prend des dispositions conformes à la déclaration que m'a faite hier soir M. Davignon que tout sera mis en œuvre pour la défense de la neutralité du pays.

KLOBUKOWSKI,

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N° 88.

**M. RONSSIN, Consul général de France à Francfort,**

**à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.**

Francfort, le 29 juillet 1914.

Je vous signale d'importants mouvements de troupes hier et cette nuit. Ce matin, plusieurs régiments sont arrivés en tenue de campagne, notamment par les routes de Darmstadt, Cassel et Mayence, qui sont remplis de militaires. Les ponts et chemins de fer sont gardés sous prétexte de préparer les manœuvres d'automne.

RONSSIN.

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N° 89.

M. ALLIZÉ, Ministre de France à Munich,

à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Munich, le 29 juillet 1914.

On m'assure que les moulins d'Illkirch (Alsace-Lorraine) ont été invités à cesser de livrer à leur clientèle ordinaire et à réserver toute leur production pour l'armée.

De Strasbourg sont signalés des transports de canons automobiles employés pour le tir sur aéroplanes et dirigeables.

Sous prétexte de modification dans les exercices d'automne, les sous-officiers et soldats des régiments d'infanterie bavaroise de Metz, qui étaient en permission en Bavière à l'occasion des récoltes, ont reçu l'ordre hier de rentrer immédiatement.

ALLIZÉ.

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N° 90.

M. DUMAINE, ambassadeur de France à Vienne,

à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Vienne, le 29 juillet 1914.

Le Consul de France à Prague me confirme la mobilisation du 8<sup>e</sup> corps d'armée déjà annoncée, et celle de la division de landwehr de ce corps d'armée. Les divisions de cavalerie de Galicie mobilisent également; des régiments, des divisions de cavalerie de Vienne et de Buda-Pest ont déjà été transportés à la frontière russe. Des convocations de réservistes ont actuellement lieu dans cette région.

En vue de faire face à toute menace, et peut-être pour en imposer à Pétersbourg, le bruit court que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois aurait l'intention de décider le 30 juillet ou le 1<sup>er</sup> août, la mobilisation générale des armées. Enfin le retour de l'Empereur d'Ischl à Vienne est assuré pour demain.

DUMAINE.

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N° 91.

**M. PALÉOLOGUE, Ambassadeur de France à Saint-Petersbourg.**

**à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.**

**Saint-Petersbourg, le 29 juillet 1914.**

La conversation directe à laquelle le Gouvernement russe avait amicalement convié le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est refusée par celui-ci.

D'autre part, l'État-Major russe a constaté que l'Autriche précipite ses préparatifs militaires contre la Russie et active sa mobilisation, qui a commencé sur la frontière de Galicie. En conséquence, l'ordre de mobilisation sera expédié, cette nuit, aux treize corps d'armée destinés à opérer éventuellement contre l'Autriche.

Malgré l'échec de sa proposition, M. Sazonoff accepte l'idée d'une conférence des quatre Puissances à Londres; il n'attache d'ailleurs aucune importance au titre officiel de cette délibération et se prêterait à toutes les tentatives anglaises en faveur de la paix.

**PALÉOLOGUE.**

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N° 92.

**M. Jules CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Berlin,**

**à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.**

**Berlin, le 29 juillet 1914.**

J'ai demandé aujourd'hui au Secrétaire d'État où en était la question des conversations directes entre Vienne et Pétersbourg, qui lui semblait hier la meilleure procédure pour arriver à une détente. Il m'a répondu qu'à Pétersbourg les dispositions sur ce point étaient bonnes et qu'il avait demandé à Vienne d'entrer dans cette voie. Il attendait la réponse. Le Gouvernement britannique, après avoir vu repousser la suggestion d'une conférence, avait fait connaître qu'il verrait avec faveur ces conversations s'ouvrir entre l'Autriche et la Russie et avait demandé que l'Allemagne y poussât l'Autriche, ce que le Gouvernement impérial ne manque pas de faire.

J'ai demandé à M. de Jagow s'il avait enfin la réponse de la Serbie à l'Autriche, et ce qu'il en pensait. Il m'a répondu qu'il y voyait une base de négociation possible. J'ai repris que c'est justement pour cela que je trouvais inexplicable la rupture de l'Autriche après la réception d'un document pareil.

Le Secrétaire d'État a alors fait remarquer qu'avec les peuples d'Orient on n'avait jamais assez de sûretés et que l'Autriche voulait contrôler l'exécution des promesses

qui lui étaient faites, contrôle que la Serbie refusait. C'est là aux yeux du Secrétaire d'État, le point capital. J'ai répliqué à M. de Jagow que, voulant rester indépendante, la Serbie devait repousser le contrôle d'une seule Puissance, mais qu'une Commission internationale ne présenterait pas le même caractère. Les États Balkaniques en comptent plus d'une, à commencer par la Commission financière à Athènes. On pourrait par exemple, ai-je dit, imaginer, entre autres combinaisons, une Commission internationale provisoire chargée de contrôler l'enquête de police demandée par l'Autriche; il était clair par cet exemple que la réponse de la Serbie ouvrait la porte à des conversations et ne justifiait pas une rupture.

J'ai ensuite demandé au Secrétaire d'État si, en dehors des conversations directes entre Vienne et Pétersbourg, auxquelles Sir Ed. Grey s'était rallié, il ne pensait pas que l'action commune des quatre Puissances pourrait s'exercer par l'intermédiaire de leurs Ambassadeurs. Il m'a répondu affirmativement ajoutant qu'actuellement le Cabinet de Londres se contentait d'appuyer dans le sens des conversations directes.

A la fin de l'après-midi, le Chancelier de l'Empire a prié l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre de venir le voir. Il lui a parlé de la proposition de Sir E. Grey tendant à la réunion d'une Conférence; il lui a dit qu'il n'avait pas pu accepter une proposition qui semblait imposer l'autorité des Puissances à l'Autriche; il a assuré mon Collègue de son sincère désir de la paix et des efforts qu'il faisait à Vienne, mais il a ajouté que la Russie était seule la maîtresse de maintenir la paix ou de déclencher la guerre.

Sir Ed. Goschen lui a répondu qu'il ne partageait pas son sentiment et que si la guerre éclatait, l'Autriche aurait la plus grosse part de responsabilité, car il était inadmissible qu'elle eût rompu avec la Serbie après la réponse de celle-ci.

Sans discuter sur ce point, le Chancelier a dit qu'il poussait autant qu'il le pouvait aux conversations directes entre l'Autriche et la Russie; il savait que l'Angleterre voyait cette conversation d'un œil favorable. Il a ajouté que sa propre action serait bien difficile à Vienne, s'il était vrai que la Russie eût mobilisé sur la frontière autrichienne quatorze corps d'armée. Il a prié mon collègue d'appeler sur toutes ces observations l'attention de Sir Ed. Grey.

Sir E. Goschen a télégraphié dans ce sens à Londres.

L'attitude du Chancelier est très probablement la conséquence du dernier entretien de Sir Ed. Grey avec le prince Lichnowski. Jusqu'à ces tout derniers jours, on s'est flatté ici que l'Angleterre resterait hors du débat, et l'impression produite par son attitude est profonde sur le Gouvernement allemand et sur les financiers et hommes d'affaires.

Jules CAMBON.

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N° 93.

**M. DUMAINE, Ambassadeur de France à Vienne,**

**à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.**

Vienne, le 29 juillet 1914.

L'opinion de mes collègues anglais, russe et italien concorde avec la mienne concernant l'impossibilité d'empêcher une première lutte entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, toutes les tentatives pour retarder le choc ayant échoué.

M. Schebeko avait demandé que les pourparlers engagés à Pétersbourg entre MM. Sazonoff et Szapary fussent poursuivis et rendus plus efficaces par des pouvoirs spécialement conférés à celui-ci, le comte Berchtold s'y est nettement opposé. Il marquait ainsi que l'Autriche-Hongrie ne tolère aucune intervention qui l'empêcherait d'infliger à la Serbie un châtiment et une humiliation.

Le duc d'Avarna admet comme très vraisemblable que l'imminence d'une insurrection générale de ses sujets Sud-Slaves ait précipité les résolutions de la Monarchie. Il s'attache encore à l'espoir qu'après un premier succès des armées austro-hongroises, mais pas plus tôt, une médiation pourrait limiter le conflit.

DUMAINE.

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N° 94.

**M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, p. i.,**

**à Londres, Berlin, Saint-Pétersbourg, Rome, Vienne, Constantinople, Belgrade.**

Paris, le 29 juillet 1914.

Ce matin, la communication suivante m'a été faite par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à titre officieux : le Gouvernement allemand poursuit ses efforts en vue d'amener le Gouvernement autrichien à une conversation amicale qui permettra à ce dernier de faire connaître exactement le but et l'extension des opérations en Serbie. Le Cabinet de Berlin espère recevoir des précisions qui seraient de nature à donner satisfaction à la Russie. Les efforts allemands ne sont aucunement entravés par la déclaration de guerre intervenue. Une communication semblable sera faite à Pétersbourg.

Au cours d'une conversation que j'ai eue ce matin avec le baron de Schoen, celui-ci m'a déclaré que le Gouvernement allemand ignorait les intentions de Vienne. Quand Berlin saura jusqu'où l'Autriche veut aller, on aura une base de discussion, qui rendra plus faciles les conversations en vue d'une intervention.

Sur mon observation que les opérations militaires engagées ne laisseraient peut-être pas le temps de causer, et que le Gouvernement allemand devrait user de son influence à Vienne en vue de les retarder, l'ambassadeur m'a répondu que Berlin ne pouvait exercer de pression, mais qu'il espérait que les opérations ne seraient pas poussées très activement.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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N° 95.

M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.,  
à Londres, Berlin, Saint-Petersbourg, Vienne, Constantinople, Rome,  
Belgrade.

Paris, le 29 juillet 1914.

D'ordre de son Gouvernement, M. Iswolsky est venu me communiquer un télégramme adressé par M. Sazonoff à Berlin. Il résulte de cette information que la Russie, à la suite de la déclaration de guerre de l'Autriche-Hongrie à la Serbie, des mesures de mobilisation déjà appliquées à la plus grande partie de l'armée austro-hongroise, enfin du refus du comte Berchtold de continuer les pourparlers entre Vienne et Saint-Petersbourg, avait décidé la mobilisation dans les arrondissements d'Odessa, Kiew, Moscou et Kazan. En portant ce fait à la connaissance du Gouvernement allemand, l'Ambassadeur de Russie à Berlin a été chargé d'ajouter que ces précautions militaires n'étaient à aucun degré dirigées contre l'Allemagne, et ne préjugeaient pas non plus des mesures agressives contre l'Autriche-Hongrie; l'Ambassadeur de Russie à Vienne n'était, d'ailleurs, pas rappelé de son poste.

L'Ambassadeur de Russie m'a donné également le sens de deux télégrammes adressés à Londres par M. Sazonoff : le premier, indiquant que la déclaration de guerre à la Serbie mettait fin aux conversations du Ministre russe avec l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche, demandait à l'Angleterre d'exercer aussi rapidement que possible son action dans le sens de la médiation et de l'arrêt immédiat des opérations de guerre de l'Autriche (dont la continuation donnait le temps à l'Autriche d'écraser la Serbie pendant que la médiation traînerait); le second communiquait l'impression gardée par M. Sazonoff de ses conversations avec l'Ambassadeur allemand, que l'Allemagne favorise l'intransigeance de l'Autriche et n'exerce pas d'action sur elle. Le Ministre russe considère l'attitude de l'Allemagne comme très inquiétante et croit que l'Angleterre est en meilleure posture que les autres Puissances pour entreprendre des démarches à Berlin, en vue d'une action sur Vienne.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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N° 96.

M. BARRÈRE, Ambassadeur de France à Rome,

à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Rome, le 29 juillet 1914.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères a été informé officiellement par l'Ambassadeur de Russie que son Gouvernement, à la suite de la déclaration de guerre de l'Autriche à la Serbie et des mesures de mobilisation prises d'ores et déjà par l'Autriche, avait donné l'ordre de mobiliser dans les districts de Kiew, Odessa, Moscou et Kazan. Il a ajouté que cette mesure n'avait pas un caractère agressif contre l'Allemagne et que l'Ambassadeur de Russie à Vienne n'avait pas été rappelé.

En commentant cette communication, le Marquis de San Giuliano m'a dit que malheureusement dans toute cette affaire la conviction de l'Autriche et celle de l'Allemagne avaient été et étaient encore que la Russie ne marcherait pas. Il m'a lu à ce propos une dépêche de M. Bollati lui rendant compte d'un entretien qu'il avait eu aujourd'hui avec M. de Jagow, et où ce dernier lui avait encore répété qu'il ne croyait pas que la Russie marcherait. Il fondait cette croyance sur le fait que le Gouvernement russe venait d'envoyer à Berlin un agent pour traiter de certaines questions financières. L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche à Berlin a dit également à son Collègue anglais qu'il ne croyait pas à une guerre générale, la Russie n'étant ni en humeur ni en état de faire la guerre.

Le Marquis de San Giuliano ne partage pas du tout cette opinion. Il estime que si l'Autriche se contente d'humilier la Serbie, et d'exiger, en outre de l'acceptation de la note, certains avantages matériels qui ne touchent pas à son territoire, la Russie peut encore trouver matière à composition avec elle. Mais si l'Autriche veut soit démembrer la Serbie, soit la détruire comme État indépendant, il considère comme impossible à la Russie de ne pas intervenir militairement.

Malgré l'extrême gravité de la situation, le Ministre des Affaires étrangères ne me paraît pas désespérer de la possibilité d'un arrangement. Il croit que l'Angleterre peut encore exercer beaucoup d'influence à Berlin dans un sens pacifique. Il a eu hier soir, m'a-t-il dit, une longue conversation avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, Sir R. Rodd, pour lui démontrer combien l'intervention anglaise pourrait être efficace. Il m'a dit en terminant : « Si tel est aussi l'avis de votre Gouvernement, il pourrait, de son côté, insister dans ce sens à Londres. »

BARRÈRE.

N° 97.

**M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères,**  
**à M. Paul CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France, à Londres.**

Paris, le 29 juillet 1914.

Je vous serais obligé de prier Sir Ed. Grey de bien vouloir reprendre le plus tôt possible à Berlin, sous la forme qu'il jugera la plus opportune et la plus efficace, sa proposition de médiation des quatre Puissances, qui avait obtenu l'adhésion de principe du Gouvernement allemand.

Le Gouvernement russe a dû, de son côté, faire exprimer directement le même désir au Gouvernement anglais; la déclaration de guerre de l'Autriche à la Serbie, ses envois de troupes sur la frontière austro-russe, la mobilisation russe consécutive sur la frontière de Galicie, ont en effet mis fin aux conversations directes austro-russes.

Les précisions que le Gouvernement allemand va demander à Vienne, conformément à la déclaration du baron de Schoen que je vous ai fait connaître, pour s'informer des intentions du Gouvernement autrichien, permettront aux quatre Puissances d'exercer une action utile entre Vienne et Pétersbourg pour le maintien de la paix.

Je vous prie de signaler également au Secrétaire d'État anglais combien il serait important qu'il obtint du Gouvernement italien le maintien de son concours le plus entier pour sa collaboration à l'action des quatre Puissances en faveur de la paix.

René VIVIANI.

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N° 98.

**M. Paul CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France, à Londres,**  
**à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.**

Londres, le 29 juillet 1914.

Dans son entretien d'aujourd'hui avec mon collègue d'Allemagne, Sir Ed. Grey a fait observer que l'ouverture de M. Sazonoff pour une conversation directe entre la Russie et l'Autriche n'ayant pas été accueillie à Vienne, il conviendrait d'en revenir à sa proposition d'intervention amicale des quatre Puissances non directement intéressées. Cette suggestion a été acceptée en principe par le Gouvernement Allemand, mais il a fait des objections à l'idée d'une conférence ou d'une médiation. Le Secrétaire d'État des Affaires étrangères a invité le Prince Lichnowski à prier son Gouvernement de

proposer lui-même une formule. Quelle qu'elle soit, si elle permet de maintenir la paix, elle sera agréée par l'Angleterre, la France et l'Italie.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a dû transmettre immédiatement à Berlin la demande de Sir Ed. Grey. En me rendant compte de cette conversation, le Secrétaire d'État des Affaires étrangères a ajouté que la réponse de l'Allemagne à cette communication, ainsi qu'à celle de la Russie relative à la mobilisation de quatre corps d'armée sur la frontière autrichienne, nous permettra de nous rendre compte des intentions du Gouvernement allemand. Mon collègue d'Allemagne ayant interrogé Sir Ed. Grey sur les intentions du Gouvernement britannique, le Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères a répondu qu'il n'avait pas à se prononcer quant à présent.

Sir Ed. Grey ne m'a pas caché qu'il trouvait la situation très grave et qu'il gardait peu d'espoir dans une solution pacifique.

Paul CAMBON.

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N° 99.

M. BOPPE, Ministre de France à Belgrade,

à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Belgrade, le 29 juillet 1914.

Le Prince héritier avait, dès la remise de l'ultimatum austro-hongrois, télégraphié au Tzar pour demander sa protection. Mon collègue de Russie me confie qu'il vient de communiquer à M. Pachitch la réponse de Sa Majesté.

Le Tzar remercie le Prince de s'être adressé à lui dans une circonstance aussi critique; il déclare que toutes les dispositions sont prises pour arriver à une solution pacifique du conflit, et donne au Prince l'assurance formelle que, si ce but ne peut être atteint, la Russie ne se désintéressera jamais du sort de la Serbie.

BOPPE.

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N° 100.

M. PALÉOLOGUE, Ambassadeur de France à Saint-Petersbourg,

à M. BIENVENU-MARTIN, Ministre des Affaires étrangères p. i.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 29 juillet 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne est venu déclarer à M. Sazonoff que si la Russie n'arrête pas ses préparatifs militaires, l'armée allemande recevra l'ordre de mobiliser.

M. Sazonoff a répondu que les préparatifs russes sont motivés : d'un côté, par l'intransigeance obstinée de l'Autriche ; d'autre part, par le fait que huit corps austro-hongrois sont déjà mobilisés.

Le ton sur lequel le comte de Pourtalès s'est acquitté de la notification a décidé le Gouvernement russe, cette nuit même, à ordonner la mobilisation des treize corps destinés à opérer contre l'Autriche.

PALÉOLOGUE.

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N° 101.

M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères,  
aux Ambassadeurs de France à Saint-Petersbourg et Londres.

Paris, le 30 juillet 1914

M. Iswolski est venu cette nuit me dire que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a notifié à M. Sazonoff la décision de son Gouvernement de mobiliser ses forces armées, si la Russie ne cesse pas ses préparatifs militaires.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Tsar fait remarquer que ces préparatifs n'ont été commencés qu'à la suite de la mobilisation par l'Autriche de huit corps d'armée et du refus de cette puissance de régler pacifiquement son différend avec la Serbie. M. Sazonoff déclare que, dans ces conditions, la Russie ne peut que hâter ses armements et envisager l'imminence de la guerre, qu'elle compte sur le secours d'alliée de la France et qu'elle considère comme désirable que l'Angleterre se joigne sans perdre de temps à la Russie et à la France.

La France est résolue à remplir toutes les obligations de l'alliance.

Elle ne négligera, d'ailleurs, aucun effort en vue de la solution du conflit dans l'intérêt de la paix générale. La conversation engagée entre les Puissances moins directement intéressées permet d'espérer encore que la paix puisse être préservée ; j'estime donc qu'il serait opportun que, dans les mesures de précaution et de défense auxquelles la Russie croit devoir procéder, elle ne prit immédiatement aucune disposition qui offrit à l'Allemagne un prétexte pour une mobilisation totale ou partielle de ses forces.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne est venu à la fin de l'après-midi d'hier me parler des mesures militaires que prenait le Gouvernement de la République en ajoutant que la France était libre d'agir ainsi, mais qu'en Allemagne les préparatifs ne pouvaient être secrets et qu'il ne faudrait pas que l'opinion française s'alarmât si l'Allemagne s'y décidait.

J'ai répondu que le Gouvernement français n'avait pris aucune mesure dont ses



voisins pussent être inquiets et que sa volonté de se prêter à toute négociation pour le maintien de la paix ne pouvait être mise en doute.

René VIVIANI.

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N° 102.

M. PALÉOLOGUE, Ambassadeur de France à Saint-Petersbourg,  
à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 30 juillet 1914.

M. Sazonoff, à qui j'ai fait connaître votre désir de voir éviter toute mesure militaire qui pourrait offrir à l'Allemagne un prétexte à la mobilisation générale, m'a répondu que justement, dans le cours de la nuit dernière, l'État-Major avait fait surseoir à des mesures de précaution militaire pour éviter toute équivoque. Hier, le Chef d'État-Major général russe a convoqué l'Attaché militaire de l'Ambassade d'Allemagne, et lui a donné sa parole d'honneur que la mobilisation ordonnée ce matin vise exclusivement l'Autriche.

Toutefois, dans un entretien qu'il a eu cet après-midi avec le comte de Pourtalès, M. Sazonoff a dû se convaincre que l'Allemagne ne veut pas prononcer à Vienne la parole décisive qui sauvegarderait la paix. L'empereur Nicolas garde la même impression d'un échange de télégrammes qu'il vient d'avoir personnellement avec l'empereur Guillaume.

D'autre part, l'État-Major et l'Amirauté russes ont reçu d'inquiétants renseignements sur les préparatifs de l'armée et de la marine allemandes.

En me donnant ces informations, M. Sazonoff a ajouté que le Gouvernement russe ne continue pas moins ses efforts de conciliation. Il m'a répété : « Jusqu'au dernier instant, je négocierai. »

PALÉOLOGUE.

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N° 103.

M. PALÉOLOGUE, Ambassadeur de France à Saint-Petersbourg,  
à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 30 juillet 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne est venu cette nuit insister de nouveau, mais dans des termes moins catégoriques, auprès de M. Sazonoff pour que la Russie cesse

ses préparatifs militaires, en affirmant que l'Autriche ne porterait pas atteinte à l'intégrité territoriale de la Serbie :

« Ce n'est pas seulement l'intégrité territoriale de la Serbie que nous devons sauvegarder, a répondu M. Sazonoff, c'est encore son indépendance et sa souveraineté. Nous ne pouvons pas admettre que la Serbie devienne vassale de l'Autriche. »

M. Sazonoff a ajouté : « L'heure est trop grave pour que je ne vous déclare pas toute ma pensée. En intervenant à Pétersbourg, tandis qu'elle refuse d'intervenir à Vienne, l'Allemagne ne cherche qu'à gagner du temps, afin de permettre à l'Autriche d'écraser le petit royaume serbe avant que la Russie n'ait pu le secourir. Mais l'empereur Nicolas a un tel désir de conjurer la guerre que je vais vous faire en son nom une nouvelle proposition :

« Si l'Autriche, reconnaissant que son conflit avec la Serbie a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, se déclare prête à éliminer de son ultimatum les clauses qui portent atteinte à la souveraineté de la Serbie, la Russie s'engage à cesser toutes mesures militaires. »

Le comte de Pourtalès a promis d'appuyer cette proposition auprès de son Gouvernement.

Dans la pensée de M. Sazonoff, l'acceptation de sa proposition par l'Autriche aurait pour corollaire logique l'ouverture d'une délibération des Puissances à Londres.

Le Gouvernement russe montre, une fois encore, par son attitude, qu'il ne néglige rien pour enrayer le conflit.

PALÉOLOGUE.

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## N° 104.

M. DUMAINE, Ambassadeur de France à Vienne,

à M. René VIVIANI, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Vienne, le 30 juillet 1914.

Malgré la communication faite hier par l'Ambassadeur de Russie à plusieurs de ses collègues, dont celui d'Allemagne, au sujet de la mobilisation partielle dans son pays, la presse de Vienne s'était abstenue d'en publier la nouvelle. Ce silence imposé vient de s'expliquer dans un entretien de haute importance entre M. Schebeko et le comte Berchtold, qui ont longuement envisagé les redoutables difficultés présentes, avec une égale bonne volonté d'y adapter des solutions réciproquement acceptables.

Les préparatifs militaires du côté russe, a expliqué M. Schebeko, n'ont d'autre but que de répondre à ceux de l'Autriche et d'indiquer l'intention et les droits du Tzar d'émettre son avis dans le règlement de la question serbe. Les mesures de mobilisation prises en Galicie, a répondu le comte Berchtold, n'impliquent non plus aucune intention agressive et visent seulement à maintenir la situation sur le même pied. De

part et d'autre on s'appliquera à ce que ces mesures ne soient pas interprétées comme des marques d'hostilité.

Pour le règlement du conflit austro-serbe, il a été convenu que les pourparlers seraient repris à Pétersbourg entre M. Sazonoff et le comte Szapary; s'ils ont été interrompus c'est par suite d'un malentendu, le comte Berchtold croyant que le Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Russie réclamait pour son interlocuteur des pouvoirs qui lui permettraient de modifier les termes de l'ultimatum autrichien. Le comte Szapary sera seulement autorisé à discuter quel accommodement serait compatible avec la dignité et le prestige dont les deux Empires ont un souci égal.

Ce serait donc, pour le moment, sous cette forme directe et réduite aux deux plus intéressées qu'aurait lieu l'examen que Sir Ed. Grey proposait de confier aux quatre Puissances non directement intéressées.

Sir M. de Bunsen, qui se trouvait chez moi, a aussitôt déclaré à M. Schebeko que le Foreign Office approuvera entièrement cette nouvelle procédure. Répétant l'exposé fait par lui au Ballplatz, l'Ambassadeur de Russie a affirmé que son Gouvernement tiendra un compte beaucoup plus large qu'on ne le suppose des exigences de la Monarchie; rien n'a été négligé par M. Schebeko pour convaincre le comte Berchtold de la sincérité du désir de la Russie d'arriver à une entente acceptable pour les deux Empires.

L'entretien s'était maintenu dans un ton amical et permettait de croire que toute chance de localiser le conflit n'était pas perdue, lorsque la nouvelle de la mobilisation allemande est parvenue à Vienne.

DUMAINE.

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## N° 105.

M. Jules CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Berlin,

à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Berlin, le 30 juillet 1914.

M. de Jagow m'a téléphoné à deux heures que la nouvelle de la mobilisation allemande, répandue une heure auparavant, était fausse, et m'a prié de vous en informer d'urgence; le Gouvernement impérial fait saisir les suppléments de journaux qui l'annonçaient. Mais ni cette communication ni ces mesures ne diminuent mes appréhensions au sujet des projets de l'Allemagne.

Il paraît certain que le Conseil extraordinaire tenu hier soir à Potsdam avec les autorités militaires et sous la présidence de l'Empereur avait décidé la mobilisation, ce qui explique la préparation de l'édition spéciale du *Lokal Anzeiger*, mais que sous des influences diverses (déclaration de l'Angleterre qu'elle réserve son entière liberté

d'action, échange de télégrammes entre le Tzar et Guillaume II) les graves mesures arrêtées ont été suspendues.

Un des Ambassadeurs avec lequel je suis le plus lié a vu, à deux heures, M. Zimmermann. D'après le Sous-Secrétaire d'État, les autorités militaires pressent beaucoup pour que la mobilisation soit décrétée, parce que tout retard fait perdre à l'Allemagne quelques-uns de ses avantages. Cependant, jusqu'à présent on aurait réussi à combattre la hâte de l'État-Major qui, dans la mobilisation, voit la guerre. Quoi qu'il en soit, la mobilisation peut être décidée d'un moment à l'autre. Je ne sais qui a lancé dans le *Lokal Anzeiger*, journal généralement officieux, une nouvelle prématurée de nature à soulever les esprits en France.

J'ai les plus fortes raisons de penser, d'ailleurs, que toutes les mesures de mobilisation qui peuvent être réalisées avant la publication de l'ordre général de mobilisation sont prises ici, où l'on voudrait nous faire publier notre mobilisation les premiers pour nous en attribuer la responsabilité.

Jules CAMBON.

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N° 106.

M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères,  
à M. Paul CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Londres.

Paris, le 30 juillet 1914.

Je vous prie de porter à la connaissance de Sir Edward Grey les renseignements suivants touchant les préparatifs militaires français et allemands. L'Angleterre y verra que si la France est résolue, ce n'est pas elle qui prend des mesures d'agression.

Vous attirerez l'attention de Sir Edward Grey sur la décision prise par le Conseil des Ministres de ce matin : bien que l'Allemagne ait pris ses dispositifs de couverture à quelques centaines de mètres de la frontière, sur tout le front du Luxembourg aux Vosges, et porté ses troupes de couverture sur leurs positions de combat, nous avons retenu nos troupes à 10 kilomètres de la frontière, en leur interdisant de s'en rapprocher davantage.

Notre plan, conçu dans un esprit d'offensive, prévoyait pourtant que les positions de combat de nos troupes de couverture seraient aussi rapprochées que possible de la frontière. En livrant ainsi une bande du territoire sans défense à l'agression soudaine de l'ennemi, le Gouvernement de la République tient à montrer que la France, pas plus que la Russie, n'a la responsabilité de l'attaque.

Pour s'en assurer, il suffit de comparer les mesures prises des deux côtés de notre frontière : en France, les permissionnaires n'ont été rappelés qu'après que nous avons acquis la certitude que l'Allemagne l'avait fait depuis cinq jours.

En Allemagne, non seulement les troupes en garnison à Metz ont été poussées jusqu'à la frontière, mais encore elles ont été renforcées par des éléments transportés en chemin de fer de garnisons de l'intérieur, telles que celles de Trèves ou de Cologne. Rien d'analogue n'a été fait en France.

L'armement des places de la frontière (déboisements, mise en place de l'armement, construction de batteries, renforcement des réseaux de fil de fer) a été commencé en Allemagne dès le samedi 25; chez nous, il va l'être, la France ne pouvant plus se dispenser de prendre les mêmes mesures.

Les gares ont été occupées militairement en Allemagne le samedi 25, en France le mardi 28.

Enfin, en Allemagne, les réservistes, par dizaine de milliers, ont été rappelés par convocations individuelles, ceux résidant à l'étranger (classes de 1903 à 1911) rappelés, les officiers de réserve convoqués; à l'intérieur, les routes sont barrées, les automobiles ne circulent qu'avec un permis. C'est le dernier stade avant la mobilisation. Aucune de ces mesures n'a été prise en France.

L'armée allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes frontières; par deux fois, hier, des patrouilles allemandes ont pénétré sur notre territoire. Tout le XVI<sup>e</sup> Corps de Metz, renforcé par une partie du VIII<sup>e</sup> venu de Trèves et de Cologne, occupe la frontière de Metz au Luxembourg; le XV<sup>e</sup> Corps d'armée de Strasbourg a serré sur la frontière.

Sous menace d'être fusillés, les Alsaciens-Lorrains des pays annexés ont défiance de passer la frontière.

René VIVIANI.

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N° 107.

M. Jules CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Berlin,

à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Berlin, le 30 juillet 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre n'a pas reçu communication de la réponse de l'Allemagne à la demande de Sir E. Grey. Il m'a dit que Berlin avait consulté Vienne et attendait encore l'avis de son allié.

Mon collègue de Russie vient de me faire connaître, de son côté, que M. de Jagow (auquel le Comte de Pourtalès avait communiqué la formule de conciliation suggérée par M. Sazonoff pour une entente austro-russe) venait de lui déclarer qu'il trouvait cette proposition inacceptable pour l'Autriche, marquant ainsi l'action négative de la diplomatie allemande à Vienne.

Jules CAMBON.

N° 108.

**M. Paul CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Londres,**

**à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.**

**Londres, le 30 juillet 1914.**

Le Prince Lichnowski n'a pas apporté de réponse à la demande que lui avait adressée hier Sir Ed. Grey pour obtenir du Gouvernement allemand une formule d'intervention des quatre puissances dans l'intérêt de la paix. Mais mon collègue d'Allemagne a questionné le Secrétaire d'État des Affaires étrangères sur les préparatifs militaires de l'Angleterre.

Sir Ed. Grey lui a répondu qu'ils n'avaient aucun caractère offensif, mais que, dans l'état actuel des affaires sur le continent, il était naturel de prendre quelques précautions; qu'en Angleterre, comme en France, on désirait le maintien de la paix, et que si, en Angleterre, comme en France, on envisageait des mesures défensives, ce n'était pas dans le but de préparer une agression.

Les renseignements que Votre Excellence m'a adressés au sujet des mesures militaires prises par l'Allemagne sur la frontière française m'ont permis de marquer à Sir Edward Grey qu'il ne s'agit plus seulement aujourd'hui d'un conflit d'influence entre la Russie et l'Autriche-Hongrie; une agression risque d'être commise qui pourrait provoquer une guerre générale.

Sir Edward Grey a parfaitement compris mon sentiment et, comme moi, il estime que le moment serait venu d'envisager toutes les hypothèses et de les discuter en commun.

**Paul CAMBON.**

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N° 109.

**M. JULES CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Berlin,**

**à M. RENÉ VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.**

**Berlin, le 30 juillet 1914.**

Dans l'entrevue que j'ai eue aujourd'hui avec le Secrétaire d'État, j'ai demandé à M. de Jagow quelle réponse il avait faite à Sir Ed. Grey, qui lui avait demandé de donner lui-même la formule de l'intervention des puissances désintéressées.

Il m'a répondu que, « pour gagner du temps », il avait décidé d'agir directement et qu'il avait demandé à l'Autriche de dire sur quel terrain on pourrait causer avec elle. Cette réponse a pour effet, sous prétexte d'aller plus vite, d'éliminer l'Angleterre, la France et l'Italie et de confier à M. de Tchirsky, dont les sentiments pangermanistes et russophobes sont connus, le soin d'amener l'Autriche à une attitude conciliante.

M. de Jagow m'a parlé ensuite de la mobilisation russe sur la frontière autrichienne ; il m'a dit que cette mobilisation compromettait le succès de toute intervention auprès de l'Autriche, et que tout dépendait de là. Il a ajouté qu'il craignait que l'Autriche ne mobilisât complètement à la suite de la mobilisation partielle russe, ce qui pouvait entraîner par contre-coup la mobilisation totale russe, et par suite celle de l'Allemagne.

J'ai fait remarquer au Secrétaire d'État qu'il m'avait dit lui-même que l'Allemagne ne se considérerait comme obligée de mobiliser que si la Russie mobilisait sur les frontières allemandes et que tel n'était pas le cas. Il m'a répondu que c'était vrai, mais que les chefs de l'Armée insistaient, car tout retard est une perte de forces pour l'armée allemande, et « que les paroles que je rappelais ne constituaient pas, de sa part, un engagement ferme ».

L'impression que je rapporte de cet entretien est que les chances de paix ont encore déchu.

Jules CAMBON.

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N° 110.

M. Paul CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Londres,

à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Londres, le 31 juillet 1914.

Au début de notre entretien d'aujourd'hui, Sir E. Grey m'a dit que le Prince Lichnowski lui avait demandé ce matin si l'Angleterre observerait la neutralité dans le conflit qui se prépare. Le Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères lui a répondu que, si le conflit devenait général, l'Angleterre ne pourrait pas rester neutre et, notamment, que si la France y était impliquée, l'Angleterre y serait entraînée.

J'ai interrogé alors Sir E. Grey sur la délibération du Cabinet qui avait eu lieu ce matin. Il m'a répondu qu'après avoir examiné la situation, le Cabinet avait pensé que pour le moment le Gouvernement britannique ne pouvait nous garantir son intervention, qu'il avait l'intention de s'entremettre pour obtenir de l'Allemagne et de la France l'engagement de respecter la neutralité belge, mais que pour envisager une intervention il convenait d'attendre que la situation se développât.

J'ai demandé à Sir E. Grey si, pour intervenir, le Gouvernement britannique attendrait l'envahissement du territoire français. J'ai insisté sur le fait que les me-

sures déjà adoptées sur notre frontière par l'Allemagne révélaient des intentions d'agression prochaine, et que si l'on voulait éviter de voir se renouveler l'erreur de l'Europe en 1870, il convenait que l'Angleterre envisageât dès maintenant les conditions dans lesquelles elle nous donnerait le concours sur lequel la France comptait.

Sir E. Grey m'a répondu que l'opinion du Cabinet ne s'était formée que sur la situation actuelle, que cette situation pouvait se modifier et que, dans ce cas, on appellerait aussitôt le Conseil des Ministres à en délibérer.

Sir A. Nicolson, que j'ai vu en sortant du Cabinet du Secrétaire d'Etat, m'a dit que le Conseil se réunirait de nouveau demain, et, confidentiellement, m'a fait entendre que le Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères ne manquerait pas de reprendre la discussion.

Conformément à vos instructions, j'ai fait le nécessaire pour que la lettre autographe que M. le Président de la République adresse à Sa Majesté le Roi d'Angleterre soit remise ce soir au Roi. Cette démarche, qui sera certainement communiquée au Premier Ministre, dès demain matin, sera, je n'en doute pas, prise en sérieuse considération par le Cabinet britannique.

Paul CAMBON.

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N° 111.

M. MOLLARD, Ministre de France à Luxembourg,

à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Luxembourg, le 31 juillet 1914.

Le Ministre d'Etat sort de la Légation, il venait de me dire que les Allemands avaient fermé les ponts sur la Moselle de Schengen et de Remich avec des voitures, celui de Wormeldange avec des cordes. Sur la Sûre, les ponts de Wasserbillig et d'Echternach ne sont pas condamnés, mais les Allemands ne laissent plus sortir de Prusse ni blé, ni bétail, ni automobiles.

M. Eyschen m'a prié, et c'est le vrai but de sa visite, de vous demander une déclaration officielle assurant que la France respectera en cas de conflit la neutralité du Luxembourg. Comme je lui demandais s'il avait reçu une déclaration analogue du Gouvernement allemand, il m'a dit qu'il allait se rendre chez le Ministre d'Allemagne pour avoir la même déclaration.

*Post-scriptum.* — Jusqu'à présent, aucune mesure particulière n'a été prise par le Gouvernement luxembourgeois. M. Eyschen revient de la Légation d'Allemagne, il s'est plaint des mesures de suspicion prises contre un voisin neutre. Le Ministre d'Etat a demandé au Ministre d'Allemagne une déclaration officielle de son Gouvernement, prenant l'engagement de respecter la neutralité. M. de Buch lui aurait répondu : « Cela va de soi mais il faudrait que le Gouvernement français prit le même engagement ».

MOLLARD.

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N° 112.

**M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères,**  
à MM. les Ambassadeurs de France à Londres, Saint-Petersbourg,  
Berlin, Vienne et Rome.

Paris, le 31 juillet 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre m'a remis une note de son Gouvernement demandant au Gouvernement français d'appuyer à Saint-Petersbourg une proposition tendant à la solution pacifique du conflit austro-serbe.

Cette note expose que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a informé Sir Edw. Grey de l'intention qu'a son Gouvernement de s'efforcer d'agir sur le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, après la prise de Belgrade et l'occupation des régions voisines de la frontière, pour obtenir la promesse de ne pas avancer davantage, pendant que les Puissances chercheraient à obtenir que la Serbie donnât des satisfactions suffisantes à l'Autriche; le territoire occupé serait évacué une fois qu'elle aurait reçu satisfaction.

Sir Edw. Grey a fait cette suggestion le 29 juillet et exprime l'espoir que les préparatifs militaires seront suspendus de tous côtés. Bien que l'Ambassadeur de Russie à Londres ait informé le Secrétaire d'État qu'il craint que la condition russe *« si l'Autriche, reconnaissant que son conflit avec la Serbie a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, se déclare prête à éliminer de son ultimatum les points qui portent atteinte au principe de la souveraineté serbe, la Russie s'engage à arrêter tous préparatifs militaires »* ne puisse être modifiée, Sir Edw. Grey pense que, si l'Autriche arrête son avance après l'occupation de Belgrade, le Gouvernement russe pourrait accepter de changer sa formule, dans ce sens que les Puissances examineraient comment la Serbie donnerait des satisfactions complètes à l'Autriche sans porter atteinte à la souveraineté ou à l'indépendance du Royaume. Dans le cas où l'Autriche, ayant occupé Belgrade et le territoire serbe voisin, se déclarerait prête, dans l'intérêt de l'Europe, à cesser d'avancer et à discuter comment l'on pourrait arriver à un arrangement, la Russie pourrait aussi consentir à la discussion et suspendre ses préparatifs militaires, pourvu que les autres Puissances agissent de même.

Conformément à la demande de Sir Edw. Grey, le Gouvernement français s'est rallié à la suggestion anglaise et a prié dans les termes suivants son Ambassadeur à Pétersbourg de s'efforcer d'obtenir sans retard l'assentiment du Gouvernement russe :

« Je vous prie de faire connaître d'urgence à M. Sazonoff que la suggestion de Sir Ed. Grey me paraît fournir une base utile de conversation entre les Puissances également désireuses de travailler à un règlement honorable du conflit austro-serbe et d'écarter ainsi les dangers qui menacent la paix générale.

« Le plan proposé par le Principal Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères, en arrêtant la marche en avant de l'armée autrichienne, et en confiant aux Puissances le soin d'examiner comment la Serbie pourrait donner pleine satisfaction à l'Autriche

sans porter atteinte aux droits souverains et à l'indépendance du Royaume, en donnant ainsi un moyen à la Russie de suspendre tous préparatifs militaires, les autres Puissances devant agir de même, est de nature à donner également satisfaction à la Russie et à l'Autriche et à ménager à la Serbie une sortie acceptable de la difficulté actuelle.

« Je vous prie de vous inspirer des considérations qui précèdent pour engager très instamment M. Sazonoff à donner sans retard son adhésion à la proposition de Sir Ed. Grey dont il a dû être saisi de son côté. »

René VIVIANI.

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N° 113.

M. PALÉOLOGUE, Ambassadeur de France à Saint-Petersbourg,

à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 31 juillet 1914.

La nouvelle du bombardement de Belgrade dans la nuit et la matinée d'hier a provoqué en Russie la plus vive émotion. On ne parvient pas à s'expliquer l'attitude de l'Autriche, dont les provocations ont constamment suivi, depuis le début de la crise, les tentatives de conciliation de la Russie et les conversations satisfaisantes échangées entre Pétersbourg et Vienne.

Quoi qu'il en soit, désireux de ne rien négliger pour prouver la sincérité de son désir de sauvegarder la paix, M. Sazonoff m'informe qu'il a modifié sa formule, à la demande de l'ambassadeur d'Angleterre, de la manière suivante :

« Si l'Autriche consent à arrêter la marche de ses troupes sur le territoire serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, elle admet que les grandes Puissances examinent les satisfactions que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement austro-hongrois, sans porter atteinte à ses droits souverains et à son indépendance, la Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante. »

PALÉOLOGUE.

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N° 114.

**M. René VIVIANI**, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères,  
à MM. les Ambassadeurs de France, à Londres, Saint-Petersbourg,  
Berlin, Vienne, Rome, Constantinople.

Paris, le 31 juillet 1914.

Les efforts poursuivis jusqu'ici parallèlement par l'Angleterre et la Russie, avec le concours empressé de la France (acquis d'avance à toute tentative pacifique), en vue d'une entente directe entre Vienne et Saint-Petersbourg ou d'une médiation des quatre puissances sous la forme la plus appropriée, se rejoignent aujourd'hui : la Russie, donnant une nouvelle preuve de son désir d'entente, s'est empressée de répondre à la première apparence d'ouverture faite par l'Allemagne depuis le début de la crise (sur les conditions auxquelles la Russie arrêterait ses préparatifs militaires), en indiquant une formule et la modifiant de suite conformément à la demande de l'Angleterre; on devrait donc espérer, les pourparlers ayant repris d'autre part entre les ambassadeurs russe et autrichien, que la médiation anglaise viendra achever à Londres l'effort des négociations directes de Vienne et Saint-Petersbourg.

Toutefois l'attitude constante de l'Allemagne qui, depuis le commencement du conflit, tout en protestant sans cesse auprès de chacune des puissances de ses intentions pacifiques, a fait échouer en fait, par son attitude ou dilatoire ou négative, toutes les tentatives d'accord et n'a pas cessé d'encourager par son ambassadeur l'intransigeance de Vienne; les préparatifs militaires allemands, commencés dès le 25 juillet et poursuivis sans arrêt depuis; l'opposition immédiate de l'Allemagne à la formule russe, déclarée à Berlin inacceptable pour l'Autriche avant même d'avoir consulté cette Puissance; enfin toutes les impressions venues de Berlin imposent la conviction que l'Allemagne a poursuivi l'humiliation de la Russie, la désagrégation de la Triple-Entente et, si ces résultats ne pouvaient être obtenus, la guerre.

René VIVIANI.

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N° 115.

**M. DUMAINE**, Ambassadeur de France à Vienne,  
à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Vienne, le 31 juillet 1914.

La mobilisation générale atteignant tous les hommes de 19 à 42 ans a été décrétée par le Gouvernement austro-hongrois ce matin à la première heure.

Mon collègue russe estime encore que cette mesure n'est pas nettement en contradiction avec les déclarations du Comte Berchtold d'hier.

DUMAINE.

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N° 116.

**M. Jules CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Berlin,**

**à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.**

Berlin, le 31 juillet 1914.

M'ayant fait demander, M. de Jagow vient de me dire qu'il avait le grand regret de me faire connaître qu'en présence de la mobilisation totale de l'armée russe, l'Allemagne, dans l'intérêt de la sécurité de l'Empire, se voyait obligée de prendre de graves mesures de précaution. On a décrété ce qu'on appelle « Kriegesfahrzustand » (l'état de danger de guerre), qui permet à l'autorité de proclamer, si elle le juge utile, l'état de siège, de suspendre certains services publics et de fermer la frontière.

En même temps, on demande à Pétersbourg de démobiliser, aussi bien du côté autrichien que du côté allemand, sans quoi l'Allemagne serait obligée de mobiliser de son côté. M. de Jagow m'a fait connaître que M. de Schoen était chargé d'informer le Gouvernement français des résolutions du cabinet de Berlin, et de lui demander quelle attitude il pensait adopter.

Jules CAMBON.

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N° 117.

**M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères,**

**à M. PALÉOLOGUE, Ambassadeur de France à Pétersbourg.**

Paris, le 31 juillet 1914.

Le Gouvernement allemand a décidé à midi de prendre toutes les dispositions militaires que comporte l'état dit « état de danger de guerre ».

En me communiquant cette décision, ce soir à 7 heures, le Baron de Schoen a ajouté que le Gouvernement exigeait en même temps que la Russie démobilise. Si le Gouvernement russe n'a pas donné une réponse satisfaisante dans un délai de douze heures, l'Allemagne mobilisera à son tour.

J'ai répondu à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que je n'étais nullement renseigné sur une prétendue mobilisation totale de l'armée et de la flotte russes, que le Gouvernement allemand invoquait comme raison des nouvelles mesures militaires qu'il prend dès aujourd'hui.

Le Baron de Schoen m'a demandé en terminant, au nom de son Gouvernement, quelle serait, en cas de conflit entre l'Allemagne et la Russie, l'attitude de la France. Il m'a dit qu'il viendrait prendre ma réponse demain samedi à une heure.

Je n'ai pas l'intention de lui faire une déclaration à ce sujet et je me bornerai à lui dire que la France s'inspirera de ses intérêts. Le Gouvernement de la République ne doit, en effet, compte de ses intentions qu'à son alliée.

Je vous prie de porter immédiatement ce qui précède à la connaissance de M. Sazonoff. Ainsi que je vous l'ai déjà fait connaître, je ne doute pas que le Gouvernement impérial, dans l'intérêt supérieur de la paix, n'évite pour sa part tout ce qui pourrait rendre inévitable ou précipiter la crise.

René VIVIANI.

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N° 118.

M. PALÉOLOGUE, Ambassadeur de France à Saint-Petersbourg,  
à M. VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 31 juillet 1914.

En raison de la mobilisation générale de l'Autriche et des mesures de mobilisation prises secrètement, mais d'une manière continue, par l'Allemagne depuis six jours, l'ordre de mobilisation générale de l'armée russe a été donné, la Russie ne pouvant, sans le plus grave danger, se laisser davantage devancer; en réalité, elle ne fait que prendre des mesures militaires correspondant à celles prises par l'Allemagne.

Pour des raisons stratégiques impérieuses, le Gouvernement russe ne pouvait plus, sachant que l'Allemagne s'armait, retarder la conversion de sa mobilisation partielle en mobilisation générale.

PALÉOLOGUE.

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N° 119.

M. KLOBUKOWSKI, Ministre de France à Bruxelles,  
à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Bruxelles, le 31 juillet 1914.

L'Agence Havas ayant annoncé que l'état « de danger de guerre » était décrété en Allemagne, j'ai dit à M. Davignon que je pouvais lui donner l'assurance que le Gouvernement de la République respecterait la neutralité de la Belgique.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères m'a répondu que le Gouvernement royal avait toujours pensé qu'il en serait ainsi et m'a remercié. Le Ministre de Russie et le Ministre d'Angleterre, que j'ai vus ensuite, se sont montrés très satisfaits qu'en la circonstance j'aie donné cette assurance, conforms d'ailleurs, m'a dit le Ministre anglais, à la déclaration de Sir Edw. Grey.

KLOBUKOWSKI.


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## **CHAPITRE VI**

### **DÉCLARATION DE GUERRE**

**DE L'ALLEMAGNE À LA RUSSIE (SAMEDI 1<sup>er</sup> AOÛT, À 19<sup>h</sup> 10)**

**ET À LA FRANCE (LUNDI 3 AOÛT, À 18<sup>h</sup> 45)**





N° 120.

**M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères,**  
**à MM. les Ambassadeurs de France à Londres, Saint-Petersbourg,**  
**Berlin, Vienne, Rome.**

Paris, le 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

Deux démarches ont été faites hier soir par les Ambassadeurs d'Autriche, l'une assez vague à Paris, l'autre précise à Pétersbourg dans un sens conciliant.

Le Comte Szecsen est venu me déclarer que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois avait avisé officiellement la Russie qu'il n'avait aucune ambition territoriale et ne touchera pas à la souveraineté d'État de la Serbie; qu'il répudie également toute intention d'occuper le sandjak; mais que ces déclarations de désintéressement ne conservent leur valeur que si la guerre reste localisée à l'Autriche et à la Serbie, une guerre européenne ouvrant des éventualités impossibles à prévoir. L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche, en commentant ces déclarations, a laissé entendre que, si son Gouvernement ne pouvait répondre aux questions des Puissances parlant en leur propre nom, il pourrait sans doute répondre à la Serbie ou à une Puissance lui demandant ses conditions au nom de la Serbie. Il ajoutait qu'il y'aurait là, peut-être encore une possibilité.

A Pétersbourg, l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche est venu voir M. Sazonoff et lui a déclaré que son Gouvernement consentait à entamer une discussion quant au fond de l'ultimatum adressé à la Serbie. Le Ministre russe s'est déclaré satisfait de cette déclaration et a proposé que les pourparlers aient lieu à Londres avec la participation des Puissances. M. Sazonoff a dû demander au Gouvernement anglais de se charger de la direction de la négociation; il a indiqué qu'il serait très important que l'Autriche arrêtât ses opérations en Serbie.

Il résulte de ces faits que l'Autriche se montrerait enfin disposée à un arrangement, de même que le Gouvernement russe est prêt à entrer en négociations sur la base de la proposition anglaise.

Malheureusement ces dispositions, qui permettraient d'espérer une solution pacifique, paraissent en fait devoir être annulées par l'attitude de l'Allemagne. Cette Puissance a en effet posé un ultimatum donnant douze heures au Gouvernement russe pour accepter de démobiliser, non seulement du côté allemand, mais aussi du côté autrichien; c'est à midi que le délai expire. L'ultimatum ne se justifie pas, puisque la Russie a accepté la proposition anglaise qui implique un arrêt des préparatifs militaires de toutes les Puissances.

L'attitude de l'Allemagne prouve qu'elle veut la guerre. Et elle la veut contre la France. Hier, lorsque M. de Schoen est venu demander au quai d'Orsay quelle attitude la France comptait prendre en cas de conflit russo-allemand, l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, bien qu'il n'y ait directement entre la France et l'Allemagne aucun conflit et que nous ayons employé depuis le début de la crise et employions encore tous nos efforts en vue d'une solution pacifique, a ajouté qu'il me priait de présenter

au Président de la République ses hommages et remerciements, et demandait que l'on voulût bien prendre « des dispositions pour sa propre personne » ; nous savons également qu'il a déjà mis en sûreté les archives de l'Ambassade. Cette attitude de rupture des relations diplomatiques sans conflit direct, et bien qu'aucune réponse négative précise ne lui ait été faite, est caractéristique de la volonté arrêtée de l'Allemagne de faire la guerre à la France. Le défaut de sincérité de ses protestations pacifiques est démontré par la rupture qu'elle impose à l'Europe, lorsque les négociations étaient enfin acceptées par l'Autriche, d'accord avec la Russie.

René VIVIANI.

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N° 121.

M. Jules CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Berlin,

à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères..

Berlin, le 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

Mon Collègue de Russie a reçu hier soir deux télégrammes de M. Sazonoff l'avisant que l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche à Pétersbourg avait déclaré que son Gouvernement était prêt à discuter avec le Gouvernement russe la note à la Serbie, même quant au fond ; M. Sazonoff lui aurait répondu que ces conversations devraient, à ses yeux, avoir lieu à Londres.

L'ultimatum à la Russie ne peut qu'écarter les dernières chances de paix que ces conversations semblaient laisser subsister. On peut se demander si, dans de pareilles conditions, l'acceptation de l'Autriche était sérieuse et n'avait pas pour objet de faire peser la responsabilité du conflit sur la Russie.

Mon Collègue d'Angleterre a fait dans la nuit un appel pressant aux sentiments d'humanité de M. de Jagow. Celui-ci lui a répondu que la question était trop engagée et qu'il fallait attendre la réponse russe à l'ultimatum allemand. Or il a dit à sir E. Goschen que l'ultimatum réclamait le retrait de la mobilisation russe non seulement du côté de l'Allemagne, mais encore du côté de l'Autriche ; mon Collègue anglais s'en est vivement étonné et lui a déclaré que ce dernier point semblait inacceptable pour la Russie.

L'ultimatum de l'Allemagne, intervenant à l'heure précise où l'accord semble près de s'établir entre Vienne et Saint-Pétersbourg, est significatif de sa politique belliqueuse.

Le conflit n'existait en fait qu'entre la Russie et l'Autriche, l'Allemagne n'ayant à intervenir que comme alliée de l'Autriche ; dans ces conditions, les deux Puissances principalement intéressées étant disposées à causer, si l'Allemagne ne désirait pas la

guerre pour son propre compte, il est incompréhensible qu'elle envoie un ultimatum à la Russie, au lieu de continuer à travailler, comme toutes les autres Puissances, à une solution pacifique.

J. CAMBON.

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N° 122.

M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères,  
à MM. les Ambassadeurs de France à Londres, Berlin, et au Ministre  
de France à Bruxelles.

Paris, le 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre est venu, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, me demander quelle serait, en cas de conflit avec l'Allemagne, l'attitude du Gouvernement Français vis-à-vis de la Belgique.

J'ai déclaré que, comme nous l'avions répété à plusieurs reprises au Gouvernement Belge, nous entendions respecter sa neutralité.

Ce serait seulement dans le cas où cette neutralité serait violée par une autre Puissance que la France, pour remplir ses obligations de Puissance garante, pourrait être amenée à pénétrer sur le territoire belge.

René VIVIANI.

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N° 123.

M. Jules CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Berlin,  
à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Berlin, le 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a été chargé par son Gouvernement de faire auprès du Gouvernement Allemand la même démarche qui a été faite auprès de vous au sujet de la neutralité de la Belgique.

M. de Jagow a répondu qu'il prendrait les ordres de l'Empereur et du Chancelier, mais qu'il doutait qu'une réponse pût être donnée, car l'Allemagne ne pouvait ainsi découvrir ses projets militaires. L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre reverra demain M. de Jagow dans l'après-midi.

J. CAMBON.

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N° 124.

**M. BARRÈRE, Ambassadeur de France à Rome,**

**à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.**

Rome, le 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

J'ai été ce matin à 8 heures 1/2 chez le Marquis de San Giuliano pour connaître de lui d'une façon précise quelle serait l'attitude de l'Italie en présence des actes provocateurs de l'Allemagne et des suites qu'ils peuvent avoir.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères m'a répondu qu'il avait reçu hier soir la visite de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. M. de Flotow lui aurait dit que l'Allemagne avait demandé au Gouvernement Russe de suspendre sa mobilisation et au Gouvernement Français d'indiquer ce qu'il avait l'intention de faire; l'Allemagne avait donné à la France un délai de dix-huit heures et à la Russie un délai de douze heures pour répondre.

M. de Flotow a demandé, à la suite de cette communication, quelles étaient les intentions du Gouvernement Italien.

Le Marquis de San Giuliano a répondu que la guerre entreprise par l'Autriche étant donné surtout les conséquences qui pouvaient en sortir d'après les paroles de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, ayant un caractère agressif ne cadrant pas avec caractère purement défensif de la Triple-Alliance, l'Italie ne pourrait participer à guerre.

BARRÈRE.

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N° 125.

**M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères,**

**à MM. les Ambassadeurs de France à Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Berlin, Vienne, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople.**

Paris, le 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne est revenu me voir ce matin à 11 heures. Après lui avoir rappelé tous les efforts poursuivis par la France en vue d'un règlement honorable du conflit austro-serbe et de la difficulté qui s'en est suivie entre l'Autriche et la Russie, je l'ai mis au courant des pourparlers continués depuis hier :

1° Proposition transactionnelle anglaise prévoyant, entre autres, de la part de la Russie, la suspension des préparatifs militaires, à condition que les autres Puissances en fassent autant; adhésion de la Russie à cette proposition;

2° Communications du Gouvernement Autrichien déclarant ne vouloir ni s'agrandir en Serbie, ni même pénétrer dans le sandjak et se disant prêt à discuter à Londres avec les autres Puissances le *fond même* de la question austro-serbe.

J'ai mis en regard l'attitude de l'Allemagne qui, abandonnant tout pourparler, posait à la Russie un ultimatum au moment même où cette Puissance vient d'accepter la formule anglaise (qui implique l'arrêt des préparatifs militaires de tous les pays ayant mobilisé) et envisageait comme imminente une rupture diplomatique avec la France.

Le Baron de Schoen m'a répondu qu'il ignorait les développements survenus dans cette question depuis vingt-quatre heures, qu'il y avait peut-être là une « lueur d'espoir » pour un accommodement, qu'il n'avait reçu aucune nouvelle communication de son Gouvernement et qu'il allait s'informer. Il a de nouveau protesté de son sincère désir de joindre ses efforts à ceux de la France pour arriver à la solution du conflit. J'ai insisté sur la grave responsabilité qu'assumerait le Gouvernement Impérial si, dans de pareilles circonstances, il prenait des initiatives non justifiées et de nature à compromettre irrémédiablement la paix.

Le Baron de Schoen n'a plus fait allusion à son départ immédiat et ne m'a plus demandé de répondre à sa question concernant l'attitude de la France en cas de conflit austro-russe. Il s'est borné à dire de lui-même qu'elle n'était pas douteuse.

Il ne convient à aucun degré d'exagérer les possibilités qui peuvent résulter de ma conversation avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, car, de son côté, le Gouvernement Impérial continue les plus dangereux préparatifs sur notre frontière. Il ne faut pas les négliger cependant et nous ne devons pas cesser de travailler à un arrangement. La France, de son côté, procède à toutes les mesures militaires propres à la garantir contre une avance trop grande des préparatifs militaires allemands. Elle estime que ses tentatives de conciliation n'auront de chances d'aboutir que dans la mesure où on la sentira prête et résolue, si la lutte lui est imposée.

René VIVIANI.

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N° 126.

M. Paul CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Londres,

à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

Paris, le 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

Sir Edward Grey m'a dit que, dans le Conseil de ce matin, le Cabinet avait de nouveau envisagé la situation. L'Allemagne ayant réclamé de l'Angleterre une déclaration de neutralité et ne l'ayant pas obtenue, le Gouvernement britannique demeurerait maître de son action et celle-ci pourrait se manifester dans différentes hypothèses.

En premier lieu, la neutralité belge importe beaucoup à l'Angleterre. La France a renouvelé immédiatement l'engagement de la respecter. L'Allemagne a déclaré « n'être pas en état de répondre ». Sir Edward Grey saisira le Cabinet de cette réponse et demandera l'autorisation de dire lundi à la Chambre des Communes que le Gouvernement britannique ne permettra pas une violation de la neutralité belge.

En second lieu, les escadres anglaises sont mobilisées et Sir Edward Grey proposera à ses collègues de déclarer qu'elles s'opposeront au passage du Déroit par les escadres allemandes ou, si elles venaient à le passer, à toute démonstration sur les côtes françaises. Le Conseil de lundi traitera ces deux questions; j'ai fait remarquer au Principal Secrétaire d'État que si, d'ici là, quelque incident venait à se produire, il ne fallait pas se laisser surprendre et qu'il conviendrait de songer à intervenir à temps.

Paul CAMBON.

N° 127.

M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères,  
à M. Paul CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France, à Londres.

Paris, le 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

Nous sommes avisés par plusieurs voies que le Gouvernement allemand et le Gouvernement autrichien essaient en ce moment d'impressionner l'Angleterre en lui faisant croire que la responsabilité de la guerre, si elle éclate, incombera à la Russie. On fait effort pour obtenir la neutralité de l'Angleterre en dénaturant la vérité.

La France n'a cessé de donner, d'accord avec l'Angleterre, des conseils de modération à Pétersbourg; ces conseils ont été écoutés.

Dès le début, M. Sazonoff a fait pression sur la Serbie pour qu'elle acceptât toutes celles des clauses de l'ultimatum qui étaient compatibles avec sa souveraineté.

Il a ensuite engagé avec l'Autriche une conversation directe qui était un nouveau témoignage de son esprit de conciliation. Il a enfin accepté de laisser les puissances, les moins intéressées rechercher les moyens d'apaiser le conflit.

Conformément au désir qui lui a été exprimé par Sir G. Buchanan, M. Sazonoff a consenti à modifier la première formule qu'il avait présentée et il en a rédigé une seconde qui ne s'éloigne pas sensiblement des déclarations qui ont été faites hier à M. de Margerie par le comte Szecsen. Ce dernier affirme que l'Autriche n'a aucune intention d'acquisition territoriale et qu'elle ne veut pas toucher à la souveraineté de la Serbie. Il ajoute expressément que l'Autriche n'a aucune visée sur le Sandjak de Novi-Bazar.

Il semblerait donc que l'accord fût facile à établir entre la suggestion de Sir Edward Grey, la formule de M. Sazonoff et les déclarations de l'Autriche.

La France est résolue à poursuivre jusqu'au bout, avec l'Angleterre, la réalisation de cet accord.

Mais pendant que l'on négociait et que la Russie montrait dans la négociation une bonne volonté incontestable, l'Autriche a, la première, procédé à une mobilisation générale.

La Russie s'est vue forcée de l'imiter pour ne pas se trouver en état d'infériorité, mais elle est toujours restée prête à négocier.

Je n'ai pas besoin de répéter que, quant à nous, nous continuerons à travailler, avec l'Angleterre, au succès de ces pourparlers.

Mais l'attitude de l'Allemagne nous a mis dans l'obligation absolue de prendre aujourd'hui le décret de mobilisation.

Bien avant la mobilisation russe, dès mercredi dernier, ainsi que je vous l'ai déjà télégraphié, M. de Schoen m'avait annoncé la publication prochaine du « Kriegsgefahr-

zustand ». Cette mesure a été prise par l'Allemagne et, à l'abri de ce paravent, elle a immédiatement commencé sa mobilisation proprement dite.

Aujourd'hui M. Paléologue a télégraphié que le Comte de Pourtalès avait annoncé au Gouvernement russe la mobilisation allemande.

Des renseignements parvenus au Ministère de la Guerre confirment que cette mobilisation est effectivement en pleine exécution.

Notre décret de mobilisation est donc une *mesure essentielle* de préservation. Le Gouvernement l'a accompagnée d'une proclamation signée du Président de la République et de tous les Ministres, et dans laquelle il explique que la mobilisation n'est pas la guerre, qu'en l'état actuel c'est pour la France le meilleur moyen de sauvegarder la paix, et que le Gouvernement de la République multipliera ses efforts pour faire aboutir les négociations.

Veuillez transmettre d'urgence toutes ces indications à Sir Edward Grey et lui marquer que nous avons obéi constamment à la préoccupation de ne commettre aucun acte de provocation.

Je suis persuadé que, au cas où la guerre éclaterait, l'opinion anglaise verrait clairement de quel côté vient l'agression, et qu'elle saisirait les raisons si fortes que nous avons données à Sir Edward Grey pour réclamer une intervention armée de l'Angleterre dans l'intérêt de l'avenir de l'équilibre européen.

René VIVIANI.

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N° 128.

M. MOLLARD, Ministre de France à Luxembourg,  
à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Luxembourg, le 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

Le Ministre d'État me charge de demander au Gouvernement français une assurance de neutralité semblable à celle qui a été donnée à la Belgique. M. Eyschen m'a déclaré qu'à présent, du fait que c'est le Ministre de France à Bruxelles qui a fait la déclaration en question au Président du Conseil du Gouvernement belge, il a pensé que la même procédure conviendrait le mieux vis-à-vis du Grand-Duché.

C'est pourquoi il s'est abstenu de faire la demande directement au Gouvernement de la République. Comme la Chambre des députés se réunit lundi, M. Eyschen désire être en possession de la réponse à cette date; une démarche analogue est faite en même temps auprès du Ministre d'Allemagne à Luxembourg.

MOLLARD.

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**N° 129.**

**M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères,  
à M. MOLLARD, Ministre de France à Luxembourg.**

**Paris, le 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.**

**Veillez déclarer au Président du Conseil que, conformément au traité de Londres de 1867, le Gouvernement de la République entend respecter la neutralité du Grand-Duché du Luxembourg, comme il l'a démontré par son attitude.**

**La violation de cette neutralité par l'Allemagne serait toutefois de nature à obliger la France à s'inspirer désormais, à cet égard, du souci de sa défense et de ses intérêts.**

**René VIVIANI.**

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**N° 130.**

**M. Jules CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Berlin.  
à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.**

**Berlin, le 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.**

**On distribue dans les rues de Berlin des éditions spéciales des journaux annonçant que la mobilisation générale de l'armée et de la flotte est ordonnée et que le 1<sup>er</sup> jour de la mobilisation est le dimanche 2 août.**

**Jules CAMBON.**

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**N° 131.**

**M. EYSCHEN, Ministre d'État du Luxembourg,  
à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.**

**Luxembourg, le 2 août 1914.**

**J'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence les faits suivants. Dimanche 2 août de grand matin les troupes allemandes, d'après les informations qui sont parvenues au Gouvernement Grand-Ducal à l'heure actuelle, ont pénétré sur le territoire Luxembourgeois par les ponts de Wasserbillig et de Remich, se**



dirigeant spécialement vers le Sud du pays et vers la ville de Luxembourg, capitale du Grand-Duché; un certain nombre de trains blindés avec des troupes et des munitions ont été acheminés par la voie de chemin de fer de Wasserbillig à Luxembourg où l'on s'attend à les voir arriver d'un instant à l'autre.

Ces faits impliquent des actes manifestement contraires à la neutralité du Grand-Duché, garantie par le traité de Londres de 1867. Le Gouvernement Luxembourgeois n'a pas manqué de protester énergiquement contre cette agression auprès des représentants de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne à Luxembourg; une protestation identique va être transmise télégraphiquement au Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires étrangères à Berlin.

*Le Ministre d'État, Président du Gouvernement,*

EYSCHEN,

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N° 132.

**M. MOLLARD**, Ministre de France à Luxembourg,

à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Luxembourg, le 2 août 1914.

Le Ministre d'État du Luxembourg, M. Eyschen, vient de recevoir, par l'intermédiaire du Ministre d'Allemagne à Luxembourg, M. de Buch, un télégramme du Chancelier de l'Empire allemand Bethmann Hollweg, disant que les mesures militaires prises par l'Allemagne en Luxembourg ne constituent pas un acte hostile contre ce pays, mais sont uniquement des mesures destinées à assurer contre l'attaque éventuelle d'une armée française l'exploitation des voies ferrées affermées à l'Empire. Le Luxembourg recevra une complète indemnité pour les dommages éventuels.

**MOLLARD.**

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N° 133.

*NOTE remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne.,*

Paris, le 2 août 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne vient d'être chargé et s'empresse de faire savoir au Ministère des Affaires étrangères que les mesures militaires prises par l'Allemagne dans le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg ne constituent pas un acte d'hostilité. Elles doivent être considérées comme des mesures purement préventives prises pour la protection des chemins de fer qui, par suite des traités existant entre l'Allemagne et le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, se trouvent sous l'administration allemande.

DE SCHÖEN.

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N° 134.

M. PALÉOLOGUE, Ambassadeur de France à Saint-Petersbourg,  
à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Petersbourg, le 2 août 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a remis à M. Sazonoff, hier, à 7 h. 10 du soir, la déclaration de guerre de son Gouvernement; il quittera Petersbourg aujourd'hui.

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie n'a reçu aucune instruction de son gouvernement pour la déclaration de guerre.

PALÉOLOGUE.

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N° 135.

M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères,  
à MM. les Représentants de la France à l'Étranger.

Paris, le 2 août 1914.

L'Ambassadeur de Russie me fait connaître que l'Allemagne vient de déclarer la guerre à la Russie, malgré les négociations en cours, et au moment où l'Autriche-Hongrie acceptait de discuter avec les puissances le fond même de son conflit avec la Serbie.

René VIVIANI.

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**N° 136.**

**M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères,  
à MM. les Ambassadeurs de France à Londres, Saint-Petersbourg,  
Berlin, Vienne, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople.**

**Paris, le 2 août 1914.**

**Le territoire français a été violé ce matin par les troupes allemandes à Cirey et près de Longwy. Elles marchent sur le fort qui porte ce dernier nom. D'autre part, le poste douanier de Delle a été assailli par une double fusillade. Enfin, les troupes allemandes ont violé ce matin aussi le territoire neutre du Luxembourg.**

**Vous utiliserez ces renseignements sans retard pour faire constater comment le Gouvernement Allemand se livre contre la France à des actes de guerre sans provocation de notre part, ni déclaration de guerre préalable, alors que nous avons scrupuleusement respecté la zone de dix kilomètres que nous avons maintenue même depuis la mobilisation, entre nos troupes et la frontière.**

**René VIVIANI.**

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**N° 137.**

**M. Paul CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Londres,  
à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.**

**Londres, le 2 août 1914.**

**A l'issue du Conseil des Ministres tenu ce matin, Sir Edward Grey m'a fait la déclaration suivante :**

**« Je suis autorisé à donner l'assurance que si la flotte allemande pénètre dans la Manche ou traverse la mer du Nord afin d'entreprendre des opérations de guerre contre la côte française ou la marine marchande française, la flotte britannique donnera toute la protection en son pouvoir.**

**« Cette assurance est naturellement donnée sous la réserve que la politique du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté sera approuvée par le Parlement britannique et ne doit**

pas être considérée comme obligeant le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté à agir jusqu'à ce que l'éventualité ci-dessus mentionnée d'une action de la flotte allemande se soit produite ».

Me parlant ensuite de la neutralité de la Belgique et de celle du Luxembourg, le Principal Secrétaire d'État m'a rappelé que la Convention de 1867 relative au Grand-Duché différait du Traité relatif à la Belgique en ce sens que l'Angleterre était tenue de faire respecter cette dernière convention sans le concours des autres Puissances garantes, tandis que, pour le Luxembourg, toutes les Puissances garantes devaient agir de concert.

La sauvegarde de la neutralité belge est considérée ici comme si importante que l'Angleterre envisagerait sa violation par l'Allemagne comme un *casus belli*. C'est là un intérêt proprement anglais, et on ne peut douter que le Gouvernement britannique, fidèle aux traditions de sa politique, ne le fasse prévaloir, même si le monde des affaires, où l'influence allemande poursuit des efforts tenaces, prétendait exercer une pression pour empêcher le Gouvernement de s'engager contre l'Allemagne.

Paul CAMBON.

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N° 138.

M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères,  
à M. Paul CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Londres.

Paris, le 2 août 1914.

Je prends note des indications contenues dans vos télégrammes des 27, 30, 31 juillet et 1<sup>er</sup> août et dans celui que vous m'avez adressé aujourd'hui.

En communiquant aux Chambres la déclaration même que vous a faite Sir Edward Grey et dont votre dernier télégramme me donne le texte, j'ajouterai que nous avons obtenu là de la Grande-Bretagne un premier concours dont la valeur nous est précieuse.

Je me propose, en outre, d'indiquer que l'assistance de la Grande-Bretagne a l'intention de donner à la France en vue de protéger les côtes de France ou la marine marchande française s'appliquerait de telle façon que notre marine de guerre fût également soutenue par la flotte anglaise, en cas de conflit franco-allemand, dans l'Atlantique, comme dans la mer du Nord et dans la Manche. Je noterais, en outre, que les ports anglais ne pourraient pas servir de points de ravitaillement à la flotte allemande.

René VIVIANI.

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N° 139.

**M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères,**  
**à M. Jules CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Berlin.**

Paris, le 2 août 1914.

Les troupes allemandes ayant aujourd'hui violé la frontière de l'Est sur plusieurs points, je vous prie de protester sans retard par écrit auprès du Gouvernement allemand. Vous voudrez bien vous inspirer de la note suivante que, dans l'incertitude des communications entre Paris et Berlin, j'ai adressé directement à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne :

« Les autorités administratives et militaires françaises de la région de l'Est viennent de signaler plusieurs faits que j'ai chargé l'Ambassadeur de la République à Berlin de porter à la connaissance du Gouvernement Impérial.

« L'un s'est produit à Delle, dans la région de Belfort : à deux reprises, le poste de douaniers français stationné dans cette localité a été l'objet d'une fusillade de la part d'un détachement de soldats allemands. Au nord de Delle, deux patrouilles allemandes du 5<sup>e</sup> chasseurs à cheval ont franchi la frontière dans la matinée d'aujourd'hui et pénétré jusqu'aux villages de Joncherey et Baron à plus de 10 kilomètres de la frontière. L'officier qui commandait la première a brûlé la cervelle à un soldat français. Les cavaliers allemands ont emmené des chevaux que le maire français de Suarce était en train de réunir et ont forcé les habitants de la commune à conduire les dits chevaux.

« L'Ambassadeur de la République à Berlin a été chargé de protester formellement auprès du Gouvernement Impérial contre des faits qui constituent une violation caractérisée de la frontière par des troupes allemandes en armes et que rien ne justifie dans l'état actuel. Le Gouvernement de la République ne peut que laisser au Gouvernement Impérial l'entière responsabilité de ces actes ».

René VIVIANI.

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N° 140.

**M. Marcelin PELLET, Ministre de France à La Haye,**  
**à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.**

La Haye, le 3 août 1914.

Le Ministre d'Allemagne s'est rendu hier chez le Ministre des Affaires étrangères pour lui expliquer la nécessité où s'était trouvée l'Allemagne, a-t-il dit, de violer la

neutralité du Luxembourg, ajoutant qu'il aurait aujourd'hui une nouvelle communication à lui faire. En effet, ce matin, il a annoncé l'entrée des troupes allemandes en Belgique pour éviter, a-t-il déclaré, une occupation de ce pays par la France.

PELLET.

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N° 141.

M. KLOBUKOWSKI, Ministre de France à Bruxelles,

à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Bruxelles, le 3 août 1914.

Le Ministre d'Allemagne a remis hier soir au Gouvernement belge un ultimatum où il est dit que son Gouvernement, ayant appris que les Français se préparaient à des opérations dans les régions de Givet et de Namur, se voyait dans l'obligation de prendre des mesures dont la première était d'inviter le Gouvernement belge à lui faire savoir, dans les sept heures, s'il était disposé à lui faciliter en Belgique les opérations militaires contre la France. En cas de refus, le sort des armes déciderait.

Le Gouvernement du Roi a répondu que les renseignements sur les mouvements français lui paraissaient inexacts en raison des assurances formelles, toutes récentes encore, données par la France; que la Belgique qui, depuis sa constitution, s'est préoccupée d'assurer la sauvegarde de sa dignité et de ses intérêts et a consacré tous ses efforts au développement pacifique du progrès, proteste hautement contre toute violation de son territoire, d'où qu'elle vienne, et que, dans cette éventualité, elle saura défendre énergiquement sa neutralité, garantie par les puissances et notamment par le Roi de Prusse.

KLOBUKOWSKI.

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N° 142.

M. KLOBUKOWSKI, Ministre de France à Bruxelles,

à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Bruxelles, le 3 août 1914.

A l'assurance que je lui donnais que, si la Belgique faisait appel à la garantie des Puissances, contre la violation de sa neutralité par l'Allemagne, la France répondrait immédiatement à son appel, le Ministre des Affaires étrangères m'a répondu :

« C'est bien sincèrement que nous remercions le Gouvernement de la République de l'appui éventuel qu'il pourrait nous offrir, mais dans la circonstance actuelle, nous ne faisons pas appel à la garantie des Puissances. Ultérieurement le Gouvernement du Roi appréciera ce qu'il y a lieu de faire ».

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N° 143.

M. Paul CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Londres,  
à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires  
étrangères.

Londres, le 3 août 1914.

Sir Ed. Grey m'a autorisé à vous faire savoir que vous pourriez déclarer au Parlement qu'il ferait aux Communes des déclarations sur l'attitude actuelle du Gouvernement Britannique et que la principale de ces déclarations serait la suivante :

« Dans le cas où l'escadre allemande franchirait le détroit ou remonterait la Mer du Nord pour doubler les îles britanniques dans le but d'attaquer les côtes françaises ou la marine de guerre française et d'inquiéter la marine marchande française, l'escadre anglaise interviendrait pour prêter à la marine française son entière protection, en sorte que dès ce moment l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne seraient en état de guerre. »

Sir Ed. Grey m'a fait observer que la mention d'une opération par la Mer du Nord impliquait la protection contre une démonstration dans l'Océan Atlantique.

La déclaration concernant l'intervention de la flotte anglaise doit être considérée comme liant le Gouvernement britannique. Sir E. Grey m'en a donné l'assurance et a ajouté que le Gouvernement français était par là même en mesure d'en donner connaissance aux Chambres.

A mon retour à l'Ambassade, j'ai eu connaissance de votre communication téléphonique relative à l'ultimatum allemand adressé à la Belgique. J'en ai fait part immédiatement à Sir Ed. Grey.

Paul CAMBON.

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N° 144.

M. Paul CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Londres,  
à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires  
étrangères.

Londres, le 3 août 1914.

Au moment où Sir Ed. Grey partait ce matin pour le Conseil, mon collègue allemand, qui l'avait déjà vu hier, est venu le prier avec insistance de lui dire que la

neutralité de l'Angleterre ne dépendait pas du respect de la neutralité belge. Sir Ed. Grey s'est refusé à toute conversation à ce sujet.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a adressé à la presse un communiqué disant que si l'Angleterre restait neutre, l'Allemagne renoncerait à toute opération navale et ne se servirait pas des côtes belges comme point d'appui. Je fais répondre que le respect des côtes n'est pas le respect de la neutralité du territoire, et que l'ultimatum allemand est déjà une violation de cette neutralité.

Paul CAMBON.

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N° 145.

M. Paul CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Londres,

à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Londres, le 3 août 1914.

Sir E. Grey a fait la déclaration relative à l'intervention de la flotte anglaise; il a précisé, en raison des événements, celle qu'il comptait faire au sujet de la neutralité belge; et la lecture d'une lettre du Roi Albert demandant l'appui de l'Angleterre a vivement ému l'Assemblée.

La Chambre votera ce soir les crédits demandés; dès à présent son appui est acquis à la politique du Gouvernement et elle suit l'opinion publique, qui se prononce de plus en plus en notre faveur.

Paul CAMBON.

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N° 146.

M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères,  
à M. Paul CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Londres.

Paris, le 3 août 1914.

Il me revient que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne aurait déclaré au Foreign Office que hier matin quatre-vingts officiers français en uniforme prussien auraient essayé de traverser la frontière allemande dans douze automobiles à Walbeck à l'ouest de Geldern, et que ceci constituait une très sérieuse violation de la neutralité de la part de la France.

Veuillez démentir d'urgence cette nouvelle de pure invention et attirer l'attention du Foreign Office sur la campagne allemande de fausses nouvelles qui commence.

René VIVIANI.

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N° 147.

*LETTRE remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, au cours de son audience de départ, le 3 août 1914, à 18 h. 45.*

MONSIEUR LE PRÉSIDENT,

Les autorités administratives et militaires allemandes ont constaté un certain nombre d'actes d'hostilité caractérisée commis sur le territoire allemand par des aviateurs militaires français. Plusieurs de ces derniers ont manifestement violé la neutralité de la Belgique survolant le territoire de ce pays; l'un a essayé de détruire des constructions près de Wesel, d'autres ont été aperçus sur la région de l'Eiffel, un autre a jeté des bombes sur le chemin de fer près de Karlsruhe et de Nuremberg.

Je suis chargé, et j'ai l'honneur de faire connaître à Votre Excellence qu'en présence de ces agressions, l'Empire allemand se considère en état de guerre avec la France, du fait de cette dernière Puissance.

J'ai en même temps l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence que les autorités allemandes retiendront les navires marchands français dans des ports allemands, mais qu'elles les relâcheront si, dans les quarante-huit heures, la réciprocité complète est assurée.

Ma mission diplomatique ayant ainsi pris fin, il ne me reste plus qu'à prier Votre Excellence de vouloir bien me munir de mes passeports et de prendre les mesures qu'elle jugera utiles pour assurer mon retour en Allemagne avec le personnel de l'Ambassade, ainsi qu'avec le personnel de la Légation de Bavière et du Consulat général d'Allemagne à Paris.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'expression de ma très haute considération.

Signé : SCHOEN.

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N° 148.

M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères,  
à MM. les Représentants de la France à l'étranger.

Paris le 3 août 1914.

L'ambassadeur d'Allemagne a demandé ses passeports et part ce soir avec le personnel de l'Ambassade et du Consulat général d'Allemagne, et de la Légation de Bavière. Le Baron de Schoen a donné pour prétexte la constatation par les autorités administratives et militaires allemandes d'actes d'hostilité qui auraient été commis

sur territoire allemand par des aviateurs militaires français accusés d'avoir survolé le territoire de l'empire et jeté des bombes; l'ambassadeur ajoute que des aviateurs auraient également violé la neutralité de la Belgique en survolant son territoire. « En présence de ces agressions, dit la lettre de M. de Schoen, l'Empire allemand se considère en état de guerre avec la France du fait de cette dernière puissance ».

J'ai formellement contesté les allégations inexactes de l'ambassadeur et, de mon côté, j'ai rappelé que dès hier, je lui avais adressé une note protestant contre les violations caractérisées de la frontière française commises depuis deux jours par des détachements de troupes allemandes.

René VIVIANI.

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N° 149.

M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères,  
à M. Jules CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Berlin,

*(Télégramme communiqué aux Représentants de la France à l'étranger.)*

Paris, le 3 août 1914.

Je vous invite à demander vos passeports et à quitter immédiatement Berlin avec le personnel de l'ambassade en laissant la charge des intérêts français et la garde des archives à l'ambassadeur d'Espagne. Je vous prie de protester en même temps par écrit contre la violation de la neutralité du Luxembourg par les troupes allemandes signalée par le premier ministre luxembourgeois, contre l'ultimatum adressé au gouvernement belge par le Ministre d'Allemagne à Bruxelles pour lui imposer la violation de la neutralité de la Belgique et exiger de celle-ci qu'elle lui facilite sur territoire belge les opérations militaires contre la France; enfin contre la fausse allégation d'un prétendu projet d'invasion de ces deux pays par les armées françaises, par lequel il a essayé de justifier l'état de guerre qu'il déclare exister désormais entre l'Allemagne et la France.

René VIVIANI.

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N° 150.

M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères,  
à M. ALLIZE, Ministre de France à Munich.

Paris le 3 août 1914.

Veillez faire connaître au Gouvernement royal bavarois que vous avez reçu pour instruction de conformer votre attitude à celle de l'Ambassadeur de la République à Berlin et de quitter Munich,

René VIVIANI.

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N° 151.

**M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères,**  
à MM. les Représentants de la France à Londres, Saint-Petersbourg,  
Vienne, Rome, Madrid, Berne, Constantinople, La Haye, Copen-  
hague, Christiania, Stockholm, Bucarest, Athènes, Belgrade.

Paris, le 3 août 1914.

J'apprends de source officielle belge que les troupes allemandes ont violé le terri-  
toire belge à Gemmerich dans la région de Verviers.

René VIVIANI.

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N° 152.

**M. KLOBUKOWSKI, Ministre de France à Bruxelles,**  
à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étran-  
gères.

Bruxelles, le 4 août 1914.

Le Chef de Cabinet du Ministère des Affaires étrangères me remet une lettre par laquelle le « Gouvernement du Roi déclare être fermement décidé à résister par tous les moyens en son pouvoir à l'agression de l'Allemagne. La Belgique fait appel à l'Angleterre, la France et la Russie pour coopérer comme garantes à la défense de son territoire.

« Il y aurait une action concertée et commune ayant pour but de résister aux mesures de force, employées par l'Allemagne contre la Belgique, et en même temps de garantir le maintien de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité de la Belgique dans l'avenir.

« La Belgique est heureuse de pouvoir déclarer qu'elle assurera la défense des places fortes. »

KLOBUKOWSKI.

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N° 153.

**M. Paul CAMBON, Ambassadeur de France à Londres,**

**à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.**

Londres, le 4 août 1914.

Sir Edw. Grey m'a prié de venir le voir à l'instant pour me dire que le premier Ministre déclarerait aujourd'hui à la Chambre des Communes que l'Allemagne avait été invitée à retirer son ultimatum à la Belgique et à donner sa réponse à l'Angleterre ce soir avant minuit.

**Paul CAMBON.**

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N° 154.

**M. KLOBUKOWSKI, Ministre de France à Bruxelles,**

**à M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.**

Bruxelles, le 4 août 1914.

Le Ministre d'Allemagne informe ce matin le Ministère des Affaires étrangères belge que, par suite du refus du Gouvernement belge, le Gouvernement impérial se voit forcé d'exécuter, par la force des armes, les mesures de sécurité indispensables vis-à-vis des menaces françaises.

**KLOBUKOWSKI.**

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155.

**M. BAPST, Ministre de France à Copenhague,**

**à M. DOUMERGUE, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.**

Copenhague, 6 août 1914.

L'Ambassadeur de France à Berlin me prie de communiquer à votre Excellence le télégramme suivant :

J'ai été dirigé par le Gouvernement allemand sur le Danemark. Je viens d'arriver à Copenhague. Tout le personnel de l'Ambassade et le Chargé d'affaires de Russie à Darmstadt avec sa famille, m'accompagnaient. On a usé de tels procédés à notre égard que je crois, utile d'en faire le rapport complet à Votre Excellence par le télégraphe.

Lundi matin, 3 août, après que j'avais, conformément à vos instructions, adressé à M. de Jagow une protestation contre les actes d'agression commis sur le territoire

français par les troupes allemandes, le Secrétaire d'État vint me voir. M. de Jagow venait se plaindre d'actes d'agression qu'il prétendait avoir été commis en Allemagne, à Nuremberg et à Coblenz notamment, par des aviateurs français qui, selon lui, « seraient venus de Belgique ». — Je répondis que je n'avais pas la moindre donnée sur les faits dont il voulait faire état et dont l'in vraisemblance me paraissait évidente; je lui demandai à mon tour s'il avait pris connaissance de la Note que je lui avais adressée au sujet de l'envahissement de notre territoire par des détachements de l'armée allemande. — Comme le Secrétaire d'État me disait n'avoir pas encore lu cette Note, je lui en donnai connaissance. J'appelai son attention sur l'acte commis par l'officier commandant un de ces détachements qui s'était avancé jusqu'au village français de Joncherey, à 10 kilomètres à l'intérieur de nos frontières, et avait brûlé la cervelle à un soldat français qu'il y avait rencontré. Après avoir qualifié cet acte, j'ajoutai : — « Vous reconnaîtrez qu'en aucune hypothèse il ne saurait être comparé à un vol d'aéroplane sur territoire étranger, accompli par des particuliers animés de cet esprit d'audace individuelle qui distingue les aviateurs.

Un acte d'agression commis sur le territoire d'un voisin par des détachements de troupes régulières commandés par des officiers présente une gravité toute autre. »

M. de Jagow me déclara qu'il ignorait les faits dont je lui parlais et il conclut qu'il était difficile qu'il ne s'en produisit pas de cette nature lorsque deux armées, remplies des sentiments qui animaient nos troupes, se trouvaient face à face de chaque côté de la frontière.

A ce moment, les attroupements qui se trouvaient sur la Parèzer Platz, devant l'Ambassade et que nous apercevions à travers la fenêtre entr'ouverte de mon cabinet, poussèrent des cris contre la France. Je demandai au Secrétaire d'État quand tout cela finirait.

« Le Gouvernement n'a pas encore pris de décision, me répondit M. de Jagow. Il est probable que M. de Schoen recevra aujourd'hui l'ordre de demander ses passeports, et ensuite, vous recevrez les vôtres ». — Le Secrétaire d'État m'assura que du reste je n'avais aucune préoccupation à avoir au sujet de mon départ et que toutes les convenances seraient observées à mon égard ainsi qu'à l'égard de mon personnel. Nous ne devions plus nous voir et nous primes congé l'un de l'autre, après un entretien qui avait été courtois et qui ne pouvait me faire prévoir ce que l'on me réservait.

Avant de quitter M. de Jagow, je lui avais exprimé le désir de faire une visite personnelle au Chancelier, puisque ce serait la dernière fois que j'aurais l'occasion de le voir.

M. de Jagow me répondit qu'il ne m'engageait pas à donner suite à cette intention, car cette entrevue ne servirait à rien et ne pourrait être que pénible.

A 6 heures du soir, M. de Langwerth m'a apporté mes passeports. Il refusa au nom de son Gouvernement d'accéder au désir que je lui exprimais de me laisser partir par la Hollande ou la Belgique. Il me proposa de partir soit par Copenhague, bien qu'il ne put m'assurer le libre passage de la mer, soit par la Suisse, via Constance,

J'acceptai cette dernière voie; M. de Langwerth m'ayant demandé de partir le plus tôt possible, il fut convenu, en raison de la nécessité où j'étais de m'entendre avec

l'Ambassadeur d'Espagne, qui prend nos intérêts en main, que je quitterais l'Ambassade le lendemain mardi 4 août, à 10 heures du soir.

Une heure après le départ de M. de Langwerth, à 7 heures, M. de Lancken, ancien Conseiller d'Ambassade à Paris, vint me dire de la part du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, d'inviter le personnel de mon Ambassade à ne plus prendre ses repas dans les restaurants. Cette consigne était si stricte que le lendemain mardi j'eus besoin de recourir à l'autorité de la Wilhelmstrasse pour que l'hôtel Bristol nous envoyât nos repas à l'Ambassade.

Le même soir, lundi à 11 heures, M. de Langwerth revint m'apprendre que son Gouvernement me refusait le retour par la Suisse sous le prétexte qu'il faudrait trois jours et trois nuits pour me conduire à Constance. Il m'annonça que je serais dirigé sur Vienne. Je ne consentis à ce changement que sous réserve et dans la nuit j'écrivis à M. de Langwerth la lettre suivante :

« Berlin, 3 août 1914.

M. LE BARON,

« Je réfléchis à la route dont vous êtes venu me parler ce soir pour me faire rentrer dans mon pays. Vous me proposez de passer par Vienne. Je suis exposé à me trouver retenu dans cette ville, sinon du fait du Gouvernement autrichien, du moins du fait des circonstances de sa mobilisation, qui lui crée des difficultés analogues à celles de l'Allemagne pour la circulation des trains.

« Dans ces conditions, je crois devoir réclamer du Gouvernement allemand l'engagement d'honneur que le Gouvernement autrichien me dirigera sur la Suisse et que le Gouvernement suisse ne fermera ni à moi, ni aux personnes qui m'accompagnent, sa frontière qu'on me dit justement fermée aux étrangers.

« Je ne puis donc accepter la proposition que vous m'avez faite que si j'ai les sûretés que je réclame et si je suis assuré de ne pas être retenu quelques mois hors de mon pays. »

Jules CAMBON.

En réponse à cette lettre, le lendemain matin, mardi 4 août, M. de Langwerth me donna par écrit l'assurance que les autorités autrichiennes et suisses avaient reçu les communications nécessaires.

En même temps, on arrêtait chez lui, dans son lit, M. Miladowski, attaché au Consulat de Berlin, ainsi que d'autres Français. M. Miladowski, pour qui un passeport diplomatique avait été demandé, put être relâché au bout de 4 heures.

Je me préparais à partir pour Vienne, quand, à 4 heures 45, M. de Langwerth revint m'annoncer que je devrais partir avec les personnes m'accompagnant à 10 heures du soir, mais que je serais conduit en Danemark. Devant cette exigence nouvelle, je demandai si l'on me mettrait dans une forteresse, au cas où je ne l'accepterais pas. M. de Langwerth me répondit simplement qu'il reviendrait chercher la réponse dans une demi-heure. Je ne voulais pas donner au Gouvernement allemand le prétexte de dire que je m'étais refusé à sortir d'Allemagne. Je déclarai donc à M. de Langwerth, lorsqu'il revint, que je me soumettrais à l'ordre qui m'était donné, mais « que je protestais ».

J'écrivis aussitôt à M. de Jagow la lettre, dont la copie suit :

« Berlin, 4 août 1914.

« MONSIEUR LE SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT,

« Votre Excellence m'avait dit à plusieurs reprises que le Gouvernement impérial, conformément aux usages de la courtoisie internationale, me faciliterait mon retour dans mon pays et me donnerait tous les moyens d'y rentrer rapidement.

« Cependant hier, après m'avoir refusé l'accès de la Belgique et de la Hollande, M. le baron de Langwerth m'a informé que je passerais par la Suisse via Constance. Dans la nuit, j'ai été avisé que je serais envoyé en Autriche, pays qui prend part du côté de l'Allemagne à la présente guerre. Comme j'ignorais les intentions de l'Autriche à mon égard, puisque sur son sol je ne suis qu'un simple particulier, j'ai écrit au baron de Langwerth que je demandais au Gouvernement impérial l'engagement que les autorités impériales et royales autrichiennes me donneraient toutes les facilités possibles pour continuer ma route, et que la Suisse ne se fermerait pas devant moi. M. de Langwerth a bien voulu me répondre par écrit que je pouvais être assuré d'un voyage facile et que les autorités autrichiennes feraient tout le nécessaire.

« Il est près de 5 heures et le baron de Langwerth vient de m'annoncer que je serai dirigé sur le Danemark. Étant donné les événements, je ne suis pas assuré de trouver un bâtiment pour me transporter en Angleterre, et c'est cette considération qui m'avait fait écarter cette proposition, d'accord avec M. de Langwerth.

« En réalité, on ne me laisse aucune liberté, et on me traite presque en prisonnier. Je suis obligé de me soumettre, n'ayant aucun moyen d'obtenir qu'il soit tenu compte des règles de la courtoisie internationale à mon égard, mais je tiens à protester entre les mains de Votre Excellence contre la façon dont je suis traité.

Jules CAMBON.

Pendant qu'on portait ma lettre, j'étais avisé que le voyage ne s'effectuerait pas directement, mais par la voie du Schleswig. A 10 heures du soir, je quittais l'Ambassade, avec mon personnel, au milieu d'un grand concours de police à pied et à cheval.

A la gare, un employé inférieur du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères représentait seul cette administration.

Le voyage s'est effectué avec une lenteur extrême. Nous avons mis plus de vingt-quatre heures pour gagner la frontière. Il a semblé qu'à chaque station on attendait des ordres pour repartir. J'étais accompagné du major von Rheinbaben, du régiment Alexandre de la Garde, et d'un fonctionnaire de la police. Aux environs du canal de Kiel, la troupe a envahi nos wagons. On a fait fermer les fenêtres et les rideaux des voitures; chacun de nous a dû se tenir isolément dans son compartiment avec défense de se lever et de toucher à ses sacs de voyage. Dans le couloir des wagons, devant la porte de chacun de nos compartiments maintenue ouverte, se tenait un soldat, le revolver au poing et le doigt sur la gachette. Le chargé d'affaires de Russie, les femmes, les enfants, tout le monde a été soumis au même traitement.

A la dernière station allemande, vers 11 heures du soir, le major von Rheinbaben

est venu prendre congé de moi. Je lui ai remis, pour M. de Jagow, la lettre qui suit :

• Mercredi soir, 5 août 1914.

• MONSIEUR LE SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT,

• Hier, avant de quitter Berlin, j'ai protesté par écrit auprès de Votre Excellence contre les changements successifs de direction qui m'ont été imposés par le Gouvernement impérial, pour sortir d'Allemagne.

• Aujourd'hui, lors du passage du train qui m'emportait au-dessus du canal de Kiel, on a voulu visiter tous nos bagages, comme si nous pouvions cacher quelque instrument de destruction. Grâce à l'intervention du major von Rheinbaben, cet affront nous a été épargné.

• Mais on a fait plus.

• On nous a obligé de rester chacun dans nos compartiments, dont les fenêtres et les rideaux étaient fermés. Pendant ce temps, dans le couloir des voitures, à la porte de chaque compartiment et faisant face à chacun de nous, se tenait un soldat, le revolver à la main, le doigt sur la gachette, durant près d'une demi-heure.

• Je crois devoir protester contre cette menace de violences à l'égard de l'Ambassadeur de la République et du personnel de son Ambassade, violences que rien n'avait pu seulement me faire pressentir. J'avais l'honneur d'écrire hier à Votre Excellence que j'étais traité presque en prisonnier. Aujourd'hui, c'est en prisonnier dangereux que j'ai été traité. Je dois noter que, dans le cours du voyage qui, depuis Berlin jusqu'au Danemark, a pris vingt-quatre heures, aucun repas n'a été préparé, ni fourni à moi, non plus qu'aux personnes reconduites avec moi jusqu'à la frontière.

Jules CAMBON.

Je croyais tout terminé, lorsque peu après le major von Rheinbaben vint, un peu confus, m'annoncer que le train ne poursuivrait pas jusqu'à la frontière danoise si je ne payais pas le prix de ce train. Je m'étonnai qu'on ne me l'eut pas fait payer à Berlin et, qu'en tout cas, on ne m'eut pas prévenu. Je proposai de payer par un chèque sur une des plus grandes banques de Berlin ; cette facilité me fut refusée. Avec le concours de mes compagnons, je pus réunir en or la somme qui m'était demandée immédiatement et qui s'élevait à 3,611 marks 75, soit à environ 5,000 francs au taux actuel du change (1).

Après ce dernier incident, je crus devoir demander à M. de Rheinbaben sa parole d'officier et de gentilhomme qu'on allait me conduire jusqu'à la frontière danoise. Il me la donna et j'exigeai que l'homme de police qui était avec nous nous accompagnât.

Nous arrivâmes ainsi à la première station danoise où le Gouvernement danois avait fait préparer un train pour nous conduire à Copenhague.

On m'assura que mon collègue d'Angleterre et le Ministre de Belgique, bien qu'ils aient quitté Berlin après moi, sont partis directement pour la Hollande. Je suis frappé de cette différence de traitement. Et comme le Danemark et la Norvège sont remplis en ce moment d'espions, si je réussis à m'embarquer en Norvège, on craint que je ne sois arrêté en mer, avec les officiers qui m'accompagnent.

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(1) Ultérieurement la somme ainsi demandée à M. Jules Cambon a été reversée à l'Ambassadeur d'Espagne à Berlin pour être remboursée à l'Ambassadeur de France.



Je ne veux pas terminer cette dépêche sans signaler à votre Excellence le dévouement et l'énergie dont tout le personnel de l'Ambassade n'a pas cessé de faire preuve pendant la durée de cette crise; je serais heureux qu'il lui fût tenu compte des services rendus à cette occasion au Gouvernement de la République, en particulier par les Secrétaires de l'Ambassade ainsi que par l'Attaché militaire et l'Attaché naval.

Jules CAMBON.

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N° 156.

M. MOLLARD, Ministre de France à Luxembourg,  
à M. DOUMERGUE, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Paris, le 4 août 1914.

Le Ministre d'État est venu mardi matin 4 août, vers huit heures et demie, à la Légation pour me notifier que les autorités militaires allemandes exigeaient mon départ. Sur ma réponse que je ne céderais que devant la force, M. Eyschen me dit qu'il connaissait mes sentiments à ce sujet et que c'était précisément pour cela qu'il était venu lui-même me faire cette communication qui lui coûtait beaucoup, car c'était effectivement devant la force qu'il me priait de partir. Il ajouta qu'il allait m'en apporter la preuve écrite.

Je ne cachai pas à M. Eyschen la tristesse et l'inquiétude que j'avais de laisser mes compatriotes sans défense et lui demandai de vouloir bien se charger de leur protection, ce qu'il accepta.

Au moment de partir, il me remit la lettre ci-jointe (annexe I), qui est la réponse du Gouvernement luxembourgeois à la déclaration que j'avais faite la veille au soir, selon les instructions télégraphiques de M. Viviani.

Vers dix heures, le Ministre d'État vint de nouveau à la Légation et me laissa, avec un mot de lui, une copie certifiée de la lettre que lui avait adressée le Ministre d'Allemagne au sujet de mon départ du Luxembourg (annexes II et III).

Il me dit également qu'il avait fait connaître à M. von Buch que le Gouvernement luxembourgeois serait chargé de la protection des Français et aurait la garde de la Légation et de la Chancellerie. Cette nouvelle ne parut pas plaire à mon collègue d'Allemagne, qui conseilla à M. Eyschen de m'inciter à confier ce soin au Ministre de Belgique. J'expliquai au Ministre d'État que la situation était particulière. Etant accrédité auprès de S. A. R. la Grande-Duchesse et mon pays n'étant pas en état de guerre avec le Luxembourg, il était, dans ces conditions, tout indiqué que ce fût le Gouvernement luxembourgeois qui assurât la sauvegarde de mes compatriotes. M. Eyschen n'insista pas et accepta de nouveau la mission que je lui confiai.

Le Ministre d'État me demanda alors de vouloir bien partir sans bruit, afin d'éviter des manifestations qui ne manqueraient pas, me dit-il, d'amener des représailles vis-à-vis des Français de la part des autorités militaires allemandes. Je lui répondis que j'attachais trop de prix à la sécurité de mes compatriotes pour la compromettre et qu'il n'avait rien à craindre.

Mon départ, qu'on exigeait le plus tôt possible, fut fixé à 2 heures, il fut également entendu que je partirais dans mon automobile. Pour le sauf-conduit, M. Eyschen me dit que le Ministre d'Allemagne était actuellement au quartier général allemand pour le demander et qu'il aurait soin de me le faire tenir en temps utile.

A 2 heures un quart, M. le Ministre d'État, accompagné de M. Henrion, Conseiller du Gouvernement, vint me faire ses adieux et recevoir les clefs de la Légation et celles de la Chancellerie.

Il me fit connaître que les ordres avaient été donnés pour mon libre passage et que je devais gagner Arlon par la route de Merle, la route de Mamers et la route d'Arlon. Il ajouta qu'un officier allemand m'attendrait route de Merle pour précéder ma voiture.

Je quittai alors la Légation et me rendis à Arlon par l'itinéraire fixé, mais je ne rencontrai personne.

Votre Excellence voudra bien trouver ci-contre (annexe IV) le texte de la lettre que j'ai remise à M. le Ministre d'État avant de quitter mon poste.

MOLLARD.

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ANNEXE I.

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M. EYSCHEN, Ministre d'État, Président du Gouvernement,

à M. MOLLARD, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire de France à Luxembourg.

Luxembourg, le 4 août 1914.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

Par sa communication verbale d'hier soir, Votre Excellence a eu la haute obligeance de porter à ma connaissance que, conformément au traité de Londres de 1867, le Gouvernement de la République entendait respecter la neutralité du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, comme il l'avait montré par son attitude, mais que la violation de cette neutralité par l'Allemagne était toutefois de nature à obliger la France à s'inspirer désormais à cet égard du souci de sa défense et de ses intérêts.

Vous me permettrez de constater, Monsieur le Ministre, que la décision du Gouvernement de la République est uniquement basée sur le fait d'une tierce Puissance dont, certes, le Grand-Duché n'est pas responsable.

Les droits du Luxembourg doivent donc rester intacts.

L'Empire allemand a formellement déclaré que seule une occupation temporaire du Luxembourg entraînait dans ses intentions.

J'aime à croire, Monsieur le Ministre, que le Gouvernement de la République n'aura pas de peine à constater avec moi que de tout temps et en toutes circonstances, le Grand-Duché a pleinement et loyalement rempli toutes les obligations généralement quelconques qui lui incombaient en vertu du traité de 1867.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

Le Ministre d'État,  
Président du Gouvernement,  
EYSCHEN.

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**ANNEXE II.**

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**Lettre particulière adressée par M. EYSCHEN, Ministre d'État, Président du Gouvernement,**

**à M. MOLLARD, Ministre de France à Luxembourg.**

**MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,**

Tout à l'heure, j'ai eu le très vif regret de vous faire connaître les intentions du Général von Fuchs au sujet de votre séjour à Luxembourg.

Comme j'ai eu l'honneur de vous le dire, j'avais demandé une constatation par écrit de la décision prise à ce sujet par l'autorité militaire.

Ci-joint copie d'une lettre que je viens de recevoir à l'instant de la part du Ministre d'Allemagne.

Il m'a été assuré que, dans l'exécution de la mesure, on ne manquera d'avoir tous les égards dus à votre qualité et à votre personne.

Veillez recevoir l'expression réitérée de tous mes regrets et de mes sentiments les meilleurs.

**EYSCHEN.**

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**ANNEXE III.**

**A Son Excellence le Ministre d'État, M. le Dr EYSCHEN.**

**EXCELLENCE,**

J'ai l'honneur, conformément aux instructions de Son Excellence M. le général Fuchs, de vous prier de vouloir bien inviter le Ministre de France, M. Mollard, à quitter aussitôt que possible le Luxembourg et à se rendre en France; autrement les autorités militaires allemandes se trouveraient dans la pénible obligation de placer M. Mollard sous la surveillance d'une escorte militaire et en cas extrême de procéder à son arrestation.

Je prie Votre Excellence de vouloir bien agréer à cette occasion l'assurance de ma considération la plus distinguée.

**VON BUCH.**

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ANNEXE IV.

**M. MOLLARD, Ministre de France à Luxembourg,**

**à Son Excellence M. EYSCHEN, Ministre d'État, Président du Gouvernement de Luxembourg.**

Luxembourg, le 4 août 1914.

**MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,**

Je viens de recevoir votre communication et m'incline devant la force.

Avant de quitter le Luxembourg, j'ai le devoir de me préoccuper du sort et de la sécurité de mes compatriotes. Connaissant l'esprit de justice et d'équité du Gouvernement luxembourgeois, j'ai l'honneur de prier Votre Excellence de les prendre sous sa haute protection et de veiller à la sauvegarde de leur vie et de leurs biens.

Je demanderai également à Votre Excellence d'assurer la garde de l'hôtel de la Légation et des bureaux de la Chancellerie.

Je serais très obligé à Votre Excellence de vouloir bien faire agréer à S. A. R. Madame la Grande-Duchesse l'hommage de mon profond respect et toutes mes excuses de n'avoir pu aller le lui exprimer moi-même.

En vous remerciant, Monsieur le Ministre, de toutes les marques de sympathie que vous m'avez données, je vous prie d'agréer la nouvelle assurance de ma haute considération.

Armand MOLLARD.

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N° 157.

*NOTIFICATION DU GOUVERNEMENT FRANÇAIS  
AUX REPRÉSENTANTS DES PUISSANCES À PARIS.*

Le Gouvernement impérial allemand, après avoir laissé ses forces armées franchir la frontière et se livrer sur le territoire français à divers actes de meurtre et de pillage; après avoir violé la neutralité du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, au mépris des stipulations de la Convention de Londres du 11 mai 1867 et de la Convention V de la Haye du 18 octobre 1907, *sur les droits et devoirs des puissances et des personnes en cas de guerre sur terre* (articles I et II), conventions signées de lui; après avoir adressé un ultimatum au Gouvernement royal de Belgique tendant à exiger le passage des forces allemandes par le territoire belge, en violation des Traités du 19 avril 1839, également signés de lui et de la susdite Convention de La Haye

A déclaré la guerre à la France le 3 août 1914, à 18 heures 45.

Le Gouvernement de la République se voit, dans ces conditions, obligé, de son côté, de recourir à la force des armes.

Il a, en conséquence, l'honneur de faire savoir, par la présente, au Gouvernement de . . . . que l'état de guerre existe entre la France et l'Allemagne à dater du 3 août 1914, 18 h. 45.

Le Gouvernement de la République proteste auprès de toutes les nations civilisées et spécialement auprès des Gouvernements signataires des Conventions et Traités sus rappelés, contre la violation par l'Empire allemand de ses engagements internationaux; il fait toutes réserves quant aux représailles qu'il pourrait se voir amener à exercer contre un ennemi aussi peu soucieux de la parole donnée.

Le Gouvernement de la République qui entend observer les principes du droit des gens, se conformera, durant les hostilités et sous réserve de réciprocité, aux dispositions des Conventions internationales signées par la France, concernant le droit de la guerre sur terre et sur mer.

La présente notification, faite en conformité de l'article 2 de la III<sup>e</sup> Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907, relative à l'ouverture des hostilités, et remise à . . . .

A Paris, le 4 août 1914, à 14 heures.

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N° 158.

*MESSAGE de M. POINCARÉ, Président de la République,  
à la séance extraordinaire du Parlement, le 4 août 1914.*

*(Journal officiel du 5 août 1914.)*

*(La Chambre écoute, debout, la lecture du message.)*

• MESSIEURS LES DÉPUTÉS,

• La France vient d'être l'objet d'une agression brutale et préméditée, qui est un insolent défi au droit des gens. Avant qu'une déclaration de guerre nous eût encore été adressée, avant même que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne eût demandé ses passeports, notre territoire a été violé. L'Empire d'Allemagne n'a fait hier soir que donner tardivement le nom véritable à un état de fait qu'il avait déjà créé.

• Depuis plus de quarante ans, les Français, dans un sincère amour de la paix, ont refoulé au fond de leur cœur le désir des réparations légitimes.

• Ils ont donné au monde l'exemple d'une grande nation qui, définitivement relevée de la défaite par la volonté, la patience et le travail, n'a usé de sa force renouvelée et rajeunie que dans l'intérêt du progrès et pour le bien de l'humanité.

• Depuis que l'ultimatum de l'Autriche a ouvert une crise menaçante pour l'Europe entière, la France s'est attachée à suivre et à recommander partout une politique de prudence, de sagesse et de modération.

• On ne peut lui imputer aucun acte, aucun geste, aucun mot qui n'ait été pacifique et conciliant.

• A l'heure des premiers combats, elle a le droit de se rendre solennellement cette

justice, qu'elle a fait, jusqu'au dernier moment, des efforts suprêmes pour conjurer la guerre qui vient d'éclater et dont l'Empire d'Allemagne supportera, devant l'histoire, l'écrasante responsabilité. (*Applaudissements unanimes et répétés.*)

• Au lendemain même du jour où nos alliés et nous, nous exprimions publiquement l'espérance de voir se poursuivre pacifiquement les négociations engagées sous les auspices du Cabinet de Londres, l'Allemagne a déclaré subitement la guerre à la Russie, elle a envahi le territoire du Luxembourg, elle a outrageusement insulté la noble nation belge (*Vifs applaudissements unanimes*), notre voisine et notre amie, et elle a essayé de nous surprendre traîtreusement en pleine conversation diplomatique. (*Nouveaux applaudissements unanimes et répétés.*)

• Mais la France veillait. Aussi attentive que pacifique, elle s'était préparée; et nos ennemis vont rencontrer sur leur chemin nos vaillantes troupes de couverture, qui sont à leurs postes de bataille et à l'abri desquelles s'achèvera méthodiquement la mobilisation de toutes nos forces nationales.

• Notre belle et courageuse armée, que la France accompagne aujourd'hui de sa pensée maternelle (*Vifs applaudissements*), s'est levée toute frémissante pour défendre l'honneur du drapeau et le sol de la patrie. (*Applaudissements unanimes et répétés.*)

• Le Président de la République, interprète de l'unanimité du pays, exprime à nos troupes de terre et de mer l'admiration et la confiance de tous les Français. (*Vifs applaudissements prolongés.*)

• Étroitement unie en un même sentiment, la Nation persévérera dans le sang-froid dont elle a donné, depuis l'ouverture de la crise, la preuve quotidienne. Elle saura, comme toujours, concilier les plus généreux élans et les ardeurs les plus enthousiastes avec cette maîtrise de soi qui est le signe des énergies durables et la meilleure garantie de la victoire. (*Applaudissements.*)

• Dans la guerre qui s'engage, la France aura pour elle le Droit, dont les peuples, non plus que les individus, ne sauraient impunément méconnaître l'éternelle puissance morale. (*Vifs applaudissements unanimes.*)

• Elle sera héroïquement défendue par tous ses fils, dont rien ne brisera devant l'ennemi l'union sacrée et qui sont aujourd'hui fraternellement rassemblés dans une même indignation contre l'agresseur et dans une même foi patriotique. (*Vifs applaudissements prolongés et cris de : vive la France.*)

• Elle est fidèlement secondée par la Russie, son alliée (*Vifs applaudissements unanimes*); elle est soutenue par la loyale amitié de l'Angleterre. (*Vifs applaudissements unanimes.*)

• Et déjà de tous les points du monde civilisé viennent à elle les sympathies et les vœux. Car elle représente aujourd'hui, une fois de plus, devant l'univers, la liberté, la justice et la raison. (*Vifs applaudissements répétés.*)

• Haut les cœurs et vive la France! (*Applaudissements unanimes et prolongés.*) •

Raymond POINCARÉ.

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N° 159.

*Discours prononcé par M. René VIVIANI, Président du Conseil,  
à la Chambre des Députés le 4 août 1914.*

(Journal officiel du 5 août 1914.)

M. René VIVIANI, *Président du Conseil*. Messieurs, l'ambassadeur d'Allemagne a quitté hier Paris, après nous avoir notifié l'état de guerre.

Le Gouvernement doit au Parlement le récit véridique des événements qui, en moins de dix jours, ont déchainé la guerre européenne et obligé la France pacifique et forte à défendre sa frontière contre une agression dont la soudaineté calculée souligne l'odieuse injustice.

Cette agression, que rien n'excuse et qui a commencé avant qu'aucune déclaration de guerre nous l'eût notifiée, est le dernier acte d'un plan dont j'entends affirmer, devant notre démocratie et devant l'opinion civilisée, l'origine et le but.

A la suite du crime abominable qui a coûté la vie à l'archiduc héritier d'Autriche-Hongrie et à la duchesse de Hohenberg, des difficultés se sont élevées entre le cabinet de Vienne et le cabinet de Belgrade.

La plupart des puissances n'en ont été qu'officieusement informées jusqu'au vendredi 24 juillet, date à laquelle les ambassadeurs d'Autriche-Hongrie leur ont remis une circulaire que la presse a publiée.

Cette circulaire avait pour objet d'expliquer et de justifier un ultimatum adressé la veille au soir à la Serbie par le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade.

Cet ultimatum, en affirmant la complicité de nombreux sujets et associations serbes dans le crime de Serajevo, insinuait que les autorités officielles serbes elles-mêmes n'y étaient pas étrangères. Il exigeait pour le samedi 25 juillet à six heures du soir, une réponse de la Serbie.

Les satisfactions exigées, ou du moins plusieurs d'entre elles, portaient indiscutablement atteinte aux droits d'un État souverain. Malgré leur caractère excessif, la Serbie, le 25 juillet, déclara s'y soumettre, presque sans aucune réserve.

A cette soumission, qui constituait pour l'Autriche-Hongrie un succès, pour la paix européenne une garantie, les conseils de la France, de la Russie et de la Grande-Bretagne, adressés à Belgrade, dès la première heure, n'étaient pas étrangers.

Ces conseils avaient d'autant plus de valeur que les exigences austro-hongroises avaient été dissimulées aux chancelleries de la Triple Entente à qui, dans les trois semaines précédentes, le Gouvernement austro-hongrois avait donné à plusieurs reprises l'assurance que ses revendications seraient extrêmement modérées.

C'est donc avec un juste étonnement que les cabinets de Paris, de Saint-Pétersbourg et de Londres apprirent le 26 juillet que le ministre d'Autriche à Belgrade, après un examen de quelques minutes, avait déclaré inacceptable la réponse serbe et rompu les relations diplomatiques.

Cet étonnement s'aggravait de ce fait que, dès le vendredi 24, l'ambassadeur d'Allemagne était venu lire au ministre français des affaires étrangères une note ver-

bale affirmant que le conflit austro-serbe devait demeurer localisé, sans intervention des grandes puissances, faute de quoi on en pouvait redouter des « conséquences incalculables ». Une démarche analogue fut faite le samedi 25 à Londres et à Saint-Pétersbourg.

Est-il besoin, messieurs, de vous signaler combien les termes menaçants employés par l'ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Paris contrastaient avec les sentiments conciliants dont les puissances de la Triple Entente venaient de fournir la preuve par les conseils de soumission qu'elles avaient donnés à la Serbie ?

Néanmoins, sans nous arrêter au caractère anormal de la démarche allemande, nous avons, d'accord avec nos alliés et nos amis, immédiatement engagé une action de conciliation en invitant l'Allemagne à s'y associer.

Nous avons eu, dès la première heure, le regret de constater que nos dispositions et nos efforts ne rencontraient à Berlin aucun écho.

Non seulement l'Allemagne ne paraissait nullement disposée à donner à l'Autriche-Hongrie les conseils amicaux que sa situation l'autorisait à formuler, mais, dès ce moment, et plus encore dans les jours suivants, elle semblait s'interposer entre le cabinet de Vienne et les propositions transactionnelles émanant des autres puissances.

Le mardi 28 juillet, l'Autriche-Hongrie déclara la guerre à la Serbie. Cette déclaration de guerre aggravant, à trois jours de distance, l'état de choses créé par la rupture des relations diplomatiques, permettait de croire à une volonté réfléchie de guerre, à un programme systématique tendant à l'asservissement de la Serbie.

Ainsi se trouvait mis en cause, non seulement l'indépendance d'un peuple vaillant, mais l'équilibre des Balkans, inscrit dans le traité de Bucarest de 1913, et consacré par l'adhésion morale de toutes les grandes puissances.

Cependant, à la suggestion du Gouvernement Britannique, toujours attaché de la façon la plus ferme au maintien de la paix européenne, les négociations se poursuivaient ou, plus exactement, les Puissances de la Triple Entente essayaient de les poursuivre.

De ce désir commun est sortie la proposition d'une action à quatre, Angleterre, France, Allemagne, Italie, destinée, en assurant à l'Autriche toutes les satisfactions légitimes, à ménager un règlement équitable du conflit.

Le mercredi 29, le Gouvernement Russe, constatant l'échec persistant de ces tentatives, et en présence de la mobilisation et de la déclaration de guerre autrichiennes, redoutant pour la Serbie un écrasement militaire, décida, à titre préventif, la mobilisation des troupes de quatre arrondissements militaires, c'est-à-dire des formations échelonnées le long de la frontière austro-hongroise exclusivement.

Ce faisant, il prenait soin d'aviser le Gouvernement allemand que cette mesure, limitée et sans caractère offensif à l'égard de l'Autriche, n'était, à aucun degré, dirigée contre l'Allemagne.

Dans une conversation avec l'ambassadeur de Russie, à Berlin, le Secrétaire d'État allemand aux affaires étrangères ne faisait point difficulté de le reconnaître.

Par contre, tout ce que tentait la Grande-Bretagne, avec l'adhésion de la Russie et l'appui de la France, pour établir le contact entre l'Autriche et la Serbie sous le



patronage moral de l'Europe, se heurtait, à Berlin, à un parti pris négatif dont les dépêches diplomatiques fournissent la preuve péremptoire.

C'était là une situation troublante et qui rendait vraisemblable l'existence à Berlin de certaines arrière-pensées. Quelques heures après, ces hypothèses et ces craintes devaient se transformer en certitudes.

En effet, l'attitude négative de l'Allemagne faisait place trente-six heures plus tard à des initiatives justement alarmantes : le 31 juillet, l'Allemagne, en proclamant l'état de « danger de guerre », coupait les communications entre elle et le reste de l'Europe et se donnait toute liberté de poursuivre contre la France, dans un secret absolu, des préparatifs militaires que rien, vous l'avez vu, ne pouvait justifier.

Depuis plusieurs jours déjà, et dans des conditions difficiles à expliquer, l'Allemagne avait préparé le passage de son armée du pied de paix au pied de guerre. .

Dès le 25 juillet au matin, c'est-à-dire avant même l'expiration du délai assigné à la Serbie par l'Autriche, elle avait consigné les garnisons d'Alsace-Lorraine. Le même jour, elle avait mis en état d'armement les ouvrages proches de la frontière. Le 26, elle avait prescrit aux chemins de fer les mesures préparatoires de la concentration. Le 27, elle avait effectué les réquisitions et mis en place ses troupes de couverture. Le 28, les appels individuels de réservistes avaient commencé et les éléments éloignés de la frontière en avaient été rapprochés.

Toutes ces mesures, poursuivies avec une méthode implacable, pouvaient-elles nous laisser des doutes sur les intentions de l'Allemagne ?

Telle était la situation, lorsque, le 31 juillet au soir, le Gouvernement allemand, qui depuis le 24, n'avait participé par aucun acte positif aux efforts conciliants de la Triple Entente, adressa au Gouvernement russe un ultimatum, sous prétexte que la Russie avait ordonné la mobilisation générale de ses armées, et il exigea dans un délai de douze heures l'arrêt de cette mobilisation.

Cette exigence, d'autant plus blessante dans la forme que, quelques heures plus tôt, l'empereur Nicolas II, dans un geste de confiance spontanée, avait demandé à l'empereur d'Allemagne sa médiation, se produisait au moment où, à la demande de l'Angleterre et au su de l'Allemagne, le Gouvernement russe acceptait une formule de nature à préparer un règlement amiable du conflit austro-serbe et des difficultés austro-russes par l'arrêt simultané des opérations et préparatifs militaires.

Le même jour, cette démarche inamicale à l'égard de la Russie se doublait d'actes nettement hostiles à l'égard de la France : rupture des communications par routes, voies ferrées, télégraphes et téléphones, saisie des locomotives françaises à leur arrivée à la frontière, placement de mitrailleuses au milieu de la voie ferrée qui avait été coupée, concentration de troupes à cette frontière.

Dès ce moment, il ne nous était plus permis de croire à la sincérité des déclarations pacifiques que le représentant de l'Allemagne continuait à nous prodiguer. (*Mouvement.*)

Nous savions qu'à l'abri de l'état de « danger de guerre » proclamé, l'Allemagne mobilisait.

Nous apprenions que six classes de réservistes avaient été appelées et que les transports de concentration se poursuivaient pour des corps d'armée même stationnés à une notable distance de la frontière.

A mesure que ces événements se déroulaient, le Gouvernement, attentif et vigilant, prenait de jour en jour, et même d'heure en heure, les mesures de sauvegarde qu'imposait la situation; la mobilisation générale de nos armées de terre et de mer était ordonnée.

Le même soir, à sept heures trente, l'Allemagne, sans s'arrêter à l'acceptation par le cabinet de Saint-Petersbourg de la proposition anglaise que j'ai rappelée plus haut, déclarait la guerre à la Russie.

Le lendemain, dimanche 2 août, sans égard à l'extrême modération de la France, en contradiction avec les déclarations pacifiques de l'ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Paris, au mépris des règles du droit international, les troupes allemandes franchissaient en trois points différents notre frontière.

En même temps, en violation du traité de 1867, qui a garanti avec la signature de la Prusse la neutralité du Luxembourg, elles envahissaient le territoire du Grand-Duché, motivant ainsi la protestation du Gouvernement luxembourgeois.

Enfin la neutralité de la Belgique même était menacée : le ministre d'Allemagne remettait le 2 août au soir au Gouvernement belge un ultimatum l'invitant à faciliter en Belgique les opérations militaires contre la France, sous le prétexte mensonger que la neutralité belge était menacée par nous; le Gouvernement belge s'y refusa, déclarant qu'il était résolu à défendre énergiquement sa neutralité, respectée par la France et garantie par les traités, en particulier par le roi de Prusse. (*Applaudissements unanimes et prolongés.*)

Depuis lors, messieurs, les agressions se sont renouvelées, multipliées et accentuées. Sur plus de quinze points notre frontière a été violée. Des coups de fusil ont été tirés contre nos soldats et nos douaniers. Il y a eu des morts et des blessés. Hier, un aviateur militaire allemand a lancé trois bombes sur Lunéville.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, à qui nous avons communiqué ces faits, ainsi qu'à toutes les grandes Puissances, ne les a pas démentis et n'en a pas exprimé de regrets. Par contre, il est venu hier soir me demander ses passeports et nous notifier l'état de guerre, en arguant, contre toute vérité, d'actes d'hostilité commis par des aviateurs français en territoire allemand dans la région de l'Eiffel et même sur le chemin de fer près de Carlsruhe et près de Nuremberg. Voici la lettre qu'il m'a remise à ce sujet :

« MONSIEUR LE PRÉSIDENT,

« Les autorités administratives et militaires allemandes ont constaté un certain nombre d'actes d'hostilité caractérisée commis sur territoire allemand par des aviateurs militaires français. Plusieurs de ces derniers ont manifestement violé la neutralité de la Belgique survolant le territoire de ce pays. L'un a essayé de détruire des constructions près de Wesel, d'autres ont été aperçus sur la région de l'Eiffel, un autre a jeté des bombes sur le chemin de fer près de Carlsruhe et de Nuremberg.

« Je suis chargé et j'ai l'honneur de faire connaître à Votre Excellence qu'en présence de ces agressions, l'Empire allemand se considère en état de guerre avec la France du fait de cette dernière Puissance.

« J'ai en même temps l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence que les autorités allemandes retiendront les navires marchands français dans des ports

allemands, mais qu'elles les relâcheront si, dans les quarante-huit heures, la réciprocité complète est assurée.

« Ma mission diplomatique ayant ainsi pris fin, il ne me reste plus qu'à prier Votre Excellence de vouloir bien me munir de mes passeports et de prendre les mesures qu'elle jugerait utiles pour assurer mon retour en Allemagne avec le personnel de l'ambassade ainsi qu'avec le personnel de la Légation de Bavière et du Consulat général d'Allemagne à Paris.

« Veuillez agréer, monsieur le président, l'expression de ma très haute considération.

« Signé : SCHOEN. »

Ai-je besoin, messieurs, d'insister sur l'absurdité de ces prétextes que l'on voudrait présenter comme des griefs? A aucun moment, aucun aviateur français n'a pénétré en Belgique, aucun aviateur français n'a commis, ni en Bavière, ni dans aucune autre partie de l'Allemagne, aucun acte d'hostilité. L'opinion européenne a déjà fait justice de ces inventions misérables. (*Vifs applaudissements unanimes.*)

Contre ces attaques qui violent toutes les lois de l'équité et toutes les règles du droit public, nous avons, dès maintenant, pris toutes les dispositions nécessaires; l'exécution s'en poursuit avec une rigoureuse méthode et un absolu sang-froid.

La mobilisation de l'armée russe se continue également avec une énergie remarquable et un enthousiasme sans restriction. (*La Chambre entière se lève. — Applaudissements unanimes et prolongés.*)

L'armée belge, mobilisée à 250.000 hommes, se dispose à défendre avec une magnifique ardeur la neutralité et l'indépendance de son pays. (*Nouveaux applaudissements vifs et unanimes.*)

La flotte anglaise est mobilisée tout entière et l'ordre a été donné de mobiliser l'armée de terre. (*Tous les députés se lèvent et applaudissent longuement.*)

Dès 1912, des pourparlers avaient eu lieu entre les États-Majors anglais et français, terminés par un échange de lettres entre Sir Edward Grey et M. Paul Cambon. Le Secrétaire d'État aux affaires étrangères a donné, hier soir, à la Chambre des communes, communication des lettres échangées, et je vais avoir l'honneur, d'accord avec le Gouvernement britannique, de porter à votre connaissance le contenu de ces deux documents :

FOREIGN OFFICE.

Londres, le 22 novembre 1912.

« MON CHER AMBASSADEUR,

« A différentes reprises, au cours des dernières années, les États-Majors militaires et navals de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne ont échangé leur vues. Il a toujours été entendu que ces échanges de vues ne portent pas atteinte à la liberté de l'un et l'autre Gouvernement de décider à n'importe quel moment dans l'avenir s'il doit ou non soutenir l'autre avec ses forces armées. Nous avons admis que des échanges de vues entre

techniciens ne constituent pas et ne doivent pas être regardés comme constituant un engagement qui oblige l'un ou l'autre Gouvernement à intervenir dans une éventualité qui ne s'est pas encore présentée et qui peut ne jamais naître. Par exemple, la répartition actuelle des flottes françaises et anglaises ne repose pas sur un engagement de collaborer en temps de guerre.

« Vous avez cependant fait remarquer que si l'un ou l'autre Gouvernement avait de graves raisons de redouter une attaque de la part d'une tierce puissance sans aucune provocation, il pourrait être essentiel de savoir si, dans cette circonstance, il pourrait compter sur l'assistance militaire de l'autre puissance.

« J'accepte que si l'un ou l'autre gouvernement a de graves raisons de craindre une attaque sans provocation de la part d'une tierce puissance, ou tout autre événement menaçant pour la paix générale, ce gouvernement devrait examiner immédiatement avec l'autre s'ils ne doivent pas agir tous deux ensemble pour empêcher l'agression et maintenir la paix et, dans ce cas, rechercher les mesures qu'ils seraient disposés à prendre en commun. Si ces mesures comportaient une action militaire, les plans des États-Majors généraux seraient aussitôt pris en considération et les deux Gouvernements décideraient alors la suite qu'il conviendrait de leur donner.

« Sincèrement vôtre,

« Signé : E. GREY. »

A cette lettre, à la date du 23 novembre 1912, notre ambassadeur, M. Paul Cambon, répondait :

« Londres, le 23 novembre 1912.

CHER SIR EDWARD.

« Par votre lettre en date d'hier, 22 novembre, vous m'avez rappelé que, dans ces dernières années, les autorités militaires et navales de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne s'étaient consultées de temps en temps; qu'il avait toujours été entendu que ces consultations ne restreignaient pas la liberté, pour chaque Gouvernement, de décider dans l'avenir s'ils se prêteraient l'un l'autre le concours de leurs forces armées; que, de part et d'autre, ces consultations entre spécialistes n'étaient et ne devaient pas être considérées comme des engagements obligeant nos Gouvernements à agir dans certains cas; que cependant je vous avais fait observer que, si l'un ou l'autre des deux Gouvernements avait de graves raisons d'appréhender une attaque non provoquée de la part d'une tierce puissance, il deviendrait essentiel de savoir s'il pourrait compter sur l'assistance armée de l'autre.

« Votre lettre répond à cette observation et je suis autorisé à vous déclarer que, dans le cas où l'un de nos deux Gouvernements aurait un motif grave d'appréhender soit l'agression d'une tierce puissance, soit quelque événement menaçant pour la paix générale, ce Gouvernement examinerait immédiatement avec l'autre si les deux Gouvernements doivent agir de concert en vue de prévenir l'agression ou de sauvegarder la paix. Dans ce cas, les deux Gouvernements délibéreraient sur les mesures qu'ils seraient disposés à prendre en commun; si ces mesures comportaient une action, les

deux Gouvernements prendraient aussitôt en considération les plans de leurs états-majors et décideraient alors de la suite qui devrait être donnée à ces plans.

« Sincèrement à vous.

« Signé : P. CAMBON. »

A la Chambre des Communes, le Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères a parlé de la France, aux applaudissements des députés, dans des termes élevés et chaleureux, et son langage a déjà profondément retenti dans tous les cœurs français. (*Vifs applaudissements unanimes.*) Je tiens, au nom du Gouvernement de la République, à remercier, du haut de la tribune, le Gouvernement anglais de la cordialité de ses paroles et le Parlement français s'associera à ce sentiment. (*Nouveaux applaudissements prolongés et unanimes.*)

Le Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères a fait, notamment, la déclaration suivante :

« Dans le cas où l'escadre allemande franchirait le détroit ou remonterait la mer du Nord pour doubler les Iles-Britanniques dans le but d'attaquer les côtes françaises ou la marine de guerre française, et d'inquiéter la marine marchande française, l'escadre anglaise interviendrait pour prêter à la marine française son entière protection, de sorte que, dès ce moment, l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne seraient en état de guerre. » (*Applaudissements répétés et prolongés.*)

Dès maintenant, la flotte anglaise couvre donc nos côtes du Nord et de l'Ouest contre une agression allemande.

Messieurs, voilà les faits. Je crois que, dans leur rigoureux enchaînement, ils suffisent à justifier les actes du Gouvernement de la République. Je veux cependant de ce récit dégager la conclusion, donner son véritable sens à l'agression inouïe dont la France est victime.

Les vainqueurs de 1870 ont eu, vous le savez, à diverses reprises, le désir de redoubler les coups qu'ils nous avaient portés. En 1875, la guerre destinée à achever la France vaincue n'a été empêchée que par l'intervention des deux Puissances à qui devaient nous unir plus tard les liens de l'alliance et de l'amitié (*Applaudissements unanimes*), par l'intervention de la Russie et par celle de la Grande-Bretagne. (*Tous les députés se lèvent et applaudissent longuement.*)

Depuis lors, la République française, par la restauration des forces nationales et la conclusion d'accords diplomatiques invariablement pratiqués, a réussi à se libérer du joug qu'au sein même de la paix, Bismarck avait su faire peser sur l'Europe.

Elle a rétabli l'équilibre européen, garant de la liberté et de la dignité de chacun.

Messieurs, je ne sais si je ne m'abuse, mais il m'apparaît que cette œuvre de réparation pacifique, d'affranchissement et de dignité définitivement scellée en 1904 et 1907 avec le concours génial du roi Édouard VII d'Angleterre et du gouvernement de la Couronne (*Vifs applaudissements*), c'est cela que l'empire allemand veut détruire aujourd'hui par un audacieux coup de force,

L'Allemagne n'a rien à nous reprocher.

Nous avons consenti à la paix un sacrifice sans précédent en portant un démi-

siècle silencieux à nos flancs la blessure ouverte par elle. (*Vifs applaudissements unanimes.*)

Nous en avons consenti d'autres dans tous les débats que, depuis 1904, la diplomatie impériale a systématiquement provoqués soit au Maroc, soit ailleurs, aussi bien en 1905 qu'en 1906, en 1908 qu'en 1911.

La Russie, elle aussi, a fait preuve d'une grande modération lors des événements de 1908, comme dans la crise actuelle.

Elle a observé la même modération, et la Triple-Entente avec elle quand, dans la crise orientale de 1912, l'Autriche et l'Allemagne ont formulé, soit contre la Serbie, soit contre la Grèce des exigences, discutables pourtant, l'événement l'a prouvé.

Inutiles sacrifices, stériles transactions, vains efforts, puisqu'aujourd'hui, en pleine action de conciliation, nous sommes, nos alliés et nous, attaqués par surprise. (*Applaudissements prolongés.*)

Nul ne peut croire de bonne foi que nous sommes les agresseurs. Vainement l'on veut troubler les principes sacrés de droit et de liberté qui régissent les nations comme les individus : l'Italie, dans la claire conscience du génie latin, nous a notifié qu'elle entendait garder la neutralité. (*Tous les députés se lèvent et applaudissent longuement.*)

Cette décision a rencontré dans toute la France l'écho de la joie la plus sincère. Je m'en suis fait l'interprète auprès du chargé d'affaires d'Italie en lui disant combien je me félicitais que les deux sœurs latines, qui ont même origine et même idéal, un passé de gloire commun, ne se trouvent pas opposées. (*Nouveaux applaudissements.*)

Ce qu'on attaque, messieurs, nous le déclarons très haut, c'est cette indépendance, cette dignité, cette sécurité que la Triple Entente a reconquises dans l'équilibre au service de la paix.

Ce qu'on attaque, ce sont les libertés de l'Europe, dont la France, ses alliées et ses amis sont fiers d'être les défenseurs. (*Vifs applaudissements.*)

Ces libertés, nous allons les défendre, car ce sont elles qui sont en cause et tout le reste n'a été que prétextes.

La France, injustement provoquée, n'a pas voulu la guerre, elle a tout fait pour la conjurer. Puisqu'on la lui impose, elle se défendra contre l'Allemagne et contre toute puissance qui, n'ayant pas encore fait connaître son sentiment, prendrait part aux côtés de cette dernière au conflit entre les deux pays. (*Tous les députés se lèvent et applaudissent.*)

Un peuple libre et fort qui soutient un idéal séculaire et s'unit tout entier pour la sauvegarde de son existence; une démocratie qui a su discipliner son effort militaire et n'a pas craint, l'an passé, d'en alourdir le poids pour répondre aux armements voisins; une nation armée luttant pour sa vie propre et pour l'indépendance de l'Europe, voilà le spectacle que nous nous honorons d'offrir aux témoins de cette lutte formidable qui, depuis quelques jours, se prépare dans le calme le plus méthodique. Nous sommes sans reproches. Nous serons sans peur. (*Tous les députés se lèvent et applaudissent longuement.*)

La France a prouvé souvent dans des conditions moins favorables, qu'elle est le

plus redoutable adversaire quand elle se bat, comme c'est le cas aujourd'hui, pour la liberté et pour le droit. (*Applaudissements.*)

En vous soumettant nos actes, à vous, Messieurs, qui êtes nos juges, nous avons pour porter le poids de notre lourde responsabilité, le réconfort d'une conscience sans trouble et la certitude du devoir accompli. (*Tous les députés se lèvent et applaudissent longuement.*)

René VIVIANI.

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## **CHAPITRE VII**

### **DÉCLARATION DE LA TRIPLE ENTENTE**

**(4 SEPTEMBRE 1914)**



## DÉCLARATION.

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**M. DELCASSÉ, Ministre des Affaires étrangères,**

**à MM. les Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France à l'étranger.**

Paris, le 4 septembre 1914

La déclaration suivante a été signée ce matin au Foreign Office, à Londres.

• Les soussignés, dûment autorisés par leurs gouvernements respectifs font la déclaration suivante :

« Les Gouvernements britannique, français et russe s'engagent mutuellement à ne pas conclure de paix séparée au cours de la présente guerre.

• Les trois gouvernements conviennent que, lorsqu'il y aura lieu de discuter les termes de la paix, aucune des Puissances alliées ne pourra poser des conditions de paix sans accord préalable avec chacun des autres alliés. »

Signé : Paul CAMBON.

Comte BENCKENDORFF.

Edward GREY.

Cette déclaration sera publiée aujourd'hui.

DELCASSE



## ANNEXES

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### EXTRAITS

DU “LIVRE BLEU” (ANGLAIS), DU “LIVRE GRIS” (BELGE),  
DU “LIVRE BLANC” (ALLEMAND), DU “LIVRE ORANGE” (RUSSE)



## ANNEXE I.

**Extraits du « Livre bleu » relatif à la position prise par le Gouvernement anglais à l'égard de la Russie, de l'Allemagne et de la France pendant les pourparlers qui ont précédé la guerre.**

### N° 6.

**Sir G. BUCHANAN, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne à Saint-Petersbourg,  
à Sir Edward GREY.**

Saint-Petersbourg, 24 juillet 1914.

J'ai reçu ce matin un message téléphonique de M. Sazonoff m'informant que le texte de l'ultimatum autrichien venait de lui parvenir.

Son Excellence ajouta qu'une réponse était exigée dans les quarante-huit heures et il me pria de venir le trouver à l'Ambassade de France pour discuter l'affaire, car la démarche autrichienne voulait dire clairement que la guerre était imminente.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères dit que la conduite de l'Autriche était tout à la fois provocante et immorale; elle n'aurait jamais agi ainsi à moins que l'Allemagne n'ait été préalablement consultée; quelques-unes de ses demandes étaient tout à fait impossibles à accepter. Il espérait que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne manquerait pas de proclamer sa solidarité avec la Russie et la France.

L'Ambassadeur de France me donna à entendre que la France remplirait, si cela devenait nécessaire, toutes les obligations que lui imposait son alliance avec la Russie, outre qu'elle seconderait fortement la Russie dans toutes les négociations diplomatiques.

J'ai dit que je vous télégraphierais un rapport complet de ce que leurs Excellences venaient de me dire. Je ne pouvais pas, naturellement, parler au nom du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté; mais, personnellement, je ne voyais aucune raison de s'attendre à une déclaration de solidarité de la part du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté qui entraînerait un engagement absolu de sa part de soutenir la Russie et la France par la force des armes. Les intérêts directs de la Grande-Bretagne en Serbie étaient nuls, et une guerre en faveur de ce pays ne serait jamais sanctionnée par l'opinion publique de la Grande-Bretagne. A ceci, M. Sazonoff répondit qu'il ne fallait pas que nous oublions que la question générale européenne était impliquée, la question de la Serbie n'en formant qu'une partie et que la Grande-Bretagne ne pourrait pas en fait se dégager des problèmes maintenant en jeu.

En réponse à ces remarques, j'ai fait observer que je comprenais, de ce qu'il disait, que Son Excellence proposait que la Grande-Bretagne se joignît à une communication qui serait faite à l'Autriche à l'effet qu'une intervention active par elle dans les affaires intérieures de la Serbie ne pourrait pas être tolérée. Mais supposant que l'Autriche, néanmoins, allait avoir recours à des mesures militaires contre la Serbie malgré nos représentations, était-ce l'intention du Gouvernement russe de déclarer de suite la guerre à l'Autriche ?

M. Sazonoff dit que lui-même pensait que tout au moins la mobilisation russe devait être faite, mais qu'il y avait un Conseil des Ministres cet après-midi pour examiner la question dans toute son étendue. Un autre Conseil, présidé par l'Empereur, serait tenu probablement demain, quand une décision serait prise.

J'ai dit qu'il me paraissait que le point important était de persuader l'Autriche d'étendre la limite de temps, et que la première chose à faire était de faire passer sur l'Autriche une influence ayant ce but en vue. L'Ambassadeur de France, cependant, croyait que, en l'Autriche avait décidé d'agir de suite ou elle bluffait. Dans n'importe quel cas, notre seule chance d'éviter la guerre était d'adopter une attitude ferme et unie. Il ne pensait pas qu'il y avait le temps de donner suite à ma proposition. Là-dessus, j'ai dit qu'il me semblait désirable pour nous de connaître exactement jusqu'à quel point la Serbie serait disposée à aller pour accepter les demandes formulées par l'Autriche dans sa note. M. Sazonoff répondit qu'il fallait d'abord qu'il consultât ses collègues à ce sujet, mais que, sans doute, quelques-unes des demandes de l'Autriche pourraient être acceptées par la Serbie.

L'Ambassadeur de France et M. Sazonoff continuèrent tous deux à me presser pour une déclaration de solidarité complète du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté avec les Gouvernements français et russe, et j'ai, en conséquence, dit qu'il me semblait possible que vous voudriez, peut-être, consentir à faire de fortes représentations aux deux Gouvernements allemand et autrichien, faisant valoir auprès d'eux qu'une attaque sur la Serbie par l'Autriche mettrait en danger la paix entière de l'Europe. Peut-être pourriez-vous trouver moyen de leur dire qu'une telle action de la part de l'Autriche amènerait probablement une intervention russe, qui impliquerait la France et l'Allemagne, et qu'il serait difficile à la Grande-Bretagne de rester à l'écart si la guerre devenait générale. M. Sazonoff répondit que tôt ou tard nous serions entraînés à la guerre si elle éclatait; nous aurions rendu la guerre plus probable si, dès le début, nous ne faisons pas cause commune avec son pays et avec la France; en tout cas, il espérait que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté exprimerait une forte réprobation de la décision prise par l'Autriche.

G. BOCHANAN.

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N° 87.

Sir Edward GREY,

à Sir F. BERTIE, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne à Paris.

Foreign Office, 29 juillet 1914.

MONSIEUR,

Après avoir exposé à M. Cambon aujourd'hui combien la situation me paraissait grave, je lui ai déclaré que j'avais l'intention de dire à l'Ambassadeur allemand aujourd'hui qu'il ne fallait pas qu'il se laissât aller, à raison du ton amical de nos conversations, à un sentiment de fausse certitude que nous resterions à l'écart si tous les efforts pour conserver la paix, que nous faisons actuellement en commun avec l'Allemagne, échouaient.

Mais j'ai continué en disant à M. Cambon que je trouvais nécessaire de lui dire aussi que l'opinion publique ici envisageait la difficulté actuelle d'un point de vue tout à fait différent de celui qu'on avait adopté pendant la difficulté au sujet du Maroc il y a quelques années. Dans le cas du Maroc, il s'agissait d'un conflit dans lequel la France était la principale intéressée et où il paraissait que l'Allemagne, dans un effort pour écraser la France, lui cherchait querelle à l'occasion d'une question qui formait l'objet d'une convention spéciale entre la France et nous-mêmes. Dans le cas actuel, le différend entre l'Autriche et la Serbie n'était pas



un cas où nous nous sentions appelés à jouer un rôle actif. Même si la question arrivait à se poser entre l'Autriche et la Russie, nous ne nous sentirions pas appelés à y jouer un rôle. Ce serait alors une question de suprématie entre le Teuton et le Slave dans les Balkans et notre idée avait toujours été d'éviter d'être entraînés dans une guerre pour une question balkanique.

Si l'Allemagne se trouvait entraînée dans la lutte et si par suite la France y était à son tour impliquée, nous n'avions pas décidé ce que nous ferions. Ce serait un cas que nous aurions à examiner. La France aurait été alors entraînée dans une querelle qui n'était pas la sienne, mais dans laquelle, par suite de son alliance, son honneur et ses intérêts l'obligeaient à s'engager. Nous étions libres d'engagements et nous aurions à décider ce que les intérêts britanniques exigeaient que nous fissions. J'estimais qu'il était nécessaire de dire cela, parce que, comme il le savait, nous prenions toutes les précautions au sujet de notre Flotte, et que j'étais sur le point d'avertir le Prince Lichnowski de ne pas compter que nous restions à l'écart; mais il ne serait pas juste que je laisse M. Cambon s'égarer jusqu'à supposer que ceci voulait dire que nous avions décidé ce que nous ferions dans une éventualité, qui comme je l'espérais encore, pouvait ne pas se présenter.

M. Cambon m'a dit que j'avais exposé la situation très clairement. Il comprenait que je voulais dire que dans une querelle balkanique et dans une lutte pour la suprématie entre le Teuton et le Slave, nous ne nous sentirions pas appelés à intervenir; mais que si d'autres questions surgissaient et si la France et l'Allemagne se trouvaient impliquées de telle sorte que la question de l'hégémonie en Europe se posât, nous déciderions alors ce qu'il nous serait nécessaire de faire. Il a paru tout à fait préparé à cette déclaration et n'y fit aucune objection.

L'Ambassadeur de France ajouta que l'opinion française était calme mais décidée. Il s'attendait à ce que l'Allemagne demandât que la France restât neutre pendant que l'Allemagne attaquerait la Russie. Cette assurance naturellement la France ne pouvait pas la donner; elle était obligée à aider la Russie si la Russie était attaquée.

E. GREY.

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N° 88.

Sir Edward GREY,

à Sir E. GOSCHEN, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne à Berlin.

Foreign Office, 29 juillet 1914.

MONSIEUR,

Après avoir causé cet après-midi avec l'Ambassadeur allemand au sujet de la situation européenne, j'ai dit que je désirais lui dire, d'une façon tout à fait particulière et amicale, quelque chose que j'avais dans l'esprit. La situation était très grave. Tant qu'elle se limitait aux questions actuellement posées, nous n'avions aucune intention d'intervenir. Mais si l'Allemagne s'y trouvait engagée et ensuite la France, la question pourrait être si vaste qu'elle impliquerait tous les intérêts européens; et je ne voulais pas qu'il fût trompé par le ton amical de notre conversation — lequel persisterait, comme je l'espérais — jusqu'à croire que nous resterions à l'écart.

Il a dit qu'il comprenait parfaitement, mais il a demandé si je voulais dire que nous interviendrions dans certaines circonstances.

Je répondis que je ne désirais pas dire cela, ni quoi que ce fût qui ressemblât à une menace ou à un essai d'exercer une pression en déclarant que, si les choses allaient plus mal, nous interviendrions. Il ne serait pas question de notre intervention si l'Allemagne n'était pas impliquée, ou même si la France n'était pas impliquée; mais nous savions fort bien que si la question devenait telle que nous croyions que les intérêts britanniques exigeaient notre intervention, il faudrait que nous intervenions immédiatement, et que la décision fut très rapide, exactement comme les décisions des autres puissances auraient à l'être. J'espérais que le ton amical de nos conversations continuerait comme à présent, et que je pourrais conserver des rapports aussi étroits avec le Gouvernement allemand en travaillant pour la paix. Mais si nous échouions dans nos efforts pour conserver la paix, et si la question s'élargissait de façon à impliquer pour ainsi dire tous les intérêts européens, je ne voulais pas être exposé à aucun reproche de sa part, que le ton amical de toutes nos conversations l'avait égaré, lui ou son gouvernement, à supposer que nous n'agirions pas au reproche que s'il n'avait pas été ainsi égaré, le cours des événements aurait pu être différent.

L'Ambassadeur allemand n'a fait aucune objection à ce que j'ai dit, au contraire, il m'a dit que cela s'accordait avec ce qu'il avait déjà fait savoir à Berlin comme sa manière personnelle d'envisager la situation.

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N° 99.

Sir F. BARNES, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne, à Paris,  
à Sir Edward GREY.

Paris, 30 juillet 1914.

Le Président de la République me fait savoir que le Gouvernement russe a été informé par le Gouvernement allemand que l'Allemagne mobiliserait à moins que la Russie n'arrêtât sa mobilisation. Mais un rapport supplémentaire reçu depuis de Saint-Petersbourg déclare que le communiqué allemand avait été modifié et prenait maintenant la forme d'une demande d'information à quelles conditions la Russie consentirait à démobiliser. La réponse donnée est qu'elle consent à le faire à la condition que l'Autriche-Hongrie donne l'assurance qu'elle respectera la souveraineté de la Serbie et soumettra certaines demandes formulées dans la note autrichienne, et non acceptées par la Serbie à une discussion internationale.

Le Président est d'avis que ces conditions ne seront pas acceptées par l'Autriche; il est convaincu que la paix entre les Puissances est entre les mains de la Grande-Bretagne. Si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté annonçait que l'Angleterre viendrait en aide à la France, dans le cas d'un conflit entre la France et l'Allemagne, résultant des différences actuelles entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, il n'y aurait pas de guerre, car l'Allemagne modifierait aussitôt son attitude.

Je lui ai expliqué combien il serait difficile au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté de faire une telle déclaration, mais il m'a répondu qu'il maintenait que cela serait dans l'intérêt de la paix. La France, disait-il, est pacifique. Elle ne désire pas la guerre et tout ce qu'elle a fait jusqu'à présent est de se préparer pour une mobilisation afin de ne pas être prise au dépourvu. Le Gouvernement français tiendra le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté au courant de tout ce qui se

fera dans ce sens. On a des renseignements sérieux que les troupes allemandes sont concentrées dans les environs de Thionville et de Metz, prêtes à la guerre. S'il y avait une guerre générale sur le continent, l'Angleterre y serait entraînée pour la protection de ses intérêts vitaux. Une déclaration dès à présent de son intention de soutenir la France, dont c'est le désir que la paix soit maintenue, empêcherait presque certainement l'Allemagne de partir en guerre.

F. BRATU.

N° 119.

Sir Ed. GREY,

à Sir Francis BERTIE, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne, à Paris.

Foreign-Office, 31 juillet 1914.

MONSIEUR,

M. Cambon s'est référé aujourd'hui à un télégramme qui avait été montré ce matin à Sir Arthur Nicolson qui provenait de l'Ambassadeur de France à Berlin et qui disait que l'incertitude concernant notre intervention était l'élément encourageant à Berlin et que, si nous voulions seulement nous déclarer définitivement du côté de la Russie et de la France, cela déciderait l'attitude allemande en faveur de la paix.

J'ai dit qu'il était tout à fait injuste de supposer que nous avions laissé l'Allemagne sous l'impression que nous n'interviendrons pas. J'avais refusé des ouvertures pour promettre que nous resterions neutres. Non seulement j'avais refusé de dire que nous resterions neutres, mais j'avais été ce matin jusqu'à dire à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que, si la France et l'Allemagne se trouvaient engagées dans une guerre, nous y serions entraînés. Cela, bien entendu, n'était pas la même chose que de prendre un engagement avec la France, et j'ai dit cela à M. Cambon, seulement pour montrer que nous n'avions pas laissé l'Allemagne sous l'impression que nous resterions à l'écart.

M. Cambon m'a alors demandé ma réponse à ce qu'il avait dit hier.

J'ai dit que nous étions arrivés à la conclusion, dans le Cabinet d'aujourd'hui, que nous ne pouvions donner aucun gage en ce moment. Bien que nous ayons à exposer notre politique devant le Parlement, nous ne pouvions pas engager le Parlement d'avance. Jusqu'à présent, nous ne ressentions pas, et l'opinion publique ne ressentait pas, qu'aucun traité ni obligation de ce pays fussent engagés. Des développements ultérieurs pourraient modifier cette situation et obliger le Gouvernement et le Parlement à considérer qu'une intervention était justifiée. La protection de la neutralité de la Belgique pourrait être, je ne dirai pas un décisif, mais un important facteur, dans la détermination de notre attitude. Que nous propositions au Parlement d'intervenir ou de ne pas intervenir dans une guerre, le Parlement désirerait savoir comment nous étions placés à l'égard de la neutralité de la Belgique, et il se pourrait que je demande et à la France et à l'Allemagne si chacune était disposée à prendre l'engagement qu'elle ne serait pas la première à violer la neutralité de la Belgique.

M. Cambon a renouvelé la question pour savoir si nous seconderions la France au cas où l'Allemagne l'attaquerait.

J'ai dit que je pouvais seulement m'en tenir à la réponse et que, au point où les choses en sont en ce moment, nous ne pouvions prendre aucun engagement.

M. Cambon a fait valoir que l'Allemagne avait, depuis le commencement, rejeté les pro-

positions qui auraient peut-être amené la paix. Il ne pouvait pas être dans l'intérêt de l'Angleterre que la France soit écrasée par l'Allemagne, nous serions alors dans une position très amoindrie vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne. En 1870, nous avons commis une grande faute en permettant un accroissement énorme de la force allemande, et nous répéterions maintenant cette faute. Il m'a demandé si je ne pouvais pas soumettre à nouveau cette question au Cabinet.

J'ai dit que le Cabinet serait certainement convoqué aussitôt qu'il y aurait de nouveaux développements, mais quant à présent, la seule réponse que je pouvais donner était que nous ne pouvions prendre aucun engagement définitif.

E. GREY.

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N° 148.

Sir Edward GREY

à Sir F. BERTIE, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne à Paris.

Foreign Office, 2 août 1914.

Après le Conseil de Cabinet de ce matin, j'ai remis à M. Cambon la note suivante :

« Je suis autorisé à donner l'assurance que si la flotte allemande pénètre dans le Pas-de-Calais ou dans la mer du Nord pour entreprendre des hostilités contre les côtes ou les bateaux français, la flotte anglaise donnera toute la protection en son pouvoir.

« Cette assurance est naturellement soumise à l'approbation du Parlement et ne doit pas être considérée comme engageant le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté jusqu'à ce qu'une telle action se produise de la part de la flotte allemande. »

J'ai fait remarquer que nous avons des questions extrêmement graves et délicates à considérer et que le Gouvernement ne pouvait s'engager à déclarer la guerre à l'Allemagne si la guerre éclatait demain entre la France et l'Allemagne, mais qu'il était essentiel que le Gouvernement français, dont la flotte était depuis longtemps concentrée dans la Méditerranée, sût quelles dispositions prendre, la côte septentrionale étant entièrement sans défense. Il nous a donc paru nécessaire de lui donner cette assurance. Cela ne nous engage pas à déclarer la guerre à l'Allemagne, à moins que la flotte allemande n'agisse comme il est indiqué ci-dessus, mais cela donne à la France une sécurité qui lui permettra de régler la disposition de sa flotte méditerranéenne.

M. Cambon m'a interrogé au sujet de la violation du Luxembourg. Je lui ai fait part de la doctrine établie sur ce point en 1867 par lord Derby et lord Clarendon.

Il m'a demandé ce que nous dirions en cas de violation de la neutralité belge. J'ai répondu que c'était là une affaire beaucoup plus importante et que nous examinions quelle déclaration nous ferions demain à ce sujet au Parlement, c'est-à-dire si nous déclarerions que la violation de la neutralité belge est un *casus belli*. Je lui ai rapporté ce qui avait été dit sur ce point à l'Ambassadeur allemand.

E. GREY.

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ANNEXE N° II.

Extraits du « Livre bleu » relatifs aux propositions faites par le Gouvernement allemand  
au Gouvernement anglais pour obtenir la neutralité de l'Angleterre.

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N° 85.

Sir E. GOSCHEN, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne à Berlin,  
à Sir Edward GREY.

Berlin, 29 juillet 1914.

On m'a prié d'aller voir le Chancelier ce soir. Son Excellence venait de rentrer de Potsdam.

Il me dit que, si la Russie attaquait l'Autriche, il craignait qu'une conflagration européenne ne devînt inévitable, étant données les obligations qu'imposait à l'Allemagne son alliance avec l'Autriche, malgré les efforts qu'il ne cessait de faire pour le maintien de la paix.

Ceci dit, il continua la conversation en offrant une forte enchère pour s'assurer la neutralité britannique. Il me dit que, selon sa conception du principe essentiel de la politique britannique, la Grande-Bretagne ne consentirait jamais à se tenir à l'écart de façon à laisser écraser la France dans un conflit qui pourrait avoir lieu. Là, cependant, n'était pas le but de l'Allemagne. Si la neutralité de la Grande-Bretagne était assurée, son Gouvernement recevrait toutes les assurances que le Gouvernement impérial n'avait pour but aucune acquisition territoriale aux frais de la France, en supposant que la guerre s'ensuivît et qu'elle se terminât à l'avantage de l'Allemagne.

J'ai posé à Son Excellence une question au sujet des colonies françaises. Il me répondit qu'il ne pouvait s'engager d'une manière semblable à cet égard.

Pour la Hollande, Son Excellence me dit que, tant que les adversaires de l'Allemagne respecteraient l'intégrité et la neutralité des Pays-Bas, l'Allemagne serait prête à assurer le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté qu'elle en ferait autant.

Les opérations que l'Allemagne pourrait se trouver dans la nécessité d'entreprendre en Belgique dépendraient de ce que ferait la France ; après la guerre, l'intégrité de la Belgique serait respectée, si ce pays ne se rangeait pas contre l'Allemagne.

En terminant, Son Excellence me déclara que, depuis le jour où il devint Chancelier, il avait eu pour but, ainsi que vous le saviez, d'arriver à une entente avec l'Angleterre ; il espérait que ces assurances pourraient devenir la base de l'entente qui lui tenait tant à cœur. Il pensait à une entente générale de neutralité entre l'Allemagne et l'Angleterre ; et, quoi qu'il fût encore trop tôt pour en discuter les détails, l'assurance de la neutralité britannique dans le conflit que pourrait peut-être provoquer la crise actuelle lui permettrait d'entrevoir la réalisation de son désir.

Son Excellence m'ayant demandé mon opinion en ce qui concerne la manière dont vous

envisager sa demande, je lui répondis qu'à mon avis il était peu probable que, dans les circonstances actuelles, vous fussiez disposé à vous engager d'une façon quelconque et que vous désireriez garder une entière liberté d'action.

E. GOSCHEN.

N° 101.

Sir Edward GREY,

à Sir E. GOSCHEN, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne à Berlin.

Foreign Office, 30 juillet 1914.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne peut pas accueillir un seul instant la proposition du Chancelier de s'engager à rester neutre dans de telles conditions. Ce qu'il nous demande, en effet, c'est de nous engager à rester à l'écart, en attendant qu'on saisisse des colonies françaises et que la France fût battue, pourvu que l'Allemagne ne prenne pas de territoire français, exception faite des colonies.

Au point de vue matériel, une telle proposition est inacceptable, car la France, sans qu'on lui enlevât de territoire en Europe, pourrait être écrasée au point de perdre sa position de grande puissance et de se trouver désormais subordonnée à la politique allemande. En général, tout ceci à part, ce serait une honte pour nous que de passer ce marché avec l'Allemagne aux dépens de la France, une honte de laquelle la bonne renommée de ce pays ne se remettrait jamais.

Le Chancelier nous demande en outre de marchander toutes les obligations ou intérêts que nous pouvons avoir dans la neutralité de la Belgique. Nous ne saurions en aucune façon accueillir ce marché non plus.

Ceci dit, il n'est pas nécessaire d'examiner si la perspective d'une convention générale de neutralité dans l'avenir entre l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne offrirait des avantages positifs suffisants pour nous dédommager de nous être lié les mains aujourd'hui. Nous devons conserver notre entière liberté d'agir comme les circonstances nous paraîtront l'exiger en cas d'un développement défavorable et regrettable de la crise actuelle, tel que le Chancelier le prévoit.

Je vous prie de parler au Chancelier dans le sens susindiqué et d'ajouter très sérieusement que la seule façon de maintenir les bonnes relations entre l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne est qu'elles continuent à coopérer au maintien de la paix de l'Europe. Si nous obtenons ce résultat, les relations mutuelles de l'Allemagne et de l'Angleterre seront, j'en suis convaincu, améliorées et renforcées *ipso facto*. A cet effet, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté travaillera dans ce sens avec un bon vouloir et une sincérité entiers.

Et j'ajouterai ceci : Si l'on peut conserver la paix de l'Europe et traverser sans accident la crise actuelle, mon effort personnel sera de prendre l'initiative d'un arrangement auquel l'Allemagne puisse souscrire et par lequel elle pourra être assurée qu'aucune politique agressive ou hostile ne sera poursuivie contre elle ou ses alliés par la France, la Russie et nous-mêmes, soit ensemble, soit séparément. J'ai désiré ceci et travaillé dans ce sens autant que je l'ai pu pendant la dernière crise balkanique, et, comme l'Allemagne avait un but semblable, nos relations se sont sensiblement améliorées. Cette idée a été jusqu'aujourd'hui trop utopique pour faire l'objet de propositions définies, mais si la crise actuelle, beaucoup plus aiguë que toutes celles par lesquelles l'Europe a passé depuis plusieurs générations, est

traversée sans accident, j'ai l'espoir que le soulagement et la réaction qui suivront rendront possible un rapprochement plus précis entre les Puissances qu'il n'a été possible jusqu'aujourd'hui.

E. GREY.

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N° 123.

Sir Edward GREY,

à Sir GOSCHEN, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne à Berlin.

Foreign Office, 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

MONSIEUR,

J'ai dit à l'Ambassadeur allemand aujourd'hui que la réponse du Gouvernement allemand au sujet de la neutralité de la Belgique était très regrettable, car cette neutralité affecte l'opinion publique en Angleterre. Si l'Allemagne pouvait donner les mêmes assurances que la France, cela contribuerait d'une manière appréciable à diminuer ici l'inquiétude et la tension générales. D'autre part, si l'un des Belligérants violait la neutralité de la Belgique pendant que l'autre la respectait, il serait très difficile de contenir le sentiment public en Angleterre. J'ai dit que nous avions discuté cette question au Conseil de Cabinet et que, étant autorisé à faire cette déclaration, je lui remettais une note à cet effet.

Il me demanda si, au cas où l'Allemagne promettrait de ne pas violer la neutralité belge, nous nous engagerions à rester neutres.

J'ai répondu que je ne pouvais pas faire de promesses, que nos mains étaient encore libres et que nous étions en voie de considérer quelle serait notre attitude. Tout ce que je pouvais dire, c'est que notre attitude serait en grande partie dictée par l'opinion publique en Angleterre, pour qui la neutralité belge avait une grande importance. Je ne pensais pas pouvoir donner une assurance de neutralité sous cette seule condition.

L'Ambassadeur me pressa de formuler les conditions moyennant lesquelles nous garderions la neutralité. Il suggéra même que l'Allemagne pourrait garantir l'intégrité de la France et de ses colonies.

J'ai répondu que j'étais obligé de refuser définitivement toute promesse de rester neutre dans de telles conditions et que je ne pouvais que répéter qu'il nous fallait garder les mains libres.

E. GREY.

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ANNEXE N° II BIS.

**Tentatives allemandes pour obtenir, sous le couvert d'un « malentendu », la garantie par l'Angleterre de la neutralité de la France dans une guerre germano-russe.**

(Publication officieuse de la *Gazette de l'Allemagne du Nord*, 20 août 1914.)

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N° 1.

**Le Prince LICHNOWSKY, Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Londres,  
à M. de BETHMANN-HOLLWEG, Chancelier de l'Empire d'Allemagne.**

Londres, 31 juillet 1914.

Sir Edward Grey vient de m'appeler au téléphone et m'a demandé si je pensais pouvoir déclarer que nous n'attaquerions pas la France si la France restait neutre dans une guerre germano-russe. J'ai dit que je pensais pouvoir assumer la responsabilité de cette déclaration.

LICHNOWSKY.

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N° 2.

**TÉLÉGRAMME de l'Empereur Guillaume au Roi George V.**

Berlin, 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

Je viens de recevoir la communication de votre Gouvernement m'offrant la neutralité de la France avec la garantie de la Grande-Bretagne. A cette offre était liée la question de savoir si, à cette condition, l'Allemagne n'attaquerait pas la France. Pour des raisons techniques, ma mobilisation, qui a été ordonnée cet après-midi sur les deux fronts, Est et Ouest, doit s'accomplir selon les préparatifs commencés.

Des contre-ordres ne peuvent être donnés et votre télégramme est malheureusement venu trop tard. Mais si la France offre sa neutralité, qui sera alors garantie par la flotte et l'armée anglaises, je m'abstiendrai d'attaquer la France et j'emploierai mes troupes ailleurs. Je souhaite que la France ne montre aucune nervosité. Les troupes, sur ma frontière, sont en ce moment arrêtées par ordres télégraphiques et téléphoniques, dans leur marche en avant au delà de la frontière française.

GUILLAUME.

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N° 3.

M. de BETHMANN-HOLLWEG, Chancelier de l'Empire,

à M. le Prince LICHNOWSKY, Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Londres.

Berlin, 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

L'Allemagne est prête à acquiescer aux propositions anglaises si l'Angleterre garantit avec ses forces militaires et navales la neutralité française dans le conflit russo-allemand. La mobilisation allemande s'est effectuée aujourd'hui, en réponse aux provocations russes, et avant l'arrivée des propositions anglaises. Par conséquent, notre concentration à la frontière française ne peut être modifiée. Nous garantissons d'ailleurs que, d'ici au lundi 3 août, à sept heures du soir, la frontière française ne sera pas franchie si l'assentiment de l'Angleterre nous est parvenu à ce moment.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

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N° 4.

*TÉLÉGRAMME du Roi George V à l'Empereur Guillaume.*

Londres, 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

En réponse à votre télégramme qui vient de me parvenir, je pense qu'il s'est produit un malentendu à propos de la suggestion qui aurait été faite au cours d'une conversation amicale entre le prince Lichnowsky et Sir Edward Grey, où ils discutaient comment un conflit armé entre l'Allemagne et la France pourrait être retardé jusqu'à ce qu'on ait trouvé un moyen d'entente entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie. Sir Edward Grey verra le prince Lichnowsky demain matin pour déterminer qu'il y a bien eu malentendu de la part de ce dernier.

GEORGE.

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N° 5.

Le Prince LICHNOWSKY, Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Londres,

à M. de BETHMANN-HOLLWEG, Chancelier de l'Empire d'Allemagne.

Londres, 2 août 1914.

Les suggestions de Sir Edward Grey, basées sur le désir de garder la neutralité, de la part de l'Angleterre, ont été faites sans accord préalable avec la France et ont été, depuis, abandonnées comme futiles.

LICHNOWSKY.

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**ANNEXE III.**

**Extraits du « Livre Bleu » relatifs au refus de l'Angleterre d'admettre le point de vue allemand dans la question de la violation de la neutralité belge.**

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**N° 153.**

**Sir Edward GREY,**

**à Sir E. GOSCHEN, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne à Berlin.**

**Foreign Office, 4 août 1914.**

Le Roi des Belges a adressé un appel à S. M. le Roi en vue d'une intervention diplomatique en faveur de la Belgique dans les termes suivants :

« Me rappelant les nombreuses preuves d'amitié de Votre Majesté et de son prédécesseur, ainsi que l'attitude amicale de l'Angleterre en 1870 et le témoignage d'amitié que vous venez de nous donner encore, je fais un suprême appel à l'intervention diplomatique du Gouvernement de Votre Majesté pour la sauvegarde de l'intégrité de la Belgique. »

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté est également informé que le Gouvernement allemand a remis au Gouvernement belge une note proposant une neutralité amicale permettant le libre passage en territoire belge et s'engageant à maintenir l'indépendance du royaume et de ses possessions à la conclusion de la paix ; au cas contraire, la Belgique serait traitée en ennemie. Une réponse est exigée dans un délai maximum de douze heures.

Nous apprenons aussi que la Belgique a opposé un refus formel à ce qu'elle considère comme une violation flagrante de la loi des nations.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté est obligé de protester contre cette violation d'un traité que l'Allemagne a signé aussi bien que nous-mêmes ; il lui faut des assurances que la demande faite à la Belgique ne sera pas suivie d'effet et que sa neutralité sera respectée par l'Allemagne. Vous demanderez une réponse immédiate.

**E. GREY.**

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**N° 155.**

**Sir Edward GREY,**

**à Sir F. VILLIERS, Ministre de Grande-Bretagne à Bruxelles.**

**Foreign Office, 4 août 1914.**

Informez le Gouvernement belge que, si l'Allemagne exerce une pression sur lui pour le faire se départir de la neutralité, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté s'attendra à ce que la Belgique résiste par tous les moyens en son pouvoir ; que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'aidera à résister ; que, dans ce cas, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté est prêt à s'unir à la Russie et à la France, s'il y a lieu, pour offrir immédiatement au Gouvernement belge une action commune pour résister à l'emploi par l'Allemagne de la force contre la Belgique et une garantie pour le maintien de son intégrité et de son indépendance dans l'avenir.

**E. GREY.**

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N° 157.

**Le Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères d'Allemagne,  
au Prince LICHNOWSKY, Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Londres (communiqué par  
l'Ambassade allemande, 4 août).**

Berlin, 4 août 1914.

Prière de dissiper tout soupçon qui pourrait subsister dans l'esprit du Gouvernement britannique au sujet de nos intentions.

Répétez positivement l'assurance formelle que, même en cas de conflit armé avec la Belgique, l'Allemagne ne s'annexera du territoire belge sous aucun prétexte.

La sincérité de cette déclaration est prouvée par notre engagement solennel à l'égard de la Hollande de respecter strictement sa neutralité. Il est évident *que nous ne pourrions annexer profitablement du territoire belge sans nous agrandir en même temps aux dépens de la Hollande.*

Faites bien comprendre à Sir Edward Grey que l'armée allemande ne saurait s'exposer à une attaque française par la Belgique, attaque qui a été envisagée selon des informations absolument sûres.

L'Allemagne est donc obligée de ne pas tenir compte de la neutralité belge: c'est pour elle une question de vie ou de mort de prévenir l'avance de l'armée française.

JAGOW.

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N° 159.

**Sir Edward GREY,**

**à Sir E. GOSCHEN, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne à Berlin.**

Foreign Office, 4 août 1914.

Nous apprenons que l'Allemagne a adressé une note au Ministre des Affaires étrangères belge, déclarant que le Gouvernement allemand serait obligé de mettre à exécution, au besoin par la force des armes, des mesures considérées comme indispensables.

Nous sommes également informés que le territoire belge a été violé à Gemmerich.

Dans ces conditions et étant donné que l'Allemagne a refusé de nous donner au sujet de la Belgique les mêmes assurances que celles que nous a données la France la semaine dernière en réponse à notre demande faite simultanément à Berlin et à Paris, il nous faut réitérer cette demande et exiger une réponse satisfaisante, ainsi qu'à mon télégramme de ce matin, qui devra être reçue avant minuit ce soir.

Sinon, vous demanderez vos passeports et vous déclarerez que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté se voit obligé de prendre toutes les mesures en son pouvoir pour maintenir la neutralité de la Belgique et le respect d'un traité auquel l'Allemagne a souscrit autant que nous mêmes.

E. GREY.

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N° 160.

Sir E. GOSCHEN,  
à Sir Edward GREY.

Londres, 8 août 1914.

MONSIEUR,

Conformément aux instructions contenues dans votre télégramme du 4 courant, je suis allé voir cet après-midi le Secrétaire d'État et lui ai demandé, au nom du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, si le Gouvernement impérial s'abstiendrait de violer la neutralité de la Belgique.

M. de Jagow a répliqué tout de suite qu'il était fâché d'avoir à dire que sa réponse devait être : « Non », étant donné que, puisque les troupes allemandes avaient franchi la frontière ce matin, la neutralité de la Belgique se trouvait d'ores et déjà violée.

M. de Jagow s'est étendu à nouveau sur les raisons qui avaient obligé le Gouvernement impérial à prendre cette mesure : c'est à savoir qu'il leur fallait pénétrer en France par la voie la plus rapide et la plus facile, de manière à prendre une bonne avance dans leurs opérations et s'efforcer de frapper quelque coup décisif le plus tôt possible. C'est pour nous, a-t-il dit, une question de vie ou de mort, car, si nous avions passé par la route plus au Sud, nous n'aurions pu, vu le petit nombre de chemins et la force des forteresses, espérer passer sans rencontrer une opposition formidable, impliquant une grosse perte de temps. Cette perte de temps aurait été autant de temps gagné par les Russes pour amener leurs troupes sur la frontière allemande. Agir avec rapidité, voilà, a-t-il ajouté, le maître-atout de l'Allemagne; celui de la Russie est d'avoir d'inépuisables ressources en soldats.

J'ai fait remarquer à M. de Jagow que ce fait accompli, la violation de la frontière belge, rendait, comme il le comprenait facilement, la situation excessivement grave, et je lui ai demandé s'il n'était pas temps encore de faire un pas en arrière et d'éviter la possibilité de conséquences que lui et moi déplorerions. Il a répondu que, pour les raisons qu'il m'avait données, il était maintenant impossible au Gouvernement allemand de faire un pas en arrière.

Au cours de l'après-midi, j'ai reçu votre nouveau télégramme de la même date, et, obéissant aux instructions y contenues, me suis rendu à nouveau au Ministère impérial des Affaires étrangères, où j'ai informé le Secrétaire d'État qu'à moins que le Gouvernement impérial pût donner ce soir avant minuit l'assurance de ne pas pousser plus loin sa violation de la frontière belge et d'arrêter sa marche, j'avais reçu des instructions pour demander mes passeports et pour informer le Gouvernement impérial que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique prendrait toutes les mesures en son pouvoir pour maintenir la neutralité de la Belgique et l'observation d'un traité auquel l'Allemagne était autant partie que lui-même.

M. de Jagow a répondu qu'à son grand regret il ne pouvait donner aucune réponse autre que celle qu'il m'avait donnée plus tôt dans la journée, c'est à savoir que la sécurité de l'Empire rendait absolument nécessaire la marche des troupes impériales à travers la Belgique. J'ai remis à Son Excellence un résumé écrit de votre télégramme et, en faisant remarquer que vous indiquiez minuit comme l'heure à laquelle le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique s'attendrait à une réponse, lui ai demandé si, vu les conséquences terribles qui suivraient nécessairement, il ne serait pas possible, même au dernier moment,

au Gouvernement impérial de reviser sa réponse. Il m'a répondu que quand bien même le temps accordé serait de vingt-quatre heures ou davantage, il fallait que sa réponse restât la même. J'ai dit que dans ce cas j'aurais à demander mes passeports.

L'entrevue dont il s'agit a eu lieu vers sept heures. Au cours d'un bref entretien qui la suivit, M. de Jagow a exprimé son poignant regret de voir s'écrouler toute sa politique et celle du Chancelier, qui a été de devenir amis avec la Grande-Bretagne et ensuite, par elle, de se rapprocher de la France. Je lui ai dit que cette terminaison soudaine de mon travail à Berlin était pour moi aussi une cause de profond regret et de déconvenue; mais qu'il lui fallait bien comprendre que dans les circonstances et vu nos engagements, il eût été tout à fait impossible au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique d'agir autrement qu'il n'avait fait.

J'ai dit ensuite que j'étais désireux d'aller faire visite au Chancelier, car ce serait peut-être la dernière fois que j'aurais l'occasion de le voir. Il m'a prié de le faire. J'ai trouvé le Chancelier très agité. Son Excellence a commencé tout de suite une harangue qui a duré environ vingt minutes. Il a dit que la mesure prise par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique était terrible au dernier point; juste pour un mot — « neutralité », un mot dont en temps de guerre on n'a si souvent tenu aucun compte, — juste pour un chiffon de papier la Grande-Bretagne allait faire la guerre à une nation à elle apparentée, qui ne désirait rien tant que d'être son amie. Tous ses efforts en ce sens ont, a-t-il continué, été rendus inutiles par cette dernière et terrible mesure; la politique à laquelle, comme je le savais, il s'était voué depuis son arrivée au pouvoir, était tombée comme un château de cartes. Il s'est écrié que ce que nous avons fait est inconcevable; c'est comme frapper par derrière un homme au moment où il défend sa vie contre deux assaillants. Il tient la Grande-Bretagne pour responsable de tous les terribles événements qui pourront se produire.

J'ai protesté avec force contre cette déclaration et ai dit que, de même que lui-même et M. de Jagow désiraient me faire comprendre que pour des raisons stratégiques, c'était pour l'Allemagne une affaire de vie ou de mort d'avancer à travers la Belgique et de violer la neutralité de cette dernière, de même je désirais qu'il comprît que c'était pour ainsi dire une affaire de « vie ou de mort » pour l'honneur de la Grande-Bretagne que de tenir l'engagement solennel pris par elle de faire en cas d'attaque tout son possible pour défendre la neutralité de la Belgique. Il est, ai-je insisté, tout simplement nécessaire de tenir ce pacte solennel, sans quoi quelle confiance n'importe qui pourrait-il avoir à l'avenir dans les engagements pris par la Grande-Bretagne?

Le Chancelier a repris : « Mais à quel prix ce pacte aura-t-il été tenu ? Le Gouvernement britannique y a-t-il songé ? » J'ai insinué à Son Excellence, avec toute la clarté qui me fut possible, que la crainte des conséquences ne pouvait guère être considérée comme une excuse pour la rupture d'engagements solennels; mais Son Excellence était dans un tel état d'excitation, il était si évidemment démonté par la nouvelle de notre action et si peu disposé à entendre raison que je m'abstins de jeter de l'huile sur le feu en argumentant davantage. Comme je prenais congé de lui, il a dit que le coup que la Grande-Bretagne portait à l'Allemagne en s'unissant à ses ennemis était d'autant plus violent que presque jusqu'au dernier moment lui et son Gouvernement avaient travaillé avec nous et appuyé nos efforts en vue du maintien de la paix entre l'Autriche et la Russie. Je répondis que c'était bien ce qu'il y avait de tragique que de voir deux nations tomber en garde précisément au moment où les rapports entre elles se trouvaient plus amicaux et plus cordiaux qu'ils ne l'avaient été depuis des années. J'ai ajouté que, par malheur, nonobstant nos efforts pour sauvegarder la paix entre la Russie et l'Autriche, la guerre s'était propagée et nous avait mis face à face avec une position qu'il nous était impossible d'esquiver si nous tenions nos engagements,

situation qui malheureusement impliquait séparation d'avec nos anciens collaborateurs. J'ai terminé en disant qu'il n'aurait point de difficulté à comprendre que personne ne le regrettait plus que moi-même.

Après cette entrevue plutôt pénible, je suis rentré à l'Ambassade et ai rédigé un compte rendu télégraphique de ce qui s'était passé. Ce télégramme a été remis au bureau de télégraphe central de Berlin, un peu avant 9 heures du soir. Il a été accepté par ledit bureau, mais semble n'avoir jamais été transmis.

Vers 9 heures et demie du soir, le Sous-Secrétaire d'État, M. de Zimmermann, est venu me voir. Après avoir exprimé son profond regret que les rapports officiels et personnels, si cordiaux entre nous, fussent sur le point de cesser, il me demanda incidemment si la demande de mes passeports équivaldrait à une déclaration de guerre. Je lui ai dit qu'une personne faisant aussi notoirement que lui autorité en matière de droit international devait savoir aussi bien ou mieux que moi quelle était la coutume en pareil cas. J'ai ajouté qu'il y avait des exemples nombreux où la rupture des rapports diplomatiques n'avait point été suivie de guerre; mais que dans le cas actuel il avait sans doute vu d'après mes instructions, dont j'avais donné un résumé par écrit à M. de Jagow, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique s'attendait à une réponse à une question définie ce soir avant minuit et qu'à défaut de réponse satisfaisante ledit Gouvernement se verrait forcé de prendre les mesures nécessitées par ses engagements. M. de Zimmermann déclara que cela était, de fait, une déclaration de guerre, étant donné qu'il était de toute impossibilité pour le Gouvernement Impérial de donner les assurances requises ni ce soir, ni aucun autre soir.

E. GOSCHKE.

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ANNEXE IV.

**Extraits du «Livre Gris» indiquant les conditions dans lesquelles l'Allemagne  
a violé la neutralité belge.**

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N° 2.

*LETTRE adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères,  
aux Ministres du Roi à Paris, Berlin, Vienne, Londres et Saint-Pétersbourg.*

Bruxelles, le 24 juillet 1914.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

Le Gouvernement du Roi s'est demandé si, dans les circonstances actuelles, il n'y aurait pas lieu d'adresser aux Puissances qui ont garanti son indépendance et sa neutralité, une communication destinée à leur confirmer sa résolution de remplir les devoirs internationaux que lui imposent les traités au cas où une guerre viendrait à éclater aux frontières de la Belgique.

Il a été amené à la conclusion qu'une telle communication serait prématurée à l'heure présente mais que les événements pourraient se précipiter et ne point lui laisser le temps de faire parvenir, au moment voulu, les instructions opportunes à ses représentants à l'étranger.

Dans cette situation, j'ai proposé au Roi et à mes collègues du Cabinet, qui se sont ralliés à ma manière de voir, de vous donner, dès à présent, des indications précises sur la démarche que vous auriez à faire si l'éventualité d'une guerre franco-allemande devenait plus menaçante.

Vous trouverez, sous ce pli, une lettre signée, mais non datée, dont vous aurez à donner lecture et à laisser copie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères si les circonstances exigent cette communication.

Je vous indiquerai par télégramme le moment d'agir.

Le télégramme vous sera adressé à l'heure où la mobilisation de l'armée belge sera décrétée, si, contrairement à notre sincère espoir, et aux apparences de solution pacifique, nos renseignements nous amenaient à prendre cette mesure extrême de précaution.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

DAVIGNON.

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ANNEXE AU N° 2.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

La situation internationale est grave; l'éventualité d'un conflit entre plusieurs Puissances ne peut être écartée des préoccupations du Gouvernement du Roi.

La Belgique a observé avec la plus scrupuleuse exactitude les devoirs d'État neutre que lui

imposent les traités du 19 avril 1839. Ces devoirs, elle s'attachera inébranlablement à les remplir, quelles que soient les circonstances.

Les dispositions amicales des Puissances à son égard ont été affirmées si souvent que la Belgique a la confiance de voir son territoire demeurer hors de toute atteinte si des hostilités venaient à se produire à ses frontières.

Toutes les mesures nécessaires pour assurer l'observation de sa neutralité n'en ont pas moins été prises par le Gouvernement du Roi. L'armée belge est mobilisée et se porte sur les positions stratégiques choisies pour assurer la défense du pays et le respect de sa neutralité. Les forts d'Anvers et de la Meuse sont en état de défense.

Il est à peine nécessaire, Monsieur le Ministre, d'insister sur le caractère de ces mesures. Elles n'ont d'autre but que de mettre la Belgique en situation de remplir ses obligations internationales; elles ne sont et n'ont pu être inspirées, cela va de soi, ni par le dessein de prendre part à une lutte armée des Puissances, ni par un sentiment de défiance envers aucune d'elles.

Me conformant aux ordres reçus, j'ai l'honneur de remettre à Votre Excellence une copie de la déclaration du Gouvernement du Roi et de La prier de bien vouloir en prendre acte.

Une communication identique a été faite aux autres Puissances garantes de la neutralité belge. Je saisis, etc.

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N° 8.

*LETTRE adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Berlin, Paris, Londres, Vienne, Saint-Petersbourg, Rome, La Haye, Luxembourg.*

Bruxelles, le 29 juillet 1914.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

Le Gouvernement du Roi a décidé de mettre l'armée sur le pied de paix renforcé.

Cette mesure ne doit être en aucune façon confondue avec la mobilisation.

A cause du peu d'étendue de son territoire, la Belgique tout entière constitue en quelque sorte une zone frontière. Son armée, sur le pied de paix ordinaire, ne comporte qu'une classe de milice sous les armes. Sur le pied de paix renforcé, ses divisions d'armée et sa division de cavalerie, grâce au rappel de trois classes ont des effectifs analogues à ceux des corps entretenus en permanence dans les zones frontières des Puissances voisines.

Ces renseignements vous permettraient de répondre aux questions qui pourraient vous être posées.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

DAVIGNON.

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N° 9.

*LETTRE adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Berlin, Paris et Londres.*

Bruxelles, le 31 juillet 1914.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

M. le Ministre de France étant venu me montrer un télégramme de l'Agence Havas, décrétant l'état de guerre en Allemagne, m'a dit : « Je profite de cette occasion pour vous



déclarer qu'aucune incursion des troupes françaises n'aura lieu en Belgique, même si des forces importantes étaient massées sur les frontières de votre pays. La France ne veut pas avoir la responsabilité d'accomplir, vis-à-vis de la Belgique, le premier acte d'hostilité. Des instructions dans ce sens seront données aux autorités françaises. »

J'ai remercié M. Klobukowski de sa communication et j'ai cru devoir lui faire remarquer que nous avions toujours eu la plus grande confiance dans la loyauté que nos deux États voisins mettraient à tenir leurs engagements à notre égard. Nous avons aussi tout lieu de croire que l'attitude du Gouvernement allemand sera identique à celle du Gouvernement de la République française.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

DAVIGNON.

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N° 11.

*LETTRE adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Berlin, Londres et Paris.*

Bruxelles, le 31 juillet 1914.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

Le Ministre d'Angleterre a demandé à me voir d'urgence et m'a fait la communication suivante, qu'il souhaitait être à même de m'exposer depuis plusieurs jours. En raison de la possibilité d'une guerre européenne, sir Edward Grey a demandé aux Gouvernements français et allemand, séparément, si chacun d'eux était prêt à respecter la neutralité de la Belgique pourvu qu'aucune Puissance ne la viole.

« Vu les traités qui existent, je suis chargé d'informer le Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Belgique de ce qui précède et de dire que Sir Edward Grey présume que la Belgique fera tout son possible pour maintenir sa neutralité et qu'elle désire et s'attend à ce que les autres Puissances l'observent et la maintiennent. »

Je me suis empressé de remercier Sir Francis Villiers de cette communication que le Gouvernement belge apprécie particulièrement et j'ai ajouté que la Grande-Bretagne et les autres nations garantes de notre indépendance pouvaient être assurées que nous ne négligerions aucun effort pour maintenir notre neutralité, et que nous étions convaincus que les autres Puissances, vu les excellents rapports d'amitié et de confiance, que nous avons toujours entretenus avec elles, observeraient et maintiendraient cette neutralité.

Je n'ai pas manqué d'affirmer que nos forces militaires, considérablement développées à la suite de notre réorganisation récente, étaient à même de nous permettre de nous défendre énergiquement en cas de violation de notre territoire.

Au cours de la conversation qui a suivi, Sir Francis m'a paru un peu surpris de la rapidité avec laquelle nous avons décidé la mobilisation de notre armée. J'ai fait remarquer que les Pays-Bas avaient pris une résolution identique avant nous et que d'autre part la date récente de notre nouveau régime militaire et les mesures transitoires que nous avons dû décider à cette occasion nous imposaient des mesures urgentes et complètes. Nos voisins et garants devaient voir dans cette résolution le désir de manifester notre profonde volonté de maintenir nous-mêmes notre neutralité.

Sir Francis m'a paru satisfait de ma réponse et m'a annoncé que son Gouvernement attendait cette réponse pour continuer les négociations avec la France et l'Allemagne, négociations dont la conclusion me serait communiquée.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

DAVIGNON.

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N° 12.

*LETTRE adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Berlin, Londres et Paris.*

Bruxelles, le 31 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Ce matin, au cours d'une conversation que le Secrétaire général de mon département a eue avec M. de Bulow, il a expliqué au Ministre d'Allemagne la portée des mesures militaires que nous avons prises et lui a dit qu'elles étaient une conséquence de notre volonté d'accomplir nos obligations internationales, qu'elles n'impliquaient en aucune façon une attitude de défiance envers nos voisins.

Le Secrétaire général a demandé ensuite au Ministre d'Allemagne s'il avait connaissance de la conversation qu'il avait eue avec son prédécesseur, M. de Flotow, et de la réponse que le Chancelier de l'Empire avait chargé celui-ci de lui faire.

Au cours de la polémique soulevée en 1911 par le dépôt du projet hollandais concernant les fortifications de Flessingue, certains journaux avaient affirmé qu'en cas de guerre franco-allemande, notre neutralité serait violée par l'Allemagne.

Le département des Affaires étrangères avait suggéré l'idée qu'une déclaration faite au Parlement allemand à l'occasion d'un débat sur la politique étrangère serait de nature à apaiser l'opinion publique et à calmer ses défiances, si regrettables au point de vue des relations des deux pays.

M. de Bethman-Holweg fit répondre qu'il avait été très sensible aux sentiments qui avaient inspiré notre démarche. Il déclarait que l'Allemagne n'avait pas l'intention de violer notre neutralité, mais il estimait qu'en faisant publiquement une déclaration, l'Allemagne affaiblirait sa situation militaire vis-à-vis de la France qui, rassurée du côté du Nord, porterait toutes ses forces du côté de l'Est.

Le baron von der Der Elst, poursuivant, dit qu'il comprenait parfaitement les objections qu'avaient faites M. de Bethman-Holweg à la déclaration publique suggérée et il rappela que depuis lors en 1913, M. de Jagow avait fait, à la Commission du budget du Reichstag, des déclarations rassurantes quant au respect de la neutralité de la Belgique.

M. de Bulow répondit qu'il était au courant de la conversation avec M. de Flotow et qu'il était certain que les sentiments exprimés à cette époque n'avaient pas changé.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

DAVIGNON.

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ANNEXE AU N° 12.

**LETRE adressée par le Ministre du Roi à Berlin à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.**

Berlin le 2 mai 1913

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître, d'après l'officiuse *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, les déclarations faites au cours de la séance du 29 avril de la Commission du budget du Reichstag, par le Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires Etrangères et le Ministre de la Guerre, relativement à la neutralité de la Belgique.

« Un membre du parti social-démocrate dit : « En Belgique on voit avec appréhension s'approcher une guerre franco-allemande, car on craint que l'Allemagne ne respectera pas la neutralité de la Belgique ».

« M. de Jagow, Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères répondit : la neutralité de la Belgique est déterminée par des conventions internationales et l'Allemagne est décidée à respecter ces conventions.

« Cette déclaration ne satisfait pas un autre membre du parti social-démocrate. M. de Jagow observa qu'il n'avait rien à ajouter aux paroles claires qu'il avait prononcées relativement aux relations de l'Allemagne avec la Belgique.

« A de nouvelles interrogations d'un membre du parti social-démocrate, M. de Heeringen, Ministre de la Guerre, répondit : la Belgique ne joue aucun rôle dans la justification du projet de réorganisation militaire allemand; celui-ci se trouve justifié par la situation en Orient. L'Allemagne ne perdra pas de vue que la neutralité belge est garantie par les traités internationaux ».

« Un membre du parti progressiste ayant encore parlé de la Belgique, M. de Jagow fit remarquer à nouveau que sa déclaration concernant la Belgique était suffisamment claire. »

Veuillez agréer, etc.

Baron BEYENS.

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N° 13.

**TÉLÉGRAMME adressé par le Comte de Lalaing, Ministre du Roi à Londres, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.**

Londres, 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

L'Angleterre a demandé séparément à la France et à l'Allemagne si elles respecteraient le territoire de la Belgique dans le cas où leur adversaire ne la violerait pas. On attend la réponse allemande. La France a accepté.

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N° 14.

**TÉLÉGRAMME adressé par le Baron Beyens, Ministre du Roi, à Berlin, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.**

Berlin, 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a été chargé de demander au Ministre des Affaires étrangères si, en cas de guerre, l'Allemagne respecterait la neutralité de la Belgique et le Ministre aurait dit qu'il ne peut pas répondre à cette question.

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N° 15.

*LETTRÉ adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Berlin, Paris et Londres.*

Bruxelles, 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que le Ministre de France m'a fait verbalement la communication suivante :

« Je suis autorisé à déclarer qu'en cas de conflit international, le Gouvernement de la République, ainsi qu'il l'a toujours déclaré, respectera la neutralité de la Belgique. Dans l'hypothèse où cette neutralité ne serait pas respectée par une autre puissance, le Gouvernement français, pour assurer sa propre défense, pourrait être amené à modifier son attitude ».

J'ai remercié son Excellence et ai ajouté que, de notre côté, nous avions pris sans aucun retard toutes les mesures voulues pour faire respecter notre indépendance et nos frontières.

Veuillez agréer, etc. . .

DAVIGNON.

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N° 19.

*LETTRÉ adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Paris, Berlin, Londres, Vienne et Saint-Petersbourg.*

Bruxelles, le 2 août 1914.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

J'avais eu soin de faire avertir par M. de Bassompierre le Ministre d'Allemagne, qu'un communiqué de M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France, à la presse bruxelloise, annoncerait la déclaration formelle que ce dernier m'avait faite le 1<sup>er</sup> août. Rencontrant M. de Balow, ce dernier m'a remercié de cette attention et a ajouté que, jusqu'à présent, il n'avait pas été chargé de nous faire une communication officielle, mais que nous connaissions son opinion personnelle sur la sécurité avec laquelle nous avons le droit de considérer nos voisins de l'Est. J'ai immédiatement répondu que tout ce que nous connaissions des intentions de ceux-ci, intentions indiquées dans les multiples entretiens antérieurs, ne nous permettait pas de douter de leur parfaite correction vis-à-vis de la Belgique; je tenais cependant à ajouter que nous attacherions le plus grand prix à être en possession d'une déclaration formelle dont la nation prendrait connaissance avec joie et reconnaissance.

Veuillez agréer, etc. . .

DAVIGNON.

N° 20.

*NOTE remise le 2 août, à 19 heures, par M. de Below Saleske, Ministre d'Allemagne, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.*

Bruxelles, 2 août 1914.

Le Gouvernement allemand a reçu des nouvelles sûres d'après lesquelles les forces françaises auraient l'intention de marcher sur la Meuse par Givet et Namur. Ces nouvelles ne laissent aucun doute sur l'intention de la France de marcher sur l'Allemagne par le territoire belge. Le Gouvernement impérial allemand ne peut s'empêcher de craindre que la Belgique, malgré sa meilleure volonté, ne sera pas en mesure de repousser sans secours une marche française d'un si grand développement. Dans ce fait, on trouve une certitude suffisante d'une menace dirigée contre l'Allemagne.

C'est un devoir impérieux de conservation pour l'Allemagne de prévenir cette attaque de l'ennemi.

Le Gouvernement allemand regretterait très vivement que la Belgique regardât comme un acte d'hostilité contre elle le fait que les mesures des ennemis de l'Allemagne l'obligent de violer de son côté le territoire belge.

Afin de dissiper tout malentendu, le Gouvernement allemand déclare ce qui suit :

I. L'Allemagne n'a en vue aucun acte d'hostilité contre la Belgique. Si la Belgique consent, dans la guerre qui va commencer, à prendre une attitude de neutralité amicale vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne, le Gouvernement allemand de son côté s'engage, au moment de la paix, à garantir le royaume et ses possessions dans toute leur étendue.

II. L'Allemagne s'engage, sous la condition énoncée, à évacuer le territoire belge aussitôt la paix conclue.

III. Si la Belgique observe une attitude amicale, l'Allemagne est prête, d'accord avec les autorités du Gouvernement belge à acheter contre argent comptant tout ce qui est nécessaire à ses troupes et à indemniser pour les dommages causés en Belgique.

IV. Si la Belgique se comporte d'une façon hostile contre les troupes allemandes et particulièrement fait des difficultés à leur marche en avant par une opposition de fortifications de la Meuse ou par des destructions de routes, de chemins de fer, tunnels ou autres ouvrages d'art, l'Allemagne sera obligée de considérer la Belgique en ennemie.

Dans ce cas, l'Allemagne ne prendra aucun engagement vis-à-vis du royaume, mais elle laissera le règlement ultérieur des rapports des deux États l'un vis-à-vis de l'autre à la décision des armes. Le Gouvernement allemand a l'espoir justifié que cette éventualité ne se produira pas et que le Gouvernement belge saura prendre les mesures appropriées pour l'empêcher de se produire. Dans ce cas, les relations d'amitié qui unissent les deux États voisins deviendront plus étroites et durables.

**N° 22.**

***Note remise par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, à M. de Bismarck-Salomon, Ministre d'Allemagne.***

**Bruxelles, le 3 août 1914 (7 heures du matin).**

Par sa note du 2 août 1914, le Gouvernement allemand a fait connaître que d'après des nouvelles sûres, les forces françaises auraient l'intention de marcher sur la Meuse par Givet et Namur, et que la Belgique, malgré sa meilleure volonté, ne serait pas en état de repousser sans secours une marche en avant des troupes françaises.

Le Gouvernement allemand s'estimerait dans l'obligation de prévenir cette attaque et de violer le territoire belge. Dans ces conditions, l'Allemagne propose au Gouvernement du Roi de prendre vis-à-vis d'elle une attitude amicale et s'engage au moment de la paix à garantir l'intégrité du Royaume et de ses possessions dans toute leur étendue. La note ajoute que si la Belgique fait des difficultés à la marche en avant des troupes allemandes, l'Allemagne sera obligée de la considérer comme ennemie et de laisser le règlement ultérieur des deux États l'un vis-à-vis de l'autre à la décision des armes.

Cette note a provoqué chez le Gouvernement du Roi un profond et douloureux étonnement.

Les intentions qu'elle attribue à la France sont en contradiction avec les déclarations formelles qui nous ont été faites le 1<sup>er</sup> août, au nom du Gouvernement de la République.

D'ailleurs si contrairement à notre attente une violation de la neutralité belge venait à être commise par la France, la Belgique remplirait tous ses devoirs internationaux et son armée opposerait à l'envahisseur la plus vigoureuse résistance.

Les traités de 1839 confirmés par les traités de 1870 consacrent l'indépendance et la neutralité de la Belgique sous la garantie des Puissances et notamment du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse.

La Belgique a toujours été fidèle à ses obligations internationales; elle a accompli ses devoirs dans un esprit de loyale impartialité; elle n'a négligé aucun effort pour maintenir ou faire respecter sa neutralité.

L'atteinte à son indépendance dont la menace du Gouvernement constituerait une flagrante violation du droit des gens. Aucun intérêt stratégique ne justifie la violation du droit.

Le Gouvernement belge en acceptant les propositions qui lui sont notifiées sacrifierait l'honneur de la nation en même temps qu'il trahirait ses devoirs vis-à-vis de l'Europe.

Conscient du rôle que la Belgique joue depuis plus de quatre-vingts ans dans la civilisation du monde, il se refuse à croire que l'indépendance de la Belgique ne puisse être conservée qu'au prix de la violation de sa neutralité.

Si cet espoir était déçu, le Gouvernement belge est fermement décidé à repousser par tous les moyens en son pouvoir toute atteinte à son droit.

**DAVIGNON.**

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N° 27.

*LETTRE adressée par M. de Below Saleske, Ministre d'Allemagne, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères. (L'original est en français).*

Bruxelles, le 4 août 1914 (6 heures du matin).

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

J'ai été chargé et j'ai l'honneur d'informer Votre Excellence que par suite du refus opposé par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi aux propositions bien intentionnées que lui avait soumises le Gouvernement impérial, celui-ci se verra, à son plus vif regret, forcé d'exécuter — au besoin par la force des armes — les mesures de sécurité exposées comme indispensables vis-à-vis des menaces françaises.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma haute considération.

VON BELOW.

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N° 28.

*NOTE remise par Sir Francis H. Villiers, Ministre d'Angleterre, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.*

Bruxelles, le 4 août 1914.

Je suis chargé d'informer le Gouvernement belge que si l'Allemagne exerce une pression dans le but d'obliger la Belgique à abandonner son rôle de pays neutre, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique s'attend à ce que la Belgique résiste par tous les moyens possibles.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, dans ce cas, est prêt à se joindre à la Russie et à la France, si la Belgique le désire, pour offrir au Gouvernement belge, sans délai, une action commune, qui aurait comme but de résister aux mesures de force employées par l'Allemagne contre la Belgique et en même temps d'offrir une garantie pour maintenir l'indépendance et l'intégrité de la Belgique dans l'avenir.

SIR FRANCIS H. VILLIERS.

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N° 30.

*TÉLÉGRAMME adressé par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Londres et à Paris.*

Bruxelles, le 4 août 1914.

L'État-Major fait savoir que le territoire national a été violé à Gemmenich.

DAVIGNON.

N° 31.

*LETTRE adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, à M. de Below Saleske, Ministre d'Allemagne.*

Bruxelles, le 4 août 1914.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à Votre Excellence que dès aujourd'hui le Gouvernement du Roi ne saurait plus Lui reconnaître de caractère diplomatique et cesse d'avoir des relations officielles avec Elle. Votre Excellence trouvera sous ce pli les passeports qui sont nécessaires à son départ et à celui du personnel de la Légation.

Je saisis, etc.

DAVIGNON.

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N° 35.

*LETTRE adressée par le Ministre de Belgique à Berlin à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.*

Berlin, 4 août 1914.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir, ci-après en traduction, la partie du discours prononcé aujourd'hui à la tribune du Reichstag par le Chancelier de l'Empire et relative à l'odieuse violation de notre neutralité :

« Nous nous trouvons en état de légitime défense et la nécessité ne connaît pas de lois.

« Nos troupes ont occupé Luxembourg et ont, peut-être, déjà pénétré en Belgique. Cela est en contradiction avec les prescriptions du droit des gens. La France a, il est vrai, déclaré à Bruxelles qu'elle était résolue à respecter la neutralité de la Belgique aussi longtemps que l'adversaire la respecterait. Mais nous savions que la France se tenait prête pour envahir la Belgique. La France pouvait attendre. Nous, pas. Une attaque française sur notre flanc dans la région du Rhin inférieur aurait pu devenir fatale. C'est ainsi que nous avons été forcés de passer outre aux protestations justifiées des Gouvernements Luxembourgeois et Belge. L'injustice que nous commettons de cette façon, nous la réparerons dès que notre but militaire sera atteint.

« A celui qui est menacé au point où nous le sommes et qui lutte pour son bien suprême, il n'est permis que de songer au moyen de se dégager; nous nous trouvons côte à côte avec l'Autriche. »

Il est à remarquer que M. de Bethmann-Hollweg reconnaît, sans le moindre détour, que l'Allemagne viole le droit international en envahissant le territoire belge et qu'elle commet une injustice à notre égard.

Veillez agréer, etc.

Baron BEYENS.

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N° 39.

*TÉLÉGRAMME adressé par le Ministre du Roi à Londres à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.*

Londres, 4 août 1914.

L'Angleterre a sommé ce matin l'Allemagne de respecter la neutralité belge. L'ultimatum dit que, vu la note adressée par l'Allemagne à la Belgique, menaçant cette dernière de la force des armes si elle s'oppose au passage de ses troupes; vu la violation du territoire belge à Gemmenich; vu le fait que l'Allemagne a refusé de donner à l'Angleterre la même assurance que celle donnée la semaine dernière par la France, l'Angleterre doit demander à nouveau une réponse satisfaisante au sujet du respect de la neutralité belge et d'un traité dont l'Allemagne est signataire aussi bien qu'elle-même. L'ultimatum expire à minuit.

En conséquence de l'ultimatum de l'Angleterre à l'Allemagne, la proposition anglaise que je vous ai transmise par télégramme est annulée pour le moment.

Comte DE LALAING.

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N° 40.

*LETTRE adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, aux Ministres de Grande-Bretagne, de France et de Russie.*

Bruxelles, le 4 août 1914.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

Le Gouvernement Belge a le regret de devoir annoncer à Votre Excellence que, ce matin, les forces armées de l'Allemagne ont pénétré sur le territoire belge, en violation des engagements qui ont été pris par traité.

Le Gouvernement du Roi est fermement décidé à résister par tous les moyens en son pouvoir.

La Belgique fait appel à l'Angleterre, à la France et à la Russie pour coopérer, comme garantes, à la défense de son territoire.

Il y aurait une action concertée et commune ayant pour but de résister aux mesures de force employées par l'Allemagne contre la Belgique et en même temps de garantir le maintien de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité de la Belgique dans l'avenir.

La Belgique est heureuse de pouvoir déclarer qu'elle assumera la défense des places fortes.

Je saisis, etc.

DAVIGNON.

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N° 41.

***TÉLÉGRAMME adressé par le Ministre du Roi à Londres, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.***

Londres, 5 août 1914.

L'Allemagne ayant rejeté les propositions anglaises, l'Angleterre lui a déclaré que l'état de guerre existait entre les deux pays, à partir de onze heures.

Comte DE LALAING.

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N° 44.

***LETTRE adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, aux Chefs de mission dans tous les pays entretenant avec la Belgique des rapports diplomatiques.***

Bruxelles, le 5 août 1914.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

Par le traité du 18 avril 1839, la Prusse, la France, l'Angleterre, l'Autriche et la Russie se sont déclarées garantes du traité conclu le même jour entre S. M. le roi des Belges et S. M. le roi des Pays-Bas. Ce traité porte : « La Belgique formera un État indépendant et perpétuellement neutre ». La Belgique a rempli toutes ses obligations internationales, elle a accompli ses devoirs dans un esprit de loyale impartialité, elle n'a négligé aucun effort pour maintenir et faire respecter sa neutralité.

Aussi est-ce avec une pénible émotion que le Gouvernement du Roi a appris que les forces armées de l'Allemagne, puissance garante de notre neutralité ont pénétré sur le territoire de la Belgique en violation des engagements qui ont été pris par traité.

Il est de notre devoir de protester avec indignation contre un attentat au droit des gens qu'aucun acte de notre part n'a pu provoquer.

Le Gouvernement du Roi est fermement décidé à repousser par tous les moyens en son pouvoir l'atteinte portée à sa neutralité et il rappelle qu'en vertu de l'article 10 de la Convention de La Haye de 1907 concernant les droits et les devoirs des Puissances et des personnes neutres en cas de guerre sur terre ne peut être considéré comme un acte hostile le fait, par une puissance neutre, de repousser même par la force les atteintes à sa neutralité.

Vous voudrez bien demander d'urgence audience au Ministre des Affaires étrangères et donner lecture à Son Excellence de la présente lettre dont vous lui laisserez copie. Si l'audience ne pouvait vous être immédiatement accordée, vous ferez par écrit la communication dont il s'agit.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

DAVIGNON.

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N° 48.

*COMMUNICATION faite le 5 août par Sir Francis Villiers, Ministre d'Angleterre, à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.*

Je suis chargé d'informer le Gouvernement Belge que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique considère l'action commune dans le but de résister à l'Allemagne comme étant en vigueur et justifiée par le traité de 1839.

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N° 52.

*LETTRE adressée par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, aux Ministres du Roi à Paris, Londres et Saint-Pétersbourg.*

Bruxelles, le 5 août 1914.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que les Ministres de France et de Russie ont fait ce matin une démarche auprès de moi pour me faire connaître la volonté de leurs Gouvernements de répondre à notre appel et de coopérer avec l'Angleterre à la défense de notre territoire.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

DAVIGNON.

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N° 60.

*TÉLÉGRAMME adressé par le Ministre du Roi à La Haye à M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.*

La Haye, le 9 août 1914.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères m'a prié de vous transmettre les informations suivantes parce que le Ministre d'Amérique à Bruxelles s'y refuse.

La forteresse de Liège a été prise d'assaut après une défense courageuse. Le Gouvernement Allemand regrette très profondément, que par suite de l'attitude du Gouvernement Belge contre l'Allemagne, on en est arrivé à des rencontres sanglantes. L'Allemagne ne vient pas en ennemie en Belgique, c'est seulement par la force des événements qu'elle a dû, à cause des mesures militaires de la France, prendre la grave détermination d'entrer en Belgique et d'occuper Liège comme point d'appui pour ses opérations militaires ultérieures. Après que l'armée belge a, par sa résistance héroïque contre une grande supériorité, maintenu l'honneur de ses armes, le Gouvernement Allemand prie le Roi des Belges et le Gouvernement Belge d'éviter à la Belgique les horreurs ultérieures de la guerre. Le Gouvernement est prêt à tous accords avec la Belgique qui peuvent se concilier avec son conflit avec

la France. L'Allemagne assure encore solennellement qu'elle n'a pas l'intention de s'approprier le territoire belge et que cette intention est loin d'elle. L'Allemagne est toujours prête à évacuer la Belgique aussitôt que l'état de guerre le lui permettra.

L'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis avait prié son collègue de se charger de cette tentative de médiation. Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères a accepté sans enthousiasme cette mission. Je m'en suis chargé pour lui faire plaisir.

Baron FALLON.

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N° 71.

*TÉLÉGRAMME adressé par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères à M. le baron Fallon, Ministre du Roi à La Haye.*

Bruxelles, le 12 août 1914.

Prière de remettre le télégramme suivant au Ministre des Affaires étrangères : « La proposition que nous fait le Gouvernement Allemand reproduit la proposition qui avait été formulée dans l'ultimatum du 2 août. Fidèle à ses devoirs internationaux, la Belgique ne peut que réitérer sa réponse à cet ultimatum, d'autant plus que depuis le 3 août sa neutralité a été violée, qu'une guerre douloureuse a été portée sur son territoire et que les garants de sa neutralité ont loyalement et immédiatement répondu à son appel. »

DAVIGNON.

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ANNEXE V.

**Télégrammes échangés entre l'Empereur Guillaume II et l'Empereur Nicolas II.**  
(Extraits du Livre Blanc allemand)

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**I.**

**L'Empereur GUILLAUME**  
**à l'Empereur NICOLAS.**

28 juillet 1914 (10 h. 45 du soir.)

C'est avec la plus vive inquiétude que j'ai appris l'impression qu'a produite dans ton Empire, la marche en avant de l'Autriche-Hongrie contre la Serbie. L'agitation sans scrupule qui se poursuit depuis des années en Serbie, a conduit au monstrueux attentat dont l'Archiduc François-Ferdinand a été la victime. L'état d'esprit qui a amené les Serbes à assassiner leur propre roi et son épouse règne encore dans ce pays. Sans doute conviendras-tu avec moi que tous deux, toi aussi bien que moi, nous avons, comme tous les souverains, un intérêt commun à insister pour que ceux qui sont moralement responsables de ce terrible meurtre reçoivent le châtiment qu'ils méritent.

D'autre part, je ne me dissimule aucunement combien il est difficile pour toi et ton Gouvernement de résister aux manifestations de l'opinion publique. En souvenir de la cordiale amitié qui nous lie tous deux étroitement depuis longtemps, j'use de toute mon influence pour décider l'Autriche-Hongrie à en venir à une entente loyale et satisfaisante avec la Russie. Je compte bien que tu me secourras dans mes efforts tendant à écarter toutes les difficultés qui pourraient encore s'élever.

Ton ami et cousin très sincère et dévoué

GUILLAUME.

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**II**

**L'Empereur NICOLAS**  
**à l'Empereur GUILLAUME.**

Palais de Péterhof, le 29 juillet 1914 (1 heure après-midi.)

Je suis heureux que tu sois rentré en Allemagne. En ce moment si grave, je te prie instamment de venir à mon aide. Une guerre honteuse a été déclarée à une faible nation ; je partage entièrement l'indignation, qui est immense en Russie.

Je prévois que très prochainement je ne pourrai plus longtemps résister à la pression qui est exercée sur moi et que je serai forcé de prendre des mesures qui conduiront à la guerre.

Pour prévenir le malheur que serait une guerre européenne, je te prie, au nom de notre vieille amitié, de faire tout ce qui te sera possible pour empêcher ton alliée d'aller trop loin.

NICOLAS

III

29 juillet 1914 (6 h. 30 du soir.)

L'Empereur GUILLAUME

à l'Empereur NICOLAS.

J'ai reçu ton télégramme et partage ton désir de maintenir la paix.

Cependant, je ne puis, ainsi que je le disais dans mon premier télégramme, considérer la marche en avant de l'Autriche-Hongrie comme « une guerre honteuse ». L'Autriche-Hongrie sait par expérience qu'on ne peut absolument pas se fier aux promesses de la Serbie tant qu'elles n'existent que sur le papier.

A mon avis, la conduite de l'Autriche-Hongrie doit être considérée comme une tentative d'obtenir toute garantie que les promesses de la Serbie seront exécutées aussi en fait. La déclaration du cabinet autrichien me fortifie dans mon opinion que l'Autriche-Hongrie ne vise à aucune acquisition territoriale au détriment de la Serbie.

Je pense donc qu'il est très possible à la Russie de persévérer, en présence de la guerre austro-serbe, dans son rôle de spectatrice, sans entraîner l'Europe dans la guerre la plus effroyable qu'elle ait jamais vue.

Je crois qu'une entente directe entre ton Gouvernement et Vienne est possible et désirable attendu que, comme je te l'ai déjà télégraphié, mon Gouvernement essaie de toutes ses forces de la favoriser.

Naturellement des mesures militaires de la Russie, que l'Autriche-Hongrie pourrait considérer comme une menace, hâteraient une calamité que tous deux nous cherchons à éviter, et rendrait également impossible ma mission de médiateur que j'ai acceptée avec empressement lorsque tu as fait appel à mon amitié et à mon aide.

GUILLAUME.

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IV

L'Empereur GUILLAUME

à l'Empereur NICOLAS.

30 juillet 1914 (1 heure du matin.)

Mon Ambassadeur a été chargé d'appeler l'attention de ton Gouvernement sur les dangers et les graves conséquences d'une mobilisation; c'est ce que je t'avais dit dans mon dernier télégramme.

L'Autriche-Hongrie n'a mobilisé que contre la Serbie et seulement une partie de son armée. Si la Russie, comme c'est le cas d'après ton télégramme et la communication de ton Gouvernement, mobilise contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, la mission de médiateur que tu m'as amicalement confiée et que j'ai acceptée sur ton instantane prière, sera compromise sinon rendue impossible.

Tout le poids de la décision à prendre pèse actuellement sur tes épaules, qui auront à supporter la responsabilité de la guerre ou de la paix.

GUILLAUME.

V

**L'Empereur NICOLAS**

**à l'Empereur GUILLAUME.**

Péterhof, le 30 juillet 1914 (1 h. 20 après-midi.)

Je te remercie cordialement de ta prompte réponse. J'envoie aujourd'hui soir Tatischeff avec mes instructions. Les décisions militaires qui sont mises maintenant en vigueur, ont déjà été prises il y a cinq jours à titre de défense contre les préparatifs de l'Autriche.

J'espère de tout mon cœur que ces mesures n'influeront en rien sur ton rôle de médiateur que j'apprécie grandement. Nous avons besoin de ton intervention énergique auprès de l'Autriche, afin qu'elle arrive à une entente avec nous.

NICOLAS.

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VI

**L'Empereur NICOLAS**

**à l'Empereur GUILLAUME.**

31 juillet 1914.

Je te remercie de tout cœur de ton intention, qui laisse percer une lueur d'espoir que tout se terminera encore à l'amiable. Techniquement, il est impossible de suspendre nos préparatifs militaires qui ont été nécessités par la mobilisation de l'Autriche.

Nous sommes loin de désirer la guerre; aussi longtemps que dureront les pourparlers avec l'Autriche, au sujet de la Serbie, mes troupes ne se livreront à aucun acte de provocation. Je t'en donne ma parole d'honneur.

J'ai confiance absolue dans la grâce divine et souhaite la réussite de ton intervention à Vienne pour le bien de nos pays et la paix de l'Europe.

Bien cordialement à toi.

NICOLAS.

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VII

**L'Empereur GUILLAUME**

**à l'Empereur NICOLAS.**

31 juillet 1914 (2 heures après-midi).

Sur ton appel à mon amitié et ta prière de te venir en aide, j'ai entrepris une action médiatrice entre ton Gouvernement et le Gouvernement austro hongrois.

Pendant que cette action était encore en cours, tes troupes ont été mobilisées contre mon alliée l'Autriche-Hongrie; à la suite de quoi, ainsi que je te l'ai déjà fait savoir, mon intervention est devenue presque illusoire. Malgré cela, je l'ai continuée.

Je recois à l'instant des nouvelles dignes de foi touchant de sérieux préparatifs de guerre également sur ma frontière orientale. Ayant à répondre de la sécurité de mon Empire, je me vois forcé de prendre les mêmes mesures défensives.

Je suis allé jusqu'à l'extrême limite du possible dans mes efforts pour maintenir la paix. Ce n'est pas moi qui supporterai la responsabilité de l'affreux désastre qui menace maintenant tout le monde civilisé.

En ce moment encore il ne tient qu'à toi de l'empêcher. Personne ne menace l'honneur et la puissance de la Russie, qui eût bien pu attendre le résultat de mon intervention. L'amitié pour toi et ton royaume, qui m'a été transmise par mon Grand-Père à son lit de mort, est toujours sacrée pour moi, et j'ai été fidèle à la Russie lorsqu'elle s'est trouvée dans le malheur, notamment dans ta dernière guerre. Maintenant encore la paix de l'Europe peut être maintenue par toi, si la Russie se décide à suspendre ses mesures militaires qui menacent l'Allemagne et l'Autriche.

GUILLAUME.

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## VIII

L'Empereur NICOLAS

à l'Empereur GUILLAUME.

1<sup>er</sup> août 1914 (2 heures après-midi).

J'ai reçu ton télégramme, je comprends que tu sois obligé de mobiliser, mais je voudrais avoir de toi la même garantie que je t'ai donnée, à savoir que ces mesures ne signifient pas la guerre et que nous poursuivrons nos négociations pour le bien de nos deux pays et la paix générale si chère à nos cœurs.

Notre longue amitié éprouvée doit, avec l'aide de Dieu, réussir à empêcher ces effusions de sang. J'attends avec confiance une réponse de toi.

NICOLAS.

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## IX

L'Empereur GUILLAUME

à l'Empereur NICOLAS.

Berlin, 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

Je te remercie de ton télégramme; j'ai indiqué hier à ton Gouvernement le seul moyen par lequel la guerre pouvait encore être évitée.

Bien que j'eusse demandé une réponse pour midi, aucun télégramme de mon Ambassadeur contenant une réponse de ton Gouvernement ne m'est encore parvenu. J'ai donc été contraint de mobiliser mon armée.

Une réponse immédiate, claire et non équivoque, de ton Gouvernement est le seul moyen de conjurer une calamité incommensurable. Jusqu'à ce que je reçoive cette réponse, il m'est impossible, à mon vif regret, d'aborder le sujet de ton télégramme. Je dois te demander catégoriquement de donner sans retard l'ordre à tes troupes de ne porter en aucun cas la moindre atteinte à nos frontières.

GUILLAUME.

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ANNEXE VI.

Extraits du « Livre orange » relatifs à la déclaration de guerre de l'Allemagne à la Russie.

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N° 76.

*NOTE remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Saint-Petersbourg, le 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914, à 7 h. 10 du soir.*

Le Gouvernement impérial s'est efforcé dès les débuts de la crise de la mener à une solution pacifique. Se rendant à un désir qui lui en avait été exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne, d'accord avec l'Angleterre, s'était appliqué à accomplir un rôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et de Saint-Petersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le résultat, procéda à la mobilisation de la totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer. A la suite de cette mesure menaçante motivée par aucun présage militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire allemand s'est trouvé vis-à-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement impérial eût manqué de parer à ce péril, il aurait compromis la sécurité et l'existence même de l'Allemagne. Par conséquent le Gouvernement allemand se vit forcé de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies en insistant sur la cessation desdits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refusé de faire droit à (n'ayant pas cru devoir répondre à)<sup>(1)</sup> cette demande et ayant manifesté par ce refus (cette attitude) que son action était dirigée contre l'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur, d'ordre de mon Gouvernement, de faire savoir à Votre Excellence ce qui suit :

Sa Majesté l'Empereur Mon Auguste Souverain au nom de l'Empire, relevant le défi, se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 19 juillet/1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

F. POURTALES.

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N° 77.

*COMMUNIQUÉ du Ministre des Affaires étrangères concernant les événements des derniers jours.*

Le 2 août 1914.

Un exposé défigurant les événements des derniers jours ayant paru dans la presse étrangère, le Ministère des Affaires étrangères croit de son devoir de publier l'aperçu suivant des pourparlers diplomatiques pendant le temps susvisé.

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<sup>(1)</sup> Les mots placés entre parenthèses se trouvent dans l'original. Il faut supposer que deux variantes avaient été préparées d'avance et que par erreur elles ont été insérées toutes les deux dans la note.

Le 10-23 juillet a. c. le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade présenta au Ministre Président serbe une note où le Gouvernement serbe était accusé d'avoir favorisé le mouvement panserbe qui avait abouti à l'assassinat de l'héritier du trône austro-hongrois. En conséquence l'Autriche-Hongrie demandait au Gouvernement serbe non seulement de condamner sous une forme solennelle la susdite propagande, mais aussi de prendre, sous le contrôle de l'Autriche-Hongrie, une série de mesures tendant à la découverte du complot, à la punition des sujets serbes y ayant participé et à la prévention dans l'avenir de tout attentat sur le sol du Royaume. Un délai de quarante-huit heures fut fixé au Gouvernement serbe pour la réponse à la susdite note.

Le Gouvernement impérial, auquel l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie à Saint-Petersbourg avait communiqué le texte de la note dix-sept heures après sa remise à Belgrade, ayant pris connaissance des demandes y contenues, dut s'apercevoir que quelques-unes parmi elles étaient inexécutables quant au fond, tandis que d'autres étaient présentées sous une forme incompatible avec la dignité d'un état indépendant. Trouvant inadmissibles la diminution de la dignité de la Serbie, contenue dans ces demandes, ainsi que la tendance de l'Autriche-Hongrie d'assurer sa prépondérance dans les Balkans démontrée par ces mêmes exigences, le Gouvernement russe fit observer dans la forme la plus amicale à l'Autriche-Hongrie qu'il serait désirable de soumettre à un nouvel examen les points contenus dans la note austro-hongroise. Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois ne crut pas possible de consentir à une discussion de la note. L'action modératrice des autres Puissances à Vienne ne fut non plus couronnée de succès.

Malgré que la Serbie eût réprouvé le crime et se fût montrée prête à donner satisfaction à l'Autriche dans une mesure qui dépassât les prévisions non seulement de la Russie, mais aussi des autres Puissances, le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade jugea la réponse serbe insuffisante et quitta cette ville.

Reconnaissant le caractère exagéré des demandes présentées par l'Autriche, la Russie avait déclaré encore auparavant qu'il lui serait impossible de rester indifférente, sans se refuser toutefois à employer tous ses efforts pour trouver une issue pacifique qui fût acceptable pour l'Autriche et ménageât son amour-propre de grande puissance. En même temps la Russie établit fermement qu'elle admettait une solution pacifique de la question seulement dans une mesure qui n'impliquerait pas la diminution de la dignité de la Serbie comme État indépendant. Malheureusement tous les efforts déployés par le Gouvernement impérial dans cette direction restèrent sans effet. Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, après s'être dérobé à toute intervention conciliatrice des Puissances dans son conflit avec la Serbie, procéda à la mobilisation, déclara officiellement la guerre à la Serbie, et le jour suivant, Belgrade fut bombardée. Le manifeste qui a accompagné la déclaration de guerre accuse ouvertement la Serbie d'avoir préparé et exécuté le crime de Sarajevo. Une pareille accusation d'un crime de droit commun lancée contre tout un peuple et tout un État attira à la Serbie par son inanité évidente les larges sympathies des cercles de la société européenne.

A la suite de cette manière d'agir du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, malgré la déclaration de la Russie qu'elle ne pourrait rester indifférente au sort de la Serbie, le Gouvernement impérial jugea nécessaire d'ordonner la mobilisation des circonscriptions militaires de Kiew, d'Odessa, de Moscou et de Kazan. Une telle décision s'imposait parce que depuis la date de la remise de la note austro-hongroise au Gouvernement serbe et les premières démarches de la Russie cinq jours s'étaient écoulés, et cependant le Cabinet de Vienne n'avait fait aucun pas pour aller au-devant de nos efforts pacifiques; au contraire la mobilisation de la moitié de l'armée austro-hongroise avait été décrétée.

Le Gouvernement allemand fut mis au courant des mesures prises par la Russie; il lui

fût en même temps expliqué qu'elles n'étaient que la conséquence des armements autrichiens et nullement dirigées contre l'Allemagne. En même temps, le Gouvernement impérial déclara que la Russie était prête à continuer les pourparlers en vue d'une solution pacifique du conflit, soit par la voie de négociations directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne, soit, en suivant la proposition de la Grande-Bretagne, par la voie d'une Conférence des quatre grandes Puissances non intéressées directement, voire l'Angleterre, la France, l'Allemagne et l'Italie.

Cependant cette tentative de la Russie échoua également. L'Autriche-Hongrie déclina un échange de vues ultérieur avec nous, et le Cabinet de Vienne se déroba à la participation à la Conférence des Puissances projetée.

Néanmoins, la Russie ne discontinua pas ses efforts en faveur de la paix. Répondant à la question de l'Allemagne, à quelles conditions nous consentirions encore à suspendre nos armements, le Ministre des Affaires étrangères déclara que ces conditions seraient la reconnaissance par l'Autriche-Hongrie que la question austro-serbe avait revêtu le caractère d'une question européenne, et la déclaration de cette même Puissance qu'elle consentait à ne pas insister sur des demandes incompatibles avec les droits souverains de la Serbie.

La proposition de la Russie fut jugée par l'Allemagne inacceptable pour l'Autriche-Hongrie. Simultanément on reçut à Saint-Petersbourg la nouvelle de la proclamation de la mobilisation générale par l'Autriche-Hongrie.

En même temps les hostilités continuaient sur le territoire serbe et Belgrade fut bombardée derechef.

L'insuccès de nos propositions nous obligea d'élargir les mesures de précautions militaires.

Le Cabinet de Berlin nous ayant adressé une question à ce sujet, il lui fut répondu que la Russie était forcée de commencer ses armements pour se prémunir contre toutes éventualités.

Tout en prenant cette mesure de précaution, la Russie n'en discontinuait pas moins de rechercher de toutes ses forces une issue de cette situation et déclara être prête à accepter tout moyen de solution du conflit qui comporterait l'observation des conditions posées par nous.

Malgré cette communication conciliante, le Gouvernement allemand, le 18/31 juillet, adressa au Gouvernement russe la demande d'avoir à suspendre ses mesures militaires à midi du 19 juillet/1<sup>er</sup> août, en menaçant, dans le cas contraire, de procéder à une mobilisation générale.

Le lendemain, 19 juillet/1<sup>er</sup> août, l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne transmet au Ministre des Affaires étrangères, au nom de son Gouvernement, la déclaration de guerre.

Sazonoff.

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N° 78.

Le MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES

aux Représentants de S. M. l'Empereur à l'étranger.

(TÉLÉGRAMME.)

Saint-Petersbourg, le 20 juillet/2 août 1914.

Il est absolument clair que l'Allemagne s'efforce dès à présent de rejeter sur nous la responsabilité de la rupture. Notre mobilisation a été provoquée par l'énorme responsabilité

que nous aurions assumée, si nous n'avions pas pris toutes les mesures de précaution à un moment où l'Autriche, se bornant à des pourparlers d'un caractère dilatoire, bombardait Belgrade et procédait à une mobilisation générale.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur s'était engagée vis-à-vis de l'Empereur d'Allemagne par sa parole à n'entreprendre aucun acte agressif tant que dureraient les pourparlers avec l'Autriche. Après une telle garantie et après toutes les preuves de l'amour de la Russie pour la paix, l'Allemagne ne pouvait ni n'avait le droit de douter de notre déclaration, que nous accepterions avec joie toute issue pacifique compatible avec la dignité et l'indépendance de la Serbie. Une autre issue, tout en étant complètement incompatible avec notre propre dignité aurait certainement ébranlé l'équilibre européen, en assurant l'hégémonie de l'Allemagne. Ce caractère européen, voire mondial, du conflit est infiniment plus important que le prétexte qui l'a créé. Par sa décision de nous déclarer la guerre à un moment où se poursuivaient les négociations entre les Puissances, l'Allemagne a assumé une lourde responsabilité.

Sazonoff.

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**Vorläufige  
Denkschrift und Aktenstücke  
zum Kriegsausbruch.**



Am 28. Juni d. J. ist der österreichisch-ungarische Thronfolger Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand und seine Gemahlin, die Herzogin von Hohenberg durch Revolverschüsse des Mitglieds einer serbischen Verschwörerbande niedergestreckt worden. Die Untersuchung des Verbrechens durch die österreichisch-ungarischen Behörden hat ergeben, daß das Komplott gegen das Leben des Erzherzog-Thronfolgers in Belgrad unter Mitwirkung amtlicher serbischer Personen vorbereitet und gefördert, mit Waffen aus den staatlichen serbischen Depots ausgeführt wurde. Dies Verbrechen mußte der ganzen zivilisierten Welt die Augen öffnen, nicht nur über die gegen den Bestand und die Integrität der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie gerichteten Ziele der serbischen Politik, sondern auch über die verbrecherischen Mittel, die die großserbische Propaganda in Serbien zur Erreichung dieser Ziele anzuwenden sich nicht scheute. Das Endziel dieser Politik war die allmähliche Revolutionierung und schließliche Lostrennung der südöstlichen Gebietsteile der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie und ihre Vereinigung mit Serbien. An dieser Richtung der serbischen Politik haben die wiederholten und feierlichen Erklärungen, in denen Serbien Österreich-Ungarn gegenüber die Abkehr von dieser Politik und die Pflege guter nachbarlicher Beziehungen gelobt hat, nicht das geringste geändert. Zum dritten Male im Laufe der letzten sechs Jahre führt Serbien auf diese Weise Europa an den Rand eines Weltkriegs. Es konnte dies nur tun, weil es sich bei seinen Bestrebungen durch Rußland gestützt glaubte. Die russische Politik war bald nach den durch die türkische Revolution herbeigeführten Ereignissen des Jahres 1908 daran gegangen, einen gegen den Bestand der Türkei gerichteten Bund der Balkanstaaten unter seinem Patronat zu begründen. Dieser Balkanbund, dem es im Jahre 1911 gelang, die Türkei siegreich aus dem größten Teil ihrer europäischen Besitzungen zu verdrängen, brach über der Frage der Beuteverteilung in sich zusammen. Die russische Politik ließ sich durch diesen Mißerfolg nicht abschrecken. In der Idee der russischen Staatsmänner sollte ein neuer Balkanbund unter russischem Patronat entstehen, dessen Spitze sich nicht mehr gegen die aus dem Balkan verdrängte Türkei, sondern gegen den Bestand der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie richtete. Die Idee war, daß Serbien gegen die auf Kosten der Donaumonarchie gehende Einverleibung Bosniens und der Herzegowina die im letzten Balkankrieg erworbenen Teile Mazedoniens an Bulgarien abtreten sollte. Zu diesem Behufe sollte Bulgarien durch Isolierung mürbe gemacht, Rumänien durch eine mit Hilfe Frankreichs unternommene Propaganda an Rußland gekettet, Serbien auf Bosnien und die Herzegowina gewiesen werden.

Unter diesen Umständen mußte Österreich sich sagen, daß es weder mit der Würde noch mit der Selbsterhaltung der Monarchie vereinbar wäre, dem Treiben jenseits der Grenze noch länger tatenlos zuzusehen. Die k. und k. Regierung benachrichtigte uns von dieser Auffassung und erbat unsere Ansicht. Aus vollem Herzen

Konnten wir unserem Bundesgenossen unser Einverständnis mit seiner Einschätzung der Sachlage geben und ihm versichern, daß eine Aktion, die er für notwendig hielt, um der gegen den Bestand der Monarchie gerichteten Bewegung in Serbien ein Ende zu machen, unsere Billigung finden würde. Wir waren uns hierbei wohl bewußt, daß ein etwaiges kriegerisches Vorgehen Österreich-Ungarns gegen Serbien Rußland auf den Plan bringen und uns hiermit unserer Bundespflicht entsprechend in einen Krieg verwickeln könnte. Wir konnten aber in der Erkenntnis der vitalen Interessen Österreich-Ungarns, die auf dem Spiele standen, unserem Bundesgenossen weder zu einer mit seiner Würde nicht zu vereinbarenden Nachgiebigkeit raten noch auch ihm unseren Beistand in diesem schweren Moment versagen. Wir konnten dies um so weniger, als auch unsere Interessen durch die andauernde serbische Mühlearbeit auf das empfindlichste bedroht waren. Wenn es den Serben mit Rußlands und Frankreichs Hilfe noch länger gestattet geblieben wäre, den Bestand der Nachbarmonarchie zu gefährden, so würde dies den allnäherlichen Zusammenbruch Österreichs und eine Unterwerfung des gesamten Slawentums unter russischem Szepter zur Folge haben, wodurch die Stellung der germanischen Rasse in Mitteleuropa unhaltbar würde. Ein moralisch geschwächtes, durch das Vordringen des russischen Panславismus zusammenbrechendes Österreich wäre für uns kein Bundesgenosse mehr, mit dem wir rechnen könnten, und auf den wir uns verlassen könnten, wie wir es angesichts der immer drohenden werdenden Haltung unserer östlichen und westlichen Nachbarn müssen. Wir ließen daher Österreich völlig freie Hand in seiner Aktion gegen Serbien. Wir haben an den Vorbereitungen dazu nicht teilgenommen.

Anlage 1a.

Österreich wählte den Weg, in einer Note der serbischen Regierung ausführlich den durch die Untersuchung des Mordes von Sarajewo festgestellten unmittelbaren Zusammenhang zwischen dem Morde und der von der serbischen Regierung nicht nur gebuldeten, sondern unterstützten großserbischen Bewegung darzulegen und von ihr eine vollständige Abstellung dieses Treibens sowie Bestrafung der Schuldigen zu fordern. Gleichzeitig verlangte Österreich-Ungarn als Garantie für die Durchführung des Verfahrens Teilnahme seiner Organe an der Untersuchung auf serbischem Gebiet und definitive Auflösung der gegen Österreich-Ungarn wühlenden großserbischen Vereine. Die k. u. k. Regierung stellte eine Frist von 48 Stunden zur bedingungslosen Annahme ihrer Forderungen. Die serbische Regierung hat einen Tag nach Überreichung der österreichisch-ungarischen Note die Mobilisation begonnen. Als nach Ablauf der Frist die serbische Regierung eine Antwort erteilte, die zwar in einigen Punkten die Wünsche Österreich-Ungarns erfüllte, im wesentlichen aber deutlich das Bestreben erkennen ließ, durch Verschleppung und neue Verhandlungen sich den gerechten Forderungen der Monarchie zu entziehen, brach diese die diplomatischen Beziehungen zu Serbien ab, ohne sich auf weitere Verhandlungen einzulassen oder sich von serbischen Versicherungen hinhalten zu lassen, deren Wert es genugsam — zu seinem Schaden — kennt.

Von diesem Augenblick an befand sich Österreich tatsächlich im Kriegszustande mit Serbien, den es dann noch durch die offizielle Kriegserklärung vom 28. d. Mts. öffentlich proklamierte.

Vom ersten Anfang des Konflikts an haben wir auf dem Standpunkt gestanden, daß es sich hierbei um eine Angelegenheit Österreichs handelte, die es allein mit



Serbien zum Austrag zu bringen haben würde. Wir haben daher unser ganzes Bestreben darauf gerichtet, den Krieg zu lokalisieren und die anderen Mächte davon zu überzeugen, daß Österreich-Ungarn in berechtigter Notwehr und durch die Verhältnisse gezwungen sich zum Appell an die Waffen habe entschließen müssen. Wir haben nachdrücklich den Standpunkt vertreten, daß kein Kulturstaat das Recht habe, in diesem Kampf gegen Unkultur und politische Verbrechermoral Österreich in den Arm zu fallen und die Serben ihrer gerechten Strafe zu entziehen. In diesem Sinne haben wir unsere Vertreter im Ausland instruiert.

Gleichzeitig teilte die Österreichisch-Ungarische Regierung der Russischen mit, daß der von ihr bei Serbien unternommene Schritt lediglich eine defensive Maßregel gegenüber den serbischen Wühlereien zum Ziele habe, daß aber Österreich-Ungarn notgedrungen Garantien für ein weiteres freundschaftliches Verhalten Serbiens der Monarchie gegenüber verlange. Es liege Österreich-Ungarn gänzlich fern, etwa eine Verschiebung der Machtverhältnisse auf dem Balkan herbeizuführen. Auf unsere Erklärung, daß die Deutsche Regierung die Lokalisierung des Konflikts wünsche und erstrebe, wurde sowohl von der Französischen als der Englischen Regierung eine Wirkung in dem gleichen Sinne zugesagt. Diesen Bestrebungen gelang es indessen nicht, eine Einmischung Rußlands in die österreichisch-serbische Auseinandersetzung zu verhindern.

Die Russische Regierung erließ am 24. Juli ein amtliches Communiqué, wonach Rußland unmöglich in dem serbisch-österreichischen Konflikt indifferent bleiben könnte. Das gleiche erklärte der russische Minister des Auswärtigen, Herr Cassonow, dem Kaiserlichen Botschafter Grafen Pourtalès. Am Nachmittag des 26. Juli ließ die k. u. k. Regierung abermals durch ihren Botschafter in St. Petersburg erklären, daß Österreich-Ungarn keinerlei Eroberungspläne habe und nur endlich an seinen Grenzen Ruhe haben wolle. Im Laufe des gleichen Tages gelangten indes bereits die ersten Meldungen über russische Mobilmachungen nach Berlin. Noch am 26. abends wurden die Kaiserlichen Botschafter in London, Paris und Petersburg angewiesen, bei den Regierungen Englands, Frankreichs und Rußlands energisch auf die Gefahr dieser russischen Mobilisierungen hinzuweisen. Nachdem Österreich-Ungarn Rußland offiziell erklärt habe, daß es keinen territorialen Gewinn in Serbien anstrebe, liege die Entscheidung über den Weltfrieden ausschließlich in Petersburg. Noch am gleichen Tage wurde der Kaiserliche Botschafter in St. Petersburg angewiesen, der Russischen Regierung zu erklären:

Vorbereitende militärische Maßnahmen Rußlands werden uns zu Gegenmaßnahmen zwingen, die in der Mobilisierung der Armee bestehen müssen. Die Mobilisierung aber bedeutet den Krieg. Da uns Frankreichs Verpflichtungen gegenüber Rußland bekannt sind, würde diese Mobilisierung gegen Rußland und Frankreich zugleich gerichtet sein. Wir können nicht annehmen, daß Rußland einen solchen europäischen Krieg entfesseln will. Da Österreich-Ungarn den Bestand des serbischen Königreichs nicht antasten will, sind wir der Ansicht, daß Rußland eine abwartende Stellung einnehmen kann. Den Wunsch Rußlands, den Bestand des serbischen Königreichs nicht in Frage stellen zu lassen, werden wir um so eher unterstützen können, als Österreich-Ungarn diesen Bestand

Anlage 1b u. 2.  
Anlage 3.

Anlage 4.

Anlage 5.

Anlage 6,  
7, 8, 9.

Anlage 10,  
10a, 10b.

gar nicht in Frage stellt. Es wird leicht sein, im weiteren Verlauf der Angelegenheit die Basis einer Verständigung zu finden.

Anlage 11.

Am 27. Juli erklärte der russische Kriegsminister Ssuchomlinow dem deutschen Militärattaché ehrenwörtlich, daß noch keine Mobilmachungsbefehle ergangen sei. Es wurden lediglich Vorbereitungsmaßregeln getroffen, kein Pferd ausgehoben, kein Reservist eingezogen. Wenn Österreich-Ungarn die serbische Grenze überschreite, würden die auf Österreich gerichteten Militärbezirke Kiew, Odessa, Moskau, Kasan mobilisiert. Unter keinen Umständen die an der deutschen Front liegenden: Petersburg, Wilna und Warschau. Auf die Frage des Militärattachés, zu welchem Zwecke die Mobilmachung gegen Österreich-Ungarn erfolge, antwortete der russische Kriegsminister mit Aufschreien und dem Hinweis auf die Diplomaten. Der Militärattaché bezeichnete darauf die Mobilmachungsmaßnahmen gegen Österreich-Ungarn als auch für Deutschland höchst bedrohlich. In den darauf folgenden Tagen folgten sich die Nachrichten über russische Mobilisierungen in schnellem Tempo. Unter diesen waren auch Nachrichten über Vorbereitungen an der deutschen Grenze, so die Verhängung des Kriegszustandes über Romno und der Abmarsch der Warschauer Garnison, Verstärkung der Garnison Alexandrowo. Am 27. Juli trafen die ersten Meldungen über vorbereitende Maßnahmen auch Frankreich ein. Das 14. Korps brach die Manöver ab und kehrte in die Garnison zurück.

Inzwischen sind wir bemüht geblieben, durch nachdrücklichste Einwirkung auf die Kabinette eine Lokalisierung des Konflikts durchzusetzen.

Anlage 12.

Am 26. hatte Sir Edward Grey den Vorschlag gemacht, die Differenzen zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und Serbien einer unter seinem Vorsitz tagenden Konferenz der Botschafter Deutschlands, Frankreichs und Italiens zu unterbreiten. Zu diesem Vorschlag haben wir erklärt, wir könnten uns, so sehr wir seine Tendenz billigten, an einer derartigen Konferenz nicht beteiligen, da wir Österreich in seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Serbien nicht vor ein europäisches Gericht zitieren könnten.

Frankreich hat dem Vorschlag Sir Edward Greys zugestimmt, er ist jedoch schließlich daran gescheitert, daß Österreich sich ihm gegenüber, wie vorauszusehen, ablehnend verhielt.

Anlage 13.

Anlage 14.

Anlage 15.

Anlage 16.

Getreu unserem Grundsatz, daß eine Vermittlungsaktion sich nicht auf den lediglich eine österreichisch-ungarische Angelegenheit darstellenden österreichisch-serbischen Konflikt, sondern nur auf das Verhältnis zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und Rußland beziehen könnte, haben wir unsere Bemühungen fortgesetzt, eine Verständigung zwischen diesen beiden Mächten herbeizuführen. Wir haben uns aber auch bereitgefunden, nach Ablehnung der Konferenzidee einen weiteren Vorschlag Sir Edward Greys nach Wien zu übermitteln, indem er anregt, Österreich-Ungarn möchte sich entschließen, entweder die serbische Antwort als genügend zu betrachten oder aber als Grundlage für weitere Besprechungen. Die Österreichisch-ungarische Regierung hat unter voller Würdigung unserer vermittelnden Tätigkeit zu diesem Vorschlag bemerkt, daß er nach Eröffnung der Feindseligkeiten zu spät komme.

Trotzdem haben wir unsere Vermittlungsversuche bis zum Äußersten fortgesetzt und haben in Wien geraten, jedes mit der Würde der Monarchie vereinbare Entgegenkommen zu zeigen. Leider sind alle diese Vermittlungsaktionen von den mili-

tärischen Vorbereitungen Rußlands und Frankreichs überholt worden. Am 29. Juli hat die Russische Regierung in Berlin amtlich mitgeteilt, daß sie vier Armeebezirke mobilisiert habe. Gleichzeitig trafen weitere Meldungen über schnell fortschreitende militärische Vorbereitungen Frankreichs zu Wasser und zu Lande ein. An demselben Tage hatte der Kaiserliche Botschafter in Petersburg eine Unterredung mit dem russischen Minister des Auswärtigen, über die er telegraphisch das Folgende berichtete:

Anlage 17.

»Der Minister versuchte mich zu überreden, daß ich bei meiner Regierung die Teilnahme an einer Konversation zu vierten befürworten sollte, um Mittel ausfindig zu machen, auf freundschaftlichem Wege Österreich-Ungarn zu bewegen, diejenigen Forderungen aufzugeben, die die Souveränität Serbiens antasten. Ich habe, indem ich lediglich die Wiedergabe der Unterredung zusagte, mich auf den Standpunkt gestellt, daß mir, nachdem Rußland sich zu dem verhängnisvollen Schritte der Mobilmachung entschlossen habe, jeder Gedankenaustausch hierüber sehr schwierig, wenn nicht unmöglich erscheine. Was Rußland jetzt von uns Österreich-Ungarn gegenüber verlange, sei dasselbe, was Österreich-Ungarn Serbien gegenüber vorgeworfen werde: einen Eingriff in Souveränitätsrechte, Österreich-Ungarn habe versprochen, durch Erklärung seines territorialen Desinteresses Rücksicht auf russische Interessen zu nehmen, ein großes Zugeständnis seitens eines kriegführenden Staates. Man sollte deshalb die Doppelmonarchie ihre Angelegenheit mit Serbien allein regeln lassen. Es werde beim Friedensschluß immer noch Zeit sein, auf Schonung der serbischen Souveränität zurückzukommen.

Sehr ernst habe ich hinzugefügt, daß augenblicklich die ganze austroserbische Angelegenheit der Gefahr einer europäischen Konflagration gegenüber in den Hintergrund trete, und habe mir alle Mühe gegeben, dem Minister die Größe dieser Gefahr vor Augen zu führen.

Es war nicht möglich, Sazonow von dem Gedanken abzubringen, daß Serbien von Rußland jetzt nicht im Stich gelassen werden dürfe.

Ebenfalls am 29. berichtete der Militärattaché in Petersburg telegraphisch über eine Unterredung mit dem Generalstabschef der russischen Armee:

»Der Generalstabschef hat mich zu sich bitten lassen und mir eröffnet, daß er von Seiner Majestät soeben komme. Er sei vom Kriegsminister beauftragt worden, mir nochmals zu bestätigen, es sei alles so geblieben, wie es mir vor zwei Tagen der Minister mitgeteilt habe. Er bot mir schriftliche Bestätigung an und gab mir sein Ehrenwort in feierlichster Form, daß nirgends eine Mobilmachung, d. h. Einziehung eines einzigen Mannes oder Pferdes bis zur Stunde, 3 Uhr nachmittags, erfolgt sei. Er könne sich dafür für die Zukunft nicht verbürgen, aber wohl nachdrücklich bestätigen, daß in den Fronten, die auf unsere Grenzen gerichtet seien, von Seiner Majestät keine Mobilisierung gewünscht würde. Es sind aber hier über erfolgte Einziehung von Reservisten in verschiedenen Teilen des Reichs, auch in Warschau und in Wilna, vielfache Nachrichten eingegangen. Ich habe deshalb dem General vorgehalten, daß ich durch die mir von ihm gemachten Eröffnungen vor ein Rätsel gestellt sei. Auf Offiziersparole erwiderte er mir jedoch, daß solche Nachrichten unrichtig seien, es möge hier und da allenfalls ein falscher Alarm vorliegen.

Ich muß das Gespräch in Anbetracht der positiven, zahlreichen, über erfolg Einziehungen vorliegenden Nachrichten als einen Versuch betrachten, uns über den Umfang der bisherigen Maßnahmen irrezuführen.

Da die Russische Regierung auf die verschiedenen Anfragen über die Gründe ihrer drohenden Haltung des öfteren darauf hinwies, daß Österreich-Ungarn noch keine Konversation in Petersburg begonnen habe, erhielt der österreichisch-ungarische Botschafter in Petersburg am 29. Juli auf unsere Anregung die Weisung, mit Herrn Saffonow die Konversation zu beginnen. Graf Szapary ist ermächtigt worden, die durch den Beginn des Kriegszustandes allerdings überholte Note an Serbien dem russischen Minister gegenüber zu erläutern und jede Anregung entgegenzunehmen, die von russischer Seite aus noch weiter erfolgen sollte, sowie mit Saffonow alle direkt die österreichisch-russischen Beziehungen tangierenden Fragen zu besprechen.

*Beilage 10.*

Schulter an Schulter mit England haben wir unausgesetzt an der Vermittlungaktion fortgearbeitet und jeden Vorschlag in Wien unterstützt, von dem wir die Möglichkeit einer friedlichen Lösung des Konflikts erhoffen zu können glaubten. Wir haben noch am 30. einen englischen Vorschlag nach Wien weitergegeben, der als Basis der Verhandlungen aufstellte, Österreich-Ungarn solle nach erfolgtem Einmarsch in Serbien dort seine Bedingungen diktieren. Wir mußten annehmen, daß Rußland diese Basis akzeptieren würde.

*Nal. 18, 20,  
21, 22, 23,  
23 a.*

Während in der Zeit vom 29. bis 31. Juli diese unsere Bemühungen um Vermittelung, von der englischen Diplomatie unterstützt, mit steigender Dringlichkeit fortgeführt wurden, kamen immer erneute und sich häufende Meldungen über russische Mobilisierungsmaßnahmen. Truppenansammlungen an der ostpreussischen Grenze, die Verhängung des Kriegszustandes über sämtliche wichtigen Plätze der russischen Westgrenze ließen keinen Zweifel mehr daran, daß die russische Mobilisierung auch gegen uns in vollem Gange war, während gleichzeitig unserem Vertreter in Petersburg alle derartigen Maßregeln erneut ehrenwörtlich abgeleugnet wurden. Noch ehe die Wiener Antwort auf den letzten englisch-deutschen Vermittlungsvorschlag, dessen Tendenz und Grundlage in Petersburg bekannt gewesen sein mußte, in Berlin eintreffen konnte, ordnete Rußland die allgemeine Mobilmachung an. In den gleichen Tagen fand zwischen Seiner Majestät dem Kaiser und König und dem Zaren Nikolaus ein Telegrammwechsel statt, in dem Seine Majestät den Zaren auf den drohenden Charakter der russischen Mobilmachung und die Fortdauer seiner eigenen vermittelnden Tätigkeit aufmerksam machte.

Am 31. Juli richtete der Zar an Seine Majestät den Kaiser folgendes Telegramm:

»Ich danke Dir von Herzen für Deine Vermittlung, die eine Hoffnung aufleuchten läßt, daß doch noch alles friedlich enden könnte. Es ist technisch unmöglich, unsere militärischen Vorbereitungen einzustellen, die durch Österreichs Mobilisierung notwendig geworden sind. Wir sind weit davon entfernt, einen Krieg zu wünschen. Solange wie die Verhandlungen mit Österreich über Serbien andauern, werden meine Truppen keine herausfordernde Aktion unternehmen. Ich gebe Dir mein feierliches Wort darauf. Ich vertraue mit aller Kraft auf Gottes Gnade und hoffe auf den Erfolg Deiner Vermittlung in Wien für die Wohlfahrt unserer Völker und den Frieden Europas.

Dein Dir herzlich ergebener  
Nikolaus.«

Mit diesem Telegramm des Zaren kreuzte sich folgendes ebenfalls am 31. Juli um 2 Uhr p. m. abgesandtes Telegramm Seiner Majestät des Kaisers:

»Auf Deinen Appell an Meine Freundschaft und Deine Bitte um Meine Hilfe habe ich eine Vermittlungsbaktion zwischen Deiner und der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Regierung aufgenommen. Während diese Aktion im Gange war, sind Deine Truppen gegen das mir verbündete Österreich-Ungarn mobilisiert worden, wodurch, wie Ich Dir schon mitgeteilt habe, Meine Vermittlung beinahe illusorisch gemacht worden ist. Trotzdem habe Ich sie fortgesetzt. Nunmehr erhalte Ich zuverlässige Nachrichten über ernste Kriegsvorbereitungen auch an Meiner östlichen Grenze. Die Verantwortung für die Sicherheit Meines Reiches zwingt Mich zu defensiven Gegenmaßnahmen. Ich bin mit Meinen Bemühungen um die Erhaltung des Weltfriedens bis an die äußerste Grenze des möglichen gegangen. Nicht Ich trage die Verantwortung für das Unheil, das jetzt der ganzen zivilisierten Welt droht. Noch in diesem Augenblicke liegt es in Deiner Hand, es abzuwenden. Niemand bedroht die Ehre und Macht Rußlands, das wohl auf den Erfolg Meiner Vermittlung hätte warten können. Die Mir von Meinem Großvater auf dem Totenbette überkommene Freundschaft für Dich und Dein Reich ist Mir immer heilig gewesen, und Ich habe treu zu Rußland gestanden, wenn es in schwerer Bedrängnis war, besonders in seinem letzten Kriege. Der Friede Europas kann von Dir noch jetzt erhalten werden, wenn Rußland sich entschließt, die militärischen Maßnahmen einzustellen, die Deutschland und Österreich-Ungarn bedrohen.«

Noch ehe dies Telegramm seine Bestimmung erreichte, war die bereits am Vormittag desselben Tages angeordnete, offensichtlich gegen uns gerichtete, Mobilisierung der gesamten russischen Streitkräfte in vollem Gange. Das Telegramm des Zaren aber war um 2 Uhr nachmittags aufgegeben.

Nach Bekanntwerden der russischen Gesamtmobilisation in Berlin erhielt am Nachmittag des 31. Juli der Kaiserliche Botschafter in Petersburg den Befehl, der Russischen Regierung zu eröffnen, Deutschland habe als Gegenmaßregel gegen die allgemeine Mobilisierung der russischen Armee und Flotte den Kriegszustand verkündet, dem die Mobilisation folgen müsse, wenn Rußland nicht binnen 12 Stunden seine militärischen Maßnahmen gegen Deutschland und Österreich-Ungarn einstelle und Deutschland davon in Kenntnis setze.

Gleichzeitig wurde der Kaiserliche Botschafter in Paris angewiesen, von der Französischen Regierung binnen 18 Stunden eine Erklärung zu verlangen, ob sie in einem russisch-deutschen Kriege neutral bleiben wolle.

Die Russische Regierung hat durch ihre die Sicherheit des Reichs gefährdende Mobilmachung die mühsame Vermittlungsarbeit der europäischen Staatskanzleien kurz vor dem Erfolge zerschlagen. Die Mobilisierungsmaßnahmen, über deren Ernst der Russischen Regierung von Anfang an keine Zweifel gelassen wurden, in Verbindung mit ihrer fortgesetzten Ablehnung zeigen klar, daß Rußland den Krieg wollte.

Der Kaiserliche Botschafter in Petersburg hat die ihm aufgetragene Mitteilung an Herrn Sazonow am 31. Juli um 12 Uhr nachts gemacht.

Eine Antwort der Russischen Regierung hierauf hat uns nie erreicht.

2 Stunden nach Ablauf der in dieser Mitteilung gestellten Frist hat der Zar an Seine Majestät den Kaiser telegraphiert:

•Ich habe Dein Telegramm erhalten, ich verstehe, daß Du gezwungen bist, mobil zu machen, aber ich möchte von Dir dieselbe Garantie haben, die ich Dir gegeben habe, nämlich, daß diese Maßnahmen nicht Krieg bedeuten und daß wir fortfahren werden, zu verhandeln, zum Heile unserer beiden Länder und des allgemeinen Friedens, der unseren Herzen so teuer ist. Unserer langbewährten Freundschaft muß es mit Gottes Hilfe gelingen, Blutvergießen zu verhindern. Dringend erwarte ich voll Vertrauen Deine Antwort. •

Hierauf hat Seine Majestät der Kaiser geantwortet:

•Ich danke Dir für Dein Telegramm, ich habe Deiner Regierung gestern den Weg angegeben, durch den allein noch der Krieg vermieden werden kann. Obwohl ich um eine Antwort für heute mittag ersucht hatte, hat mich bis jetzt noch kein Telegramm Meines Botschafters mit einer Antwort Deiner Regierung erreicht. Ich bin daher gezwungen worden, meine Armee zu mobilisieren. Eine sofortige klare und unmißverständliche Antwort Deiner Regierung ist der einzige Weg, um endloses Elend zu vermeiden. Bis ich diese Antwort erhalten habe, bin ich zu meiner Betrübnis nicht in der Lage, auf den Gegenstand Deines Telegramms einzugehen. Ich muß auf das ernsteste von Dir verlangen, daß Du unverzüglich Deinen Truppen den Befehl gibst, unter keinen Umständen auch nur die leiseste Verletzung unserer Grenzen zu begehen. •

Anlage 26.

Da die Rußland gestellte Frist verstrichen war, ohne daß eine Antwort auf unsere Anfrage eingegangen wäre, hat Seine Majestät der Kaiser und König am 1. August um 5 Uhr p. m. die Mobilmachung des gesamten deutschen Heeres und der Kaiserlichen Marine befohlen. Der Kaiserliche Botschafter in Petersburg hatte inzwischen den Auftrag erhalten, falls die Russische Regierung innerhalb der ihr gestellten Frist keine befriedigende Antwort erteilen würde, ihr zu erklären, daß wir nach Ablehnung unserer Forderung uns als im Kriegszustand befindlich betrachten. Ehe jedoch eine Meldung über die Ausführung dieses Auftrages einkam, überschritten russische Truppen, und zwar schon am Nachmittag des 1. August, also desselben Nachmittags, an dem das eben erwähnte Telegramm des Zaren abgesandt war, unsere Grenze und rückten auf deutschem Gebiet vor.

Hiermit hat Rußland den Krieg gegen uns begonnen.

Inzwischen hatte der Kaiserliche Botschafter in Paris die ihm befohlene Anfrage an das französische Kabinett am 31. Juli um 7 Uhr nachmittags gestellt.

Anlage 27.

Der französische Ministerpräsident hat darauf am 1. August um 1 Uhr nachmittags eine zweideutige und unbefriedigende Antwort erteilt, die über die Stellungnahme Frankreichs kein klares Bild gibt, da er sich darauf beschränkte, zu erklären, Frankreich würde das tun, was seine Interessen ihm geböten. Wenige Stunden darauf, um 5 Uhr nachmittags, wurde die Mobilisierung der gesamten französischen Armee und Flotte angeordnet.

Am Morgen des nächsten Tages eröffnete Frankreich die Feindseligkeiten.

Abgeschlossen am 2. August mittags.

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## Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.

25. Juli 1914.

### Die Note Österreich-Ungarns an Serbien.

Berlin, den 24. Juli.

Der österreichisch-ungarische Gesandte in Belgrad überreichte gestern abend 6 Uhr der serbischen Regierung eine Verbalnote mit den Forderungen der österreichisch-ungarischen Regierung. In der Note wird die Antwort bis Sonnabend, den 25. Juli, 6 Uhr abends, verlangt. — Sie hat folgenden Wortlaut:

Am 31. März 1909 hat der Königlich Serbische Gesandte am Wiener Hofe im Auftrage seiner Regierung der Kaiserlichen und Königlichen Regierung folgende Erklärung abgegeben: »Serbien anerkennt, daß es durch die in Bosnien geschaffene Tatsache in seinen Rechten nicht berührt wurde, und daß es sich demgemäß den Entschlüssen anpassen wird, welche die Mächte in bezug auf Artikel 25 des Berliner Vertrags treffen werden. Indem Serbien den Ratschlägen der Großmächte Folge leistet, verpflichtet es sich, die Haltung des Protestes und des Widerstandes, die es hinsichtlich der Annexion seit verganginem Oktober eingenommen hat, aufzugeben, und verpflichtet sich ferner, die Richtung seiner gegenwärtigen Politik gegenüber Österreich-Ungarn zu ändern und künftighin mit diesem letzteren auf dem Fuße freundschaftlicher Beziehungen zu leben.

Die Geschichte der letzten Jahre nun, und insbesondere der schmerzlichen Ereignisse des 28. Juni, haben das Vorhandensein einer subversiven Bewegung in Serbien erwiesen, deren Ziel es ist, von der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie gewisse Teile ihres Gebiets loszutrennen. Diese Bewegung, die unter den Augen der serbischen Regierung entstand, hat in der Folge jenseits des Gebiets des Königreichs durch Akte des Terrorismus, durch eine Reihe von Attentaten und durch Morde Ausdruck gefunden.

Weit entfernt, die in der Erklärung vom 31. März 1909 enthaltenen formellen Verpflichtungen zu erfüllen, hat die Königlich Serbische Regierung nichts getan, um diese Bewegung zu unterdrücken. Sie duldet das verbrecherische Treiben der verschiedenen gegen die Monarchie gerichteten Vereine und Vereinigungen, die zügellose Sprache der Presse, die Verherrlichung der Urheber von Attentaten, die Teilnahme von Offizieren und Beamten an subversiven Umtrieben, sie duldet eine ungesunde Propaganda im öffentlichen Unterricht und duldet schließlich alle Manifestationen, welche die serbische Bevölkerung zum Hass gegen die Monarchie und zur Verachtung ihrer Einrichtungen verleiten konnten.

Diese Duldung, der sich die Königlich Serbische Regierung schuldig machte, hat noch in jenem Moment angebauert, in dem die Ereignisse des 28. Juni der ganzen Welt die grauenhaften Folgen solcher Duldung zeigten.

Es erhellt aus den Aussagen und Geständnissen der verbrecherischen Urheber des Attentats vom 28. Juni, daß der Mord von Serajewo in Belgrad angezettelt wurde, daß die Mörder die Waffen und Bomben, mit denen sie ausgestattet waren, von serbischen Offizieren und Beamten erhielten, die der Narodna Odbrana angehörten, und daß schließlich die Beförderung der Verbrecher und deren Waffen nach Bosnien von leitenden serbischen Grenzorganen veranstaltet und durchgeführt wurde.

Die angeführten Ergebnisse der Untersuchung gestatten es der k. und k. Regierung nicht, noch länger die Haltung zuwartender Langmut zu beobachten, die sie durch Jahre jenen Treibereien gegenüber eingenommen hatte, die ihren Mittelpunkt in Belgrad haben und von da auf die Gebiete der Monarchie übertragen werden. Diese Ergebnisse legen der k. und k. Regierung vielmehr die Pflicht auf, Umtrieben ein Ende zu bereiten, die eine beständige Bedrohung für die Ruhe der Monarchie bilden.

Um diesen Zweck zu erreichen, sieht sich die k. und k. Regierung gezwungen, von der serbischen Regierung eine offizielle Versicherung zu verlangen, daß sie die gegen Österreich-Ungarn gerichtete Propaganda verurteilt, daß heißt die Gesamtheit der Bestrebungen, deren Endziel es ist, von der Monarchie Gebiete loszulösen, die ihr angehören, und daß sie sich verpflichtet, diese verbrecherische und terroristische Propaganda mit allen Mitteln zu unterdrücken.

Um diesen Verpflichtungen einen feierlichen Charakter zu geben, wird die Königlich Serbische Regierung auf der ersten Seite ihres offiziellen Organs vom 26./13. Juli nachfolgende Erklärung veröffentlichen:

„Die Königlich Serbische Regierung verurteilt die gegen Österreich-Ungarn gerichtete Propaganda, daß heißt die Gesamtheit jener Bestrebungen, deren Ziel es ist, von der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie Gebiete loszutrennen, die ihr angehören, und sie bedauert aufrichtigst die grauenhaften Folgen dieser verbrecherischen Handlungen.

Die Königlich Serbische Regierung bedauert, daß serbische Offiziere und Beamte an der vorgenannten Propaganda teilgenommen und damit die freundschaftlichen Beziehungen gefährdet haben, die zu pflegen sich die Königliche Regierung durch ihre Erklärung vom 31. März 1909 feierlichst verpflichtet hatte.

Die Königliche Regierung, die jeden Gedanken oder jeden Versuch einer Einmischung in die Geschicke der Bewohner was immer eines Teiles Österreich-Ungarns mißbilligt und zurückweist, erachtet es für ihre Pflicht, die Offiziere und Beamten und die gesamte Bevölkerung des Königreichs ganz ausdrücklich aufmerksam zu machen, daß sie künftighin mit äußerster Strenge gegen jene Personen vorgehen wird, die sich derartiger Handlungen schuldig machen sollten, Handlungen, denen vorzubeugen und die zu unterdrücken sie alle Anstrengungen machen wird.“

Diese Erklärung wird gleichzeitig zur Kenntnis der Königlichen Armee durch einen Tagesbefehl Seiner Majestät des Königs gebracht und in dem offiziellen Organ der Armee veröffentlicht werden.

Die Königlich Serbische Regierung verpflichtet sich überdies,

1. jede Publikation zu unterdrücken, die zum Haß und zur Verachtung der Monarchie aufreizt und deren allgemeine Tendenz gegen die territoriale Integrität der letzteren gerichtet ist,



2. sofort mit der Auflösung des Vereins »Narodna Odbrana« vorzugehen, dessen gesamte Propagandamittel zu konfiszieren und in derselben Weise gegen die anderen Vereine und Vereinigungen in Serbien einzuschreiten, die sich mit der Propaganda gegen Österreich-Ungarn beschäftigen. Die Königliche Regierung wird die nötigen Maßregeln treffen, damit die aufgelösten Vereine nicht etwa ihre Tätigkeit unter anderem Namen oder in anderer Form fortsetzen,

3. ohne Verzug aus dem öffentlichen Unterricht in Serbien, sowohl was den Lehrkörper als auch die Lehrmittel betrifft, alles zu beseitigen, was dazu dient oder dienen könnte, die Propaganda gegen Österreich-Ungarn zu nähren,

4. aus dem Militärbienst und der Verwaltung im allgemeinen alle Offiziere und Beamte zu entfernen, die der Propaganda gegen Österreich-Ungarn schuldig sind, und deren Namen unter Mitteilung des gegen sie vorliegenden Materials der Königlichen Regierung bekanntzugeben, sich die k. und k. Regierung vorbehält,

5. einzuwilligen, daß in Serbien Organe der k. und k. Regierung bei der Unterdrückung der gegen die territoriale Integrität der Monarchie gerichteten subversiven Bewegung mitwirken,

6. eine gerichtliche Untersuchung gegen jene Teilnehmer des Komplotts vom 28. Juni einzuleiten, die sich auf serbischem Territorium befinden.

Von der k. u. k. Regierung hierzu delegierte Organe werden an den bezüglichen Erhebungen teilnehmen,

7. mit aller Beschleunigung die Verhaftung des Majors Boja Tankosic und eines gewissen Milan Ciganovic, serbischen Staatsbeamten, vorzunehmen, welche durch die Ergebnisse der Untersuchung kompromittiert sind,

8. durch wirksame Maßnahmen die Teilnahme der serbischen Behörden an dem Einschmuggeln von Waffen und Explosivkörpern über die Grenze zu verhindern,

jene Organe des Grenzdienstes von Schabaz und Voznica, die den Urhebern des Verbrechens von Serajewo bei dem Übertritt über die Grenze behilflich waren, aus dem Dienste zu entlassen und streng zu bestrafen,

9. der k. u. k. Regierung Aufklärungen zu geben über die nicht zu rechtfertigenden Äußerungen hoher serbischer Funktionäre in Serbien und dem Auslande, die ihrer offiziellen Stellung ungeachtet nicht gezögert haben, sich nach dem Attentat vom 28. Juni in Interviews in feindlicher Weise gegen Österreich-Ungarn auszusprechen,

10. die k. u. k. Regierung ohne Verzug von der Durchführung der in den vorigen Punkten zusammengefaßten Maßnahmen zu verständigen.

Die k. u. k. Regierung erwartet die Antwort der Königlichen Regierung spätestens bis Sonnabend, den 25. d. Mts., um 6 Uhr nachmittags.

Eine Memoire über die Ergebnisse der Untersuchung von Serajewo, soweit sie sich auf die in Punkt 7 und 8 genannten Funktionäre beziehen, ist dieser Note beigeflossen.

Beilage. Die bei dem Gericht in Serajewo gegen den Gabrilo Princip und Genossen wegen des am 28. Juni d. J. begangenen Mordmordes beziehungsweise wegen Mitschuld hieran anhängige Strafuntersuchung hat bisher zu folgenden Feststellungen geführt:

1. Der Plan, den Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand während seines Aufenthaltes in Serajewo zu ermorden, wurde in Belgrad von Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko Gabrinovic,

einem gewissen Milan Eiganovic und Trifko Grabez unter Beihilfe des Majors Boja Tankosic ausgehett.

2. Die sechs Bomben und vier Browningpistolen, deren sich die Verbrecher als Werkzeuge bedienten, wurden dem Princip, Gabrinovic und Grabez in Belgrad von einem gewissen Milan Eiganovic und dem Major Boja Tankosic verschafft und übergeben.

3. Die Bomben sind Handgranaten, die dem Waffendepot der serbischen Armee in Aragujevac entstammen.

4. Um das Gelingen des Attentats zu sichern, unterwies Milan Eiganovic den Princip, den Gabrinovic und Grabez in der Handhabung der Granaten und gab in einem Walde neben dem Schießfelde von Topshider dem Princip und Grabez Unterricht im Schießen mit Browningpistolen.

5. Um dem Princip, Gabrinovic und Grabez den Übergang über die bosnisch-herzegowinische Grenze und die Einschmuggelung ihrer Waffen zu ermöglichen, wurde ein ganzes geheimes Transportsystem durch Eiganovic organisiert. Der Eintritt der Verbrecher samt ihren Waffen nach Bosnien und der Herzegowina wurde von den Grenzhauptleuten von Schabaz (Nade Popovic) und Vojnica sowie von den Zollorganen Rudivoj Orbic von Vojnica mit Beihilfe mehrerer anderer Personen durchgeführt.

## Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.

29. Juli 1914.

### Österreich-Ungarn und die serbische Note.

Wien, 27. Juli. Die Note der Königlich Serbischen Regierung vom 12./23. Juli 1914 lautet in deutscher Übersetzung wie folgt:

Die Königliche Regierung hat die Mitteilung der k. und k. Regierung vom 10. d. M. erhalten und ist überzeugt, daß ihre Antwort jedes Mißverständnis zerstreuen wird, daß die freundschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen der österreichischen Monarchie und dem Königreich Serbien zu stören droht.

Die Königliche Regierung ist sich bewußt, daß der großen Nachbarmonarchie gegenüber bei keinem Anlaß jene Proteste erneuert wurden, die seinerzeit sowohl in der Skupstina als auch in Erklärungen und Handlungen der verantwortlichen Vertreter des Staates zum Ausdruck gebracht wurden und die durch die Erklärung der serbischen Regierung vom 18. März 1909 ihren Abschluß gefunden haben, sowie weiter, daß seit jener Zeit weder von den verschiedenen einander folgenden Regierungen des Königreichs noch von deren Organen der Versuch unternommen wurde, den in Bosnien und der Herzegowina geschaffenen politischen und rechtlichen Zustand zu ändern. Die Königliche Regierung stellt fest, daß die k. und k. Regierung in dieser Richtung keinerlei Vorstellung erhoben hat, abgesehen von dem Falle eines Lehrbuches, hinsichtlich dessen die k. und k. Regierung eine vollkommen befriedigende Aufklärung erhalten hat. Serbien hat während der Dauer der Balkankrise in zahlreichen Fällen Beweise für seine pazifistische und gemäßigte Politik geliefert, und es ist nur Serbien und den Opfern, die es ausschließlich im Interesse des europäischen Friedens gebracht hat, zu danken, wenn dieser Friede erhalten geblieben ist.

Dazu bemerkt die Österreichisch-Ungarische Regierung:

Die Königlich Serbische Regierung beschränkt sich darauf, festzustellen, daß seit Abgabe der Erklärung vom 18. März 1909 von Seiten der Serbischen Regierung und ihrer Organe kein Versuch zur Änderung der Stellung Bosniens und der Herzegowina unternommen wurde.

Damit verschiebt sie in bewußt willkürlicher Weise die Grundlagen unserer Demarche, da wir nicht die Behauptung aufgestellt haben, daß sie und ihre Organe in dieser Richtung offiziell irgend etwas unternommen hätten.

Unser Gravamen geht vielmehr dahin, daß sie es trotz der in der zitierten Note übernommenen Verpflichtungen unterlassen hat, die gegen die territoriale Integrität der Monarchie gerichtete Bewegung zu unterdrücken.

Ihre Verpflichtung bestand also darin, die ganze Richtung ihrer Politik zu ändern und zur österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie in ein freundnachbarliches Verhältnis zu treten, nicht bloß die Zugehörigkeit Bosniens zur Monarchie offiziell nicht anzutasten.

Die Note Serbiens fährt dann fort:

Die Königlische Regierung kann nicht für Äußerungen privaten Charakters verantwortlich gemacht werden, wie es Zeitungsartikel und die friedliche Arbeit von Gesellschaften sind, Äußerungen, die fast in allen Ländern ganz gewöhnliche Erscheinungen sind, und die sich im allgemeinen der staatlichen Kontrolle entziehen. Dies um so weniger, als die Königlische Regierung bei der Lösung einer ganzen Reihe von Fragen, die zwischen Serbien und Österreich-Ungarn aufgetaucht waren, großes Entgegenkommen bewiesen hat, wodurch es ihr gelungen ist, deren größeren Teil zugunsten des Fortschritts der beiden Nachbarländer zu lösen.

Anmerkung der k. und k. Regierung:

Die Behauptung der Königlich Serbischen Regierung, daß die Äußerungen der Presse und die Tätigkeit von Vereinen privaten Charakter haben und sich der staatlichen Kontrolle entziehen, steht in vollem Widerspruche zu den Einrichtungen moderner Staaten, selbst der freiheitlichsten Richtung auf dem Gebiete des Press- und Vereinsrechts, das einen öffentlich-rechtlichen Charakter hat und Presse sowie Vereine der staatlichen Aufsicht unterstellt. Übrigens sehen auch die serbischen Einrichtungen eine solche Aufsicht vor. Der gegen die Serbische Regierung erhobene Vorwurf geht eben dahin, daß sie es gänzlich unterlassen hat, ihre Presse und ihre Vereine zu beaufsichtigen, deren Wirkung im monarchiefeindlichen Sinne sie kannte.

Die Note Serbiens fährt fort:

Die Königlische Regierung war deshalb durch die Behauptungen, daß Angehörige Serbiens an der Vorbereitung des in Serajewo verübten Attentats teilgenommen hätten, schmerzlich überrascht. Sie hatte erwartet, zur Mitwirkung bei den Nachforschungen über dieses Verbrechen eingeladen zu werden, und war bereit, um ihre vollkommene Korrektheit durch Taten zu beweisen, gegen alle Personen vorzugehen, hinsichtlich welcher ihr Mitteilungen zugekommen wären.

Anmerkung der k. und k. Regierung:

Diese Behauptung ist unrichtig. Die Serbische Regierung war über den gegen ganz bestimmte Personen bestehenden Verdacht genau unterrichtet und nicht nur in

der Lage, sondern auch nach ihren internen Befehlen verpflichtet, ganz spontan Erhebungen einzuleiten. Sie hat in dieser Richtung gar nichts unternommen.

**Note Serbiens:**

Den Wünschen der k. und k. Regierung entsprechend ist die Königliche Regierung somit bereit, dem Gericht ohne Rücksicht auf Stellung und Rang jeden serbischen Staatsangehörigen zu übergeben, für dessen Teilnahme an dem Serajewer Verbrechen ihr Beweise geliefert werden sollten. Sie verpflichtet sich insbesondere auf der ersten Seite des Amtsblatts vom 13./26. Juli folgende Enuntiation zu veröffentlichen: Die Königlich Serbische Regierung verurteilt jede Propaganda, die gegen Österreich-Ungarn gerichtet sein sollte, d. h. die Gesamtheit der Bestrebungen, die in letzter Linie auf die Losreißung einzelner Gebiete von der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie abzielen, und sie bedauert aufrichtig die traurigen Folgen dieser verbrecherischen Machenschaften.

**Anmerkung der k. und k. Regierung:**

Unsere Forderung lautete: »Die Königlich Serbische Regierung verurteilt die gegen Österreich-Ungarn gerichtete Propaganda...«

Die von der Königlich Serbischen Regierung vorgenommene Änderung der von uns geforderten Erklärung will sagen, daß eine solche gegen Österreich-Ungarn gerichtete Propaganda nicht besteht, oder daß ihr eine solche nicht bekannt ist. Diese Formel ist unaufrichtig und hinterhältig, da sich die Serbische Regierung damit für später die Ausflucht reserviert, sie hätte die derzeit bestehende Propaganda durch diese Erklärung nicht desavouiert und nicht als monarchiefeindlich anerkannt, woraus sie weiter ableiten könnte, daß sie zur Unterdrückung einer der jetzigen Propaganda gleichen nicht verpflichtet sei.

**Note Serbiens:**

Die Königliche Regierung bedauert, daß laut der Mitteilung der k. und k. Regierung gewisse serbische Offiziere und Funktionäre an der eben genannten Propaganda mitgewirkt, und daß diese damit die freundschaftlichen Beziehungen gefährdet hätten, zu deren Beobachtung sich die Königliche Regierung durch die Erklärung vom 31. März 1909 feierlich verpflichtet hatte.

Die Regierung . . . .« gleichlautend mit dem geforderten Texte.

**Anmerkung der k. und k. Regierung:**

Die von uns geforderte Formulierung lautete: »Die Königliche Regierung bedauert, daß serbische Offiziere und Funktionäre . . . . mitgewirkt haben . . . .«

Auch mit dieser Formulierung und dem weiteren Beisatz »laut der Mitteilung der k. und k. Regierung« verfolgt die Serbische Regierung den bereits oben angedeuteten Zweck, sich für die Zukunft freie Hand zu wahren.

**Note Serbiens:**

Die Königliche Regierung verpflichtet sich weiter

1. Anlässlich des nächsten ordnungsmäßigen Zusammentritts der Skupschtina in das Preßgesetz eine Bestimmung einzuschalten, wonach die Aufreizung zum Haß und zur Verachtung gegen die Monarchie sowie jede Publikation strengstens bestraft würde, deren allgemeine Tendenz gegen die territoriale Integrität Österreich-Ungarns gerichtet ist.

Sie verpflichtet sich, anlässlich der demnächst. erfolgenden Revision der Verfassung in den Artikel XXII des Verfassungsgesetzes einen Zusatz aufzunehmen, der die Konfiskation derartiger Publikationen gestattet, was nach den klaren Bestimmungen des Artikels XXII der Konstitution derzeit unmöglich ist.

**Anmerkung der k. und k. Regierung:**

Wir hatten gefordert:

»1. Jede Publikation zu unterdrücken, die zum Hass und zur Verachtung der Monarchie aufreizt und deren Tendenz gegen die territoriale Integrität der Monarchie gerichtet ist.«

Wir wollten also die Verpflichtung Serbiens herbeiführen, dafür zu sorgen, daß derartige Preßangriffe in Zukunft unterbleiben; wir wünschten also einen bestimmten Erfolg auf diesem Gebiete sichergestellt zu wissen.

Statt dessen bietet uns Serbien die Erlassung gewisser Gesetze an, welche als Mittel zu diesem Erfolge dienen sollen, und zwar:

a) Ein Gesetz, womit die fraglichen monarchiefeindlichen Preßäußerungen subjektiv bestraft werden sollen, was uns ganz gleichgültig ist, um so mehr, als bekanntermaßen die subjektive Verfolgung von Preßdelikten äußerst selten möglich ist, und bei einer entsprechend lagen Behandlung eines solchen Gesetzes auch die wenigen Fälle dieser Art nicht zur Bestrafung kommen würden; also ein Vorschlag, der unserer Forderung in keiner Weise entgegenkommt, daher uns nicht die geringste Garantie für den von uns gewünschten Erfolg bietet;

b) ein Nachtragsgesetz zu Artikel XXII der Konstitution, daß die Konfiskation gestattet würde — ein Vorschlag, der uns gleichfalls nicht befriedigen kann, da der Bestand eines solchen Gesetzes in Serbien uns nichts nützt, sondern nur die Verpflichtung der Regierung, es auch anzuwenden, was uns aber nicht versprochen wird.

Diese Vorschläge sind also vollkommen unbefriedigend — dies um so mehr, als sie auch in der Richtung evasiv sind, daß uns nicht gesagt wird, innerhalb welcher Frist diese Gesetze erlassen würden, und daß im Falle der Ablehnung der Gesetzesvorlagen durch die Skupschtina — von der eventuellen Demission der Regierung abgesehen — alles beim alten bliebe.

**Note Serbiens:**

2. Die Regierung besitzt keinerlei Beweise dafür und auch die Note der k. und k. Regierung liefert ihr keine solchen, daß der Verein »Narodna Odbrana« und andere ähnliche Gesellschaften bis zum heutigen Tage durch eines ihrer Mitglieder irgendwelche verbrecherischen Handlungen dieser Art begangen hätten. Nichtsdestoweniger wird die Königliche Regierung die Forderung der k. und k. Regierung annehmen und die Gesellschaft »Narodna Odbrana« sowie jede Gesellschaft, die gegen Österreich-Ungarn wirken sollte, auflösen.

**Anmerkung der k. und k. Regierung:**

Die monarchiefeindliche Propaganda der »Narodna Odbrana« und der ihr affilierten Vereine erfüllt in Serbien das ganze öffentliche Leben, es ist daher eine ganz unzulässige Reserve, wenn die serbische Regierung behauptet, daß ihr darüber nichts bekannt ist.

Ganz abgesehen davon ist die von uns aufgestellte Forderung nicht zur Gänze erfüllt, da wir überdies verlangt haben:

die Propagandamittel dieser Gesellschaften zu konfiszieren;  
die Neubildung der aufgelösten Gesellschaften unter anderem Namen und in anderer Gestalt zu verhindern.

In diesen beiden Richtungen schweigt das Belgrader Kabinett vollkommen, so daß uns auch durch die gegebene halbe Zusage keine Garantie dafür geboten ist, daß dem Treiben der monarchiefeindlichen Assoziationen, insbesondere der »Narodna Odbrana«, durch deren Auflösung definitiv ein Ende bereitet wäre.

Nota Serbiens:

3. Die Königlich Serbische Regierung verpflichtet sich ohne Verzug aus dem öffentlichen Unterricht in Serbien alles auszuschneiden, was die gegen Österreich-Ungarn gerichtete Propaganda fördern könnte, falls ihr die k. und k. Regierung tatsächliche Beweise für diese Propaganda liefert.

Anmerkung der k. und k. Regierung:

Auch in diesem Falle verlangt die serbische Regierung erst Beweise dafür, daß im öffentlichen Unterrichte Serbiens eine monarchiefeindliche Propaganda getrieben wird, während sie doch wissen muß, daß die bei den serbischen Schulen eingeführten Lehrbücher in dieser Richtung zu beanstandenden Stoff enthalten, und daß ein großer Teil der serbischen Lehrer im Lager der »Narodna Odbrana« und der ihr affilierten Vereine steht.

Übrigens hat die Serbische Regierung auch hier einen Teil unserer Forderungen nicht so erfüllt, wie wir es verlangt haben, indem sie in ihrem Texte den von uns gewünschten Beisatz »sowohl was den Lehrkörper, als auch was die Lehrmittel anbelangt«, wegließ, — ein Beisatz, welcher ganz klar zeigt, wo die monarchiefeindliche Propaganda in der serbischen Schule zu suchen ist.

Nota Serbiens:

4. Die Königliche Regierung ist auch bereit, jene Offiziere und Beamten aus dem Militär- und Zivildienst zu entlassen, hinsichtlich welcher durch gerichtliche Untersuchung festgestellt wird, daß sie sich Handlungen gegen die territoriale Integrität der Monarchie haben zuschulden kommen lassen; sie erwartet, daß ihr die k. und k. Regierung zwecks Einleitung des Verfahrens die Namen dieser Offiziere und Beamten und die Tatsachen mitteilt, welche denselben zur Last gelegt werden.

Anmerkung der k. und k. Regierung:

Indem die Königlich Serbische Regierung die Zusage der Entlassung der fraglichen Offiziere und Beamten aus dem Militär- und Zivildienst an den Umstand knüpft, daß diese Personen durch ein Gerichtsverfahren schuldig befunden werden, schränkt sie ihre Zusage auf jene Fälle ein, in denen diesen Personen ein strafgesetzlich zu ahnendes Delikt zur Last liegt. Da wir aber die Entfernung jener Offiziere und Beamten verlangen, die monarchiefeindliche Propaganda betreiben, was ja im allgemeinen in Serbien kein gerichtlich strafbarer Tatbestand ist, erscheinen unsere Forderungen auch in diesem Punkte nicht erfüllt.

**Note der Königlich Serbischen Regierung:**

5. Die Königlische Regierung muß bekennen, daß sie sich über den Sinn und die Tragweite jenes Begehrens der k. und k. Regierung nicht volle Rechenschaft geben kann, welches dahin geht, daß die Königlich Serbische Regierung sich verpflichten soll, auf ihren Gebieten die Mitwirkung von Organen der k. k. Regierung zuzulassen, doch erklärt sie, daß sie jede Mitwirkung anzunehmen bereit wäre, welche den Grundsätzen des Völkerrechts und des Strafprozesses sowie den freundschaftlichen Beziehungen entsprechen würde.

**Anmerkung der k. und k. Regierung:**

Mit dieser Frage hat das allgemeine Völkerrecht ebensowenig etwas zu tun wie das Strafprozeßrecht: Es handelt sich um eine Angelegenheit rein staatspolizeilicher Natur, die im Wege einer besonderen Vereinbarung zu lösen ist. Die Reserve Serbiens ist daher unverständlich und wäre bei ihrer vagen allgemeinen Form geeignet, zu unüberbrückbaren Schwierigkeiten bei Abschluß des zu treffenden Abkommens zu führen.

**Note der Königlich Serbischen Regierung:**

6. Die Königlische Regierung hält es selbstverständlich für ihre Pflicht, gegen alle jene Personen eine Untersuchung einzuleiten, die an dem Komplott vom 15./28. Juni beteiligt waren oder beteiligt gewesen sein sollen und die sich auf ihrem Gebiete befinden. Was die Mitwirkung von hierzu speziell delegierten Organen der k. und k. Regierung an dieser Untersuchung anbelangt, so kann sie eine solche nicht annehmen, da dies eine Verletzung der Verfassung und des Strafprozeßgesetzes wäre. Doch könnte den österreichisch-ungarischen Organen in einzelnen Fällen Mitteilung von den Ergebnissen der Untersuchung gemacht werden.

**Anmerkung der k. und k. Regierung:**

Unser Verlangen war ganz klar und nicht mißzudeuten. Wir begehrten 1. Einleitung einer gerichtlichen Untersuchung gegen die Teilnehmer des Komplotts, 2. Teilnahme von k. und k. Organen an den hierauf bezüglichen Erhebungen (Recherche im Gegensatz zu enquete judiciaire), 3. es ist uns nicht beigefallen, k. und k. Organe an dem serbischen Gerichtsverfahren teilnehmen zu lassen: Sie sollten nur an den polizeilichen Vorerhebungen mitwirken, welche das Material für die Untersuchung herbeizuschaffen und sicherzustellen hatten.

Wenn die Serbische Regierung uns hier mißversteht, so tut sie dies bewußt, denn der Unterschied zwischen enquete judiciaire und den einfachen Recherchen muß ihr geläufig sein.

Da sie sich jeder Kontrolle des einzuleitenden Verfahrens zu entziehen wünschte, daß bei korrekter Durchführung höchst unerwünschte Ergebnisse für sie liefern würde, und da sie keine Handhabe besitzt, in plausibler Weise die Mitwirkung unserer Organe an dem polizeilichen Verfahren abzulehnen (Analogien für solche polizeilichen Interventionen bestehen in großer Menge), hat sie sich auf einen Standpunkt begeben, der ihrer Ablehnung den Schein der Berechtigung geben und unserem Verlangen den Stempel der Unerfüllbarkeit aufdrücken soll.



**Note der Serbischen Regierung:**

7. Die Königliche Regierung hat noch am Abend des Tages, an dem ihr die Note zukam, die Verhaftung des Majors Voislav Tankosic verfügt. Was aber den Milan Ciganovic anbelangt, der ein Angehöriger der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie ist, und der bis zum 15. Juni (als Aspirant) bei der Eisenbahndirektion bedienstet war, so konnte dieser bisher nicht ausgeforscht werden, weshalb ein Steckbrief gegen ihn erlassen wurde.

Die k. und k. Regierung wird gebeten, zwecks Durchführung der Untersuchung sobald als möglich die bestehenden Verdachtsgründe und die bei der Untersuchung in Serajewo gesammelten Schuldbeweise in der bezeichneten Form bekanntzugeben.

**Anmerkung der k. und k. Regierung:**

Diese Antwort ist hinterhältig. Ciganovic ging laut der von uns veranlaßten Nachforschung drei Tage nach dem Attentat, als bekannt wurde, daß Ciganovic an dem Komplotte beteiligt war, auf Urlaub und begab sich im Auftrag der Polizeipräfektur in Belgrad nach Ribari. Es ist also zunächst unrichtig, daß Ciganovic schon am 15./28. Juni aus dem serbischen Staatsdienst schied. Hierzu kommt, daß der Polizeipräfekt von Belgrad, der die Abreise des Ciganovic selbst veranlaßt hat und der wußte, wo dieser sich aufhielt, in einem Interview erklärte, ein Mann namens Milan Ciganovic existiere in Belgrad nicht.

**Note der Serbischen Regierung:**

8. Die Serbische Regierung wird die bestehenden Maßnahmen gegen die Unterdrückung des Schmuggels von Waffen und Explosivstoffen verschärfen und erweitern.

Es ist selbstverständlich, daß sie sofort eine Untersuchung einleiten und jene Beamten des Grenzdienstes in der Linie Sabae-Poznica streng bestrafen wird, die ihre Pflicht verlegt und die Urheber des Verbrechens die Grenze haben überschreiten lassen.

9. Die Königliche Regierung ist gern bereit, Erklärungen über die Äußerungen zu geben, welche ihre Beamten in Serbien und im Ausland nach dem Attentat in Interviews gemacht haben und die nach der Behauptung der k. und k. Regierung der Monarchie feindselig waren, sobald die k. und k. Regierung die Stellen dieser Ausführungen bezeichnet und bewiesen haben wird, daß diese Äußerungen von den betreffenden Funktionären tatsächlich gemacht worden sind. Die Königliche Regierung wird selbst Sorge tragen, die nötigen Beweise und Überführungsmittel hierfür zu sammeln.

**Anmerkung der k. und k. Regierung:**

Der Königlich Serbischen Regierung müssen die bezüglichen Interviews ganz genau bekannt sein. Wenn sie von der k. und k. Regierung verlangt, daß diese ihr allerlei Details über diese Interviews liefere und sich eine förmliche Untersuchung hierüber vorbehält, zeigt sie, daß sie auch die Forderung nicht ernstlich erfüllen will.

**Note der Serbischen Regierung:**

10. Die Königliche Regierung wird, sofern dies nicht schon in dieser Note geschehen ist, die k. und k. Regierung von der Durchführung der in den vorstehenden Punkten enthaltenen Maßnahmen in Kenntnis setzen, sobald eine dieser Maßregeln angeordnet und durchgeführt wird.



Die Königlich Serbische Regierung glaubt, daß es im gemeinsamen Interesse liegt, die Lösung dieser Angelegenheit nicht zu überstürzen und ist daher, falls sich die k. und k. Regierung durch diese Antwort nicht für befriedigt erachten sollte, wie immer bereit, eine friedliche Lösung anzunehmen, sei es durch Übertragung der Entscheidung dieser Frage an das Internationale Gericht im Haag, sei es durch Überlassung der Entscheidung an die Großmächte, welche an der Ausarbeitung der von der Serbischen Regierung am 18./31. März 1909 abgegebenen Erklärung mitgewirkt haben. — Schluß der Note.

### Aus dem österreichisch-ungarischen Material

Wien, 27. Juli. Daß in der österreichisch-ungarischen Zirkularnote an die auswärtigen Botschaften in Angelegenheit des serbischen Konflikts erwähnte Dossier wird heute veröffentlicht.

In diesem Memoire wird darauf hingewiesen, daß die von Serbien ausgegangene Bewegung, die sich zum Ziele gesetzt hat, die süblichen Teile Österreich-Ungarns von der Monarchie loszureißen, um sie mit Serbien zu einer staatlichen Einheit zu verbinden, weit zurückgreift. Diese in ihren Endzielen stets gleichbleibende und nur in ihren Mitteln und an Intensität wechselnde Propaganda erreichte zur Zeit der Annexionskrise ihren Höhepunkt und trat damals offen mit ihren Tendenzen hervor. Während einerseits die gesamte serbische Presse zum Kampfe gegen die Monarchie aufrief, bildeten sich — von anderen Propagandamitteln abgesehen — Affoziationen, die diese Kämpfe vorbereiteten, unter denen die Narodna Obbrana an Bedeutung hervorragte. Aus einem revolutionären Komitee hervorgegangen, konstituierte sich diese vom Belgrader Auswärtigen Amte völlig abhängige Organisation unter Leitung von Staatsmännern und Offizieren, darunter dem General Jankovic und dem ehemaligen Minister Ivanovic. Auch Major Oja Jankovic und Milan Pribicevic gehören zu diesen Gründern. Dieser Verein hatte sich die Bildung und Ausrüstung von Freischaren für den bevorstehenden Krieg gegen die österreichisch-ungarische Monarchie zum Ziele gesetzt. In einer dem Memoire angefügten Anlage wird ein Auszug aus dem vom Zentralausschusse der Narodna Obbrana herausgegebenen Vereinsorgane gleichen Namens veröffentlicht, worin in mehreren Artikeln die Tätigkeit und Ziele dieses Vereins ausführlich dargelegt werden. Es heißt darin, daß zu der Hauptaufgabe der Narodne Obbrana die Verbindung mit ihren nahen und ferneren Brüdern jenseits der Grenze und unseren übrigen Freunden in der Welt gehören.

Österreich ist als erster und größter Feind bezeichnet. Wie die Narodna Obbrana die Notwendigkeit des Kampfes mit Österreich predigt, predigt sie eine heilige Wahrheit unserer nationalen Lage. Das Schlußkapitel enthält einen Apell an die Regierung und das Volk Serbiens, sich mit allen Mitteln für den Kampf vorzubereiten, den die Annexion vorangezeigt hat.

Das Memoire schildert nach einer Aussage eines von der Narodna Obbrana angeworbenen Komitatschis die damalige Tätigkeit der Narodna Obbrana, die eine von zwei Hauptleuten, darunter Jankovic, geleitete Schule zur Ausbildung von Banden unterhielt, Schulen, welche von General Jankovic und von

Hauptmann Milan Pribicevic regelmäßig inspiziert wurden. Weiter wurden die Komitatschis im Schießen und Bombenwerfen, im Minenlegen, Sprengen von Eisenbahnbrücken usw. unterrichtet. Nach der feierlichen Erklärung der Serbischen Regierung vom Jahre 1909 schien auch das Ende dieser Organisation gekommen zu sein. Diese Erwartungen haben sich aber nicht nur nicht erfüllt, sondern die Propaganda wurde durch die serbische Presse fortgesetzt. Das Memoire führt als Beispiel die Art und Weise an, wie das Attentat gegen den bosnischen Landeschef Varesanin publizistisch verwertet wurde, indem der Attentäter als serbischer Nationalheld gefeiert und seine Tat verherrlicht wurde. Diese Blätter wurden nicht nur in Serbien verbreitet, sondern auch auf wohlorganisierten Schleichwegen in die Monarchie eingeschmuggelt.

Unter der gleichen Leitung wie bei ihrer Gründung wurde die Narodna Odbrana neuerlich der Zentralpunkt einer Agitation, welcher der Schützenbund mit 762 Vereinen, ein Sokolbund mit 3500 Mitgliedern und verschiedene andere Vereine angehörten.

Im Kleide eines Kulturvereins auftretend, dem nur die geistige und die körperliche Entwicklung der Bevölkerung Serbiens sowie deren materielle Kräftigung am Herzen liegt, enthüllt die Narodna Odbrana ihr wahres reorganisiertes Programm in vorzitiertem Auszug aus ihrem Vereinsorgan, in welchem »die heilige Wahrheit« gepredigt wird, daß es eine unerläßliche Notwendigkeit ist, gegen Österreich, seinen ersten größten Feind, diesen Ausrottungskampf mit Gewehr und Kanone zu führen, und das Volk mit allen Mitteln auf den Kampf vorzubereiten, zur Befreiung der unterworfenen Gebiete, in denen viele Millionen unterjochter Brüder schmachten. Die in dem Memoire zitierten Aufrufe und Reden ähnlichen Charakters beleuchten die vielseitige auswärtige Tätigkeit der Narodna Odbrana und ihrer affilierten Vereine, die in Vortragsreisen, in der Teilnahme an Festen von bosnischen Vereinen, bei denen offen Mitglieder für die erwähnte serbische Vereinigung geworben wurden, besteht. Gegenwärtig ist noch die Untersuchung darüber im Zuge, daß die Sokolvereine Serbiens analoge Vereinigungen der Monarchie bestimmten, sich mit ihnen in einem bisher geheim gehaltenen Verbande zu vereinigen. Durch Vertrauensmänner und Missionäre wurde die Aufwiegelung in die Kreise Erwachsener und der urteilslosen Jugend gebracht. So wurden von Milan Pribicevitch ehemalige Honvedoffiziere und ein Gendarmerieleutnant zum Verlassen des Heeresdienstes in der Monarchie unter bedenklichen Umständen verleitet. In den Schulen der Lehrerbildungsanstalten wurde eine weitgehende Agitation entwickelt. Der gewünschte Krieg gegen die Monarchie wurde militärisch auch insofern vorbereitet, als serbische Emissäre im Falle des Ausbruchs der Feindseligkeiten mit der Zerstörung von Transportmitteln usw., der Anfachung von Revolten und Paniken betraut wurden. Alles dies wird in einer besonderen Beilage belegt.

Das Memoire schildert ferner den Zusammenhang zwischen dieser Tätigkeit der Narodna Odbrana und den affilierten Organisationen mit den Attentaten gegen den königlichen Kommissär in Agram Cuvaj im Juli 1912, dem Attentat von Dojcic in Agram 1913 gegen Skerlec und dem mißglückten Attentat Schäfers am 20. Mai im Agramer Theater. Es verbreitet sich hierauf über den Zusammenhang

des Attentats auf den Thronfolger und dessen Gemahlin, über die Art, wie sich die Jungen schon in der Schule an dem Gedanken der Narodna Odbrana vergifteten und wie sich die Attentäter mit Hilfe von Pribicevic und Dacic die Werkzeuge zu dem Attentat verschafften, wobei insbesondere die Rolle des Majors Tankosic dargelegt wird, der die Mordwaffen lieferte, wie auch die Rolle eines gewissen Eiganovic, eines gewesenen Komitatschi und jetzigen Beamten der serbischen Eisenbahndirektion Belgrad, der schon 1909 als Zögling der Bandenschule der damaligen Narodna Odbrana auftauchte. Ferner wird die Art dargelegt, wie Bomben und Waffen unbemerkt nach Bosnien eingeschmuggelt wurden, die keinen Zweifel darüber läßt, daß dies ein wohl vorbereiteter und für die geheimnisvollen Zwecke der Narodna oft begangener Schleichweg war.

Eine Beilage enthält einen Auszug aus den Akten des Kreisgerichts in Serajewo über die Untersuchung des Attentats gegen den Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand und dessen Gemahlin. Danach sind Princip, Gabrinovic, Grabez, Crupilovic und Papovic geständig, in Gemeinschaft mit dem flüchtigen Mehmedbasic ein Komplott zur Ermordung des Erzherzogs gebildet und ihn zu diesem Zwecke aufgelauert zu haben. Gabrinovic ist geständig, die Bombe geworfen und Gabrilo Princip das Attentat mit der Browningpistole ausgeführt zu haben. Beide Täter gaben zu, bei der Verübung der Tat die Absicht des Mordes gehabt zu haben. Die weiteren Teile der Anlage erhalten weitere Angaben der Beschuldigten vor dem Untersuchungsrichter über Entstehung des Komplotts, Herkunft der Bomben, welche fabrikmäßig hergestellt wurden, für militärische Zwecke bestimmt waren und ihrer Originalpackung nach aus dem serbischen Waffenlager aus Kragujevac stammten. Endlich gibt die Beilage Auskunft über den Transport der drei Attentäter und der Waffen von Serbien nach Bosnien. Aus dem weiteren Zeugenprotokoll ergibt sich, daß ein Angehöriger der Monarchie einige Tage vor dem Attentat dem österreichisch-ungarischen Konsulat in Belgrad Meldung von der Vermutung erstatten wollte, daß ein Plan zur Verübung des Attentats gegen den Erzherzog während dessen Anwesenheit in Bosnien bestehe. Dieser Mann soll nun durch Belgrader Polizeiorgane, welche ihn unmittelbar vor Betreten des Konsulats aus nichtigen Gründen verhafteten, an der Erstattung der Meldung verhindert worden sein. Weiter gehe aus dem Zeugenprotokoll hervor, daß die betreffenden Polizeiorgane von dem geplanten Attentat Kenntnis gehabt hätten. Da diese Angaben noch nicht nachgeprüft sind, kann über deren Stichhaltigkeit vorläufig noch kein Urteil abgegeben werden. In der Beilage zum Memoire heißt es: Vor dem Empfangssaal des serbischen Kriegsministeriums befinden sich an der Wand vier allegorische Bilder, von denen drei Darstellungen serbischer Kriegserfolge sind, während das vierte die Verwirklichung der monarchiefeindlichen Tendenzen Serbiens versinnbildlicht. Über einer Landschaft, die teils Gebirge (Bosnien), teils Ebene (Südungarn), darstellt, geht die Zora, die Morgenröte der serbischen Hoffnungen, auf. Im Vordergrund steht eine bewaffnete Frauengestalt, auf deren Schilde die Namen aller noch zu befreienden Provinzen: Bosnien, Herzegowina, Wojwodina, Syrmien, Dalmatien usw. stehen.

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Anlage 1b.

**Der Reichskanzler an die Kaiserlichen Botschafter in Paris, London, St. Petersburg vom 23. Juli 1914:**

Die Veröffentlichungen der Österreichisch-ungarischen Regierung über die Umstände, unter denen das Attentat auf den österreichischen Thronfolger und seine Gemahlin stattgefunden hat, enthüllen offen die Ziele, die sich die großserbische Propaganda gesetzt hat, und die Mittel, deren sie sich zur Verwirklichung derselben bedient. Auch müssen durch die bekannt gegebenen Tatsachen die letzten Zweifel darüber schwinden, daß das Aktionszentrum der Bestrebungen, die auf Auflösung der sübslawischen Provinzen von der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie und deren Vereinigung mit dem serbischen Königreich hinauslaufen, in Belgrad zu suchen ist, und dort zum mindesten mit der Konnivenz von Angehörigen der Regierung und Armee seine Tätigkeit entfaltet.

Die serbischen Treibereien gehen auf eine lange Reihe von Jahren zurück. In besonders markanter Form trat der großserbische Chauvinismus während der bosnischen Krisis in die Erscheinung. Nur der weitgehenden Selbstbeherrschung und Mäßigung der Österreichisch-ungarischen Regierung und dem energischen Einschreiten der Großmächte war es zuzuschreiben, wenn die Provokationen, welchen Österreich-Ungarn in dieser Zeit von seiten Serbiens ausgesetzt war, nicht zum Konflikt führten. Die Zusicherung künftigen Wohlverhaltens, die die Serbische Regierung damals gegeben hat, hat sie nicht eingehalten. Unter den Augen, zum mindesten unter stillschweigender Duldung des amtlichen Serbiens, hat die großserbische Propaganda inzwischen fortgesetzt an Ausdehnung und Intensität zugenommen; auf ihr Konto ist das jüngste Verbrechen zu setzen, dessen Taten nach Belgrad führen. Es hat sich in unzweideutiger Weise kundgetan, daß es weder mit der Würde noch mit der Selbsterhaltung der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie vereinbar sein würde, dem Treiben jenseits der Grenze noch länger tatenlos zuzusehen, durch das die Sicherheit und die Integrität ihrer Gebiete dauernd bedroht wird. Bei dieser Sachlage können das Vorgehen sowie die Forderungen der Österreichisch-ungarischen Regierung nur als gerechtfertigt angesehen werden. Trotzdem schließt die Haltung, die die öffentliche Meinung sowohl als auch die Regierung in Serbien in letzter Zeit eingenommen hat, die Befürchtung nicht aus, daß die Serbische Regierung es ablehnen wird, diesen Forderungen zu entsprechen, und daß sie sich zu einer provokatorischen Haltung Österreich-Ungarn gegenüber hinreißen läßt. Es würde der Österreichisch-ungarischen Regierung, will sie nicht auf ihre Stellung als Großmacht endgültig Verzicht leisten, nichts anderes übrigbleiben, als ihre Forderungen bei der Serbischen Regierung durch einen starken Druck und nötigenfalls unter der Ergreifung militärischer Maßnahmen durchzusetzen, wobei ihr die Wahl der Mittel überlassen bleiben muß.

Es. usw. beehre ich mich zu ersuchen, sich in vorstehendem Sinne (dem derzeitigen Vertreter des Herrn Viviani) (Sir Edward Grey) (Herrn Sazanow) gegenüber auszusprechen und dabei insbesondere der Anschauung nachdrücklich Ausdruck zu verleihen, daß es sich in der vorliegenden Frage um eine lediglich zwischen Österreich-

Ungarn und Serbien zum Austrag zu bringende Angelegenheit handle, die auf die beiden direkt Beteiligten zu beschränken das ernste Bestreben der Mächte sein müsse. Wir wünschen dringend die Lokalisierung des Konflikts, weil jedes Eingreifen einer anderen Macht infolge der verschiedenen Bündnisverpflichtungen unabsehbare Konsequenzen nach sich ziehen würde.

Einem gefälligen telegraphischen Bericht über den Verlauf Ihrer Unterredung werde ich mit Interesse entgegensehen.

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Anlage 2.

## Der Reichskanzler an die Bundesregierungen.

Vertraulich!

Berlin, den 28. Juli 1914.

Euer pp. wollen der Regierung, bei der Sie beglaubigt sind, folgende Mitteilung machen:

Angeichts der Tatsachen, die die Österreichisch-Ungarische Regierung in ihrer Note an die Serbische Regierung bekanntgegeben hat, müssen die letzten Zweifel darüber schwinden, daß das Attentat, dem der österreichisch-ungarische Thronfolger und seine Gemahlin zum Opfer gefallen sind, in Serbien zum mindesten mit der Konnivenz von Angehörigen der Serbischen Regierung und Armee vorbereitet worden ist. Es ist ein Produkt der großserbischen Bestrebungen, die seit einer Reihe von Jahren eine Quelle dauernder Beunruhigungen für die Österreichisch-Ungarische Monarchie und für ganz Europa geworden sind.

In besonders markanter Form trat der großserbische Chauvinismus während der bosnischen Krise in die Erscheinung. Nur der weitgehenden Selbstbeherrschung und Mäßigung der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Regierung und dem energischen Einschreiten der Großmächte war es zuzuschreiben, wenn die Provokationen, welchen Österreich-Ungarn in dieser Zeit von seiten Serbiens ausgesetzt war, nicht zum Konflikt führten. Die Zusicherung künftigen Wohlverhaltens, die die Serbische Regierung damals gegeben hat, hat sie nicht eingehalten. Unter den Augen, zum mindesten unter stillschweigender Duldung des amtlichen Serbiens, hat die großserbische Propaganda inzwischen fortgesetzt an Ausdehnung und Intensität zugenommen. Es würde weder mit der Würde noch mit ihrem Recht auf Selbsterhaltung vereinbar sein, wollte die Österreichisch-Ungarische Regierung dem Treiben jenseits der Grenze noch länger tatenlos zusehen, durch das die Sicherheit und die Integrität ihrer Gebiete dauernd bedroht wird. Bei dieser Sachlage müssen das Vorgehen sowie die Forderungen der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Regierung als gerechtfertigt angesehen werden.

Die Antwort der Serbischen Regierung auf die Forderungen, welche die Österreichisch-ungarische Regierung am 23. d. Mts. durch ihren Vertreter in Belgrad hat stellen lassen, läßt indessen erkennen, daß die maßgebenden Faktoren in Serbien nicht gesonnen sind, ihre bisherige Politik und agitatorische Tätigkeit aufzugeben. Der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Regierung wird demnach, will sie nicht auf ihre Stellung als Großmacht endgültig Verzicht leisten, nichts anderes übrig bleiben, als ihre Forderungen durch einen starken Druck und nötigenfalls unter der Ergreifung militärischer Maßnahmen durchzusetzen.

Einzelne russische Stimmen betrachten es als selbstverständliches Recht und als die Aufgabe Rußlands, in dem Konflikte zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und Serbien aktiv für Serbien Partei zu ergreifen. Für die aus einem solchen Schritte Rußlands resultierende europäische Konflagration glaubt die Nowoje Wremja sogar Deutschland verantwortlich machen zu dürfen, sofern es nicht Österreich-Ungarn zum Nachgeben veranlaßt. Die russische Presse stellt hiermit die Verhältnisse auf den Kopf. Nicht Österreich-Ungarn hat den Konflikt mit Serbien hervorgerufen, sondern Serbien ist es gewesen, das durch eine skrupellose Begünstigung großserbischer Aspirationen auch in Teilen der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie diese selbst in ihrer Existenz gefährdet und Zustände geschaffen hat, die schließlich in der frevelhaften Tat von Serajewo ihren Ausdruck gefunden haben. Wenn Rußland in diesem Konflikte für Serbien eintreten zu müssen glaubt, so ist das an sich gewiß ein gutes Recht. Es muß sich aber darüber klar sein, daß es damit die serbischen Bestrebungen auf Unterhöhlung der Existenzbedingungen der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie zu den seinigen macht, und daß es allein die Verantwortung dafür trägt, wenn aus dem österreichisch-serbischen Handel, den alle übrigen Großmächte zu lokalisieren wünschen, ein europäischer Krieg entsteht. Diese Verantwortung Rußlands liegt klar zutage und wiegt um so schwerer, als Graf Berchtold Rußland offiziell erklärt hat, es beabsichtige weder serbische Gebietsteile zu erwerben noch den Bestand des serbischen Königreichs anzutasten, sondern wolle lediglich Ruhe vor den seine Existenz gefährdenden serbischen Umtrieben haben.

Die Haltung der Kaiserlichen Regierung in dieser Frage ist deutlich vorgezeichnet. Die von den Panlawisten gegen Österreich-Ungarn betriebene Agitation erstrebt in ihrem Endziel, mittels der Zertrümmerung der Donaumonarchie die Sprengung oder Schwächung des Dreibundes und in ihrer Folgewirkung eine völlige Isolierung des Deutschen Reichs. Unser eigenstes Interesse ruft uns demnach an die Seite Österreich-Ungarns. Die Pflicht, Europa wenn irgend möglich vor einem allgemeinen Kriege zu bewahren, weist uns gleichzeitig darauf hin, diejenigen Bestrebungen zu unterstützen, die auf die Lokalisierung des Konflikts hingen, getreu den Richtlinien derjenigen Politik, die wir seit nunmehr 44 Jahren im Interesse der Aufrechterhaltung des europäischen Friedens mit Erfolg durchgeführt haben. Sollte indes wieder Erhoffen durch ein Eingreifen Rußlands der Brandherd eine Erweiterung erfahren, so würden wir getreu unserer Bundespflicht mit der ganzen Macht des Reichs die Nachbarmonarchie zu unterstützen haben. Nur gezwungen werden wir zum Schwerte greifen, dann aber in dem ruhigen Bewußtsein, daß wir an dem Unheil keine Schuld tragen, das ein Krieg über Europas Völker bringen müßte.

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Anlage 3.

**Telegramm des Kaiserlichen Botschafters in Wien  
an den Reichskanzler vom 24. Juli 1914.**

Graf Berchtold hat heute den Russischen Geschäftsträger zu sich gebeten, um ihm eingehend und freundschaftlich den Standpunkt Österreich-Ungarns Serbien gegenüber auseinanderzusetzen. Nach Recapitulierung der historischen Entwicklung der letzten Jahre betonte er, daß die Monarchie nicht daran denke, Serbien gegenüber erobernd aufzutreten. Österreich-Ungarn werde kein serbisches Territorium beanspruchen. Es halte strikt daran fest, daß der Schritt nur eine definitive Maßregel gegenüber den serbischen Wühlereien zum Ziele habe. Notgebrungen müsse Österreich-Ungarn Garantien für ein weiteres freundschaftliches Verhalten Serbiens der Monarchie gegenüber verlangen. Es liege ihm fern, eine Verschiebung der Machtverhältnisse im Balkan herbeiführen zu wollen. Der Geschäftsträger, der noch keine Weisungen aus Petersburg hatte, hat die Ausführungen des Ministers ad referendum genommen mit der Zusage, sie sofort Sasanow zu unterbreiten.

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Anlage 4.

**Telegramm des Kaiserlichen Botschafters in Petersburg  
an den Reichskanzler vom 24. Juli 1914.**

Den Inhalt des Erlasses 592 habe ich soeben in einer langen Unterredung mit Sasanow eingehend verwertet. Der Minister erging sich gegen Österreich-Ungarn in maßlosen Anklagen und war sehr erregt. Auf das bestimmteste erklärte er: daß die serbisch-österreichische Differenz zwischen den Beteiligten allein ausgetragen werde, könne Rußland unmöglich zulassen.

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Anlage 5.

**Der Kaiserliche Botschafter in Petersburg  
an den Reichskanzler.**

Telegramm vom 26. Juli 1914.

Der Österreichisch-Ungarische Botschafter hatte heute nachmittag eine längere Unterredung mit Sasanow. Beide Beteiligten hatten, wie sie mir nachher sagten, einen befriedigenden Eindruck. Die Versicherung des Botschafters, daß Österreich-Ungarn keine Eroberungspläne habe und nur endlich an seinen Grenzen Ruhe halten wolle, hat den Minister sichtlich beruhigt.

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Anlage 6.

**Telegramm des Kaiserlichen Botschafters in Petersburg  
an den Reichstanzler vom 25. Juli 1914.**

Meldung für S. M. von General von Chelius. Im Kadtschelager wurden heute die Truppenübungen plötzlich abgebrochen, und die Regimenter kehren in ihre Garnisonen sofort zurück. Die Manöver sind abgesagt worden. Die Kriegsschüler wurden heute statt im Herbst zu Offizieren befördert. Über das Vorgehen Österreichs herrscht im Hauptquartier große Aufregung. Ich habe den Eindruck, daß alle Vorbereitungen für die Mobilmachung gegen Österreich getroffen werden.

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Anlage 7.

**Telegramm des Kaiserlichen Botschafters in Petersburg  
an den Reichstanzler vom 26. Juli 1914.**

Der Militärattaché bittet um Übermittlung nachstehender Meldung an den Generalstab:

Ich halte es für sicher, daß für Kiew und Odessa die Mobilmachung befohlen worden ist. Bei Warschau und Moskau ist dies fraglich und bei den anderen wohl noch nicht der Fall.

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Anlage 8.

**Telegramm des Kaiserlichen Konsultsverwesers in  
Kowno an den Reichstanzler vom 27. Juli 1914.**

In Kowno Kriegszustand erklärt.

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Anlage 9.

**Telegramm des Kaiserlichen Gesandten in Bern  
an den Reichstanzler vom 27. Juli 1914.**

Erfahre zuverlässig, daß französisches XIV. Korps Manöver abbrach.

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Anlage 10.

**Telegramm des Reichstanzlers an den Kaiserlichen  
Botschafter in London.**

Dringend.

26. Juli 1914.

Österreich-Ungarn hat in Petersburg offiziell und feierlich erklärt, daß es keinen territorialen Gewinn in Serbien beabsichtigt, den Bestand des Königreichs nicht antasten, sondern nur Ruhe schaffen wolle. Nach hier eingegangenen Nachrichten steht in Rußland Einberufung mehrerer Reservisten-Jahrgänge unmittelbar bevor, was einer Mobilisierung auch gegen uns gleichkommen würde. Wenn sich diese Nachrichten bewahrheiten, so werden wir gegen unsern Wunsch zu Gegenmaßregeln gezwungen. Auch heute noch geht unser Streben dahin, den Konflikt zu lokalisieren und den europäischen Frieden zu erhalten. Wir bitten daher in diesem Sinne in Petersburg mit allem Nachdruck zu wirken.

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Anlage 10a.

**Telegramm des Reichstanzlers an den Kaiserlichen  
Botschafter in Paris. Vom 26. Juli 1914.**

Nachdem Österreich-Ungarn Rußland offiziell erklärt hat, daß es keinen territorialen Gewinn beabsichtige, den Bestand des Königreichs nicht antasten wolle, liegt die Entscheidung, ob ein europäischer Krieg entstehen soll, nur bei Rußland, das die gesamte Verantwortung zu tragen hat. Wir vertrauen auf Frankreich, mit dem wir uns in dem Wunsche um die Erhaltung des europäischen Friedens eins wissen, daß es in Petersburg seinen Einfluß in beruhigendem Sinne geltend machen wird.

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Anlage 10b.

**Telegramm des Reichstanzlers an den Kaiserlichen  
Botschafter in Petersburg vom 26. Juli 1914.**

Nachdem Österreich sein territoriales Desinteressement feierlich erklärt hat, ruht die Verantwortung für eine eventuelle Störung des europäischen Friedens durch eine russische Intervention allein auf Rußland. Wir vertrauen immer noch darauf, daß Rußland keine Schritte unternimmt, die den europäischen Frieden ernstlich gefährden würden.

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**Anlage 11.**

**Telegramm des Kaiserlichen Botschafters in Petersburg  
an den Reichskanzler vom 27. Juli 1914.**

Militärattaché meldet über Gespräch mit Kriegsminister:

Sasnow habe diesen letzteren gebeten, mich über die Lage aufzuklären. Der Kriegsminister hat mir sein Ehrenwort darauf gegeben, daß noch keine Mobilisierungs-  
ordre ergangen sei. Es würden lediglich vorläufig Vorbereitungsmaßnahmen getroffen,  
aber es sei kein Reservist eingezogen und kein Pferd aufgehoben. Wenn Österreich  
die serbische Grenze überschreiten werde, so werden diejenigen Militärbezirke, die auf  
Österreich gerichtet sind, Kiew, Odessa, Moskau, Kasan, mobilisiert werden. Diejenigen  
an der deutschen Front, Warschau, Wilna, Petersburg unter keinen Umständen. Man  
wünsche den Frieden mit Deutschland bringend. Auf meine Frage nach dem Zweck  
der Mobilisierung gegen Österreich erfolgte Aufsehnendes, und es wurde auf die Diplo-  
matie hingewiesen. Ich sagte dem Minister, daß man die freundschaftlichen Absichten  
bei uns würdige, aber auch die allein gegen Österreich gerichtete Mobilisierung als  
sehr bedrohlich ansehen werde.

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**Anlage 12.**

**Telegramm des Reichskanzlers an den Kaiserlichen  
Botschafter in London vom 27. Juli 1914.**

Von einem Vorschlag Sir Edward Grey's, eine Konferenz in London zu vierten  
abzuhalten, ist hier bisher nichts bekannt. Es ist für uns unmöglich, unseren Bundes-  
genossen in seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Serbien vor ein europäisches Gericht zu  
ziehen. Unsere Vermittlungstätigkeit muß sich auf die Gefahr eines österreichisch-  
russischen Konfliktes beschränken.

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**Anlage 13.**

**Telegramm des Reichskanzlers an den Kaiserlichen  
Botschafter in London vom 25. Juli 1914.**

Die von Sir Edward Grey zwischen österreichisch-serbischem und österreichisch-  
russischem Konflikte gemachte Unterscheidung trifft vollkommen zu. Wir wollen eben-  
sowenig wie England uns in ersteren einmischen, und nach wie vor vertreten wir den

Standpunkt, daß diese Frage dadurch lokalisiert bleiben muß, daß alle Mächte sich der Einmischung enthalten. Es ist deshalb unsere dringende Hoffnung, daß Rußland sich eines jeden aktiven Eingriffs enthalten wird, im Bewußtsein seiner Verantwortung und des Ernstes der Situation. Wir sind, falls ein österreichisch-russischer Streit entstehen sollte, bereit, vorbehaltlich unserer bekannten Bündnispflichten, zwischen Rußland und Österreich mit den anderen Großmächten zusammen eine Vermittlung eintreten zu lassen.

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**Anlage 14.**

**Telegramm des Reichskanzlers an den Kaiserlichen Botschafter in Petersburg vom 28. Juli 1914.**

Wir bemühen uns unausgesetzt, Wien zu veranlassen, in Petersburg Zweck und Umfang des österreichischen Vorgehens in Serbien in einer unanfechtbaren und hoffentlich Rußland befriedigenden Weise klarzulegen. Hieran ändert auch die inzwischen erfolgte Kriegserklärung nichts.

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**Anlage 15.**

**Telegramm des Reichskanzlers an den Kaiserlichen Botschafter in London vom 27. Juli 1914.**

Wir haben die Vermittlungssaktion in Wien in dem von Sir Edward Grey gewünschten Sinne sofort eingeleitet. Überdies haben wir Graf Berchtold auch den Wunsch des Herrn Sazanow auf direkte Aussprache mit Wien mitgeteilt.

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**Anlage 16.**

**Telegramm des Kaiserlichen Botschafters in Wien an den Reichskanzler vom 28. Juli 1914.**

Graf Berchtold bittet mich, Euerer Exzellenz seinen verbindlichen Dank für Mitteilung des englischen Vermittlungsvorschlags zu sagen. Er bemerkt jedoch dazu, daß nach Eröffnung der Feindseligkeiten seitens Serbiens und nach der inzwischen erfolgten Kriegserklärung er den Schritt Englands als verspätet ansehen müsse.

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Anlage 17.

**Telegramm des Reichstanzlers an den Kaiserlichen  
Botschafter in Paris vom 29. Juli.**

Die uns über französische Kriegsvorbereitungen zugehenden Nachrichten mehren sich von Stunde zu Stunde. Ich bitte dies bei der Französischen Regierung zur Sprache zu bringen und sie eindringlichst darauf hinzuweisen, daß uns beratige Maßnahmen zu Schutzmaßregeln zwingen würden. Wir würden Kriegsgefahr proclamieren müssen, und wenn dies auch noch keine Einberufungen und noch nicht Mobilisierung bedeute, so würde dadurch immerhin die Spannung erhöht werden. Wir hoffen fortgesetzt noch auf Erhaltung des Friedens.

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Anlage 18.

**Telegramm des Militärbevollmächtigten in St. Petersburg an S. M. den Kaiser vom 30. Juli.**

Gestern sagte mir Fürst Troubekli, nachdem er veranlaßt hatte, daß Euer Majestät Telegramm an Kaiser Nikolaus sofort übermittelt würde: Gottlob, daß ein Telegramm Ihres Kaisers gekommen ist. Er sagte mir nun soeben, daß Telegramm hätte auf den Kaiser tiefen Eindruck gemacht, aber da die Mobilisierung gegen Österreich bereits befohlen gewesen und Sazonow Seine Majestät wohl davon überzeugt hätte, daß es nicht mehr möglich sei, zurückzuweichen, so könne Seine Majestät leider nichts mehr ändern. Ich sagte ihm darauf, die Schuld an den unabsehbaren Folgen trage die frühzeitige Mobilisierung gegen das doch nur in einen lokalen Krieg mit Serbien verwickelte Österreich-Ungarn, denn Deutschlands Antwort darauf sei wohl klar und die Verantwortung liege auf Rußland, welches Österreich-Ungarns Zusicherung, daß es territoriale Erwerbungen in Serbien in keiner Weise beabsichtige, ignoriert habe. Österreich-Ungarn habe gegen Serbien und nicht gegen Rußland mobilisiert, und zum sofortigen Eingreifen sei kein Grund für Rußland. Ich fügte des weiteren hinzu, daß man in Deutschland die Lebensart Rußlands »wir können unsere Brüder in Serbien nicht im Stich lassen« nach dem furchtbaren Verbrechen von Serajewo nicht mehr verstehe. Ich sagte ihm schließlich, er möge, wenn Deutschlands Streitmacht mobilisiert werde, sich nicht wundern.

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Anlage 19.

**Telegramm des Reichskanzlers an den Kaiserlichen  
Botschafter in Rom vom 31. Juli 1914.**

Fortgesetzt ist von uns zwischen Rußland und Österreich-Ungarn sowohl durch direkten Depeschenwechsel Seiner Majestät des Kaisers mit Seiner Majestät dem Zaren als auch im Benehmen mit Sir Edward Grey vermittelt worden. Durch die Mobilisierung Rußlands sind jedoch alle unsere Bemühungen sehr erschwert, wenn nicht unmöglich gemacht. Trotz beruhigender Versicherungen trifft Rußland allen uns zugegangenen Nachrichten zufolge so weitgehende Maßnahmen auch gegen uns, daß die Lage immer bedrohlicher wird.

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Anlage 20.

**I. Seine Majestät an den Zaren.**

28. Juli 10·45 p. m.

Mit der größten Beunruhigung höre ich von dem Eindruck, den Österreich-Ungarns Vorgehen gegen Serbien in Deinem Reiche hervorrufen. Die skrupellose Agitation, die seit Jahren in Serbien getrieben worden ist, hat zu dem empörenden Verbrechen geführt, dessen Opfer Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand geworden ist. Der Geist, der die Serben ihren eigenen König und seine Gemahlin morden ließ, herrscht heute noch in jenem Lande. Zweifellos wirst Du mit mir darin übereinstimmen, daß wir beide, Du und ich sowohl, als alle Souveräne ein gemeinsames Interesse daran haben, darauf zu bestehen, daß alle diejenigen, die für den scheußlichen Mord moralisch verantwortlich sind, ihre verdiente Strafe erleiden.

Andererseits übersehe ich keineswegs, wie schwierig es für Dich und Deine Regierung ist, den Strömungen der öffentlichen Meinung entgegenzutreten. Eingedenk der herzlichen Freundschaft, die uns beide seit langer Zeit mit festem Band verbindet, setze ich daher meinen ganzen Einfluß ein, um Österreich-Ungarn dazu zu bestimmen, eine offene und befriedigende Verständigung mit Rußland anzustreben. Ich hoffe zuversichtlich, daß Du mich in meinen Bemühungen, alle Schwierigkeiten, die noch entstehen können, zu beseitigen, unterstützen wirst.

Dein sehr aufrichtiger und ergebener Freund und Vetter

gez. Wilhelm.

---

Anlage 21.

**II. Der Zar an Seine Majestät.**

Petershoff. Palais, 29. Juli 1 p. m.

Ich bin erfreut, daß Du zurück in Deutschland bist. In diesem so tristen Augenblick bitte ich Dich inständig mir zu helfen. Ein schmählicher Krieg ist an ein schwaches Land erklärt worden, die Entrüstung hierüber, die ich völlig teile, ist in Rußland ungeheuer. Ich sehe voraus, daß ich sehr bald dem Druck, der auf mich ausgeübt wird, nicht mehr widerstehen können und gezwungen sein werde, Maßregeln zu ergreifen, die zum Kriege führen werden. Um einem Unglück, wie es ein europäischer Krieg sein würde, vorzubeugen, bitte ich Dich im Namen unserer alten Freundschaft, alles Dir mögliche zu tun, um Deinen Bundesgenossen davon zurückzuhalten, zu weit zu gehen.

gez. Nikolaus.

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Anlage 22.

**III. Seine Majestät an den Zaren.**

29. Juli 6.30 p. m.

Ich habe Dein Telegramm erhalten und teile Deinen Wunsch nach Erhaltung des Friedens. Jedoch kann ich — wie ich Dir in meinem ersten Telegramm sagte — Österreich-Ungarns Vorgehen nicht als »schmählichen Krieg« betrachten. Österreich-Ungarn weiß aus Erfahrung, daß Serbiens Versprechungen, wenn sie nur auf dem Papier stehen, gänzlich unzuverlässig sind. Meiner Ansicht nach ist Österreich-Ungarns Vorgehen als ein Versuch zu betrachten, volle Garantie dafür zu erhalten, daß Serbiens Versprechungen auch wirklich in die Tat umgesetzt werden. In dieser Ansicht werde ich bestärkt durch die Erklärung des österreichischen Kabinetts, daß Österreich-Ungarn keine territorialen Eroberungen auf Kosten Serbiens beabsichtige. Ich meine daher, daß es für Rußland durchaus möglich ist, dem österreichisch-serbischen Krieg gegenüber in der Rolle des Zuschauers zu verharren, ohne Europa in den schrecklichsten Krieg hineinzuziehen, den es jemals erlebt hat. Ich glaube, daß eine direkte Verständigung zwischen Deiner Regierung und Wien möglich und wünschenswert ist, eine Verständigung, die — wie ich Dir schon telegraphierte — meine Regierung mit allen Kräften zu fördern bemüht ist. Natürlich würden militärische Maßnahmen Rußlands, welche Österreich-Ungarn als Drohung auffassen könnte, ein Unglück beschleunigen, das wir beide zu vermeiden wünschen, und würden auch meine Stellung als Vermittler, die ich — auf Deinen Appell an meine Freundschaft und Hilfe — bereitwillig angenommen habe, untergraben.

gez. Wilhelm.

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Anlage 23.

**IV. Seine Majestät an den Zaren.**

30. Juli 1 a. m.

Mein Botschafter ist angewiesen, Deine Regierung auf die Gefahren und schweren Konsequenzen einer Mobilisation hinzuweisen; das gleiche habe ich Dir in meinem letzten Telegramm gesagt. Österreich-Ungarn hat nur gegen Serbien mobilisiert, und zwar nur einen Teil seiner Armee. Wenn Rußland, wie es jetzt nach Deiner und Deiner Regierung Mitteilung der Fall ist, gegen Österreich-Ungarn mobil macht, so wird die Vermittlerrolle, mit der Du mich in freundschaftlicher Weise betraustest und die ich auf Deine ausdrückliche Bitte angenommen habe, gefährdet, wenn nicht unmöglich gemacht. Die ganze Schwere der Entscheidung ruht jetzt auf Deinen Schultern, sie haben die Verantwortung für Krieg oder Frieden zu tragen.

gez. Wilhelm

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Anlage 23a.

**V. Der Zar an Seine Majestät.**

Peterhof, den 30. Juli 1914, 1<sup>h</sup> 20 p. m.

Ich danke Dir von Herzen für Deine rasche Antwort. Ich entsende heute Abend Tatishcheff mit Instruktion. Die jetzt in Kraft tretenden militärischen Maßnahmen sind schon vor 5 Tagen beschlossen worden, und zwar aus Gründen der Verteidigung gegen die Vorbereitungen Österreichs. Ich hoffe von ganzem Herzen, daß diese Maßnahmen in keiner Weise Deine Stellung als Vermittler beeinflussen werden, die Ich sehr hoch anschlage. Wir brauchen Deinen starken Druck auf Österreich, damit es zu einer Verständigung mit uns kommt.

Nicolaus.

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Anlage 24.

**Telegramm des Reichskanzlers an den Kaiserlichen Botschafter in Petersburg vom 31. Juli 1914. Dringend.**

Trotz noch schwebender Vermittlungsverhandlungen und obwohl wir selbst bis zur Stunde keinerlei Mobilisierungsmaßnahmen getroffen haben, hat Rußland ganze Armee und Flotte, also auch gegen uns, mobilisiert. Durch diese russischen Maßnahmen sind wir gezwungen worden, zur Sicherung des Reichs die drohende Kriegsgefahr auszusprechen, die noch nicht Mobilisierung bedeutet. Die Mobilisierung muß aber folgen, falls nicht Rußland binnen zwölf Stunden jede Kriegsmaßnahme gegen uns und Österreich-Ungarn einstellt und uns hierüber bestimmte Erklärung abgibt. Bitte dies sofort Herrn Sazonow mitteilen und Stunde der Mitteilung bringen.

**Anlage 25.**

**Telegramm des Reichstanzlers an den Kaiserlichen  
Botschafter in Paris vom 31. Juli 1914. Dringend.**

Rußland hat trotz unserer noch schwebenden Vermittlungaktion und obwohl wir selbst keinerlei Mobilmachungsmaßnahmen getroffen haben, Mobilmachung seiner gesamten Armee und Flotte, also auch gegen uns, verfügt. Wir haben darauf drohenden Kriegszustand erklärt, dem Mobilmachung folgen muß, falls nicht Rußland binnen 12 Stunden alle Kriegsmaßnahmen gegen uns und Österreich einstelle. Die Mobilmachung bedeutet unvermeidlich Krieg. Bitte französische Regierung fragen, ob sie in einem russisch-deutschen Kriege neutral bleiben will. Antwort muß binnen 18 Stunden erfolgen. Sofort Stunde der gestellten Anfrage bringen. Größte Eile geboten.

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**Anlage 26.**

**Telegramm des Reichstanzlers an den Kaiserlichen  
Botschafter in Petersburg vom 1. August 12<sup>52</sup> p. m.  
Dringend.**

Falls die Russische Regierung keine befriedigende Antwort auf unsere Forderung erteilt, so wollen Eure Excellenz ihr heute nachmittags 5 Uhr (mitteleuropäische Zeit) folgende Erklärung überreichen:

Le Gouvernement Impérial s'est efforcé dès les débuts de la crise de la mener à une solution pacifique. Se rendant à un désir que lui en avait été exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre était appliqué à accomplir un rôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et de St. Pétersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le résultat, procéda à la mobilisation de la totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer.

A la suite de cette mesure menaçante motivée par aucun préparatif militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire Allemand se trouva vis-à-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Impérial eût manqué de parer à ce péril il aurait compromis la sécurité et l'existence même de l'Allemagne. Par conséquent le Gouvernement Allemand se vit forcé de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies en sistant sur la cessation des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refusé de faire droit à cette demande et ayant manifesté par ce refus, que son action



était dirigée contre l'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur d'ordre de mon Gouvernement de faire savoir à Votre Excellence ce qui suit:

Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom de l'Empire relève le défi et Se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie.

Bitte Eingang und Zeitpunkt der Ausführung dieser Instruktion nach russischer Zeit bringend drahten.

Bitte Ihre Pässe fordern und Schutz und Geschäfte Amerikanischer Botschaft übergeben.

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Anlage 27.

**Telegramm des Kaiserlichen Botschafters in Paris an  
den Reichskanzler vom 1. August 1 Uhr 5 Min. nm.**

Auf meine wiederholte bestimmte Frage, ob Frankreich im Falle eines deutsch-russischen Krieges neutral bleibe, erklärte der Ministerpräsident mir, daß Frankreich das tun werde, was seine Interessen ihm geböten.



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# GREAT BRITAIN

AND THE

## EUROPEAN CRISIS.

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CORRESPONDENCE, AND STATEMENTS  
IN PARLIAMENT, TOGETHER WITH AN  
INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.

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## INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.

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### (1.)

ON the 23rd June, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the Emperor of Austria, Heir to the Throne, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, left Vienna to attend army manœuvres in the Province of Bosnia. On Sunday, the 28th, he visited Sarajevo, the capital of the province, and made a progress through the town accompanied by his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg. While passing through the streets their automobile was fired on by an assassin. Both the Archduke and Duchess were killed.

No crime has ever aroused deeper or more general horror throughout Europe; none has ever been less justified. Sympathy for Austria was universal. Both the Governments and the public opinion of Europe were ready to support her in any measures, however severe, which she might think it necessary to take for the punishment of the murderer and his accomplices.

It immediately appeared, from the reports of our representatives abroad, that the press and public opinion of Austria-Hungary attributed much of the responsibility for the crime to the Servian Government, which was said to have encouraged a revolutionary movement amongst the Serb populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

That there had for many years been a strong Serb nationalist movement in these two provinces there is no doubt. This movement in an earlier form had swept the provinces, then part of the Turkish Empire, into the insurrection against the Turkish Government in the seventies of last century, culminating in the war of 1877-8 between Russia and Turkey. It had continued when Austria took over the administration of the provinces under the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Austria then pledged her word to Turkey that her occupation should not "detract from the rights of sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan over these provinces." Thirty years later, however, in 1908, she suddenly proclaimed their annexation to her Empire. On the 7th October of that year, the annexation was celebrated in Sarajevo by the firing of salutes and ringing of cathedral bells, amid scenes of official rejoicing and popular apathy. Servian nationalist feeling immediately asserted itself, and the Servian Government protested to the Powers against the annexation as a "deep injury done to the feelings, interests, and rights of the Servian people." Serbia's attitude, coupled with the resentment felt by Russia and certain other Great Powers, nearly brought about a European war; but after six months of extreme tension she was induced to make a declaration abandoning her protest and promising to live on good terms with Austria. Her nationalist aspirations still continued, however, and were strengthened by her successes in the Balkan wars of 1912-13—successes which were compromised by Austria's opposition to her territorial expansion. As Serbia grew, Austrian suspicion of her designs deepened.

### (2.)

In the light of this history the storm of anti-Servian feeling which swept Austria-Hungary after the Sarajevo murders is easily understood. It was a feeling based on patriotism and loyalty. Europe was disposed to excuse its exaggerations and to sympathise with its motives.

But the dangers to European peace which it involved were immediately evident from the reports which reached the Government in London. Anti-Serb riots took place at Sarajevo and Agram. The members of the Serb party in the Provincial Council of Croatia were assailed by their colleagues with cries of "Servian assassins." Mobs in Vienna threatened the Servian Legation. The Austrian press, almost without exception, used the most unbridled language, and called for the condign punishment of Serbia. There were signs

that the popular resentment was shared, and perhaps encouraged, by the Austrian Government. Both the British and also the German Government knew that the peace might be disturbed.

In view of these reports, it naturally became incumbent on disinterested Powers to exercise what influence they possessed in a direction which would reconcile justice with peace. Unfortunately, though the attitude of public opinion in Austria, and, to a less degree, also in Germany, was plain, the intentions of the Austrian Government remained almost equally obscure. The Austrian Foreign Office maintained an attitude of reticence towards the British and Russian Ambassadors. On the 7th July the Government were careful to make a public announcement that a joint meeting of the Cabinets of Austria and Hungary, which had just taken place, was only concerned with the question of domestic measures to repress the Pan-Serb propaganda in Bosnia. On the 8th July the Minister-President of Hungary made, on the whole, a pacific speech in the Hungarian Parliament, defending the loyalty of the majority of the Serb subjects of the Empire. On the 11th July the Servian Minister at Vienna had no reason to anticipate a threatening communication from the Austrian Government, and as late as the 22nd July, the day before the Austrian ultimatum was delivered at Belgrade, the Minister-President of Hungary stated in Parliament that the situation did not warrant the opinion that a serious turn of events was necessary or even probable.

His Majesty's Government had therefore largely to fall back on conjecture. It was known that the situation might become serious, but it was also known that Serbia had made professions of readiness to accept any demands compatible with the sovereignty of an independent State. (It was known that the opinion of the Russian and French—and also of the German—Governments was that the Servian Government was not itself to blame for the crime, but that Serbia must be ready to investigate and put an end to the propaganda which had apparently led to it, and which was said to have originated in part on Servian soil.) Sir E. Grey advised Serbia to show herself moderate and conciliatory. He promised the German Ambassador to use his influence with the Russian Government in the same direction. More could not be done, for no actual evidence had yet been furnished that Servian territory had in fact been made the base for revolutionary operations. It was only known that a court-martial had been set up at Sarajevo, the proceedings before which were secret. The Servian Government stated that they were only waiting for the Austrian Government to communicate the evidence thus collected before setting their own investigations on foot. The Servian Government also stated that both the assassins implicated were Austrian subjects, and that on a previous occasion the Austrian Government had informed the Servian Government, in reply to enquiries, that one of these men was harmless and was under their protection. It was remembered that Austria had tried on previous occasions to fasten guilt on the Servian Government by means of police evidence brought forward in Austrian courts, and had failed. It was therefore assumed on all sides that, before Austria took any action, she would disclose to the public her case against Serbia. When Sir E. Grey said this to the German Ambassador on the 20th July, the latter replied that he certainly assumed that Austria would act upon some case that would be known; but, as a matter of fact, His Majesty's Government did not receive any statement of the evidence on which Austria had founded her ultimatum till the 7th August.

It was, therefore, necessary to wait. The situation was as clear as it could be made till Austria would consent to throw off her reticence. There was nothing doubtful in the general international situation, no incalculable element which Austria could not take into full consideration. Whatever she did, she would know accurately the consequences of her action. The Triple Alliance and the Triple *Entente* remained as they had always been. We had been quite recently assured that no new secret element had been introduced into the former, and Sir E. Grey had stated emphatically in Parliament on the 11th June that the latter had remained unchanged so far as we were concerned. Russia's interest in the Balkans was well known. As late as the 23rd May the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the Duma the policy of the "Balkans for the Balkans," and it was known that any attack on a Balkan State by any great European Power would be regarded as a menace to that policy. If Serbia was, as the Austrian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey on the 29th July, "regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence"; if Serbia

was to be humiliated; then assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent. It was not a question of the policy of Russian statesmen at St. Petersburg, but of the deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations bred in the Russian people by more than two centuries of development. These things had been, as Sir E. Grey said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan war, "a commonplace in European diplomacy in the past." They were the facts of the European situation, the products of years of development, tested and retested during the last decade. Patient work might change them, but the product of years could not be pushed aside in a day.

### (3.)

Yet two days were as much as Austria decided to allow for the task. On the 23rd July she showed her hand. She delivered an ultimatum at Belgrade and required an answer in forty-eight hours. She made ten demands, directed towards the elimination from Servian national life of everything which was hostile to Austria. These demands involved the suppression of newspapers and literature, the suppression of nationalist societies, a reorganisation of the Government schools, the dismissal of officers from the army, the participation of Austrian officials in judicial proceedings in Serbia, the arrest of two specified men, the prevention of all traffic in arms across the frontier, a full explanation of anti-Austrian utterances, and immediate notification of the enforcement of these measures. In addition, the Servian Government was to publish on the front page of the "Official Journal" a prescribed statement, which amounted to a full recantation of her alleged errors, and a promise of amendment. A very brief summary was annexed to the ultimatum, giving the bare findings of the secret trial at Sarajevo, with no corroborative evidence. No independent nation had ever been called on to accept a greater humiliation.

Between the delivery of this ultimatum and the declaration of war between Great Britain and Germany there was an interval of only twelve days. In the whirl of negotiations which now followed, there was no time to draw breath and ponder. At the outset, therefore, it may be well to explain definitely the British attitude towards the Austrian ultimatum.

Austria was under provocation. She had to complain of a dangerous popular movement against her government. What evidence she might have against the Servian Government no one in Europe then knew. Great Britain had no interest in the Balkans, except one. She desired the consolidation and progressive government of the Balkan States; she desired, in the words recently used by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Duma, that "the Balkan Governments should recognise that, in the matter of strengthening a State, the acquisition of territory is insufficient; the devotion and confidence of the new citizens must be enlisted." The dispute between Austria and Serbia did not necessarily affect that interest; it was a dispute between two Governments with which Great Britain had nothing to do. Sir E. Grey, therefore, consistently stated that he had no concern in that dispute; that he had no title to intervene between Austria and Serbia; that he would express no opinion on the merits of the ultimatum. But there was the other side. If the dispute affected the interests of Russia, then the peace of Europe was at stake; and, from the first, Sir E. Grey told the Austrian Government that he did not see how Russia, interested as she was in Serbia, could take any but a most serious view of such a formidable document as the ultimatum. The peace of Europe must be maintained, and it could only be maintained, as Mr. Asquith had said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan crisis, by a "spirit of forbearance, patience, and self-sacrifice"—by a "loyal spirit of give and take on the part of the Great Powers directly concerned." It was as the agent of this spirit of conciliation alone that Great Britain intervened in the European crisis.

### (4.)

On the 23rd July the Austrian Ambassador told Sir E. Grey that an ultimatum was being handed to Serbia. For the first time Sir E. Grey heard that "there would be something in the nature of a time limit." He immediately expressed his grave alarm. Next morning the text of the ultimatum was handed to him, and he learnt that the time limit was forty-eight hours. He

confessed to the German Ambassador that, as no time had been left for deliberation, he felt helpless. There was no time to advise Russia or to influence Serbia.

At this critical moment everything depended on Germany. As the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said a little later, "the key of the situation was to be found in Berlin." What was Germany's attitude? Privately, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his doubts as to the ultimatum; officially, the German Government called it "equitable and moderate," and said that they "desired urgently the localisation of the conflict." Everyone desired that; but it was no time for phrases. The same morning the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had summoned the French and British Ambassadors in St. Petersburg, had said that Austria's step meant imminent war, and had asked for the support of Great Britain and France. The French Ambassador had pledged the support of France, as was well known to be inevitable under the terms of her alliance. The next morning the Russian Government stated publicly that Russia could not remain indifferent to the Austro-Servian conflict. The next evening troops in Vienna had to be called out to guard the Russian Embassy from hostile crowds. "Localisation" was a good phrase, but we had to deal with facts. Austria had surprised Europe, and with surprise had come universal alarm.

During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at peace. Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be extended. Great Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great Britain urged Germany to join in pressing the Austrian Government. All that Berlin consented to do was to "pass on" the message to Vienna.

Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy should work together at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of conciliation. Italy assented; France assented; Russia declared herself ready; Germany said she had no objection, "if relations between Austria and Russia became threatening."

Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Belgrade were instructed to advise Serbia to go as far as possible to meet Austria.

But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not extend, had expired; and after all Serbia did not need advice. On the afternoon of Saturday, the 25th, she returned to Austria a reply which amounted to an acceptance of all Austria's demands, subject on certain points to the delays necessary for passing new laws and amending her Constitution, and subject to an explanation by Austria-Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Servian judicial proceedings. The reply went far beyond anything which any Power—Germany not excepted—had ever thought probable. But the same day the British Ambassador at Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press left the impression that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported that the impression left on his mind was that the Austrian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable. In spite of the conciliatory nature of Serbia's reply, the Austrian Minister left Belgrade the same evening, and Serbia ordered a general mobilisation.

But an outline of the Servian reply had been communicated to Sir E. Grey an hour or two before it was delivered. He immediately expressed to Germany the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin again contented itself with "passing on" the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna through the German Ambassador there. The fate of the message so passed on may be guessed from the fact that the German Ambassador told the British Ambassador directly afterwards that Serbia had only made a pretence of giving way, and that her concessions were all a sham.

## (5.)

During the next four days, 26th to 29th July, there was only one question before Europe—how could Russia and Austria be brought to an agreement? It was evident that Russia did not believe that Austria would, or could, stop short of the absolute ruin of the Servian State, if she once actually attacked it. Here again, the question was not merely one of Government policy; the popular sentiment of two great nations was involved. Austria indeed professed, no doubt with perfect honesty, that she would take no territory from Serbia. But the Austrian Ministers were being borne along on a wave of



violent popular enthusiasm. They said themselves that they would be swept from power if they did not follow the popular desire for a conflict with Serbia. Would this popular enthusiasm be content with any mere punitive expedition against the enemy? Surely not. Russia, therefore, openly said that she would have to intervene if Serbia were attacked; but she promised Austria on the 27th that she would use all her influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to give satisfaction to Austria, and only asked Austria to delay hostilities in order to give time for deliberation. Austria refused, saying it was too late. She declared war on Serbia on the 28th. Russia ordered a partial mobilisation on the 29th.

But meanwhile Sir Edward Grey had proposed that the German, Italian, and French Ambassadors should meet him in London, to discuss the best means towards a settlement. Italy and France at once accepted; Russia said she was ready to stand aside; but Germany refused. She did not like what she called "a court of arbitration," and proposed instead direct negotiations between Russia and Austria. These negotiations actually began, as we have seen in the last paragraph, but they were cut short by the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia. Austria then apparently considered that the moment for such negotiations was passed. She had, moreover, refused to discuss the Servian reply in any way, and it was difficult to see, after that refusal, what Russia could negotiate with her about. Russia, therefore, fell back on Sir E. Grey's proposal for a conference of Ambassadors in London, which she had originally expressed her readiness to accept. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs urged Sir E. Grey to induce Germany to indicate in what way she would consent to work for a settlement.

This brings the narrative of events down to Wednesday, the 29th July. Russia was mobilising partially in her southern provinces. Austrian troops were bombarding Belgrade. But, on the other hand, better news was coming from Berlin. Up to the 28th at least, both Germany and Austria had seemed unwilling to admit that the situation was really serious; Russia, it was said, was unprepared, and France was in no condition to go to war. Germany had said, in reply to Sir E. Grey's repeated advances, that she did not like to make representations to Vienna for fear of stiffening Austria's attitude. But on the evening of the 28th the German Chancellor assured the British Ambassador that he was trying to mediate at Vienna and St. Petersburg. On the strength of this assurance and similar assurances made by the German Ambassador in London on the 29th, Sir E. Grey telegraphed to Berlin once more, in accordance with the request of the Russian Government, urging the German Government, if they did not like the idea of the Ambassadors' conference in the form he had suggested it, to suggest any other form they pleased. "Mediation," he said, "was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would press the button in the interests of peace." The telegram was despatched at about 4 o'clock on the evening of the 29th.

## (6.)

This appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange response. About midnight, a telegram arrived at the Foreign Office from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. The German Chancellor had sent for him late at night. He had asked if Great Britain would promise to remain neutral in a war, provided Germany did not touch Holland and took nothing from France but her colonies. He refused to give any undertaking that Germany would not invade Belgium, but he promised that, if Belgium remained passive, no territory would be taken from her.

Sir E. Grey's answer was a peremptory refusal, but he added an exhortation and an offer. The business of Europe was to work for peace. That was the only question with which Great Britain was concerned. If Germany would prove by her actions now that she desired peace, Great Britain would warmly welcome a future agreement with her whereby the whole weight of the two nations would be thrown permanently into the scale of peace in years to come.

For the next two days peace proposals and negotiations continued, some initiated and all supported by Great Britain. There remained a spark of hope. But from the British point of view the face of Europe henceforward was changed. On the 29th July the only conflict in progress had been on the frontiers of Serbia and Austria; the only fear of further war had lain in the

relations of Russia and Austria. Germany's declarations were pacific; Russia had said she desired nothing but a period of peace to allow for her internal development; France would not fight except to help her ally. There had seemed no insuperable difficulty in keeping the peace; it was only a question of allaying the mutual suspicion between Vienna and St. Petersburg. But now a new element of danger had been introduced. Great Britain now knew that Germany was contemplating an attack on France. She knew more. The independence of the Low Countries had for centuries been considered as one of the strongest means of securing the peace of Europe. Their position and the nature of the country rendered them the natural battlefield of Northern Europe. If it was made impossible for a Great Power to invade them, war would become increasingly difficult and dangerous. With the growth of the idea of a fixed system of international law founded on treaties, the neutrality of Belgium had been devised as a permanent safeguard to this end. As such, it had been consecrated by two international treaties signed by all the Powers, and recognised by two generations of statesmen. Now, when the peace of Europe was our one object, it was found that Germany was preparing to tear out the main rivet of that peace.

Germany's position must be understood. She had fulfilled her treaty obligations in the past; her action now was not wanton. Belgium was of supreme military importance in a war with France; if such a war occurred, it would be one of life and death;—Germany feared that, if she did not occupy Belgium, France might do so. In face of this suspicion, there was only one thing to do. The neutrality of Belgium had not been devised as a pretext for wars, but to prevent the outbreak of wars. The Powers must reaffirm Belgian neutrality in order to prevent the war now threatened. The British Government, therefore, on Friday, the 31st July, asked the German and French Governments for an engagement to respect Belgium's neutrality, and the Belgian Government for an engagement to uphold it. France gave the necessary engagement the same day; Belgium gave it the day after; Germany returned no reply. Henceforward there could be no doubt of German designs.

Meanwhile, on the 30th and 31st negotiations continued between Russia and Austria. On the 29th Germany had suggested to Austria that she should stop as soon as her troops had occupied Belgrade. Late on the same night Russia offered to stop all military preparations, if Austria would recognise that the conflict with Serbia had become a question of general European interest, and would eliminate from her ultimatum the points which involved a violation of the sovereignty of Serbia. As the result of this offer, Russia was able to inform His Majesty's Government on the 31st that Austria had at last agreed to do the very thing she had refused to do in the first days of the crisis, namely, to discuss the whole question of her ultimatum to Serbia. Russia asked the British Government to assume the direction of these discussions. For a few hours there seemed to be a hope of peace.

### (7.)

At this moment, on Friday, the 31st, Germany suddenly despatched an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should countermand her mobilisation within twelve hours. Every allowance must be made for the natural nervousness which, as history has repeatedly shown, overtakes nations when mobilisation is under way. All that can be said is that, according to the information in the possession of His Majesty's Government, mobilisation had not at the time proceeded as far in Russia as in Germany, although general mobilisation was not publicly proclaimed in Germany till the next day, the 1st August. France also began to mobilise on that day. The German Secretary of State refused to discuss a last proposal from Sir E. Grey for joint action with Germany, France, and Italy until Russia's reply should be received, and in the afternoon the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg presented a declaration of war. Yet on this same day, Saturday, the 1st, Russia assured Great Britain that she would on no account commence hostilities if the Germans did not cross the frontier, and France declared that her troops would be kept 6 miles from her frontier so as to prevent a collision. This was the situation when very early on Sunday morning, the 2nd August, German troops invaded Luxemburg, a small independent State whose neutrality had been guaranteed by all the Powers.

with the same object as the similar guarantee of Belgium. The die was cast. War between Germany, Russia, and France had become inevitable.

Only one question now remained for this country. His Majesty's Government failed in their attempts to secure a general peace. Should they now remain neutral? The grounds on which that question was decided are clearly set forth in the statements of Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith in Parliament, which are contained in this volume,\* and no additional explanations are needed here. But one fact may be emphasised. From the 24th July, when Russia first asked for British support, to the 2nd August, when a conditional promise of naval assistance was given to France, Sir E. Grey had consistently declined to give any promise of support to either of our present allies. He maintained that the position of Great Britain was that of a disinterested party whose influence for peace at Berlin and Vienna would be enhanced by the knowledge that we were not committed absolutely to either side in the existing dispute. He refused to believe that the best road to European peace lay through a show of force. We took no mobilisation measures except to keep our fleet assembled, and we confined ourselves to indicating clearly to Austria on the 27th July, and to Germany on the 29th July, that we could not engage to remain neutral if a European conflagration took place. We gave no pledge to our present allies, but to Germany we gave three times—on the 30th July, the 31st July, and the 1st August—a clear warning of the effect which would be produced on our attitude and on the sentiment of the British people by a violation of the neutrality of Belgium.

After Germany's declaration of war on Russia on the afternoon of the 1st, the Tsar telegraphed to His Majesty the King as follows: "In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have done all in my power to avert war." It is right to say that His Majesty's Government believe this to be a true statement of the attitude both of Russia and France throughout this crisis. On the other hand, with every wish to be fair and just, it will be admitted that the response of Germany and Austria gave no evidence of a sincere desire to save the peace of Europe.

*Foreign Office, Sept. 28, 1914.*

\* See Part II.



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**OF**  
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**NOTE.**

(1) Documents Nos. 1-159 have been published as a White Paper, Miscellaneous No. 6 (1914) [Cd. 7467].

(2) Document No. 160 has been published as a White Paper, Miscellaneous No. 8 (1914) [Cd. 7445].

(3) Document No. 161 has been published as a White Paper, Miscellaneous No. 10 (1914) [Cd. 7596].

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54	" ...	28	Communicates telegram received from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to effect that German Government appear to have taken no measures to induce Austria-Hungary to modify attitude towards Servia, and suggesting His Majesty's Government approaching the German Government. Key of the situation really at Berlin ... ..	84
55	Sir G. Buchanan .. (Telegraphic)	27	Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs will use all his influence at Belgrade to induce Servia to give satisfaction to Austria, but Servian territorial integrity must be guaranteed and sovereign rights be respected. He has proposed direct conversations with Austria, but would be perfectly ready to stand aside if idea of conference accepted ... ..	85

No.	Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
56	Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic)	1914. July 27	Reports conversation between Russian Ambassador and Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Russia will be unable to localise war. Russia will restrain Serbia as long as possible, in order to give time for a settlement. Russian Ambassador urged that conversations should be continued at St. Petersburg ... ..	25
57	Sir R. Rodd ... (Telegraphic)	27	Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs' views as to conference and suspension of hostilities. Possibility of Serbia accepting Austrian note in its entirety on recommendation of four Powers ... ..	26
58	Sir F. Bertie ... (Telegraphic)	28	Has communicated substance of No. 46 to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is confident that Sir E. Grey's observations to German Ambassador will tend towards peace ... ..	26
59	" ... (Telegraphic)	28	Has communicated No. 47 to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who fully appreciates standpoint of His Majesty's Government. German Ambassador has informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria-Hungary would respect integrity of Serbia, but gave no assurance respecting her independence ... ..	26
60	Sir E. Goschen ... (Telegraphic)	28	Refers to No. 43. German Secretary of State has used similar language to French and Italian Ambassadors. Agrees with his two colleagues in thinking that German Government object only to form of proposal respecting conference. Suggests Herr von Jagow might himself be induced to suggest lines of co-operation ... ..	27
61	Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic)	28	Minister for Foreign Affairs states that Austria cannot delay proceedings against Serbia, and would decline any negotiations on basis of Servian reply. Nothing could now prevent conflict ... ..	27
62	" ... (Telegraphic)	28	Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who says that war will be declared to-day, and that no mediation could be accepted. Has appealed to him to place peace of Europe first and quarrel with Serbia second ... ..	27
63	Sir R. Rodd ... (Telegraphic)	28	Has informed Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs of substance of No. 27. He is telegraphing similar instructions to Berlin and Vienna ... ..	28
64	" ... (Telegraphic)	28	Inform of conversation between Servian Chargé d'Affaires and Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Serbia might still accept whole Austrian note if certain explanations were given her. Such explanations should be given to the Powers, who should then advise Serbia to accept without conditions ... ..	28
65	Mr. Crackanthorpe ... (Telegraphic)	28	Has urged greatest moderation on Servian Government pending result of efforts for peaceful solution ... ..	28
66	" ... (Telegraphic)	28	Declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Serbia ... ..	28
67	To Sir E. Goschen ... (Telegraphic)	28	Refers to No. 43. Proposed conference would not be arbitration, but private and informal discussion to find a settlement. Agrees that direct conversations between St. Petersburg and Vienna would be preferable ... ..	28
68	" ... (Telegraphic)	28	Ready to propose that German Secretary of State should suggest method of mediation by four Powers. Will keep the idea in reserve till result of Austro-Russian conversations is seen ... ..	29

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69	To Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic)	1914. July 28	Refers to No. 55. Expresses satisfaction at prospect of direct Austro-Russian conversations. Enquires further as to proposed action at Belgrade ...	39
70	Communicated by Count Benckendorff	29	Communicates text of two telegrams from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that Russian Government will announce partial mobilisation on the 29th July; that Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled; and that mediation by His Majesty's Government is most urgent ...	39
71	Sir E. Goschen ... (Telegraphic)	28	Conversation with Imperial Chancellor, who expressed anxiety to work in concert with England. Reasons for German refusal to support proposed conference. As Russia had mobilised, he could no longer urge moderation at Vienna. General opinion at Berlin that Russia is unprepared for war ...	40
72	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic)	28	Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs grateful for Sir E. Grey's language to German Ambassador (see No. 46). If Austria crossed Servian frontier Russia would mobilise. Has informed German Ambassador that Germany should use her influence at Vienna ...	40
73	Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic)	28	Informs of Austrian declaration of war against Servia	41
74	" (Telegraphic)	28	Russian Ambassador states that Austro-Hungarian Government have declined Russian Government's suggestion of direct discussion between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg. Russian Ambassador considers conference in London of less interested Powers the only solution ...	41
75	Sir E. Goschen ... (Telegraphic)	29	Chancellor states it is too late to act on British suggestion that Servian reply might form basis of discussion. German Government had informed Austrian Government that they quite understood that latter could not rest satisfied unless guaranteed that demands on Servia should be carried out in their entirety. Austrian Government had been advised to say openly that hostilities had that exclusive object ...	41
76	" (Telegraphic)	29	German Secretary of State states that any appearance of pressing moderation on Austria would probably precipitate matters. His Excellency is troubled by reports of military measures in Russia and France	42
77	To Sir E. Goschen... (Telegraphic)	29	Refers to No. 75. Much appreciates language of Chancellor, and will be very grateful if he can save the peace of Europe. This country will continue to make every effort in that direction ...	42
78	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic)	29	Partial Russian mobilisation ordered. Has communicated substance of No. 68 to Minister for Foreign Affairs. Mobilisation only directed against Austria. As Austria has definitely declined direct conversations, Minister for Foreign Affairs will suggest to German Ambassador return to idea of conference. Views of Minister for Foreign Affairs on Italian proposals (see Nos. 57 and 69). German Ambassador says his Government are continuing to exert friendly influence at Vienna ...	42
79	Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic)	29	French and Italian Ambassadors agree that no steps can now be taken to stop war with Servia. Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might remain quiet if Austro-Hungarian Government gave binding engagement to Europe not to acquire Servian territory or destroy independence of Servia ...	43

No.	Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
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81	To Sir R. Rodd ... (Telegraphic)	29	Understands that Austria will not accept any form of mediation between Austria and Servia. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs should speak at Berlin and Vienna ... ..	44
82	Mr. Beaumont ... (Telegraphic)	29	Designs of Austria likely to extend considerably beyond the sanjak and the punitive occupation of Servian territory. Expected assistance for Austrian army from Mussulman population in Servia ... ..	44
83	Mr. Crackenthorpe... (Telegraphic)	29	Has been asked by Servian Prime Minister to convey his thanks for statement in the House of Commons on the 27th July ... ..	45
84	To Sir E. Goschen... (Telegraphic)	29	German Ambassador states that Chancellor is endeavouring to mediate between Austria and Russia. His Majesty's Government urge that Germany should suggest some method by which the four Powers could preserve the peace between Austria and Russia ... ..	45
85	Sir E. Goschen ... (Telegraphic)	29	German Secretary of State offers that in return for British neutrality German Government would give every assurance that they would make no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France. He was unable to give similar assurance as regards French colonies. If neutrality of Holland were respected by Germany's adversaries, Germany would give assurances to do likewise. Operations of Germany in Belgium depend on action of France, but at end of war Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany ... ..	45
86	Sir R. Rodd ... (Telegraphic)	29	In view of partial Russian mobilisation, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks moment is passed for further discussions on basis of Servian note. His utmost hope is that Germany will influence Vienna to prevent or moderate any further Austrian demands on Servia ... ..	46
87	To Sir F. Bertie ...	29	Conversation with French Ambassador respecting policy of His Majesty's Government. Has told M. Cambon of intention to warn German Ambassador that His Majesty's Government will not necessarily stand aside if efforts for peace fail. On the other hand, the present case is different from that of Morocco a few years back, and if France becomes involved His Majesty's Government, who are free from engagements, will have to decide on their attitude in the light of British interests ... ..	46
88	To Sir E. Goschen...	29	Conversation with German Ambassador. Austro-Hungarian declaration of war having rendered direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg impossible, it is most important, in the event of German Chancellor failing in his efforts at mediation, that Germany should propose some method of co-operation between the four Powers ... ..	47
89	" " ...	29	Has warned German Ambassador of possibility of British intervention in certain eventualities ... ..	47
90	" " ...	29	Has communicated to German Ambassador text of Italian proposals and of reply returned thereto (see Nos. 64 and 81). Discussion of question of mediation ... ..	48

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92	To Sir R. Rodd ...	29	Conversation with Italian Ambassador. Italian Government suggest that German objections to mediation might be met by some change in procedure ...	49
93	Communicated by Count Benckendorff	80	Communicates telegraphic correspondence between himself, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Russian Ambassador at Vienna. (1) Austro-Hungarian Government have been urged by Russian Ambassador at Vienna to be moderate towards Serbia; (2) negotiations with German Government through Russian Ambassador at Berlin; (3) Austro-Hungarian Government decline direct conversations with Russian Government ...	49
94	Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic)	29	In present temper of Austria-Hungary, irrevocable steps may be taken unless Germany with the other three Powers can mediate at once. Russian Ambassador fears effect on Russian opinion if serious engagement takes place before agreement is reached. Reports interviews between the Russian and French Ambassadors and the German Ambassador ... ..	52
95	" " ... (Telegraphic)	80	Conversation with Russian Ambassador. Russia could not see Serbia crushed, but would acquiesce in measures that would safeguard Austria-Hungary's Slav provinces from further hostile propaganda. Extreme anti-Servian and anti-Russian sentiments of German Ambassador to whom text of Austro-Hungarian note was probably known beforehand ... ..	53
96	" " ... (Telegraphic)	80	Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed Russian Ambassador that, as Russia had mobilised, Austria must do likewise. No threat meant. No objection to direct Austro-Hungarian conversations being continued at St. Petersburg. Russian Ambassador more hopeful ... ..	53
97	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic)	80	German Ambassador has informed Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Government would guarantee that Austria should respect Servian integrity. Russia could not, however, agree to vassalage of Serbia to Austria. Formula of conditions subject to which Russia would stop military preparations ... ..	53
98	Sir E. Goschen ... (Telegraphic)	80	German Government have asked Austrian Government whether they would accept mediation on basis of occupation of Belgrade by Austrian troops and issue of conditions from there. Could His Majesty's Government induce Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement? German Secretary of State says that Russian mobilisation has increased difficulties of situation. German Government have made no special military preparations ... ..	53
99	Sir F. Bertie ... (Telegraphic)	80	Conversation with President of the Republic regarding German communication to St. Petersburg as to Russian mobilisation. Russia consents to demobilise subject to assurance from Austria to respect sovereignty of Serbia and submit certain point, in the Austrian note to international discussion. Peace depended on attitude of His Majesty's Government. Pacific attitude of France. A British declaration to support France would prevent Germany going to war. Explained difficulty of such a declaration ...	53

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100	Sir R. Rodd ... (Telegraphic)	1914 July 30	German Ambassador at Rome thinks Germany could prevent Austria from making exorbitant demands if Serbia would submit on occupation of Belgrade ...	54
101	To Sir E. Goschen... (Telegraphic)	30	Replies to No. 85. His Majesty's Government cannot entertain German proposals to secure British neutrality. For many reasons such a bargain with Germany at the expense of France would be a disgrace to Great Britain. His Majesty's Government cannot bargain away her obligations regarding Belgian neutrality. His Majesty's Government must preserve full freedom of action. Best way of maintaining good relations with Great Britain is for Germany to work with her for the preservation of peace ... ..	55
102	" " ... (Telegraphic)	30	Has warned German Ambassador that Germany must not count on Great Britain standing aside in all circumstances ... ..	55
103	To Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic)	30	German Ambassador states that German Government would advise Austria not to advance beyond Belgrade and adjoining territories, whilst Powers urged Serbia to give satisfaction sufficient to placate Austria. Earnest hope that this may be agreed to. Suggests change in the formula proposed by Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs (see No. 97) in order to meet existing situation ... ..	55
104	To Sir F. Bertie ... (Telegraphic)	30	To inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of telegram to Sir G. Buchanan (see No. 103). Trusts that French Ambassador at St. Petersburg will be able to induce Russian Government not to precipitate a crisis ... ..	56
105	" " ...	30	Conversation with French Ambassador respecting attitude of Great Britain in event of conflict between France and Germany; encloses copies of notes exchanged with French Ambassador in 1912, and discusses their scope. Cabinet to meet to-morrow ...	56
106	Sir R. Rodd ... (Telegraphic)	30	Austria has declined to continue direct conversations with Russia. Germany believed to be more disposed to give conciliatory advice at Vienna owing to likelihood of British support for Russia and France. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs is in favour of working with His Majesty's Government even if idea of discussions between four Powers is impossible ... ..	58
107	Sir E. Goschen ... (Telegraphic)	30	Has asked German Secretary of State if he can suggest any course of action. Latter replied that he was in communication with Vienna to save time. Chancellor was "pressing the button" at Vienna to utmost of his power, and feared he had perhaps gone too far ... ..	59
108	" " ... (Telegraphic)	31	German Chancellor states that owing to Russian mobilisation Germany cannot remain quiet. These proceedings had come just when the Czar had appealed to the Emperor and when the latter was about to mediate at Vienna ... ..	59
109	" " ... (Telegraphic)	31	Reports having read to Chancellor reply of His Majesty's Government to his appeal for British neutrality (see No. 101). Chancellor desires time to reflect on it ... ..	60
110	To Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic)	31	German Ambassador states that Austro-Russian conversations have been resumed at Vienna and St. Petersburg. German Ambassador has asked that Russia should suspend military preparations in meanwhile. Has informed his Excellency that His	



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			Majesty's Government cannot ask Russia to do this unless Austria consents to limit advance of her troops into Serbia. Expresses satisfaction at resumption of conversations ... ..	60
111	To Sir E. Goschen... (Telegraphic)	July 31	If settlement cannot be reached by direct Austro-Russian conversations, suggests that four Powers should undertake to obtain full satisfaction of Austrian demands from Serbia, provided latter's sovereignty and integrity remain intact. Has informed German Ambassador that if Austria and Germany could bring forward any fair proposal, His Majesty's Government would support it strongly at Paris and St. Petersburg ... ..	60
112	Sir E. Goschen ... (Telegraphic)	31	German Government are about to proclaim "Kriegs-gefahr," to be followed by immediate mobilisation. Germany preparing for all emergencies ... ..	61
113	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic)	31	Russian general mobilisation ordered, owing to Austro-Hungarian movements of troops against her. Germany also making military preparations. Russia cannot allow Germany to get a start ... ..	61
114	To Sir F. Bertie ... ,, Sir E. Goschen... (Telegraphic)	31	Enquires whether France and Germany will engage to respect neutrality of Belgium ... ..	61
115	To Sir F. Villiers ... (Telegraphic)	31	To inform Belgium Government of No. 114. Sir E. Grey assumes that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her neutrality ... ..	62
116	To Sir E. Bertie ... (Telegraphic)	31	French Ambassador informed that His Majesty's Government cannot undertake definite pledge to intervene in war, but that situation will be reconsidered in presence of any new development ... ..	62
117	Sir F. Bertie ... (Telegraphic)	31	Informs of German ultimatum to Russia. German Ambassador demands answer from French Government by 1 P.M. to-morrow as to French attitude ... ..	62
118	Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic)	31	Under-Secretary of State says that mobilisation was not necessarily a hostile act. Austria-Hungary resents Russian intervention on behalf of Serbia. Russian Ambassador states that his Government have advised Servian compliance with Austrian demands so far as compatible with independence ... ..	63
119	To Sir F. Bertie ...	31	Has denied to French Ambassador that His Majesty's Government had given German Government the impression that they would remain neutral. His Majesty's Government could not, however, at the present moment give France any pledge, though further developments might justify intervention ... ..	63
120	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic)	31	New formula proposed by Russian Government. Russian Government will maintain waiting attitude if Austria agrees to stop advance of her troops and to allow consideration by Great Powers of satisfaction to be given by Serbia to Austria-Hungary without prejudice to her independence. Czar has undertaken that no Russian soldier will cross frontier so long as conversation with Austria continues ... ..	64
121	Sir E. Goschen ... (Telegraphic)	31	German Government appreciate Sir E. Grey's efforts to maintain peace, but cannot consider any proposal pending Russian reply to ultimatum presented by Germany relating to Russian mobilisation. ... ..	65

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122	Sir E. Goschen ... (Telegraphic)	1914 July 31	Belgian neutrality. Refers to No. 114. Secretary of State cannot reply to British request until he has consulted Emperor and Chancellor. - He doubts, however, whether German Government can give any answer. German Government alleges commission of hostile acts by Belgium ... ..	65
123	To Sir E. Goschen...	Aug. 1	Conversation with German Ambassador respecting the possible effect on British public opinion of any violation of the neutrality of Belgium. Any promise that His Majesty's Government should stand aside definitely refused ... ..	65
124	Sir F. Bertie ... (Telegraphic)	July 31	German ultimatum to Russia. French Government anxious to know at once attitude of His Majesty's Government ... ..	66
125	" ... (Telegraphic)	31	Neutrality of Belgium (see No. 114). French Government are resolved to respect neutrality of Belgium unless compelled to act otherwise by reason of violation at the hands of another Power ... ..	66
126	" ... (Telegraphic)	Aug. 1	German Ambassador has been informed that French Government fail to understand reason for German communication respecting attitude of France in the event of a Russo-German war (see No. 117). German Ambassador will see Minister for Foreign Affairs in the evening ... ..	67
127	Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic)	1	Mobilisation of Austrian army and fleet ... ..	67
128	Sir F. Villiers ... (Telegraphic)	1	Belgian neutrality. Refers to No. 115. Belgium expects Powers to observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power ... ..	67
129	Luxemburg Minister of State	2	German Government have informed Luxemburg that the German military measures in that country do not constitute a hostile act, but are only to insure against attack from France ... ..	67
130	To Sir E. Goschen... (Telegraphic)	1	British merchant ships have been detained at Hamburg. To request immediate release. Points out deplorable effect on British public opinion if detention continued ... ..	68
131	" ... (Telegraphic)	1	Russian Government report readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and to accept basis of mediation not open to objections raised in regard to original Russian formula (see No. 97). Hopes that German Government may be able to make use of Russian communication in order to avoid tension ... ..	68
132	" ... (Telegraphic)	1	Russia consents to British formula for basis of mediation (see No. 103) ... ..	68
133	" ... (Telegraphic)	1	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has informed Russian Government that Austro-Hungarian Government are ready to discuss substance of Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. Russian Government hope that these discussions will take place in London with participation of Great Powers, and that His Majesty's Government will assume direction of them ... ..	69
134	Sir F. Bertie ... (Telegraphic)	1	Conversation with President of Republic. German Government are trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility for present situation. President justifies Russian action. Germany is practically mobilising, so France must also. French troops are kept 10 kilom. from frontier, whereas Germans have made incursions into French territory. French Government do not yet despair of possibility of avoiding war	



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135	To Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic)	1914. Aug. 1	Has received reliable information that Austria-Hungary has informed German Government that she would accept Sir E. Grey's proposal for mediation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Military action would continue against Serbia for present, but Russian mobilisation and Austro-Hungarian counter measures would cease. He should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs ... ..	69
136	Sir F. Bertie ... (Telegraphic)	1	General mobilisation in France ordered owing to German military measures. French troops have left a zone of 10 kilom. between them and the frontier ...	70
137	To Sir M. de Bunsen (Telegraphic)	1	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has given assurance that Austrians will respect territorial integrity of Serbia, and will not occupy sanjak. Austria has not "banged the door" on further conversations with Russia .. .. .	70
138	Sir E. Goschen ... (Telegraphic)	1	Conversation with German Secretary of State. German Government have ordered mobilisation. Absence of reply to German ultimatum must be regarded as creating a state of war. Russian Government will be so informed ... ..	71
139	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic)	1	Unsatisfactory result of discussions between German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors with the Czar and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respectively. Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs says that Austrian domination of Serbia would vitally affect Russia, and that he is weary of his ceaseless efforts to avoid war. Action of Austro-Hungarian Government and German preparations have forced Russian Government to order mobilisation, and mobilisation of Germany has created desperate situation. M. Sazonof would adhere to formula contained in No. 120, if its acceptance could be secured before the Germans cross frontier. In no case will Russia commence hostilities. Fear of general conflagration in the Balkans ... ..	71
140	Sir F. Bertie ... (Telegraphic)	1	French Minister for War has impressed on British military attaché that only way of securing peace was for Great Britain to take military action. Minister of War maintains that France has, by withdrawing from frontier, given proof of her desire to abstain from any provocative act ... ..	72
141	Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic)	1	Conversation with Russian Ambassador at Vienna respecting German ultimatum to Russia. His Excellency thinks that German Government desired war from the first. Explains nature of Russian mobilisation, and says that Russia had no intention of attacking Austria. French Ambassador to speak earnestly to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Anxiety as to attitude of Great Britain ... ..	72
142	Sir E. Goschen ... (Telegraphic)	1	General mobilisation of German army and navy ...	73
143	" ... (Telegraphic)	1	Detention of British steamers. German Secretary of State has promised to send orders to release steamers without delay ... ..	78
144	" ... (Telegraphic)	2	German Secretary of State says that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are in a state of war ... ..	73

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146	Sir F. Villiers ... (Telegraphic)	2	Belgian Government confirms report that German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg ...	73
147	Luxemburg Minister of State (Telegraphic)	2	Acts of German troops in Luxemburg territory are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy guaranteed by Treaty of London of 1867. Protest has been made to the German representatives at Luxemburg and also to German Secretary of State ... ..	74
148	To Sir F. Bertie ... (Telegraphic)	2	Assurance given to French Ambassador respecting protection by British fleet of French coasts or shipping subject to consent of Parliament. Question of despatch of British force to assist France. Effect of violation of Luxemburg and Belgian neutrality ...	74
149	To Sir E. Goschen... (Telegraphic)	2	Detention of British steamers. Sugar unloaded by force from British vessels at Hamburg and detained. Should inform Secretary of State that His Majesty's Government trust that order already sent for release of British vessels covers also release of cargoes (see No. 143). ... ..	75
150	Sir E. Goschen ... (Telegraphic)	3	Detention of British steamers. Refers to No. 149. No information available ... ..	75
151	Sir F. Villiers ... (Telegraphic)	3	French Government have offered five army corps to Belgian Government. Belgian Government reply that whilst sincerely grateful they do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers, and will decide later on their action ... ..	75
152	To Sir F. Bertie ...	3	Communication of French Ambassador to effect that Italy does not consider <i>casus fœderis</i> has arisen ...	75
153	To Sir E. Goschen... (Telegraphic)	4	Belgian neutrality. His Majesty's Government have been informed that German Government have proposed to Belgium friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and of German threat in case of refusal. Belgian Government have declined offer. Should ask for immediate assurance from German Government that they will not proceed with threat or violate Belgian territory ...	76
154	Sir F. Villiers ... (Telegraphic)	4	Belgian neutrality (see No. 153). In view of Belgian reply, German Government have threatened to carry out their proposals by force ... ..	76
155	To Sir F. Villiers ...	4	To inform Belgian Government that His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist attempt to infringe their neutrality. His Majesty's Government prepared to join with Russia and France in assisting Belgian Government to resist German aggression and to guarantee independence and integrity in future years ... ..	76
156	To Sir E. Goschen... (Telegraphic)	4	To demand immediate release of British ships detained in German ports ... ..	76
157	Communicated by German Ambassador (Telegraphic)	4	Assurance that Germany will in no case annex Belgian territory. Germany forced to disregard Belgian neutrality owing to knowledge of French plans ...	77
158	Sir F. Villiers ... (Telegraphic)	4	German troops have entered Belgian territory. Liège summoned to surrender ... ..	77

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160	Sir E. Goschen ...	8	Reports final negotiations at Berlin. Records departure from Berlin and journey to England ... ..	77
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## GREAT BRITAIN.

<i>Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Sir Edward Grey.
<i>Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Sir A. Nicolson.
<i>French Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Paul Cambon.
<i>Russian Ambassador</i>	...	Count Benckendorff.
		Monsieur de Etter ( <i>Counsellor of Embassy</i> ).
<i>German Ambassador</i>	...	Prince Lichnowsky.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i>	...	Count Mensdorff.
<i>Belgian Minister</i>	...	Count Lalaing.
<i>Servian Minister</i>	...	Monsieur Boschkovitch.

## FRANCE.

<i>President of the Republic</i>	...	Monsieur Poincaré.
<i>President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Monsieur Viviani.
<i>Minister of Justice and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Monsieur Bienvenu-Martin.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	...	Sir Francis Bertie.
<i>Russian Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Isvolsky.
<i>German Ambassador</i>	...	Baron von Schoen.
<i>Austrian Ambassador</i>	...	Count Scézszen.

## RUSSIA.

<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Monsieur Sazonof.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	...	Sir George Buchanan.
<i>French Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Paléologue.
<i>German Ambassador</i>	...	Count Pourtalès.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i>	...	Count Szápáry.

## GERMANY.

<i>Imperial Chancellor</i>	...	Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg.
<i>Secretary of State</i>	...	Herr von Jagow.
<i>Under Secretary of State</i>	...	Herr von Zimmermann.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	...	Sir Edward Goschen.
		Sir Horace Rumbold ( <i>Counsellor of Embassy</i> ).
<i>Russian Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Swerbeiev.
<i>French Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Jules Cambon.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i>	...	Count Szogyény.

## AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

<i>Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Count Berchtold.
<i>Under Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Baron Macchio.
	...	Count Forgach
<i>British Ambassador</i>	...	Sir Maurice de Bunsen.
<i>French Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Dumaino.
<i>Russian Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Schebeko.
<i>German Ambassador</i>	...	Herr von Tschirscky.

## ITALY.

<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Marquis di San Giuliano.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	...	Sir Rennell Rodd.

## BELGIUM.

<i>British Minister</i>	...	Sir Francis Villiers.
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## SERVIA.

<i>Prime Minister</i>	...	Monsieur Pashitch.
<i>British Minister</i>	...	Mr. des Graz.
		Mr. Crackanthorpe ( <i>First Secretary</i> ).
<i>Austro-Hungarian Minister</i>	...	Baron Giesl.

**PART I.**

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**CORRESPONDENCE LAID BEFORE  
PARLIAMENT.**

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No. 1.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 20, 1914.*

I ASKED the German Ambassador to-day if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Serbia.

He said that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take some step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable.

I said that I had not heard anything recently, except that Count Berchtold,\* in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be cleared up.

The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Serbia.

I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Serbia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial.

The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that they would act upon some case that would be known.

I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things over. I hated the idea of a war between any of the Great Powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Serbia would be detestable.

The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

\* Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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No. 2.

*Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to  
Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 22, 1914.*

LAST night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the forthcoming Austrian *démarche* at Belgrade was alluded to by his Excellency in the conversation that ensued. His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that question at issue was one for settlement between Serbia and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference from outside in the discussions between those two countries. He had therefore considered it inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Government on the matter. He had, however, on several occasions, in conversation with the Servian Minister, emphasised the extreme importance that Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing.

Finally, his Excellency observed to me that for a long time past the attitude adopted towards Serbia by Austria had, in his opinion, been one of great forbearance.

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## No. 3.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 23, 1914.*

COUNT \*MENSENDORFF\* told me to-day that he would be able to-morrow morning to let me have officially the communication that he understood was being made to Serbia to-day by Austria. He then explained privately what the nature of the demand would be. As he told me that the facts would all be set out in the paper that he would give me to-morrow, it is unnecessary to record them now. I gathered that they would include proof of the complicity of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Serbia.

As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would make any comment until I received an official communication, and it seemed to me probably a matter on which I should not be able to make any comment at first sight.

But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would be something in the nature of a time-limit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum, I said that I regretted this very much. To begin with a time-limit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from Serbia. I admitted that, if there was no time-limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but I urged that a time-limit could always be introduced afterwards; that if the demands were made without a time-limit in the first instance, Russian public opinion might be less excited, after a week it might have cooled down, and if the Austrian case was very strong it might be apparent that the Russian Government would be in a position to use their influence in favour of a satisfactory reply from Serbia. A time-limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last resort, after other means had been tried and failed.

Count Mensdorff said that if Serbia, in the interval that had elapsed since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an enquiry on her own territory, all this might have been avoided. In 1909, Serbia had said in a note that she intended to live on terms of good neighbourhood with Austria; but she had never kept her promise, she had stirred up agitation the object of which was to disintegrate Austria, and it was absolutely necessary for Austria to protect herself.

I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count Mensdorff had told me this afternoon, but I could not help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the situation. Great apprehension had been expressed to me, not specially by M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff, but also by others, as to what might happen, and it had been represented to me that it would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburg should use it on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Europe—let us say, Austria, France, Russia, and Germany—were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away.

Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would depend upon Russia.

I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this, it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each other.

\* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but he was under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburg had not been very favourable recently.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 4.

*Count Berchtold, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Mensdorff, Austrian Ambassador in London.—(Communicated by Count Mensdorff, July 24, 1914.)*

(Translation.)

LE Gouvernement Impérial et Royal s'est vu obligé d'adresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois, par l'entremise du Ministre Impérial et Royal à Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie :

"Le 31 mars, 1909, le Ministre de Serbie à Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal la déclaration suivante :—

"La Serbie reconnaît qu'elle n'a pas été atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli créé en Bosnie-Herzégovine et qu'elle se conformera par conséquent à telle décision que les Puissances prendront par rapport à l'article 25 du Traité de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des Grandes Puissances, la Serbie s'engage dès à présent à abandonner l'attitude de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a observée à l'égard de l'annexion depuis l'automne dernier, et elle s'engage, en outre, à changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers l'Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre désormais avec cette dernière sur le pied d'un bon voisinage."

"Or, l'histoire des dernières années, et notamment les événements douloureux du 28 juin, ont démontré l'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement subversif dont le but est de détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe, est arrivé à se manifester au delà du territoire du royaume par des actes de terrorisme, par une série d'attentats et par des meurtres.

"Le Gouvernement Royal serbe, loin de satisfaire aux engagements formels contenus dans la déclaration du 31 mars, 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement: il a toléré l'activité criminelle des différentes sociétés et affiliations dirigées contre la Monarchie, le langage effréné de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'attentats, la participation d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans les agisse-

THE Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on the 23rd July, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade :—

"On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government :—

"Serbia recognises that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighbourly terms with the latter."

"The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

"Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators of



ments subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans l'instruction publique, toléré enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe à la haine de la Monarchie et au mépris de ses institutions.

"Cette tolérance coupable du Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'avait pas cessé au moment où les événements du 28 juin dernier en ont démontré au monde entier les conséquences funestes.

"Il résulte des dépositions et aveux des auteurs criminels de l'attentat du 28 juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a été tramé à Belgrade, que les armes et explosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient être munis leur ont été donnés par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes faisant partie de la 'Narodna Odbrana,' et enfin que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a été organisé et effectué par des chefs du service-frontière serbe.

"Les résultats mentionnés de l'instruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de poursuivre plus longtemps l'attitude de longanimité expectative qu'il avait observée pendant des années vis-à-vis des agissements concentrés à Belgrade et propagés de là sur les territoires de la Monarchie; ces résultats lui imposent au contraire le devoir de mettre fin à des menées qui forment une menace perpétuelle pour la tranquillité de la Monarchie.

"C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se voit obligé de demander au Gouvernement serbe l'énonciation officielle qu'il condamne la propagande dirigée contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage à supprimer, par tous les moyens, cette propagande criminelle et terroriste.

"Afin de donner un caractère solennel à cet engagement, le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie fera publier à la première page du 'Journal officiel' en date du 13/26 juillet l'énonciation suivante :—

"Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore

outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction, in short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions.

"This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world.

"It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Sarajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade; that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana; and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

"The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which they have maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on them the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy.

"To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government see themselves compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that they condemn this dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that they undertake to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

"In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of their 'Official Journal' of the 13/26 July the following declaration :—

"The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary — i.e., the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the



sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels.

“Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé à la propagande susmentionnée et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auquel le Gouvernement Royal s'était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 mars, 1909.

“Le Gouvernement Royal, qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer.

“Cette énonciation sera portée simultanément à la connaissance de l'Armée Royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majesté le Roi et sera publiée dans le ‘Bulletin officiel’ de l'armée.

“Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage en outre :

“1° à supprimer toute publication qui excite à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie et dont la tendance générale est dirigée contre son intégrité territoriale ;

“2° à dissoudre immédiatement la société dite ‘Narodna Odbrana,’ à confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, et à procéder de la même manière contre les autres sociétés et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent à la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise ; le Gouvernement Royal prendra les mesures nécessaires pour que les sociétés dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activité sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme ;

“3° à éliminer sans délai de l'instruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomentier la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie ;

“4° à éloigner du service militaire et de l'administration en général tous les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et dont le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se réserve de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gouvernement Royal ;

fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

“The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Government were solemnly pledged by their declaration of the 31st March, 1909.

“The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, consider it their duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward they will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and suppress.

“This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the Royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and shall be published in the ‘Official Bulletin’ of the Army.

“The Royal Servian Government further undertake :

“1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity ;

“2. To dissolve immediately the society styled ‘Narodna Odbrana,’ to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form ;

“3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary ;

“4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the Royal Government ;

"5° à accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirigé contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie;

"6° à ouvrir une enquête judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe;

"des organes, délégués par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, prendront part aux recherches y relatives;

"7° à procéder d'urgence à l'arrestation du Commandant Voïja Tankosić et du nommé Milan Čiganović, employé de l'État serbe, compromis par les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo;

"8° à empêcher, par des mesures efficaces, le concours des autorités serbes dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière;

"à licencier et punir sévèrement les fonctionnaires du service-frontière de Schabatz et de Ložnica coupables d'avoir aidé les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontière;

"9° à donner au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal des explications sur les propos injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, qui, malgré leur position officielle, n'ont pas hésité après l'attentat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une manière hostile envers la Monarchie austro-hongroise; enfin

"10° d'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents.

"Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal attend la réponse du Gouvernement Royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi, 25 de ce mois, à 6 heures du soir.

"Un mémoire concernant les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo à l'égard des fonctionnaires mentionnés aux points 7 et 8 est annexé à cette note."

J'ai l'honneur d'inviter votre Excellence de vouloir porter le contenu de cette note à la connaissance du Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité, en accompagnant cette communication du commentaire que voici:

Le 31 mars, 1909, le Gouvernement Royal serbe a adressé à l'Autriche-Hongrie la déclaration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus.

Le lendemain même de cette déclaration la Serbie s'est engagée dans une politique tendant à inspirer des idées

"5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;

"6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Servian territory; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto;

"7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voïja Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Čiganovitch, a Servian State employé, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial enquiry at Sarajevo;

"8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Ložnica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Sarajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;

"9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Serbia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally,

"10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

"The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July.

"A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial enquiry at Sarajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note."

I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following observations:—

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Serbia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the

subversives aux ressortissants serbes de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et à préparer ainsi la séparation des territoires austro-hongrois, limitrophes à la Serbie.

La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle.

Des sociétés et affiliations ne tardèrent pas à se former qui, soit ouvertement, soit clandestinement, étaient destinées à créer des désordres sur le territoire austro-hongrois. Ces sociétés et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des généraux et des diplomates, des fonctionnaires d'État et des juges, bref les sommités du monde officiel et inofficiel du royaume.

Le journalisme serbe est presque entièrement au service de cette propagande, dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent leurs lecteurs à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie voisine ou à des attentats dirigés plus ou moins ouvertement contre sa sûreté et son intégrité.

Un grand nombre d'agents est appelé à soutenir par tous les moyens l'agitation contre l'Autriche-Hongrie et à corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays.

L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens serbes, esprit dont les annales du royaume portent les sanglantes empreintes, a subi une recrudescence depuis la dernière crise balkanique; des individus ayant fait partie des bandes jusque-là occupées en Macédoine sont venus se mettre à la disposition de la propagande terroriste contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

En présence de ces agissements, auxquels l'Autriche-Hongrie est exposée depuis des années, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gouvernement serbe a manqué au devoir que lui imposait la déclaration solennelle du 31 mars, 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contradiction avec la volonté de l'Europe et avec l'engagement qu'il avait pris vis-à-vis de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

La longanimité du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal à l'égard de l'attitude provocatrice de la Serbie était inspirée du désintéressement territorial de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de l'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe finirait tout de même par apprécier à sa juste valeur l'amitié de l'Autriche-Hongrie. En observant une attitude bienveillante pour les intérêts politiques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal espérait que le

Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing for the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier.

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members generals and diplomatists, Government officials and judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom; individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government have not thought it incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Servian Government have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government

royaume se déciderait finalement à suivre de son côté une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait surtout à une pareille évolution dans les idées politiques en Serbie, lorsque, après les événements de l'année 1912, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal rendit possible, par une attitude désintéressée et sans rancune, l'agrandissement si considérable de la Serbie.

Cette bienveillance manifestée par l'Autriche-Hongrie à l'égard de l'État voisin n'a cependant aucunement modifié les procédés du royaume, qui a continué à tolérer sur son territoire une propagande, dont les funestes conséquences se sont manifestées au monde entier le 28 juin dernier, jour où l'héritier présomptif de la Monarchie et son illustre épouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot tramé à Belgrade.

En présence de cet état de choses le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a dû se décider à entreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes démarches à Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouvernement serbe à arrêter le mouvement incendiaire menaçant la sûreté et l'intégrité de la Monarchie austro-hongroise.

Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal est persuadé qu'en entreprenant cette démarche il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisées, qui ne sauraient admettre que le régicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impunément dans la lutte politique, et que la paix européenne fût continuellement troublée par les agissements partant de Belgrade.

C'est à l'appui de ce qui précède que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal tient à la disposition du Gouvernement Royal de Grande-Bretagne un dossier élucidant les menées serbes et les rapports existant entre ces menées et le meurtre du 28 juin.

Une communication identique est adressée aux représentants Impériaux et Royaux auprès des autres Puissances signataires.

Vous êtes autorisé de laisser une copie de cette dépêche entre les mains de M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

*Vienne, le 24 juillet, 1914.*

#### ANNEXE.

L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le Tribunal de Sarajevo contre Gavrilo Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicité y relative—crime com-

hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Serbia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement of Serbia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold at the disposal of the British Government a dossier elucidating the Servian intrigues, and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

*Vienna, July 24, 1914.*

#### ANNEX.

The criminal enquiry opened by the Court of Sarajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassination com-



mis par eux le 28 juin dernier—a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations suivantes :

1°. Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son séjour à Sarajevo, de l'Archiduc François-Ferdinand fut formé à Belgrade par Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović le nommé Milan Čiganović et Trifko Grabež, avec le concours du commandant Voija Tankosić.

2°. Les six bombes et les quatre pistolets Browning avec munition, moyennant lesquels les malfaiteurs ont commis l'attentat, furent livrés à Belgrade à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež par le nommé Milan Čiganović et le commandant Voija Tankosić.

3°. Les bombes sont des grenades à la main provenant du dépôt d'armes de l'armée serbe à Kragujevac.

4°. Pour assurer la réussite de l'attentat, Čiganović enseigna à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež la manière de se servir des grenades et donna, dans un forêt près du champ de tir à Topschider, des leçons de tir avec pistolets Browning à Princip et Grabež.

5°. Pour rendre possible à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež de passer la frontière de Bosnie-Herzégovine et d'y introduire clandestinement leur contrebande d'armes, un système de transport secret fut organisé par Čiganović.

D'après cette organisation l'introduction en Bosnie-Herzégovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut opérée par les capitaines-frontières de Chabać (Rade Popović) et de Ložnica ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbić de Ložnica avec le concours de divers particuliers.

mitted by them on the 28th June last has up to the present led to the following conclusions:—

1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Sarajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, one Milan Čiganović, and Trifko Grabež, with the assistance of Commander Voija Tankosić.

2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to Princip, Čabrinović and Grabež, by the man Milan Čiganović and Commander Voija Tankosić at Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand-grenades coming from the arms depot of the Servian Army at Kragujevac.

4. In order to ensure the success of the act, Čiganović taught Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež how to use the bombs, and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabež in a forest near the shooting ground at Topschider.

5. To enable Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was organised by Čiganović.

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the frontiers at Chabać (Rade Popović) and Ložnica, as well as by the customs officer Rudivoj Grbić, of Ložnica, with the assistance of various individuals.

#### No. 5.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*  
(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.*

NOTE addressed to Servia, together with an explanation of the reasons leading up to it, has been communicated to me by Count Mensdorff.\*

In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency, I remarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Servia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia.

I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made in order to discuss those merits.

\* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other Powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.

Count Mensdorff\* replied that the present situation might never have arisen if Serbia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke; Serbia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed since the murder; a time limit, said his Excellency, was essential, owing to the procrastination on Serbia's part.

I said that if Serbia had procrastinated in replying, a time limit could have been introduced later; but, as things now stood, the terms of the Servian reply had been dictated by Austria, who had not been content to limit herself to a demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from its presentation. ✓

\* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

## No. 6.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)*

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

I HAD a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof\* to the effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him

His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was imminent.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfil all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Serbia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M. Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general European question was involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue

In reply to these remarks, I observed that I gathered from what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs of Serbia could not be tolerated. But supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Serbia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria?

M. Sazonof\* said that he himself thought that Russian mobilisation would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be held, probably to-morrow, at which the Emperor would preside, when a decision would be come to

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view; French Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable that we should know just how far Serbia was prepared to go to meet the

\* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must first consult his colleagues on this point, but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Serbia.

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack by Austria upon Serbia would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France; at any rate, he hoped His Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria.

President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach France, on their return from Russia, for four or five days, and it looks as though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum.

It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.

## No. 7.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

BEFORE departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian Ambassador that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Serbia could not leave Russia indifferent.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires was received this morning by Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own personal view, that Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were accepted integrally by 4 p.m. to-morrow. His Excellency added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at stake; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction throughout the country. He did not think that objections to what had been done could be raised by any Power.

## No. 8.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 24, 1914.

AUSTRIAN demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Servian Government, who earnestly trust that His Majesty's Government may see their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them.

This request was conveyed to me by Servian Prime Minister, who returned early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clearly very anxious as to developments that may arise.

## No. 9.

*Note communicated by German Ambassador, July 24, 1914.*

THE publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Great Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts now made known must also do away with the last doubts

that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the connivance of members of Government and army.

The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Great Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic interference of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission of official Serbia, the Great Servian propaganda has continuously increased in extension and intensity; to its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still longer to remain inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Serbia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them.

The Imperial Government want to emphasise their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently the localisation of the conflict, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences.

No. 10.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.*

AFTER telling M. Cambon\* to-day of the Austrian communication to Serbia, which I had received this morning, and of the comment I had made to Count Mensdorff† upon it yesterday, I told M. Cambon that this afternoon I was to see the German Ambassador, who some days ago had asked me privately to exercise moderating influence in St. Petersburg. I would say to the Ambassador that, of course, if the presentation of this ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it; but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which it seemed to me that any Power interested in Serbia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in Serbia, should act together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburg.

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four Powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Serbia, for the Servians could not possibly accept

\* French Ambassador in London.

† Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.



the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Serbia, and therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Serbia, it would be too late for any mediation.

I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburg until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move into Serbia, and Russia then mobilised, it would be possible for the four Powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate in it.

M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved against Serbia. The important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would be that Germany should propose it to the other Powers.

I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Serbia.

He replied that it was so.

I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon on the subject.

I am, &c.  
E. GREY.

#### No. 11.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

GERMAN Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the German Government about the Austrian demand in Serbia. I understand the German Government is making the same communication to the Powers.

I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia I had no concern with it; I had heard nothing yet from St. Petersburg, but I was very apprehensive of the view Russia would take of the situation. I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavour to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Serbia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any Power could exercise influence alone.

The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being effective, was that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening.

The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Serbia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Serbia; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You should inform Secretary of State.

Prince Lichnowsky\* said that Austria might be expected to move when the time limit expired unless Serbia could give unconditional acceptance of Austrian demands *in toto*. Speaking privately, his Excellency suggested that a negative reply must in no case be returned by Serbia; a reply favourable on some points must be sent at once, so that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded to Austria.

\* German Ambassador in London.

#### No. 12.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

SERBIA ought to promise that, if it is proved that Servian officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at

Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Servian interests.

It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying favourably to as many points as the time limit allows.

Servian Minister here has begged that His Majesty's Government will express their views, but I cannot undertake responsibility of saying more than I have said above, and I do not like to say even that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by French and Russian Governments. You should therefore consult your French and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my views are, as expressed above, to Servian Government.

I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate military action.

No. 13.

*Note communicated by Russian Ambassador. July 25.*

(Translation.)

M. SAZONOF télégraphie au Chargé d'Affaires de Russie à Vienne en date du 11 (24) juillet, 1914:

"La communication du Gouvernement austro-hongrois aux Puissances le lendemain de la présentation de l'ultimatum à Belgrade ne laisse aux Puissances qu'un délai tout à fait insuffisant pour entreprendre quoi qu'il soit d'utile pour l'aplanissement des complications surgies.

"Pour prévenir les conséquences incalculables et également néfastes pour toutes les Puissances qui peuvent suivre le mode d'action du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, il nous paraît indispensable qu'avant tout le délai donné à la Serbie pour répondre soit prolongé. L'Autriche-Hongrie, se déclarant disposée à informer les Puissances des données de l'enquête sur lesquelles le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal base ses accusations, devrait leur donner également le temps de s'en rendre compte.

"En ce cas, si les Puissances se convainquaient du bien-fondé de certaines des exigences autrichiennes, elles se trouveraient en mesure de faire parvenir au Gouvernement serbe des conseils en conséquence.

"Un refus de prolonger le terme de l'ultimatum priverait de toute portée la démarche du Gouvernement austro-hongrois auprès des Puissances et se trouverait en contradiction avec les bases même des relations internationales.

"Le Prince Koudachef est chargé de communiquer ce qui précède au Cabinet de Vienne."

M. Sazonof espère que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique ad-

M. SAZONOF telegraphs to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna on the 11th (24th) July, 1914.

The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.

"In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them.

"In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Servian Government.

"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.

"Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet at Vienna."

M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Government will adhere to

hèrera au point de vue exposé, et il exprime l'espoir que Sir Edward Grey voudra bien munir l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Vienne d'instructions conformes.

the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at Vienna.

## No. 14.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

AUSTRIAN Ambassador has been authorised to explain to me that the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a *démarche* with a time limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the time limit the Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic relations and begin military preparations, not operations.

In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same information at Paris (St. Petersburg), you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible; it makes the immediate situation rather less acute.

## No. 15.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 25, 1914.*

I LEARN from the Acting Political Director that the French Government have not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Government contained in your telegram of to-day.\* They have, however, through the Servian Minister here, given similar advice to Servia as was contained in your telegram to Belgrade of yesterday.†

\* See No. 14.

† See No. 12.

## No. 16.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 25, 1914.*

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs has no suggestions to make except that moderating advice might be given at Vienna as well as Belgrade. He hopes that the Servian Government's answer to the Austrian ultimatum will be sufficiently favourable to obviate extreme measures being taken by the Austrian Government. He says, however, that there would be a revolution in Servia if she were to accept the Austrian demands in their entirety.

## No. 17.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—*(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.*

I SAW the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and communicated to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of to-day to Paris,\* and this afternoon I discussed with him the communication which the French Ambassador suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade.†

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that the explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond with the information which had reached him from German quarters. As regards the latter, both his Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is too late to make such a communication, as the time limit expires this evening.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversa-

\* See No. 14.

† See No. 12.

tion which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Servia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was in favour of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers.

If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present *status quo* in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war.

I said that England could play the rôle of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality.

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate.

#### No. 18.

*Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

Your telegram of the 24th July\* acted on.

Secretary of State says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he immediately instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it appeared from press that Count Berchtold† is at Ischl, and Secretary of State thought that in these circumstances there would be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands.

Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and had told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburg. I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I said that telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. He

\* See No. 11.

† Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

said that he had given the Russian Government to understand that last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that note, he had in fact had no such knowledge.

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## No. 19.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 25, 1914.

I saw the Secretary-General this morning and found that he knew of the suggestion that France, Italy, Germany, and ourselves should work at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of moderation, if the relations between Austria and Servia become menacing.

In his opinion Austria will only be restrained by the unconditional acceptance by the Servian Government of her note. There is reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica Railway.

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## No. 20.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

LANGUAGE of press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender of Servia is neither expected nor really desired. It is officially announced that the Austrian Minister is instructed to leave Belgrade with staff of legation failing unconditional acceptance of note at 6 p.m. to-day.

Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl to-day to communicate personally to the Emperor Servian reply when it comes.

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## No. 21.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to*  
*Sir Edward Grey.—*(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

THE Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible.

The following is a brief summary of the projected reply:—

The Servian Government consent to the publication of a declaration in the "Official Gazette." The ten points are accepted with reservations. Servian Government declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of enquiry so long as the appointment of the commission can be shown to be in accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested the officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to suppress the Narodna Odbrana.

The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction offered in the Servian reply.

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## No. 22.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to*  
*Sir Edward Grey.—*(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

I HAVE seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from Constantinople, and my Russian colleague, and informed them of your views.

They have not yet received instructions from their Governments, and in

(new of this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Servian reply, I have up to now abstained from offering advice to the Servian Government.

I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have already urged the utmost moderation on the Servian Government.

No. 23.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to  
Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

THE Austrian Minister left at 6.30.

The Government have left for Nish, where the Skupstchina\* will meet on Monday. I am leaving with my other colleagues, but the vice-consul is remaining in charge of the archives.

\* The Servian Parliament.

No. 24.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at  
St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you said, as reported in your telegram of yesterday,\* and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government.

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.

The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian démarche makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilised against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate.

No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included the allies or friends of both. The co-operation of Germany would, therefore, be essential.

\* See No. 6.

No. 25.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

THE Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that the Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time-limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military operations. In informing the German Ambassador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had urged yesterday should be delayed. Apparently we should now soon be face to face with the mobilisation of Austria and Russia. The only chance of peace, if this did happen, would be for Germany, France, Russia, and ourselves to keep together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier till we had had time to try and arrange matters between them.

The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German Foreign Office saying that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Servia, but once she had launched that note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky\* said, however, that if what I contemplated was mediation

German Ambassador in London.



between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it.) He expressed himself as personally favourable to this suggestion.

I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title to intervene between Austria and Serbia, but as soon as the question became one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we must all take a hand.

I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of Russian and Austrian mobilisation, the participation of Germany would be essential to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were travelling at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, and could not therefore be sure of their views, but I was prepared, if the German Government agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Government that I thought it the right thing to act upon it.

## No. 26.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

THE Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following telegram which his Government have sent to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, with instructions to communicate it to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

“The delay given to Serbia for a reply is so limited that the Powers are prevented from taking any steps to avert the complications which are threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austrian Government will prolong the time limit, and as the latter have declared their willingness to inform the Powers of the data on which they have based their demands on Serbia, the Russian Government hope that these particulars will be furnished in order that the Powers may examine the matter. If they found that some of the Austrian requests were well founded, they would be in a position to advise the Servian Government accordingly. If the Austrian Government were indisposed to prolong the time limit, not only would they be acting against international ethics, but they would deprive their communication to the Powers of any practical meaning.”

You may support in general terms the step taken by your Russian colleague.

Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, it has been a relief to hear that the steps which the Austrian Government were taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to military preparations, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any irretrievable steps.

## No. 27.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, and Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

I HAVE communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of the Servian reply contained in Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegram of to-day.\* I have said that, if Servian reply, when received at Vienna, corresponds to this forecast, I hope the German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favourable view of it.

\* See No. 21.

## No. 28.

[Nil.]

## No. 29.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome. /*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

THE Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day. I told him in general terms what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning.

The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He made no secret of the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

## No. 30.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

THE Servian Minister called on the 23rd instant and spoke to Sir A. Nicolson\* on the present strained relations between Servia and Austria-Hungary.

He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted. They were perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria-Hungary so long as such demands were kept on the "terrain juridique." If the results of the enquiry at Serajevo—an enquiry conducted with so much mystery and secrecy—disclosed the fact that there were any individuals conspiring or organising plots on Servian territory, the Servian Government would be quite ready to take the necessary steps to give satisfaction; but if Austria transported the question on to the political ground, and said that Servian policy, being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that Servia must abandon certain political ideals, no independent State would, or could, submit to such dictation.

He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke were Austrian subjects—Bosniaks; that one of them had been in Servia, and that the Servian authorities, considering him suspect and dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian authorities found that the latter protected him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual.

Sir A. Nicolson, on being asked by M. Boschkovitch† his opinion on the whole question, observed that there were no data on which to base one, though it was to be hoped that the Servian Government would endeavour to meet the Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

\* British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

† Servian Minister in London.

## No. 31.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

SERVIAN reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered satisfactory, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade. War is thought to be imminent.

## No. 32.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

ACCORDING to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will keep quiet during chastisement of Servia, which Austria-Hungary is resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Servian territory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose, the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister



for Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to take a step which would probably result in many frontier questions in which Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian, and Persian questions being brought into the melting-pot. France, too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war.

I replied that matters had, I thought, been made a little difficult for other Powers by the tone of Austro-Hungarian Government's ultimatum to Servia. One naturally sympathised with many of the requirements of the ultimatum, if only the manner of expressing them had been more temperate. It was, however, impossible, according to the German Ambassador, to speak effectively in any other way to Servia. Servia was about to receive a lesson which she required; the quarrel, however, ought not to be extended in any way to foreign countries. He doubted Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Servia, acting as if she made any such claim. As for Germany she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter.

The German Ambassador had heard of a letter addressed by you yesterday to the German Ambassador in London in which you expressed the hope that the Servian concessions would be regarded as satisfactory. He asked whether I had been informed that a pretence of giving way at the last moment had been made by the Servian Government. I had, I said, heard that on practically every point Servia had been willing to give in. His Excellency replied that Servian concessions were all a sham. Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilisation and retirement of Government from Belgrade.

## No. 33.

*Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 26, 1914.*

EMPEROR returns suddenly to-night, and Under-Secretary of State says that Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on His Majesty's own initiative. They fear that His Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excitement. Under-Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador at St. Petersburg had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Servian territory Russia would not remain indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia would not act if Austria did not annex territory.

## No. 34.

*Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 26, 1914.*

UNDER-SECRETARY of State has just telephoned to me to say that German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a favourable view of Servian reply if it corresponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July.\*

Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German Government do not see their way to going beyond this.

\* See No. 21.

## No. 35.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, July 26, 1914.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a conference, and will instruct Italian Ambassador to-night accordingly.

Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this evening that Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did not imply declaration of war.

## No. 36.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, and Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.

Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg should be authorised to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference.

## No. 37.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.

BERLIN telegram of 25th July.\*

It is important to know if France will agree to suggested action by the four Powers if necessary.

\* See No. 18.

## No. 38.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 27.)*

Sir,

Rome, July 23, 1914.

I GATHER that the Italian Government have been made cognisant of the terms of the communication which will be addressed to Servia. Secretary-General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusiones which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success.

I have, &c.

RENNELL RODD

## No. 39.

*Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note.—(Communicated  
by the Servian Minister, July 27.)*

(Translation.)

LE Gouvernement Royal serbe a reçu la communication du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal du \*10 de ce mois et il est persuadé que sa réponse éloignera tout malentendu qui menace de gâter les bons rapports de voisinage entre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et le Royaume de Serbie.

Le Gouvernement Royal conscient que les protestations qui ont apparu tant de la tribune de la Skoupchtina nationale que dans les déclarations et les actes des représentants responsables de l'État, protestations qui furent coupées court par les déclarations du Gouvernement serbe, faites le \*18 mars, 1909, ne se sont plus renou-

THE Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant,\* and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina† and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18th\* March, 1909—have not been renewed

\* Old style.

† The Servian Parliament.

velées vis-à-vis de la grande Monarchie voisine en aucune occasion et que, depuis ce temps, autant de la part des Gouvernements Royaux qui se sont succédé que de la part de leurs organes, aucune tentative n'a été faite dans le but de changer l'état de choses politique et juridique créé en Bosnie et Herzégovine, le Gouvernement Royal constate que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal n'a fait aucune représentation, sauf en ce qui concerne un livre scolaire, et au sujet de laquelle le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a reçu une explication entièrement satisfaisante. La Serbie a de nombreuses fois donné des preuves de sa politique pacifique et modérée pendant la durée de la crise balkanique, et c'est grâce à la Serbie et au sacrifice qu'elle a fait dans l'intérêt exclusif de la paix européenne que cette paix a été préservée. Le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas être rendu responsable pour les manifestations d'un caractère privé, telles que les articles des journaux et le travail paisible des sociétés, manifestations qui se produisent dans presque tous les pays comme une chose ordinaire et qui échappent, en règle générale, au contrôle officiel, d'autant moins que le Gouvernement Royal, lors de la solution de toute une série de questions qui se sont présentées entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, a montré une grande prévenance et a réussi, de cette façon, à en régler le plus grand nombre au profit du progrès des deux pays voisins.

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Royal a été péniblement surpris par les affirmations, d'après lesquelles des personnes du Royaume de Serbie auraient participé à la préparation de l'attentat commis à Sarajevo; il s'attendait à ce qu'il soit invité à collaborer à la recherche de tout ce qui se rapporte à ce crime, et il était prêt, pour prouver son entière correction, à agir contre toutes les personnes à l'égard desquelles des communications lui seraient faites, se rendant donc au désir du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, est disposé à remettre au Tribunal tout sujet serbe, sans égard à sa situation et à son rang, pour la complicité duquel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, des preuves lui seraient fournies, et spécialement, il s'engage à faire publier à la première page du "Journal officiel" en date du 13 (26) juillet, l'annonce suivante :

"Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie

on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Serbia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Serbia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Sarajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Sarajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the "Journal officiel," on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration:—

"The Royal Government of Serbia

condamne toute propagande qui serait dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels. Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que certains officiers en fonctionnaires serbes aient participé, d'après la communication du Gouvernement Royal et Impérial, à la propagande susmentionnée, et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvernement Royal serbe était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 mars, 1909,\* qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'une immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que se soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers et fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que, dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer."

Cette énonciation sera portée à la connaissance de l'armée Royale par un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majesté le Roi, par Son Altesse Royale le Prince héritier Alexandre, et sera publié dans le prochain bulletin officiel de l'armée.

Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en outre :

1. D'introduire dans la première convocation régulière de la Skoupchtinat une disposition dans la loi de la presse, par laquelle sera punie de la manière la plus sévère la provocation à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance générale serait dirigée contre l'intégrité territoriale de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Il se charge, lors de la revision de la Constitution, qui est prochaine, à faire introduire dans l'article 22 de la Constitution un amendement de telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus puissent être confisquées, ce qui actuellement aux termes catégoriques de l'article 22 de la Constitution est impossible.

2. Le Gouvernement ne possède aucune preuve et la note du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne lui en fournit non plus aucune que la société

condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909,\* which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials, and entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavour."

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertake:—

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchinat a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the "Narodna

\* New style.

† The Servian Parliament.

"Narodna Odbrana" et autres sociétés similaires aient commis, jusqu'à ce jour quelques actes criminels de ce genre, par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Néanmoins, le Gouvernement Royal acceptera la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal et dissoudra la société "Narodna Odbrana" et toute autre société qui agirait contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

3. Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage à éliminer sans délais de l'instruction publique en Serbie tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, quand le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui fournira des faits et des preuves de cette propagande.

4. Le Gouvernement Royal accepte de même à éloigner du service militaire ceux pour qui l'enquête judiciaire aura prouvé qu'ils sont coupables d'actes dirigés contre l'intégrité du territoire de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, et il attend que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui communique ultérieurement les noms et les faits de ces officiers et fonctionnaires aux fins de la procédure qui doit s'ensuivre.

5. Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la portée de la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal que la Serbie s'engage à accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, mais il déclare qu'il admettra la collaboration qui répondrait aux principes du droit international et à la procédure criminelle ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage.

6. Le Gouvernement Royal, cela va de soi, considère de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquête contre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, éventuellement, auraient été mêlés au complot du 15\* juin, et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du royaume. Quant à la participation à cette enquête des agents ou autorités austro-hongrois qui seraient délégués à cet effet par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas l'accepter, car ce serait une violation de la Constitution et de la loi sur la procédure criminelle; cependant dans des cas concrets des communications sur les résultats de l'instruction

Odbrana" and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational establishments in Serbia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Serbia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th\* June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications

\* Old style.



en question pourraient être données aux agents austro-hongrois.

7. Le Gouvernement Royal a fait procéder, dès le soir même de la remise de la note, à l'arrestation du Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. Quant à Milan Ziganovitch, qui est sujet de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et qui jusqu'au 15<sup>e</sup> juin était employé (comme aspirant) à la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore être arrêté.

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est prié de vouloir bien, dans la forme accoutumée, faire connaître le plus tôt possible, les présomptions de culpabilité ainsi que les preuves éventuelles de leur culpabilité qui ont été recueillies jusqu'à ce jour par l'enquête à Sarajevo, aux fins d'enquête ultérieure.

8. Le Gouvernement serbe renforcera et étendra les mesures prises pour empêcher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière. Il va de soi qu'il ordonnera de suite une enquête et punira sévèrement les fonctionnaires des frontières sur la ligne Schabatz-Loznitza qui ont manqué à leurs devoirs et laissé passer les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo.

9. Le Gouvernement Royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les propos que ses fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, ont eu après l'attentat dans des entrevues et qui, d'après l'affirmation du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, ont été hostiles envers la Monarchie, dès que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui aura communiqué les passages en question de ces propos, et dès qu'il aura démontré que les propos employés ont, en effet, été tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, quoique le Gouvernement Royal lui-même aura soin de recueillir des preuves et convictions.

10. Le Gouvernement Royal informera le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents en tant que cela n'a pas été déjà fait par la présente note, aussitôt que chaque mesure aura été ordonnée et exécutée.

Dans le cas où le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne serait pas satisfait de cette réponse, le Gouvernement serbe, considérant qu'il est de l'intérêt commun de ne pas précipiter la solution de cette question, est prêt comme toujours d'accepter une en-

as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15<sup>th</sup> June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Sarajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry.

8. The Serbian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Sarajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials, whether in Serbia or abroad, in interviews after the crime which according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Serbian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by refer-

tente pacifique, soit en remettant cette question à la décision du Tribunal international de La Haye, soit aux Grandes Puissances qui ont pris part à l'élaboration de la déclaration que le Gouvernement serbe a faite le 18 (31) mars, 1909.

*Belgrade, le 12 (25) juillet, 1914.*

ring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague; or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909.

*Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.*

No. 40.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 27.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war, and that it is impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th instant\* (last paragraph).

When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Paris† arrived, I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both with me. They expressed great satisfaction with its contents, which I communicated to them. They doubted, however, whether the principle of Russia being an interested party entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro-Servian dispute would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government.

Instructions were also given to the Italian Ambassador to support the request of the Russian Government that the time limit should be postponed. They arrived, however, too late for any useful action to be taken.

\* See No. 26.

† See No. 36.

No. 41.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 27.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 27, 1914.*

I HAVE had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Servia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment.

I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of His Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency whether he cannot suggest a way out even now.

No. 42.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 27.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

YOUR proposal, as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday,\* is accepted by the French Government. French Ambassador in London, who returns there this evening, has been instructed accordingly. Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. Necessary instructions have also been sent to the French representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, but until it is known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Russian, and British Ambassadors to do so.

\* Nos. 36 and 37.

## No. 43.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 26th July.\*

Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonoff to exchange views with Count Berchtold.† He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments.

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by "mobilising against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.

Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburg had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation.

\* See No. 36.

† Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

‡ Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

## No. 44.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—*(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

AUSTRIAN Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objectionable features of the recent action taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that, although he perfectly understood Austria's motives, the ultimatum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be accepted as a whole by the Servian Government. Although the demands were reasonable enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly be put into immediate execution seeing that they entailed revision of existing Servian laws, but were, moreover, incompatible with Servia's dignity as an independent State. It would be useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In order, however, to put an end to the present tension, he thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria. The Austrian Ambassador undertook to communicate his Excellency's remarks to his Government.

On the Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told him that I had correctly defined the attitude of His Majesty's Government in my conversation with him, which I reported in my telegram of the 24th instant.\* I added that you could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if they supported Austria by force of arms. Their attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace. His Excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict.

\* See No. 6.



In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer mobilisation ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.

In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that until the issue of the Imperial ukase no effective steps towards mobilisation could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete her military preparations if it was deferred too long.

## No. 45.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

SINCE my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my telegram of to-day,\* I understand that his Excellency has proposed that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

\* See No. 44.

## No. 46.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.*

GERMAN Ambassador has informed me that German Government accept in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. He has also been instructed to request me to use influence in St. Petersburg to localise the war and to keep up the peace of Europe.

I have replied that the Servian reply went farther than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Serbia could hardly be expected to accept. I assumed that Servian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now required. If Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into Serbia, it meant that she was determined to crush Serbia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be involved. Servian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German Government should urge this at Vienna.

I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if the war could not be localised, and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Serbia, and would bring other Powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Servian reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged.

## No. 47.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.*

SEE my telegram of to-day to Sir E. Goschen.\*

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce.

This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manœuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.

We hear from German and Austrian sources that they believe Russia will

\* See No. 46.

take no action so long as Austria agrees not to take Servian territory. I pointed this out, and added that it would be absurd if we were to appear more Servian than the Russians in our dealings with the German and Austrian Governments.

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No. 48.

*Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.*

COUNT MENSENDORFF\* told me by instruction to-day that the Servian Government had not accepted the demands which the Austrian Government were obliged to address to them in order to secure permanently the most vital Austrian interests. Serbia showed that she did not intend to abandon her subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier territories and their final disruption from the Austrian Monarchy. Very reluctantly, and against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change in the attitude of enmity pursued up to now by Serbia. As the British Government knew, the Austrian Government had for many years endeavoured to find a way to get on with their turbulent neighbour, though this had been made very difficult for them by the continuous provocations of Serbia. The Serajevo murder had made clear to everyone what appalling consequences the Servian propaganda had already produced and what a permanent threat to Austria it involved. We would understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guarantees for the definite suppression of the Servian aspirations and for the security of peace and order on the south-eastern frontier of Austria. As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted, the Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. They had not taken this decision without reluctance. Their action, which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could not be represented otherwise than as an act of self-defence. Also they thought that they would serve a European interest if they prevented Serbia from being henceforth an element of general unrest such as she had been for the last ten years. The high sense of justice of the British nation and of British statesmen could not blame the Austrian Government if the latter defended by the sword what was theirs, and cleared up their position with a country whose hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity. Finally, the Austrian Government, confiding in their amicable relations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localising the fight, if necessary.

Count Mensdorff added on his own account that, as long as Serbia was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures because of her adherence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now that Serbia had doubled her territory and population without any Austrian interference, the repression of Servian subversive aims was a matter of self-defence and self-preservation on Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Servian territory or aggressive designs against Servian territory.

I said that I could not understand the construction put by the Austrian Government upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mensdorff the substance of the conversation that I had had with the German Ambassador this morning about that reply.

Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory; but the Servians had refused the one thing—the co-operation of Austrian officials and police—which would be a real guarantee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.

I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that, even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Serbia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Serbia and at the same time satisfy Russia, well and good; but, if not, the consequences would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an expression of the views of the German Government. I feared that it would be expected in St. Petersburg that the Servian reply would diminish the tension,

\* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

and now, when Russia found that there was increased tension, the situation would become increasingly serious. Already the effect on Europe was one of anxiety. I pointed out that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day, but we had felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to me that the Servian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Serbia that I had ever seen a country undergo, and it was very disappointing to me that the reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 49.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.*

THE Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson\* to-day that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal for a conference of four to be held in London.

As regards the question of asking Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Serbia to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, the Marquis di San Giuliano† would recommend the suggestion warmly to the German Government, and would enquire what procedure they would propose should be followed at Vienna.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

\* British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

† Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 50.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 31.)*

Sir,

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the Austro-Hungarian note announcing the declaration of war against Serbia.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 50.

*Copy of Note verbale, dated Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

(Translation.)

POUR mettre fin aux menées subversives partant de Belgrade et dirigées contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a fait parvenir à la date du 23 juillet, 1914, au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie une note dans laquelle se trouvait formulée une série de demandes pour l'acceptation desquelles un délai de quarante-huit heures a été accordé au Gouvernement Royal. Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'ayant pas répondu à cette note d'une manière satisfaisante, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se trouve dans la nécessité de pourvoir lui-même à la sauvegarde de ses droits et intérêts et de recourir à cet effet à la force des armes.

L'Autriche - Hongrie, qui vient

IN order to bring to an end the subversive intrigues originating from Belgrade and aimed at the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Imperial and Royal Government has delivered to the Royal Servian Government a note, dated July 23, 1914, in which a series of demands were formulated, for the acceptance of which a delay of forty-eight hours has been granted to the Royal Government. The Royal Servian Government not having answered this note in a satisfactory manner, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms.

Austria-Hungary, who has just ad-

d'adresser à la Serbie une déclaration formelle conformément à l'article 1<sup>er</sup> de la convention du 18 octobre, 1907, relative à l'ouverture des hostilités, se considère dès lors en état de guerre avec la Serbie.

En portant en qui précède à la connaissance de l'Ambassade Royale de Grande-Bretagne le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de déclarer que l'Autriche-Hongrie se conformera au cours des hostilités, sous la réserve d'un procédé analogue de la part de la Serbie, aux stipulations des conventions de La Haye du 18 octobre, 1907, ainsi qu'à celles de la Déclaration de Londres du 26 février, 1909.

L'Ambassade est priée de vouloir bien communiquer, d'urgence, la présente notification à son Gouvernement.

dressed to Serbia a formal declaration, in conformity with article 1 of the convention of the 18th October, 1907, relative to the opening of hostilities, considers herself henceforward in a state of war with Serbia.

In bringing the above to notice of His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to declare that Austria-Hungary will act during the hostilities in conformity with the terms of the Conventions of The Hague of the 18th October, 1907, as also with those of the Declaration of London of the 26th February, 1909, provided an analogous procedure is adopted by Serbia.

The embassy is requested to be so good as to communicate the present notification as soon as possible to the British Government.

No. 51.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 28.)

Sir,  
I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum from the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steps to be taken to prevent an outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

I have, &c.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

FRANÇOIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 51.

*Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Bienvenu-Martin.*

(Translation.)

PAR une note en date du 25 de ce mois, son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a fait connaître au Gouvernement de la République que, d'après Sir Edward Grey, la seule manière d'assurer, si c'était possible, le maintien de la paix dans le cas où les rapports entre la Russie et l'Autriche deviendraient plus tendus serait une démarche commune à Vienne et à Saint-Petersbourg des représentants de l'Angleterre, de la France, de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie en Autriche et en Russie; et il a exprimé le désir de savoir si le Gouvernement de la République était disposé à accueillir favorablement cette suggestion.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères par intérim a l'honneur de faire connaître à son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie qu'il a invité M. Jules Cambon\* à se concerter avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre en Allemagne et à appuyer la démarche qu'ils jugeront opportune de faire auprès du Cabinet de Berlin.

Le Gouvernement de la République

IN a note of the 25th of this month, his Excellency the British Ambassador informed the Government of the Republic that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, the only possible way of assuring the maintenance of peace in case of the relations between Russia and Austria becoming more strained would be if the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy in Austria and Russia were to take joint action at Vienna and at St. Petersburg; and he expressed the wish to know if the Government of the Republic were disposed to welcome such a suggestion.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, *ad interim* has the honour to inform his Excellency Sir F. Bertie that he has requested M. Jules Cambon\* to concert with the British Ambassador in Germany and to support any representation which they may consider it advisable to make to the Berlin Cabinet.

In accordance with the desire ex-

\* French Ambassador in Berlin.

a, d'autre part, conformément au désir exprimé par le Gouvernement britannique et que son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie lui a transmis par une note en date du 26 de ce mois, autorisé M. Paul Cambon\* à prendre part à la réunion proposée par Sir Edward Grey pour rechercher avec lui et les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne et d'Italie à Londres, les moyens de résoudre les difficultés actuelles.

Le Gouvernement de la République est prêt également à donner aux agents français à Pétersbourg, à Vienne et à Belgrade des instructions pour qu'ils obtiennent des Gouvernements russe, autrichien et serbe de s'abstenir de toute opération militaire active en attendant les résultats de cette conférence. Il estime toutefois que les chances de succès de la proposition de Sir Edward Grey reposent essentiellement sur l'action que Berlin serait disposée à Vienne [sic]. Une démarche auprès du Gouvernement austro-hongrois pour amener la suspension des opérations militaires paraît vouée à l'échec si l'influence de l'Allemagne ne s'est pas exercée au préalable sur le Cabinet de Vienne.

Le Garde des Sceaux, Président du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères par intérim, saisit cette occasion de renouveler, &c.

Paris, le 27 juillet, 1914.

pressed by the British Government and conveyed to them by Sir F. Bertie in his note of the 26th of this month, the Government of the Republic have also authorised M. Paul Cambon\* to take part in the conference which Sir E. Grey has proposed with a view to discovering in consultation with himself and the German and Italian Ambassadors in London a means of settling the present difficulties.

The Government of the Republic is likewise ready to instruct the French representatives at St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Belgrade to induce the Russian, Austrian, and Servian Governments to abstain from all active military operations pending the results of this conference. He considers, however, that the chance of Sir E. Grey's proposal being successful depends essentially on the action which the Berlin Government would be willing to take at Vienna. Representations made to the Austrian-Hungarian Government for the purpose of bringing about a suspension of military operations would seem bound to fail unless the German Government do not beforehand exercise their influence on the Vienna Cabinet.

The President of the Council *ad interim* takes the opportunity, &c.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

\* French Ambassador in London.

No. 52.

*Note communicated by French Embassy, July 28, 1914.*

(Translation.)

LE Gouvernement de la République accepte la proposition de Sir Edward Grey relative à une intervention de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France, de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie en vue d'éviter les opérations militaires actives sur les frontières autrichiennes, russes et serbes; il a autorisé M. P. Cambon\* à prendre part aux délibérations de la réunion à quatre, qui doit se tenir à Londres.

L'Ambassadeur de France à Berlin a reçu pour instructions, après s'être concerté avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Berlin, d'appuyer la démarche de ce dernier dans la forme et la mesure qui seraient jugées opportunes.

M. Viviani† est prêt à envoyer aux représentants français à Vienne, Saint-

THE Government of the Republic accept Sir Edward Grey's proposal in regard to intervention by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy with a view to avoiding active military operations on the frontiers of Austria, Russia, and Servia; and they have authorised M. P. Cambon\* to take part in the deliberations of the four representatives at the meeting which is to be held in London.

The French Ambassador in Berlin has received instructions to consult first the British Ambassador in Berlin, and then to support the action taken by the latter in such manner and degree as may be considered appropriate.

M. Viviani is ready to send to the representatives of France in Vienna,

\* French Ambassador in London.

† French Minister for Foreign Affairs.



Pétersbourg et Belgrade des instructions dans le sens suggéré par le Gouvernement britannique.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,  
le 27 juillet, 1914.*

St. Petersburg, and Belgrade instructions in the sense suggested by the British Government.

*French Embassy, July 27, 1914.*

No. 53.

*M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.—(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28.)*

*Saint-Pétersbourg,  
le 14 (27) juillet, 1914.*

(Télégraphique.)

L'AMBASSADEUR d'Angleterre est venu s'informer si nous jugeons utile que l'Angleterre prenne l'initiative de convoquer à Londres une conférence des représentants de l'Angleterre, la France, l'Allemagne et l'Italie, pour étudier une issue à la situation actuelle.

J'ai répondu à l'Ambassadeur que j'ai entamé des pourparlers avec l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie, en conditions que j'espère favorables. Pourtant je n'ai pas encore reçu de réponse à la proposition que j'ai faite d'une revision de la note entre les deux Cabinets.

Si des explications directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne se trouvaient irréalisables, je suis prêt à accepter la proposition anglaise, ou toute autre de nature à résoudre favorablement le conflit.

Je voudrais pourtant écarter dès aujourd'hui un malentendu qui pourrait surgir de la réponse donnée par le Ministre de la Justice français à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, concernant des conseils de modération à donner au Cabinet Impérial.

(Translation.)

*St. Petersburg,  
July 27, 1914.*

(Telegraphic.)

THE British Ambassador came to ascertain whether we think it desirable that Great Britain should take the initiative in convoking a conference in London of the representatives of England, France, Germany, and Italy to examine the possibility of a way out of the present situation.

I replied to the Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which, I hope, may be favourable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets.

If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove impossible, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favourable solution of the conflict.

I wish, however, to put an end from this day forth to a misunderstanding which might arise from the answer given by the French Minister of Justice to the German Ambassador, regarding counsels of moderation to be given to the Imperial Cabinet.

No. 54.

*M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.—(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28, 1914.)*

*Saint-Pétersbourg,  
le 15 (28) juillet, 1914.*

(Télégraphique.)

MES entretiens avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne confirment mon impression que l'Allemagne est plutôt favorable à l'intransigeance de l'Autriche.

Le Cabinet de Berlin, qui aurait pu arrêter tout le développement de la crise, paraît n'exercer aucune action sur son alliée.

L'Ambassadeur trouve insuffisante la réponse de la Serbie.

(Translation.)

*St. Petersburg,*

(Telegraphic.) *July 15 (28), 1914.*

MY interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favour of the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria.

The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exerting no influence on their ally.

The Ambassador considers that the Servian reply is insufficient.

Cette attitude allemande est tout particulièrement alarmante.

Il me semble que mieux que toute autre Puissance l'Angleterre serait en mesure de tenter encore d'agir à Berlin pour engager le Gouvernement allemand à l'action nécessaire. C'est à Berlin qu'indubitablement se trouve la clef de la situation.

This attitude of the German Government is most alarming.

It seems to me that England is in a better position than any other Power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.

No. 55.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

WITH reference to my telegram of yesterday,\* I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon and found him very conciliatory and more optimistic.

He would, he said, use all his influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to Austria, but her territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign State respected, so that she should not become Austria's vassal. He did not know whether Austria would accept friendly exchange of views which he had proposed, but, if she did, he wished to keep in close contact with the other Powers throughout the conversations that would ensue.

He again referred to the fact that the obligations undertaken by Servia in 1908, alluded to in the Austrian ultimatum, were given to the Powers.

I asked if he had heard of your proposal with regard to conference of the four Powers, and on his replying in the affirmative, I told him confidentially of your instructions to me, and enquired whether instead of such a conference he would prefer a direct exchange of views, which he had proposed. The German Ambassador, to whom I had just spoken, had expressed his personal opinion that a direct exchange of views would be more agreeable to Austria-Hungary.

His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the Powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place.

\* See No. 44.

No. 56.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 27, 1914.*

THE Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversation with Baron Macchio, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told him that, having just come back from St. Petersburg, he was well acquainted with the views of the Russian Government and the state of Russian public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out with Servia it would be impossible to localise it, for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that something would be done before Servia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been the aggressors. The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place, and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satisfactory conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had yesterday with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg. The former had agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia had been perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had practically reached an understanding as to

the guarantees which Serbia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behaviour. The Russian Ambassador urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be furnished with full powers to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to advise Serbia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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## No. 57.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 27, 1914.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs greatly doubts whether Germany will be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the conference, but he had hopes that military action may be practically deferred by the fact of the conference meeting at once. As at present informed, he sees no possibility of Austria receding from any point laid down in her note to Serbia, but he believes that if Serbia will even now accept it Austria will be satisfied, and if she had reason to think that such will be the advice of the Powers, Austria may defer action. Serbia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone.

Telegrams from Vienna to the press here stating that Austria is favourably impressed with the declarations of the Italian Government have, the Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me, no foundation. He said he has expressed no opinion to Austria with regard to the note. He assured me both before and after communication of the note, and again to-day, that Austrian Government have given him assurances that they demand no territorial sacrifices from Serbia.

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## No. 58.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 28, 1914.

I COMMUNICATED to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon the substance of your conversation with the German Ambassador, recorded in your telegram\* to Berlin of the 27th July.

His Excellency is grateful for the communication. He said that it confirms what he had heard of your attitude, and he feels confident that your observations to the German Ambassador will have a good effect in the interest of peace.

\* See No. 46.

## No. 59.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 28, 1914.

I INFORMED the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day of your conversation with the Russian Ambassador, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday\* to St. Petersburg.

He is grateful for the communication, and quite appreciates the impossibility for His Majesty's Government to declare themselves "solidaires" with Russia on a question between Austria and Serbia, which in its present condition is not one affecting England. He also sees that you cannot take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna more Servian than that attributed in German and Austrian sources to the Russian Government.

German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect the integrity of Serbia, but when asked whether her independence also would be respected, he gave no assurance.

\* See No. 47.



## No. 60.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

SECRETARY of State spoke yesterday in the same sense as that reported in my telegram of yesterday\* to my French and Italian colleagues respecting your proposal. I discussed with my two colleagues this morning his reply, and we found that, while refusing the proposed conference, he had said to all of us that nevertheless he desired to work with us for the maintenance of general peace. We therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can only be objecting to the form of your proposal. Perhaps he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us.

\* See No. 43.

## No. 61.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I SAW Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.

His Excellency declared that Austria-Hungary cannot delay warlike proceedings against Serbia, and would have to decline any suggestion of negotiations on basis of Servian reply.

Prestige of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent conflict.

## No. 62.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I SPOKE to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of your telegram of 27th July\* to Berlin. I avoided the word "mediation," but said that, as mentioned in your speech,† which he had just read to me, you had hopes that conversations in London between the four Powers less interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian Government would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had regarded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary; that you thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war would be declared to-day, and that well-known pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not now be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to complications threatening the peace of Europe.

In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that, if in the course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes differ from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the many just complaints which Austria-Hungary had against Serbia, but from the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with Serbia, you were anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandisement and which could no longer be postponed.

\* See No. 46.

† "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Columns 931, 932, 933.

No. 63.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 28, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 25th July to Paris.\*

I have communicated substance to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who immediately telegraphed in precisely similar terms to Berlin and Vienna.

\* See No. 27.

No. 64.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 28, 1914.

AT the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I submit the following to you:—

In a long conversation this morning Servian Chargé d'Affaires had said he thought that if some explanations were given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene under article 5 and article 6, Serbia might still accept the whole Austrian note.

As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give such explanations to Serbia, they might be given to Powers engaged in discussions, who might then advise Serbia to accept without conditions.

The Austro-Hungarian Government had in the meantime published a long official explanation of grounds on which Servian reply was considered inadequate. Minister for Foreign Affairs considered many points besides explanation—such as slight verbal difference in sentence regarding renunciation of propaganda—quite childish, but there was a passage which might prove useful in facilitating such a course as was considered practicable by the Servian Chargé d'Affaires. It was stated that co-operation of Austrian agents in Serbia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures. Serbia was said to have wilfully misinterpreted this. He thought, therefore, that ground might be cleared here.

I only reproduce from memory, as I had not yet received text of Austrian declaration.

Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for the immediate beginning of discussion. A wide general latitude to accept at once every point or suggestion on which he could be in agreement with ourselves and Germany had been given to Italian Ambassador.

No. 65.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to*  
*Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Nish, July 28, 1914.

I HAVE urged on the Servian Government the greatest moderation pending efforts being made towards a peaceful solution.

Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged, and two Servian merchant-vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova.

No. 66.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to*  
*Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Nish, July 28, 1914.

TELEGRAM received here that war declared by Austria.

No. 67.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.

EXPLANATION given in your telegram of the 27th July\* of what was my idea in proposing a conference is quite right. It would not be an arbitration,

\* See No. 43.

but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settlement. No suggestion would be put forward that had not previously been ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom the mediating Powers could easily keep in touch through their respective allies.

But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely agree that it is the most preferable method of all.

I understand that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed a friendly exchange of views to the Austrian Government, and, if the latter accepts, it will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical.

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.\*

\* See No. 46.

No. 68.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.*

GERMAN Government, having accepted principle of mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, if necessary, I am ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied. I will, however, keep the idea in reserve until we see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress.

No. 69.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.*

IT is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct exchange of views between the Russian and Austrian Governments, as reported in your telegram of the 27th July.

I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would facilitate this, but I am not quite clear as to what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes the Ministers at Belgrade should do. Could he not first mention in an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to co-operate in some such scheme? It might then take more concrete shape.

\* See No. 55.

No. 70.

*Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London, July 29, 1914.*

(1.) *Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, dated July 28, 1914.*

IN consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Serbia, the Imperial Government will announce to-morrow (29th) the mobilisation in the military circumscriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan. Please inform German Government, confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive intention against Germany.

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post.

(2) *Telegram to Count Benckendorff.\**

The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end to the idea of direct communications between Austria and Russia. Action by London Cabinet in order to set on foot mediation with a view to suspension of military operations of Austria against Serbia is now most urgent.

Unless military operations are stopped, mediation would only allow matters to drag on and give Austria time to crush Serbia.

\* Russian Ambassador in London.

## No. 71.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

At invitation of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his Excellency this evening. He said that he wished me to tell you that he was most anxious that Germany should work together with England for maintenance of general peace, as they had done successfully in the last European crisis. He had not been able to accept your proposal for a conference of representatives of the Great Powers, because he did not think that it would be effective, and because such a conference would in his opinion have had appearance of an "Areopagus" consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining Powers; but his inability to accept the proposed conference must not be regarded as militating against his strong desire for effective co-operation. You could be assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and St. Petersburg to get the two Governments to discuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussions would take place and lead to a satisfactory result, but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilised fourteen army corps in the south, he thought situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilising, would have to take similar measures, and if war were to result, Russia would be entirely responsible. I ventured to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian note, which, to my mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded by Austria, and which in any case offered a basis for discussion, surely a certain portion of responsibility would rest with her. His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do. He reiterated his desire to co-operate with England and his intention to do his utmost to maintain general peace. "A war between the Great Powers must be avoided" were his last words.

Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here.

## No. 72.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—*(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank you for the language you had held to the German Ambassador, as reported in your telegram\* to Berlin, substance of which I communicated to his Excellency. He took a pessimistic view of the situation, having received the same disquieting news from Vienna as had reached His Majesty's Government. I said it was important that we should know the real intentions of the Imperial Government, and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurances which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect of Servia's integrity and independence. I added that I was sure any arrangement for averting a European war would be welcomed by His Majesty's Government. In reply his Excellency stated that if Servia were attacked Russia would not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points, and that order for mobilisation against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria crossed Servian frontier.

I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to give moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from the beginning I had not ceased to do so, and that the German Ambassador at Vienna should now in his turn use his restraining influence. I made it clear to his Excellency that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted if Servia were attacked by Austria.

\* See No. 46.

As regards the suggestion of conference, the Ambassador had received no instructions, and before acting with me the French and Italian Ambassadors are still waiting for their final instructions.

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## No. 73.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. —*  
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I HAVE received *note verbale* from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that, the Servian Government not having replied to note of 23rd July\* in a satisfactory manner, Imperial and Royal Government is compelled itself to provide for protection of its rights, and to have recourse for that object to force of arms. Austria-Hungary has addressed to Servia formal declaration according to article 1 of convention of 18th October, 1907, relative to opening of hostilities, and considers herself from to-day in state of war with Servia. Austria-Hungary will conform, provided Servia does so, to stipulations of Hague conventions of 18th October, 1907, and to Declaration of London of 26th February, 1909

\* See No. 4.

## No. 74.

*Sr M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. —*  
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I AM informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Russian Government's suggestion has been declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government. The suggestion was to the effect that the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict should be discussed directly between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who should be authorised accordingly.

The Russian Ambassador thinks that a conference in London of the less interested Powers, such as you have proposed, offers now the only prospect of preserving peace of Europe, and he is sure that the Russian Government will acquiesce willingly in your proposal. So long as opposing armies have not actually come in contact, all hope need not be abandoned.

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## No. 75.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —*  
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I WAS sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, who told me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late to act upon your suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion. His Excellency had, on receiving their reply, despatched a message to Vienna, in which he explained that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been shown in the Servian reply to meet the demands of Austria, he understood entirely that, without some sure guarantees that Servia would carry out in their entirety the demands made upon her, the Austro-Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in view of their past experience. He had then gone on to say that the hostilities which were about to be undertaken against Servia had presumably the exclusive object of securing such guarantees, seeing that the Austrian Government already assured the Russian Government that they had no territorial designs.

He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be correct, to speak openly in this sense. The holding of such language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible misunderstandings.

As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna.

From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving advice at



Vienna, his Excellency hoped that you would realise that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of European complications.

The fact of his communicating this information to you was a proof of the confidence which he felt in you and evidence of his anxiety that you should know he was doing his best to support your efforts in the cause of general peace, efforts which he sincerely appreciated.

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## No. 76.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I FOUND Secretary of State very depressed to-day. He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a *fait accompli*. This had, in fact, now happened, and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that Serbia's reply offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of war. He was much troubled by reports of mobilisation in Russia, and of certain military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in France. He subsequently spoke of these measures to my French colleague, who informed him that French Government had done nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled officers on leave. His Excellency denied German Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is true. My French colleague said to Under-Secretary of State, in course of conversation, that it seemed to him that when Austria had entered Serbia, and so satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favourable for four disinterested Powers to discuss situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver complications. Under-Secretary of State seemed to think idea worthy of consideration, as he replied that would be a different matter from conference proposed by you.

Russian Ambassador returned to-day, and has informed Imperial Government that Russia is mobilising in four southern governments.

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## No. 77.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

I MUCH appreciate the language of Chancellor, as reported in your telegram of to-day.\* His Excellency may rely upon it that this country will continue, as heretofore, to strain every effort to secure peace and to avert the calamity we all fear. If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to his Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe

\* See No. 75.

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## No. 78.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—*(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.

PARTIAL mobilisation was ordered to-day.

I communicated the substance of your telegram of the 28th instant\* to Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance with your instructions, and informed him confidentially of remarks as to mobilisation which the German Secretary of State had made to the British Ambassador at Berlin. This had already reached his Excellency from another source. The mobilisation, he explained, would only be directed against Austria.

Austrian Government had now definitely declined direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had proposed such an exchange of views on advice of German Ambassador. He proposed, when informing German Ambassador of this refusal of Austria's,

\* See No. 67.

to urge that a return should be made to your proposal for a conference of four Ambassadors, or, at all events, for an exchange of views between the three Ambassadors less directly interested, yourself, and also the Austrian Ambassador if you thought it advisable. Any arrangement approved by France and England would be acceptable to him, and he did not care what form such conversations took. No time was to be lost, and the only way to avert war was for you to succeed in arriving, by means of conversations with Ambassadors either collectively or individually, at some formula which Austria could be induced to accept. Throughout Russian Government had been perfectly frank and conciliatory, and had done all in their power to maintain peace. If their efforts to maintain peace failed, he trusted that it would be realised by the British public that it was not the fault of the Russian Government.

I asked him whether he would raise objections if the suggestion made in Rome telegram of the 27th July,\* which I mentioned to him, were carried out. In reply his Excellency said that he would agree to anything arranged by the four Powers provided it was acceptable to Servia; he could not, he said, be more Servian than Servia. Some supplementary statement or explanations would, however, have to be made in order to tone down the sharpness of the ultimatum.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram of the 28th instant† was one of secondary importance. Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it. Further, the German Ambassador had informed his Excellency, so the latter told me, that his Government were continuing at Vienna to exert friendly influence. I fear that the German Ambassador will not help to smooth matters over, if he uses to his own Government the same language as he did to me to-day. He accused the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilisation, and said, when I referred to all that had been recently done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters. I called his attention to the fact that Austrian consuls had warned all Austrian subjects liable to military service to join the colours, that Austria had already partially mobilised, and had now declared war on Servia. From what had passed during the Balkan crisis she knew that this act was one which it was impossible without humiliation for Russia to submit to. Had not Russia by mobilising shown that she was in earnest, Austria would have traded on Russia's desire for peace, and would have believed that she could go to any lengths. Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier immediately, and a week or more would, in any case, elapse before mobilisation was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work together.

\* See No. 57.

† See No. 69.

#### No. 79

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

THERE is at present no step which we could usefully take to stop war with Servia, to which Austro-Hungarian Government are now fully committed by the Emperor's appeal to his people which has been published this morning, and by the declaration of war. French and Italian Ambassadors agree with me in this view. If the Austro-Hungarian Government would convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which has been made at St Petersburg to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence of Servia nor to acquire Servian territory, the Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might be induced to remain quiet. This, however, the Italian Ambassador is convinced the Austrian Government would refuse to do.

No. 80.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 29, 1914.

IN your telegram of the 27th instant\* to Berlin, German Ambassador was reported to have accepted in principle the idea of a conference. This is in contradiction with the telegram of the 27th instant† from Berlin.

Information received by the Italian Government from Berlin shows that German view is correctly represented in Sir E. Goschen's telegram of the 27th July,† but what creates difficulty is rather the "conference," so the Minister for Foreign Affairs understands, than the principle. He is going to urge, in a telegram which he is sending to Berlin to-night, adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in London. He suggests that the German Secretary of State might propose a formula acceptable to his Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that this exchange of views would keep the door open if direct communication between Vienna and St. Petersburg fails to have any result. He thinks that this exchange of views might be concomitant with such direct communication.

The German Government are also being informed that the Italian Government would not be pardoned by public opinion here unless they had taken every possible step so as to avoid war. He is urging that the German Government must lend their co-operation in this.

He added that there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France he thought it would have a great effect.

Even should it prove impossible to induce Germany to take part, he would still advocate that England and Italy, each as representing one group, should continue to exchange views.

\* See No. 46.

† See No. 43.

No. 81.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday.\*

It is impossible for me to initiate discussions with Ambassadors here, as I understand from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria will not accept any discussion on basis of Servian note, and the inference of all I have heard from Vienna and Berlin is that Austria will not accept any form of mediation by the Powers as between Austria and Servia. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs must therefore speak at Berlin and Vienna. I shall be glad if a favourable reception is given to any suggestions he can make there.

\* See No. 64.

No. 82.

*Mr. Beaumont, British Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, to Sir Edward Grey.—* (Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, July 29, 1914.

I UNDERSTAND that the designs of Austria may extend considerably beyond the sanjak and a punitive occupation of Servian territory. I gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador here, who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonica under Greek administration and of the assistance on which the Austrian army could count from Mussulman population discontented with Servian rule.



No. 83.

*Mr Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Nish, July 29, 1914.

I HAVE been requested by Prime Minister to convey to you expression of his deep gratitude for the statement which you made on the 27th instant in the House of Commons

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No. 84.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

THE German Ambassador has been instructed by the German Chancellor to inform me that he is endeavouring to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and he hopes with good success. Austria and Russia seem to be in constant touch, and he is endeavouring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburg the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings in Servia. I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. I would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, but my information this morning was that the Austrian Government have declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be authorised to discuss directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict. The press correspondents at St. Petersburg had been told that Russian Government would mobilise. The German Government had said that they were favourable in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if necessary. They seemed to think the particular method of conference, consultation or discussion, or even conversations *à quatre* in London too formal a method. I urged that the German Government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the button" in the interests of peace.

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No. 85.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I WAS asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise.

It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire.

In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.

Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated the contents of your telegram of to-day\* to his Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you.

\* See No. 77.

No. 86.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 29, 1914:

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs thinks that moment is past for any further discussions on basis of Servian note, in view of communication made to-day by Russia at Berlin regarding partial mobilisation. The utmost he now hopes for is that Germany may use her influence at Vienna to prevent or moderate any further demands on Servia.

No. 87.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir,

AFTER telling M. Cambon\* to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon\* that I thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky† not

\* French Ambassador in London.

† German Ambassador in London.

to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.

I am, &c.,  
E. GREY.

No. 88.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

Sir,

I TOLD the German Ambassador this afternoon of the information that I had received, that Russia had informed Germany respecting her mobilisation. I also told him of the communication made by Count Benckendorff,\* that the Austrian declaration of war manifestly rendered vain any direct conversations between Russia and Austria. I said that the hope built upon those direct conversations by the German Government yesterday had disappeared to-day. To-day the German Chancellor was working in the interest of mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg. If he succeeded, well and good. If not, it was more important than ever that Germany should take up what I had suggested to the German Ambassador this morning, and propose some method by which the four Powers should be able to work together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed out, however, that the Russian Government, while desirous of mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military operations against Servia should be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only drag on matters, and give Austria time to crush Servia. It was, of course, too late for all military operations against Servia to be suspended. In a short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation of some Servian territory. But even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from Servia, stated that she would not advance further, pending an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and Russia.

The German Ambassador said that he had already telegraphed to Berlin what I had said to him this morning.

I am, &c.,  
E. GREY.

\* Russian Ambassador in London.

No. 89.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

Sir,

AFTER speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our

conversation—which I hoped would continue—into thinking that we should stand aside.

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew very well, that if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation.

I am, &c.,  
E. GREY.

No. 90.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

IN addition to what passed with the German Ambassador this morning, as recorded in my telegram of the 29th July\* to your Excellency, I gave the Ambassador a copy of Sir Rennell Rodd's† telegram of the 28th July‡ and of my reply to it.§ I said I had begun to doubt whether even a complete acceptance of the Austrian demands by Servia would now satisfy Austria. But there appeared, from what the Marquis di San Giuliano¶ had said, to be a method by which, if the Powers were allowed to have any say in the matter, they might bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only the latter would give them an opportunity. I could, however, make no proposal, for the reasons I have given in my telegram to you, and could only give what the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the German Ambassador for information, as long as it was understood that Austria would accept no discussion with the Powers over her dispute with Servia. As to mediation between Austria and Russia, I said it could not take the form simply of urging Russia to stand on one side while Austria had a free hand to go to any length she pleased. That would not be mediation, it would simply be putting pressure upon Russia in the interests of Austria. The German Ambassador said the view of the German Government was that Austria could not by force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a Great Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliating Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the humiliation of others. There must, of course, be some humiliation of Servia, but Austria might press things so far as to involve the humiliation of Russia.

The German Ambassador said that Austria would not take Servian territory, as to which I observed that, by taking territory while leaving nominal Servian independence, Austria might turn Servia practically into a vassal State, and this would affect the whole position of Russia in the Balkans.

I observed that when there was danger of European conflict it was impossible to say who would not be drawn into it. Even the Netherlands apparently were taking precautions.

The German Ambassador said emphatically that some means must be found of preserving the peace of Europe.

I am, &c.,  
E. GREY.

\* See No. 84.

§ See No. 81.

† British Ambassador in Rome.

¶ Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

‡ See No. 64.

## No. 91.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

THE Austrian Ambassador told me to-day he had ready a long memorandum, which he proposed to leave, and which he said gave an account of the conduct of Serbia towards Austria, and an explanation of how necessary the Austrian action was.

I said that I did not wish to discuss the merits of the question between Austria and Serbia. The news to-day seemed to me very bad for the peace of Europe. The Powers were not allowed to help in getting satisfaction for Austria, which they might get if they were given an opportunity, and European peace was at stake.

Count Mensdorff\* said that the war with Serbia must proceed. Austria could not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilising again and again, as she had been obliged to do in recent years. She had no idea of territorial aggrandisement, and all she wished was to make sure that her interests were safeguarded.

I said that it would be quite possible, without nominally interfering with the independence of Serbia or taking away any of her territory, to turn her into a sort of vassal State.

Count Mensdorff\* deprecated this.

In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that the Austrian action might have upon the Russian position in the Balkans, he said that, before the Balkan war, Serbia had always been regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence.

I am, &c.,  
E. GREY.

\* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

## No. 92.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

THE Italian Ambassador made to me to-day a communication from the Marquis di San Giuliano\* suggesting that the German objections to the mediation of the four Powers, a mediation that was strongly favoured by Italy, might be removed by some change in the form of procedure.

I said that I had already anticipated this by asking the German Government to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle, could be applied.

I am, &c.,  
E. GREY.

\* Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

## No. 93.

*Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London, July 30, 1914.*

(1.)

*Russian Ambassador at Vienna to M. Sazonof.\**

*Vienna,  
le 15 (28) juillet, 1914.*

(Translation.)  
*Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914.*

(Télégraphique.)

J'AI entretenu aujourd'hui le Comte Berchtold† dans le sens des instructions de votre Excellence. Je lui fis

(Telegraphic.)

I SPOKE to Count Berchtold† to-day in the sense of your Excellency's instructions. I brought to his notice.

\* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

observer, en termes les plus amicaux, combien il était désirable de trouver une solution qui, en consolidant les bons rapports entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, donnerait à la Monarchie austro-hongroise des garanties sérieuses pour ses rapports futurs avec la Serbie.

J'attirais l'attention du Comte Berchtold\* sur tous les dangers pour la paix de l'Europe, qu'entraînerait un conflit armé entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie.

Le Comte Berchtold\* me répondit qu'il se rendait parfaitement compte du sérieux de la situation et des avantages d'une franche explication avec le Cabinet de Saint-Petersbourg. Il me dit que d'un autre côté le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, qui ne s'était décidé que très mal volontiers aux mesures énergiques qu'il avait prises contre la Serbie, ne pouvait plus ni reculer, ni entrer en discussion au- cune des termes de la note austro-hongroise.

Le Comte Berchtold\* ajouta que la crise était devenue si aigue, et que l'excitation de l'opinion publique avait atteint tel degré, que le Gouvernement, le voulait-il, ne pouvait plus y consentir, d'autant moins, me dit-il, que la réponse même de la Serbie donne la preuve du manque de sincérité de ses promesses pour l'avenir.

in the most friendly manner, how desirable it was to find a solution which, while consolidating good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, would give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy genuine guarantees for its future relations with Serbia.

I drew Count Berchtold's\* attention to all the dangers to the peace of Europe which would be involved by an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

Count Berchtold\* replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburg Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, who had only decided much against their will on the energetic measures which they had taken against Serbia, could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.

Count Berchtold\* added that the crisis had become so acute, and that public opinion had risen to such a pitch of excitement, that the Government, even if they wished it, could no longer consent to such a course. This was all the more impossible, he said, inas- much as the Serbian reply itself furnished proof of the insincerity of Serbia's promises for the future.

\* *Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(2.)

*M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.*

*Saint-Petersbourg,  
le 16 (29) juillet, 1914.*

*St. Petersburg,  
July 16 (29), 1914.*

(Télégraphique.)

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'in- forme, au nom du Chancelier, que l'Allemagne n'a pas cessé d'exercer à Vienne une influence modératrice et qu'elle continuera cette action même après la déclaration de guerre. Jusqu'à ce matin il n'y avait aucune nouvelle que les armées autrichiennes aient franchi la frontière serbe. J'ai prié l'Ambassadeur de transmettre au Chancelier mes remerciements pour la teneur amicale de cette communi- cation. Je l'ai informé des mesures mili- taires prises par la Russie, dont au- cune, lui dis-je, n'était dirigée contre l'Allemagne; j'ajoutais qu'elles ne pré- jugeaient pas non plus des mesures agressives contre l'Autriche-Hongrie,

(Telegraphic.)

THE German Ambassador informs me, in the name of the Chancellor, that Germany has not ceased to exercise a moderating influence at Vienna, and that she will continue to do so even after the declaration of war. Up to this morning there had been no news that the Austrian army has crossed the Serbian frontier. I have begged the Ambassador to express my thanks to the Chancellor for the friendly tenor of this communication. I have informed him of the military measures taken by Russia, none of which, I told him, were directed against Germany; I added that neither should they be taken as aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary, their explanation



ces mesures s'expliquant par la mobilisation de la plus grande partie de l'armée austro-hongroise.

L'Ambassadeur se prononçant en faveur d'explications directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne et nous, je répondis que j'y étais tout disposé, pour peu que les conseils du Cabinet de Berlin dont il parlait trouvent écho à Vienne.

En même temps je signalais que nous étions tout disposés à accepter le projet d'une conférence des quatre Puissances, un projet auquel, paraissait-il, l'Allemagne ne sympathisait pas entièrement.

Je dis que, dans mon opinion, le meilleur moyen pour mettre à profit tous les moyens propres à produire une solution pacifique, consisterait en une action parallèle des pourparlers d'une conférence à quatre de l'Allemagne, de la France, de l'Angleterre et de l'Italie et d'un contact direct entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, à l'instar à peu près de ce qui avait eu lieu aux moments les plus critiques de la crise de l'an dernier.

Je dis à l'Ambassadeur qu'après les concessions faites par la Serbie, un terrain de compromis pour les questions restées ouvertes ne serait pas très difficile à trouver, à condition toutefois de quelque bonne volonté de la part de l'Autriche et à condition que toutes les Puissances usent de toute leur influence dans un sens de conciliation.

being the mobilisation of the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian army.

The Ambassador said that he was in favour of direct explanations between the Austrian Government and ourselves, and I replied that I, too, was quite willing, provided that the advice of the German Government, to which he had referred, found an echo at Vienna.

I said at the same time that we were quite ready to accept the proposal for a conference of the four Powers, a proposal with which, apparently, Germany was not in entire sympathy.

I told him that, in my opinion, the best manner of turning to account the most suitable methods of finding a peaceful solution would be by arranging for parallel discussions to be carried on by a conference of the four Powers—Germany, France, England, and Italy—and by a direct exchange of views between Austria-Hungary and Russia on much the same lines as occurred during the most critical moments of last year's crisis.

I told the Ambassador that, after the concessions which had been made by Servia, it should not be very difficult to find a compromise to settle the other questions which remained outstanding, provided that Austria showed some good-will and that all the Powers used their entire influence in the direction of conciliation.

(3.)

*M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.*

*Saint-Petersbourg,  
le 16 (29) juillet, 1914.*

(Télégraphique.)

Lors de mon entretien avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, dont traite mon télégramme précédent, je n'avais pas encore reçu le télégramme du 15 (28) juillet de M. Schébéko.\*

Le contenu de ce télégramme constitue un refus du Cabinet de Vienne de procéder à un échange d'idées direct avec le Gouvernement Impérial.

Dès lors, il ne nous reste plus qu'à nous en remettre entièrement au Gouvernement britannique pour l'initiative des démarches qu'il jugera utile de provoquer.

*St. Petersburg,  
July 16 (29), 1914.*

(Telegraphic.)

AT the time of my interview with the German Ambassador, dealt with in my preceding telegram, I had not yet received M. Schébéko's\* telegram of the 15th (28th) July.

The contents of this telegram constitute a refusal of the Vienna Cabinet to agree to a direct exchange of views with the Imperial Government.

From now on, nothing remains for us to do but to rely entirely on the British Government to take the initiative in any steps which they may consider advisable.

\* Russian Ambassador at Vienna.

No. 94.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

I LEARN that mobilisation of Russian corps destined to carry out operations on Austrian frontier has been ordered. My informant is Russian Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign Affairs here has realised, though somewhat late in the day, that Russia will not remain indifferent in present crisis. I believe that the news of Russian mobilisation will not be a surprise to the Ministry, but so far it is not generally known in Vienna this evening. Unless mediation, which German Government declared themselves ready to offer in concert with three other Great Powers not immediately interested in the Austro-Servian dispute, be brought to bear forthwith, irrevocable steps may be taken in present temper of this country. German Ambassador feigns surprise that Servian affairs should be of such interest to Russia. Both my Russian and French colleagues have spoken to him to-day. Russian Ambassador expressed the hope that it might still be possible to arrange matters, and explained that it was impossible for Russia to do otherwise than take an interest in the present dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could already at Belgrade to induce Servian Government to meet principal Austrian demands in a favourable spirit; if approached in a proper manner, he thought she would probably go still further in this direction. But she was justly offended at having been completely ignored, and she could not consent to be excluded from the settlement. German Ambassador said that if proposals were put forward which opened any prospect of possible acceptance by both sides, he personally thought that Germany might consent to act as mediator in concert with the three other Powers.

I gather from what Russian Ambassador said to me that he is much afraid of the effect that any serious engagement may have upon Russian public opinion. I gathered, however, that Russia would go a long way to meet Austrian demands on Servia.

No. 95.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

RUSSIAN Ambassador hopes that Russian mobilisation will be regarded by Austria as what it is, viz., a clear intimation that Russia must be consulted regarding the fate of Servia, but he does not know how the Austrian Government are taking it. He says that Russia must have an assurance that Servia will not be crushed, but she would understand that Austria-Hungary is compelled to exact from Servia measures which will secure her Slav provinces from the continuance of hostile propaganda from Servian territory.

The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the German Ambassador at Vienna is instructed to speak seriously to the Austro-Hungarian Government against acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European war.

Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Servian feeling prevalent in Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of peace with entire sincerity.

Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it.

No. 96.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

THE Russian Ambassador gave the French Ambassador and myself this afternoon at the French Embassy, where I happened to be, an account of his



interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he said was quite friendly. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that as Russia had mobilised, Austria must, of course, do the same. This, however, should not be regarded as a threat, but merely as the adoption of military precautions similar to those which had been taken across the frontier. He said he had no objection to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg continuing their conversations, although he did not say that they could be resumed on the basis of the Servian reply.

On the whole, the Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had begun to make his preparations for his departure on the strength of a rumour that Austria would declare war in reply to mobilisation. He now hopes that something may yet be done to prevent war with Austria.

## No. 97.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.*

FRENCH Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. His Excellency said that German Ambassador had told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this might be so, but nevertheless Servia would become an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar circumstances, Bokhara had become a Russian vassal. There would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.

M. Sazonof\* told us that absolute proof was in possession of Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia—more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland.

German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2 A.M., when former completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof\* to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof\* accordingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French, of which following is translation:—

“If Austria, recognising that her conflict with Servia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages to stop all military preparations.”

Preparations for general mobilisation will be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a European war. Excitement here has reached such a pitch that, if Austria refuses to make a concession, Russia cannot hold back, and now that she knows that Germany is arming, she can hardly postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into general mobilisation.

\* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

## No. 98.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

SECRETARY of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's\* telegram recording his last conversation with you he asked Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions from here. He has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian mobilisation against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria-Hungary, who has as yet only mobilised against Servia, will probably find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of

\* German Ambassador in London.

aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace may be preserved.

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view of Russian mobilisation and military measures which he hears are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave—a measure which had been officially taken after, and not before, visit of French ambassador yesterday—Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of military preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when they mobilised they would have to mobilise on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity.

His Excellency added that telegram\* received from Prince Lichnowsky† last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.

He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late last night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course, not have spoken to me in the way he had done.

\* See No. 102.

† German Ambassador in London.

No. 99.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 30, 1914.

PRESIDENT of the Republic tells me that the Russian Government have been informed by the German Government that unless Russia stops her mobilisation Germany would mobilise. But a further report, since received from St. Petersburg, states that the German communication had been modified, and was now a request to be informed on what conditions Russia would consent to demobilisation. The answer given is that she agrees to do so on condition that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the sovereignty of Serbia and submit certain of the demands of the Austrian note, which Serbia has not accepted, to an international discussion.

President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by Austria. He is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present differences between Austria and Serbia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.

I explained to him how difficult it would be for His Majesty's Government to make such an announcement, but he said that he must maintain that it would be in the interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific. She does not desire war, and all that she has done at present is to make preparations for mobilisation so as not to be taken unawares. The French Government will keep His Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done in that way. They have reliable information that the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war. If there were a general war on the Continent it would inevitably draw England into it for the protection of her vital interests. A declaration now of her intention to support France, whose desire it is that peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany from going to war.

No. 100.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 30, 1914.

GERMAN Ambassador told me last night that he thought Germany would be able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands if Serbia could be induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, as soon as the occupation of Belgrade had been accomplished.

I made to his Excellency the personal suggestion that some formula might be devised by Germany which might be acceptable for an exchange of views.

I see, however, that you have already made this suggestion.

## No. 101.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 29th July.\*

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be *ipso facto* improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.

And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.

\* See No. 85.

## No. 102.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

I HAVE warned Prince Lichnowsky\* that Germany must not count upon our standing aside in all circumstances. This is doubtless the substance of the telegram from Prince Lichnowsky\* to German Chancellor, to which reference is made in the last two paragraphs of your telegram of 30th July.†

\* German Ambassador in London.

† See No. 98.

## No. 103.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

GERMAN Ambassador informs me that German Government would endeavour to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further, while Powers endeavoured

to arrange that Serbia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria. Territory occupied would of course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can be obtained, I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides.

Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof,\* as quoted in your telegram of the 30th July,† and fears it cannot be modified; but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that the Powers would examine how Serbia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence.

If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighbouring Servian territory, declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion and suspension of further military preparations, provided that other Powers did the same.

It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

\* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† See No. 97.

No. 104.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

YOU should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir G. Buchanan\* of to-day,† and say that I know that he has been urging Russia not to precipitate a crisis. I hope he may be able to support this last suggestion at St. Petersburg.

\* British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

† See No. 103.

No. 105.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

M. CAMBON\* reminded me to-day of the letter I had written to him two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was seriously threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do. I enclose for convenience of reference copies of the letter in question and of M. Cambon's reply. He said that the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France. He gave me a paper, of which a copy is also enclosed, showing that the German military preparations were more advanced and more on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet done. He anticipated that the aggression would take the form of either a demand that France should cease her preparations, or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things could France admit.

I said that the Cabinet was to meet to-morrow morning, and I would see him again to-morrow afternoon.

I am, &c..

E. GREY.

\* French Ambassador in London.

Enclosure 1 in No. 105.

*Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London.*

My dear Ambassador,

Foreign Office, November 22, 1912.

FROM time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood

that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, &c.,  
E. GREY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 105.

*M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to Sir Edward Grey.*

*L'Ambassade de France,*

*Londres,*

*ce 23 novembre, 1912.*

(Translation.)

*French Embassy, London,*

*November 23, 1912.*

Cher Sir Edward,

PAR votre lettre en date d'hier, 22 novembre, vous m'avez rappelé que, dans ces dernières années, les autorités militaires et navales de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne s'étaient consultées de temps en temps; qu'il avait toujours été entendu que ces consultations ne restreignaient pas la liberté, pour chaque Gouvernement, de décider dans l'avenir s'ils se prêteraient l'un l'autre le concours de leurs forces armées; que, de part et d'autre, ces consultations entre spécialistes n'étaient et ne devaient pas être considérées comme des engagements obligeant nos Gouvernements à agir dans certains cas; que cependant je vous avais fait observer que, si l'un ou l'autre des deux Gouvernements avait de graves raisons d'appréhender une attaque non provoquée de la part d'une tierce Puissance, il deviendrait essentiel de savoir s'il pourrait compter sur l'assistance armée de l'autre.

Votre lettre répond à cette observation, et je suis autorisé à vous déclarer que, dans le cas où l'un de nos deux Gouvernements aurait un motif grave d'appréhender soit l'agression d'une tierce puissance, soit quelque événement menaçant pour la paix générale, ce Gouvernement examinerait immédiatement avec l'autre si les deux Gouvernements doivent agir de concert en vue de prévenir l'agression ou de sauvegarder la paix. Dans ce cas, les

Dear Sir Edward,

YOU reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would de-

deux Gouvernements délibéreraient sur les mesures qu'ils seraient disposés à prendre en commun; si ces mesures comportaient une action, les deux Gouvernements prendraient aussitôt en considération les plans de leurs états majors et décideraient alors de la suite qui devrait être donnée à ces plans.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,

PAUL CAMBON.

liberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common; if those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours, &c.,

PAUL CAMBON.

Enclosure 3 in No. 105.

*French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London*

(Translation.)

L'ARMÉE allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes-frontières, hier; par deux fois des patrouilles allemandes ont pénétré sur notre territoire. Nos avant-postes sont en retraite à 10 kilom. en arrière de la frontière. Les populations ainsi abandonnées à l'attaque de l'armée adverse protestent; mais le Gouvernement tient à montrer à l'opinion publique et au Gouvernement britannique que l'agresseur ne sera en aucun cas la France. Tout le 16<sup>e</sup> Corps de Metz renforcé par une partie du 8<sup>e</sup> venu de Trèves et de Cologne occupe la frontière de Metz au Luxembourg. Le 15<sup>e</sup> Corps d'Armées de Strasbourg a serré sur la frontière. Sous menace d'être fusillés les Alsaciens-Lorrains des pays annexés ne peuvent pas passer la frontière; des réservistes par dizaines de milliers sont rappelés en Allemagne; c'est le dernier stade avant la mobilisation. or, nous n'avons rappelé aucun réserviste.

Comme vous le voyez, l'Allemagne l'a fait. J'ajoute que toutes nos informations concordent pour montrer que les préparatifs allemands ont commencé samedi,\* le jour même de la remise de la note autrichienne.

Ces éléments, ajoutés à ceux contenus dans mon télégramme d'hier, vous permettent de faire la preuve au Gouvernement britannique de la volonté pacifique de l'un et des intentions agressives de l'autre.

THE German Army had its advance-posts on our frontiers yesterday, German patrols twice penetrated on to our territory. Our advance-posts are withdrawn to a distance of 10 kilom. from the frontier. The local population is protesting against being thus abandoned to the attack of the enemy's army, but the Government wishes to make it clear to public opinion and to the British Government that in no case will France be the aggressor. The whole 16th corps from Metz, reinforced by a part of the 8th from Treves and Cologne, is occupying the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg side. The 15th army corps from Strasbourg has closed up on the frontier. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are prevented by the threat of being shot from crossing the frontier. Reservists have been called back to Germany by tens of thousands. This is the last stage before mobilisation, whereas we have not called back a single reservist.

As you see, Germany has done so. I would add that all my information goes to show that the German preparations began on Saturday,\* the very day on which the Austrian note was handed in.

These facts, added to those contained in my telegram of yesterday, will enable you to prove to the British Government the pacific intentions of the one party and the aggressive intentions of the other.

\* Sic in original. The actual date of the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum was, in fact, Thursday, July 23. The Servian reply was dated Saturday, July 25, and it is clearly to the latter document that reference is intended.

No. 106.

*Sir R. Kodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—*

*(Received July 31.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 30, 1914.

I LEARNED from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me this evening, that the Austrian Government had declined to continue the direct



exchange of views with the Russian Government. But he had reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us.

He said he was télégraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange of views between the four Powers should be resumed in any form which Austria would consider acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she would demand from Serbia, and give a guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence nor annex territory. It would be useless to ask for anything less than was contained in the Austrian ultimatum, and Germany would support no proposal that might imply non-success for Austria. We might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once. There was still time so long as Austria had received no check. He in any case was in favour of continuing an exchange of views with His Majesty's Government if the idea of discussions between the four Powers was impossible.

No. 107.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.  
(Received July 31.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

I DO not know whether you have received a reply from the German Government to the communication\* which you made to them through the German Ambassador in London asking whether they could suggest any method by which the four Powers could use their mediating influence between Russia and Austria. I was informed last night that they had not had time to send an answer yet. To-day, in reply to an enquiry from the French Ambassador as to whether the Imperial Government had proposed any course of action, the Secretary of State said that he had felt that time would be saved by communicating with Vienna direct, and that he had asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what would satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been returned.

The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the button" as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise.

\* See No. 84.

No. 108.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received July 31.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

CHANCELLOR informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilisation against Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his country defenceless while time was being utilised by other Powers; and if, as he learns is the case, military measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible for him to remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite possible that in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the German Government would take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to have an audience with the Emperor.

His Excellency added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request.

No. 109.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

I READ to the Chancellor this morning your answer to his appeal for British neutrality in the event of war, as contained in your telegram of yesterday.\* His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram, that he received your communication without comment. He asked me to let him have the message that I had just read to him as a memorandum, as he would like to reflect upon it before giving an answer, and his mind was so full of grave matters that he could not be certain of remembering all its points. I therefore handed to him the text of your message on the understanding that it should be regarded merely as a record of conversation, and not as an official document.

His Excellency agreed.

\* See No. 101.

No. 110.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*  
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I LEARN from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions by the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg has also been instructed that he may converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explanations about the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and discuss suggestions and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations. If the Russian Government object to the Austrians mobilising eight army corps, it might be pointed out that this is not too great a number against 400,000 Serbians.

The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Government to show goodwill in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations.

It is with great satisfaction that I have learnt that discussions are being resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will encourage them.

I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Serbia.

No. 111.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I HOPE that the conversations which are now proceeding between Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling-block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Serbian assurances, and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Serbia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburg, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Serbia, provided that they did not impair Serbian sovereignty and the integrity of Serbian territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Serbian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course suspend further military operations or preparations.

You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal.



I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in.

You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State as to proposal above.

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No. 112.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

ACCORDING to information just received by German Government from their Ambassador at St. Petersburg, whole Russian army and fleet are being mobilised. Chancellor tells me that "Kriegsgefahr"\* will be proclaimed at once by German Government, as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilisation is directed. Mobilisation would follow almost immediately. His Excellency added in explanation that "Kriegsgefahr"\* signified the taking of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained relations with a foreign country.

This news from St. Petersburg, added his Excellency, seemed to him to put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany must certainly prepare for all emergencies.

I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter.

\* "Imminence of War."

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No. 113.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—* (Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

It has been decided to issue orders for general mobilisation.

This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Serbia.

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.

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No. 114.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and*  
*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I STILL trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilisation in Germany it becomes essential to His Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government are prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it.

A similar request is being addressed to German (French) Government. It is important to have an early answer.

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No. 115.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

IN view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked French and German Governments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power.

You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of their power their neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe.

You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired.

No. 116.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I HAVE received your telegram of yesterday's date.\*

Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directly involving France, whereas in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers.

I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality.

We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's Government to reconsider this decision.

I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at the present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situation again directly there is a new development.

\* See No. 99.

No. 117.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 31, 1914.

AT 7 o'clock this evening I was sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs. When I arrived the German Ambassador was leaving his Excellency.

German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of the fact that orders had been given for the total mobilisation of Russian army and fleet, German Government have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the Russian Government required that Russian forces should be demobilised.

The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total mobilisation of the German army on the Russian and French frontiers if within twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply with German demand.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to you, and enquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England.

German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours terminates. He is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 p.m. in order to receive the French Government's answer as to the attitude they will adopt in the circumstances.

He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports.

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that he is not aware of any general mobilisation of the Russian forces having taken place.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 31, 1914.*

I AM informed by Count Forgach, Under-Secretary of State, that although Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilisation, which he deplored, the Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions to inform you that mobilisation was not to be regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side. Telegrams were being exchanged between the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor, and conversations were proceeding between Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A general war might, he seriously hoped, be staved off by these efforts. On my expressing my fear that Germany would mobilise, he said that Germany must do something, in his opinion, to secure her position. As regards Russian intervention on behalf of Serbia, Austria-Hungary found it difficult to recognise such a claim. I called his attention to the fact that during the discussion of the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of Ambassadors the Russian Government had stood behind Serbia, and that a compromise between the views of Russia and Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line. Although he spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not regard the situation as desperate, I could not get from him any suggestion for a similar compromise in the present case. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above conversation.

The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has no desire to interfere unduly with Serbia; that, as compared with the late Russian Minister, the present Minister at Belgrade is a man of very moderate views; and that, as regards Austrian demands, Russia had counselled Serbia to yield to them as far as she possibly could without sacrificing her independence. His Excellency is exerting himself strongly in the interests of peace.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

M. CAMBON\* referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson† this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace.

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.

M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday.

I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium; and it might be that I should ask

\* French Ambassador in London.

† British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her.

I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again.

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 120.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador and asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula as best calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your telegram of 30th July\* with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July.† He trusted it would meet with your approval:—

"Si l'Autriche consentira à arrêter marche des ses troupes sur le territoire serbe, et, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits d'État souverain et à son indépendance, la Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante."‡

His Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to German Emperor by Emperor of Russia in reply to the former's telegram. He said that Emperor Nicholas had begun by thanking Emperor William for his telegram and for the hopes of peaceful solution which it held out. His Majesty had then proceeded to assure Emperor William that no intention whatever of an aggressive character was concealed behind Russian military preparations. So long as conversation with Austria continued, His Imperial Majesty undertook that not a single man should be moved across the frontier; it was, however, of course impossible, for reasons explained, to stop a mobilisation which was already in progress.

M. Sazonoff§ said that undoubtedly there would be better prospect of a peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take place in London, where the atmosphere was far more favourable, and he therefore hoped that you would see your way to agreeing to this.

His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to His Majesty's Government, who had done so much to save the situation. It would be largely due to them if war were prevented. The Emperor, the Russian Government, and the Russian people would never forget the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain.

\* See No. 103.

† See No. 97

‡ TRANSLATION.—"If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory; if, recognising that the dispute between Austria and Serbia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Serbia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude."

§ Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

## No. 121.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 31st July.\*

I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him most earnestly to accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war.

He expressed himself very sympathetically towards your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day; this communication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately countermmand her mobilisation against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilise at once.

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilise in south as well. He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilisation was only directed against Austria.

His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited favourable consideration, and in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had sent in their answer to the German demand.

He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions—and telegraphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature—but Russia's mobilisation had spoilt everything.

\* See No. 111.

## No. 122.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

NEUTRALITY of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir F. Bertie.\*

I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.

It appears from what he said that German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already.

I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote.

In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French Government.

\* See No. 114.

## No. 123.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day that the reply\* of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very

\* See No. 122.

great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorised to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 124.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 31, 1914.

ON the receipt at 8.30 to-night of your telegram of this afternoon,\* I sent a message to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. He received me at 10.30 to-night at the Elysée, where a Cabinet Council was being held. He took a note of the enquiry as to the respecting by France of the neutrality of Belgium which you instructed me to make.

He told me that a communication had been made to you by the German Ambassador in London of the intention of Germany to order a general mobilisation of her army if Russia do not demobilise at once. He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the circumstances, and begs an answer may be made by His Majesty's Government at the earliest moment possible.

Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German Embassy is packing up.

\* See No. 114.

No. 125.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 31, 1914.

MY immediately preceding telegram.\*

Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to your enquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. It is as follows:—

French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defence of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day.

\* See No. 124.

No. 126.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 1)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, August 1, 1914.

I HAVE had conversation with the Political Director, who states that the German Ambassador was informed, on calling at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning, that the French Government failed to comprehend the reason which prompted his communication of yesterday evening. It was pointed out to his Excellency that general mobilisation in Russia had not been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general mobilisation, and that the Russian Government were ready to demobilise if all Powers did likewise. It seemed strange to the French Government that in view of this and of the fact that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Government should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St. Petersburg requiring immediate demobilisation by Russia. There were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French Government and had requested an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The Ambassador was informed that the French Government considered that this was an extraordinary proceeding.

The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs again this evening, said nothing about demanding his passports, but he stated that he had packed up.

No. 127.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, August 1, 1914.

GENERAL mobilisation of army and fleet.

No. 128.

*Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, August 1, 1914.

BELGIAN neutrality.

The instructions conveyed in your telegram of yesterday\* have been acted upon.

Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbours were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies.

\* See No. 115.

No. 129.

*Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)*

(Translation.)

Luxemburg, 2 août, 1914.

Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.

(Télégraphique.)

MINISTRE d'État du Luxembourg Eyschen vient de recevoir par l'intermédiaire du Ministre d'Allemagne à Luxembourg, M. de Buch, un télégramme du Chancelier de l'Empire

(Telegraphic.)

The Luxemburg Minister of State, Eyschen, has just received through the German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor of the German Empire, Bethmann-



allemand Bethmann-Hollweg disant que les mesures militaires à Luxembourg ne constituent pas un acte hostile contre le Luxembourg, mais sont uniquement des mesures destinées à assurer contre attaque éventuelle d'une armée française. L'exploitation des voies ferrées affermées à l'Empire Luxembourg recevra complète indemnité pour dommages éventuels.

Hollweg, to the effect that the military measures taken in Luxembourg do not constitute a hostile act against Luxembourg, but are only intended to insure against a possible attack of a French army. Full compensation will be paid to Luxembourg for any damage caused by using the railways which are leased to the Empire.

## No. 130.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

WE are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly detained steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British merchant-ships.

I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships has been ordered.

You should request German Government to send immediate orders that they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty's Government, on their side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and the German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take any step which would make the situation between us impossible.

## No. 131.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

I STILL believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war.

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.

Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters.

## No. 132.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

FOLLOWING telegram from M. Sazonof\* to Count Benckendorff† of the 31st July communicated to me to-day:—

(Urgent.)

"Formule amendée conformément à la proposition anglaise: 'Si Autriche consent à arrêter la marche de ses troupes sur le territoire serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement austro-hongrois sans laisser porter

\* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† Russian Ambassador in London.



atteinte à ses droits d'État souverain et à son indépendance, la Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante.' ”\*

(Above communicated to all the Powers.)

\* TRANSLATION.—“Formula amended in accordance with the English proposal: ‘If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude.’ ”

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No. 133.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

M. DE ETTER\* came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonof,† dated the 31st July, which are as follows:—

“The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers.

“M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory.”

(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.)

\* Counsellor of Russian Embassy in London.

† Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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No. 134.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

PRESIDENT of the Republic has informed me that German Government were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only after a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation; that, although the measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobilisation, they are not so designated; that a French general mobilisation will become necessary in self-defence, and that France is already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military preparations; that the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions on it; that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war.

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No. 135.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

INFORMATION reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that though the situation has been changed by the mobilisation of Russia they would in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace be ready to consider favourably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Serbia. The effect of

this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Serbia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilisation of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilisation.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilisation, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter should be discussed with German Government, also by Russian Government.

No. 136.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edicard Grey.—*  
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, August 1, 1914.

MINISTER of War informed military attaché this afternoon that orders had been given at 3.40 for a general mobilisation of the French Army. This became necessary because the Minister of War knows that, under the system of "Kriegszustand,"\* the Germans have called up six classes. Three classes are sufficient to bring their covering troops up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve. This, he says, being tantamount to mobilisation, is mobilisation under another name.

The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army corps on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. It is therefore of the utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of 10 kilom. has been left between the French troops and German frontier. The French troops will not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilisation is one for purely defensive purposes.

\* "State of war."

No. 137.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

I SAW the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning. He supplied me with the substance of a telegram which the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. In this telegram his Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian Government to impair the sovereign rights of Serbia or to obtain territorial aggrandisement. The Ambassador added that he was further instructed to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no truth in the report which had been published in Paris to the effect that Austria-Hungary intended to occupy the sanjak.

Count Mensdorff\* called again later at the Foreign Office. He informed me of a telegram sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg by Count Berchtold,† and gave me the substance.

It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador, whom he sent for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburg that the "door had been banged" by Austria-Hungary on all further conversations. The Russian Ambassador promised to do this. Count Berchtold repeated on this occasion to the Russian Ambassador the assurance which had already been given at St. Petersburg, to the effect that neither an infraction of Servian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Servian territory was being contemplated by Austria-Hungary.

Special attention was called by Count Mensdorff\* to the fact that this telegram contains a statement to the effect that conversations at St. Petersburg had not been broken off by Austria-Hungary.

\* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

† Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 138.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
*(Received August 2.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

YOUR telegram of to-day.\*

I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary of State, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If therefore Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilised against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilise, had caused Germany to mobilise also. Russia had said that her mobilisation did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilised for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had therefore ordered mobilisation, and the German representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to an answer as creating a state of war.

\* See No. 131.

No. 139.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)*

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, August 1, 1914.

MY telegram of 31st July.\*

The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor to the German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency yesterday. No progress whatever was made.

In the evening M. Sazonoff had an interview with the Austrian Ambassador, who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to deflect the conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Serbia. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory; but the real question which they had to solve at this moment was whether Austria was to crush Serbia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave Serbia a free and independent State. In these circumstances, while the Serbian question was unsolved, the abstract discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia was a waste of time. The only place where a successful discussion of this question could be expected was London, and any such discussion was being made impossible by the action of Austria-Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually unfortified town, to bombardment.

M. Sazonoff informed the French Ambassador and myself this morning of his conversation with the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Serbia. It was clear that Austrian domination of Serbia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought that she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally.

\* See No. 120.

† Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Similarly the policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburg: the former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war. M. Sazonof\* was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavours he had made to avoid a war. No suggestion held out to him had been refused. He had accepted the proposal for a conference of four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for direct conversation between Austria and Russia; but Germany and Austria-Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive replies or had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian Government to order mobilisation, and the mobilisation of Germany had created a desperate situation.

M. Sazonof\* added that the formula, of which the text is contained in my telegram of 31st July,† had been forwarded by the Russian Government to Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the frontier was crossed by German troops. In no case would Russia begin hostilities first.

I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agreement of France and Germany can be obtained to keep their armies mobilised on their own sides of the frontier, as Russia has expressed her readiness to do, pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis.

\* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† See No. 120.

No. 140.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, August 1, 1914.

THE Minister of War again sent for the military attaché this evening, as he said he wished to keep him informed of the situation. He laid great stress on the fact that the zone of 10 kilom., which he had arranged between the French troops and the German frontier, and which was still occupied by peasants, was a proof of the French endeavours to commit no provocative act.

No. 141.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, August 1, 1914.

I AM to be received to-morrow by Minister for Foreign Affairs. This afternoon he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors. I have just been informed by the Russian Ambassador of German ultimatum requiring that Russia should demobilise within twelve hours. On being asked by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield to this curt summons meant war, the German Ambassador replied that Germany would be forced to mobilise if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador at Vienna thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that as mobilisation is too expensive to be kept for long, Germany will attack Russia at once. He says that the so-called mobilisation of Russia amounted to nothing more than that Russia had taken military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany. There seems to be even greater tension between Germany and Russia than there is between Austria and Russia. Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence. He says that Russia had no intention to attack Austria. He is going again to-day to point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that most terrific consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his Excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the

first, and that his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first.

It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being considered. There is great anxiety to know what England will do. I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course, if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany.

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## No. 142.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

ORDERS have just been issued for the general mobilisation of the navy and army, the first day of mobilisation to be 2nd August.

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## No. 143.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

DETENTION of British merchant ships at Hamburg.

Your telegram of 1st August\* acted on.

Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance, has promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to proceed without delay.

\* See No. 130.

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## No. 144.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 2, 1914.

SECRETARY of State has just informed me that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now in a state of war.

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## No. 145.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 2, 1914.

MY telegram of 1st August.\*

Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to allow British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must be regarded as a special favour to His Majesty's Government, as no other foreign ships have been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other precautions being taken.

\* See No. 143.

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## No. 146.

*Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, August 2, 1914.

THE news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg has been officially confirmed to the Belgian Government.

No. 147.

*Minister of State, Luxembourg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)*

(Translation.)

*Luxembourg, le 2 août, 1914.*

(Telegraphic.)

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence les faits suivants

Dimanche, 2 août, de grand matin, les troupes allemandes, d'après les informations qui sont parvenues au Gouvernement Grand ducal à l'heure actuelle, ont pénétré sur le territoire luxembourgeois par les ponts de Wasserbillig et de Remich, se dirigeant spécialement vers le sud du pays et vers la ville de Luxembourg, capitale du Grand Duché. Un certain nombre de trains blindés avec des troupes et des munitions ont été acheminés par la voie de chemin de fer de Wasserbillig à Luxembourg, où l'on s'attend de les voir arriver. D'un instant à l'autre, ces faits impliquent des actes manifestement contraire à la neutralité du Grand Duché garantie par le Traité de Londres de 1867. Le Gouvernement luxembourgeois n'a pas manqué de protester énergiquement contre cette agression auprès des représentants de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne à Luxembourg. Une protestation identique va être transmise télégraphiquement au Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères à Berlin.

*Luxembourg,**August 2, 1914.*

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice the following facts:—

On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxembourg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxembourg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxembourg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxembourg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxembourg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

No. 148.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.*

AFTER the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon\* the following memorandum:—

"I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.

M. Cambon\* asked me about the violation of Luxembourg. I told him the

\* French Ambassador in London.



doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow—in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a *casus belli*. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point.

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## No. 149.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 1st August.\*

I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily unloaded from the British steamship "Sappho" at Hamburg and detained. Similar action appears to have been taken with regard to other British vessels loaded with sugar.

You should inform Secretary of State that, for reasons stated in my telegram of 1st August,† I most earnestly trust that the orders already sent to Hamburg to allow the clearance of British ships covers also the release of their cargoes, the detention of which cannot be justified.

\* See No. 143.

† See No. 130.

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## No. 150.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 3, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 2nd August\*: Detention of British ships at Hamburg.  
No information available.

\* See No. 149.

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## No. 151.

*Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

FRENCH Government have offered through their military attaché the support of five French army corps to the Belgian Government. Following reply has been sent to-day:—

"We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think it necessary to take."

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## No. 152.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 3, 1914.

ON the 1st instant the French Ambassador made the following communication:—

"In reply to the German Government's intimation of the fact that ultimatums had been presented to France and Russia, and to the question as to what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano\* replied:—

"The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral.'"

In making this communication, M. Cambout was instructed to lay stress

\* Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† French Ambassador in London.

upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive but an aggressive war, and that, for this reason, the *casus foederis* under the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise.

I am, Sir,  
E. GREY.

## No. 153.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

THE King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms:—

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government have delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours.

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.

## No. 154.

*Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—*  
(Received August 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

GERMAN Minister has this morning addressed note to Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that as Belgian Government have declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces.

## No. 155.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

YOU should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years.

## No. 156.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

I CONTINUE to receive numerous complaints from British firms as to the detention of their ships at Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and other German ports. This



action on the part of the German authorities is totally unjustifiable. It is in direct contravention of international law and of the assurances given to your Excellency by the Imperial Chancellor. You should demand the immediate release of all British ships if such release has not yet been given.

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## No. 157.

*German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London.—(Communicated by German Embassy, August 4.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 4, 1914.

PLEASE dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.

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## No. 158.

*Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—  
(Received August 4.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

MILITARY attaché has been informed at War Office that German troops have entered Belgian territory, and that Liège has been summoned to surrender by small party of Germans who, however, were repulsed.

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## No. 159.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

WE hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmonich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning\* be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

\* See No. 153.

## No. 160.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.*

Sir,

London, August 8, 1914.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant\* I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government

\* See No. 153.

would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow\* at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fast accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date,† and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow\* expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I know, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow\* wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to

\* German Secretary of State.

† See No. 159.

advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 P.M. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never despatched.\*

At about 9.30 P.M. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow† a written summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night, and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann‡ said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermann‡ left me, a flying sheet, issued by the "Berliner Tageblatt," was circulated stating that Great Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before His Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the embassy was soon overpowered, and the attitude of the mob became more threatening. We took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing-room, where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happening. Herr von Jagow† at once informed the Chief of Police, and an adequate force of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantness occurred.

After order had been restored Herr von Jagow† came to see me and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behaviour of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not been authorised by the Government; in fact, the Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement should be issued, and he had replied, "Certainly

\* This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.

† German Secretary of State.

‡ German Under-Secretary of State.

not, until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision to that effect that only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbourhood of the embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to disturbances. It was the 'pesidential Tageblatt,' which had somehow got hold of the news, that had upset his calculations. He had heard rumours that the mob had been excited to violence by gestures made and missiles thrown from the embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology could have been more full and complete.

On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor sent one of his Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message. —

"The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those titles."

I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery.

On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow\* and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel handed me my passports—which I had earlier in the day demanded in writing—and told me that he had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood that I preferred the route via the Hook of Holland to that via Copenhagen; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed to this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr von Jagow couched in the most friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such articles as time allowed.

The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter Station, while the embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrangements ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A retired colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds which thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped from insulting us; but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier.

Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behaviour of my staff under the most trying circumstances possible. One and all, they worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval and military attachés, secretaries, and the two young attachés buckled to their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside and inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring for advice and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support, often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so readily and cheerfully gave to me.

I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all by

\* German Secretary of State.

my American colleague, Mr. Gerard,\* and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us and to make arrangements for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to himself, and his calmness and *savoir-faire* and his firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and able hands.

I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

\* American Ambassador in Berlin.

No. 161.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador in Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.*

Sir,

London. September 1, 1914.

THE rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now to add a few comments.

The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note to Serbia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except Herr von Tschirscky,\* who must have been aware of the tenour, if not of the actual words of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see through the veil. On the 22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, by whom he was left under the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, and that the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the second of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under-Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me on the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presentation about the time we were speaking.

So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days when events compelled him to return. It might have been supposed that Duke Avarna, Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtold† during this critical time. In point of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on the 15th July the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed to you the following day. It is true that during all this time the "Neue Freie Presse" and other leading Viennese newspapers were using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Serbia. The official "Fremdenblatt," however, was more cautious, and till the note was published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European complications.

On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by Serbia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known later in the evening that the Serbian reply had been rejected and that Baron Giesl‡ had broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning.

The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most part of organised processions through the principal streets ending up at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations against the

\* German Ambassador at Vienna.

† Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

‡ Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade.

Russian Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the principal embassies during those days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna and, as I was informed, in many other principal cities of the Monarchy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Serbia, and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be said the determination, of the people, except presumably in portions of the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Serbia during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the recent Balkan war. Count Berchtold's\* peace policy had met with little sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punishment of the hated Serbian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Serbia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Serbian question by which Austrian fears of Serbian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war against Serbia by a partial Russian mobilisation against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisation, and Russia again responded with results which have passed into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Paper on the European Crisis.† On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold and urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in the House of Commons‡ on the previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far; Austria was that day declaring war on Serbia, and she could never accept the conference which you had suggested should take place between the less interested Powers on the basis of the Serbian reply. This was a matter which must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Serbia, and pointed out that whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her policy, His Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart.

His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversation that, though he had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellency maintained a most friendly demeanour

\* Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)."

‡ See Hansard, Vol. 65, No. 107, columns 931-933.



throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed with the invasion of Serbia.

The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von Tschirscky\* abstained from inviting my co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szapary† with full powers to continue at St. Petersburg the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof‡. Count Berchtold§ refused at the time, but two days later (30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised against Austria, he received M. Schebeko|| again, in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburg. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was informed by M. Schebeko|| that Count Szapary† had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof‡ that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Serbia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof‡ M. Schebeko|| added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of Serbia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorff,¶ to the effect that Austria had neither "banged the door" on compromise nor cut off the conversations.\*\* M. Schebeko|| to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold,§ and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach,†† had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schebeko|| repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise.

Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history.

Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko|| had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on the 6th August when Count Berchtold§ informed the foreign missions at Vienna that "the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been instructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austro-Hungary considered herself also at war with Russia."

M. Schebeko|| left quietly in a special train provided by the Austro-Hungarian Government on the 7th August. He had urgently requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground that

\* German Ambassador in Vienna.

† Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

‡ Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

§ Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

|| Russian Ambassador in Vienna.

¶ Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

\*\* See No. 137

†† Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On the 8th August, M. Dumaine had received from Count Berchtold\* the categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's assurance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French frontier, but that none were moving from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replace German troops employed at the front. These two statements were made by Count Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine, under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador's departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps of the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris was in the throes of a revolution, and that the President of the Republic had been assassinated.

The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by special editions of the newspapers about midday on the 4th August. An abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons, and also of the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the 4th August, appeared the same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of these days transpired. The "Neue Freie Presse" was violently insulting towards England. The "Freundenblatt" was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgium neutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alternative but to take part in the war.

The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, but scarcely mentioned in the newspapers.

On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of the previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my passport or to make any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at the same time that His Majesty's Government of course expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us without the notice required by diplomatic usage.

On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform Count Mensdorff,† at the request of the French Government, that a complete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on the ground that Austria had declared war on Russia who was already fighting on the side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to the German frontier under conditions that were a direct menace to France. The rupture having been brought about with France in this way, I was to ask for my passport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion, that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist between the two countries from midnight of the 12th August.

After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency would take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mr. Theo Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold\* received me at midday. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram from Count Mensdorff had just come in but had not yet been brought to him. His Excellency received my communication with the courtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at war with France, though diplomatic relations with that country had been broken off. I explained in a few words how circumstances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided useless argument. Then I ventured to recommend to his Excellency's consideration the case of the numerous stranded British subjects at Carlsbad, Vienna, and

\* Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.



other places throughout the country. I had already had some correspondence with him on the subject, and his Excellency took a note of what I said, and promised to see what could be done to get them away when the stress of mobilisation should be over. Count Berchtold agreed to Mr. Phillpotts, till then British consul at Vienna under Consul-General Sir Frederick Duncan, being left by me at the Embassy in the capacity of Chargé des Archives. He presumed a similar privilege would not be refused in England if desired on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Government. I took leave of Count Berchtold with sincere regret, having received from the day of my arrival in Vienna, not quite nine months before, many marks of friendship and consideration from his Excellency. As I left I begged his Excellency to present my profound respects to the Emperor Francis Joseph, together with an expression of my hope that His Majesty would pass through these sad times with unimpaired health and strength. Count Berchtold was pleased to say he would deliver my message.

Count Walterskirchen, of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, was deputed the following morning to bring me my passport and to acquaint me with the arrangements made for my departure that evening (14th August). In the course of the day Countess Berchtold and other ladies of Vienna society called to take leave of Lady de Bunsen at the embassy. We left the railway station by special train for the Swiss frontier at 7 P.M. No disagreeable incidents occurred. Count Walterskirchen was present at the station on behalf of Count Berchtold. The journey was necessarily slow, owing to the encumbered state of the line. We reached Buchs, on the Swiss frontier, early in the morning of the 17th August. At the first halting place there had been some hooting and stone throwing on the part of the entraining troops and station officials, but no inconvenience was caused, and at the other large stations on our route we found that ample measures had been taken to preserve us from molestation as well as to provide us with food. I was left in no doubt that the Austro-Hungarian Government had desired that the journey should be performed under the most comfortable conditions possible, and that I should receive on my departure all the marks of consideration due to His Majesty's representative. I was accompanied by my own family and the entire staff of the embassy, for whose untiring zeal and efficient help in trying times I desire to express my sincere thanks. The Swiss Government also showed courtesy in providing comfortable accommodation during our journey from the frontier to Berne, and, after three days' stay there, on to Geneva, at which place we found that every provision had been made by the French Government, at the request of Sir Francis Bertie, for our speedy conveyance to Paris. We reached England on Saturday morning, the 22nd August.

I have, &c.,

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

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
**PART II.**

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**SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.**

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## PART II.

### SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

#### (1) STATEMENT BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 3, 1914.

LAST week I stated that we were working for peace not only for this country, but to preserve the peace of Europe. To-day events move so rapidly that it is exceedingly difficult to state with technical accuracy the actual state of affairs, but it is clear that the peace of Europe cannot be preserved. Russia and Germany, at any rate, have declared war upon each other.

Before I proceed to state the position of His Majesty's Government, I would like to clear the ground so that, before I come to state to the House what our attitude is with regard to the present crisis, the House may know exactly under what obligations the Government is, or the House can be said to be, in coming to a decision on the matter. First of all let me say, very shortly, that we have consistently worked with a single mind, with all the earnestness in our power, to preserve peace. The House may be satisfied on that point. We have always done it. During these last years, as far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, we would have no difficulty in proving that we have done so. Throughout the Balkan crisis, by general admission, we worked for peace. The co-operation of the Great Powers of Europe was successful in working for peace in the Balkan crisis. It is true that some of the Powers had great difficulty in adjusting their points of view. It took much time and labour and discussion before they could settle their differences, but peace was secured, because peace was their main object, and they were willing to give time and trouble rather than accentuate differences rapidly.

In the present crisis, it has not been possible to secure the peace of Europe; because there has been little time, and there has been a disposition—at any rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell—to force things rapidly to an issue, at any rate to the great risk of peace, and, as we now know, the result of that is that the policy of peace as far as the Great Powers generally are concerned, is in danger. I do not want to dwell on that, and to comment on it, and to say where the blame seems to us to lie, which Powers were most in favour of peace, which were most disposed to risk or endanger peace, because I would like the House to approach this crisis in which we are now from the point of view of British interests, British honour, and British obligations, free from all passion as to why peace has not been preserved.

We shall publish papers as soon as we can regarding what took place last week when we were working for peace; and when those papers are published I have no doubt that to every human being they will make it clear how strenuous and genuine and whole-hearted our efforts for peace were, and that they will enable people to form their own judgment as to what forces were at work which operated against peace.

I come first, now, to the question of British obligations. I have assured the House—and the Prime Minister has assured the House more than once—that if any crisis such as this arose we should come before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British attitude should be, that we would have no secret engagement which we should spring upon the House, and tell the House that because we had entered into that engagement there was an obligation of honour upon the country. I will deal with that point to clear the ground first.

There have been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and what came to be called the Triple *Entente*, for some years past. The Triple *Entente* was not an alliance—it was a diplomatic group. The House will remember that in 1908 there was a crisis—also a Balkan crisis—originating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to London, because his visit was planned before the crisis broke out. I told him definitely then, this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public opinion in this country would justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic

support. More was never asked from us, more was never given, and more was never promised.

In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of anything more than diplomatic support—up till yesterday no promise of more than diplomatic support. Now I must make this question of obligation clear to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906. That was the time of the Algeiras Conference, and it came at a time of very great difficulty to His Majesty's Government when a general election was in progress, and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I—spending three days a week in my constituency and three days at the Foreign Office—was asked the question whether, if that crisis developed into war between France and Germany, we would give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign Power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco—a question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides—that if out of that agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France.

I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis, as far as I remember almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador at the time. I made no promise, and I used no threats; but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by the French Government, but they said to me at the time, and I think very reasonably, "If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts." There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorised those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose.

As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election was in prospect; I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted, I remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War; and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the most I could do, and they authorised that, on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose. The fact that conversations between military and naval experts took place was later on—I think much later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to be of importance—but later on it was brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet.

The Agadir crisis came—another Morocco crisis—and throughout that I took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906. But subsequently, in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the Cabinet, it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding in writing, which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter, that these conversations which took place were not binding upon the freedom of either Government; and on the 22nd of November, 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will now read to the House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms in reply. The letter which I have to read to the House is this, and it will be known to the public now as the record that, whatever took place between military and naval experts, they were not binding engagements upon the Governments:—

"My dear Ambassador,

"From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for

instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

"You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

"I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common."

*Lord Charles Beresford.*—What is the date of that?

*Sir E. Grey.*—The 22nd November, 1912. That is the starting point for the Government with regard to the present crisis. I think it makes it clear that what the Prime Minister and I said to the House of Commons was perfectly justified, and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what our line should be, whether we should intervene or whether we should abstain, the Government remained perfectly free, and *a fortiori*, the House of Commons remains perfectly free. That I say to clear the ground from the point of view of obligation. I think it was due to prove our good faith to the House of Commons that I should give that full information to the House now, and say what I think is obvious from the letter I have just read, that we do not construe anything which has previously taken place in our diplomatic relations with other Powers in this matter as restricting the freedom of the Government to decide what attitude they should take now, or restrict the freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should be.

Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this: The situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question. In the Morocco question it was primarily a dispute which concerned France—a dispute which concerned France and France primarily—a dispute, as it seemed to us, affecting France out of an agreement subsisting between us and France, and published to the whole world, in which we engaged to give France diplomatic support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support; we were, at any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to stand with France diplomatically in that question.

The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything with which we had a special agreement with France; it has not originated with anything which primarily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute between Austria and Servia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence—no Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria and Servia than the Government and the country of France. They are involved in it because of their obligation of honour under a definite alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of honour cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms of that alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard to the question of obligation.

I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. For many years we have had a long-standing friendship with France. I remember well the feeling in the House—and my own feeling—for I spoke on the subject, I think, when the late Government made their agreement with France—the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations, who had had perpetual differences in the past, had cleared these differences away; I remember saying, I think, that it seemed to me that some benign influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. But how far that friendship entails obligation—it has been a friendship between the nations and ratified by the nations—how far that entails an obligation, let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon anyone else more than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my own feeling in the matter.

The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the northern and western

coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet being concentrated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us.

The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside, and see this going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing. I believe that would be the feeling of this country. There are times when one feels that if these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling which would spread with irresistible force throughout the land.

But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point of view of British interests, and it is on that that I am going to base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House. If we say nothing at the moment, what is France to do with her fleet in the Mediterranean? If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to what we will do, she leaves her northern and western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming down the Channel to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European conflagration; can anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it? Let us assume that to-day we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, saying, "No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this conflict." Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; and let us assume that the consequences—which are already tremendous in what has happened in Europe even to countries which are at peace—in fact, equally whether countries are at peace or at war—let us assume that out of that come consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in defence of vital British interests, we should go to war; and let us assume—which is quite possible—that Italy, who is now neutral—because, as I understand, she considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple Alliance being a defensive alliance, her obligation did not arise—let us assume that consequences which are not yet foreseen and which, perfectly legitimately consulting her own interests, make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when we are forced in defence of vital British interests ourselves to fight—what then will be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at some critical moment those consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes in the Mediterranean might be vital to this country.

Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any particular trade route, the keeping open of which may not be vital to this country. What will be our position then? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Mediterranean. It would be the very moment when we could not detach more ships to the Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this country from our negative attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk. I say that from the point of view of British interests, we feel strongly that France was entitled to know—and to know at once—whether or not in the event of attack upon her unprotected northern and western coasts she could depend upon British support. In that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement:—

"I am authorised to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on our part, not as entailing immediate aggressive action on our part, but as binding us to take aggressive action should that contingency arise. Things move very hurriedly from hour to hour. Fresh news comes in, and I cannot give this in any very formal



way; but I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the northern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came to the House, but it is far too narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir, there is the more serious consideration—becoming more serious every hour—there is the question of the neutrality of Belgium.

I shall have to put before the House at some length what is our position in regard to Belgium. The governing factor is the treaty of 1839, but this is a treaty with a history—a history accumulated since. In 1870, when there was war between France and Germany, the question of the neutrality of Belgium arose, and various things were said. Amongst other things, Prince Bismarck gave an assurance to Belgium that—confirming his verbal assurance, he gave in writing a declaration which he said was superfluous in reference to the treaty in existence—that the German Confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium, it being always understood that that neutrality would be respected by the other belligerent Powers. That is valuable as a recognition in 1870 on the part of Germany of the sacredness of these treaty rights.

What was our own attitude? The people who laid down the attitude of the British Government were Lord Granville in the House of Lords and Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons. Lord Granville on the 8th August, 1870, used these words. He said:—

“We might have explained to the country and to foreign nations, that we could not think this country was bound either morally or internationally, or that its interests were concerned in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium; though this course might have had some conveniences, though it might have been easy to adhere to it, though it might have saved us from some immediate danger, it is a course which Her Majesty’s Government thought it impossible to adopt in the name of the country with any due regard to the country’s honour or to the country’s interests.”

Mr. Gladstone spoke as follows two days later:—

“There is, I admit, the obligation of the treaty. It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of that treaty; but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen, such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never to my knowledge took that rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of the guarantee. The circumstance that there is already an existing guarantee in force is, of necessity, an important fact, and a weighty element in the case, to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, the force of which we must all feel most deeply, and that is, the common interests against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power whatever.”

The treaty is an old treaty—1839—and that was the view taken of it in 1870. It is one of those treaties which are founded, not only on consideration for Belgium, which benefits under the treaty, but in the interests of those who guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The honour and interests are, at least, as strong to-day as in 1870, and we cannot take a more narrow view or a less serious view of our obligations, and of the importance of those obligations, than was taken by Mr. Gladstone’s Government in 1870.

I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When mobilisation was beginning, I knew that this question must be a most important element in our policy—a most important subject for the House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us to know whether the French and German Governments respectively were prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French Government this reply:—

“The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power

violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure the defence of her security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day."

From the German Government the reply was:—

"The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor."

Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important to have an answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing, to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign. I telegraphed at the same time to Brussels to the Belgian Government, and I got the following reply from Sir Francis Villiers:—

"Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbours were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies."

It now appears from the news I have received to-day—which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form—that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium. Well, Sir, until one has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment, I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in a position to give the House full, complete, and absolute information upon the point. We were sounded in the course of last week as to whether, if a guarantee were given that, after the war, Belgian integrity would be preserved, that would content us. We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutrality.

Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following telegram had been received from the King of the Belgians by our King—King George:—

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessors, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship she has just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can diplomatic intervention do now? We have great and vital interests in the independence—and integrity is the least part—of Belgium. If Belgium is compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she could only do so under duress. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is that they should be left alone and independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, not so much that their integrity but that their independence should be interfered with. If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate its neutrality and no action be taken to resent it, at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be, the independence will be gone.

I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to what he thought about the independence of Belgium. It will be found in "Hansard," volume 203, p. 1787. I have not had time to read the whole speech and verify the context, but the thing seems to me so clear that no context could make any difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone said:—

"We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether, under

the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin."

No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, whatever may have been offered to her in return, her independence is gone if that holds. If her independence goes, the independence of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British interests to consider what may be at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great Power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself—consequences which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often—still, if that were to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power?

It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and that, whatever happened in the course of this war, at the end of it intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust them to our own point of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost. And do not believe, whether a great Power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a powerful fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.

We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end. Continental nations engaged in war—all their populations, all their energies, all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle—they cannot carry on the trade with us that they are carrying on in times of peace, whether we are parties to the war or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment that at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the West of Europe opposite to us—if that had been the result of the war—falling under the domination of a single Power, and I am quite sure that our moral position would be such as to have lost us all respect. I can only say that I have put the question of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, because I am not yet sure of all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at present, it is quite clear that there is an obligation on this country to do its utmost to prevent the consequences to which those facts will lead if they are undisputed.

I have read to the House the only engagements that we have yet taken definitely with regard to the use of force. I think it is due to the House to say that we have taken no engagement yet with regard to sending an expeditionary armed force out of the country. Mobilisation of the fleet has taken place; mobilisation of the army is taking place; but we have as yet taken no engagement, because I feel that—in the case of a European conflagration such as this, unprecedented, with our enormous responsibilities in India and other parts of the Empire, or in countries in British occupation, with all the unknown factors—we must take very carefully into consideration the use which we make of sending an expeditionary force out of the country until we know how we stand. One thing I would say.

The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. The general feeling throughout Ireland—and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad—does not make the Irish question a consideration which we feel we have now to take into account. I have told the House how far we have at present gone in commitments and the conditions which influence our policy, and I have put to the House and dwelt at length upon how vital is the condition of the neutrality of Belgium.

What other policy is there before the House? There is but one way in which

the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France that I have read to the House which prevents us doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any unconditional neutrality, and, without these conditions absolutely satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power. If we did take that line by saying, "We will have nothing whatever to do with this matter" under no conditions—the Belgian treaty obligations, the possible position in the Mediterranean, with damage to British interests, and what may happen to France from our failure to support France—if we were to say that all those things mattered nothing, were as nothing, and to say we would stand aside, we should, I believe, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences.

My object has been to explain the view of the Government, and to place before the House the issue and the choice. I do not for a moment conceal, after what I have said, and after the information, incomplete as it is, that I have given to the House with regard to Belgium, that we must be prepared, and we are prepared, for the consequences of having to use all the strength we have at any moment—we know not how soon—to defend ourselves and to take our part. We know, if the facts all be as I have stated them, though I have announced no intending aggressive action on our part, no final decision to resort to force at a moment's notice, until we know the whole of the case, that the use of it may be forced upon us. As far as the forces of the Crown are concerned, we are ready. I believe the Prime Minister and my right hon. friend the First Lord of the Admiralty have no doubt whatever that the readiness and the efficiency of those forces were never at a higher mark than they are to-day, and never was there a time when confidence was more justified in the power of the navy to protect our commerce and to protect our shores. The thought is with us always of the suffering and misery entailed, from which no country in Europe will escape by abstention, and from which no neutrality will save us. The amount of harm that can be done by an enemy ship to our trade is infinitesimal, compared with the amount of harm that must be done by the economic condition that is caused on the Continent.

The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding what to advise the House of Commons to do. We have disclosed our mind to the House of Commons. We have disclosed the issue, the information which we have, and made clear to the House, I trust, that we are prepared to face that situation, and that should it develop, as probably it may develop, we will face it. We worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the last moment. How hard, how persistently, and how earnestly we strove for peace last week the House will see from the papers that will be before it.

But that is over, as far as the peace of Europe is concerned. We are now face to face with a situation and all the consequences which it may yet have to unfold. We believe we shall have the support of the House at large in proceeding to whatever the consequences may be and whatever measures may be forced upon us by the development of facts or action taken by others. I believe the country, so quickly has the situation been forced upon it, has not had time to realise the issue. It perhaps is still thinking of the quarrel between Austria and Servia, and not the complications of this matter which have grown out of the quarrel between Austria and Servia. Russia and Germany we know are at war. We do not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany is to support, is yet at war with Russia. We know that a good deal has been happening on the French frontier. We do not know that the German Ambassador has left Paris.

The situation has developed so rapidly that technically, as regards the condition of the war, it is most difficult to describe what has actually happened. I wanted to bring out the underlying issues which would affect our own conduct, and our own policy, and to put them clearly. I have now put the vital facts before the House, and if, as seems not improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, to take our stand upon those issues, then I believe, when the country realises what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the West of Europe, which I have endeavoured to describe to the House, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the whole country.

**(2) FURTHER STATEMENT MADE BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. AUGUST 3, 1914.**

**GERMANY AND BELGIUM.**

I want to give the House some information which I have received, and which was not in my possession when I made my statement this afternoon. It is information I have received from the Belgian Legation in London, and is to the following effect —

"Germany sent yesterday evening at 7 o'clock a note proposing to Belgium friendly neutrality, covering free passage on Belgian territory, and promising maintenance of independence of the kingdom and possession at the conclusion of peace, and threatening, in case of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time limit of twelve hours was fixed for the reply. The Belgians have answered that an attack on their neutrality would be a flagrant violation of the rights of nations, and that to accept the German proposal would be to sacrifice the honour of a nation. Conscious of its duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel aggression by all possible means."

Of course, I can only say that the Government are prepared to take into grave consideration the information which it has received. I make no further comment upon it.

**(3) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 4, 1914.**

*Mr Bonar Law* —I wish to ask the Prime Minister whether he has any statement that he can now make to the House?

*The Prime Minister (Mr Asquith)*.—In conformity with the statement of policy made here by my right hon friend the Foreign Secretary yesterday, a telegram was early this morning sent by him to our Ambassador in Berlin. It was to this effect —

"The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium. His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours. We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations. His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium may not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply."

We received this morning from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram —

"German Minister has this morning addressed note to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that, as Belgian Government have declined the well-intended proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces."

Simultaneously—almost immediately afterwards—we received from the Belgian Legation here in London the following telegram —

"General staff announces that territory has been violated at Gemmenich (near Aix-la-Chapelle)."

Subsequent information tended to show that the German force has penetrated still further into Belgian territory. We also received this morning from the German Ambassador here the telegram sent to him by the German Foreign Secretary, and communicated by the Ambassador to us. It is in these terms —

"Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions by repeating most posi-



tively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgic territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance."

I have to add this on behalf of His Majesty's Government: We cannot regard this as in any sense a satisfactory communication. We have, in reply to it, repeated the request we made last week to the German Government, that they should give us the same assurance in regard to Belgian neutrality as was given to us and to Belgium by France last week. We have asked that a reply to that request and a satisfactory answer to the telegram of this morning—which I have read to the House—should be given before midnight.

#### (4) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 5, 1914.

*Mr. Bonar Law.*—May I ask the Prime Minister if he has any information he can give us to-day?

*The Prime Minister.*—Our Ambassador at Berlin received his passports at 7 o'clock last evening, and since 11 o'clock last night a state of war has existed between Germany and ourselves.

We have received from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram:—

"I have just received from Minister for Foreign Affairs—

—that is the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs—

"a note of which the following is a literal translation:—

"Belgian Government regret to have to inform His Majesty's Government that this morning armed forces of Germany penetrated into Belgian territory in violation of engagements assumed by treaty.

"Belgian Government are further resolved to resist by all means in their power.

"Belgium appeals to Great Britain and France and Russia to co-operate, as guarantors, in defence of her territory.

"There would be concerted and common action with the object of resisting the forcible measures employed by Germany against Belgium, and at the same time of guarding the maintenance for future of the independence and integrity of Belgium.

"Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will assume defence of her fortified places."

We have also received to-day from the French Ambassador here the following telegram received by the French Government from the French Minister at Brussels:—

"The Chef du Cabinet of the Belgian Ministry of War has asked the French military attaché to prepare at once for the co-operation and contact of French troops with the Belgian army pending the results of the appeal to the guaranteeing Powers now being made. Orders have therefore been given to Belgian provincial Governors not to regard movements of French troops as a violation of the frontier."

This is all the information I am at the moment able to give to the House, but I take the opportunity of giving notice that to-morrow, in Committee of Supply, I shall move a vote of credit of 100,000,000*l.*

#### (5) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 6, 1914.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a sum, not exceeding £100,000,000, be granted to His Majesty, beyond the ordinary grants of Parliament, towards defraying expenses that may be incurred during the year ending March 31st, 1915, for all measures which may be taken for the security of the

country, for the conduct of Naval and Military operations, for assisting the food supply, for promoting the continuance of trade, industry, and business communications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk, or otherwise for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war."

*The Prime Minister (Mr Asquith)*—In asking the House to agree to the resolution which Mr Speaker has just read from the Chair, I do not propose, because I do not think it is in any way necessary, to traverse the ground again which was covered by my right hon friend the Foreign Secretary two or three nights ago. He stated—and I do not think any of the statements he made are capable of answer and certainly have not yet been answered—the grounds upon which, with the utmost reluctance and with infinite regret, His Majesty's Government have been compelled to put this country in a state of war with what, for many years and indeed generations past, has been a friendly Power. But, Sir, the papers which have since been presented to Parliament, and which are now in the hands of hon Members, will, I think, show how strenuous, how unrelenting, how persistent, even when the last glimmer of hope seemed to have faded away, were the efforts of my right hon. friend to secure for Europe an honourable and a lasting peace. Everyone knows, in the great crisis which occurred last year in the East of Europe, it was largely, if not mainly, by the acknowledgment of all Europe, due to the steps taken by my right hon. friend that the area of the conflict was limited, and that, so far as the great Powers are concerned, peace was maintained. If his efforts upon this occasion have, unhappily, been less successful, I am certain that this House and the country, and I will add posterity and history, will accord to him what is, after all, the best tribute that can be paid to any statesman: that, never derogating for an instant or by an inch from the honour and interests of his own country, he has striven, as few men have striven, to maintain and preserve the greatest interest of all countries—universal peace. These papers which are now in the hands of hon Members show something more than that. They show what were the terms which were offered to us in exchange for our neutrality. I trust that not only the Members of this House, but all our fellow-subjects everywhere, will read the communications, will read, learn and mark the communications which passed only a week ago to-day between Berlin and London in this matter. The terms by which it was sought to buy our neutrality are contained in the communication made by the German Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen on the 29th July. No. 85 of the published Paper.\* I think I must refer to them for a moment. After referring to the state of things as between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward Goschen goes on —

"He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government"—

Let the House observe these words—

"aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue."

Sir Edward Goschen proceeded to put a very pertinent question:—

"I questioned His Excellency about the French colonies"—

What are the French colonies? They mean every part of the dominions and possessions of France outside the geographical area of Europe—

"and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect."

Let me come to what, in my mind, personally, has always been the crucial, and almost the governing consideration, namely, the position of the small States:—

"As regards Holland, however, His Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise."

Then we come to Belgium:—

"It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but, when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany."

\* See Part II, No. 85. page 64.

Let the House observe the distinction between those two cases. In regard to Holland it was not only independence and integrity but also neutrality, but in regard to Belgium, there was no mention of neutrality at all, nothing but an assurance that after the war came to an end the integrity of Belgium would be respected. Then His Excellency added —

"Ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been to bring about an understanding with England. He trusted that these assurances" —

the assurances I have read out to the House—

"might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired."

What does that amount to? Let me just ask the House. I do so, not with the object of inflaming passion, certainly not with the object of exciting feeling against Germany, but I do so to vindicate and make clear the position of the British Government in this matter. What did that proposal amount to? In the first place, it meant this: That behind the back of France—they were not made a party to these communications—we should have given, if we had assented to that, a free licence to Germany to annex, in the event of a successful war, the whole of the extra-European dominions and possessions of France. What did it mean as regards Belgium? When she addressed, as she has addressed in these last few days, her moving appeal to us to fulfil our solemn guarantee of her neutrality, what reply should we have given? What reply should we have given to that Belgian appeal? We should have been obliged to say that, without her knowledge, we had bartered away to the Power threatening her our obligation to keep our plighted word. The House has read, and the country has read, of course, in the last few hours, the most pathetic appeal addressed by the King of Belgium, and I do not envy the man who can read that appeal with an unmoved heart. Belgians are fighting and losing their lives. What would have been the position of Great Britain to-day in the face of that spectacle, if we had assented to this infamous proposal? Yes, and what are we to get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of our obligations? What are we to get in return? A promise—nothing more; a promise as to what Germany would do in certain eventualities, a promise, be it observed—I am sorry to have to say it, but it must be put upon record—given by a Power which was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treaty and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied or temporised, we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves with dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of this country, of which we are trustees. I am glad, and I think the country will be glad, to turn to the reply which my right hon. friend made, and of which I will read to the House two of the more salient passages. This document, No. 101 of my Paper,\* puts on record a week ago the attitude of the British Government, and, as I believe, of the British people. My right hon. friend says:—

"His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French Colonies are taken if France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the Colonies. From the material point of view" —

My right hon. friend, as he always does, used very temperate language:—

"such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy."

That is the material aspect. But he proceeded:—

"Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either."

He then says:—

"We must preserve our full freedom to act, as circumstances may seem to us to require."

And he added, I think, in sentences which the House will appreciate:—

"You should . . . add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that

\* See Part II, No. 101, page 77.



they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe. . . . For that object this Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good will.

If the peace of Europe can be preserved and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it"—

The statement was never more true—

"as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis and Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto."

That document, in my opinion, states clearly, in temperate and convincing language the attitude of this Government. Can anyone who reads it fail to appreciate the tone of obvious sincerity and earnestness which underlies it; can anyone honestly doubt that the Government of this country in spite of great provocation—and I regard the proposals made to us as proposals which we might have thrown aside without consideration and almost without answer—can anyone doubt that in spite of great provocation the right hon. Gentleman, who had already earned the title—and no one ever more deserved it—of Peace Maker of Europe, persisted to the very last moment of the last hour in that beneficent but unhappily frustrated purpose? I am entitled to say, and I do so on behalf of this country—I speak not for a party, I speak for the country as a whole—that we made every effort any Government could possibly make for peace. But this war has been forced upon us. What is it we are fighting for? Every one knows, and no one knows better than the Government, the terrible incalculable suffering, economic, social, personal and political, which war, and especially a war between the Great Powers of the world, must entail. There is no man amongst us sitting upon this bench in these trying days—more trying perhaps than any body of statesmen for a hundred years have had to pass through, there is not a man amongst us who has not, during the whole of that time, had clearly before his vision the almost unequalled suffering which war, even in a just cause, must bring about, not only to the peoples who are for the moment living in this country and in the other countries of the world, but to posterity and to the whole prospects of European civilisation. Every step we took we took with that vision before our eyes, and with a sense of responsibility which it is impossible to describe. Unhappily, if—in spite of all our efforts to keep the peace, and with that full and overpowering consciousness of the result, if the issue be decided in favour of war—we have, nevertheless, thought it to be the duty as well as the interest of this country to go to war, the House may be well assured it was because we believe, and I am certain the country will believe, we are unsheathing our sword in a just cause.


If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two sentences. In the first place to fulfil a solemn international obligation, an obligation which, if it had been entered into between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life, would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honour, which no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle which, in these days when force, material force, sometimes seems to be the dominant influence and factor in the development of mankind, we are fighting to vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and over-mastering Power. I do not believe any nation ever entered into a great controversy—and this is one of the greatest history will ever know—with a clearer conscience and stronger conviction that it is fighting not for aggression, not for the maintenance even of its own selfish interest, but that it is fighting in defence of principles, the maintenance of which is vital to the civilisation of the world. With a full conviction, not only of the wisdom and justice, but of the obligations which lay upon us to challenge this great issue, we are entering into the struggle. Let us now make sure that all the resources, not only of this United Kingdom, but of the vast Empire of which it is the centre, shall be thrown into the scale, and it is that that object may be adequately secured that I am now about to ask this Committee—to make the very unusual demand upon it—to give the Government a Vote of Credit of 100,000,000/. I am not going, and I am sure the Committee do not wish it, into the technical distinctions between Votes of Credit and Supple-

mentary Estimates and all the rarities and refinements which arise in that connection. There is a much higher point of view than that. If it were necessary, I could justify, upon purely technical grounds, the course we propose to adopt, but I am not going to do so, because I think it would be foreign to the temper and disposition of the Committee. There is one thing to which I do call attention, that is, the Title and Heading of the Bill. As a rule, in the past, Votes of this kind have been taken simply for naval and military operations, but we have thought it right to ask the Committee to give us its confidence in the extension of the traditional area of Votes of Credit so that the money, which we are asking them to allow us to expend, may be applied not only for strictly naval and military operations, but to assist the food supplies, promote the continuance of trade, industry, business, and communications—whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk or otherwise—for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war. I believe the Committee will agree with us that it was wise to extend the area of the Vote of Credit so as to include all these various matters. It gives the Government a free hand. Of course, the Treasury will account for it, and any expenditure that takes place will be subject to the approval of the House. I think it would be a great pity—in fact, a great disaster—if, in a crisis of this magnitude, we were not enabled to make provision—provision far more needed now than it was under the simpler conditions that prevailed in the old days—for all the various ramifications and developments of expenditure which the existence of a state of war between the great Powers of Europe must entail on any one of them.

I am asking also in my character of Secretary of State for War—a position which I held until this morning—for a Supplementary Estimate for men for the Army. Perhaps the Committee will allow me for a moment just to say on that personal matter that I took upon myself the office of Secretary of State for War under conditions, upon which I need not go back but which are fresh in the minds of everyone, in the hope and with the object that the condition of things in the Army, which all of us deplored, might speedily be brought to an end and complete confidence re-established. I believe that is the case; in fact, I know it to be. There is no more loyal and united body, no body in which the spirit and habit of discipline are more deeply ingrained and cherished than in the British Army. Glad as I should have been to continue the work of that office, and I would have done so under normal conditions, it would not be fair to the Army, it would not be just to the country, that any Minister should divide his attention between that Department and another, still less that the First Minister of the Crown, who has to look into the affairs of all departments and who is ultimately responsible for the whole policy of the Cabinet, should give, as he could only give, perfunctory attention to the affairs of our Army in a great war. I am very glad to say that a very distinguished soldier and administrator, in the person of Lord Kitchener, with that great public spirit and patriotism that everyone would expect from him, at my request stepped into the breach. Lord Kitchener, as everyone knows, is not a politician. His association with the Government as a Member of the Cabinet for this purpose must not be taken as in any way identifying him with any set of political opinions. He has, at a great public emergency, responded to a great public call, and I am certain he will have with him, in the discharge of one of the most arduous tasks that has ever fallen upon a Minister, the complete confidence of all parties and all opinions.

I am asking on his behalf for the Army, power to increase the number of men of all ranks, in addition to the number already voted, by no less than 500,000. I am certain the Committee will not refuse its sanction, for we are encouraged to ask for it not only by our own sense of the gravity and the necessities of the case, but by the knowledge that India is prepared to send us certainly two Divisions, and that every one of our self-governing Dominions, spontaneously and unasked, has already tendered to the utmost limits of their possibilities, both in men and in money, every help they can afford to the Empire in a moment of need. Sir, the Mother Country must set the example, while she responds with gratitude and affection to those filial overtures from the outlying members of her family.

Sir, I will say no more. This is not an occasion for controversial discussion. In all that I have said, I believe I have not gone, either in the statement of our case or in my general description of the provision we think it necessary to make, beyond the strict bounds of truth. It is not my purpose—it is not the purpose of any patriotic man—to inflame feeling, to indulge in rhetoric, to excite international animosities. The occasion is far too grave for that. We have a great duty to perform, we have a great trust to fulfil, and confidently we believe that Parliament and the country will enable us to do it.



**MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES.**

**RECUEIL**  
**DE DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES.**

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**Négociations ayant précédé la guerre.**

**10/23 Juillet — 24 Juillet  
6 Août 1914.**



**Petrograde.  
Imprimerie de l'Etat.  
1914.**



**N° 1.**

**Le Chargé d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

**Belgrade, le 10/11, Juillet 1914.**

**(Télégramme).**

Le Ministre d'Autriche vient de transmettre, à 6 heures du soir, au Ministre des Finances Patchou, qui remplace Pachitch, une note ultimative de son Gouvernement fixant un délai de 48 heures pour l'acceptation des demandes y contenues. Giesl a ajouté verbalement que pour le cas où la note ne serait pas acceptée intégralement dans un délai de 48 heures, il avait l'ordre de quitter Belgrade avec le personnel de la Légation. Pachitch et les autres Ministres qui se trouvent en tournée électorale ont été rappelés et sont attendus à Belgrade demain Vendredi à 10 heures du matin. Patchou qui m'a communiqué le contenu de la note, sollicite l'aide de la Russie et déclare qu'aucun Gouvernement Serbe ne pourra accepter les demandes de l'Autriche

**(Signé) Strandtman.**

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**N° 2.**

**Le Chargé d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

**Belgrade, le 10/11, Juillet 1914.**

**(Télégramme).**

Texte de la note qui a été transmise aujourd'hui par le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie au gouvernement Serbe:

Le 31 Mars 1909 le Ministre de Serbie à Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, au Gouvernement I. et R. la déclaration suivante:

La Serbie reconnaît qu'elle n'a pas été atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli créé en Bosnie Herzégovine et qu'elle se conformera

par conséquent à telle décision que les Puissances prendront par rapport à l'article 25 du Traité de Berlin. Se rendant aux Conseils des Grandes Puissances, la Serbie s'engage dès à présent à abandonner l'attitude de protestation et opposition qu'elle a observée à l'égard de l'annexion depuis l'automne dernier, et elle s'engage, en outre, à changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers l'Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre désormais avec cette dernière sur le pied d'un bon voisinage.

Or, l'histoire des dernières années, et notamment les événements douloureux du 28 Juin, ont démontré l'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement subversif dont le but est de détacher de la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement Serbe est arrivé à se manifester au delà du territoire du Royaume par des actes de terrorisme, par une série d'attentats et par des meurtres.

Le Gouvernement Royal Serbe, loin de satisfaire aux engagements formels contenus dans la déclaration du 31 Mars 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement: il a toléré l'activité criminelle des différentes sociétés et affiliations dirigées contre la Monarchie, le langage effréné de la presse, la glorification des auteurs de l'attentat, la participation d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans les agissements subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans l'instruction publique, toléré enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe à la haine de la Monarchie et au mépris de ses institutions.

Cette tolérance coupable du Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'avait pas cessé au moment où les événements du 28 Juin dernier en ont démontré au monde entier les conséquences funestes:

Il résulte des dépositions et aveux des auteurs criminels de l'attentat du 28 Juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a été tramé à Belgrade, que les armes et explosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient être munis, leur ont été donnés par des officiers et fonctionnaires Serbes faisant partie de la «Narodna Odbrana» et enfin que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a été organisé et effectué par des chefs du service-frontière serbe.

Les résultats mentionnés de l'instruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement I. et R. de poursuivre plus longtemps l'attitude de longanimité expectative qu'il avait observé pendant des années vis-à-vis des agissements concentrés à Belgrade et propagés de là sur les territoires de la Monarchie; ces résultats lui imposent au contraire

le devoir de mettre fin à des menées qui forment une menace perpétuelle pour la tranquillité de la Monarchie.

C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement I. et R. se voit obligé de demander au Gouvernement Serbe l'énonciation officielle qu'il condamne la propagande dirigée contre la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise, c'est à dire, l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage à supprimer, par tous les moyens, cette propagande criminelle et terroriste.

Afin de donner un caractère solennel à cet engagement, le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie fera publier à la première page du journal officiel en date du 26/13 Juillet l'énonciation suivante:

«Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est à dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels.

Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé à la propagande susmentionnée et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auquel le Gouvernement Royal s'était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 Mars 1909.

Le Gouvernement Royal, qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du Royaume que dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer.

Cette énonciation sera portée simultanément à la connaissance de l'Armée Royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majesté le Roi et sera publiée dans le bulletin officiel de l'Armée.

Le Gouvernement Royal Serbe s'engage en outre:

1) à supprimer toute publication qui excite à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie et dont la tendance générale est dirigée contre son intégrité territoriale,

2) à dissoudre immédiatement la société dite «Narodna Odbrana», à confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande et à procéder de la même

manière contre les autres sociétés et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent à la propagande contre la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise; le Gouvernement Royal prendra les mesures nécessaires pour que les sociétés dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activité sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme,

3) à éliminer sans délai de l'instruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie,

4) à éloigner du service militaire et de l'administration en général tous les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise et dont le Gouvernement I. et R. se réserve de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gouvernement Royal,

5) à accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement I. et R. dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirigé contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie,

6) à ouvrir une enquête judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 Juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe;

des organes délégués par le Gouvernement I. et R. prendront part aux recherches y relatives;

7) à procéder d'urgence à l'arrestation du commandant Vojta Tankosic et du nommé Milan Ciganovic, employé de l'état Serbe, compromis par les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo,

8) à empêcher, par des mesures efficaces le concours des autorités Serbes dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière,

à licencier et punir sévèrement les fonctionnaires du service frontière de Schabatz et de Loznica coupables d'avoir aidé les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontière,

9) à donner au Gouvernement I. et R. des explications sur les propos injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger qui, malgré leurs positions officielles, n'ont pas hésité après l'attentat du 28 Juin de s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une manière hostile envers la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise, enfin,

10) d'avertir sans retard le Gouvernement I. et R. de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents.



Le Gouvernement I. et R. attend la réponse du Gouvernement Royal au plus tard jusqu'au Samedi 25 de ce mois, à 6 heures du soir.

Un mémoire concernant les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo à l'égard des fonctionnaires mentionnés aux points 7 et 8 est annexé à cette note.

(Signé) Strandtman.

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N<sup>o</sup> 3.

**Note Verbale transmise personnellement par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie à St.-Petersbourg au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères le 11<sup>h</sup>, Juillet 1914 à 10 heures du matin.**

Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal s'est trouvé dans la nécessité de remettre le Jeudi 10<sup>h</sup>, du mois courant, par l'entremise du Ministre Impérial et Royal à Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie:

(Suit le texte de la note).

Voir document N<sup>o</sup> 2.

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N<sup>o</sup> 4.

**Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères au Chargé d'affaires en Autriche-Hongrie.**

St.-Petersbourg, le 11<sup>h</sup>, Juillet 1914.

(l'élégramme).

Veuillez transmettre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Autriche-Hongrie ce qui suit.

La communication du Gouvernement austro-hongrois aux Puissances le lendemain de la présentation de l'ultimatum à Belgrade ne laisse aux Puissances qu'un délai tout-à-fait insuffisant pour entreprendre quoi qu'il soit d'utile pour l'aplanissement des complications surgies. Pour prévenir les conséquences incal-

culables et également néfastes pour toutes les Puissances qui peuvent suivre le mode d'action du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, il nous paraît indispensable qu'avant tout le délai donné à la Serbie pour répondre soit prolongé. L'Autriche-Hongrie se déclarant disposée à informer les Puissances des données de l'enquête sur lesquelles le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal base ses accusations, devrait leur donner également le temps de s'en rendre compte. En ce cas, si les Puissances se convainquaient du bienfondé de certaines des exigences autrichiennes, elles se trouveraient en mesure de faire parvenir au Gouvernement Serbe des conseils en conséquence. Un refus de prolonger le terme de l'ultimatum priverait de toute portée la démarche du Gouvernement austro-hongrois auprès des Puissances et se trouverait en contradiction avec les bases mêmes des relations internationales.

Communiqué à Londres, Rome, Paris, Belgrade.

(Signé) Sazonow.

N° 5.

**Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Représentants de  
Sa Majesté l'Empereur en Angleterre, en Allemagne, en  
Italie et en France.**

St.-Petersbourg, le 11/11 Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Me réfère à mon télégramme à Koudachew d'aujourd'hui; nous espérons que le Gouvernement auprès duquel Vous êtes accrédité partagera notre point de vue et prescrira d'urgence à son Représentant à Vienne de se prononcer dans le même sens.

Communiqué à Belgrade.

(Signé) Sazonow.

**Télégramme de Son Altesse Royale le Prince Régent de  
Serbie à Sa Majesté l'Empereur.**

Belgrade, le 11/11 Juillet 1914.

Le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois a remis hier soir au Gouvernement serbe une note concernant l'attentat de Sarajevo. Consciente de ses devoirs internationaux, la Serbie dès les premiers jours de l'horrible crime a déclaré qu'elle le condamnait et qu'elle était prête à ouvrir une enquête sur son territoire si la complicité de certains de ses sujets était prouvée au cours du procès instruit par les autorités Austro-hongroises. Cependant les demandes contenues dans la note Austro-hongroise sont inutilement humiliantes pour la Serbie et incompatibles avec sa dignité comme Etat indépendant. Ainsi on nous demande sur un ton péremptoire une déclaration du gouvernement dans l'officiel et un ordre du souverain à l'armée, ou nous réprimerions l'esprit hostile contre l'Autriche en nous faisant à nous mêmes des reproches d'une faiblesse criminelle envers nos menées perfides.— On nous impose ensuite l'admission des fonctionnaires austro-hongrois en Serbie pour participer avec les nôtres à l'instruction et pour surveiller l'exécution des autres conditions indiquées dans la note. Nous avons reçu un délai de 48 heures pour accepter le tout, faute de quoi la Légation d'Autriche-Hongrie quittera Belgrade. Nous sommes prêts à accepter les conditions austro-hongroises qui sont compatibles avec la situation d'un Etat indépendant, ainsi que celles dont l'acception nous sera conseillée par Votre Majesté; toutes les personnes dont la participation à l'attentat sera démontrée seront sévèrement punis par nous. Certaines parmi ces demandes ne pourraient être exécutées sans des changements de notre législation, ce qui exige du temps. On nous a donné un délai trop court. Nous pouvons être attaqués après l'expiration du délai par l'armée austro-hongroise qui se concentre sur notre frontière. Il nous est impossible de nous défendre et nous supplions Votre Majesté de nous donner Son aide le plus tôt possible. La bienveillance précieuse de Votre Majesté qui s'est manifestée tant de fois à notre égard nous fait espérer fermement que cette fois encore notre appel sera entendu par Son généreux cœur slave.

En ces moments difficiles J'interprète les sentiments du peuple serbe qui supplie Votre Majesté de vouloir bien s'intéresser au sort du Royaume de Serbie.

(Signé) Alexandre.

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N° 7.

**Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Berlin, le 11/11, Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Tous les journaux du matin, même ceux, rares, qui reconnaissent l'impossibilité pour la Serbie d'accepter les conditions posées, accueillent avec une grande sympathie le ton énergique adopté par l'Autriche. L'officieux «Local-Anzeiger» est particulièrement agressif; il qualifie de superflus les recours éventuels de la Serbie à St. Pétersbourg, à Paris, à Athènes et à Bucarest, et termine en disant que le peuple allemand respirera librement quand il aura appris que la situation dans la péninsule Balcanique va enfin s'éclaircir.

(Signé) Bronewaky.

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N° 8.

**Le Chargé d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Paris, le 11/11, Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

La copie de la note officiellement remise à Belgrade a été communiquée par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche au Gouvernement Français. Plus tard l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a visité le Ministre et lui a lu une communication reproduisant les arguments autrichiens et indiquant qu'en cas de refus de la part de la Serbie, l'Autriche serait obligée de recourir à une pression et, en cas

de besoin, à des mesures militaires; la communication se terminait par la remarque qu'à l'avis de l'Allemagne cette question devrait être résolue directement entre l'Autriche et la Serbie et qu'il était de l'intérêt des Puissances de circonscrire l'affaire en l'abandonnant aux Parties intéressées. Le Gérant du Département Politique, qui assistait à l'entretien, demanda à l'Ambassadeur s'il fallait considérer l'action autrichienne comme un ultimatum—en d'autres termes, si, dans le cas où la Serbie ne se soumettrait pas entièrement aux demandes autrichiennes, les hostilités étaient inévitables? L'ambassadeur évita une réponse directe en alléguant l'absence d'instructions.

(Signé) Sevastopoulo.

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**N<sup>o</sup> 9.**

**Le Chargé d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Belgrade, le 11<sup>1/2</sup>, Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Pachitch est rentré à Belgrade. Il a l'intention de donner dans le délai fixé, c'est à dire demain Samedi à 6 heures du soir, une réponse à l'Autriche indiquant les points acceptables et inacceptables. On adressera aujourd'hui même aux Puissances la prière de défendre l'indépendance de la Serbie. Ensuite, ajouta Pachitch, si la guerre est inévitable—nous ferons la guerre.

(Signé) Strandtman.

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**N<sup>o</sup> 10.**

**Communiqué du Gouvernement Impérial.**

St.-Petersbourg, le 12<sup>1/2</sup>, Juillet 1914.

Les derniers événements et l'envoi par l'Autriche-Hongrie d'un ultimatum à la Serbie préoccupent le Gouvernement Impé-

rial au plus haut degré. Le Gouvernement suit attentivement l'évolution du conflit serbo-autrichien qui ne peut pas laisser la Russie indifférente.

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N° 11.

**Le Chargé d'Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des  
Affaires Etrangères.**

Vienne, le 12/11 Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Le comte Berchtold se trouve à Ischl. Vu l'impossibilité d'y arriver à temps, je lui ai télégraphié notre proposition de prolonger le délai de l'ultimatum et l'ai répétée verbalement au Baron Macchio. Ce dernier m'a promis de la communiquer à temps au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, mais a ajouté qu'il pouvait prédire avec assurance un refus catégorique.

(Signé) Koudachew.

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N° 12.

**Le Chargé d'Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des  
Affaires Etrangères,**

Vienne, le 12/11 Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Suite à mon télégramme d'aujourd'hui. Viens de recevoir de Macchio la réponse négative du Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois à notre proposition de prolonger le délai de la note.

(Signé) Koudachew.

**N<sup>o</sup> 13.**

**Le Chargé d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

**Belgrade, le 12/7, Juillet 1914.**

**(Télégramme).**

**Reçu avec retard le 14—27 Juillet 1914.**

**Je transmets la réponse que le Président du Conseil des Ministres Serbe a remis au ministre Austro-Hongrois à Belgrade aujourd'hui avant l'expiration du délai de l'ultimatum.**

**«Le Gouvernement Royal Serbe a reçu la communication du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal du 10/7, de ce mois et il est persuadé que sa réponse éloignera tout malentendu qui menace de gâter les bons rapports de voisinage entre la Monarchie austro hongroise et le Royaume de Serbie.**

**Le Gouvernement Royal est conscient que les protestations qui ont apparu tant de la tribune de la Skoupchtina nationale que dans les déclarations et les actes des représentants responsables de l'Etat, protestations qui furent coupées court par la déclaration du Gouvernement Serbe en date du 18/3, Mars 1909, ne se sont plus renouvelées vis-à-vis de la grande Monarchie voisine en aucune occasion et que, depuis ce temps, autant de la part des Gouvernements Royaux qui se sont succédé que de la part de leurs organes, aucune tentative n'a été faite dans le but de changer l'état de choses politique et juridique créé en Bosnie et Herzegovine. Le Gouvernement Royal constate que sous ce rapport le gouvernement J. et R. n'a fait aucune représentation, sauf en ce qui concerne un livre scolaire, et au sujet de laquelle le gouvernement Impérial et Royal a reçu une explication entièrement satisfaisante.**

**La Serbie a, de nombreuses fois, donné des preuves de sa politique pacifique et modérée pendant la durée de la crise balkanique, et c'est grâce à la Serbie et au sacrifice qu'elle a fait dans l'intérêt exclusif de la paix européenne, que cette paix a été préservée.**

**Le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas être rendu responsable des manifestations d'un caractère privé telles que les articles des journaux**

et le travail paisible des sociétés, manifestations qui se produisent dans presque tous les pays comme une chose ordinaire et qui échappent, en règle générale, au contrôle officiel, d'autant moins que le Gouvernement Royal, lors de la solution de toute une série de questions qui se sont présentées entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, a montré une grande prévenance et a réussi, de cette façon, à en régler le plus grand nombre au profit du progrès des deux pays voisins.

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Royal a été péniblement surpris par les affirmations, d'après lesquelles des personnes du royaume de Serbie auraient participé à la préparation de l'attentat commis à Sarajevo. Il s'attendait à être invité à collaborer à la recherche de tout ce qui se rapporte à ce crime et il était prêt, pour prouver par des actes son entière correction, à agir contre toutes les personnes à l'égard desquelles des communications lui seraient faites.

Se rendant donc au désir du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, le Gouvernement Royal est disposé à remettre aux tribunaux tout sujet serbe, sans égard à sa situation et à son rang, pour la complicité duquel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, des preuves lui seraient fournies.

Il s'engage spécialement à faire publier à la première page du Journal officiel en date du 13-26 juillet, l'énonciation suivante:

«Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne toute propagande qui serait dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels.

«Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que certains officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé, d'après la communication du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, à la propagande susmentionnée et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvernement Royal s'était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 18/31 mars 1909.

«Le Gouvernement Royal, qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'une immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère qu'il est de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorénavant il procédera avec la der-



nière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer.

Cette énonciation sera portée à la connaissance de l'armée Royale par un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majesté le Roi par S. A. R. le Prince héritier Alexandre, et sera publiée dans le prochain Bulletin officiel de l'armée.

Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en outre:

1) A introduire dans la première convocation régulière de la Skoupchtina une disposition dans la loi de la presse par laquelle sera punie de la manière la plus sévère la provocation à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise, ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance générale serait dirigée contre l'intégrité territoriale de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

Il se charge, lors de la révision de la Constitution, qui est prochaine, de faire introduire dans l'article 22 de la Constitution un amendement de telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus puissent être confisquées, ce qui, actuellement, aux termes catégoriques de l'article 22 de la Constitution, est impossible.

2) Le Gouvernement ne possède aucune preuve, et la note du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne lui en fournit non plus aucune, que la Société Narodna Obrana et les autres sociétés similaires aient commis jusqu'à ce jour quelque acte criminel de ce genre par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Néanmoins, le Gouvernement Royal acceptera la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal et dissoudra la Société Narodna Obrana et toute autre société qui agirait contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

3) Le Gouvernement Royal Serbe s'engage à éliminer sans délai de l'instruction publique en Serbie tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, quand le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui fournira des faits et des preuves de cette propagande.

4) Le Gouvernement Royal accepte de même d'éloigner du service militaire ceux pour qui l'enquête judiciaire aura prouvé qu'ils sont coupables d'actes dirigés contre l'intégrité du territoire de la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise; il attend que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui communique ultérieurement les noms et les faits de ces officiers et fonctionnaires aux fins de la procédure qui doit s'ensuivre.

5) Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la portée de la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal tendant à ce que la Serbie s'engage à accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal.

Mais il déclare qu'il admettra toute collaboration qui répondrait aux principes du droit international et à la procédure criminelle, ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage.

6) Le Gouvernement Royal, cela va de soi, considère de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquête contre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, éventuellement, auraient été mêlés au complot du 15 juin et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du royaume. Quant à la participation à cette enquête des agents des autorités austro-hongroises qui seraient délégués à cet effet par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas l'accepter, car ce serait une violation de la Constitution et de la loi sur la procédure criminelle. Cependant, dans des cas concrets, des communications sur les résultats de l'instruction en question pourraient être données aux organes austro-hongrois.

7) Le Gouvernement Royal a fait procéder dès le soir même de la remise de la note à l'arrestation du commandant Voija Tankositch. Quant à Milan Ciganovitch, qui est sujet de la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise et qui jusqu'au 15 juin était employé (comme aspirant) à la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore être joint. Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal est prié de vouloir bien, dans la forme accoutumée, faire connaître le plus tôt possible les présomptions de culpabilité, ainsi que les preuves éventuelles de culpabilité qui ont été recueillies jusqu'à ce jour par l'enquête à Sarajevo, aux fins d'enquêtes ultérieures.

8) Le Gouvernement Serbe renforcera et étendra les mesures prises pour empêcher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière. Il va de soi qu'il ordonnera tout de suite une enquête et punira sévèrement les fonctionnaires des frontières sur la ligne Schabatz-Loznica, qui ont manqué à leur devoir et laissé passer les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo.

9) Le Gouvernement Royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les propos que ses fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, ont tenus après l'attentat dans des entrevues et qui, d'après l'affirmation du Gouvernement I. et R., ont été hostiles envers la Monarchie, dès que le

Gouvernement I. et R. lui aura communiqué les passages en question de ces propos, et dès qu'il aura démontré que les propos employés ont en effet été tenus par les dits fonctionnaires, quoique le Gouvernement Royal lui même aura soin de recueillir des preuves et convictions.

10) Le Gouvernement Royal informera le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents, en tant que cela n'a pas été déjà fait par la présente note, aussitôt que chaque mesure aura été ordonnée et exécutée. Dans le cas où le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne serait pas satisfait de cette réponse, le Gouvernement Royal Serbe, considérant qu'il est de l'intérêt commun de ne pas précipiter la solution de cette question, est prêt, comme toujours, à accepter une entente pacifique, en remettant cette question, soit à la décision du tribunal international de la Haye, soit aux Grandes Puissances qui ont pris part à l'élaboration de la déclaration que le Gouvernement serbe a faite le 18/31 Mars 1909.

(Signé) Strandtman.

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N° 14.

**Le Chargé d'affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des affaires Etrangères.**

Berlin, le 12<sup>12</sup>,<sub>13</sub> Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Ai reçu Votre télégramme du 11<sup>11</sup>,<sub>12</sub> Juillet. Ai communiqué son contenu au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. Il me dit que le Gouvernement Anglais l'a également prié de conseiller à Vienne la prolongation du délai de l'ultimatum; il a communiqué cette démarche télégraphiquement à Vienne, il va en faire autant pour notre démarche, mais il craint qu'à la suite de l'absence de Berchtold parti pour Ischl, et vu le manque de temps, ses télégrammes ne restent sans résultats; il a, en outre, des doutes sur l'opportunité pour l'Autriche de céder au dernier moment et il se demande si cela ne pouvait pas augmenter l'assurance de la Serbie. J'ai répondu qu'une grande Puissance comme l'Autriche pourrait céder sans porter

atteinte à son prestige et ai fait valoir tous les arguments conformes cependant je n'ai pu obtenir des promesses plus précises. Même lorsque je laissais entendre qu'il fallait agir à Vienne pour éviter la possibilité de conséquences redoutables, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères répondait chaque fois négativement.

(Signé) Bronewsky.

N° 15.

**Le Chargé d'affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.**

Paris, le 14<sup>es</sup> Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Ai reçu le télégramme du 11<sup>es</sup> Juillet concernant la prolongation du délai de l'ultimatum autrichien et ai fait la communication prescrite. Le Représentant de France à Vienne a été muni d'instructions conformes.

(Signé) Sevastopoule.

N° 16.

**L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.**

Londres, le 14<sup>es</sup> Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Reçu télégramme du 11 Juillet. Grey a prescrit à l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Vienne d'appuyer notre démarche concernant la prolongation du délai de l'ultimatum. Il m'a dit en même temps que l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche était venu le voir et avait expliqué qu'on ne devrait pas attribuer à la note autrichienne le caractère d'un ultimatum; il faudrait la considérer comme une démarche qui, en cas d'absence de réponse ou en cas de réponse insuffisante au terme fixé, aurait comme suite la rupture des relations diplomatiques et le départ immédiat

de Belgrade du Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie, sans entraîner cependant le commencement immédiat des hostilités.—Grey a ajouté qu' à la suite de cette explication il a indiqué à l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Vienne que dans le cas où il serait trop tard pour soulever la question de la prolongation du délai de l'ultimatum, celle de l'arrêt des hostilités pourrait peut-être servir de base à la discussion.

(Signé) Benckendorff.

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**N° 17.**

**Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur à Londres.**

**St.-Petersbourg, le 12/1, Juillet 1914.**

**(Télégramme).**

Dans le cas d'une nouvelle aggravation de la situation, pouvant provoquer de la part des Grandes Puissances des actions conformes, nous comptons que l'Angleterre ne tardera pas de se ranger nettement du côté de la Russie et de la France, en vue de maintenir l'équilibre européen, en faveur duquel elle est intervenue constamment dans le passé et qui serait sans aucun doute compromis dans le cas du triomphe de l'Autriche.

(Signé) Sazonow.

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**N° 18.**

**Note verbale remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères le 12/1, Juillet 1914.**

Il nous revient de source autoritative que la nouvelle répandue par quelques journaux d'après laquelle la démarche du Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade aurait été faite à l'instigation de l'Allemagne est absolument fausse. Le Gouvernement Allemand n'a pas eu connaissance du texte de la note Autrichienne avant qu'elle ait été remise et n'a exercé

aucune influence sur son contenu. C'est à tort qu'on attribue à l'Allemagne une attitude comminatoire.

L'Allemagne appuie naturellement comme allié de l'Autriche les revendications à son avis légitimes du Cabinet de Vienne contre la Serbie.

Avant tout elle désire comme elle l'a déjà déclaré dès le commencement du différend Austro-Serbe que ce conflit reste localisé.

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N° 19.

**Le Chargé d'affaire en France au Ministre des affaires  
Etrangères.**

Paris, le 11/11 Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Me réfère à mon télégramme du 11/11 Juillet.

Aujourd'hui un journal du matin a publié, sous une forme pas entièrement exacte, les déclarations d'hier de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, en les faisant suivre de commentaires qui attribuent à cette démarche le caractère d'une menace. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, très impressionné par ces divulgations, a visité aujourd'hui le Gérant du Département Politique pour lui dire que ses paroles n'avaient nullement eu le caractère de menace qu'on leur attribue. Il a déclaré que l'Autriche avait présenté sa note à la Serbie sans entente précise avec Berlin, mais que cependant l'Allemagne approuvait le point de vue de l'Autriche et que certainement « la flèche une fois partie » (ce sont là ses propres paroles), l'Allemagne ne pouvait se laisser guider que par ses devoirs d'alliée.

(Signé) Sevastopoulo.

**N° 20.**

**L'ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

**Londres, le 12/23 Juillet 1914.**

**(Télégramme).**

Grey m'a dit que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne lui a déclaré que le Gouvernement Allemand n'avait pas été informé du texte de la note autrichienne, mais qu'il soutenait entièrement la démarche autrichienne. L'Ambassadeur a demandé en même temps si l'Angleterre pouvait consentir à agir à St.-Petersbourg dans un esprit de conciliation. Grey a répondu que cela était complètement impossible. Le Ministre a ajouté que tant que les complications n'existaient qu'entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, les intérêts Anglais n'étaient engagés qu'indirectement, mais qu'il devait prévoir que la mobilisation autrichienne aurait comme suite la mobilisation de la Russie et que dès ce moment on se trouverait en présence d'une situation à laquelle seraient intéressées toutes les Puissances. L'Angleterre se réservait pour ce cas une complète liberté d'action.

**(Signé) Benckendorff.**

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**N° 21.**

**Le Chargé d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

**Belgrade le 12/23 Juillet 1914.**

**(Télégramme).**

Malgré le caractère extrêmement conciliant de la réponse serbe à l'ultimatum, le Ministre d'Autriche vient d'informer, à 6<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>, du soir, le Gouvernement Serbe par note, que n'ayant pas reçu au délai fixé une réponse satisfaisante il quitte Belgrade avec tout le personnel de la Légation. La Scoupchtina est convoquée à Nich pour le 14/27 Juillet. Le Gouvernement Serbe et le Corps Diplomatique partent ce soir pour la même ville.

**(Signé) Strandman.**

N° 22.

**L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Londres le 12/13 Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Grey a dit à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qu'à son avis la mobilisation autrichienne devait entraîner la mobilisation de la Russie, qu'alors surgirait le danger aigu d'une guerre générale et qu'il ne voyait qu'un seul moyen pour une solution pacifique: qu'en présence des mobilisations autrichienne et russe, l'Allemagne, la France, l'Italie et l'Angleterre s'abstiennent d'une mobilisation immédiate et proposent tout d'abord leurs bons offices. Grey m'a dit que ce plan nécessitait avant tout l'agrément de l'Allemagne et l'engagement de cette Puissance de ne pas mobiliser. En conséquence il a adressé tout d'abord à Berlin une question à ce sujet.

(Signé) Benckendorff.

N° 23.

**Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur en  
Italie.**

St. Pétersbourg, le 12/13 Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

L'Italie pourrait jouer un rôle de tout premier ordre en faveur du maintien de la paix, en exerçant l'influence nécessaire sur l'Autriche et en adoptant une attitude nettement défavorable au conflit, car ce dernier ne saurait être localisé. Il est désirable que vous exprimiez la conviction qu'il est impossible pour la Russie de ne pas venir en aide à la Serbie.

(Signé) Sazonow.



**N<sup>o</sup> 24.**

**Le Gérant du Consulat à Prague au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

**Prague, le 13/1, Juillet 1914.**

**(Télégramme).**

**La mobilisation a été décrétée.**

**(Signé) Kazanskv.**

**N<sup>o</sup> 25.**

**Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur en  
Autriche Hongrie.**

**St. Pétersbourg, le 13/1, Juillet 1914.**

**(Télégramme).**

J'ai eu aujourd'hui un long entretien sur un ton amical avec l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie. Après avoir examiné avec lui les 10 demandes adressées à la Serbie, j'ai fait observer qu'à part la forme peu habile sous laquelle elles sont présentées, quelques unes parmi elles sont absolument inexécutables, même dans le cas où le gouvernement Serbe déclarerait les vouloir accepter. Ainsi, par exemple, les points 1 et 2 ne pourraient être exécutés sans un remaniement des lois serbes sur la presse et sur les associations, pour lequel le consentement de la Scoupchtina pourrait être difficilement obtenu; quant à l'exécution des points 4 et 5, elle pourrait produire des conséquences fort dangereuses et même faire naître le danger d'actes de terrorisme dirigés contre les membres de la Maison Royale et contre Pachitch, ce qui ne saurait entrer dans les vues de l'Autriche. En ce qui regarde les autres points, il me semble, qu'avec certains changements dans les détails, il ne serait pas difficile de trouver un terrain d'entente si les accusations y contenues étaient confirmées par des preuves suffisantes.

Dans l'intérêt de la conservation de la paix qui, aux dires de Szapary, est précieuse à l'Autriche au même degré qu'à toutes les Puissances, il serait nécessaire de mettre au plus tôt possible une

fin à la situation tendue du moment. Dans ce but il me semblerait très désirable, que l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie fût autorisé d'entrer avec moi dans un échange de vues privé aux fins d'un remaniement en commun de quelques articles de la note autrichienne du 1<sup>er</sup>/<sub>11</sub> Juillet. Ce procédé permettrait peut être de trouver une formule qui fût acceptable pour la Serbie, tout en donnant satisfaction à l'Autriche quant au fond de ses demandes. Veuillez avoir une explication prudente et amicale dans le sens de ce télégramme avec le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. Communiqué aux Ambassadeurs en Allemagne, en France, en Angleterre et en Italie.

(Signé) Sazonow.

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N° 26.

**Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur en Allemagne.**

St. Pétersbourg, le 1<sup>er</sup>/<sub>11</sub> Juillet.

(Télégramme).

Veuillez communiquer le contenu de mon télégramme à Vienne d'aujourd'hui au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Allemand et lui exprimer l'espoir, que de son côté il trouvera possible de conseiller à Vienne d'aller au devant de notre proposition.

(Signé) Sazonow.

N° 27.

**Le Chargé d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.**

Paris, le 1<sup>er</sup>/<sub>11</sub> Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Le Directeur du Département Politique m'informe, que lors de la communication qu'il a faite à l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche du contenu de la réponse serbe à l'ultimatum, l'Ambassadeur n'a pas caché son

étonnement de ce qu'elle n'ait pas donné satisfaction à Giesl. L'attitude conciliante de la Serbie doit, selon l'avis du Directeur du Département Politique, produire la meilleure impression en Europe.

(Signé) Sevastopoulo.

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№ 28.

**Le Chargé d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.**

Paris, le 13<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>, Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a de nouveau rendu visite au Gérant du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et lui a fait les déclarations suivantes:

«L'Autriche a déclaré à la Russie qu'elle ne recherche pas des acquisitions territoriales et qu'elle ne menace pas l'intégrité de la Serbie. Son but unique est d'assurer sa propre tranquillité. Par conséquent il dépend de la Russie d'éviter la guerre. L'Allemagne se sent solidaire avec la France dans le désir ardent de conserver la paix et espère fermement que la France usera de son influence à Pétersbourg dans un sens modérateur». Le Ministre fit observer que l'Allemagne pourrait de son côté entreprendre des démarches analogues à Vienne, surtout en présence de l'esprit de conciliation dont a fait preuve la Serbie. L'Ambassadeur répondit que cela n'était pas possible, vu la résolution prise de ne pas s'immiscer dans le conflit austro-serbe. Alors le Ministre demanda, si les quatre Puissances—l'Angleterre, l'Allemagne, l'Italie et la France—ne pouvaient pas entreprendre des démarches à St.-Pétersbourg et à Vienne, puisque l'affaire se réduisait en somme à un conflit entre la Russie et l'Autriche. L'Ambassadeur alléguait l'absence d'instructions. Finalement le Ministre refusa d'adhérer à la proposition allemande.

(Signé) Sevastopoulo.

**N° 29.**

**Le Chargé d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

**Paris, le 12<sup>e</sup> Juillet 1914.**

**(Télégramme).**

**Le Directeur du Département Politique a déclaré qu'à son avis personnel, les démarches successives allemandes à Paris ont pour but d'intimider la France et d'amener son intervention à St-Pétersbourg.**

**(Signé) Sevastopoule.**

**N° 30.**

**Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affai-  
res Etrangères.**

**Berlin, le 12<sup>e</sup> Juillet 1914.**

**(Télégramme).**

**Après la réception à Berlin de la nouvelle de la mobilisation de l'armée autrichienne contre la Serbie une grande foule, composée, aux dires des journaux, en partie d'éléments autrichiens, se livra à une série de bruyantes manifestations en faveur de l'Autriche. A une heure avancée de la soirée les manifestants se massèrent à plusieurs reprises devant le palais de l'Ambassade Impériale en poussant des cris hostiles à la Russie; la police était presque absente et ne prenait aucune mesure.**

**(Signé) Bronewsky.**

**N° 31.**

**L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

**Londres, le 16/17 Juillet 1914.**

**(Télégramme).**

**Ai reçu votre télégramme du 13—26 Juillet. Prie me télégraphier si, à Votre avis, Vos pourparlers directs avec le cabinet de Vienne s'accordent avec le projet de Grey concernant la médiation des 4 Gouvernements. Ayant appris de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à St.-Petersbourg que Vous étiez disposé à accepter cette combinaison, Grey a décidé de la transformer en une proposition officielle qu'il a faite hier soir à Berlin, à Paris et à Rome.**

**(Signé) Benckendorff.**

**N° 32.**

**Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en  
France et en Angleterre.**

**St.-Petersbourg, le 16/17 Juillet 1914.**

**(Télégramme).**

**L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre est venu s'informer si nous jugeons utile que l'Angleterre prenne l'initiative de convoquer à Londres une conférence des représentants de l'Angleterre, la France, l'Allemagne et l'Italie, pour étudier une issue à la situation actuelle.**

**J'ai répondu à l'Ambassadeur que j'ai entamé des pourparlers avec l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie, en conditions que j'espère favorables. Pourtant je n'ai pas encore reçu de réponse à la proposition que j'ai faite d'une revision de la note entre les deux Cabinets.**

Si des explications directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne se trouvaient irréalisables, je suis prêt à accepter la proposition anglaise ou toute autre de nature à résoudre favorablement le conflit.

(Signé) Sazonow.

N° 33.

**Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en France, en Angleterre, en Allemagne, en Autriche-Hongrie et en Italie.**

St.-Petersbourg, le 14/1, Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Ai pris connaissance de la réponse transmise par le Gouvernement Serbe au Baron Giessl. Elle dépasse toutes nos prévisions par sa modération et son désir de donner la plus complète satisfaction à l'Autriche. Nous ne voyons pas quelles pourraient être encore les demandes de l'Autriche, à moins que le Cabinet de Vienne ne cherche un prétexte pour une guerre avec la Serbie.

(Signé) Sazonow.

N° 34.

**Le Chargé d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.**

Paris, le 14/1, Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a conféré aujourd'hui de nouveau longuement sur la situation avec le Directeur du Département Politique. L'Ambassadeur a beaucoup insisté sur l'exclusion de toute possibilité d'une médiation ou d'une conférence.

(Signé) Sevastopoulo.

**N<sup>o</sup> 35.**

**L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Paris, le 14/17 Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Ai conféré avec le Gérant du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, en présence de Berthelot, immédiatement après mon retour à Paris. Tous les deux m'ont confirmé les détails concernant les démarches de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que Sevastopoulo Vous a communiqués dans ses télégrammes. Ce matin le Baron de Schoen a confirmé par écrit sa déclaration d'hier, savoir: 1) l'Autriche a déclaré à la Russie qu'elle ne recherche pas d'acquisitions et n'attende pas à l'intégrité de la Serbie. Son unique but. est d'assurer sa propre tranquillité. 2) Par conséquent il dépend de la Russie d'éviter la guerre. 3) L'Allemagne et la France, complètement solidaires dans l'ardent désir de ne pas rompre la paix, doivent agir sur la Russie dans un sens modérateur. Le Baron de Schoen a spécialement souligné l'expression de la solidarité entre l'Allemagne et la France. D'après la conviction du Ministre de la Justice, les démarches susdites de l'Allemagne ont pour but évident de désunir la Russie et la France, d'entraîner le Gouvernement Français dans la voie des représentations à St.-Petersbourg et de compromettre ainsi notre allié à nos yeux; enfin, en cas de guerre, d'en rejeter la responsabilité non sur l'Allemagne, qui employe soi disant tous ses efforts pour le maintien de la paix, mais sur la Russie et la France.

(Signé) Iswolsky.

**N<sup>o</sup> 36.**

**L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Paris, le 14/17 Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Il ressort de vos télégrammes du 13/14 Juillet que vous ne connaissiez pas encore la réponse du Gouvernement Serbe. Le télégramme par lequel cette nouvelle m'a été communiquée de Belgrade a été

également en route pendant 20 heures. Le télégramme du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Français expédié avant hier, au triple tarif, à onze heures du matin, et contenant l'ordre d'appuyer notre démarche n'est parvenu à sa destination qu'à 6 heures. Il n'y a aucun doute que ce télégramme n'ait été retenu intentionnellement par le télégraphe autrichien.

(Signé) Iswolsky.

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N° 37.

**L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Paris, le 14/17, Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

D'ordre de son Gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a communiqué au Gérant du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères que la réponse de la Serbie a été jugée insuffisante à Vienne et que demain, mardi, l'Autriche procéderait à des actions énergiques dont le but serait de forcer la Serbie de lui donner les garanties nécessaires. Le Ministre ayant demandé en quoi consisteraient ces actions, l'Ambassadeur répondit qu'il n'avait pas de renseignements exacts à ce sujet, mais qu'il pouvait s'agir d'un passage de la frontière serbe, d'un ultimatum et même d'une déclaration de guerre.

(Signé) Iswolsky.

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N° 38.

**Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Berlin, le 14/17, Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

J'ai prié le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'appuyer à Vienne votre proposition tendant à autoriser Szapary d'élaborer, par la voie d'un échange de vues privé avec Vous, une rédaction des demandes



austro-hongroises acceptable pour les deux parties. Jagow a répondu qu'il était au courant de cette proposition et qu'il partageait l'avis de Pourtalès que, puisque Szapary avait commencé cette conversation, il pourrait aussi bien la continuer. Il télégraphiera dans ce sens à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Vienne. Je l'ai prié de conseiller d'une façon plus pressante à Vienne de s'engager dans cette voie de conciliation; Jagow a répondu qu'il ne pouvait pas conseiller à l'Autriche de céder.

(Signé) Bronewsky.

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№ 39.

**Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Berlin, le 14/17 Juillet 1914.,

(Télégramme).

Aujourd'hui, avant ma visite au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, ce dernier avait reçu celle de l'Ambassadeur de France qui avait tenté de lui faire accepter la proposition anglaise relative à une action en faveur de la paix, action qui serait exercée simultanément à St.-Pétersbourg et à Vienne par l'Angleterre, l'Allemagne, l'Italie et la France. Cambon a proposé que ces Puissances donnent à Vienne un conseil dans les termes suivants: «S'abstenir de tout acte qui pourrait aggraver la situation de l'heure actuelle». En adoptant cette formule voilée on éviterait de mentionner la nécessité de s'abstenir d'une invasion de la Serbie. Jagow a opposé à cette proposition un refus catégorique, et cela malgré les instances de l'Ambassadeur qui a fait valoir, comme un bon côté de la proposition, le groupement mixte des Puissances grâce auquel on évitait l'opposition de l'Alliance à l'Entente, ce dont s'était si souvent plaint Jagow lui même.

(Signé) Bronewsky.

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N° 40.

**Télégramme de Sa Majesté Impériale l'Empereur à Son  
Altesse Royale le Prince Alexandre de Serbie en date du  
11/17 Juillet 1914.**

Votre Altesse Royale en s'adressant à Moi dans un moment particulièrement difficile ne s'est pas trompée sur les sentiments qui M'animent à Son égard et sur Ma sympathie cordiale pour le peuple serbe.

Ma plus sérieuse attention est attirée par la situation actuelle et Mon Gouvernement s'applique de toutes ses forces à aplanir les présentes difficultés. Je ne doute point que Votre Altesse et le Gouvernement Royal ne veuillent faciliter cette tâche en ne négligeant rien pour arriver à une solution qui permette de prévenir les horreurs d'une nouvelle guerre tout en sauvegardant la dignité de la Serbie.

Tant qu'il y a le moindre espoir d'éviter une effusion de sang, tous nos efforts doivent tendre vers ce but. Si, malgré Notre plus sincère désir, Nous ne réussissons pas, Votre Altesse peut être assurée qu'en aucun cas la Russie ne se désintéressera du sort de la Serbie.

(Signé) Nicolas.

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N° 41.

**L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des  
Affaires Etrangères.**

Vienne le 11/17 juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères est absent. Pendant un entretien prolongé, que j'ai eu aujourd'hui avec Macchio, j'ai, en termes tout à fait amicaux, attiré son attention sur l'impression défavorable qu'a produite en Russie la présentation par l'Autriche à la Serbie de demandes absolument inacceptables pour chaque état indépendant, bien que petit. J'ai ajouté que ce procédé, qui pourrait amener des complications les moins désirables, a provoqué en Russie une profonde surprise et une réprobation générale. Il faut sup-

poser que l'Autriche, sous l'influence des assurances du Représentant Allemand à Vienne, lequel pendant toute cette crise a joué un rôle d'instigateur, a compté sur la probabilité de la localisation de son conflit avec la Serbie et sur la possibilité de porter à cette dernière impunément un coup grave. La déclaration du Gouvernement Impérial concernant l'impossibilité pour la Russie de rester indifférente en présence d'un tel procédé a provoqué ici une grande impression.

(Signé) Schébéko.

N<sup>o</sup> 42.

**L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Londres, le 14/17 Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Grey vient de répondre à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, qui était venu le questionner sur la possibilité d'une action à St.-Petersbourg, que cette action devrait se produire à Vienne et que le cabinet de Berlin serait le mieux qualifié pour l'exercer. Grey a fait observer en même temps que la réponse serbe à la note autrichienne dépassait par sa modération et son esprit de conciliation tout ce à quoi on pouvait s'attendre. Grey a ajouté qu'il en concluait que la Russie avait conseillé à Belgrade de donner une réponse modérée et qu'il pensait que la réponse serbe pouvait servir de base à une solution pacifique et acceptable de la question.

Dans ces conditions, a continué Grey, si l'Autriche malgré cette réponse commençait les hostilités, elle prouverait son intention d'anéantir la Serbie. La question placée sur ce terrain produirait une situation qui pourrait amener une guerre dans laquelle seraient impliquées toutes les Puissances.

Grey a enfin déclaré que le Gouvernement Anglais était bien sincèrement disposé à collaborer avec le gouvernement Allemand tant qu'il s'agirait de la conservation de la paix; mais que pour le cas contraire l'Angleterre se réservait une pleine liberté d'action.

(Signé) Benckendorff.

**N° 43.**

**Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à l'Ambassadeur en  
Angleterre.**

**St.-Petersbourg, le 12/07, Juillet 1914.**

**(Télégramme).**

Mes entretiens avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne confirment mon impression que l'Allemagne est plutôt favorable à l'intransigeance de l'Autriche.

Le Cabinet de Berlin, qui aurait pu arrêter tout le développement de la crise, paraît n'exercer aucune action sur son allié.

L'ambassadeur trouve insuffisante la réponse de la Serbie.

Cette attitude allemande est tout particulièrement alarmante.

Il me semble que mieux que toute autre Puissance l'Angleterre serait en mesure de tenter encore d'agir à Berlin pour engager le Gouvernement Allemand à l'action nécessaire. C'est à Berlin qu'indubitablement se trouve la clef de la situation.

**(Signé) Sazonow.**

**N° 44.**

**Le Consul général à Fiume au Ministre des Affaires Étran-  
gères.**

**Fiume le 16/07, Juillet 1914.**

**(Télégramme).**

L'état de siège a été proclamé en Slavonie, en Croatie et à Fiume et en même temps les réservistes de toutes les catégories ont été mobilisés.

**(Signé) Salviati.**

N<sup>o</sup> 45.

**L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Vienne le 1<sup>er</sup>/<sub>2</sub>, Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

J'ai entretenu aujourd'hui le Comte Berchtold dans le sens des instructions de Votre Excellence. Jo lui fis observer, en termes les plus amicaux, combien il était désirable de trouver une solution qui, en consolidant les bons rapports entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, donnerait à la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise des garanties sérieuses pour ses rapports futurs avec la Serbie.

J'attirais l'attention du Comte Berchtold sur tous les dangers pour la paix de l'Europe qu'entraînerait un conflit armé entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie.

Le Comte Berchtold me répondit qu'il se rendait parfaitement compte du sérieux de la situation et des avantages d'une franche explication avec le Cabinet de Saint-Pétersbourg. Il me dit que d'un autre côté le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois, qui ne s'était décidé que très mal volontiers aux mesures énergiques qu'il avait prises contre la Serbie, ne pouvait plus ni reculer, ni entrer en discussion aucune des termes de la note Austro-Hongroise.

Le Comte Berchtold ajouta que la crise était devenue si aiguë, et que l'excitation de l'opinion publique avait atteint tel degré, que le Gouvernement, le voulait il, ne pouvait plus y consentir, d'autant moins, me dit-il, que la réponse même de la Serbie donne la preuve du manque de sincérité de ses promesses pour l'avenir.

(Signé) Schébéko.

N<sup>o</sup> 46.

**Le Chargé d'affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Berlin, le 1<sup>er</sup>/<sub>2</sub>, Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Le Bureau Wolff n'a pas publié le texte de la note responsive serbe qui lui avait été communiqué. Jusqu'à ce moment

cette note n'a paru in extenso dans aucun des journaux locaux; qui selon toute évidence ne veulent pas lui donner place dans leurs colonnes, se rendant compte de l'effet calmant que cette publication produirait sur les lecteurs Allemands.

(Signé) Brunewsky.

№ 47.

**L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.**

Vienne, le 15/10 Juillet, 1914.

(Télégramme).

Le décret sur la mobilisation générale a été signé.

(Signé) Schébéko.

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№ 48.

**Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur à Londres.**

St.-Petersbourg, le 15/11 Juillet, 1914.

(Télégramme).

En présence des hostilités entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie il est nécessaire que l'Angleterre entreprenne d'urgence une action médiatrice et que l'action militaire de l'Autriche contre la Serbie soit immédiatement suspendue. Autrement la médiation ne servira que de prétexte pour tirer en longueur la solution de la question et donnera entre temps à l'Autriche la possibilité d'écraser complètement la Serbie et d'occuper une situation dominante dans les Balkans.

Communiqué à Paris, Berlin, Vienne et Rome.

(Signé) Sazonow.

**Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères au Charge d'Affaires  
en Allemagne.**

St.-Petersbourg, le 1<sup>er</sup> 1/2, Juillet, 1914.

(Télégramme).

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'informe, au nom du Chancelier, que l'Allemagne n'a pas cessé d'exercer à Vienne une influence modératrice et qu'elle continuera cette action même après la déclaration de guerre. Jusqu'à ce matin il n'y avait aucune nouvelle que les armées autrichiennes aient franchi la frontière Serbe. J'ai prié l'Ambassadeur de transmettre au Chancelier mes remerciements pour la teneur amicale de cette communication. Je l'ai informé des mesures militaires prises par la Russie, dont aucune, lui dis-je, n'était dirigée contre l'Allemagne; j'ajoutais qu'elles ne préjugeaient pas non plus des mesures agressives contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, ces mesures s'expliquant par la mobilisation de la plus grande partie de l'armée austro-hongroise. L'ambassadeur se prononçant en faveur d'explications directes entre le Cabinet de Vienne et nous, je répondis que j'y étais tout disposé, pour peu que les conseils du Cabinet de Berlin dont il parlait trouvent écho à Vienne.

En même temps je signalais que nous étions tout disposés à accepter le projet d'une conférence des quatre Puissances, un projet auquel, paraissait-il, l'Allemagne ne sympathisait pas entièrement.

Je dis que, dans mon opinion, le meilleur moyen pour mettre à profit tous les moyens propres à produire une solution pacifique consisterait en une action parallèle des pourparlers d'une conférence à quatre de l'Allemagne, de la France, de l'Angleterre et de l'Italie et d'un contact direct entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, à l'instar à peu près de ce qui avait eu lieu aux moments les plus critiques de la crise de l'an dernier.

Je dis à l'Ambassadeur qu'après les concessions faites par la Serbie, un terrain de compromis pour les questions restées ouvertes ne serait pas très difficile à trouver, à condition toutefois de

quelque bonne volonté de la part de l'Autriche et à condition que toutes les Puissances usent de toute leur influence, dans un sens de conciliation.

Communiqué aux Ambassadeurs en Angleterre, en France, en Autriche-Hongrie et en Italie.

(Signé) Sazonow.

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N° 50.

**Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en Angleterre et en France.**

St.-Petersbourg, le 1<sup>er</sup>/10 Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Lors de mon entretien avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, dont traite mon télégramme précédent, je n'avais pas encore reçu le télégramme du 1<sup>er</sup>/10 Juillet de M. Schébéko.

Le contenu de ce télégramme constitue un refus du Cabinet de Vienne de procéder à un échange d'idées direct avec le Gouvernement Impérial.

Dès lors, il ne nous reste plus qu'à nous en remettre entièrement au Gouvernement britannique pour l'initiative des démarches qu'il jugera utile de provoquer.

Communiqué à Vienne, Rome et Berlin.

(Signé) Sazonow.

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N° 51.

**Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.**

Berlin, le 1<sup>er</sup>/10 Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Sur ma question s'il avait une réponse de Vienne relativement à Votre proposition de pourparlers privés à St.-Petersbourg, le Secrétaire d'Etat a répondu négativement.



Il déclare qu'il lui est fort difficile d'agir sur Vienne, surtout ouvertement. Parlant à Cambon, il a même ajouté qu'en cas d'une pression trop évidente l'Autriche se hâterait de mettre l'Allemagne en présence d'un fait accompli.

Le Secrétaire d'Etat dit qu'il a reçu aujourd'hui un télégramme de Pourtalès d'où il constate que plus que les premiers jours Vous êtes disposé à trouver un compromis acceptable pour tous. J'ai répliqué que probablement Vous avez été dès le commencement en faveur d'un compromis bien entendu à la condition qu'il soit acceptable non seulement pour l'Autriche, mais également pour nous. Il m'a dit ensuite qu'il paraissait que nous avions commencé à mobiliser sur la frontière autrichienne et qu'il craignait que ceci rendrait plus difficile pour l'Autriche la possibilité de s'entendre avec nous, d'autant plus que l'Autriche ne mobilisait que contre la Serbie et ne faisait pas de préparatifs sur notre frontière. J'ai répondu que, d'après les renseignements dont je disposais, l'Autriche mobilisait également sur notre frontière et que par conséquent nous devons prendre des mesures analogues. J'ai ajouté que les mesures que nous avons peut-être prises de notre côté n'étaient nullement dirigées contre l'Allemagne.

(Signé) Bronewsky.

N<sup>o</sup> 52.

**Le Chargé d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Nich, le 16/11, Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Aujourd'hui le Ministre de Bulgarie, au nom de son Gouvernement, a déclaré à Pachitch que la Bulgarie observerait la neutralité.

(Signé) Strandtman.

N° 53.

**L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Paris, le 1<sup>er</sup>, Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

A l'occasion de l'arrivée du Président de la République Française le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères avait préparé un court exposé de la situation politique actuelle, à peu près dans les termes suivants: L'Autriche, craignant la décomposition intérieure, s'est emparée du prétexte de l'assassinat de l'Archiduc pour essayer d'obtenir des garanties qui pourront revêtir la forme de l'occupation des communications militaires serbes ou même du territoire serbe. L'Allemagne soutient l'Autriche. Le maintien de la paix dépend de la seule Russie, parce qu'il s'agit d'une affaire qui doit être «localisée» entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, c'est à dire de la punition de la politique précédente de la Serbie et des garanties pour l'avenir. De ceci l'Allemagne conclue qu'il faut exercer une action modératrice à Pétersbourg. Ce sophisme a été réfuté à Paris comme à Londres. A Paris, le Baron de Schoen a en vain tâché d'entraîner la France à une action solidaire avec l'Allemagne sur la Russie en faveur du maintien de la paix. Les mêmes tentatives ont été faites à Londres. Dans les deux capitales il a été répondu que l'action devrait être exercée à Vienne, car les demandes excessives de l'Autriche, son refus de discuter les rares réserves de la Serbie, et la déclaration de guerre menacent de provoquer la guerre générale. La France et l'Angleterre ne peuvent exercer une action modératrice sur la Russie laquelle jusqu'ici a fait preuve de la plus grande modération, surtout en conseillant à la Serbie d'accepter ce qui était possible de la note autrichienne. Aujourd'hui l'Allemagne paraît renoncer à l'idée d'une action sur la Russie seule et incline vers une action médiatrice à Pétersbourg et à Vienne, mais en même temps l'Allemagne comme l'Autriche tâchent de faire traîner l'affaire. L'Allemagne s'oppose à la Conférence sans indiquer aucune autre manière d'agir pratique. L'Autriche mène des pourparlers manifestement dilatoires à Pétersbourg. En même temps elle prend des mesures actives, et si ces mesures sont tolérées, ses prétentions augmenteront proportionnellement. Il est très désirable que la Russie prête tout

son appui au projet de médiation que présentera Sir E. Grey. Dans le cas contraire l'Autriche, sous prétexte de «garantie», pourra, en fait, changer le statut territorial de l'Europe orientale.

(Signé) Iswolsky.

**N° 54.**

**L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Londres, le 16/7, Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Ai communiqué le contenu de Vos télégrammes du 15/7, Juillet à Grey. Il a déclaré aujourd'hui à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que les pourparlers directs entre la Russie et l'Autriche avaient échoué. et que les correspondants des journaux mandaient de St.-Petersbourg que la Russie mobilisait contre l'Autriche à la suite de la mobilisation de cette dernière. Grey dit qu'en principe le Gouvernement Allemand s'est déclaré en faveur de la médiation. mais qu'il rencontre des difficultés quant à la forme. Grey a insisté pour que le Gouvernement Allemand indiquât la forme laquelle à l'avis de l'Allemagne pourrait permettre aux 4 Puissances d'exercer leur médiation pour éviter la guerre; vu le consentement de la France, de l'Italie et de l'Angleterre la médiation pourrait avoir lieu seulement dans le cas où l'Allemagne consentirait à se ranger du côté de la paix.

(Signé) Benckendorff.

**N° 55.**

**L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.**

Paris, le 16/7, Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Viviani vient de me confirmer l'entière résolution du Gouvernement Français d'agir d'accord avec nous. Cette résolution est sou-

tenne par les cercles les plus étendus et par les partis y compris les radicaux-socialistes qui viennent de lui présenter une déclaration exprimant la confiance absolue et les dispositions patriotiques du groupe. Dès son arrivée à Paris, Viviani a télégraphié d'urgence à Londres que vu la cessation des pourparlers directs entre Pétersbourg et Vienne il était nécessaire que le Cabinet de Londres renouvelât le plus tôt possible sous telle ou autre forme sa proposition concernant la médiation des Puissances. Avant moi Viviani a reçu aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qui lui a renouvelé l'assurance des tendances pacifiques de l'Allemagne. Viviani ayant fait observer que si l'Allemagne désirait la paix elle devrait se hâter d'adhérer à la proposition de médiation anglaise, le Baron Schoen a répondu que les mots «conférence» ou «arbitrage» effrayaient l'Autriche. Viviani a répliqué qu'il ne s'agissait pas de mots et qu'il serait facile de trouver une autre forme de médiation. D'après l'avis du Baron de Schoen, pour le succès des négociations entre les Puissances il serait nécessaire de savoir ce que l'Autriche compterait demander à la Serbie. Viviani a répondu que le Cabinet de Berlin pourrait bien facilement s'en enquérir auprès de l'Autriche, mais qu'en attendant la note responsive serbe pourrait servir de base à la discussion; il a ajouté que la France désirait sincèrement la paix, mais qu'elle était en même temps résolue d'agir en pleine harmonie avec ses alliés et amis, et que lui, le Baron de Schoen, avait pu se convaincre que cette résolution rencontrait la plus vive approbation du pays.

(Signé) Iswolsky.

N° 56.

**Télégramme de son Altesse Royale le Prince Alexandre de Serbie à sa Majesté l'Empereur.**

Profondément touché par le télégramme que Votre Majesté a bien voulu M'adresser hier, Je M'empresse de La remercier de tout mon coeur. Je prie Votre Majesté d'être persuadée que la cordiale sympathie, dont Votre Majesté est animée envers Mon pays, nous est particulièrement précieuse et remplit notre âme de l'espoir que l'avenir de la Serbie est assuré étant devenu l'objet de la Haute sollicitude de

**Votre Majesté.**—Ces moments pénibles ne peuvent que raffermir les liens de l'attachement profond qui unissent la Serbie à la sainte Russie slave, et les sentiments de reconnaissance éternelle pour l'aide et la protection de Votre Majesté seront conservés pieusement dans l'âme de tous les serbes.

(Signé) Alexandre.

**N<sup>o</sup> 57.**

**Le Chargé d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.**

Nich le 16/7, Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

J'ai communiqué à Pachitch le texte du télégramme responsif de Sa Majesté l'Empereur au Prince Alexandre. Pachitch après l'avoir lu, se signa et dit: «Seigneur! Le Tzar est grand et clément! Ensuite il m'embrassa, ne pouvant contenir l'émotion qui l'avait gagné. L'héritier est attendu à Nich dans la nuit.

(Signé) Strandtman.

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**N<sup>o</sup> 58.**

**Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur en France.**

St. Pétersbourg le 16/7, Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a communiqué la résolution prise par son gouvernement de mobiliser, si la Russie ne cessait pas ses préparatifs militaires. Or, nous n'avons commencé ces derniers qu'à la suite de la mobilisation à laquelle avait déjà procédé l'Autriche et vu l'absence évidente chez cette dernière du désir d'accepter un mode quelconque d'une solution pacifique de son conflit avec la Serbie.

Puisque nous ne pouvons pas accéder au désir de l'Allemagne, il ne nous reste que d'accélérer nos propres armements et de compter avec l'inévitabilité probable de la guerre.—Veuillez en avertir le Gouvernement Français et lui exprimer en même temps notre sincère reconnaissance pour la déclaration que l'Ambassadeur de France m'a faite en son nom en disant que nous pouvons compter entièrement sur l'appui de notre alliée la France. Dans les circonstances actuelles cette déclaration nous est particulièrement précieuse. Communiqué aux Ambassadeurs en Angleterre, Autriche-Hongrie, Italie, Allemagne.

(Signé) Sazonow.

N<sup>o</sup> 50.

**Le Chargé d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires  
Étrangères.**

Nich., le 17/10. Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Le Prince-Régent a publié hier un manifeste signé par tous les Ministres à l'occasion de la déclaration de la guerre par l'Autriche à la Serbie. Le manifeste se termine par les paroles suivantes: «Défendez de toutes vos forces vos foyers et la Serbie». Lors de l'ouverture solennelle de la Scouptchina, le Régent lut en son nom le discours du trône, au début duquel il indiqua que le lieu de la convocation démontrait l'importance des événements actuels. Suit l'exposé des faits des derniers jours—l'ultimatum autrichien, la réponse serbe, les efforts du gouvernement Royal de faire tout ce qui était compatible avec la dignité de l'Etat pour éviter la guerre et enfin l'agression armée du voisin plus puissant contre la Serbie, aux côtés de laquelle se tient le Monténégro. En passant à l'examen de l'attitude des Puissances en présence du conflit, le Prince insista tout d'abord sur les sentiments dont est animée la Russie et sur la Toute Gracieuse Communication de sa Majesté l'Empereur disant que la Russie en aucun cas n'abandonnera la Serbie. A chaque mention du nom de Sa Majesté Impériale et de la Russie un «jivio

formidable et fébrile secouait la salle des séances. Les marques de sympathie de la part de la France et de l'Angleterre furent aussi relevées séparément et provoquèrent des «jivios» d'approbation de la part des députés. Le discours du trône se termine par la déclaration d'ouverture de la Scouptchina et par l'expression du vœu que toutes les mesures soient prises pour faciliter la tâche du Gouvernement.

(Signé) Strandtman.

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№ 60.

**Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en  
Allemagne, en Autriche-Hongrie, en France, en Angleterre,  
et en Italie.**

St. Pétersbourg, le 17/30 Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qui vient de me quitter m'a demandé si nous ne pouvions pas nous contenter de la promesse que l'Autriche pourrait donner—de ne pas porter atteinte à l'intégrité du Royaume de Serbie—et indiquer à quelles conditions nous pourrions encore consentir à suspendre nos armements; je lui ai dicté, pour être transmise d'urgence à Berlin, la déclaration suivante: «Si l'Autriche, reconnaissant que la question austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question européenne, se déclare prête à éliminer de son ultimatum les points qui portent atteinte aux droits souverains de la Serbie, la Russie s'engage à cesser ses préparatifs militaires».

Veuillez télégraphier d'urgence quelle sera l'attitude du Gouvernement Allemand en présence de cette nouvelle preuve de notre désir de faire le possible pour la solution pacifique de la question, car nous ne pouvons pas admettre que de semblables pourparlers ne servent qu'à faire gagner du temps à l'Allemagne et à l'Autriche pour leurs préparatifs militaires.

(Signé) Sazonow.

N° 61.

**L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Berlin, le 17/10 Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

J'apprends que le décret de mobilisation de l'armée et de la  
flotte allemandes vient d'être promulgué.

(Signé) Swerbéew.

N° 62.

**L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Berlin, le 17/10 Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères vient de me téléphoner pour  
me communiquer que la nouvelle lancée tout à l'heure de la mobili-  
sation de l'armée et de la flotte allemandes est fausse; que les feuilletons  
des journaux étaient imprimés d'avance en prévision de toutes éven-  
tualités, et mis en vente à l'heure de l'après midi, mais que main-  
tenant ils sont confisqués.

(Signé) Swerbéew.

N° 63.

**L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Berlin, le 17/10 Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Ai reçu Votre télégramme du 16—29 Juillet et ai transmis le  
texte de Votre proposition au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères que je



viens de voir; il m'a dit qu'il avait reçu un télégramme identique de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à St.-Petersbourg et m'a déclaré ensuite qu'il trouvait notre proposition inacceptable pour l'Autriche.

(Signé) Swerbéew.

N. 64.

**L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Londres, le 17/30 Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Ai communiqué le contenu de Vos télégrammes du 16 et 17 Juillet à Grey lequel considère la situation comme très sérieuse, mais désire continuer les pourparlers. J'ai fait observer à Grey que depuis que Vous lui aviez fait la proposition d'accepter tout ce qu'il proposerait en faveur du maintien de la paix, pourvu que l'Autriche ne pût profiter de ces attermoiements pour écraser la Serbie, la situation dans laquelle Vous vous trouviez s'était apparemment modifiée. A cette époque nos rapports avec l'Allemagne n'étaient pas compromis. Après la déclaration de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à St.-Petersbourg concernant la mobilisation allemande, ces rapports avaient changé et sa demande avait reçu de Votre part la seule réponse que pouvait donner une grande Puissance. Lorsque l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne était revenu auprès de Vous et s'était enquis de Vos conditions, Vous les aviez formulées dans des circonstances tout-à-fait spéciales. J'ai en même temps de nouveau insisté auprès de Grey sur la nécessité de prendre en considération la situation nouvelle créée par la faute de l'Allemagne à la suite de l'action de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. Grey a répondu qu'il le comprenait et qu'il tiendrait compte de ces arguments.

(Signé) Benckendorff.

N° 65.

**L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Londres, le 11<sup>h</sup>/<sub>10</sub> Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a demandé à Grey pour quelle raison l'Angleterre prenait des mesures militaires sur terre et sur mer. Grey a répondu que ces mesures n'avaient pas un caractère agressif, mais que la situation était telle que chaque Puissance devait se préparer.

(Signé) Benckendorff.

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N° 66.

**L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Vienne, le 11<sup>h</sup>/<sub>11</sub> Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Malgré la mobilisation générale je continue à échanger des vues avec le Comte Berchtold et ses collaborateurs. Tous insistent sur l'absence chez l'Autriche d'intentions agressives quelconques contre la Russie et de visées de conquête à l'égard de la Serbie, mais tous insistent également sur la nécessité pour l'Autriche de poursuivre jusqu'au bout l'action commencée et de donner à la Serbie une leçon sérieuse qui pourrait constituer une certaine garantie pour l'avenir.

(Signé) Schébéko.

N<sup>o</sup> 67.

**Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en Allemagne, Autriche-Hongrie, en France, en Angleterre et en Italie.**

St. Pétersbourg, le 18/31 Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Me réfère à mon télégramme du 17/31 Juillet. D'ordre de son gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre m'a transmis le désir du Cabinet de Londres d'introduire quelques modifications dans la formule que j'ai proposée hier à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. J'ai répondu que j'acceptais la proposition anglaise. Ci dessous je vous transmets la formule modifiée en conséquence.

«Si l'Autriche consent à arrêter la marche de ses armées sur le territoire Serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits d'Etat souverain et à son indépendance,— la Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante».

(Signé) Sazonow.

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N<sup>o</sup> 68.

**L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.**

Berlin, le 18/31 Jullet 1914.

(Télégramme).

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères vient de me dire que nos pourparlers, qui étaient déjà difficiles à la suite de la mobilisation contre l'Autriche, le deviennent encore davantage en présence des graves mesures militaires que nous prenons contre l'Allemagne; des nouvelles y relatives sont, d'après lui, reçues ici de tous les côtés et devront provoquer inévitablement des mesures analogues de la part de l'Allemagne.

A cela j'ai répondu que, d'après des renseignements sûrs dont je disposais et qui étaient confirmés par tous nos compatriotes arrivant à Berlin, la prise contre nous des mesures susdites se poursuivait également en Allemagne avec grande activité. Malgré cela, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères affirme qu'ici on n'a fait que rappeler les officiers de leurs congés et les troupes des champs de manœuvres.

(Signé) Swarbéew.

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N° 69.

**Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur en Angleterre.**

S.-Petersbourg, le 11/11, Juillet 1914.

(Télégramme).

J'ai prié l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre de transmettre à Grey l'expression de ma plus sincère reconnaissance pour le ton amical et ferme dont il a usé pendant les pourparlers avec l'Allemagne et l'Autriche, grâce à quoi l'espoir de trouver une issue pacifique de la situation actuelle n'est pas encore perdu.

Je l'ai aussi prié de dire au Ministre Anglais que je pensais que ce n'était qu'à Londres que les pourparlers auraient encore quelques chances d'un succès quelconque, en facilitant à l'Autriche la nécessité d'un compromis.

Communiqué à l'Ambassadeur en France.

(Signé) Sazonow.

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N° 70.

**Télégramme secret aux Représentants de Sa Majesté l'Empereur à l'étranger.**

Le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914.

(Télégramme).

A minuit l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a déclaré, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, que si dans les 12 heures, c'est à dire à midi, Samedi, nous ne commençons pas la démobilisation, non seulement

à l'égard de l'Allemagne, mais aussi à l'égard de l'Autriche, le Gouvernement Allemand serait forcé de donner l'ordre de mobilisation. A ma question si c'était la guerre, l'Ambassadeur a répondu par la négative, mais en ajoutant que nous étions fort près d'elle.

(Signé) Sazonow.

N<sup>o</sup> 71.

**L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Londres 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914.

(Télégramme).

Grey m'a dit qu'il a télégraphié à Berlin qu'à son avis la dernière formule acceptée par le Gouvernement Russe constitue la base de négociations qui présente le plus de chances pour une solution pacifique du conflit. Il a exprimé en même temps l'espoir qu'aucune grande Puissance ne commencerait les hostilités avant l'examen de cette formule.

(Signé) Benckendorff.

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N<sup>o</sup> 72.

**L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Londres, le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914.

(Télégramme).

Le Gouvernement de la Grande Bretagne a posé aux Gouvernements Français et Allemand la question s'ils respecteraient la neutralité de la Belgique.

La France a répondu dans l'affirmative, tandis que le Gouvernement Allemand a déclaré ne pouvoir répondre à cette question catégoriquement.

(Signé) Benckendorff.

N° 73.

**L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

**Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914.**

(Télégramme).

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a visité hier Viviani et lui a déclaré que l'Autriche non seulement n'avait pas le dessein de porter atteinte à l'intégrité territoriale de la Serbie, mais était prête à discuter avec les autres Puissances le fond de son conflit avec la Serbie. Le Gouvernement Français est très préoccupé par les préparatifs militaires extraordinaires de l'Allemagne sur la frontière française, car il est convaincu que sous le voile du «Kriegszustand» se produit une véritable mobilisation.

(Signé) Iswolsky.

N° 74.

**L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

**Paris, la 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914.**

(Télégramme).

A la réception ici du télégramme de l'Ambassadeur de France à St.-Petersbourg contenant la communication que Vous a faite l'Ambassadeur Allemand concernant la résolution de l'Allemagne de décréter aujourd'hui la mobilisation générale, le Président de la République a signé le décret de mobilisation. Dans les rues on procède à l'affichage des listes d'appel des réservistes. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne vient de rendre visite à Viviani, mais ne lui a fait aucune nouvelle communication, en alléguant l'impossibilité de déchiffrer les télégrammes qu'il a reçus. Viviani l'a informé de la signature du décret de mobilisation en réponse à la mobilisation allemande et lui a fait part de son étonnement de ce que l'Allemagne eût pris une telle mesure à un moment où se poursuivait encore un échange de vues amical entre la Russie, l'Autriche et les Puissances; il a ajouté

que la mobilisation ne préjugait pas nécessairement la guerre et que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne pourrait rester à Paris comme l'Ambassadeur de Russie est resté à Vienne et celui d'Autriche à St.-Pétersbourg.

(Signé) Iswolsky.

N<sup>o</sup> 75.

**L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères.**

Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914.

(Télégramme).

Je tiens du Président que pendant les dernières journées l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a assuré avec force le Président du Conseil des Ministres et lui même, que l'Autriche nous aurait déclaré être prête à respecter non seulement l'intégrité territoriale de la Serbie, mais aussi ses droits souverains, mais que nous aurions intentionnellement fait le silence sur cette déclaration. J'ai opposé un démenti catégorique à cela..

(Signé) Iswolsky.

N<sup>o</sup> 70.

**Note remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à S.-Péters-  
bourg le 19 Juillet 1914 à 7 h. 10 du soir.**

Le Gouvernement Impérial s'est efforcé dès les débuts de la crise de la mener à une solution pacifique. Se rendant à un désir qui lui en avait été exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre s'était appliqué à accomplir un rôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et de St.-Pétersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le résultat, procéda à la mobilisation de la totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer. A la suite de cette mesure menaçante motivée par aucun présage militaire de la part de l'Allemagne l'Empire Allemand c'est trouvé vis-à-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouverne-

ment Impérial eût manqué de parer à ce péril, il aurait compromis la sécurité et l'existence même de l'Allemagne. Par conséquent le Gouvernement Allemand se vit forcé de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies en insistant sur la cessation des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refusé de faire droit à (n'ayant pas cru devoir répondre à<sup>1)</sup> cette demande et ayant manifesté par ce refus (cette attitude<sup>1)</sup>) que son action était dirigée contre l'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur, d'ordre de mon Gouvernement, de faire savoir à Votre Excellence ce qui suit:

Sa Majesté l'Empereur Mon Auguste Souverain au nom de l'Empire, relevant le défi se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie.

St.-Petersbourg, le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914.

(Signé) F. Pourtalès.

N° 77.

**Communiqué du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères concernant les événements des derniers jours.**

**Le 20 Juillet/2 Août 1914.**

Un exposé défigurant les événements des derniers jours ayant paru dans la presse étrangère, le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères croit de son devoir de publier l'aperçu suivant des pourparlers diplomatiques pendant le temps susvisé.

Le 10/23 Juillet a. c. le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade présenta au Ministre Président Serbe une note où le Gouvernement Serbe était accusé d'avoir favorisé le mouvement panserbe qui avait abouti à l'assassinat de l'héritier du trône austro-hongrois. En conséquence l'Autriche-Hongrie

<sup>1)</sup> Les mots placés entre parenthèses se trouvent dans l'original. Il faut supposer que deux variantes avaient été préparées d'avance et que par erreur elles ont été insérées toutes les deux dans la note.



demandait au Gouvernement Serbe non seulement de condamner sous une forme solennelle la susdite propagande, mais aussi de prendre, sous le contrôle de l'Autriche-Hongrie, une série de mesures tendant à la découverte du complot, à la punition des sujets serbes y ayant participé et à la prévention dans l'avenir de tout attentat sur le sol du Royaume. Un délai de 48 heures fut fixé au Gouvernement Serbe pour la réponse à la susdite note.

Le Gouvernement Impérial, auquel l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie à St.-Petersbourg avait communiqué le texte de la note 17 heures après sa remise à Belgrade, ayant pris connaissance des demandes y contenues, dut s'apercevoir que quelques unes parmi elles étaient inexécutables quant au fond, tandis que d'autres étaient présentées sous une forme incompatible avec la dignité d'un Etat indépendant. Trouvant inadmissibles la diminution de la dignité de la Serbie contenue dans ces demandes, ainsi que la tendance de l'Autriche-Hongrie d'assurer sa prépondérance dans les Balkans démontrée par ces mêmes exigences, le Gouvernement Russe fit observer dans la forme la plus amicale à l'Autriche-Hongrie qu'il serait désirable de soumettre à un nouvel examen les points contenus dans la note austro-hongroise. Le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois ne crut possible de consentir à une discussion de la note. L'action modératrice des autres Puissances à Vienne ne fut non plus couronnée de succès.

Malgré que la Serbie eût reprouvé le crime et se fût montrée prête à donner satisfaction à l'Autriche dans une mesure qui dépassa les prévisions non seulement de la Russie, mais aussi des autres Puissances, le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade jugea la réponse serbe insuffisante et quitta cette ville.

Reconnaissant le caractère exagéré des demandes présentées par l'Autriche, la Russie avait déclaré encore auparavant qu'il lui serait impossible de rester indifférente, sans se refuser toutefois à employer tous ses efforts pour trouver une issue pacifique qui fût acceptable pour l'Autriche et ménageât son amour-propre de grande puissance. En même temps la Russie établit fermement qu'elle admettait une solution pacifique de la question seulement dans une

mesure qui n'impliquerait pas la diminution de la dignité de la Serbie comme Etat indépendant. Malheureusement tous les efforts déployés par le Gouvernement Impérial dans cette direction restèrent sans effet. Le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois, après s'être dérobé à toute intervention conciliatrice des Puissances dans son conflit avec la Serbie, procéda à la mobilisation, déclara officiellement la guerre à la Serbie, et le jour suivant Belgrade fut bombardée. Le manifeste qui a accompagné la déclaration de guerre accuse ouvertement la Serbie d'avoir préparé et exécuté le crime de Serajevo. Une pareille accusation d'un crime de droit commun lancée contre tout un peuple et tout un état attira à la Serbie par son inanité évidente les larges sympathies des cercles de la société européenne.

A la suite de cette manière d'agir du Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois, malgré la déclaration de la Russie qu'elle ne pourrait rester indifférente au sort de la Serbie, le Gouvernement Impérial jugea nécessaire d'ordonner la mobilisation des circonscriptions militaires de Kiew, d'Odessa, de Moscou et de Kazan. Une telle décision s'imposait parceque depuis la date de la remise de la note austro-hongroise au Gouvernement Serbe et les premières démarches de la Russie cinq jours s'étaient écoulés, et cependant le Cabinet de Vienne n'avait fait aucun pas pour aller au devant de nos efforts pacifiques; au contraire, la mobilisation de la moitié de l'armée austro-hongroise avait été décrétée.

Le Gouvernement Allemand fut mis au courant des mesures prises par la Russie; il lui fut en même temps expliqué qu'elles n'étaient que la conséquence des armements autrichiens et nullement dirigées contre l'Allemagne. En même temps, le Gouvernement Impérial déclara que la Russie était prête à continuer les pourparlers en vue d'une solution pacifique du conflit, soit par la voie de négociations directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne, soit, en suivant la proposition de la Grande Bretagne, par la voie d'une Conférence des quatre Grandes Puissances non intéressées directement, voire, l'Angleterre, la France, l'Allemagne et l'Italie.

Cependant cette tentative de la Russie échoua également. L'Autriche-Hongrie déclina un échange de vues ultérieur avec nous, et le Cabinet de Vienne se déroba à la participation à la Conférence des Puissances projetée.

Néanmoins, la Russie ne discontinua pas ses efforts en faveur de la paix. Répondant à la question de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, à quelles conditions nous consentirions encore à suspendre nos armements, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères déclara que ces conditions seraient la reconnaissance par l'Autriche-Hongrie que la question Austro-Serbe avait revêtu le caractère d'une question européenne, et la déclaration de cette même Puissance qu'elle consentait à ne pas insister sur des demandes incompatibles avec les droits souverains de la Serbie.

La proposition de la Russie fut jugée par l'Allemagne inacceptable pour l'Autriche-Hongrie. Simultanément on reçut à St.-Petersbourg la nouvelle de la proclamation de la mobilisation générale par l'Autriche-Hongrie.

En même temps les hostilités continuaient sur le territoire Serbe et Belgrade fut bombardée de rechef.

L'insuccès de nos propositions pacifiques nous obligea d'élargir les mesures de précaution militaires.

Le Cabinet de Berlin nous ayant adressé une question à ce sujet, il lui fut répondu que la Russie était forcée de commencer ses armements pour se prémunir contre toutes éventualités.

Tout en prenant cette mesure de précaution, la Russie n'en continuait pas moins de rechercher de toutes ses forces une issue de cette situation et déclara être prête à accepter tout moyen de solution du conflit qui comporterait l'observation des conditions posées par nous.

Malgré cette communication conciliante, le Gouvernement Allemand, le 18/3, Juillet, adressa au Gouvernement Russe la demande d'avoir à suspendre ses mesures militaires à midi du 19 Juillet/1 Août, en menaçant, dans le cas contraire, de procéder à une mobilisation générale.

Le lendemain, 19 Juillet/1 Août, l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne transmit au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, au nom de son Gouvernement, la déclaration de guerre.

N° 78.

**Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Représentants de  
S. M. l'Empereur à l'étranger.**

St.-Petersbourg, le 20 Juillet/2 Août 1914.

(Télégramme).

Il est absolument clair que l'Allemagne s'efforce dès à présent de rejeter sur nous la responsabilité de la rupture. Notre mobilisation a été provoquée par l'énorme responsabilité que nous aurions assumée, si nous n'avions pas pris toutes les mesures de précaution à un moment où l'Autriche, se bornant à des pourparlers d'un caractère dilatoire, bombardait Belgrade et procédait à une mobilisation générale.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur s'était engagé vis-à-vis de l'Empereur d'Allemagne par sa parole à n'entreprendre aucun acte agressif tant que dureraient les pourparlers avec l'Autriche. Après une telle garantie et après toutes les preuves de l'amour de la Russie pour la paix, l'Allemagne ne pouvait ni avoir le droit de douter de notre déclaration que nous accepterions avec joie toute issue pacifique compatible avec la dignité et l'indépendance de la Serbie. Une autre issue, tout en étant complètement incompatible avec notre propre dignité, aurait certainement ébranlé l'équilibre Européen, en assurant l'hégémonie de l'Allemagne. Ce caractère Européen, voire mondial, du conflit est infiniment plus important que le prétexte qui l'a créé. Par sa décision de nous déclarer la guerre à un moment où se poursuivaient les négociations entre les Puissances, l'Allemagne a assumé une lourde responsabilité.

(Signé) Sazonow.

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N° 79.

**Note remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie à  
St.-Petersbourg au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères le  
24 Juillet à 6 h. du soir.**

D'ordre de son Gouvernement le soussigné Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a l'honneur de notifier à Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Russie ce qui suit:

«Vu l'attitude menaçante prise par la Russie dans le conflit entre la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise et la Serbie et en présence du fait qu'en suite de ce conflit la Russie d'après une communication du Cabinet de Berlin a cru devoir ouvrir les hostilités contre l'Allemagne et que celle-ci se trouve par conséquent en état de guerre avec la dite Puissance, l'Autriche-Hongrie se considère également en état de guerre avec la Russie à partir du présent moment.

(Signé) Szapary.

St.-Petersbourg.  
6 Août/24 Juillet 1914.





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**2<sup>e</sup> SÉRIE**

# **Les Pourparlers Diplomatiques**

**16/29 JUIN — 3/16 AOUT**

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**IV**

**LE LIVRE BLEU SERBE**

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# **Les Pourparlers Diplomatiques**

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**Correspondance diplomatique du Gouvernement serbe**

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**N° 1**

*M. Jov. M. Jovanovitch, ministre à Vienne,  
à M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et mi-  
nistre des Affaires étrangères.*

(Télégramme.)

Vienne, le 16/29 juin 1914.

Les journaux de Vienne affirment que l'instruction judiciaire, ouverte contre les auteurs de l'attentat, a établi que le crime avait été préparé à Belgrade, que tout un complot sur une base plus large avait été organisé à Belgrade parmi la jeunesse inspirée par l'idée panserbe, et que les journaux de Belgrade alarment le public par leurs peintures de la gravité de la situation en Bosnie. Ceci, d'après eux, exerce une influence

considérable, vu que ces journaux sont introduits en Bosnie, en cachette, en grand nombre.

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N° 2

*M. Jov. M. Jovanovitch, ministre à Vienne, à M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et ministre des Affaires étrangères.*

(Télégramme.)

Vienne, le 17/30 juin 1914.

La tendance est de plus en plus évidente à Vienne de donner à l'Europe l'impression que l'attentat commis contre l'archiduc-héritier d'Autriche-Hongrie est le résultat d'un complot préparé en Serbie. On a l'intention de s'en servir comme d'un moyen politique contre nous. Aussi faut-il surveiller avec la plus grande attention le langage de nos journaux sur l'événement de Serajevo.

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N° 3

*M. le Dr M. Jovanovitch, chargé d'affaires à Berlin, à M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et ministre des Affaires étrangères.*

(Télégramme.)

Berlin, le 11/30 juin 1914.

Les journaux de Berlin publient, d'après les informations de Vienne et de Budapest, les ar-

tibles où l'attentat de Serajevo est rattaché à la Serbie : on induit ainsi en erreur l'opinion publique allemande.

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N° 4

*M. le Dr M. Jovanovitch, chargé d'affaires à Berlin, à M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et ministre des Affaires étrangères.*

(Télégramme.)

Berlin, le 17/30 juin 1914.

L'hostilité de l'opinion publique en Allemagne envers nous dure toujours, entretenue par des nouvelles mensongères, envoyées de Vienne et de Budapest, que presque tous les journaux allemands, malgré nos démentis, répandent avec zèle par l'intermédiaire de certains journaux et agences.

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N° 5

*M. Jov. M. Jovanovitch, ministre à Vienne, à M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et ministre des Affaires étrangères.*

Vienne, le 17/30 juin 1914.

Monsieur le Président,

Comme le comte Berchtold n'a pu me recevoir, j'ai eu, sur l'attentat de Serajevo, un entre-

tien avec le premier chef de section du ministère des Affaires étrangères. Au cours de notre conversation, je lui ai dit en résumé ceci :

« Le Gouvernement Royal réproouve de la manière la plus énergique l'attentat de Serajevo et de son côté fera, certainement et le plus loyalement, tout pour prouver que sur son territoire il ne souffrira aucune agitation ou entreprise passible d'une peine et pouvant nuire à nos relations déjà si délicates avec l'Autriche-Hongrie. Je pense que le Gouvernement de Belgrade est prêt à mettre en jugement les complices, s'il est prouvé qu'il y en ait en Serbie, en dépit de tous les obstacles qu'y a apportés la diplomatie austro-hongroise (création d'une Albanie indépendante, opposition à une sortie libre du Royaume serbe sur l'Adriatique, demande de revision du traité de Bucarest, ultimatum du mois de septembre, etc...), le Gouvernement serbe a persisté dans son désir de rétablir sur des bases solides nos relations de voisinage. Vous savez que dans cette voie quelque chose a été fait et obtenu. La Serbie veut poursuivre cet effort, convaincue qu'il peut et doit être continué. L'attentat de Serajevo ne doit pas et ne peut pas entraver cette tâche. »

Le baron Macchio a pris note en se chargeant de communiquer au comte Berchtold tout ce que je lui ai dit. Le même jour, j'ai communiqué le fond de mon entretien aux ambassadeurs de France et de Russie.

Veillez, etc.

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N° 6

*M. M. Georgevitch, chargé d'affaires à Constantinople, à M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et ministre des Affaires étrangères.*

Constantinople, le 17/30 juin 1914.

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai eu aujourd'hui, à propos de l'attentat de Serajevo, une assez longue conversation avec l'ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie. J'ai exprimé l'espoir que ce triste événement, quoi qu'on en dise dans certains cercles diplomatiques, ne nuirait pas aux relations entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, considérablement améliorées dans ces derniers temps.

Il m'a répondu qu'il ne faut pas même avoir de crainte à ce sujet. Il trouve, lui aussi, que les rapports entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie sont devenus bien meilleurs ces derniers temps. Il a ajouté qu'il faut continuer dans cette voie. Il m'a dit que ses derniers entretiens avec le comte Berchtold l'avaient convaincu que celui-ci était content de l'attitude du Gouvernement serbe et que, pour sa part, il désire sincèrement les relations amicales avec la Serbie.

Veuillez, etc.

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N° 7

*M. M. S. Bochkovitch, ministre à Londres, à M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et ministre des Affaires étrangères.*

(Télégramme.) Londres, le 18 juin/1<sup>er</sup> juillet 1914.

Presque tous les journaux anglais annoncent,

d'après les sources autrichiennes, que l'attentat de Serajevo est l'œuvre des révolutionnaires serbes.

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## N° 8

*M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil, ministre des Affaires étrangères, à toutes les Légations Royales.*

Belgrade, le 18 juin/1<sup>er</sup> juillet 1914.

La presse austro-hongroise accuse de plus en plus la Serbie de l'attentat de Serajevo. Le but est évident : ruiner le grand crédit moral dont la Serbie jouit aujourd'hui en Europe et exploiter politiquement contre la Serbie la folle entreprise d'un jeune fanatique exalté. Cependant l'attentat de Serajevo a rencontré en Serbie la réprobation la plus sévère dans toutes les classes sociales ; dans les cercles officiels et non officiels, tous ont immédiatement compris que cet événement aurait la répercussion la plus défavorable sur nos relations de bon voisinage et sur la vie des Serbes d'Autriche-Hongrie, ce que les derniers événements ont confirmé. Au moment où la Serbie fait tout pour que les relations avec la Monarchie voisine deviennent meilleures et de plus en plus amicales, il serait absurde de penser qu'elle aurait pu, soit directement soit indirectement, inspirer de pareils actes. Tout au contraire, il était dans l'intérêt vital de la Serbie elle-même que ce crime fût évité. Par malheur, cela n'était



pas en son pouvoir, les deux auteurs de l'attentat étant sujets autrichiens. La Serbie a toujours veillé, et depuis les derniers événements elle redoublera de vigilance, sur les éléments anarchistes; si elle en découvre en Serbie, elle prendra contre eux, avec énergie, les mesures les plus sévères. De plus, elle fera tout son devoir, et par tous les moyens en son pouvoir, pour calmer, à l'intérieur de ses frontières, les esprits exaltés. Seulement, elle ne peut nullement permettre que la presse austro-hongroise induise en erreur l'opinion publique en Europe et que, dans un but purement politique, elle fasse retomber la lourde responsabilité du crime d'un sujet autrichien sur la Serbie et tout le peuple serbe, auxquels de pareils actes ne peuvent causer que des dommages sans leur apporter aucun profit.

Je vous prie d'agir, en cet esprit, par tous les moyens propices, pour mettre fin le plus tôt possible à la campagne antiserbe devant l'opinion publique européenne.

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N° 9

*M. Jov. M. Jovanovitch, ministre à Vienne, à  
M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et mi-  
nistre des Affaires étrangères.*

(Télégramme.) Vienne, le 18 juin/1<sup>er</sup> juillet 1914.

Des démonstrations ont eu lieu hier soir devant la Légation. Je peux dire que la police s'est mon-

trée énergique. L'ordre et la tranquillité ont été maintenus. Si j'apprenais que le drapeau national ait été brûlé, je ferais une démarche auprès de qui de droit et vous informerais du résultat. Ce sont surtout les cercles catholiques inférieurs, la presse et les cercles militaires qui prêchent la haine contre les Serbes et la Serbie. Je vous prie de faire le nécessaire pour que les démonstrations soient évitées chez nous et pour que le ton de la presse de Belgrade soit mesuré autant que possible. Les dispositions contre nous restent ici les mêmes. On croit que l'attitude à prendre, vis-à-vis de la Serbie et des Serbes, sera décidée après les funérailles de l'Archiduc.

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## N° 10

*M. le Dr M. R. Vesnitch, ministre à Paris, à  
M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et mi-  
nistre des Affaires étrangères.*

(Télégramme.)

Paris, le 19 juin/2 juillet 1914.

Le Gouvernement français nous conseille d'observer le plus grand sang-froid et le recueillement aussi bien dans nos cercles officiels que dans l'opinion publique.

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## N° 11

*M. Joo. M. Jovanovitch, ministre à Vienne, à  
M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et mi-  
nistre des Affaires étrangères.*

Vienne, le 20 juin/3 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Président,

Hier, jour du transfert des déponilles mortelles de l'archiduc François-Ferdinand et de sa femme, de Serajevo, j'ai fait hisser et mettre en berne, à mon domicile, le drapeau national.

Cet événement a donné lieu hier soir aux protestations du concierge, des locataires, du gérant et du propriétaire même de l'immeuble, qui exigèrent qu'on enlevât le drapeau. Les explications n'ayant servi à rien, on a requis le concours de la police qui a demandé, non officiellement, l'enlèvement du drapeau pour éviter les désordres. Le drapeau a été maintenu, et ce fait a provoqué hier soir des démonstrations véhémentes devant la Légation. La police fut énergique et aucune atteinte ne fut portée ni au bâtiment, ni au drapeau. Vers 2 heures du matin, les manifestants furent repoussés de mon domicile. Les journaux d'aujourd'hui, surtout ceux de la nuance clérico-populaire, ont publié des articles sous le titre : « Les provocations du ministre de Serbie » en représentant d'une façon infidèle toute cette affaire.

Le drapeau est resté hissé sur l'immeuble de la Légation jusqu'à la fin de la messe funèbre célébrée, dans l'église de la Cour, pour les défunts, puis il a été retiré.

Tous les habitants du quartier que j'habite sont allés à la police, à l'Hôtel de Ville, à la présidence du Conseil des ministres, pour réclamer l'enlèvement de notre drapeau.

Les manifestants furent harangués par le docteur Funder, le directeur principal du journal catholique *Reichspost*, Hermengild Wagner et Léopold Mandl, qui sont connus comme les principaux instigateurs de la campagne dirigée dans la presse autrichienne et allemande contre la Serbie et les Serbes.

Veuillez, etc.

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N° 12

*M. Joo. M. Joovanovitch, ministre à Vienne, à  
M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et mi-  
nistre des Affaires étrangères.*

Vienne, le 20 juin/3 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Président,

Dans la conversation que j'ai eue à propos de l'attentat de Serajevo avec le premier chef de section au ministère des Affaires étrangères, le baron Macchio a attaqué très vivement la presse de Belgrade. Il a cité des exemples afin de prouver qu'elle était effrénée et qu'elle faisait *die Hetzereien gegen die Monarchie* (des excitations contre la Monarchie). Je lui ai dit que la presse était chez nous complètement libre et que les particuliers et le Gouvernement en souffrent souvent, mais que nous n'avions d'autres moyens contre elle que le recours aux tribunaux. J'ai ajouté que, dans le cas présent, la presse autri-

chienne et hongroise, que le Gouvernement commun tenait entre ses mains, avait commencé : n'est-ce pas la presse autrichienne et hongroise qui, depuis presque deux ans, administre des coups aux Serbes et à la Serbie, en touchant les points les plus sensibles ? Ces jours-ci, il y avait juste un an depuis la malheureuse guerre avec les Bulgares. J'ai été témoin du manque de respect avec lequel la presse de Vienne avait traité la Serbie et son armée pendant et après la campagne, puis dans beaucoup d'autres questions. La presse de Belgrade a été beaucoup plus modérée. Aujourd'hui aussi, après cet horrible crime, c'est d'ici qu'on envoie dans le monde des télégrammes accusant tout le peuple serbe et la Serbie comme s'ils avaient été mêlés à l'odieux attentat de Serajevo. Tous les journaux de la Monarchie écrivent en ce sens. Peut-on rester indifférent devant tout cela ? Si l'auteur de l'attentat est de race serbe, tout le peuple serbe et le royaume de Serbie n'en sont pas coupables, et on ne peut pas les en accuser comme on le fait à présent.

Le baron Macchio m'a répondu :

— Personne n'accuse le Royaume, ni le Gouvernement serbe, ni tout le peuple serbe. Nous accusons seulement ceux qui entretiennent les projets panserbes et qui travaillent à leur réalisation...

— Il m'a paru dès le premier moment, lui répondis-je, qu'on insistait sur la race de l'auteur pour le rattacher à Belgrade et provoquer l'impression que le crime avait été préparé en Serbie. Ceci m'a frappé de suite, car je savais que jusqu'à présent on appelait les Serbes en Bosnie

*die Bosniaken* (les Bosniaques), et que l'on disait *die bosnische Sprache* (la langue bosniaque), *die Orthodoxen aus Bosnien* (les orthodoxes de Bosnie); maintenant on dit que l'auteur de l'attentat est *ein Serbe* (un Serbe), mais sans ajouter qu'il était de Bosnie et sujet autrichien...

— Je vous répète, reprit le baron Macchio, que nous n'accusons ni le Gouvernement serbe, ni le peuple serbe, mais certains agitateurs...

Je l'ai prié d'agir sur la presse de Vienne, afin qu'en ces heures difficiles où l'on met à sérieuse épreuve les relations entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, elle n'aggrave pas cette crise par de telles accusations.

Veillez, etc.

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N° 13

*M. le Dr M. R. Vesnitch, ministre à Paris, à  
M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et mi-  
nistre des Affaires étrangères.*

Paris, le 21 juin/4 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai eu, mercredi, à propos de l'attentat de Serajevo, un assez long entretien avec le nouveau ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Viviani, que cet événement a rendu passablement inquiet. J'ai profité de cette occasion pour lui exposer à grands traits les causes qui ont provoqué cet attentat, à savoir, en premier lieu, l'intolérable système de gouvernement dans les provinces annexées, surtout l'attitude des organes officiels

et toute la politique du Gouvernement bosniaque vis-à-vis de tout ce qui touche à la religion orthodoxe. Il a compris la situation; cependant il a exprimé le désir et l'espoir que le sang-froid et la dignité seront gardés chez nous, afin de ne pas donner des motifs pour de nouvelles accusations de Vienne.

Après la première émotion, l'opinion publique française s'est ressaisie à tel point que le président du Conseil lui-même a jugé convenable d'adoucir au Palais-Bourbon les termes de la déclaration qu'à propos de cet événement, il avait faite antérieurement au Sénat.

Veillez, etc.

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N° 14

*M. le Dr M. Spalaïkovitch, ministre à Pétrograd,  
à M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil, mi-  
nistre des Affaires étrangères.*

(Télégramme.) Pétrograd, le 21 juin/4 juillet 1914.

Le ministre des Affaires étrangères m'a dit que les cruautés commises sur les Serbes en Bosnie accroîtront les sympathies de l'Europe pour nous. Il croit que le monde ne prêterait pas foi aux accusations lancées de Vienne contre nous. Il est essentiel que l'opinion publique en Serbie reste calme.

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## N° 15

*M. Jov. Jocrânovitch, ministre à Vienne, à  
M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et mi-  
nistre des Affaires étrangères.*

(Télégramme.) Vienne, le 23 juin/6 juillet 1914.

L'émotion dans les cercles militaires et gouver-  
nementaux contre la Serbie augmente sans cesse,  
par suite des articles de nos journaux que la Léga-  
tion austro-hongroise à Belgrade exploite avec  
zèle.

## N° 16

*M. Jov. Jocrânovitch, ministre à Vienne, à  
M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil, mi-  
nistre des Affaires étrangères.*

Vienne, le 23 juin/6 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Président,

La tendance générale des journaux de Vienne  
au sujet de l'attentat est la suivante :

Dès le dimanche 15 juin, dans l'après-midi,  
les éditions spéciales des journaux annonçaient  
en gros caractères que les deux auteurs de l'at-  
tentat étaient des Serbes, de façon à faire croire  
qu'il s'agissait de Serbes de Serbie. Dans les  
comptes rendus publiés plus tard, on remarque  
la tendance constante d'établir un lien entre cet  
événement et la Serbie, en insistant particulière-



ment sur deux circonstances qui semblaient prouver que les origines de l'attentat devraient être recherchées à Belgrade : 1° le séjour de deux auteurs de l'attentat à Belgrade et 2° l'origine des bombes. Comme troisième et dernière de leurs preuves, les journaux d'ici ont commencé à publier les dires des auteurs de l'attentat à l'instruction. Il est caractéristique que ces « dires » n'ont été connus que par le Bureau hongrois de correspondance et les journaux magyars, surtout le journal *Az Est*. Ces dires se résument à ceci : 1° qu'il est prouvé que les auteurs de l'attentat avaient fréquenté à Belgrade le comitadji Michel Ciganovitch et 2° que l'organisateur et l'instigateur de l'attentat avait été le commandant Pribitchevitch.

En même temps, une nouvelle tendance de faire retomber la responsabilité sur l'association « Narodna Odbrana » (la Défense nationale) commençait à se faire jour, de sorte que le dernier communiqué du Bureau hongrois de correspondance aux journaux, vendredi dernier, a été conçu dans ces termes :

« L'instruction poursuivie jusqu'ici a démontré, d'une façon qui exclut le moindre doute, que cet attentat était le résultat d'un complot. En dehors de deux auteurs de l'attentat, on a arrêté un certain nombre de personnes, pour la plupart des jeunes gens ; d'après ce qui est démontré, ils avaient été, comme les auteurs de l'attentat, engagés par la « Narodna Odbrana » de Belgrade pour commettre le crime et c'était à Belgrade qu'on leur avait remis les bombes et les revolvers. »

Le même jour, tard dans la nuit, le même Bu-

reau avait adressé aux journaux la demande suivante : « Nous prions l'honorable rédaction de ne pas publier la nouvelle au sujet de l'attentat de Serajevo, insérée dans notre édition de ce soir. »

En même temps, le Bureau de correspondance de Vienne a publié le communiqué suivant :

« On affirme en lieu compétent que l'instruction au sujet de l'attentat se poursuit dans le plus grand secret. Tous les détails publiés là-dessus doivent être acceptés sous réserves. »

Néanmoins, on ne cessait pas de publier à Budapest les prétendus comptes rendus de l'instruction. Dans le dernier compte rendu publié par le journal *A Nap* et reproduit par les journaux viennois d'hier, la tendance à faire retomber la responsabilité de l'attentat sur la « Narodna Odbrana » est encore plus accentuée : on prétend que l'accusé Cabrinovitch aurait désigné le général Jankovitch comme le principal instigateur.

Veuillez, etc.

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N° 17

*M. Jov. M. Jovanovitch, ministre à Vienne, à  
M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et ministre des Affaires étrangères.*

Vienne, le 24 juin/7 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Président,  
L'émotion produite par l'attentat de Serajevo

subsiste toujours dans les cercles compétents. Bien que l'Empereur ait adressé aux présidents des Conseils autrichien et hongrois et au ministre commun des Finances, M. Bilinski, une lettre qui invite au calme, on ne peut tout de même pas préciser quelle attitude le Gouvernement commun prendra à notre égard. Pour eux, une chose est claire : avec ou sans preuve que l'attentat ait été inspiré à Belgrade, ils doivent régler une fois pour toutes la question des soi-disant agitations panserbes dans les limites de la Monarchie des Habsbourg. Il n'est pas encore décidé de quelle façon ils procéderont et quels moyens ils emploieront pour atteindre leur but ; on en délibère, surtout dans les hautes sphères catholiques et militaires. La décision ne sera prise certainement qu'après qu'on aura appris ce que les juges d'instruction auront trouvé à Scrajevo. C'est d'après ce qu'on aura trouvé que la décision sera prise.

A cet égard, l'Autriche-Hongrie aura à choisir entre deux solutions : ou considérer le crime de Scrajevo comme un malheur national, mais aussi comme un acte criminel qui doit être jugé suivant les preuves établies, en demandant à la Serbie de lui prêter aide dans cette tâche, afin que les coupables ne puissent pas se soustraire à la condamnation la plus sévère ; ou faire de l'attentat de Scrajevo un complot panserbe, jougo-slave, panslave, avec toutes les manifestations de la haine envers le monde slave, haine jusqu'ici dissimulée. Il y a plusieurs signes qu'on pousse les cercles compétents vers cette seconde solution, et c'est pour cela qu'il faut être prêt pour la défense. Au cas où la première solution serait

adoptée, ce qui serait un signe de grande sagesse, il nous faudrait nous y rallier complètement. Veuillez, etc.

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## N° 18

*M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et ministre des Affaires étrangères, à toutes les Légations royales.*

(Télégramme.) Belgrade, le 26 juin/9 juillet 1914.

Presque tous les jours, le Prince-héritier reçoit d'Autriche-Hongrie des lettres de menace de mort. Mettez au courant de ce fait dans vos conversations vos collègues et les journalistes.

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## N° 19

*M. le Dr M. Jovanovitch, chargé d'affaires à Berlin, à M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et ministre des Affaires étrangères.*

(Télégramme.) Berlin, le 1<sup>er</sup>/16 juillet 1914.

Le secrétaire d'État a déclaré qu'il ne comprenait pas l'attitude provocante de la presse serbe et ses attaques contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, que celle-ci, comme grande puissance, ne peut supporter.

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## N° 20

*M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et ministre des Affaires étrangères, à toutes les Légations royales.*

(Télégramme.)

Belgrade, le 1<sup>er</sup>/14 juillet 1914.

1° Le *Correspondenz Bureau* impérial et royal alarme l'opinion européenne dans un but spécial. Il ne représente pas l'attitude de la presse de Belgrade d'une façon exacte et vraie. Il choisit à dessein les expressions les plus fortes dans les articles des journaux qui publient des réponses aux injures, aux menaces et aux mensonges tendancieux, et les sert au public en Autriche-Hongrie;

2° Le *Correspondenz Bureau* cite surtout les extraits des journaux, qui ne sont les organes ni des partis, ni des corporations;

3° L'Autriche-Hongrie a interdit, depuis l'annexion bosniaque, l'importation sur son territoire des organes de nos partis ainsi que de tous les autres journaux paraissant en Serbie, de sorte que ceux-ci ne pourraient pas exciter l'opinion publique en Autriche-Hongrie et en Europe, si le *Correspondenz Bureau* ne faisait pas ressortir et répandre les nouvelles dont il fait choix dans les différents journaux en aggravant leur contenu. Il y a six jours, l'*Odjek*, organe du parti radical indépendant, a été frappé d'interdiction; maintenant aucun journal serbe ne peut passer en Autriche-Hongrie;

4° La presse est complètement libre chez nous;

les journaux ne peuvent être confisqués que pour le crime de lèse-majesté ou bien au cas d'une excitation à la révolution. Il n'existe aucune censure préventive.

En cet état de choses, expliquez à qui de droit, rien qu'à titre de renseignement, que nous ne possédons aucun moyen constitutionnel ou légal de changer la manière d'écrire de nos journaux. Cependant si l'on compare la manière d'écrire des journaux serbes avec celle des journaux d'Autriche-Hongrie, on voit clairement que ce sont ces derniers qui commencent la polémique et que nos journaux ne font que riposter. Insistez de même sur le fait que l'opinion publique chez nous est relativement calme et que, de notre côté, personne ne désire provoquer ou blesser l'Autriche-Hongrie. De ce que nos journaux publient, personne en Europe n'en saurait rien, si le *Correspondenz Bureau* de Vienne ne le répandait dans le seul but de nuire à la Serbie.

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#### N° 21

*M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et ministre des Affaires étrangères, à toutes les Légations royales.*

(Télégramme.)

Belgrade, le 1<sup>er</sup>/14 juillet 1914.

Les journaux austro-hongrois ont répandu ces derniers jours le bruit que des démonstrations contre la légation d'Autriche-Hongrie auraient

. lieu à Belgrade, que certains correspondants des journaux austro-hongrois auraient été assassinés, que les sujets austro-hongrois sont maltraités et qu'ils sont pris de panique, que les étudiants serbes ont manifesté contre le ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie lors des funérailles de feu Hartwig, ministre de Russie, etc... Toutes ces nouvelles sont absolument fausses et inventées. La tranquillité absolue règne à Belgrade; aucune démonstration n'a eu lieu cette année; personne n'a eu l'intention de provoquer des désordres. Ce n'est pas seulement le ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie et ses fonctionnaires qui se promènent librement en ville; mais encore aucune injure, soit par des actes soit par des paroles, n'a été faite à aucun sujet austro-hongrois, comme les journaux de Vienne le prétendent, de même qu'aucun n'a vu sa maison attaquée ni ses fenêtres brisées; aucun sujet austro-hongrois n'a eu des motifs pour exprimer la moindre plainte. Toutes ces fausses nouvelles ne sont répandues que dans le but d'émouvoir et d'aigrir l'opinion publique en Autriche-Hongrie contre la Serbie.

Toute la population de Belgrade a pris part aux obsèques de M. Hartwig, tout le corps diplomatique y assistait, et aucune manifestation contre qui que ce soit n'a été signalée. Toute la cérémonie s'est passée dans un ordre exemplaire, de sorte que les étrangers en furent surpris. Je vous prie de porter ces renseignements à la connaissance du Gouvernement et de la presse.

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## N° 22

*M. Joo. M. Jovanovitch, ministre à Vienne, à  
M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et mi-  
nistre des Affaires étrangères.*

Vienne, le 1<sup>er</sup>/14 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Président,

C'est le Bureau de la presse du ministère des Affaires étrangères qui, cette fois encore, a dirigé l'opinion publique contre nous. Sauf la *Zeit* et l'*Arbeiter Zeitung*, tous les journaux austro-hongrois ont été renseignés et dirigés par lui pour leurs articles sur l'attentat de Serajevo. Vous avez vu quels furent ces renseignements et le ton de leurs articles.

Je tiens d'une source sûre que les cercles officiels allemands d'ici sont les plus hostiles contre nous. Ces cercles ont exercé une certaine influence sur la façon d'écrire des journaux de Vienne, particulièrement sur celle de la *Nouvelle Presse Libre*.

Ce journal est toujours animé d'un esprit anti-serbe à outrance. La *Nouvelle Presse Libre* qui a assez de lecteurs et d'amis dans les hauts cercles financiers et qui, lorsqu'il le faut, écrit suivant les instructions du Bureau de la presse de Vienne, résume l'affaire en quelques mots : « Nous devons régler nos affaires avec la Serbie par la force des armes; il est évident qu'il n'est pas possible d'y arriver par des moyens pacifiques. Et puisqu'on arrivera à la guerre plus tard, il vaut mieux en finir tout de suite! »



La Bourse est très mauvaise. Une pareille baisse n'a pas eu lieu depuis longtemps. Certains papiers ont baissé de 45 couronnes.

Veillez, etc.

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N° 23

*M. Jov. M. Jovanovitch, ministre à Vienne,  
à M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et  
ministre des Affaires étrangères.*

Vienne, le 2/15 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Président,

La chose qui doit le plus nous intéresser, c'est le geste que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois a l'intention de faire à propos de l'attentat de Serajevo. Jusqu'à présent, je n'ai pas pu me renseigner à ce sujet; mes collègues non plus. La devise est ici maintenant : « Ne rien communiquer à personne. »

Une réunion des ministres communs a eu lieu la semaine dernière à Vienne. On n'a pas appris beaucoup de choses sur les délibérations et les résultats de ce conseil. Le communiqué en fut court et peu clair. Il semble qu'on y a discuté longuement sur les conséquences de l'attentat de Serajevo, mais qu'aucune décision n'a été prise. On n'est pas sûr que le chef d'état-major général et le chef de la marine aient assisté à cette séance, comme on l'avait dit. Après cette séance, le comte Berchtold est allé à Ischl pour en rendre compte à l'Empereur qui y était reparti

après les funérailles de François-Ferdinand, dans un état de santé et d'esprit parfait. Au Parlement de Hongrie, Tisza a répondu aux interpellations de l'opposition sur l'événement de Serajevo; vous savez ce qu'il a dit. Son discours n'était pas clair; je pense qu'il n'était pas clair à dessein. D'aucuns y ont vu un ton rassurant pour le développement des choses et pour l'attitude du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, et d'aucuns, les intentions dissimulées pour—dirai-je—une action encore non décidée. On s'est aperçu qu'il ne fallait point s'aventurer avant de connaître les résultats de l'instruction. Après cela, un certain temps se passa; on parla, on discuta, on écrivit, on inventa, puis survinrent la mort de Hartwig et l'alarme du baron Giesl. A ce propos, de nouvelles interpellations furent adressées au comte Tisza au Parlement hongrois; vous avez lu sa seconde réponse également. Plusieurs personnes trouvent ici que ce discours est beaucoup plus rassurant que le premier et qu'il est dû à la lettre de l'Empereur. La Bourse est meilleure maintenant; les deux ministres de la Guerre et le chef d'état-major général sont partis en congé. Je m'abstiens de toute appréciation. Ce qui frappe dans ce dernier discours, c'est que l'hypothèse d'une guerre n'est pas exclue, au cas où les réclamations austro-hongroises au sujet des conséquences de l'attentat de Serajevo n'obtiendraient pas satisfaction.

Une chose est d'ores et déjà sûre : l'Autriche-Hongrie fera des démarches diplomatiques à Belgrade aussitôt que l'instruction aura été close à Serajevo, et l'affaire présentée au tribunal.

Veillez, etc.

N° 24

*M. Jov. M. Jovanovitch, ministre à Vienne,  
à M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et  
ministre des Affaires étrangères.*

Vienne, le 2/15 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Président,

On est d'avis ici que ni l'instruction, ni l'enquête sur l'attentat commis à Serajevo n'ont fourni de preuve suffisante pour qu'on puisse accuser la Serbie officielle; mais on croit que la Serbie sera accusée d'avoir toléré sur son territoire certains éléments révolutionnaires. On critique et on condamne dans les cercles diplomatiques d'ici les procédés du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, surtout l'attitude du *Correspondenz Bureau*, du Ballplatz et de la presse viennoise depuis l'attentat jusqu'aujourd'hui. Un très grand nombre de personnes approuvent notre attitude, la jugeant correcte et digne d'un pays sérieux. Elles désapprouvent seulement les articles de certains de nos journaux, quoiqu'elles reconnaissent toutes que ces articles ont été provoqués par la presse viennoise.

Bien qu'il paraisse que le ministère des Affaires étrangères allemand n'approuve pas la politique de Vienne contre la Serbie, l'ambassade d'Allemagne à Vienne encourage cette politique précisément en ce moment-ci.

Veillez, etc.

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N° 85

*M. Jov. M. Jovanovitch, ministre à Vienne, à  
M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et mi-  
nistre des Affaires étrangères.*

Vienne, le 2/15 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Président,

Quelles démarches seront faites? Sous quelle forme? Que va demander à la Serbie l'Autriche-Hongrie? Je ne crois pas qu'au Ballplatz même, on puisse répondre aujourd'hui à ces questions d'une manière claire et précise. Je pense que cela s'élabore maintenant et que le comte Forgach y est redevenu le facteur principal.

Dans un de mes rapports précédents, j'ai mentionné que l'Autriche-Hongrie avait à choisir entre deux voies : considérer l'attentat de Serajevo comme une affaire intérieure en nous invitant à lui prêter aide pour découvrir les coupables et les punir; ou bien faire de la tragédie de Serajevo un procès contre les Serbes et la Serbie et même contre la Jougo-slavie. A en juger par tout ce qui se prépare et ce qui se fait, il me semble que l'Autriche-Hongrie choisira cette seconde voie. Elle fera cela, convaincue qu'elle obtiendra l'approbation de l'Europe; pourquoi ne pas en profiter pour nous humilier et, jusqu'à un certain point, justifier le procès Friedjung et celui d'Agram? En outre, elle justifierait devant ses peuples et devant l'Europe les mesures sévères et réactionnaires qu'elle a l'intention de prendre dans le pays, pour réprimer la propa-

gande panserbe et l'idée jougo-slave. Enfin, ce Gouvernement croira faire quelque chose aussi en faveur de son prestige, convaincu que cela le relèvera à l'extérieur ainsi qu'à l'intérieur de la Monarchie.

Je pense que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois rédigera un mémoire, plutôt une accusation contre la Serbie. Dans cet acte d'accusation, on exposera tout ce qui a été recueilli contre nous depuis avril 1909 jusqu'aujourd'hui, et je crois que cet acte sera assez long. Cet acte d'accusation, il le transmettra aux cabinets des Puissances européennes, en ajoutant que les faits exposés lui confèrent le droit de faire à Belgrade des démarches diplomatiques et de demander que la Serbie remplisse à l'avenir toutes les obligations d'un voisin loyal. En même temps, le Gouvernement de Vienne nous remettra, à nous aussi, une note où sera consigné tout ce que la Monarchie dualiste désire que nous exécutions sans discussion.

Veillez, etc...

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N° 26

*M. le Dr M. Jovanovitch, chargé d'affaires à Berlin, à M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et ministre des Affaires étrangères.*

(Télégramme.)

Berlin, le 3/16 juillet 1914.

**Le secrétaire d'État m'a déclaré qu'il a acquis**

la conviction, d'après les rapports du ministre d'Allemagne à Belgrade, de l'existence d'une propagande pauserbe, que le Gouvernement devrait énergiquement réprimer, dans l'intérêt de ses bonnes relations avec l'Autriche-Hongrie.

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## N° 27

*M. M. S. Bochkovitch, ministre à Londres, à  
M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et mi-  
nistre des Affaires étrangères.*

(Télégramme.)

Londres, le 4/17 juillet 1914.

L'ambassade d'Autriche fait les plus grands efforts pour exciter la presse anglaise contre nous et la gagner à l'idée que la Monarchie doit donner une bonne leçon à la Serbie. L'ambassade remet aux rédactions les coupures de nos journaux comme preuves de la façon dont notre presse est rédigée. La situation peut s'aggraver au cours des semaines à venir. Il ne faut pas se fier aux déclarations pacifiques, bien calculées, des cercles austro-hongrois, car on prépare une pression sur la Serbie, qui peut se transformer en une attaque à main armée. Il est à croire que l'Autriche-Hongrie changera d'attitude et cherchera à humilier la Serbie, dès qu'elle aura fait une démarche à Belgrade.

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N° 28

*M. Ljoub. Michaillovitch, ministre à Rome, à  
M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et mi-  
nistre des Affaires étrangères.*

(Télégramme.)

Rome, le 4/17 juillet 1914.

J'ai des informations sûres que le marquis de San Giuliano a déclaré à l'ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie, qu'une démarche quelconque de l'Autriche-Hongrie, dirigée contre la Serbie et ne lui témoignant pas les égards dus par une nation à une nation, rencontrerait la réprobation de l'opinion publique en Italie; et que le Gouvernement italien tient à ce que l'entière indépendance de la Serbie soit maintenue.

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N° 29

*M. le Dr M. Spalaïkovitch, ministre à Petro-  
grad, à M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil  
et ministre des Affaires étrangères.*

(Télégramme.)

Petrograd, le 5/18 juillet 1914.

J'ai eu un entretien avec l'adjoint du ministre des Affaires étrangères au sujet de l'attitude provocante du *Correspondenz Bureau* de Vienne et de la presse austro-hongroise. M. Sazonoff m'a dit, il y a quelques jours, qu'il était étonné

que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois n'eût pris aucune mesure pour mettre fin à cette agitation stérile de la presse de Vienne qui aboutit à n'émouvoir personne et qui ne nuit qu'à l'Autriche-Hongrie.

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## N° 30

*M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et ministre des Affaires étrangères à toutes les Légations royales.*

(Télégramme.)

Belgrade, le 6/19 juillet 1914.

Dès l'attentat de Serajevo, la presse austro-hongroise a commencé à rejeter sur la Serbie la responsabilité de ce crime horrible qui, à son avis, était le résultat de l'idée panserbe. Elle a ensuite affirmé que cette idée avait été soutenue et propagée par les différentes associations comme « Narodna Odbrana », « Kolo Srpskih Sestara » (cercle des Sœurs serbes), etc..., que le Gouvernement serbe avait tolérées.

Cependant, dès l'arrivée de la nouvelle de l'attentat, la Cour et le Gouvernement serbes ont exprimé non seulement leurs condoléances, mais leur vive réprobation et leur horreur contre un tel crime. Toutes les réjouissances qui devaient avoir lieu ce jour-là à Belgrade furent suspendues.

Néanmoins la presse de la Monarchie voisine n'a cessé de rendre la Serbie responsable de l'événement de Serajevo. De plus elle a commencé à



ce propos à lancer différentes nouvelles tendancieuses et fausses qui ont provoqué la presse de Belgrade à y répondre, à se défendre et quelquefois à attaquer aussi, indignée de la voir dénaturer ainsi les événements. Voyant que c'est avec intention que la presse austro-hongroise attirait la presse de Belgrade dans cette discussion délicate et désagréable, le Gouvernement serbe s'est empressé de conseiller à la presse de Belgrade et même de lui recommander de garder le sang-froid et de se borner à démentir et à réfuter les fausses et tendancieuses nouvelles. Cette démarche du Gouvernement serbe est restée sans résultat auprès de certains journaux de moindre importance, surtout parce qu'on ne cessait de lancer de nouvelles inventions dont la tendance était d'exploiter l'attentat au point de vue politique, non seulement contre la Serbie, mais aussi contre les Serbes d'Autriche-Hongrie. Le Gouvernement serbe n'a pas été à même de mettre fin à cette polémique entre les presses serbe et austro-hongroise; la loi et même les clauses de la Constitution garantissent en Serbie l'entière liberté de la presse et interdisent toute mesure préventive et même la confiscation des journaux. Cette polémique a été cependant aggravée par ce fait que les journaux de Vienne et de Budapest avaient pris des extraits de certains de nos journaux, qui n'exercent aucune influence sur l'opinion publique, aggravé encore leur ton et, déformés de cette façon, les avaient répandus dans la presse étrangère dans le but évident d'émouvoir l'opinion publique dans les autres Etats européens et de représenter la Serbie comme coupable.

Ceux qui ont suivi cette polémique savent que

les journaux de Belgrade n'ont fait que se défendre et se borner à repousser des attaques, à réfuter des mensonges tendancieux. Les Gouvernements étrangers, occupés par d'autres affaires, n'ont pas eu le loisir de bien voir le but poursuivi par la presse austro-hongroise qui est d'émouvoir l'opinion publique dans la Monarchie et à l'étranger. Dès le commencement, le Gouvernement serbe s'est déclaré prêt à traduire devant les tribunaux tout sujet serbe dont il aurait été prouvé qu'il eût pris part à l'attentat de Serajevo. En outre, il a déclaré qu'il avait préparé un projet de loi pour rendre plus efficaces les mesures déjà prises contre tout abus d'explosifs. Ce projet de loi était déjà soumis au Conseil d'Etat, mais il n'a pas pu être présenté à la Skoupchtina, celle-ci ayant été dissoute. Enfin, le Gouvernement serbe a déclaré qu'il était prêt à l'avenir comme par le passé à remplir tous les devoirs de voisinage, auxquels l'oblige sa position d'Etat européen.

Depuis que l'attentat a été commis, le Gouvernement austro-hongrois ne s'est jamais adressé au Gouvernement serbe pour un concours quelconque au sujet de l'attentat. Il n'a réclamé pour aucun des complices ni l'ouverture d'une instruction ni la mise en jugement. Une seule fois, il a demandé des renseignements sur le domicile actuel de quelques élèves expulsés de l'École normale primaire de Pakrac, qui avaient passé en Serbie pour continuer leurs études. Tous les renseignements qui ont pu être recueillis à ce sujet lui ont été transmis.

Cependant la campagne contre la Serbie continuait dans la presse austro-hongroise, et on exci-

tait contre la Serbie l'opinion publique en Autriche-Hongrie et en Europe. On a poussé si loin dans cette voie que des chefs éminents de partis politiques en Autriche-Hongrie ont commencé à interpeller au Parlement au sujet de l'attentat, et que le Président du Conseil hongrois leur a répondu. Des discussions engagées à ce sujet, il apparaît que l'Autriche-Hongrie a l'intention de faire certaines démarches, mais on ne voit pas dans quel sens. On ne dit pas si les mesures prises, surtout les mesures militaires, dépendront de la réponse et de l'esprit de conciliation du Gouvernement serbe. De loin, on fait entrevoir la possibilité d'un conflit, au cas où le Gouvernement serbe ne pourrait pas donner une réponse catégorique et satisfaisante.

Lors de la mort subite du ministre russe Hartwig à Belgrade, au domicile du ministre d'Autriche, la polémique de presse a été encore ranimée; mais ce triste événement n'a provoqué aucun désordre, lors des funérailles. Cependant la légation d'Autriche-Hongrie, par suite de fausses nouvelles recues par elle, s'était émue à tel point, que les sujets austro-hongrois avaient commencé à se cacher dans des hôtels de Semlin et de Belgrade, et certains à la Légation même. Le jour de l'anniversaire du Roi, qui s'est passé dans un ordre parfait, le ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie, par l'intermédiaire du vice-consul Podgradski, m'a informé, vers 5 heures de l'après-midi, que des agressions contre la légation d'Autriche-Hongrie et contre les sujets austro-hongrois à Belgrade étaient projetées pour cette nuit même. Il m'a prié de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour la protection des sujets austro-hongrois et

de la Légation, en ajoutant qu'il rendrait la Serbie responsable de tout ce qui arriverait. Je lui ai répondu que le Gouvernement responsable du Royaume de Serbie n'avait aucun renseignement sur n'importe quels préparatifs de cette nature, mais que j'en informerais tout de même, sans retard, le ministre de l'Intérieur et lui demanderais en même temps de prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires. Le lendemain a démontré que la légation d'Autriche-Hongrie avait été trompée par de faux renseignements, étant donné qu'aucune agression n'a été tentée, aucun préparatif d'attaque n'ayant été fait. Néanmoins, la presse austro-hongroise a exploité cette affaire encore dans le but de prouver que l'opinion serbe est excitée et prête à tout. Elle est allée même plus loin et a essayé d'affirmer « qu'en effet quelque chose devait se passer, car M. Pachitch, lui-même, avait dit qu'il en avait entendu parler ». Tout cela démontre d'une façon évidente l'intention d'exciter l'opinion publique contre la Serbie dans chaque occasion et à propos de tout événement.

Si l'on prend en considération tout ce qui a été dit au Parlement hongrois au sujet de la tragédie de Serajevo, on aura des raisons de s'inquiéter et de croire qu'on prépare contre nous une démarche qui pourrait avoir des conséquences désagréables pour les relations entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie. Cette inquiétude est d'autant plus justifiée qu'il semble, d'après tout, que l'instruction ouverte ne se bornerait pas aux seuls coupables et aux complices éventuels de l'attentat, mais qu'elle engloberait aussi la Serbie et l'idée panslave.

Par son attitude et ses procédés, le Gouvernement serbe a donné des preuves irréfutables qu'il travaille à l'apaisement des esprits, dans l'intérêt de la paix et du maintien des bons rapports avec tous ses voisins. Il a donné surtout des preuves de son désir de régler et d'améliorer ses relations avec la Monarchie austro-hongroise qui, dans ces derniers temps, s'étaient refroidies, à cause de la guerre balkanique et des questions qui en ont découlé. Dans ce but, le Gouvernement serbe a procédé au règlement des chemins de fer orientaux, de nouveaux chemins de fer et du transit des produits austro-hongrois pour Constantinople, Sofia, Salonique et Athènes.

Le Gouvernement serbe considère que ses intérêts vitaux lui imposent que la paix et la tranquillité dans les Balkans soient consolidées au mieux et pour la durée la plus longue possible. Et c'est parce qu'il désire cela qu'il craint maintenant que la surexcitation de l'opinion publique en Autriche-Hongrie ne fournisse au Gouvernement austro-hongrois des motifs pour faire une démarche qui tendrait à humilier la dignité de l'Etat serbe et pour faire présenter des réclamations qui ne pourraient pas être acceptées.

C'est pour cela que j'ai l'honneur de vous prier de faire, auprès du Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité, tout ce qui est nécessaire pour qu'il prenne note de notre désir sincère de maintenir des relations amicales avec l'Autriche-Hongrie, et de réprimer sur notre territoire toute tentative pouvant porter atteinte à la tranquillité et à la sécurité de la Monarchie voisine. De même, nous accueillerons les réclamations de l'Autriche-Hongrie au cas où elle

demanderait que certains complices se trouvant en Serbie — s'il y en a, bien entendu — soient traduits devant nos tribunaux indépendants, pour être jugés.

Mais nous ne pourrions jamais accepter des réclamations qui iraient contre la dignité de la Serbie et que ne saurait accepter aucun État qui respecte son indépendance et qui veut la conserver.

Dans le désir de voir les bons rapports de voisinage avec la Monarchie dualiste se consolider et se maintenir, nous prions les Gouvernements amis de prendre note de notre déclaration et d'agir dans un esprit pacifique lorsque l'occasion se présentera ou lorsque le besoin l'exigera.

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N° 31

*M. Joo. M. Jovanovitch, ministre à Vienne, à  
M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil, ministre  
des Affaires étrangères.*

Vienne, le 7/20 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Président,

Il est très difficile, presque impossible d'apprendre ici quelque chose de positif sur les véritables intentions de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Le mot d'ordre pour tout ce qui se fait est d'en garder le secret absolu. A en juger par ce que nos journaux écrivent, on est optimiste à Belgrade en ce qui concerne nos rapports avec l'Autriche-Hon-

grie. Cependant, on ne peut pas être optimiste. Il n'est pas douteux que l'Autriche-Hongrie prépare quelque chose de sérieux. Ce qu'on devrait craindre le plus, et ce qui est très à croire, c'est qu'elle prépare une guerre contre la Serbie. La conviction générale ici est que ne rien faire cette fois-ci encore contre la Serbie équivaldrait pour l'Autriche-Hongrie à un véritable suicide. En outre, l'idée que la Serbie, après deux guerres, est complètement épuisée et qu'une guerre entreprise contre elle serait en fait une simple expédition terminée par une prompt occupation, a pris des racines encore plus profondes. On croit aussi qu'une telle guerre serait terminée avant que l'Europe ait pu intervenir.

Les préparatifs militaires qu'on est en train de faire, surtout sur la frontière serbe, prouvent que les intentions de l'Autriche sont sérieuses.

Veillez, etc.

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N° 32

*M. le baron Giesl de Gieslingen, ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade, à M. Laza Patchou, président du Conseil et ministre des Affaires étrangères par intérim.*

Belgrade, le 10/23 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de remettre à Votre Excellence la note ci-jointe que j'ai reçue de mon Gouverne-

ment et qui est adressée au Gouvernement du Royaume de Serbie.

Veuillez, etc.

Remis personnellement à 6 heures de l'après-midi.

« Le 31 mars 1909, le ministre de Serbie à Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, au Gouvernement impérial et royal, la déclaration suivante :

« La Serbie reconnaît qu'elle n'a pas été atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli créé en Bosnie-Herzégovine et qu'elle se conformera par conséquent à telle décision que les Puissances prendront par rapport à l'article 25 du traité de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des grandes Puissances, la Serbie s'engage dès à présent à abandonner l'attitude de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a observée à l'égard de l'annexion depuis l'automne dernier et elle s'engage, en outre, à changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers l'Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre désormais avec cette dernière sur le pied d'un bon voisinage. »

Or, l'histoire des dernières années et notamment les événements douloureux du 28 juin ont démontré l'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement subversif dont le but est de détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe, est arrivé à se manifester au delà du territoire du royaume par des actes de terrorisme, par une série d'attentats et par des meurtres.

Le Gouvernement royal serbe, loin de satis-



faire aux engagements formels contenus dans la déclaration du 31 mars 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement : il a toléré l'activité criminelle des différentes sociétés et affiliations dirigées contre la Monarchie, le langage effréné de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'attentats, la participation d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans des agissements subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans l'enseignement, toléré enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe à la haine de la Monarchie et au mépris de ses institutions.

Cette tolérance coupable du Gouvernement royal de Serbie n'avait pas cessé au moment où les événements du 28 juin dernier en ont démontré au monde entier les conséquences funestes.

Il résulte des dépositions et aveux des auteurs de l'attentat du 28 juin que le meurtre de Serajevo a été tramé à Belgrade, que les armes et les explosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient être munis leur ont été donnés par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes faisant partie de la « Narodna Odbrana » et enfin que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a été organisé et effectué par des chefs du service-frontière serbe.

Les résultats mentionnés de l'instruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement impérial et royal de poursuivre plus longtemps l'attitude de longanimité expectative qu'il avait observée pendant des années vis-à-vis des agissements de Belgrade propagés de là sur les territoires de la Monarchie. Ces résultats lui imposent au contraire le devoir de mettre fin à des menées qui

forment une menace perpétuelle pour la tranquillité de la Monarchie.

C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement impérial et royal se voit obligé de demander au Gouvernement serbe d'énoncer officiellement qu'il condamne la propagande dirigée contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage à supprimer, par tous les moyens, cette propagande criminelle et terroriste.

Afin de donner un caractère solennel à cet engagement, le Gouvernement royal de Serbie fera publier à la première page du *Journal Officiel* en date du 13/26 juillet l'énonciation suivante :

« Le Gouvernement royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels.

« Le Gouvernement royal regrette que ses officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé à la propagande susmentionnée et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvernement royal s'était solennellement engagé par ses déclarations du 31 mars 1909.

« Le Gouvernement royal, qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les

fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer. »

Cette énonciation sera portée en même temps à la connaissance de l'armée royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majesté le Roi et sera publiée dans le *Bulletin Officiel de l'Armée*.

Le Gouvernement royal serbe s'engage, en outre :

1° A interdire toute publication qui excite à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie et dont la tendance générale est dirigée contre son intégrité territoriale ;

2° A dissoudre immédiatement la Société dite « Narodna Odbrana », à confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande et à procéder de la même manière contre les autres sociétés et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent à la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise. Le Gouvernement royal prendra les mesures nécessaires pour que les sociétés dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activité sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme ;

3° A éliminer sans délai de l'enseignement public en Serbie, tant du corps enseignant que des moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie ;

4° A éloigner du service militaire et de l'administration en général tous les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables de propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et dont le Gouvernement impérial et royal se réserve de communi-

quer les noms et les actes au Gouvernement royal;

5° A accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement impérial et royal dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirigé contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie;

6° A ouvrir une enquête judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur le territoire serbe; des organes délégués par le Gouvernement impérial et royal prendront part aux recherches;

7° A procéder d'urgence à l'arrestation du commandant Voïa Tankositch et du nommé Milan Ciganovitch, employé de l'État serbe, compromis par les résultats de l'instruction de Serajevo;

8° A empêcher par des mesures efficaces le concours des autorités serbes dans le trafic illégal d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière; à licencier et punir sévèrement les fonctionnaires du service frontière de Chabatz et de Loznitza coupables d'avoir aidé les auteurs du crime de Serajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontière;

9° A donner au Gouvernement impérial et royal des explications sur les propos injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger qui, malgré leur position officielle, n'ont pas hésité, après l'attentat du 28 juin, à s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une manière hostile envers la Monarchie austro-hongroise;

10° Avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement impérial et royal de l'exécution des mesures précédentes.

Le Gouvernement impérial et royal attend la

réponse du Gouvernement royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi 25 de ce mois à 5 heures du soir.

Le mémoire relatif aux résultats de l'instruction ouverte à Serajevo, en ce qui concerne les fonctionnaires mentionnés sous les n<sup>os</sup> 7 et 8, est joint à cette note.

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L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le tribunal de Serajevo contre Gavriilo Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicité y relative, crime commis par eux le 28 juin dernier, a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations suivantes :

1<sup>o</sup> Le complot, ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son séjour à Serajevo, l'archiduc François-Ferdinand, fut formé à Belgrade par Gavriilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovitch, le nommé Milan Ciganovitch et Trifko Grabez, avec le concours du commandant Voïa Tankositch ;

2<sup>o</sup> Les six bombes et les quatre pistolets browning, au moyen desquels les malfaiteurs ont commis l'attentat, furent livrés à Belgrade à Princip, Cabrinovitch et Grabez par le nommé Milan Ciganovitch et le commandant Voïa Tankositch ;

3<sup>o</sup> Les bombes sont des grenades à main provenant du dépôt d'armes de l'armée serbe à Kragujevats ;

4<sup>o</sup> Pour assurer la réussite de l'attentat, Ciganovitch enseigna à Princip, Cabrinovitch et Grabez la manière de se servir des grenades et donna, dans une forêt près du champ de tir à Topchideré, des leçons de tir avec pistolets browning à Princip et à Grabez ;

grie étaient telles que le Gouvernement d'aucun pays indépendant ne pourrait les accepter en entier. Je lui ai exprimé l'espoir que le Gouvernement anglais pourrait agir auprès du Gouvernement austro-hongrois pour que ce dernier atténue ses réclamations. Je ne lui ai pas caché que j'étais inquiet, à cause des événements qui pourraient survenir.

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## N° 36

*M. le Dr N. Spalaïkovitch, ministre à Pétrograd,  
à M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et mi-  
nistre des Affaires étrangères.*

(Télégramme.)

Pétrograd, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.

En sortant du cabinet de M. Sazonow, à qui j'ai fait connaître le texte de l'ultimatum austro-hongrois, j'ai rencontré l'ambassadeur d'Allemagne. Il avait l'air d'être de très bonne humeur. Dans la conversation que j'ai engagée avec le comte de Pourtalès au sujet de la démarche austro-hongroise, je l'ai prié de m'indiquer la manière dont on pourrait sortir de la situation créée par l'ultimatum austro-hongrois. L'ambassadeur m'a répondu que cela ne dépendrait que de la Serbie, puisqu'il s'agit d'une question qui doit être réglée entre l'Autriche et la Serbie seules et dont personne autre ne pourrait se mêler. J'ai répondu au comte de Pourtalès qu'il se trompait et qu'il se convaincrail bientôt qu'il s'agissait non pas d'une

question entre la Serbie et l'Autriche, mais d'une question européenne.

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N° 37

*S. A. R. le prince héritier Alexandre  
à S. M. l'Empereur de Russie.*

(Télégramme.)

Belgrade, le 11/24 juillet 1914.

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois a remis hier soir au Gouvernement serbe une note concernant l'attentat de Serajevo. Consciente de ses devoirs internationaux, la Serbie, dès les premiers jours qui suivirent l'horrible crime, a déclaré qu'elle le condamnait et qu'elle était prête à ouvrir une enquête sur son territoire si la complicité de certains de ses sujets était prouvée au cours du procès instruit par les autorités austro-hongroises.

Cependant, les demandes contenues dans la note austro-hongroise sont inutilement humiliantes pour la Serbie et incompatibles avec sa dignité d'Etat indépendant. Ainsi on nous demande sur un ton péremptoire une déclaration du Gouvernement dans l'*Officiel* et un ordre du Souverain à l'armée où nous réprimerions l'esprit hostile contre l'Autriche, en nous faisant à nous-mêmes des reproches d'une faiblesse criminelle envers nos menées perfides. On nous impose ensuite l'admission de fonctionnaires austro-hongrois en Serbie pour participer avec les nôtres à

l'instruction et pour surveiller l'exécution des autres conditions indiquées dans la note. Nous avons reçu un délai de quarante-huit heures pour accepter le tout, faute de quoi la légation d'Autriche-Hongrie quittera Belgrade.

Nous sommes prêts à accepter les conditions austro-hongroises qui sont compatibles avec la situation d'un Etat indépendant, ainsi que celles dont l'acceptation nous sera conseillée par Votre Majesté; toutes les personnes dont la participation à l'attentat sera démontrée seront sévèrement punies par nous. Certaines, parmi ces demandes, ne pourraient être exécutées sans des changements de notre législation, ce qui exige du temps. On nous a donné un délai trop court. Nous pouvons être attaqués après l'expiration du délai par l'armée austro-hongroise qui se concentre sur notre frontière. Il nous est impossible de nous défendre et nous supplions Votre Majesté de nous donner son aide le plus tôt possible. La bienveillance précieuse de Votre Majesté, qui s'est manifestée tant de fois à notre égard, nous fait espérer fermement que, cette fois encore, notre appel sera entendu par son généreux cœur slave.

Eu ces moments difficiles, j'interprète les sentiments du peuple serbe qui supplie Votre Majesté de vouloir bien s'intéresser au sort du Royaume de Serbie.

ALEXANDRE.

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## N° 38

*M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et ministre des Affaires étrangères, à toutes les Légations royales.*

(Télégramme.)

Belgrade, le 12/25 juillet 1914.

J'ai communiqué aujourd'hui aux représentants des Etats amis les grands traits de la réponse du Gouvernement royal. Je leur ai dit que la réponse sera tout à fait conciliante et que le Gouvernement serbe acceptera toutes les réclamations austro hongroises dans la mesure où il sera possible de le faire. Le Gouvernement serbe espère que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, sauf dans le cas où il désirerait à tout prix la guerre, ne pourra qu'accepter la satisfaction complète que lui donne la réponse serbe.

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N° 39

*Réponse du Gouvernement royal serbe à la note de l'Autriche-Hongrie.*

Belgrade, le 12/25 juillet 1914.

Le Gouvernement royal serbe a reçu la communication du Gouvernement impérial et royal du 10/23 de ce mois et il est persuadé que sa réponse éloignera tout malentendu qui menace de

compromettre les bons rapports de voisinage entre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et le Royaume de Serbie.

Le Gouvernement royal a conscience que les protestations qui ont apparu tant à la tribune de la Skoupchtina nationale que dans les déclarations et les actes des représentants responsables de l'Etat, protestations auxquelles coupa court la déclaration du Gouvernement serbe faite le 18/31 mars 1909, ne se sont plus renouvelées vis-à-vis de la grande Monarchie voisine en aucune occasion et que, depuis ce temps, autant de la part des Gouvernements royaux qui se sont succédé que de la part de leurs organes, aucune tentative n'a été faite dans le but de changer l'état de choses politique et juridique créé en Bosnie-Herzégovine.

Le Gouvernement royal constate que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement impérial et royal n'a fait aucune représentation, sauf en ce qui concerne un livre scolaire, au sujet de laquelle représentation le Gouvernement impérial et royal a reçu une explication entièrement satisfaisante.

La Serbie a, à de nombreuses reprises, donné des preuves de sa politique pacifique et modérée pendant la durée de la crise balkanique, et c'est grâce à la Serbie et aux sacrifices qu'elle a faits dans l'intérêt exclusif de la paix européenne, que cette paix a été préservée.

Le Gouvernement royal ne peut pas être rendu responsable des manifestations d'un caractère privé telles que les articles des journaux et les agissements des sociétés, manifestations qui se produisent dans presque tous les pays comme une chose ordinaire et qui échappent en règle

générale au contrôle officiel — d'autant moins que le Gouvernement royal, lors de la solution de toute une série de questions qui se sont présentées entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, a montré une grande prévenance et a réussi, de cette façon, à en régler le plus grand nombre au profit du progrès des deux pays voisins.

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement royal a été péniblement surpris par les affirmations d'après lesquelles des sujets du Royaume de Serbie auraient participé à la préparation de l'attentat commis à Serajevo. Il s'attendait à être invité à collaborer à la recherche de tout ce qui se rapporte à ce crime et il était prêt, pour prouver par des actes son entière correction, à agir contre toutes les personnes à l'égard desquelles des communications lui seraient faites.

Se rendant donc au désir du Gouvernement impérial et royal, le Gouvernement royal est disposé à remettre aux tribunaux sans égard à sa situation et à son rang, tout sujet serbe, pour la complicité duquel, dans le crime de Serajevo, des preuves lui seraient fournies.

Il s'engage spécialement à faire publier à la première page du *Journal Officiel* en date du 13/26 juillet l'énonciation suivante :

« Le Gouvernement royal de Serbie condamne toute propagande qui serait dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels.

« Le Gouvernement royal regrette que cer-

tains officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé, d'après la communication du Gouvernement impérial et royal, à la propagande susmentionnée et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvernement royal s'était solennellement engagé par la déclaration du 18/31 mars 1909.

« Le Gouvernement, qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'une immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère qu'il est de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du Royaume que dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer. »

Cette énonciation sera portée à la connaissance de l'armée royale par un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majesté le Roi par S. A. R. le Prince héritier Alexandre, et sera publiée dans le prochain *Bulletin officiel de l'Armée*.

Le Gouvernement royal s'engage, en outre :

1° A introduire dans la première convocation régulière de la Skoupchtina une disposition dans la loi sur la presse par laquelle sera punie de la manière la plus sévère la provocation à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance générale sera dirigée contre l'intégrité territoriale de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

Il se charge, lors de la revision de la Constitution, qui est prochaine, de faire introduire dans l'article 22 de la Constitution, un amendement

de telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus puissent être confisquées, ce qui, actuellement, aux termes catégoriques de l'article 22 de la Constitution, est impossible ;

2° Le Gouvernement ne possède aucune preuve et la note du Gouvernement impérial et royal ne lui en fournit non plus aucune, que la société « Narodna Odbrana » et les autres sociétés similaires aient commis jusqu'à ce jour quelque acte criminel de ce genre par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Néanmoins, le Gouvernement royal acceptera la demande du Gouvernement impérial et royal et dissoudra la société « Narodna Odbrana » et toute autre société qui agirait contre l'Autriche-Hongrie ;

3° Le Gouvernement royal serbe s'engage à éliminer sans délai de l'instruction publique en Serbie tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, quand le Gouvernement impérial et royal lui fournira des faits et des preuves de cette propagande ;

4° Le Gouvernement royal accepte, du moins, d'éloigner du service militaire ceux dont l'enquête judiciaire aura prouvé qu'ils sont coupables d'actes dirigés contre l'intégrité du territoire de la Monarchie austro-hongroise ; il attend que le Gouvernement impérial et royal lui communique ultérieurement les noms et les faits de ces officiers et fonctionnaires aux fins de la procédure qui doit s'ensuivre ;

5° Le Gouvernement royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la portée de la demande du Gouvernement impérial et royal tendant à ce que la Serbie s'engage

à accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du Gouvernement impérial et royal.

Mais il déclare qu'il admettra toute collaboration qui répondrait aux principes du droit international et à la procédure criminelle, ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage ;

6° Le Gouvernement royal, cela va de soi, considère de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquête contre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, éventuellement, auraient été mêlés au complot du 15/28 juin et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du Royaume. Quant à la participation à cette enquête des agents des autorités austro-hongroises qui seraient délégués à cet effet par le Gouvernement impérial et royal, le Gouvernement royal ne peut pas l'accepter, car ce serait une violation de la Constitution et de la loi sur la procédure criminelle. Cependant, dans des cas concrets, des communications sur les résultats de l'instruction en question pourraient être données aux organes austro-hongrois ;

7° Le Gouvernement royal a fait procéder dès le soir même de la remise de la note à l'arrestation du commandant Voïa Tankositch. Quant à Milan Ciganovitch, qui est sujet de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et qui, jusqu'au 15/28 juin, était employé (comme aspirant) à la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore être joint. Le Gouvernement impérial et royal est prié de vouloir bien, dans la forme accoutumée, faire connaître le plus tôt possible les présomptions de culpabilité, ainsi que les preuves éventuelles de culpabilité qui ont été recueillies jusqu'à ce jour par l'enquête de Serajevo, aux fins d'enquêtes ultérieures ;

8° Le Gouvernement serbe renforcera et étendra les mesures prises pour empêcher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière. Il va de soi qu'il ordonnera tout de suite une enquête et punira sévèrement les fonctionnaires des frontières sur la ligne Chabatz-Loznitza qui ont manqué à leur devoir et laissé passer les auteurs du crime de Serajevo ;

9° Le Gouvernement royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les propos que ses fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, ont tenu après l'attentat dans des interviews et qui, d'après l'affirmation du Gouvernement impérial et royal, ont été hostiles à la Monarchie, dès que le Gouvernement impérial et royal lui aura communiqué les passages en question de ces propos, et dès qu'il aura démontré que les propos employés ont en effet été tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, propos au sujet desquels le Gouvernement royal lui-même aura soin de recueillir des preuves et convictions ;

10° Le Gouvernement royal informera le Gouvernement impérial et royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents en tant que cela n'a pas été déjà fait par la précédente note. A l'issitôt que chaque mesure aura été ordonnée et exécutée, dans le cas où le Gouvernement impérial et royal ne serait pas satisfait de cette réponse, le Gouvernement royal serbe, considérant qu'il est de l'intérêt commun de ne pas précipiter la solution de cette question, est prêt, comme toujours, à accepter une entente pacifique, en remettant cette question soit à la décision du tribunal international de La Haye, soit aux grandes puissances qui ont pris

part à l'élaboration de la déclaration que le Gouvernement serbe a faite le 18/31 mars 1909.

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N° 40

*M. le baron Giesl de Gieslingen, ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade, à M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et ministre des Affaires étrangères.*

Belgrade, le 12/15 juillet 1914, 6 heures de l'après-midi.

Monsieur le Président,

Étant donné que le délai fixé par la note que j'ai remise sur l'ordre de mon Gouvernement à Son Excellence M. Patchou avant-hier, jendi, à six heures de l'après-midi, a expiré, et que je n'ai pas reçu une réponse satisfaisante, j'ai l'honneur d'informer Votre Excellence que je quitte Belgrade ce soir avec le personnel de la légation impériale et royale.

La protection de la légation impériale et royale avec tout ce qui s'y rattache, avec ses annexes et ses archives, ainsi que la protection des sujets et intérêts autrichiens et hongrois en Serbie sont confiées à la légation impériale d'Allemagne.

Les chanceliers Ferdinand Jovanovitch et Milan Mekovitch, qui resteront à Belgrade, sont rattachés à la légation impériale d'Allemagne.

Enfin, je constate que, dès le moment où Votre Excellence aura reçu cette lettre, la rup-



ture des relations diplomatiques entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie revêtira le caractère d'un fait accompli.

Veillez, etc...

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N° 41

*M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et ministre des Affaires étrangères, à toutes les Légations royales.*

Belgrade, le 12/25 juillet 1914.

C'est aujourd'hui à 5 h. et 3/4 de l'après-midi que j'ai remis la réponse à la note austro-hongroise. Vous en recevrez ce soir le texte intégral. Vous y verrez que nous sommes allés jusqu'aux limites extrêmes où nous pouvions aller. Lorsqu'il a reçu la note, le ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a déclaré qu'il devait la comparer avec les instructions et qu'il donnerait immédiatement sa réponse. Dès mon retour au ministère, le ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie m'a informé par lettre qu'il n'était pas satisfait de notre réponse et qu'il quittera Belgrade ce soir même avec tout le personnel de la légation. Il remet au ministre d'Allemagne la protection de la légation avec tout le mobilier et les archives, ainsi que la protection des sujets et des intérêts austro-hongrois en Serbie. Enfin, il déclare que, par le fait de la remise de sa lettre, les relations diplomatiques entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie sont complètement rompues.

Le Gouvernement royal a convoqué la Skoupchtina pour le 14/27 juillet à Nich, où partent

dès ce soir tous les ministères avec leur personnel. Au nom du Roi, le Prince héritier a signé l'ordre de mobilisation de l'armée; demain ou après-demain, paraîtra une proclamation par laquelle les citoyens qui ne sont pas militaires seront invités à rester tranquillement chez eux, et les militaires à rejoindre leurs drapeaux et à défendre la Serbie selon leurs forces, au cas où elle serait attaquée.

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## N° 42

*M. le comte Léopold Berchtold, ministre des Affaires étrangères d'Autriche-Hongrie, à M. Jov. M. Jovanovitch, ministre de Serbie à Vienne.*

Vienne, le 12/25 juillet 1914.

Étant donné que la note que l'envoyé extraordinaire et ministre plénipotentiaire impérial et royal a remise au Gouvernement royal le 10/23 de ce mois, est restée sans réponse favorable, j'ai été contraint d'envoyer l'ordre au baron Giesl de quitter la capitale serbe et de remettre la protection des sujets de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale apostolique au ministre d'Allemagne.

Ayant le regret de voir par là se terminer les rapports que j'ai eu l'honneur d'entretenir avec vous, Monsieur le Ministre, je n'ai pu manquer de mettre à votre disposition les passeports ci-joints pour votre retour en Serbie et pour le retour du personnel de la légation royale.

Veillez, etc.

## N° 43

*Sa Majesté Impériale l'Empereur de Russie à  
Son Altesse Royale le Prince héritier de Ser-  
bie, Alexandre.*

(Télégramme.)

Petrograd, le 14/27 juillet 1914.

Votre Altesse Royale, en s'adressant à Moi dans un moment particulièrement difficile, ne s'est pas trompée sur les sentiments qui m'animent à Son égard et sur Ma sympathie cordiale pour le peuple serbe.

Ma plus sérieuse attention est attirée sur la situation actuelle et Mon Gouvernement s'applique de toutes ses forces à aplanir les présentes difficultés. Je ne doute point que Votre Altesse et le Gouvernement royal ne veuillent faciliter cette tâche en ne négligeant rien pour arriver à une solution qui permette de prévenir les horreurs d'une nouvelle guerre, tout en sauvegardant la dignité de la Serbie.

Tant qu'il y a le moindre espoir d'éviter une effusion de sang, tous mes efforts doivent tendre vers ce but. Si, malgré notre plus sincère désir, Nous ne réussissons pas, Votre Altesse peut être assurée qu'en aucun cas, la Russie ne se désintéressera du sort de la Serbie.

NICOLAS.

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## N° 44

*Son Altesse Royale le Prince héritier de Serbie  
Alexandre à Sa Majesté Impériale l'Empereur  
de Russie.*

(Télégramme.)

Nich, le 17/30 juillet 1914.

Profondément touché par le télégramme que Votre Majesté a bien voulu M'adresser hier, je m'empresse de La remercier de tout Mon cœur. Je prie Votre Majesté d'être persuadée que la cordiale sympathie dont Votre Majesté est animée envers Mon pays nous est particulièrement précieuse et remplit notre âme de l'espoir que l'avenir de la Serbie est assuré, étant devenu l'objet de la haute sollicitude de Votre Majesté.

Ces moments pénibles ne peuvent que raffermir les liens d'attachement profond qui unissent la Serbie à la sainte Russie slave et les sentiments de reconnaissance éternelle pour l'aide et la protection de Votre Majesté seront conservés précieusement dans l'âme de tous les Serbes.

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ALEXANDRE.

## N° 45

*M. le comte Léopold Berchtold, ministre des  
Affaires étrangères d'Autriche-Hongrie, à  
M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et mi-  
nistre des Affaires étrangères de Serbie.*

(Télégramme.)

Vienne, le 15/28 juillet 1914.

Le Gouvernement royal serbe n'ayant pas donné une réponse favorable à la note que le

ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie lui a remise le 23/10 juillet 1914, le Gouvernement impérial et royal se voit obligé de pourvoir lui-même à la protection de ses droits et intérêts et de recourir, dans ce but, à la force des armes. L'Autriche-Hongrie se considère donc, dès ce moment, en état de guerre avec la Serbie.

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N° 46

*M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et ministre des Affaires étrangères, à toutes les Légations royales.*

(Télégramme.)

Nich, le 15/28 juillet 1914.

Le Gouvernement de l'Autriche-Hongrie a déclaré la guerre aujourd'hui, à midi, par un télégramme en clair adressé au Gouvernement serbe.

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N° 47

*M. le Dr Spalaïkovitch, ministre à Petrograd, à M. S. D. Sazonow, ministre russe des Affaires étrangères.*

Petrograd, le 15/28 juillet 1914.

Excellence,

J'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que je viens de recevoir de M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil, ce télégramme urgent envoyé

de Nich aujourd'hui à 2 h. 10 dans l'après-midi.

« Le Gouvernement de l'Autriche-Hongrie a déclaré la guerre aujourd'hui, à midi, par un télégramme en clair adressé au Gouvernement serbe. »

« PACHITCH. »

En portant à votre connaissance l'acte qu'une grande Puissance a eu le triste courage de commettre vis-à-vis d'un petit pays slave qui vient à peine de sortir d'une longue série de luttes aussi héroïques qu'épuisantes, je prends la liberté, en une circonstance si grave pour mon pays, d'exprimer l'espoir que cet acte, qui brise la paix de l'Europe et révolte sa conscience, sera réprouvé par tout le monde civilisé et sévèrement puni par la Russie, protectrice de la Serbie.

Je prie Votre Excellence de vouloir bien porter devant le trône de Sa Majesté cette prière de tout le peuple serbe et de vouloir bien agréer l'assurance de mon dévouement et de mon respect.

Veuillez, etc.

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N° 48

*M. S. D. Sazonow, ministre des Affaires étrangères russe, à M. le Dr Spalatkovitch, ministre de Serbie à Petrograd.*

Petrograd, le 17/30 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 15/28 juillet, n° 527, par laquelle vous avez bien voulu me communiquer le télégramme de Son

Excellence M. N. Pachitch au sujet de la déclaration de guerre de l'Autriche-Hongrie à la Serbie. En regrettant sincèrement ce triste événement, je m'empresse de vous informer, Monsieur le Ministre, que je ne manquerai pas de soumettre à Sa Majesté l'Empereur la demande du peuple serbe, dont vous êtes l'interprète.

Veillez, etc.

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N° 49

*M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et ministre des Affaires étrangères, à M. le Dr Jovanovitch, chargé d'affaires à Berlin.*

(Télégramme.)

Nich, le 22 juillet/4 août 1914.

Je vous prie d'informer le Gouvernement impérial que vous avez reçu l'ordre de quitter l'Allemagne avec le personnel de la légation et du consulat. Je vous prie de partir sans retard.

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N° 50

*Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères serbe à la Légation d'Allemagne à Nich.*

Nich, le 24 juillet/6 août 1914.

Le Ministère royal des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur d'informer la Légation impériale d'Al-

Allemagne que, vu l'état de guerre existant entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, alliée de l'Allemagne, ainsi que l'état de guerre existant entre la Russie et l'Allemagne, alliée de l'Autriche-Hongrie, le Gouvernement royal serbe, se solidarissant avec la Russie et ses alliés, considère comme terminée la mission en Serbie de Son Excellence le baron Griesinger, envoyé extraordinaire et ministre plénipotentiaire d'Allemagne. Il prie Son Excellence de quitter, avec le personnel de la légation, le territoire de la Serbie et lui remet ci-joint les passeports nécessaires.

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## N° 51

*M. le Dr Jovanovitch, chargé d'affaires à Berlin, à M. Pachitch, président du Conseil et ministre des Affaires étrangères.*

Berlin, le 24 juillet/6 août 1914.

Lors de la visite que j'ai faite au sous-secrétaire d'Etat, M. Zimmermann, pour lui notifier la rupture des rapports diplomatiques, il m'a, entre autres choses, déclaré que l'Allemagne avait toujours été animée de sentiments amicaux envers la Serbie et qu'elle regrettait que les relations entre la Serbie et l'Allemagne, à cause des combinaisons politiques, dussent être rompues. Il tient la Russie, qui a sans cesse excité la Serbie, pour seule responsable des événements qui sont survenus et qui auront de lourdes conséquences



pour tous les peuples. Si la Russie n'avait pas, au dernier moment, alors qu'il paraissait déjà possible d'éviter un conflit armé, mobilisé toute sa force militaire, on n'en serait pas arrivé à la guerre, car l'Allemagne avait usé de toute son influence sur l'Autriche-Hongrie pour qu'elle s'entendit avec la Russie. Peut-être l'Autriche-Hongrie se serait-elle contentée d'occuper Belgrade, et alors des négociations se seraient engagées dans le but de régler les rapports austro-serbes.

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N° 52

*M. Jov. M. Jovanovitch, ministre à Vienne, à  
M. N. Pachitch, président du Conseil et mi-  
nistre des Affaires étrangères.*

Nich, le 3/16 août 1914.

Monsieur le Président,

Depuis le 17/30 juin, la légation de Serbie à Vienne a été assiégée par la police et la gendarmerie, et son personnel soumis sans cesse à la surveillance des fonctionnaires de la Sûreté. Nos mouvements et nos communications avec le monde extérieur furent rendus, comme vous pouvez le penser, considérablement plus difficiles; l'attitude de la rue avait quelque chose de menaçant envers la légation et son personnel.

Dès le commencement du mois de juillet, même les communications télégraphiques avec vous devinrent plus difficiles et les événements se sont

#### PAGES D'HISTOIRE

développés si vite que je n'ai pas pu vous communiquer certains détails relatifs à ce qui a précédé notre conflit armé avec l'Autriche-Hongrie. C'est pourquoi je le fais maintenant.

Jusqu'à la fin du mois de juin, il parut que toute l'affaire de Serajevo se développait normalement. Mais au commencement du mois de juillet un revirement s'opéra. Il n'y avait pas de signes patents de ce revirement : c'étaient plutôt des indices et des symptômes imprécis qui trahissaient certaines intentions dissimulées. Tout d'abord, les journaux de Vienne et de Budapest, sur les instructions du Bureau de la presse du ministère des Affaires étrangères, suspendirent la publication des informations sur le cours de l'instruction au sujet de l'attentat de Serajevo. Cette même presse commença à représenter toute l'affaire comme une question qui devait être réglée entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, éventuellement par la force des armes.

D'ailleurs, les grands journaux de Vienne recevaient des communications pareilles provenant de l'ambassade d'Allemagne; exception doit être faite pour le semi-officiel *Fremdenblatt* qui était, en général, plus modéré, comme aussi pour la *Zeit* et l'*Arbeiter Zeitung*.

A cette nouvelle attitude de la presse, vint s'ajouter un état d'insécurité de la Bourse tel qu'on n'en avait pas connu de pareil durant tout le cours des derniers événements dans les Balkans. Dans les conversations privées des hauts cercles financiers, on dénonçait le « compte à régler avec la Serbie », comme la seule issue de la crise générale, financière et économique, où l'Autriche-Hongrie était entrée depuis l'annexion de la Bos-

nie-Herzégovine. Puis, par une circulaire secrète, on ordonna le retrait graduel de la monnaie d'or et en même temps la hausse graduelle de son cours. On ne tarissait pas d'explications sur l'interruption du congé du ministre de la Guerre Krobatin et du chef d'état-major Hœtzendorf, sur leur retour et leur séjour à Vienne. Le chef d'état-major général était tantôt dans le Sud, tantôt dans l'Est, tantôt dans le Nord de la Monarchie, où il se rencontrait avec le chef d'état-major allemand, comte de Moltke, en Bohême, à Karlsbad, je crois.

Tous les réservistes, qui avaient été convoqués pour les manœuvres de juin en Bosnie-Herzégovine, furent maintenus sous les drapeaux. Les soldats des cadres en Autriche et en Hongrie obtenaient en nombre beaucoup plus considérable que d'ordinaire de courtes permissions dans le but de terminer les travaux des champs et autres, et les réservistes chargés des services administratifs dans l'armée étaient convoqués de plus en plus. Ajoutez les interpellations au Parlement hongrois et les réponses ambiguës du président du Conseil, le comte Tisza, un homme d'État qui, jusque-là, avait été très clair dans ses déclarations politiques.

L'attitude du Ballplatz fut la plus caractéristique. Les réceptions hebdomadaires chez le comte Berchtold furent suspendues. Tout d'un coup, les conversations au sujet de l'événement de Serajevo avec les représentants des États étrangers cessèrent, ou, lorsqu'on en parlait, c'était toujours comme par ordre et pour dissiper la crainte ou le doute que l'Autriche-Hongrie préparât une action sérieuse contre la Serbie. On y

avouait que certaines démarches seraient faites à Belgrade dès que les résultats de l'instruction ouverte au sujet de l'attentat de Serajevo en auraient suffisamment prouvé les attaches avec Belgrade. Mais, en même temps, on disait que ces démarches ne seraient pas telles qu'on dût s'en inquiéter beaucoup. L'ambassadeur de Russie qui, en l'absence du comte Berchtold, avait plusieurs fois causé à ce sujet avec le comte Forgach, n'a jamais pu saisir les véritables intentions de l'Autriche-Hongrie. M. Schébéko m'a dit que le comte Szapary, ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie à Petrograd, qui, pour des raisons de famille, se trouvait en Autriche-Hongrie, lui avait dit que les démarches qui seraient faites à Belgrade auraient le caractère conciliant. Le comte, d'après les dires de M. Schébéko à M. Sazonow, a donné l'assurance que la note que l'Autriche-Hongrie avait l'intention d'adresser à la Serbie serait telle que les Russes n'en seraient pas mécontents. M. Dumaine, ambassadeur de France, qui, sur l'ordre de son Gouvernement, avait attiré l'attention du Gouvernement de Vienne sur les complications qui pourraient surgir au cas où les réclamations éventuelles qu'on avait l'intention d'adresser à la Serbie ne seraient pas modérées, reçut du baron Macchio, premier chef de section au ministère des Affaires étrangères, la réponse que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois appréciait les démarches amicales et conciliantes de la France et que les conditions de la note à la Serbie seraient de nature à être acceptées par celle-ci sans grande hésitation. Je fis remarquer aux ambassadeurs des puissances de la Triple-Entente que de telles assurances pou-

vaient cacher les vraies intentions du Gouvernement austro-hongrois afin de mettre les puissances devant certains faits accomplis que l'Europe serait obligée d'accepter pour éviter une guerre générale.

Cependant, les procédés du Ballplatz eurent un certain succès, car tous mes collègues, que j'eus l'occasion de voir ces jours-là, croyaient à peine que l'Autriche-Hongrie voulût entreprendre une action sérieuse qui pût provoquer des complications européennes. Plusieurs membres du corps diplomatique étaient si confiants que, ces jours-là, ils faisaient des préparatifs pour leur départ en long congé ou dans les villes d'eaux.

Malgré tout, on savait qu'on préparait au ministère une note qui contiendrait les griefs et les réclamations de l'Autriche-Hongrie contre la Serbie. Ce travail fut confié au comte Forgach, ancien ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie en Serbie. On croyait généralement que, parmi les représentants étrangers, seul l'ambassadeur d'Allemagne, M. Tschirsky, avait été tenu au courant de ce travail, et j'ai eu des raisons de croire qu'il a même collaboré à la rédaction de la note. Aussi les représentants des États qui nous étaient favorables étaient-ils d'accord avec moi pour penser que, rédigée par ces deux auteurs, la note contiendrait des conditions très dures pour la Serbie, mais non pas telles qu'elle ne pût les accepter. Lorsque le texte de la note fut publié, ils en furent tous surpris, pour ne pas dire consternés.

Autant on a fait mystère avec soin du contenu de la note, autant on a caché la date où elle serait présentée. Le jour de la remise de l'ultimatum à Belgrade, l'ambassadeur de France eut, à ce

sujet, une longue conversation avec le premier chef de section au ministère des Affaires étrangères, le comte Berchtold s'étant trouvé de nouveau à Ischl. Or, le baron Macchio n'avait pas dit à M. Dumaine que ce jour-là, dans l'après-midi, la note serait remise à Belgrade et que le lendemain elle serait publiée par les journaux.

Lorsque le 11/24 juillet, au matin, les journaux viennois publièrent le contenu de la note que le baron Giesl avait remise au Gouvernement serbe, une inquiétude s'empara de nos amis et des amis de la paix européenne. C'est alors seulement qu'on comprit que de grands événements européens pourraient survenir, bien qu'on ne crût pas que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois eût l'intention de les provoquer. Ce sentiment fut fortifié par les violents articles de tous les journaux de Vienne, excepté le *Zeit* et l'*Arbeiter Zeitung*, ainsi que par les démonstrations de la rue qui prouvaient d'une façon évidente que la guerre — bien entendu une guerre contre la Serbie, — serait la solution la plus désirable.

Après deux, trois conversations que j'ai eues ce jour-là, je me suis rendu compte qu'un conflit armé entre la Serbie et la Monarchie était inévitable, même au cas où la Serbie accepterait toutes les conditions austro-hongroises, de la première à la dernière. L'attitude de la rue envers notre légation était déjà telle que je m'attendais même à des voies de fait contre le personnel de la légation.

L'ambassadeur de France aussi bien que celui d'Angleterre, et le chargé d'affaires de Russie considérèrent que la démarche du Gouvernement austro-hongrois était, non pas une simple

note, mais un ultimatum. Ils furent indignés de la forme aussi bien que du fond et du délai fixé par la note, et ils la jugèrent, eux aussi, inacceptable. Dans les conversations que j'ai eues avec eux au sujet de cette note, je leur expliquai qu'en particulier les passages relatifs à l'ordre du jour du Roi à l'armée, à la destitution des fonctionnaires et officiers, et surtout à la participation des fonctionnaires austro-hongrois à la « répression du mouvement existant en Serbie contre l'intégrité de la Monarchie », ne pourraient absolument pas être acceptés, étant contraires à la dignité et à la souveraineté nationales. Ce n'est qu'une guerre victorieuse, dis-je, qui pourrait amener l'acceptation de conditions aussi humiliantes pour un pays indépendant. A leur question : s'il ne valait pas mieux les accepter pour le moment et éviter la guerre, j'ai répondu que la note austro-hongroise, qui en fait était une déclaration de guerre à la Serbie, était rédigée de façon que, même au cas où la Serbie l'aurait acceptée sans aucune réserve, l'Autriche-Hongrie y aurait trouvé à tout instant des motifs pour faire entrer ses troupes en Serbie. C'est dans la conviction que le conflit resterait limité à nous deux qu'elle avait rédigé une telle note.

M. Dumaine, Sir Maurice de Bunsen et le prince Koudacheff, chargé d'affaires russe, furent surpris de cette note inattendue, autant qu'inquiets des complications qu'elle menaçait d'amener. Avant la remise de la note austro-hongroise, M. Schébéko, ambassadeur de Russie, avait dit à plusieurs reprises à ses collègues que la Russie ne pourrait pas rester indifférente à une démarche

de l'Autriche-Hongrie qui tendrait à humilier la Serbie. Cette opinion, il l'avait ouvertement exprimée au Ballplatz. D'où, l'inquiétude chez les ambassadeurs qui envisageaient la possibilité d'une guerre entre la Russie et l'Autriche-Hongrie.

Le lendemain du jour où la note fut remise à Belgrade, le prince Koudacheff alla en parler au comte Berchtold. A sa déclaration que la note, telle quelle, était inacceptable et que la Russie ne pouvait pas regarder avec indifférence une humiliation de la Serbie, le comte Berchtold répondit que l'Autriche-Hongrie s'était trouvée forcée de faire une telle démarche en Serbie, son existence même étant mise en question, que l'Autriche-Hongrie ne pourrait pas renoncer à ses démarches ni changer les conditions de la note, et qu'elle estimait que ce différend ne regardait que la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire qu'aucune autre puissance n'avait de raisons de s'en mêler.

Cette réponse du comte Berchtold ne laissait pas de doutes sur l'intention de l'Autriche-Hongrie d'infliger une correction à main armée à la Serbie, sans jugement de l'Europe l'y autorisant. Des conversations que j'ai eues alors avec les ambassadeurs des puissances de la Triple-Entente, — qui, durant ces jours pénibles, furent à tous égards accueillants et bienveillants envers moi et envers le personnel de la légation, — il ressortait clairement que, du moment où elle s'était décidée à adresser cette note qui signifiait sans aucun doute la guerre, l'Autriche-Hongrie avait reçu des assurances et même acquis la conviction que le conflit serbo-austro-hongrois serait localisé. De même, il était clair que l'Autriche-



Hongrie avait été confirmée dans cette conviction particulièrement et peut-être uniquement par M. Tschirsky, ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Vienne. M. Tschirsky était seul à penser et à dire ouvertement que la Russie se tiendrait tranquille pendant que l'Autriche-Hongrie infligerait la punition (*Strafexpedition*) à la Serbie. Il assurait que le ministre des Affaires étrangères de Russie viendrait facilement à bout des panslavistes, comme l'année précédente, et que la Russie n'avait aujourd'hui aucun intérêt à soulever tant de questions épineuses qui la touchent de plus près en Europe et en Asie. Selon lui, il était nécessaire qu'une leçon fût donnée à la Serbie. La Russie n'avait aucun droit d'intervenir. Quant à l'Allemagne, il déclarait qu'elle avait pleine conscience de ce qu'elle faisait, en appuyant l'Autriche-Hongrie dans sa démarche.

Ce langage de M. Tschirsky a fait penser à beaucoup de personnes que c'est l'Allemagne qui a voulu provoquer la guerre européenne, car, bien auparavant, on a dit et même écrit à Vienne qu'il fallait faire la guerre à la Russie avant qu'elle fût prête au point de vue militaire, c'est-à-dire avant le printemps de 1917 : « Plus on remet l'affaire, moindres seront les chances des puissances de la Triple-Alliance. » Cependant, de Berlin, de sources diplomatiques, les plus authentiques nouvelles me parvenaient que la Wilhelmstrasse n'approuvait pas l'action de l'Autriche-Hongrie dans cette question et que M. Tschirsky avait outrepassé ses instructions.

A son retour de Petrograd, M. Schébéko, ambassadeur de Russie, multiplia ses efforts auprès du Ballplatz, afin d'obtenir prolongation du ceurt

délai fixé au Gouvernement serbe pour sa réponse à la note austro-hongroise, et de trouver le moyen d'arriver à un échange d'idées sur l'ensemble du différend entre Vienne et Petrograd; mais ces efforts restèrent sans succès jusqu'au 13/26 juillet, jour de notre entrevue. Par la conversation que j'eus alors avec lui, je compris qu'à Petrograd la note austro-hongroise était considérée, dans le fond et dans la forme, comme une provocation adressée à la Russie, non pas à la Serbie, et que la Russie ne souffrirait pas l'humiliation de la Serbie, dût-elle s'exposer à une guerre.

Le jour de mon départ de Vienne, M. Schébéko me dit que, en dépit de toutes les grandes difficultés, il y avait des chances pour qu'on trouvât à Petrograd, entre le Gouvernement russe et le comte Szapary, une solution quelconque qui empêcherait l'ouverture du conflit. D'autre part, dès que l'on apprit à Vienne que le conflit austro-serbe pouvait provoquer une guerre entre la Russie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, on commença à s'en inquiéter.

# ANNEXE

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## *Déclarations de M. Giolitti à la Chambre italienne (1)*

5 décembre 1914.

« ... Comme je tiens pour nécessaire que la loyauté de l'Italie dans l'observation des pactes internationaux soit au-dessus de toute discussion, je me sens obligé de rappeler un précédent qui démontre que l'interprétation donnée par notre Gouvernement à nos traités, au début du conflit, était exacte et qu'elle a été admise comme vraie par les Puissances alliées elles-mêmes.

« Au cours de la guerre balkanique, précisé-ment le 9 août 1913, étant absent de Rome, j'ai reçu de mon collègue, l'hon. Di San Giuliano, le télégramme suivant :

« L'Autriche nous a communiqué, ainsi qu'à  
« l'Allemagne, son intention d'agir contre la

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(1) Il semble qu'il y ait également eu une démarche symétrique de l'Autriche auprès de la Roumanie en mai 1913. M. Take Ionesco a formellement déclaré qu'il en avait trace dans un télégramme adressé par le comte Berchtold au prince de Fürstenberg et communiqué par lui au chef du Gouvernement roumain. Les démentis officiels auxquels cette révélation a donné lieu de la part de l'Autriche ne nous permettent pas de lui donner place dans ce recueil sous forme d'un texte officiel.

« Serbie et elle définit cette action une action  
« défensive, espérant appliquer à la Triple-Alliance le *casus foederis*, que je crois inapplicable. Je cherche à concerter avec l'Allemagne des efforts en vue d'empêcher cette action autrichienne; mais il pourrait être nécessaire de dire clairement que nous ne considérons pas cette action éventuelle comme défensive et que, par conséquent, nous ne croyons pas que le *casus foederis* existe. Je te prie de me télégraphier à Rome si tu approuves. »

« — J'ai répondu ainsi :

« Si l'Autriche agit contre la Serbie, il est évident que le *casus foederis* n'existe pas. C'est une action qu'elle entreprend pour son propre compte; car il n'est pas question de défense, puisque personne ne songe à l'attaquer. Il est nécessaire que cela soit déclaré à l'Autriche de la façon la plus formelle et il est à souhaiter que l'action de l'Allemagne dissuade l'Autriche de cette périlleuse aventure. »


« C'est ce qui fut fait; et l'interprétation donnée par nous eut le consentement de nos alliés avec lesquels nos rapports d'amitié ne furent pas le moins du monde troublés. La déclaration de neutralité faite au début du présent conflit est donc conforme à l'esprit et à la lettre des traités. J'ai voulu rappeler ce fait parce que je juge utile qu'il apparaisse aux yeux de toute l'Europe que l'Italie a été complètement loyale. »

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
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